THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF

THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE

1810-1823

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR

THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

BY

BUTLER ALFONSO JONES

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

JUNE 1938

/ ' ' I // / ii

PREFACE

The most casual study of the relations between the United States and the Latin American republics will indicate that the great republic in the north has made little effort to either understand the difficulties that have sorely tried her younger and less powerful neighbors or to study their racial characteristics and customs with the friendly appreciation necessary to good relations between states. Nor is it sufficient in a democracy where public opinion plays an important part in foreign affairs to confine know¬ ledge of foreign policies and peoples to the select few who make up the go¬ vernment. Such understanding should be widespread among the peoples them¬ selves, so that public opinion, based upon an intelligent comprehension of the facts, can aot as a lever towards more friendly cobperation, rather than as a spur to jealous and rival aspirations. To bring about this better re¬ lationship, v/hich can be accomplished only by a better mutual understanding, every avenue of approach should be utilized. It is the purpose of this paper to utilize one of the avenues of approach by presenting, in an objective man¬ ner, the story of the early relations of the United States with what, in some respects, is the most powerful of the Latin American nations and, in all respects, is the most stabilized of our South American neighbors. Chile was chosen as the subject of this thesis because it is the one country in South

America where an attitude of preference for the United States has been most lasting among the people, because the course of its rise to power has most closely resembled that of the United States, because it has borne the brunt of some of the most insulting despatches ever sent out by the department of state, because, of all the nations of South America, it has the most justi¬ fiable cause of complaint against the United States and finally, because there is a dearth of written material on the subject. iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I INTRODUCTION 1

II EARLY RELATIONS 1810-1814 13

III PRELIMINARIES OF RECOGNITION 30

IV RECOGNITION AND THE YEARS MEDIATELY THEREAFTER . . 65

CONCLUSION 80

BIBLIOGRAPHY 83 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The middle of the fifteenth century marlæd the end of an era in world history and the introduction of a new epoch which was destined to transplant European civilization to the uttermost parts of the earth* Por¬

tugal was fairly well united under her ambitious ruler, Prince Henry the

Navigator; Spain was entering the last stage of her heroic struggle against

Moorish domination; France under her absolutist kings was centralizing her political administration and law; England was in the throes of a severe dy¬ nastic struggle while Holland was still a part of the Austrian Netherlands.

In 1453 the Ottoman Turks captured Constantinople; in 1485 Henry VII, the first of the Tudors, ascended the English throne* Three years later Bartho¬ lomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope, on the southern tip of Africa, and in 1492 the Spanish reconqulsta practically ended with the fall of Gra¬ nada* ^ A few months later three small ships set out to sea under the com¬ mand of an unknown Genoese sailor sailing westward under the flag of Cas¬ tille and seeking a new route to the Indies.

With the launching of the three ships from Cadiz the commercial revolution may be said to have really begun. The decline of the Levantine trade transferred the money marts of the world from the Italien oity-states of the eastern Mediterranean to the "western periphery." Coincident with the progress of the commercial revolution was the growth of a new economio

^For a general study of the European background of American history see E. P. Cheney, European Background of American History 1300-1600 (London, New York, 1904).

-1- -2 system — mercantilism. "Mercantilism," says Heoksher, "is primarily an agent of unificatian. Its adversary was the mediaeval combination of univer- salism and particularism, and its first object was to make the state purposes decisive in a uniform economic sphere and to males all economic activity sub¬ servient to considerations corresponding to the requirements of the state and

H 1 to the state*s domain regarded as uniform in nature. Herein lies the basio assumption underlying the Spanish colonial system far down into the nineteenth oentury* It was to be the attempt to apply the principles of mercantilism to the Spanish colonies in America that was to account in a large measure for the epidemic of revolutions which convulsed them from 1810 on. It was also this new economic system that gave impetus to the growth of national states in 2 Europe.

The two nations which soon took the lead in the age of exploration, disoovery and colonization were Spain and Portugal. Among the more important reasons for this were their geographical location and their earlier attainment of national unity. Most important of all probably was the fact that they had taken little part in the Levantine trade and consequently were desirous of increasing their national wealth by the acquisition of new and valuable terri¬ tories. Because of their priority of disoovery the sovereigns of these two nations laid claim to the whole of the newly discovered lands. In order to forestall possible conflict between his two most highly esteemed temporal sovereigns, Pope Alexander VI by the Bull of Demarcation (May 4, 1493) divided the Hew World between Spain and Portugal. The dividing boundary was to be a line running 100 leagues to the east and south of the Cape Verde and Azores

■hsii F. Hecksher, Mercantilism (London, 1935), I, 22.

Ibid., I, 2 et seq. -3-

islands. But this "line of demarcation" suited neither Spain nor Portugal and the two of them displaced it with the treaty of Tordesillas (June 7, 1494)

which placed the dividing line at a point 370 leagues west of the AZOres, there¬ by giving Portugal her only colony on continental South America — Brazil. *

Following closely in the wake of the Spanish discoverers were the

Spanish colonizers sent out, in many instances, by private companies but in most instances by the Spanish monarchs. In line with the fundamental tenets of mercantilism, Spanish colonization was not to establish an overseas empire or a new Spain but to have available at the source of production an adequate 2 labor supply. But the colonizing efforts of the Spaniards, for whatever reason it might have been, did lead to the establishment of an overseas co¬ lonial empire which gave rise to problems of colonial administration. In the system which she developed to meet these problems Spain made use of her previous experience in governing foreign peoples and gave to the world a 3 colonial system that was unusually wise and efficient.

The exploration and colonization of Chile was the backwash result of Pizarro’s conquest of Peru. The first expedition into Chile was led by

Don Almagro who followed the old Inca route along the Andean range and pene¬ trated as far south as Copiapo. Almagro was followed by Pedro de Valdivia who laid the foundation for many of the Chilean cities —Saint Iago or San¬ tiago, Concepcion and Valdivia being among the more famous of them. ^ It was

^Van Der Linden, "Alexander VI and the Bulls of Demarcation", American Histori¬ cal Review, XXII (October, 1916), pp. 1-20. o A olose study of the principles of mercantilism and a comparison of those prin¬ ciples with the practices of the Spanish colonial system will, the -writer think bear Out this conclusion.

®Mary W. Williams, People and Politics of Latin America (Boston, 1930), p. 149.

^For these early explorations see particularly the biography by Gunninghame Graham, Pedro de Valdivia, Conqueror of Chile (New York, London, 1927). -4.

during this period that a feature of Chilean life came to the fore which has

since that time played an important part in the development of Chilean national

life, namely, the fierce resistance to Spanish domination by the liberty lov¬

ing aborigines, the Arauoanian Indians. It was their resistance that kept

Spanish colonizing efforts in Chile confined to the area north of the river

Biobio from 1565 to 1810. In 1612 a Jesuit priest, Luis de Valdivia, entered

into an agreement with the ^raucanians voider the terms of which Spanish mission¬

aries were allowed to christianize the Indians and the southern boundary of

Spanish colonizing efforts was definitely fixed as the Biobio. This boundary remained the dividing line between the Araucanians and the white men until 1 long after the establishment of Chilean independence.

O The Spanish Colonial System

Spain’s political organigation of her colonies was at first divided

into the two viceroyalties of Peru and Mexico. The viceroy was the official

representative of the king in the colonies. As his title implies, he was at

first an almost absolute ruler but as time went on his powers were gradually

reduced. The viceroy was president of the audienoia, he maintained a sump¬

tuous court at the seat of his vioeroyalty, he was captain-general of his pro¬

vince and had the responsibility for the care and protection of the church and

all the people voider him including the Indians. He was not allowed to aoquire

property in the colonies during his administration nor hold any colonial of¬

fices except those which he held ex officio. His children could not marry

^Williams, People and Politics, pp. 602 et seq.

**A. Curtis Wilgus, A History of Hispanic America (Washington, 1931), p. 134 et seq. -5-

within his jurisdiction while he held office. He was required at the end of

his term to submit a memorandum on the condition of his viceroyalty to his

successor. At various times during his tenure the viceroy was subjected to

a residencia, that is, an examination and hearing of charges and complaints

against his administration brought by his subjects. There was also a visita-

dor general sent out from Spain occasionally whose duty it was to visit all

of the viceroys and examine their records, accounts and general administration

of the viceroyalty. The salary of the viceroy varied according to the vice¬

royalty held, e. g., it was higher for the viceroyalty of Peru than for that

of New Spain. The term of office varied from three to five years but in some

instances it lasted longer.

The most important political or administrative subdivisions of the viceroy were the captaincy-general and the presidency. The presidency was

in reality little more than an audiencia presided over by a president. The

captaincy-general was at first a military district ruled over by a captain-

general who held powers very much similar to those of the viceroy and who was,

in many instances, subject to that official.

Below these officials were many sub-officials in the political ad¬ ministration of the Spanish colonies. Among them were the corregidor who was charged with the regulation of weights and measures, promotion of agriculture and, most important of all, with the collection of the tax paid by the abori¬ gines to escape from working in the mita, and the intendant who was below the viceroy in rank but who enjoyed complete independence of that officer in the performance of his duties.

An institution which evolved during the early period of Spanish co¬ lonial administration and which gradually grew until it assumed and exercised unusual powers in the oolonies was the audiencia. The term audiencia was ap¬ plied to both the judicial and legislative body and the area over which that -t>-

body held sway. The audiencia performed both judicial and legislative func¬ tions. It sat as the highest court of law receiving and passing upon appeals from the lower courts and acting as the court of first instance in all matters arising in the colonies concerning the crown. It sat as a legislative body when passing some act made necessary by an emergency local need. It sat as

an advisory council to the highest administrative authority in the audiencia

(i. e., the area over which the audiencia sat) who was bound to call upon it

for advice in certain matters. In the early colonial period it enjoyed the unique right of appealing directly to the king without consulting the viceroy.

In later years this right was enjoyed by the independent captaincy-generals

such as Chile and the intendants, or financial agents of the king in the co¬

lonies. After 1550 the audiencia was allowed to rule in the absence of the viceroy. The meetings of the audiencia were presided over by the highest ad¬ ministrative official in the audiencia but this official held no vote in judi¬ cial decisions.

