SOUTHEAST ASIA SERIES Vol. XXII No. 4 (Thailand)

A NOTE ON THAILAND

The Student Rebellion and Political Change

by Brewster Grace July 1974

Introduction In the immediate aftermath of Thailand's "October revolution," the focus of the political In October 1973 Thailand took a single but pos- struggle has not been simply on drafting and pro- sibly monumental step toward democracy, an un- mulgating a democratic constitution and estab- usual event in a region where political development lishing parliamentary government to replace has been increasingly towards military regimes or Thanom's rule by executive decree. Rather, the authoritarian civilian governments. But unlike central issues have concerned whether parlia- South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines- mentary government can function effectively at a where civil rights have suffered in recent years- time of growing economic uncertainty and confron- civilians in Thailand are demanding greater polit- tation, when political consciousness is growing, and ical participation, a wider distribution of wealth, when traditional, entrenched military interests are and a stronger voice in the international commu- under threat. Thus the next steps towards democ- nity. Before October 1973, wealth and power had racy in Thailand can be expected to be even shakier been in the hands of a very small military, bureau- than the first, and fewer people would be surprised cratic, and business elite in Bangkok. The massive by another coup d'ittat than were surprised by student-inspired demonstrations in October, how- events last October. ever, challenged this control, and led to the sudden Thailand's Political Legacies and unexpected political collapse and exile of three of Thailand's most prominent and unpopular mili- Abrupt change of government is not unusual in tary leaders: Prime Minister General Thanom Thailand. Since the abolition of the absolute mon- Kittikachorn, his Deputy Prime Minister and Min- archy in 1932, there have been 15 governments, ister of the Interior Field Marshal Prapass Charu- most of which have been dominated by the military, sathiara, and his ambitious son Colonel Narong eight constitutions, and eight coup d'ittats. The last Kittikachorn. constitutional government fell in 1971 when Field Marshal Thanom dismissed an elected national Whether second and subsequent steps will be assembly and established a military controlled taken towards real democratic rule is by no means "National Executive Council." As President of the assured, although students and civilian politicians Council he and his Deputy President, General pressing for change have not lost many initiatives Prapass, governed Thailand. It was a bloodless and since the fall of the Thanom regime. Despite their virtually undisputed seizure of power. Those who factional disputes and political differences, the welcomed it-many of Bangkok's commercially "democratic forces," have led farmers' protest active elite and middle class-saw it as preferable groups to Bangkok, demanded fewer military and to government by an ineffective legislature. Those more economic initiatives in the "sensitive," insur- who would have opposed it--democrats, liberals, gent-dominated rural areas of Thailand, contacted progressives-were so small in number and so insurgent leaders in the northeast, supported politically unorganized that any resistance short of striking workers, and traveled through the country- joining an insurgency was unthinkable. side in an effort to politicize the peasantry in Thai- land's traditionally apolitical society. Such activity Since 1932, political control in Thailand has has been rare in recent Thailand history. characteristically resided almost exclusively with

