A Note on Thailand

SOUTHEAST ASIA SERIES Vol. XXII No. 4 (Thailand) A NOTE ON THAILAND The Student Rebellion and Political Change by Brewster Grace July 1974 Introduction In the immediate aftermath of Thailand's "October revolution," the focus of the political In October 1973 Thailand took a single but pos- struggle has not been simply on drafting and pro- sibly monumental step toward democracy, an un- mulgating a democratic constitution and estab- usual event in a region where political development lishing parliamentary government to replace has been increasingly towards military regimes or Thanom's rule by executive decree. Rather, the authoritarian civilian governments. But unlike central issues have concerned whether parlia- South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines- mentary government can function effectively at a where civil rights have suffered in recent years- time of growing economic uncertainty and confron- civilians in Thailand are demanding greater polit- tation, when political consciousness is growing, and ical participation, a wider distribution of wealth, when traditional, entrenched military interests are and a stronger voice in the international commu- under threat. Thus the next steps towards democ- nity. Before October 1973, wealth and power had racy in Thailand can be expected to be even shakier been in the hands of a very small military, bureau- than the first, and fewer people would be surprised cratic, and business elite in Bangkok. The massive by another coup d'ittat than were surprised by student-inspired demonstrations in October, how- events last October. ever, challenged this control, and led to the sudden Thailand's Political Legacies and unexpected political collapse and exile of three of Thailand's most prominent and unpopular mili- Abrupt change of government is not unusual in tary leaders: Prime Minister General Thanom Thailand. Since the abolition of the absolute mon- Kittikachorn, his Deputy Prime Minister and Min- archy in 1932, there have been 15 governments, ister of the Interior Field Marshal Prapass Charu- most of which have been dominated by the military, sathiara, and his ambitious son Colonel Narong eight constitutions, and eight coup d'ittats. The last Kittikachorn. constitutional government fell in 1971 when Field Marshal Thanom dismissed an elected national Whether second and subsequent steps will be assembly and established a military controlled taken towards real democratic rule is by no means "National Executive Council." As President of the assured, although students and civilian politicians Council he and his Deputy President, General pressing for change have not lost many initiatives Prapass, governed Thailand. It was a bloodless and since the fall of the Thanom regime. Despite their virtually undisputed seizure of power. Those who factional disputes and political differences, the welcomed it-many of Bangkok's commercially "democratic forces," have led farmers' protest active elite and middle class-saw it as preferable groups to Bangkok, demanded fewer military and to government by an ineffective legislature. Those more economic initiatives in the "sensitive," insur- who would have opposed it--democrats, liberals, gent-dominated rural areas of Thailand, contacted progressives-were so small in number and so insurgent leaders in the northeast, supported politically unorganized that any resistance short of striking workers, and traveled through the country- joining an insurgency was unthinkable. side in an effort to politicize the peasantry in Thai- land's traditionally apolitical society. Such activity Since 1932, political control in Thailand has has been rare in recent Thailand history. characteristically resided almost exclusively with Copyright @ 1974, American Universitips Field Staff, Inc. [BG-3-'741 those who have wealth and power. And political more remote regions of the country. Not only does participation, or at least political awareness, has the government have difficulty in gaining access to been confined to Bangkok's middle class. This has large portions of entire provinces but the rebellions meant, with few exceptions, that Thailand has been also challenge the professional credibility of the governed by a small elite-perhaps 10-15 per cent military. The latter is considered all the more of Thailand's 32 million people-drawn from the serious because to an unknown degree communist military brass, the upper echelons of the cadres have had some role in organizing the rebel- bureaucracy, and the super rich in the business lions. community. These men have accumulated enor- Rural, ethnic Thais may have elected political mous wealth through power and achieved enor- passivity for reasons of economic expediency, but mous power through wealth. the minority groups often rebel for reasons of economic abuse and neglect. This is reflected in part in There are a number of fundamental economic the nature of resistance activity. In the south, and social reasons that have helped sustain elite resistance has ranged from outright banditry to domination of their politics. First, the peasantry banditry A la Robin Hood to something close to a has scarcely emerged from its pre-1932 feudal secessionist struggle. In the north and northeast the world, its physical and mental isolation from the rebels style themselves "liberators" and have re- commercial and political activity concentrated in sorted to armed struggle against pacification Bangkok. And while administrative channels exist efforts by the Thai. In all cases the resistance is re- to carry directives to the peasantry via Bangkok- portedly against extortion by military and police oriented and -controlled provincial authorities, officials. The Thai military, even considering se- there are no effective vehicles for the expression of curity alone, might well be alarmed. peasant opinion in Bangkok. The peasantry's isolation, moreover, has been compounded by its im- With the lower classes of Thais either having poverishment. While the commercialization of rice been left out or locked out of politics only the agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth cen- middle class, largely in Bangkok, has served even tury brought great wealth to Bangkok, it trapped as a limited political constituency for the ruling Thailand's predominantly subsistence farmers in elite. Its low level of participation may partly be heavy indebtedness, perpetuating their subser- due to the fact that life in Bangkok has been good vience to merchants and landlords. since the mid 1950s. Artisans, tradesmen, business- Second, industrialization has made slow progress men, and government clerks have generally bene- in Thailand, and thus the creation of a nonagricul- fited from laissez-faire policies and a low rate of tural work force is of recent origin. In 1953 only 3 inflation. The domestic price of rice, for example, to 4 per cent of the total work force were urban has been kept artificially low by means of a stiff blue-collar workers, increasing rather rapidly to export premium. The premium also keeps farm about 10 per cent by 1970. A substantial number of prices down, suggesting that the middle class lives these are poorly paid female and even child laborers well at the expense of the farmers. Politically, the in Bangkok's burgeoning textile and light elec- rice premium symbolizes the domination of the tronic factories. Combined with the almost total rural majority by Bangkok's mainly middle class prohibition of any labor organization over the past elite. 15 years, these factors have tended to inhibit the development of a politically conscious urban pro- There have been few efforts to challenge the letariat. status quo. In the early 1950s the Chinese community, which makes up a good portion of the middle Third, the rebellions by the hill tribes in the class, agitated for political reforms but the issues north, the Lao and Vietnamese in the northeast, were ultimately communal and nationalist and and the Malays in the south represent serious often more related to developments in China than political threats to central government control of in Thailand. Other exceptions have occurred when any type, and their persistence has long provided constitutional government allowed for parlia- justification for a significant military role in mentary politics. Then outspoken and strongly politics. But the Thai military, with substantial socialist politicians campaigned for the resolution American support, has been only partially success- of grievances in the northeast. There have also ful in containing resistance to Bangkok authority in been a handful of courageous and persistent Children in a northeastern Thai village. The implements used in northeast Thailand for pounding rice meal to make noodles. Houses on stilts in northeast Thailand. Home indlustry in a northeast Thai village. At left woman w,eaves her own sarong. Bangkok socialist politicians whose reformist causes and careers sometimes go back to the orig- inal constitutional government of 1932. Addition- ally, there have been a few intellectuals and jour- nalists who have kept writing social and economic critiques for an admittedly limited audience of students and other intellectuals. The student rebellion, of course, is the latest and perhaps most dramatic exception to middle class complacency. But whether it is a harbinger of fundamental change is a matter now for little more than speculation. The Bureaucratic Monolith Bangkok's bureaucracy has been the center of power ever since the Thai monarchy decided in the middle

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