The colonial Spanish towns were classified according to their size and importance to the crown. Theoretically they were all autonomous. After

1523 many towns eleoted their own regidores, officials similar to aldermen.

Each town had from four to twelve regidores who in their collective oapacity were known as the regimiento. The regimiento elected from within their group an alcalde mayor or mayor. This body also chose the justice of peace (alcalde

ordinario) for the town as well as the sheriff and town treasuere, and, in the

latter half of the sixteenth century, the proctor who represented the town's

interest before the king. All of these officials meeting together became the cabildo or ayuntamiento and enacted various local ordinances. Occasionally town meetings, much like those of colonial New England, were called to discuss

important matters such as taxation. These town meetings were designated

cabildos abiertos. The term cabildo was used to designate the body and the -7-

building where the body held its deliberation.

The economic administration ^ of the Spanish colonies though not rigidly mercantilistic was so exacting that it was unworkable. There was

early set up in Spain as a unit distinct from the political administration of the colonies the casa de contratacion to regulate the economic activities of the colonies. The economic administration of the colonies was not of itself harsh, but, since the incidence of taxation and other forms of governmental

and ecclesiastical extortion fell upon those least able to pay, the system

seemed oppressive. The system was repulsive to the colonial merchants be¬

cause it limited their purchasing market. Among the more odious of the taxes were the alcabala or sales tax which was paid every time the commodity changed hands, the almojarifazgo or export and import tax of about fifteen per cent which, by raising the retail price of a given commodity, restricted the retail market, and the quinto or royal revenue tax. Added to all of these taxes were many others of all kinds including certain religious taxes and revenues which fell to the state because of some agreement between the pope and the

sovereign. The effect of these taxes would have been less upon the colonists had the free importation of goods been allowed. But this Spain steadfastly refused to do (but she was not alone among colonizing nations in her refusal).

For one hundred years she confined her colonial trade to the monopolistic 2 practices of the merchants of Cadiz and Seville.

Over and above all colonial administration was the Council of the

Indies established in 1524 and residing in Spain. The Council served as a judicial body, it received and heard appeals from colonial audiencias and acted as a court of original jurisdiction in certain specified cases. But,

*See particularly the excellent chapter on "Economic Activities in the Spanish Colonies" in Williams, People and Politics, pp. 193-208.

^Botirne, Spain in America, pp. 283 et seq -8

says Miss Williams,

the administration and executive functions of the Council were the most important of all. In consultation with the crown, it created territorial units and political offices; it appointed and removed most of the colonial functionaries, temporal and spiritual, from the viceroys dorm; and by means of a vast correspondence it sought to keep in touch with and control these appointees. Under its supervision those accused of maladministration were tried and punished. Under its care were placed the millions of Aborigines, wham it sought to protect from exploitation and to bring within the foster¬ ing fold of the Church. It was also responsible for the Indies as a royal business investment, through having general supervision of the Çaga de Con- tratacion or House of Trade, which controlled colonial commerce. ^

Though it was not an inviolable rule, the Council sought to have at all times among its membership former colonial officials who could lend advice resulting 2 from experience in the colonies.

The Church in the Spanish Indies, like the Church in all other coloni£ empires, was one of the chief oppressors of the people whom it was supposed to help. "A pompous and sensual Catholicism satisfied the imagination of the

Creoles, the superstitious fears of the Indians and the cheerful materialism

»Z of the Negroes."

The social sohism in the Spanish Indies was artificially created

and maintained by rigid Spanish law. At the top of the social scale were the peninsulares, persons born in Spain and living in the colonies. Next were the creoles, persons of Spanish parents living in the colonies. Then fol¬

lowed the other races in descending order. Under Spanish law no creole could hold any important political office in the colonies nor could any colonial

official marry a creole and remain in office. It is reported that the father

of Bernado O' Higgins, Ambrosio, while captain-general of Chile was afraid to

acknowledge his wife even though she was the daughter of one of the oldest

■^Williams, People and Politics, pp. 151-152.

2Ibid., p. 151. 2 Francisco Garcia Calderon, Latin Americas Its Rise and Progress (New York, 1918), p. 53. and most distinguished creole families in all Chile. He feared that his career would be ended if his marriage to her became known. This social stratifica¬ tion resulting in the ostracism of the creoles from their own government was bitterly resented by them and was one of the fundamental causes of the Spanish-

American colonial revolutions.

Early in 1558 Chile was made a captaincy-general nominally under the viceroyalty of Peru. But because of its general remoteness from the rest of the Spanish mainland provinces, Chile gradually assumed a status of practical independence of the viceroyalty. In 1609 this independence was virtually ad¬ mitted with the re-establishment of a separate Chilean audienoia. In later years the importance of the captaincy-general of Chile grew to such propor¬ tions that it was generally the last stopping place before the viceroyalty of

Peru, always the cream of political jobs in the Indies. Because Chile was a captaincy-general, its government up to 1810 was essentially that outlined above.

In 1808 Napoleon induced the indigent Charles VI, King of Spain, to abdicate in favor of his son, the prince of Asturias, who then became King of Spain as Ferdinand VII. Thereupon, Napoleon deposed Ferdinand and set up his brother, Joseph, as king of Spain. Despite their seeming indifference to

Spanish misgovernment the people of Spain bitterly resented this usurpation of their sovereign's rights and consequently rebelled against the usurper.

Revolutionary juntas were established throughout Spain nominally to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII. Both the government de facto and the revolutionary juntas sent agents to the Spanish colonies in America to obtain their alle¬ giance . ^

The news of the French conquest of Spain reached Chile in the late

^■Charles Oman, History of the Peninsular War (Oxford, 1902), V. I. -10-

summer of 1809. Immediately the landed aristocracy and the Spanish colonial officials were torn between two opinions: first.whether to accept the offer of the revolutionary juntas and send a delegate to Cadiz to represent Chile

in the forthcoming revolutionary Cortes or, second, whether to establish a separate and independent junta to rule nominally in the name of the deposed king -until that king was restored or until French domination was made secure.

At the same time there were a few brave souls in Chile who desired to take advantage of Spain's distress and declare Chile's complete independence. Evi¬ dence does not, hoxvever, support the view that at this time this group was in anything but the minority. ^

The captain-general of Chile at this time, Jose Garcia Carasco, was a weak and indecisive man. He was, however, torn between the desire to per¬ petuate imperial rule in Chile, and along with it himself, and an attempt to plaoate the wealthy Creoles by some concessions. In line with the first desire he conducted certain correspondence with the sister of Ferdinand who was the wife of the Prince Regent of Portugal, then residing in Brazil. This correspondence proved fruitless. In the state of uncertainty which followed the reception, in Chile, of the news of the Prench domination of Spain the citizens of Santiago began to organize and drill a militia and to levy certain taxes in preparation for an unknown emergency. Carasco became more fearful and ordered the arrest of several of the most prominent Creoles in Chile. But the popular outcry against this highhanded act of the captain-general forced him to order uheir release though Evans states that they had already been de¬ ported to Peru. Carasco then ordered the assembly of a oabildo abierto to en-

^See Poinsett's report on the progress of the revolutions in South America prior to 1818 in A. S. ?., p R. IV, 324 et seq. -11

join obedience to certain rules sent out by the Central Junta at Cadiz ’which had transformed itself into the Regency. Carasco at the same time postponed the elections for a delegate to the Spanish Assembly. Consequently, 'when the cabildo met it was in no humor to delay. It very quickly deposed the captain- general and set up a junta of seven prominent Creoles, among them, the Carreras and Lorraines. Thus began the struggle for independence in Chile. ^

Revolutionary sentiment in Chile was no new thing. The Chileans had imbibed the revolutionary philosophy of Rousseau, Voltaire and the French

Encyclopédistes. Some Chileans had served in the wars of the French Revolu¬ tion and many had learned of the glorious deeds of the North American revolu¬ tion. Further, actual riots against Spanish misrule had broken out from time to time in Chile culminating in an uprising in Santiago in 1776. ^ Rigid class distinctions, economic and religious oppression were the causes of the war for independence in the Spanish Colonial empire; the Napoleonic wars the occasion. The Spanish colonies belonged not to the Spanish nation but to the

Spanish crown, and more particularly, to Castille, for the wedding agreement that had joined Isabella of Castillo with Fredinand of Aragon had granted to 3 Castille all of the lands to the west. From this situation the Chileans de¬ rived a philosophy to justify their revolutions —they were not revolts against

Spain but against the attempt of Napoleon and later the Cadiz Regency to es¬ tablish their authority in the name of Spain over the personal property of the deposed king. The establishment of their own provisional juntas, according to this theory, was the just exercise of a legitimate function, namely, the continuation of the status quo.

■^Henry Clay Evans, Jr., Chile and the United States (Durham, 1929), pp. 9-10.

^Wilgus, Hispanic America, pp. 223, 225-226.

3 Reger B. Merriman, The Rise of the Sp-nish Empire in the Old World and in the New (New York, London, 1918’)"7~'E,' Y-8'5. 12

Particularismus has ever been the bogey man of South American

national unity. With the establishment of the independent junta of Santiago

this feature displayed itself in the refusal of certain provinces to submit

to its regulations. Consequently, there was called to meet at Santiago a

national congress to give to Chile a government and a constitution. But the

junta made the mistake of allotting to Santiago almost as many delegates as

to the provinces combined. The elections to this congress took place in

April, 1811. When, at the same time, the Spanish garrisons of Santiago re¬

volted Don Jose^ Miquel Carrera further distinguished himself by leading an

improvised Chilean army against and defeating it.

The oongress met and drew up a constitution for Chile, but dis¬

sension soon arose between the Patriotic Party (partido patriota) consisting

of the great landed aristocracy who naturally opposed radical innovations or

complete separation, and the radicals (exaltados) who desired a complete break with Spain and the formation of a republic. There was superimposed upon this political quarrel the old provincial spirit of particularismus.