Copyright @ 1974, American Universitips Field Staff, Inc. [BG-3-'741 those who have wealth and power. And political more remote regions of the country. Not only does participation, or at least political awareness, has the government have difficulty in gaining access to been confined to Bangkok's middle class. This has large portions of entire provinces but the rebellions meant, with few exceptions, that Thailand has been also challenge the professional credibility of the governed by a small elite-perhaps 10-15 per cent military. The latter is considered all the more of Thailand's 32 million people-drawn from the serious because to an unknown degree communist military brass, the upper echelons of the cadres have had some role in organizing the rebel- bureaucracy, and the super rich in the business lions. community. These men have accumulated enor- Rural, ethnic Thais may have elected political mous wealth through power and achieved enor- passivity for reasons of economic expediency, but mous power through wealth. the minority groups often rebel for reasons of eco- nomic abuse and neglect. This is reflected in part in There are a number of fundamental economic the nature of resistance activity. In the south, and social reasons that have helped sustain elite resistance has ranged from outright banditry to domination of their politics. First, the peasantry banditry A la Robin Hood to something close to a has scarcely emerged from its pre-1932 feudal secessionist struggle. In the north and northeast the world, its physical and mental isolation from the rebels style themselves "liberators" and have re- commercial and political activity concentrated in sorted to armed struggle against pacification Bangkok. And while administrative channels exist efforts by the Thai. In all cases the resistance is re- to carry directives to the peasantry via Bangkok- portedly against extortion by military and police oriented and -controlled provincial authorities, officials. The Thai military, even considering se- there are no effective vehicles for the expression of curity alone, might well be alarmed. peasant opinion in Bangkok. The peasantry's isola- tion, moreover, has been compounded by its im- With the lower classes of Thais either having poverishment. While the commercialization of rice been left out or locked out of politics only the agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth cen- middle class, largely in Bangkok, has served even tury brought great wealth to Bangkok, it trapped as a limited political constituency for the ruling Thailand's predominantly subsistence farmers in elite. Its low level of participation may partly be heavy indebtedness, perpetuating their subser- due to the fact that life in Bangkok has been good vience to merchants and landlords. since the mid 1950s. Artisans, tradesmen, business- Second, industrialization has made slow progress men, and government clerks have generally bene- in Thailand, and thus the creation of a nonagricul- fited from laissez-faire policies and a low rate of tural work force is of recent origin. In 1953 only 3 inflation. The domestic price of rice, for example, to 4 per cent of the total work force were urban has been kept artificially low by means of a stiff blue-collar workers, increasing rather rapidly to export premium. The premium also keeps farm about 10 per cent by 1970. A substantial number of prices down, suggesting that the middle class lives these are poorly paid female and even child laborers well at the expense of the farmers. Politically, the in Bangkok's burgeoning textile and light elec- rice premium symbolizes the domination of the tronic factories. Combined with the almost total rural majority by Bangkok's mainly middle class prohibition of any labor organization over the past elite. 15 years, these factors have tended to inhibit the development of a politically conscious urban pro- There have been few efforts to challenge the letariat. status quo. In the early 1950s the Chinese commu- nity, which makes up a good portion of the middle Third, the rebellions by the hill tribes in the class, agitated for political reforms but the issues north, the Lao and Vietnamese in the northeast, were ultimately communal and nationalist and and the Malays in the south represent serious often more related to developments in China than political threats to central government control of in Thailand. Other exceptions have occurred when any type, and their persistence has long provided constitutional government allowed for parlia- justification for a significant military role in mentary politics. Then outspoken and strongly politics. But the Thai military, with substantial socialist politicians campaigned for the resolution American support, has been only partially success- of grievances in the northeast. There have also ful in containing resistance to Bangkok authority in been a handful of courageous and persistent Children in a northeastern Thai village.

The implements used in northeast Thailand for pounding rice meal to make noodles.

Houses on stilts in north- east Thailand. Home indlustry in a north- east Thai village. At left woman w,eaves her own sarong.

Bangkok socialist politicians whose reformist causes and careers sometimes go back to the orig- inal constitutional government of 1932. Addition- ally, there have been a few intellectuals and jour- nalists who have kept writing social and economic critiques for an admittedly limited audience of stu- dents and other intellectuals.

The student rebellion, of course, is the latest and perhaps most dramatic exception to middle class complacency. But whether it is a harbinger of fundamental change is a matter now for little more than speculation.

