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II. Definition of Key Terms Forum: Council of Arab Foreign Ministers Issue: The Syrian Civil War Student Officers: Adham Zaineldin, Hanya Abdelhamid. I. Introduction: The Syrian Civil War is a crisis that has been plaguing Syria for nearly an entire decade. Its beginning can be traced back to the early 2010s. In late 2010 and early 2011, a wave of revolutions, known as the Arab Spring, began to arise in multiple countries in the Arab world. Numerous pro-democracy protests started to erupt through the Middle East, such as in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and several other Middle Eastern countries. Inspired by this wave of revolutions, demonstrations began erupting all over Syria, protesting against the severely strict rule of Bashar Al-Assad. These demonstrations were met with violence from the Syrian police and military, which led to the formation of militias aiming to overpower the Syrian government. The conflict between the militias and the Syrian military continued to escalate as time went by, until it finally developed into a full civil war. More than nine years later, conditions are still as hostile as they ever were, and the war is showing no signs of coming to an end. Over the course of these nine years, the war has led to more than 500,000 total deaths, at least 200,000 civilian deaths, and an estimated 13 million refugees. This seemingly never-ending war has devastated all aspects of Syrian life, leaving the country as a mere shadow of what it was before. After countless attempts to bring an end to this conflict, none of which had any significant long-term effects on the war, the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers is assembling in an attempt to put an end to this dreadful crisis that is plaguing Syria once and for all. II. Definition of Key Terms: Arab Spring: a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across several Arab countries in the early 2010s. The protests began in Tunisia, before spreading to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Refugee: an individual who is forced to leave their country/ city to escape war or persecution. Militia: a civilian military force that is formed to oppose a regular army. Ceasefire: an agreement between two opposing sides in a war to temporarily stop fighting. Buffer zone: a neutral area between two hostile nations or forces, designed to prevent acts of aggression. III. Focused Overview: 1. History of the Conflict The Syrian Civil War is a quite complex situation with many different sides and elements to consider. Subsequently, to truly grasp the causes of the events that are currently taking place in Syria, one must first understand the history of the war. The true beginning of the conflict is agreed to have been in March 2011, when anti-Assad demonstrations first began to arise. In early March, demonstrations were sparked after Syrian police arrested a group of teenagers for anti-government graffiti. As protests began to increase in number, the government started taking increasingly drastic measures, leading to the killing of more than 100 people in the first month. As protests began to spread throughout the country, government forces continued to attack protesters in an attempt to put an end to the uprising. The demonstrations kept growing in number, reaching more 100,000 protesters by mid-2011. In support of the ever-growing revolution, defectors from the army began uniting to form rebel militias, including the Syrian National Coalition and the Free Syrian Army. Figure 1: Thousands of protestors gather to protest against These militias began to attack Bashar Al-Assad government troops, marking the Image source: New York Times beginning of the Syrian Civil War. 3 February 2012 saw one of the bloodiest massacres of the war, as the government launched an offensive on Homs, which was the center of the Syrian Revolution at the time. It is said that more than 200 protestors were killed on this day. Despite the losses faced by protestors in the early days of the offensive, fighting in Homs continued until March 2017, when the government gained full control of the district. As the Syrian Government continued to attack Syrian protestors, the United Nations Security Council began peace talks. On 12 April 2012, a ceasefire was issued by the council. Despite the ceasefire initially being accepted by the government and the opposition, it broke down immediately. Throughout the following years, countless were made by the United Nations to reach a peaceful solution, all of which failed to bring about long- term peace. On January 6, 2013, President Bashar Al-Assad proposed a peaceful solution to the war. He offered a peace conference and a new government and constitution. However, this offer was rejected by the Syrian opposition. At this time, rebel forces began capturing key locations in Syria, including the city of Raqqa and several military bases in Aleppo. Terrorist groups in the Middle East, namely the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and EL Qaeda, began to grow their influence in Syria, launching attacks on both the opposition and the Syrian Government. In June 2013, President Barack Obama, in response to the Syrian Government’s use of chemical weapons in the war, began issuing military support to the opposition. In June 2014, presidential elections were held by the Syrian Government, and the results were announced to be a landslide victory for Bashar Al-Assad, who received 90% of votes. The opposition completely dismissed the election, claiming that its results had been manipulated by the government. As ISIL continued to grow its power in Syria, gaining control over many key locations, the United States began launching air strikes on ISIL- controlled locations in Syria. In January 2015, the United States began arming Syrian rebels fighting ISIL. As the war waged on, and the Syrian government continued to bomb rebel forces, Russia began its own bombing campaigns. Despite the claims made by the Russian government that the bombings were targeting ISIL, many sources confirmed that the bombing were in fact targeting civilians and rebels. The bombings significantly weakened the rebel forces, shifting the tide of the war in Al-Assad’s favor. As foreign involvement continued to rise, the United States began to deploy American forces on Syrian soil, claiming that they were sent to combat ISIL. In early 2016, the United Nations held multiple peace conferences, in which the Syrian Government and opposition agreed on a nationwide ceasefire. Unfortunately, despite the United Nations’s efforts, the ceasefire fell apart in less than two months. Over the following years, several other attempts were made at reaching a long-term ceasefire, none of which were successful. Instead of the war dying down as was expected, it seemed to only be growing as time went by. More and more new countries began to join the fighting, either through sending troops or through bombings, including Iraq, Israel, Turkey, and several other countries. In December 2018, President Donald Trump announced he they believed ISIL had been defeated in Syria, and that the US was consequently withdrawing its 2000 US troops from Syrian soil, and that 600 US soldiers would remain in Syria to prevent ISIL from regaining power. Despite peace talks between the Government and opposition on April 26, 2019, Syrian and Russian forces launched many air strikes on rebel cities in northwest Syria. 2. Involvement of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the conflict Ever since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, ISIL has played a major role in the war, acting not only as a belligerent, but also as a means for foreign powers to justify their involvement in the war. Over the course of the war, many countries used ISIL in this way, including the United States, Russia, Israel, and Turkey. ISIL’s reign of terror came with countless atrocities against the Syrian people, as they waged a war against both the Syrian government and the opposition. Because of their eventual defeat in Syria in 2018, the impact of ISIL on the war is often underestimated. However, it is safe to assume that the Syrian Civil War would never have reached such catastrophic levels had it not been for ISIL’s involvement. This is because by 2013-2014, a big part of the fighting was held by not only Syrian forces but also by foreign forces, including soldiers, missiles, and aircraft. Had ISIL not gotten involved in the fighting in Syria, foreign powers, such as the United States and Russia, would have had no excuse to engage in the conflict, and would have Figure 2: ISIL leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi consequently been much less involved in the war. announcing that he would take revenge on "the west" just months before his death ISIL’s effect on the war lasted until their eventual defeat in 2018, when the United States finally Image source: Daily Mail declared that ISIL no longer had power in Syria. The leader of ISIL, Abu Bakr Al- Baghdadi, was killed during a U.S. raid on October 27th, 2019. 3. Socio-economic impact of the war The Syrian Civil war is possibly one of the most destructive civil wars in modern history. It has had and continues to have an immensely devastating impact on Syria, both from the humanitarian point of view and the economic point of view. The first and arguably the more important consequence of the war is the humanitarian one. The war has not only led to deaths and injuries that are too many to count, but it has also caused arguably the worst refugee crisis today.
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