Seizing an opportunity to make himself all powerful, José Carrera joined with Martinez de Rosas, a distinguished but radical lawyer of Concepcion, de¬ posed the oongress at Santiago, and set himself up as the first supreme direc¬ tor of Chile. ^

^Thomas C. Dawson, The South American Republics (New York, 1909), II, 161 et- seq. Especially recommended for a study of this early period of the Chilean National period. See also Percy A, Martin and Herman G. James, The Republics of Latin America (New York, 1926 Revised Edition), pp. 89 et seq. CHAPTER II

EARLY RELATIONS 1810-1814

In the preceding pages we have outlined the Spanish colonial sys¬ tem and traced the progress of the Chilean revolution prior to the arrival of Joel R. Poinsett, "United States Consul to Buenos Ayres, Chile and Peru."

This versatile American who was to play such an important part in Chilean affairs during the next few years was a native of Charleston, South Carolina, and, was, on the whole, a man of most unusual capacities. Born in 1779, the son of a prominent Charleston physician, Poinsett was early ambitious to serve his country in some capacity, preferably in the military service. ^

His father had deterred his soldierly instincts by guiding him into the more

"honorable" profession of medicine. Following the death of his father in

1803 and that of his sister shortly afterwards, Poinsett seems to have en¬ tered upon a glorified lecture tour. He spent six years travelling in

Europe and conversing with most of the notables of that time. Upon his re¬ turn to the United States he intrigued in Washington for the position as quarter master for the army. It was while in Washington hoping for this military plum that Poinsett was offered the mission to South America. He was at first against acceptance but when he became convinced that no war threatened between the United States and some European power in which he could satisfy his bellicose instinct, Poinsett finally aocepted the offer.

■^The best biography of Poinsett is that by J. Fred Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American (Durham, 1935).

-13. 14-

The fear of possible English diplomatic interposition necessitated Madison*s

making the appointment in secret and his later insistence upon Poinsett's

secret departure. Poinsett finally set sail for Buenos Aires in January,

1811 disguised as an Englishman.

Poinsett’s instructions were dated June 28, 1810 though he did not

sail until January, 1811. He ms instructed to

diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest goodwill towards the people of Spanish America as neighbors, as belonging to the same portion of the globe, and as having a material interest in cultiva¬ ting friendly intercourse ; that this disposition will exist whatever may be their internal system or European relation with respect to which no inter¬ ference of any sort is pretended; and that in the event of political separa¬ tion from the parent country, and the establishment of an independent system of national government, it will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to promote the most friendly relations, and the most liberal intercourse, between the inhabitants of this hemisphere, as having all a oom- mon interest, and as having a common obligation to maintain that system of peace, justice and goodwill, which is the only source of happiness for nations .... The real as well as ostensible object of your mission is to explain the mutual advantages of commerce with the United States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable information on the subject.

The later interpretation that Poinsett, while in Chile, put on these instruc¬

tions is nothing short of miraculousl

The time was ripe in Chile for Poinsett’s mission. There had existed

in Santiago a friendly feeling towards the United States for some time past.

Before the news of Poinsett's mission had reached Chile the supreme director

had written to President Madison urging him to lend the support of the United

States government to the Chilean cause. In return for this support Carrera

offered the United States commercial preference in Chile. "We hope," he had written, "... that you will not hesitate to accept our cordial alliance

Ibid., p. 38.

William Ray Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Conoern- the Independence of the Latin American Uations~(Wew York, Londond, etc., 15-19 ), I, 6-7. Hereafter cited as Manning, Independence, 15-

anâ to supply us with the means of maintaining our liberty .... Any kind of arms is most urgently needed by us, and in particular, rifles and pistols." X The supreme director asked the United States to furnish Chile mechanics and gunsmiths whom he promised to reward liberally. This despatch constitutes the only direct appeal from the Chilean government to that of tiie

United States prior to 1817. The despatch reached the Department of State enclosed in a letter sent by Mathew Hoeval, a citizen of the United States residing in Santiago, to President Madison. The allusion to the formation of an alliance is believed simply to mean an invitation to sign a commercial treaty, for the whole tenor of the note seems to indicate that the Chileans had no expectation of entering into an armed alliance with the United States.

The despatch merely shows that Chile was suffering from the belief, general 2 in Spanish America, that the United States would aid the insurgents.

But if the general populace were receptive to American overtures, the Spanish merchants of Santiago were not so, Organized as the Tribunal del Consulado these men saw in the continued radicalism a threat to their business ventures and consequently did not want to go farther in the direc¬ tion of independence. Moreover, the news of Poinsett’s activities, while in Buenos Aires, in urging the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata towards in¬ dependence had preceded him to Chile and the tribunal feared that these ac¬ tivities would be duplicated in Chile but productive of more decided action there than in Buenos Aires. As an argument against Poinsett’s reception the tribunal urged that his appointment had not been confirmed by the United States

Senate. Against the tribunal and urging reception was Agustin Vial, secre-

XIbid., II, 845.

2 RiPPy* Historical Evolution of Hispanic America (New York, 1932), p. 345. -16

tary of the Junta, who contended that if commercial relations were to be

established there had to be a consul through whom they would be conducted.

To reject the representative of a friendly and sympathetic nation, he ar¬

gued, might be considered an insult. But despite the popular feeling Poin- 1 sett’s reception was delayed for weeks.

Finally, on February 24, 1812, amid considerable pomp and ceremony,

Poinsett was presented to the revolutionary junta. Carrera made the scene

an imposing one and in his warm address of welcome spoke of the natural friend¬

ship of Chile for the United States. In his reply Poinsett, speaking in

Spanish, said that

The -Americans of the North generally observe with the greatest of interest the success of these countries, and ardently wish for the prosper¬ ity and happiness of their brothers of the South. I shall be happy to in¬ form the government of the United States of the friendly sentiments of your Excellency and I am happy to be the first to have the honor of establishing relations between two generous nations which should unite as friends and natural allies. ^

Poinsett’s status is hard to define. His original title was that

of "Agent for seamen and commerce," but his instructions of June 28, 1810

had given him the tinle of United States consul to Buenos Aires, Chile and

Peru while his promotion in June, 1811 had made him consul-general for Buenos

Aires, Chile and Peru. Despite the change in titles Poinsett at no time oc¬

cupied the status of a consul for, as Moore remarks, "Consuls- General and

Consuls are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent

of the Senate." ® Since, as the trihunal del Consulado in arguing against

Poinsett’s reception wisely pointed out, the Senate had not confirmed his

^Rippy, Poinsett, pp. 41 et seq.

^J. B. Lockey, Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings (New York, 1920), p. 444.

®John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law (Washington, 1908), V. 6, p 6. -17 appointment he was not an accredited agent of the United States. Nor did his appointment carry with it any kind of recognition for

The act of soliciting and receiving from the government of a certain country an exequatur for a consular officer at a particular place, is not a conclusive recognition of such country's sovereignty over the place in ques¬ tion. The request for an exequatur concerns merely the performance of cer¬ tain duties by a United States officer toward the vessels and citizens of the United States, with the permission of the authority in actual possession, and cannot be assumed to inply the expression of any opinion as to the right of possession or to operate in confirmation of a claim or right. ^

As has been stated, Poinsett's original title was that of "Agent for Seamen and Commerce." What are the duties of a commercial agent?

The duties of a commercial agent are similar to those of a Consul, and the same instructions are given to each, yet he does not, like the lat¬ ter, bear a commission from the government; this is given only under the seal of the United States. He is a mere executive agent sent abroad for the promotion and advantage of American commercial interests, selected by the Department £of stated corresponding with, instructed, and controlled by the Department, and bearing an authority from the President under the seal of the Department. 2

The appointment of such an agent does not carry with it "a recognition on the part of this government of the existing authority at the places to which •? they are made." ° Though this was the well defined policy of the United

States in later years and the generally accepted viewpoint in international law, such must not have been the case at the time of Poinsett's appointment as the fear of English interference connotes. Nevertheless, the subsequent actions of the Department of State must lead us to believe that in the eyes of the Department Poinsett was at all times a mere executive agent.

Poinsett upon his arrival in Chile formed a lasting friendship with

Don José Carrera. The two men were a good match — both young, impetuous and possessed of a fiery Latin temperament,though Poinsett, through his wide tra-

1Ibid», V, 13. o As quoted by Moore, Digest, V, 3, from the Consular Regulations of the United States (1896).

®Loc. cit. -le¬

vels,had gained considerable experience which served him as a kind of check.

Carrera soon began, to look to Poinsett for advice on matters of government

and gradually the latter assumed more and more influence in the government

of Chile. He was lavishly entertained by the ruling oreole class. The vice¬

roy of Peru, who, as the protector of the king’s colonial dominion^ sought

to keep those dominions intact, declared the Chilean junta’s declarations

of free and open ports to the commerce of all nations to be null and void

and began to issue letters of marque to privateers who preyed upon merchant vessels touching Chilean ports. Mindful of his instructions to protect •‘kneri-

can seamen,who were the chief sufferers from the Peruvian privateers, Poinsett urged the Chileans to close their ports to all Peruvian ships. But the junta

did not want to go quite so far in further antagonizing the viceroy and there¬ fore rejected Poinsett's advice. At the same time Poinsett was •urging the

Chileans to declare their independence, promising to help them to get arms

in the United States and even going so far as to furnish them with the names

of certain manufacturers in the United States. But at this time war had broken out between the United States and England and the supply of aims from the United States to other countries was practically cut off, though Poinsett did not know this. ^

In the meantime additional instructions had been received from

Washington after Poinsett had repeatedly written asking for a letter of credentials to the governments of Buenos Aires and Chile. These instruc¬ tions, dated April 30, 1811, though not entirely satisfactory to him did assuage some of his suspicions that the United States was growing a little cold towards her southern neighbors. Monroe, then Secretary of State, wrote

Evans, Chile, p. 15. -19.

that "as inhabitants of the same hemisphere, as neighbors, the United States

cannot be unfeeling spectators of so important a movement .... Should

such a revolution {^against Spanish rulej take place it cannot be doubted that our relations with them will be more intimate, our friendship stronger than it can be while they are colonies of any European power. " ^ Was this an encouragement to seek independence? Surely so astute a diplomat as James Monroe could see the hidden innuendos of such instructions. Since one of the fundamental motives for the revolution in Spanish America was the desire to establish closer commercial relations with nations other than

Spain, these sentiments could easily be misread by the eager revolutionaries to whom Poinsett made known his instructions, to mean, in essence, that if the colonies declared their independence the United States would extend to them almost immediate commercial intercourse and perchance, recognition.