The Bureaucratic Monolith

Bangkok's bureaucracy has been the center of power ever since the Thai monarchy decided in the middle of the nineteenth century to establish a gov- ernmental administration to develop Thai agriculture. Its central pillar has been the Ministry of Interior, under whose authority have come all provincial officials-as far down as district chief. This vast array of civil servants is a network for communicating directives downward from the core of senior bureaucrats and transmitting expressions of respect, loyalty, and government revenue upward from the local level officials. Lower ranking bureaucrats traditionally avoid initiative at all costs. At the very bottom are the peasants whose obedience to the bureaucratic behemoth has been a has taken place within the power elite-military cultural norm and economic expediency. and commercial-and until the October 1973 student rebellion, there was no doubt that the Closely allied to the bureaucracy have been the military had kept the upper hand whether formally predominantly Chinese commercial elite. Periodic- ally subject to Thai nationalist attempts to exercise in or out of office. Its net effect has been predomi- some control over their vast network of enterprises, nantly economic, insuring that most of the gains the Chinese have had to allow the top government and opportunities of postwar growth are reserved officials a piece of the action. Not to do so would for a small portion of the population. endanger licensing agreements, favorable import and export quotas, and government contracts. A The Student Rebellion highly successful accommodation has evolved. Gov- ernment officials sit on the boards of directors of The student rebellion which eventually focused private enterprises, and Chinese serve as manage- on returning Thailand to constitutional democracy ment in the state enterprises and government mo- was in fact the outcome of dissent over a number of nopolies originally established to keep some issues during the previous year. Military poaching economic activity out of Chinese hands. On the in a national forest reserve, the expulsion of nine boards of directors of these enterprises, of course, students at Ramkhamhaeng "open" University for sit both senior government officials and leading publishing a sharp satire of Prapass-these and businessmen, Thai and Chinese. other events had brought students and the Thanom regime into progressively sharper confrontation. Control of Thai society and economy does not The regime's responses to student attacks were come for the asking. The military has seized it ambiguous. On the one hand Thanom promised a through coup d'6tats and the positioning of its most constitution; on the other he threatened to suppress powerful officers as cabinet members, ministers, or further student political activism. During the year senior civil servants. Their interests have combined of Thanom's and Prapass's vaguely conciliatory the traditional interests of the military with that of policies, Thai students became increasingly polit- profit making, The former is evident in one of the icized and developed considerable solidarity. stated purposes of the 1947 army-led coup d'Ctat: Under the aegis of the National Student Center of "to exonerate the honor of the Army which had Thailand (NSCT), students molded, in effect, a been trampled underf~ot."~The latter is evident in genuine movement and organization. the enormous wealth military leaders have taken with them at the end of their political reigns: Sarit The day-to-day issues sustaining the student Thanarat's estimated personal wealth on his death movement, however, were only the tip of the ice- in 1963 was around $150,000,000 and Thanom, berg. Underneath Thailand's troubled political Prapass, and Narong left at least $25,000,000 in waters lay more fundamental sources of student known assets (and possibly twice as much) when unrest. First, higher education in Thailand in fleeing Thailand in October 1973. recent years has undergone massive change. Quan- titatively this is symbolized in the development of Civilian interests have also pursued power, some- Ramkhamhaeng University with its open class- times contesting and sometimes cooperating with rooms allowing an enrollment of 50,000. In fact, all the military, but operating through political parties Thai universities have grown in size, although by no and sustaining pressures for constitutional democ- racy. The Democratic Party, for example, espouses means as rapidly. This has produced demands for liberal economic philosophies which coincidentally an expansion of employment opportunities reflect the commercial interests of Bangkok's appropriate for B.A.s and M.A.s. Some of these business elite. It has been closely aligned with the have been overtrained in specialized, sophisticated Throne. Its parliamentary opposition has been the skills. While not much data are available on Socialist Front. It has resisted royal power, tended employment, it is