Whether this was the intention of Monroe or not, and we are fairly well con¬ vinced by subsequent events that it was not, it is substantially this inter¬ pretation which Poinsett applied to this, the last seu of instructions he received while in South America.

Probably the most influential organ in broadcasting United States friendship and goodwill was the Aurora de Chile, a daily newspaper established and ably edited by Camilo Henriquez. Henriquez was a radical who had imbibed deeply of eighteenth century French philosophy and who, probably because his paper was printed by Americans and on a press imported by Mathew Hoeval, an American citizen residing in Chile, had a great deal of admination for the

United States. Though the publication did not last long it made one contri¬ bution to Americo-Chilean relations in that it acquainted the people of

Chile with the utterances and opinions of some of the most famous American

Manning, Independence, I, 11. -20-

statesmen of the revolutionaty period as well as of the contemporary period.

The constant urgings of Poinsett upon the Chilean government, the

outright demand of Henriquez through the Aurora for a constitution and a de¬ claration of independence, plus the despotic action of the Peruvian vice¬ roy in closing all Chilean ports to foreign commerce and arming privateers to prey upon such commerce, finally induced the Chilean Patriots to adopt a

Patriot flag of yellow, blue and white and a cockade of the same color. To oelebrate the gala occasion a reception was set for July 4, 1812, the anni¬ versary of the North -American Declaration of Independence, with Poinsett as guest of honor. The celebration took place on the appointed date but was unfortunately marred by an untoward incident which served to cool Chilean ardor for the republic of the north. Prom all available reports it appears that the American printers of the Aurora imbibed too much of the spirituous liquors and engaged in a brawl with a detachment of Chilean soldiers from whom they had to be rescued by the police. The printers were arrested and

Poinsett broke off with Hoeval whom he accused of betrayal. Though Evans ^ implies that Carrera declined to fiilow the American example because of this incident, the ease with which the incident was overcome belies the statement.

Further, the close personal friendship of Carrera and Poinsett was not even disturbed by it. Later in the evening the banquet was held during the course of which, Poinsett drank a toast to Chilean independence.

But Poinsett was not one who did not believe in following up an opening and so when, after the banquet of July 4, he was appointed councillor

Evans, Chile, pp. 16 ot aeg.

2 Ibid., pp. 18 et seq.

*Z °Rippy, Poinsett, p. 44. -21-

for the Chilean government he did not hesitate to aooept. Many Chileans

had become enthused with the idea of independence and had begun to exert

pressure upon the government to draw up a constitution and declare its in¬

dependence, This committee appointed by the government included Henriquez

among its members and held most of its meetings at the home of Poinsett

where he could give counsel. Finally on July 11 this versatile individual

presented his own draft of a constitution modelled after that of the United

States and based on the assumption that Chile would declare its independence.

It, nevertheless, made provision for certain distinctly Chilean features,

of which the assertion of ecclesiastioal patronage was the most important.

The Poinsett draft was, notwithstanding this concession to distinctly Chilean

features, too strong for the committee which rejected it. The Chilean draft

recognized the rights of Ferdinand VII, made Catholicism the state religion,

contained a Bill of Rights and left the question of patronage to be decided

later.

At about this time a feud occurred between the Carrera brothers.

The eldest brother, Juan José, probably inspired by outsiders, attempted

to depose Don José, accusing him of misappropriations and dictatorial de¬

signs. A civil war between them seemed imminent when Poinsett stepped in

and effected a reconciliation. The effect of this act upon the Chilean

people is not known. Since, however, the Carreras were beginning to be

looked upon with suspicion and were being maintained in power solely by

force of arms, it is quite conceivable that they would not have looked ask¬

ance upon an event which would have wiped out the whole group.

Poinsett again began to complain of the lack of instructions from

Washington. In August, 1814, he -wrote to a friend in Charleston that "he

■'■Ibid., pp. 45 et seq. -22-

was tired of being shut up here without any communication from without."

In the same letter he complained of the temerity of the Chileans. "Could

I see a bold determination to appeal to heaven and the future of their cause,

and be free in spite of every obstacle, I would willingly await the event

... but their timidity vexes me." ^

While the above events were taking place in Chile, the United States

declared war on England. To protect American commerce in the western Paci¬

fic the American frigate,Essex, Captain Porter in command, was dispatched to

that region. Porter arrived in Valparaiso and sent an agent to Poinsett at

Santiago to announce his arrival. The latter in company with Don Luis Carrera,

commander of the Chilean artillery, hurried to Valparaiso to welcome him.

Upon his arrival in Valparaiso Poinsett was visüiy disappointed that no new

instructions had been brought him by Porter. He, nevertheless, set about

to arrange a big banquet of welcome for the captain and his officers. The

Chileans saw in the appearance of the American man-of-war- a bid for an

alliance with Chile and an intention on the part of the United States to de¬

fend Chilean independence with arms. As the time for the banquet arrived

and as the guests were gathering, a strange sail was sighted on the horizon.

Immediately the signal to board ship was given and the Chileans retired to the hills overlooking Valparaiso to witness the naval battle. But, alas, the

strange sail proved to be only a whaler and the hillside spectators, especially the women, were greatly disappointed. Soon afterwards Porter left Valparaiso for a long cruise but his stay at Valparaiso convinced the Chileans of what they considered an American manifes^tation of friendship. Such was Poin¬ sett’s influence in Chile that he had been able to induce the government to

1 Ibid., pp. 47-48. -23-

waive all customs, thereby allowing Porter to dispose of all of his prize captures and booty in Valparaiso, and to invite Porter to visit the seat

of the government at Santiago.

Since early childhood Poinsett had sought to do military service

in the cause of his country. He was too young to participate in the revo¬ lutionary war and too old to participate in the Mexican war and, ironically enough, was out of the country when the only war in which he could have par¬ ticipated took place. But it cannot be said that his military ability, what¬ ever its worth, never was shown for in Chile he served as a pseudo quarter¬ master-general for the Chilean army. Indeed he took the field against the

Spanish troops that were invading Chile from Peru. He was present at the battles of San Carlos, Concepcion and Talcahauno. Indeed, it was at his insistence that the latter was fought. The privateers commissioned by the viceroy of Peru had captured many American seamen, mostly whalers out of

Nantucket, whom they had taken to Talcahauno from whence the authorities were threatening to send them in irons to Lima and Poinsett hoped to storm the city and deliver the sailors. The town was carried after a furious three hours battle and many years later the citizens of Nantucket raised a memorial to this brave American.

But the beginning of the end was in sight. In order to allay the growing hostility to his regime at Santiago, Carrera sent Poinsett back to mend his broken fences. But already the people were complaining that the government was too much under American influence and so Poinsett’s mision failed of its object. The executive junta deposed the Carreras, re-establishec the army and made Bernado O’Higgins its commander-in-chief. There followed a virtual civil war between the followers of O'Higgins and those of Carrera with Poinsett definitely allying himself with the latter.

Meantime, in response to the almost constant representations of the -24-

British consxxlar agents of the Rio de la Plata region, a British squadron

was dispatched to Chile to counteract the efforts and influence of Poinsett.

Captain Hillyar, in command of the British squadron, while on his way to

Chile stopped at Lima where he received from the viceroy certain conditions

for peace. When Hillyar arrived at Valparaiso he found Porter already there

Unwilling to violate Chilean neutrality by attacking the American while in

port, Hillyar decided on a long policy of watchful waiting. At length, on

March 28, Porter thought he saw his chance to escape and under a brisk wind

weighed anchor. But luck was not with the doughty commander and just as he

rounded the last point a severe squall set in which so damaged his riggings

that he was forced to put back. There, within a few feet of the shore,the

two forces engaged in battle while the Chilean populace gazed from the dis¬

tant hillsides and cheered the game fight being waged by the Americans.

Poinsett sought most earnestly to have the Chileans agree to fire upon the

English to prevent Porter's surrender but this they steadfastly re&sed to do

The result of the battle was a foregone conclusion. Porter surrendered and was allowed to return to the United States, with his crew, in a small craft,

’/.lien Poinsett asked to be allowed to accompany them, Hillyar bluntly refused

averring that he would not permit "the arch enemy of England to return to

America while the countries were at war." ^

In the year 1815 Spanish forces had invaded Chile with a view to x-estoring Spanish dominance there. There had followed a series of battles

in which the royalists were generally defeated. Captain Hillyar, after the naval battle of Valparaiso, began to push plans for a settlement between

Chile and Peru,and Poinsett knew that any obstructionist efforts on his part

xtippy, Poinsett, p. 54. -25-

would be futile. Porter, before his departure, had warned him that only a superior naval force could restore the prestige of the United States in

Chile and urged him to quit the country. A superior naval force, Porter argued, would awe the Chileans into friendship for the United States, but stated that "sxich a friendship is scarcely worth possessing as we cannot count on its durability." ^

Poinsett’s influence had been on the decline since 1813 and his continued hostility to England and Spain made Hillyar urge upon the Chilean government his expulsion from the country. Poinsett was already dejected over the apparent failure of the Chilean movement for independence and over his seeming desertion by the United States government. Already in 1813 he had written his friend in Charleston that "it is now nearly two years since

I received a line from home and I find myself shut out from the world and all intercourse with my friends .... I have made the greatest sacrifice 2 possible and remained banished . . . ." The immediate occasion for Poin¬ sett’s departure was his complete break with the Supreme Director over the

Chilean attitude in the recent Anglo-American fracas at Valparaiso. Almost exactly one month after the surrender of Porter at Valparaiso, Poinsett left

Chile to return to the United States by ’way of Buenos Aires. He returned in disguise just as he had gone there and received from the President public 3 commendation for his work in Chile.

Within less than a fortnight (May 5) after Poinsett’s departure,

Chile and Peru came to a settlement under the mediation of Captain Hillyar.

~*Tbid., p. 55

"Ibid., pp. 52-53.

I5icL«j p. 57• -26-

Under the terms of agreement the Spaniards were to evacuate Chile within two months and Chile was to recognize the Cadiz Regency and to receive a general amnesty for most of the patriots. Both sides were dissatisfied with this treaty and especially so were the Carreras who had been excluded from the general amnesty provisions. Further, the viceroy who, upon re¬ ceipt of the treaty was feeling more confident of an ultimate victory be¬ cause of his reinforcements from Spain, refused to accept it and ordered

Chile invaded. The Chileans did not like the new pretensions of the Regency.

Two of the Carrera brothers escaped from their Spanish prisons and returned to Chile where Don Luis was arrested immediately upon his reappearance in

Santiago while Don José reentered that city at the head of a considerable body of troops and was received enthusiastically by the Chilean garrisons there. The civil war now began again between Carrera and O’Higgins but the renewed menace of Spanish invasions from Peru served temporarily to bring the two rival forces together to protect their independence. But two such mutually suspicious and jealous leaders could not offer the resistance necessary to overwhelm a superior, well trained and disciplined force. At the battle of Rancagua, in October, 1814, the Chilean forces under O’Higgins were crushed and the patriots, including O'Higgins, scattered across the

Andes where they joined the army -of the Andes then forming under Jose" San

Martin. Thus ended the first phase of the Chilean struggle for independence and with it the first period of Chilean-Amerioan relations.

But this chapter cannot be brought to a close without a brief con¬ sideration of the European attitude with respect to the general revolutionary movement in South America. Only three European countries figured very pro¬ minently in the Spanish American revolutionary movement, France, England and Spain. Spain, as the parent country, can be briefly dismissed by say¬ ing that she violently opposed any independence movement and consistently -27-

refused to alleviate those conditions which made such a movement inevitable.

The French attitude with regard to the revolutionary movement in

South Amerioa may be conveniently divided into two periods — the first from 1789 to 1795 and the second from 1796 to 1814. The French revolu¬ tionary spirit of 1789 sought to give liberty to all oppressed peoples and

in 1792 a plan was presented to the French government for the revolutioni¬

zing of Spanish America. In that same year France approached England with

a view to putting into effect the proposal specifically offering England the

isle of Cuba. ^ After 1795 when the Spaniards swung back into the French

orbit no serious discussions for the severing of the colonies of her ally took place in Frenoh councils. With the Napoleonic domination of Spain there naturally occurred no French encouragement of a Spanish-American revolt.

The attitude of England towards the Spanish-American colonies was a long time developing. As early as 1741, Stephen Deveros, a British ob¬ ject, put forward a scheme for the dismemberment of the Spanish colonial em¬ pire, partly for commercial and partly for humanitarian reasons; and in

1776 a British naval officer (Captain Kaye) had laid down a similar but more detailed scheme. Between 1779 when the Spaniards definitely entered the

American revolution and 1783 when the American Revolution was over, these schemes were multiplied and on certain occasions seemed to have gained 2 government perusal. By 1783 the Spanish-Amerieans had definitely come g to look to England for support of their independence schemes.

By 1790 the schemes and intrigues of Franeisco de Marianda were

^W. S. Robertson, "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of South America", Annual Report American Historical Association for 1907 (Washing¬ ton, 1908), I, 184-528. "

^Ibid., pp. 197 et seq.

3j. Fred Rippy, Latin America in World Politics (New York, 1928), p. 26. 28

known throughout Europe and Worth America and Pitt, who had became frightened by the Nootka Sound controversy, actually began seriously to study Miranda’s great scheme. Miranda sought to establish, with British aid, a vast constitutional empire in America having as its northern boundary a parallel line 45 degrees north latitude drawn from the source of the Miss¬ issippi to the mouth of the Paoifio and extending on the south to Cape Horn and on the east to embrace Cuba while on the west to the Pacific Ocean. But when Spain saw that revolutionary France was not willing to live up to the

Family Compact she yielded on the Nootka Sound controversy and Miranda was temporarily put aside. ^ With the break up of the first coalition in 1795 and the return of Spain to the French orbit, England again studied carefully the plans of Miranda. He was kept in England and put on a government pen¬ sion and in the spring of 1808 a force was actually gathered to be sent to

South America, but the spirited resistance of the Spanish people to Napo-

o leonic rule caused the troops to be sent to the Peninsula instead.

In 1806 and the early part of 1807 Britain entertained ideas of oon- quest of some of the Spanish colonies as witness the Popham expedition (un¬ authorized) against Buenos Aires and the subsequent Whitelock expedition. In

1807 and 1808 the English entertained ideas of revolutionizing the Spanish colonies as witness the Castlereagh memorandum of March, 1808 on this sub¬ ject. But "by the summer of 1810," says Professor Rippy, "British policy toward the revolting colonies had been clearly formulated. It can be stummed up in a few words: moral opposition, a hint of mediation and protection from

For the Nootka Sound controversy see the article by Professor W. R. Manning, "The Nootka Sound Oontroversy”, Annual Report American Historical Association for 1904 (Washington, 1905), pp. S?9-47fe. ”

^Robertson, Miranda, pp. 404 et seq. 29-

France." ^ Though England1s official attitude may have been one of moral opposition, the British agents on the scene certainly did nothing to reflect that opposition. It was at the insistence of these agents that Captain Hill- yar was sent around to Chile to offset .American influence. Further, the vioeroy of Peru justified the seizure of certain American vessels during the period from 1812 to 1815 by asserting that the United States and England were at war and since Spain was an ally of Great Britain (Spain had rejoined the ooalition in 1808) he had a legal right to make the seizures. This argument has no basis in international law but England did not dispute this right of seizure. Thus British attitude from 1808 onward was at one and the same time contradictory — she was morally opposed to independence but she sent agents to the Spanish American colonies to foster commercial relations which only independence could permanently establish.

1 RiPPy» Latin America in World Politics, p. 40. CHAPTER III

PRELIMINARIES OF RECOGNITION

The battle of Raneagua reestablished Spanish rule throughout Chile, and in the two and a half years which elapsed between that decisive conflict and the renewal of the struggle in 1817, the restored Spanish authorities ruled with an iron hand» Under Osorio and his successor, Monte del Ponte, an attempt was made to restore the status quo ante, newspapers were sup¬ pressed and their most prominent editors jailed. Spanish judges were rein¬ stated, the elective cabildo was abolished and all of the liberal decrees of the revolutionary government were abolished.

But the force that was to sound the death knell of Spanish domina¬ tion on continental South America was already being prepared under the skill¬ ful direction of Don José do San Martin. San Martin was a young man of creole parents who had served in the Spanish army, gaining a commission and a reputation as a doughty fighter and good officer in the peninsular cam¬ paigns. Resigning his commission in the Spanish army in 1812, San Martin had returned to Buenos Ayres to take part in that province’s struggle for independence. Vi/hile serving in the army of the de la Plata region he had conoeived the idea of delivering Peru from Spanish rule by striking at her from the south, that is, by way of Chile. In order, therefore, to accom¬ plish his aim, Chile had to be freed of Spanish rule so as to offer him pro¬ tection for his long lines of communication and, he hoped, a recruiting place for additional troops. In order to deliver Chile it was necessary to trans-

^Wilgus, Hispanic-Amerioa, p. 251.

-30- ■31-

port an army across the hitherto impassable Andean mountain range. Despite the many seemingly insurmountable difficulties which beset him, San Martin began to reoruit and train men for the task. While engaged in these organi¬ zational activities he was joined by Bernado O'Higgins and the remainder of the Chilean patriots fleeing the Spanish army in 1814. ^

It bespeaks the rough nature of the country that the Spaniards allowed a new army to collect against them within one hundred and fifty miles of Santiago and yet felt themselves to be almost absolutely safe from at¬ tack. The Andes were thought to be simply impassable by an army of any con¬ siderable sizel In 1817 San Martin decided to march on Chile, and aftsr an heroic march across the Andes, probably unexcelled in all military annals, descended on that country. Passing so quickly over the Ancagua plain that the Spaniards had little time to draw up effective resistance, San Martin crossed the range just north of Santiago and descended on the gorge of Cha- cabuco. Here the deoisive battle for Chilean independence was fought. The

Spanish soldiers fought bravely and held to the attack not believing for a moment that San Martin had had time to bring his main army across the Andes until that army was upon them. Over half of the Spanish army was left lying on the field while the remainder fled to Valparaiso from whence they embarked for Lima. A few days later San Martin victoriously entered Santiago. ^

Strangely ënough San Martin’s reoeption in Santiago was not at all enthusiastic. The commercial classes feared another civil war with its at¬ tendant evils of forced contributions and general disorder while the common

^For the life and work of San Martin see the short biography by Anna Schoell- kopf, Don José de San Martin 1778-1850 A Study of His Career (Neiv York, 1924).

2Ibid., p. 89 -32-

people cared little whether a Spaniard or a Bantu occupied the governmental palace. San Martin, nevertheless, called together an assembly of notables which promptly elected him to the position of "Governor with Plenary Powers" which he, with characteristic self effaoement, refused to accept. Further, his primary aim was the deliverance of Peru and he knew that he could not get wholehearted Chilean support in this project so long as a foreigner, even himself, held the reigns of government by force. On his recommendation, therefore, Bernado O’Higgins, son of a former captain-general of Chile, was selected as Supreme Director of Chile. ^

Among his first acts as Supreme Director O'Higgins, on March 8,

1817, appointed Don Manuel Hernandez de Aguirre already in the United States as agent for the United Provinces, to act also as agent for Chile. He was authorized to make purchases for the Chilean army for which purchases O'Hig¬ gins pledged the responsibility of the Chilean treasury. On April 1, he ex¬ tended the hand of fellowship to the United States and asserted his desire to enter into more friendly relations with them. "Your Excellency,” he wrote to Monroe, "will always find me most earnestly desirous of promoting the commercial and friendly relations of the two countries, and of removing evéry obstacle to the establishment of the most perfect harmony and good

O understanding."