apparent that the market has not toward a more progressive economic policy, and kept up with the supply. Similarly, the increasingly pressed for administrative reforms to eliminate eco- higher quality of academic training seems to have nomic abuses. Even this amount of political activity given students a more perceptive and critical awareness of the weaknesses in various government 1. As quoted in David Wilson, Politics in Thailand, (Ithaca: policies. Thus the increase in both the quality and Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 177. quantity of education has contributed to growing frustrations as reality fails to conform to expecta- National Security Council decree forbidding the tions. gathering of more than five persons for political purposes.2 Prapass elevated the confrontation by When the moral and political corruption of asserting that the students had been involved in a Thanom, Prapass, and Narong are taken into subversive plot to overthrow the government. Faced account, student actions become even more under- with potential charges of treason, the National Stu- standable. In terms of sheer wealth, Prapass dent Center of Thailand immediately responded appears to have been the more guilty, or at least the with a demonstration of about 150,000 students de- more successful, of the two. Much of the manding the release of the "Bangkok 13" and a $25,000,000 he left in Thailand were in shares and return to constitutional government. The Thanom- investments in various enterprises. Even though he Prapass government ultimately agreed in an effort claims all of it was acquired legally, there will cer- to get the students off the streets. tainly be a strong tax suit against him, if the assets are not simply confiscated. Such wealth could only But tensions were as high as the number of stu- have come through collaboration with private busi- dents. Riot police made an as yet unexplained nesses, as described above, and as a result of attack on a large group of demonstrators trying to directors fees from state enterprises. Prapass was disperse near the Royal Palace several hours after chairman of eight such enterprises from which he the release of the "Bangkok 13." The attack reputedly earned $10,000 per month. Colonel sparked violent reactions by the students and trans- Narong Kittikachorn, Thanom9sson and Prapass's formed the demonstration into a rebellion. The son-in-law, also left considerable funds behind. It is estimated 400,000 students and their sympathizers generally believed these were derived in part by first smashed cars and buses, then focused on some plundering Thailand's timber reserves and, it is of the more onerous symbols of Thanom-Prapass rumored, from Thailand's huge opium trade. All of power and corruption: The Revenue Department, this was known to the students and a source of the National Lottery Board, the Board of genuine disgust, but open confrontation on these Inspection and Follow-up of Government Opera- issues was unthinkable, as Thanom and Prapass tions (an immensely corrupt operation used exten- had too much power. sively by Colonel Narong Kittikachorn), and several police stations. It should also be noted that this abuse of the nation's wealth was, in the eyes of many students, Thanom, Prapass, and Narong called on the adding insult to the perceived injury done to social army to put down the rebellion. Some of the mili- justice by the continued concentration of wealth. A tary simply failed to appear and others refused to number of factors were at work in sharpening these fire on the students, lending credence to the im- perceptions. Not the least important was the pression that the Commander-in-Chief of the growing number of Thai graduate students re- Army, General Kris Sivara, was involved. Along turning from the United States where they were in- with officers from other branches of the service, he fluenced by the antiwar movement and the radical refused to intervene. Instead, General Kris is said social critique it helped to stimulate and popu- to have remarked that the student demonstrators larize. At the same time, student political con- were the sons and daughters of the government sciousness elsewhere in the world has tended to elite. And, indeed, many were. shift to the left, with increased emphasis on in- equalities between industrialized and Third World It will probably be long debated whether the re- countries. It is not in the least surprising, therefore, fusal of the army to intervene was the fatal blow to that there should have emerged in Thailand over Prapass and Thanom. Some argue that the King's the past few years a politicized student leadership support of the students was of at least equal able to attract larger numbers of student activists. influence, undermining the regime's legitimacy and It would have been inconceivable for students not authority. Certainly both King Bhumidol and Gen- to enter the larger political arena at some point. eral Kris and his supporters emerged as more