San Martin soon returned to Buenos Ayres leaving the conquest of southern Chile to O'Higgins and Las Heras. The lack of a patriot navy al¬ lowed the Spaniards to land four thousand well-trained troops at Taloahauno, one of the seats of Spanish power in the southern part of Chile. These

^Dawson, Republics, II, 170 et seq.

2 Manning, Independence, II, 898. 33- troops under General Osorio began to advance towards Santiago, whereupon

San Martin, who was still commander-in-chief of the army, issued orders to

O'Higgins, then in command at Concepcion, to retreat, so as to lengthen

Osorio's lines of communication and thereby weaken his flanks. It was dur¬

ing this retreat that O'Higgins stopped at Talca to await further orders and then and there, on January 1, 1818, issued his defiant proclamation of

Chilean independence.

Of more international importance than the Chilean Declaration of

Independence was a circular manifesto addressed to all the nations of the world. In the document Chile set forth the causes which impelled them to separation. It asserted that the Chileans claimed the soil by right of birth, that the temporary regency acting in behalf of Ferdinand VII had vio¬ lated its promises and by its tyrannical acts had forced the Chileans to assume their natural right to be free and independent of Spain. The manifesto is in reality a bid for recognition of Chilean independence by the civilised nations of the world. Though based on philosophical justifications it is a remarkable indictment of Spanish misrule in Chile under the monarchy, the 2 regency and the restored monarchy.

"While the events outlined above were taking place in Chile, there was growing recognition in world councils of the importance of South American affairs in world politics. Indeed, it may be truthfully stated that an ap¬ preciation of South isnerican affairs is absolutely necessary to an under¬ standing of European diplomatic history from the time of the Congress of

Vienna to the establishment of the July Monarchy. Continental Europe looked longingly to England for support in the solution of its problems while Eng-

1Ibid., II, 900.

^Ibid., II, 900 et seq. 34-

land sought to combat the influence of the newly risen power in Worth America in South America* England sought to know the attitude of the United States on the struggle in the Spanish colonies. Would they offer moral or active support to the colonists? Would they prematurely recognize the independence of the colonists and by so doing precipitate at least a diplomatic struggle with the Holy Alliance? If so what would be England's policy? On the ans¬ wer to these and like questions hung English diplomacy during the critical years from 1815 to 1823 when she allowed continental Europe to float in a sea of uncertainty while she watched anxiously towards the Worth American shores. Thus, more than indirectly, did the policy of the United States to¬ wards the Spanish American colonies determine the course of European history during the eventful period of 1815-1823. ^

American statesmen were well aware of the European attitude and shaped their policy with an eye to it. It is probably fortunate that the two men who were directing that policy in the early years were the same two men who brought it to a fairly successful conclusion in 1823 —- John Quincy

Adams was United States minister to England in 1815 and James Monroe was

Secretary of State. As early as December, 1815, Monroe wrote to Adams at

London that

The revolution which is making rapid progress in South America becomes daily more interesting to the United States. From the best infor¬ mation that we can obtain, there is much cause to believe that those pro¬ vinces will separate from the Mother country. Several of them already have abrogated its authority and established independent governments. They in¬ sist on the acknowledgement of their governments by the United States, and

For the most detailed study of the attitude of the various European nations during this period see Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826 (Cambridg 1927). The two excellent biographies, C. K. Webster, Foreign Policy of Castle reagh 1815-1822 (London, 1925) and Harold V. Temperley,' Foreign Policy of ban¬ ning 1822-1827ÏLondon. 1925) furnish additional information as does The Cam¬ bridge History of British Foreign Policy, Ed. by Ward and Gooche (London, 1922 j, II« 35 when it is considered that the alternative between governments which in the event of their independence would be free and friendly, and the relations which, reasoning from the past, must be expected from them as colonies, there is no cause to doubt in which scale our interest lies. 1

As chief executive Monroe returned to the subject two years later when in his message to congress of December 2, he declared that

It was anticipated at an early stage that the contest between Spain and her colonies would become highly interesting to the United States. It was natural that our citizens should sympathize in events which affected their neighbors .... Through every stage of the conflict the United States have maintained an impartial neutrality, giving aid to neither of the par¬ ties in men, money, ships, or munitions or war. They have regarded the con¬ test not in the light of an ordinary insurrection or rebellion, but as a ci¬ vil war between parties nearly equal, having as to neutral powers equal rights. Our ports have been open to both, and every article the fruit of our soil or the industry of our citizens which either was permitted ID take has been equally free to the other. Should the colonies establish their independence, it is proper now to state that this Government neither seeks nor would ac¬ cept from them any advantage in commerce or otherwise which will not be equally open to all other nations. The colonies will in that event become independent states, free from any obligation to or connection with us which it may not be their interest to form on the basis of a fair reciprocity. 2

It was this attitude of watchful waiting that characterized American policy towards the Spanish colonies during the next few years. Official sympathy for the Patriot oause may be read into the American recognition of their belli¬ gerency. That such personal sympathy existed for the Patriot cause is seen in a consideration of Monroe's previous attitude toward the Mexican revolu¬ tionary agents. ® The message aroused interest in those South American colonies where it was printed or otherwise attracted the attention of the ruling officials. ^

■Hlocre, Digest, I, 2.

O «J. D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1769-1897 (Washington, 1898), II, 13.

3 Isaac J, Cox, ’’Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents", Annual Reports American Historical Association for 1911 (Washington, 1912), 199-215.

%he message was officially brought to the attention of the Chilean officials by Theodorick Bland who arrived in Chile sometime later. See Bland report A. S. P.,. 1. R., TV", 293 et seq. -36-

At the same time the Chilean agent, de Aguirre, was urging recogni¬ tion upon the United States. On December 16, 1817 he wrote Adams again to urge upon him the necessity and justice of such recognition. In reply to the contention that such a "premature" recognition might involve the United

States in war he astutely pointed out that though there were no set rules for determining political successes the usual practice was to recognize de faoto sovereigns and if this practice were to vary it should vary always in favor of the oppressed against the oppressor. He continued

It is, therefore, strongly contended by many of the most celebrated civilians ‘that in all revolutions produced by the tyranny of the prince foreign nations have a right to assist oppressed people', a right dictated by justice and generosity. Now it can not be supposed that the observance of justice ever gave a pretext for war to the party or nation most interested in a different conduct. Since, there8*s[and here Aguirre plays his trump cardj my government has limited its pretensions to acknowledgment of its real and effective sovereignty, which even our adversary himself would not call in question, it considers itself authorized to take this step, by the practice of nations, by public opinion and the sanction of eternal justice. ^

A fortnight later Aguirre complained of the unfavorable effect upon the oo- 2 lonists of the United States neutrality laws, bringing to the fore a charge which has ever been the bane of neutrality laws, that is, they tend to aid the stronger power in its struggle against a weaker and, in many instances, oppressed people.

It has been the time-honored preliminary to recognition of new na¬ tions for the nation contemplating or even debating such recognition to send agents or commissions to investigate prevailing conditions in the new state.

have seen how the United States early sent out Joel R. Poinsett as agent for oanmerce and seamen. We, too, have noted the activities of that agent

1A. £. P., F. R., IV, 180.

2Ibid., IV, 182.

^Evans, Chile, p. 23 -37-

while in Chile and the subsequent failure of that phase of the Chilean

revolt. Among the first of these special agents to arrive in Chile was

John B. Prévost who arrived in the early part of 1818 on board the United

States man-of-war Ontario, Captain Biddle in command. Prévost had been in¬

structed to take charge of all discussions that might arise with Chile. ^

In his first despatches Prévost wrote of the generally favorable

attitude of the Chilean people towards the United States. In a despatch

dated Santiago, February 13, he wrote of a conversation he had held with

the Supreme Direotor during the course of which O'Higgins had again ap¬

proached the subject of recognition, holding that Chile was extremely anx¬

ious to maintain the closest relations with the United States as the only

country upon whose friendship they could rely and that the interests of

both must ever serve to unite them against European influence which was of

its nature hostile to republics. O'Higgins further claimed to have received

considerable aid from England but flatly stated that they would have much

preferred it from the United States. In replying to the points raised by

the Supreme Director Prévost stated that the people of the United States were greatly interested in the Chilean revolution but that their (the Chileans*

internal strife had not inspired that American confidence in their permanent

separation which would justify the United States in taking steps that might

involve them in war. He further stated that when "they should take Lima and

assume any political shape we should be the first to meet the danger and

acknowledge their independence. " But, he added, "for the moment they ought to be satisfied with the advantage derived from the commerce by which, alone, they obtained the supplies necessary for their defense." In this final posi-

^Evans, Chile, p. 23 -38

tion O’Higgins acquiesced but expressed the hope that the two Americas would

soon become one great ^erican family. ^

W. G. D. Worthington was another of those early special agents of

the United States to Buenos Ayres, Chile, and Peru. He had been in Buenos

Ayres for some time where he had favorably impressed the Patriots. In his

first despatch Worthington spoke of the "beneficial effect produced by the

arrival of the Ontario, the manly and correct conduct of Captain Biddle" as well as the good understanding on which Judge Prévost had placed things "prior

to his Worthington’s arrival." Worthington joined Prévost in urging the

United States to keep always a vessel of war in the waters around Chile, a

request that brings to mind Porter’s earlier statement that only United 2 States worships could awe the Chileans into friendship.

The Chilean secretary of state, upon returning Worthington's cre¬ dentials, remarked that while the Supreme Director had observed that they

lacked even a letter of introduction he had, nevertheless, instructed him to accept and treat with Worthington as a special agent of the United States on matters of commeroe. At the same time he made it perfectly clear that this departure from strict international usage was occasioned by the desire to foster in every possible way the most friendly relations with the United

States. In his reply to the points raised by the Supreme Director as to the inadequacy of his credentials ’Worthington expressed regret that they were thought in any way incomplete but at the same time pointed out that the cre¬ dentials antedated the battle of Chacabuoo from whioh Chile could date her

^Manning, Independence, II, 913 et. seq.

^Worthington to Adams, Santiago, February 15, 1818, Manning, Independence, II, 915.

^Miquel Zanartu to Worthington, Santiago, March 1, 1818, Manning, Independence, II, 915 et seq. -39-

de facto independence. He took occasion to point out also that at the time

of his presentation to the Supreme Director the confidential views of the

President on the nature of his mission were unfolded to the Supreme Direotor.

Those views, he continued

... not only evinced the foresight of the chief magistrate in anticipating in a great degree the present state of things, but it is pre¬ sumed it was under the influence of that anticipation that the undersigned was so particularly instructed to conduct the present agency in the most con¬ ciliatory and friendly manner -^when it is further considered that only a month had elapsed since the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed in this capital that it is possible, tho' in the opinion of the undersigned not within the urge of probability that the star of Chile may again be eclipsed for a time on the banks of the Maule, the Plains of San Fernando or the Fields of Rancagua. That obligations are due in good faith from the United States to his Catholic Majesty between whom relations of amity are still subsisting; and that the extraordinary state of the political world did not justify more decided steps to be taken in the Patriot cause of South •America, it is confidently believed that even up to this date the United States £ancQ its citizens have done everything [.that} ought to be expected of them ... 'L

The above portion of Worthington's reply may bear some explanation.

The foresight alluded to in the reply was merely the recognition by Monroe, as evidenced in his letter to Adams in 1815, that a free South America would be commercially advantageous to the United States. He sought, by continuing

Madison's policy of sending commercial agents to South America, to offset

English influence there. The previous conduct of Poinsett while in that re¬ gion plus the fact that in December, 1817, Luis D'Onis,the Spanish minister to the United States, arrived in Washington, and, though he was not immediately recognized, began to press upon the attention of the State Department certain alleged departures from strict neutrality probably led Monroe to urge con¬ ciliatory tactics. More important, probably, than either of these reasons was the fact that in 1817 Adams already had his eye to the cession of West

Florida by Spain to the United States and he realized that any precipitate

"Worthington to Zanartu, Santiago, March 12, 1818, Ibid., II, 917, et seq.. -40' action on the part of the United States towards the Spanish American co¬ lonies would seriously hinder such an agreement. The reference to the

"extraordinary state of the political v/orld" clearly shows American appre¬ hension over its South American policy.

Between the time of Worthington’s despatch, dated February 27, and the date of his reply to the objections raised by the Supreme Director in re¬ gard to his credentials the Spaniards had reentered Chile from the south and had begun to advance upon Santiago. Therefore, at the request of certain

American citizens residing at Santiago he had hurried to Valparaiso to ask

Captain Biddle to delay his departure until after the outcome of the impend¬ ing military battle which would, in all probability, decide the fate of Chile.

These citizens supposedly sought to delay Biddle so that in case of a Patriot defeat they would have a quick and ready means of evacuation. But the ser¬ vices of Captain Biddle v/ere never needed, for, on the plains of Maipo, was fought the second decisive battle for Chilean independence. Of the five thousand royalists engaged in the battle only about eight hundred escaped the

Patriot slaughter, while the Chilean losses consisted mainly of Negroes who fought bravely for Chilean independence and left half their number dead on 2 the fields of Maipo.

On April 9, Prévost, who was still in the country, wrote that only a small portion of Chile remained in the hands of the royalists and that with the smallest force and a little attention the ports of Coquimbo, Talcahauno and Valparaiso could be made inaccessible to any force which Spain could send over. He began now to urge Chilean recognition showing the vast commercial advantages that would accrue to the United States as a result of such previous

LWorthington to Adams, Valparaiso, March 5, 1818, Ibid., II, 916.

^Dawson, Republics, p. 181. -41-

recognition. Prévost stated that after a residence of three months he could truthfully say that the impression first produced by the arrival of the On¬ tario was still graving in Chile and declared that this favorable impression had resulted in a compensatory decline of British influence in Chile. He mentioned the fact that he had brought to the attention of the Chilean govern¬ ment that several .American ships had been illegally confiscated and held in

Talcahauno by the Spaniards and that he would greatly appreciate the return of those ships to their owners when the Chilean army effected the oapture

(then impending) of that port. It was at this stage that Prévost began to show his Chilean sympathies which were eventually to make him more "Chilean than the Chileans" and ultimately lead to his recall. After stating that

Worthington had named a vice consul for Valpariaso and one for Coquimbo he urged that all such appointments in the future be given exclusively to natives, pointing out that such a course would help to promote the American feeling. ^

Despite the presidential injunction of conciliatory tactics, Worthing¬ ton now began to emulate Poinsett and take a hand in the internal affairs of

Chile. On the same day that Theodorick Bland arrived, Worthington presented to O'Higgins, the Supreme Director, the draft of a constitution modelled after that of the United States and along with it a proposed manifesto calling for 2 a general election, to be signed by O'Higgins.

In the summer of 1817 Monroe had determined to send a commission to

South America to investigate and gather certain information necessary to the formation of a policy toward the newly risen republics. A commission of three was chosen only one of whom crossed over into Chile. The commission was in¬ structed to ascertain the pecuniary resources of the countries visited, their

"^Prévost to Adams, Valparaiso, April 9, 1818, Ibid., II, 920 et seq.

2 Manning, Independence, II 923 et seq. form of government, the degree of literacy, the total population, the appro¬

ximate number in each contending party, type of leadership, extent and size

of the army and navy, the attitude of the people towards the United States

and Europe, what American products find the best markets, the principal ports, 1 harbors with defense works, etc.

Bland, the only one of the Commission to cross the Andes, arrived

in Chile on May 5, 1818, and was presented to the Supreme Director on the

next day. He remained in Chile until July 15, when he returned to Buenos

Ayres and finally to the United States in November. In his report on Chile

which was submitted to Congress in December, 1819, Bland dealt mainly with

the commercial future of Chileno-American relations. In answer to the ques¬

tion as to the nature of the Chilean population Bland reported it to be main¬

ly white and about one million two hundred thousand persons. Bland waxed

very enthusiastic over the possibilities of commerce which Chile offered.

He wrote

Immediately in front of the mountain coast of Chile is the great vrtiale fisnery of the Pacific which has been so profitably pursued by the citizens of the United States. There are engaged in this business, annually, about fifteen or twenty American ships .... The advantages and conveniences to this branch of trade of the open free ports of such a country as Chile are obviously prodigious «... The aggregate value of this branch of trade may be estimated at one million dollars per annum. 2

Further, he reported that the islands on the coast of Chile literally swarmed with various species of seals "whose skins find ready sale in India," and abounded in sandalwood "a product of immense value in China for religious purposes." He estimated that there \vere no less than five American ships of from two hundred to three hundred tons engaged each year in this trade and

^Rush to Rodney and Graham, Washington, July 17, 1817, Ibid., II, 42 et seq.

2A. S. P., F. R., IV, 311. -43-

having an annual cargo of about sixty thousand dollars each. "These ships,

when outward bound," he asserted, "always pass directly by Chile and it would

be to their great advantage in having its ports open to them for outward

freight, for supplies, and for protection." The American vessels trading

coastwise with the Indians and Spaniards bartered for valuable otter skins

which they sold in China doing an average yearly business of about eighty

thousand dollars per ship, he reported. "These ships might in many respects

be very advantageously supplied on their outward voyage from the ports of

Chile, which are directly in their way." Bland saw in an independent Chile

a source of supplies for the maintenance of the newly graving northwest re¬

gion of the United States. He recognized the industrial importance to that

region of Chile since as a growing nation Chile would need ships' spars

and lumber in abundant quantities, the principal product of the northwest

region. Between February, 1817 and July, 1818, American merchants, according

to this report, landed at Chilean ports merchandise valued at 11,375,000

. . . and a much greater value might have been imported with a cer¬ tainty of its finding a market and being paid for in the fair course of trade, but for the inconveniences growing out of the present state of things .... But if we recollect the advantages which our citizens have in the China and India trade by being unfettered with the monopoly of an East India Company, and that the silver and copper of Chile will enable them to extend their en¬ terprise and push their commerce to a greater advantage than ever, I think it will not be deemed an exaggeration to set down the commerce itself as worth to the United States, annually, about two millions of dollars .... Summing up the whole of these branches of commerce, they will form a total of six millions one hundred and fifty eight thousand dollars of annual value to the United States, which will be either produced, cherished, or protected from that new and interesting country . . . . ^

When he brought to the attention of the Supreme Director the position of the

o United States with regard to Amelia Island, Bland reported that the Supreme

XA. S. P., F. R., IV, 312. ~ — — <=K

^Amelia Island, a small dot of territory lying off the Northeastern coast of Florida, was Spanish by right of discovery. The general breakdown of Spanish -44-

Director professed to be entirely ignorant of the existence of such an island.

Upon his departure from Chile Bland was again informed that Chile was willing to grant commercial concessions to the United States in return for recogni¬ tion. To this Bland gave the usual answer that the United States desired no

concessions but simply the granting of most favored nation status. ^

On June 10, Prévost again wrote to Adams of his intercession on be¬ half of the American ships,the Canton and the Beaver. In order to gain a hearing before the Viceroy at Lima he had used the pretext of wanting to dis¬ cuss the Spanish depredations on American commerce in the western Pacific.

During the audience he brought forth the Canton and Beaver claims. The vice¬ roy asserted that while Talcahauno was nominally under the rule of the captain- general of Chile he had jurisdiction on application. Later the viceroy ap¬ proached Prévost with the req uest that he act as mediator in effecting a

cessation of hostilities in Chile. In return for his mediation the viceroy

offered Prévost freedom from detention for all American ships not laden with

colonial authority had permitted pirates to use the island as a base from which to launch their illegal operations. It was also used as a port for fitting out filibustering expeditions against Spanish mainland provinces. In the sum¬ mer of 1817 a group of persons who had seized the island in the name of certain rebellious Spanish provinces launched an expedition from it against east Flo¬ rida then being claimed by the United States. President Monroe had thereupon ordered the suppression of the island establishment. In order to allay, how¬ ever, any Spanish American fears that the United States had any general designs upon Spanish territory in the New World the members of the South American com¬ mission were particularly instructed to inform the Patriot government that the United States intended the seizure not as an unfriendly act towards them, in whose name the expedition was presumably launched, but only as an act of self defense. The commissioners were told to inform these governments that the United States laid no claim to sovereignty over Amelia Island and that its seizure would last only until effective rule was established by the lawful government. See Moore, Digest, II, pp. 42, 173, 175; I, 406 et seq.