- The students' "cause cCl6bre" came in October 2. The student movement and demonstrations have been 1973 when the government arrested 13 student and described at some length and need not be repeated here. faculty members of the "Movement Calling for a See, for example, Robert Shaplen, Letter from Thailand," New Constitution" charging them with violating a The New Yorker (January 14, 1974), pp. 67-83. powerful figures in the present political maneuver- the Privy Council. The Privy Council is appointed ing. by the King. This arrangement could conceivably allow for minority governments. Finally, there are But the student rebellion itself is the central fact of Thai politics today. It has established two dra- no provisions for the supreme court to rule on the constitutionality of parliamentary enactments. matic and portentous precedents. For the first time in postwar Thailand a civilian movement has been The draft constitution is a disappointment to the undoing of a government. Significantly, civil- progressive students. Other, more moderate ians acted in spite of Thanom's and Prapass's students, however, maintain that such a constitu- frequent and vociferous assertions that it was all a tion is necessary to ease the political transition communist plot, a charge once sufficient to dis- from previous dictatorships to democracy. The fact credit any civilian political movement. remains that Thailand's ninth constitution is its most conservative. It does not concern itself directly Second, the student success has created a power with nor provide the machinery for the restruc- vacuum in Thai politics. The new Prime Minister turing of economic opportunities. Rather, it is pri- appointed by the King, Sanya Dhammasak, a marily a guide to the management and operations modest university professor, was acceptable to of a parliamentary government. The National almost everyone. But ultimately he can only be a Assembly which has responsibility for its final ver- "caretaker," unable to undertake significant new sion and promulgation consists of 94 civil servants, initiatives to solve economic and social problems. 37 professors and teachers, 33 politicians, 36 mili- Thus the government lingers in limbo awaiting the tary and police officers, 21 businessmen (one of coalescence of new civilian politicians into viable them is a taxi driver), 8 lawyers, 13 journalists and units under a new constitution and elections. It is a writers, and only 11 village chiefs and two farmers. dangerous moment for Thailand. Should the un- certainty prevail too long, economic and social The drafting of the constitution has only been deterioration might seriously jeopardize oppor- one of several issues dividing moderate and mili- tunities for reform reflecting the recently expressed tant students and threatening the unity built up aspirations for social justice. by the NSCT before the rebellion. The Center's leader in the early demonstrations, Sombat Tham- Post-Rebellion Initiatives rongthanyawong, was replaced in the final stages The Draft Constitution. Prime Minister Sanya by Saeksan Prasertkul. After the rebellion Saeksan has a critical, if temporary, role. He must oversee found the NSCT to be lacking in commitment to the creation and promulgation of a new constitu- reform Thailand's unequal social system and left to tion, then turn over the reins to a duly elected gov- form his more militant Federation of Independent ernment. Thus, a constitutional drafting committee Students of Thailand (FIST). Thus recent student was established almost immediately and has initiatives and expressions of an activist philosophy already submitted a draft to a newly created have come largely from FIST and its close ally the National Assembly which functions as an interim People for Democracy Movement under the leader- parliament. ship of Thirayuth Boonmee, one of "Bangkok 13" and also a former head of NSCT. But the draft is coming under criticism. Students and others charge that it avoids the fundamental It is argued that student militancy makes political challenge of transferring substantial Sanya's job as caretaker Prime Minister more dif- power away from the small Bangkok elite to the ficult by exacerbating already unmanageable prob- mostly rural Thai majority. Of its 221 clauses, for lems. The activists claim, however, that now is a example, 79 are provisions for the National Par- critical time to dramatize and deepen political par- ticipation for fear that peasants and workers will be liament, 19 provide for the authority of the King, and 22 concern the cabinet. Only three are con- left out of the new political structure. In the cerned with "local administration" and two others process, Saeksan and Thirayuth have become in- creasingly hostile to Thailand's middle class. refer, in vague terms, to the responsibilities of the state to promote agricultural development. Fur- The American Presence. Ironically but perhaps thermore, the draft stipulates that all members of significantly, one of the first issues seized upon by the upper house, the Senate, will be appointed by the students after the rebellion was not how to get the lower house from a list of names provided by more people participating in politics but rather how to get the United States out of Thai politics. tary is not accustomed to being on the defensive- The American presence has been well established especially with students. and deeply felt in Thailand as a result of a number Social and Economic Reform. Recent student in- of large military bases linked to the Indochina war itiatives relate more directly to fundamental issues effort. These have not only symbolized close Thai of social and economic justice in Thailand, such as adherence to American policies in the region but low farm incomes and low wages for urban have also had, in the view of many Thais, a de- workers. It is generally recognized that changing grading cultural impact in the areas where they are these conditions requires a long-term effort located. This has been demonstrated most notably bringing workers and peasants into the political in the flourishing of prostitution. process. The extent to which Thai students will dedicate themselves to actions toward this end is Thailand has always jealously guarded and the real test of their commitment to fundamental proudly asserted its independence. Thus the issue change. of American influence in Thailand is an extremely sensitive one. Moreover, it was inflamed shortly The urban labor scene has never been good in after the rebellion when a CIA agent was found to Thailand and it is especially gloomy with current have forged a letter to the Thai government in the high rates of inflation. Living conditions are bad, name of a Thai insurgent leader to propose a truce. salaries are low-at the end of 1973 the minimum Unfortunately for the United States, the incident wage was 60 cents a day-and overall inflation in took place at about the same time that William 1973 was about 22 per cent. The wholesale price of Kintner, a hawkish University of Pennsylvania rice, moreover, increased 70 per cent between political scientist with suspected CIA involvements, January 1972 and May 1973. In spite of the long was settling in as the Ambassador to Thailand. standing ban on trade union activity in Thailand, Sensitivities aroused by Kintner's appointment and deteriorating economic conditions led to an in- the CIA disclosure led to student-initiated protests creasing number of strikes in 1972 and 1973. With in front of the United States embassy-a major the fall of the Thanom government, the country "first" in Thai politics and challenge to pre-rebel- was virtually beseiged with strikes. Labor unrest lion foreign policy. reached its highest pitch to date in June 1974 when over 10,000 textile workers walked out over a The Thai Military. Another student initiative led demand for a 20 cents per day wage increase. to direct confrontation with well-established Thai The NSCT, FIST, and the People for Democracy military prerogatives. It was a dramatization of the Group joined strategy sessions with the strike destruction of Na Sai village in northeastern Thai- leaders while groups of several hundred students land. The villagers claimed that Thai Border Patrol marched in support of strikers and student spokes- Police entered the village and levelled it: the police men addressed workers rallies on university and military claimed that communist insurgents campuses. In the end, the textile workers were were responsible. Students, particularly the People given their wage increase and the promise of labor for Democracy Group, sided with the villagers, unions by the end of 1974. The student movement brought a number to Bangkok to make representa- had demonstrated its ability to preserve a measure tions to the Sanya government, and generally of unity and deal successfully with labor leaders aroused as much public awareness of the event as and issues. Whether the student organizations possible. The issue is whether Thai military could mobilize large numbers and sustain long pacification programs are engaged in purely re- campaigns remained uncertain. pressive military campaigns combined with extor- tion and abuse of villages or, on the contrary, The major and most heralded student efforts merely carrying out necessary security functions in since October have been the democracy campaigns the face of externally derived insurgent activities. in rural areas. Initially conceived as tours through The Na Sai village incident is only one of a number the countryside by teams of students to arouse of such events, although it has since been defused political consciousness, the objective was broad- by official inquiries. Nevertheless, the significance ened to include educating the students about rural of public challenge and debate on the methods, problems. Utilizing a $500,000 grant from the objectives and, indeed, appropriateness of internal Sanya government, "The Return to the Country- military security campaigns is enormous. The mili- side" campaign brought 4,000 students into vil- lages for a period of one month each over a the public and private sector. Further, the demand four-month period. The results are still being dis- for increased urban wages and agricultural cussed and evaluated. While there is some doubt incomes affect prices in general at a time of overall about the long-term educational value for the stu- inflationary trends in Thailand and the world. dents, there is substantially more about what was "Anti-democratic" feelings could be a reaction. accomplished by way of arousing peasant political There is the additional and thorny problem of consciousness. conciliation with rebel minorities in the north, Only 20 per cent of the 4,000 students who northeast, and south. Not only must special care be "returned to the countryside" came from univer- taken to determine and meet their economic griev- sities while the bulk came from teacher training ances, but military and civilian administrations will colleges and high schools outside Bangkok. It was have to be redesigned to end exploitation, extor- difficult, in short, to arouse much interest on the tion, and oppression. And ultimately, social and part of the more highly educated students. Adding political policies will have to be devised to assure to doubts over the campaign was the paucity of evi- suitable integration of minorities without excluding dence regarding student success in stimulating the possibility of recognizing some semi-autono- effective political initiative. When asked what to do mous status. Not to do so suggests the specter of by the villagers, the students too frequently had expensive military campaigns to suppress revolts advised talking to local officials-the very action and fight wars against liberation armies-now a which has failed for decades. rarely successful effort in Asia-and the tragic diversion of funds from overall development needs. More dramatic and potentially more significant results have been achieved by NSCT and FIST Whether a strong reformist administration will leadership in organizing peasant protests in take power under the new constitution is hard to Bangkok. Groups of up to 1,000 farmers have been predict. Numerous new political parties are being brought into the city to lodge specific complaints organized, while some of the old parties are badly with the government against land grabbing, unfair divided. Yet most of these are again Bangkok ori- tenancy practices, and loan sharks, among other ented and few, if any, can claim organized and grievances. These direct action campaigns appear extensive rural and worker support. to have won quick results, and the government has In all probability only successful efforts to cope promised to respond with funds and new policies with the foregoing can resolve the most fearsome making more land available, insuring security of problem of all-the military. General Kris and tenure, and providing reasonable credit terms. The other senior officers claim no political ambitions extent to which these promises will be implemented under the new government. At the same time, remains to be seen. But they represent, nonetheless, however, it would be virtually impossible to confine impulses in the right direction. the military to the barracks during long periods Conclusion either of urban labor or rural unrest. In the north, northeast, and south, the military will not readily The struggle for political democracy is still en- accept civilian curtailment of security operations if gaged. And, if for no other reason than the reasser- tion of the King's influence and the unprecedented it results in defeat or anything other than genuine entry of students into politics, there is reason for resolution of the conflict. In the south, for example, optimism. Yet for Thailand to achieve true demo- the Commander of the Fifth Military region, cratic government, political changes must be Major-General Sant Chitipatima, has sharply accompanied by genuine and far-reaching criticized the government for interfering with his economic reforms. To do this will require unprece- effort to crush the Muslim revolt. To him it is a dented government initiatives, providing for labor matter of fighting "common criminals." unions and a firm administration of rural institu- The delicacy of military-civilian relations is tions, and a willingness to implement reforms. clear. Reform there must be, but each step must Promises have been made to these ends and have assiduously avoid the toes of the military until that the strong support of the King as well as the stu- time when civilian politics and politicians are suf- dents but they will not be easily achieved. Many ficiently unified and more broadly representative of reforms will challenge traditionally powerful land- Thai society to legislate bit by bit the military into a lord and industrial management interests in both subservient role.