For the entire Bland report see A. S. P., R., IV, 292 et seq. -45'

arms and protection from injuries of any kind to the ships engaged in the

whaling trade, allowing the latter group to take on supplies at blockaded

ports y/ithout molestation. Taken back by this generous offer, Prévost per¬

suaded Captain Biddle to allov/ the use of the Ontario as the soene of nego¬

tiations and exchange of prisoners. With this aotion of Biddle's the vice¬

roy was so pleased that he gave him a note instructing all vessels of the

Spanish squadron to permit his free navigation. An important enclosure of

this despatch was copy of the royal order sent to all viceroys instructing

them to make financial estimates of the injuries sustained by them as a re¬

sult of aid of any kind given by American oitizens to the Patriate from the

time of Miranda until then. These estimates were to be used by the Spanish

government in the Florida treaty negotiations to offset the claims expected 1 to be presented by the Americans.

Worthington now began to urge recognition upon the United States,

averring that though the rulers of Chile were partial to England the bulk

of the populace was favorable to the United States. Evidence that the

Chilean government had not forgotten Poinsett's partiality for the Carreras

is seen in the fact that the government looked upon every citizen of the

United States as one of their supporters. Worthington expressed a fear that unless recognition came to Chile soon that country would be swallowed up by 2 Buenos Ayres. Sometime later the American agent was given a chance to dis¬ pel in some measure this official Chilean belief that every American was favorable to Carrera by his aotion in answer to a request from Bon Jose

Miquel Carrera to intercede in behalf of his brothers who were then in a

^Manning, Independence, II, 925 et seq.

^Worthington to Adams, Santiago, July 4, 1818, Ibid.. II, 920 et seq. -46

Chilean prison under sentence of death. Yi/hen his request for clemency was

refused, Worthington dropped the matter entirely and by eo doing, according 1 to his own despatch, convinced the Chileans that he was not a party man.

The tone of Worthington’s despatches to his government now began

to change. In October he wrote of the graving Chilean belief that the Ameri¬

cans were after all only a group of Shylocks willing to buy and sell in the

best market regardless of the setbacks which such activities might occasion

the people for whose cause they expressed the most profound sympathies.

Worthington cites two of the most flagrant examples of this selfish ccsamer-

cial interest, the sale to the viceroy of Peru of the governor Shelby , a ship

of about three hundred tons, and the case of the Two Catharines. The captain 2 of the latter had sailed into Valparaiso, bought five hundred fanegas of wheat at three dollars per fanega and then cleared for Rio de Janeiro. Once

he reached the high seas, however, the captàin changed his course and steered

for Lima, arriving at that port sometime later and disposing of his wheat

at sixteen dollars per fanega, thus making a gross profit of thirteen dollars

per fanega. In order to understand the Chilean indignation at this flagi¬

tious disregard of their sympathies it must be remembered that Chile and

the United Provinces had been at war with the viceroy of Peru since early

1817; that since they had no navy with which to blockade the Peruvian coast

they had decided to prohibit the exportation of grain to Peru. As a result

of this colonial embargo upon shipment grain in Peru was extraordinarily

scarce, thus accounting for the great disproportion in price. The Chileans,

therefore, looked upon the American sale of -wheat, bought under false pre-

^Carrera to Worthington, Buenos Ayres, September 12, 1818, Ibid., II, 939 et se'

^Spanish measurement equal to 2.58 bushels in Chile.

Sworthington to Adams, Santiago, October 22, 1818, Manning, Independence, II, 941 et seq. 47-

tenses, as feeding their half starved enemies. In this same note Worthing¬ ton opined that nothing short of recognition ecu Id dispell the Chilean view that the United States neutrality law really aided Spain against them. He observed, too, that the British kept two men-of-war in those waters which seemed at that moment to be making a vain attempt to establish some system of trade between Lima and Santiago.

In the meantime Aguirre was in the Unitod States trying to purchase supplies for the Chilean army and ships for the Chilean navy. His activities in behalf of the Patriots led to his subsequent arrest though he was later released on payment of a fine.'*' The failure to deliver these ships, for which Chile had already sent over two hundred thousand dollars, plus the fact that, in the meantime, a ship of the Spanish expedition had been cap¬ tured by the Chileans in two vessels obtained from England led to a cooling off of the popular Chilean ardor for the United States. ^

At the same time the voice of Henry Clay was being raised in the

United States Congress in favor of Hie South American revolutionaries. In

March, 1818, he introduced a motion in the House appropriating eighteen thousand dollars to maintain a minister from the United States at Buenos

Ayres. Though the motion met with popular sympathy the House rejected it, largely on constitutional grounds, by a vote cf one hundred fifteen to 3 forty-five.

In the presidential oabinet meetings the question of recognition was the topic of the day and on March 25, 1818, Monroe asked his cabinet

■''Evans, Chile, p. 22 p ^Worthington to Adams, Santiago, November 18, 1818, Manning, Independence, 11, 1023. "

•2 jfemal,s_ of Congress, Fifteenth Congress, First Session, 11, 1570 et seq., 1605 et seq., 1655j Adams, Memoirs, T7, 67-7'2 passim".' -48-

these four questions:

Has the Executive power to acknowledge the independence of new states whose independence has not been acknowledged by the parent country, and be¬ tween which parties a war actually exists on that account?

Will the sending or receiving a minister to a new stats under suoh circumstances be considered an acknowledgment of its independence?

Is such acknowledgment a justifiable cause of war to the parent country? It is a just cause of complaint of other nations?

Is it expedient for the United States, at this tin», to acknowledge the independence of Buenos Ayres, or any other part of the Spanish dominions in America now in a state of revolt? 1

The cabinet was split on this issue» Some members urged this recog¬ nition by the appointment of a minister to one of the colonies, thereby en¬ snaring congressional approval — the senate by its confirmation of the appointee and the House by its initiation of the appropriation necessary to the maintenance of that officer. From this opinion Adams dissented, ar¬ guing that recognition was an executive duty and fearing the establishment of the dangerous precedent of prior legislative approval to the performance 2 of what he thought to be a purely executive funfcion.

In August Adams drafted a reply to Aguirre’s note of December 16, and sent a copy of this draft to Monroe. In this letter Adams set forth one of the most brilliant arguments against premature recognition in all diplo¬ matic history. He at the same time answered the four questions propounded by Monroe in the cabinet meeting of March 25, After reviewing briefly the course of the revolution in Venezuela, Adams conceded that

... there is a stage in such [revolutionary/ contests when the parties struggling for independence have a right to demand its acknowledg¬ ment by neutral parties and when the acknowledgment may be granted without

W. S. Robertson, "The Recognition of the Hispanic American Rations by the United States," Hispanic American Historical Review, I (August, 1918), 246.

2Ibid., I, 247. -48-

departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is the stage when indepen¬ dence is established as a matter of fact so as to leave the chances of the opposition party to recover their dominion utterly desperate. The nation must, of course, judge for itself when this period has arrived; and as the belligerent nation has the same right to judge for itself, it is very likely to judge differently from the neutral and to make it a cause or pretext for war, as Great Britain did expressly against France in our Revolution, and sub¬ stantially against Holland. If war thus results in point of fact from the measure of recognizing a contest independence, the moral right or wrong of the war depends upon the justice and sincerity and prudence with which the recognizing nation took the step. I am satisfied that the cause of the South .Americans so far as it consists in the assertion of independence against Spain, is just. But the justice of a cause, however it may list individual feelings in its favor, is not sufficient to justify third parties in siding with it. The fact and the right combined can authorize a neutral to acknow¬ ledge a new and disputed sovereignty. The neutral may, indeed, infer the right from the fact, but not the fact from the right . . . 1

During the summer of this same year Spain had asked the allied powers

of Europe to mediate the struggle between her and her colonies. In his mes¬

sage to Congress of November 16, Monroe had expressed a belief that any general

European aid which Spain might receive in her struggle with her colonies would be diplomatic and that there was little cause for alarm over a possible armed

intervention. He, also, expressed satisfaction with the policy pursued by p the government In the struggle.

The Chileans since 1817 had sought to acquire a navy for the purpose

of blockading the Peruvian coast but all efforts seemed to come to naught,

despite the gigantic efforts of San Martin, and as late as June, 1818, the

Chilean secretary of state asserted that there was "not one sailor in all

Chile"; yet less than eight months later practically all Spanish commerce had

been driven from the western Pacific and the coast of Peru effectively block¬

aded by the Chilean navyl The oredit for this apparent miracle rests with

■^Moore, Digest, I, 78-79.

^Richardson, Messages, II, 43 et seq. -49-

an English nobleman, Earl of Dundonald, Thomas Cochrane.

Lord Cochrane was born to the sea. His uncle was an admiral in the

British navy and when young Cochrane joined him at seventeen he was already technically credited with, five years services in the fleet. Cochrane early

showed his precocious instincts and during the Napoleonic wars he exhibited unusual tactical ability. The hidebound traditions of the British navy in the early nineteenth century had prevented his rapid promotion to the ad¬ miralty while his impetuosity led him in 1809 to prefer oharges against a

superior officer, for which he had been "stripped on deck." He had then

served in the House of Commons for varying terms and in May, 1818 was in¬ vited to take charge of the Chilean navy, an invitatiai which he accepted.

This action led to a vigorous protest from the Spanish ambassador whose sovereign had once before offered dochrane an admiralty in his navy, a re¬ quest which Cochrane refused. Disregarding the Spanish ambassador’s pro¬ test, Cochrane left England for Chile in August and arrived in Valparaiso on November 28. He immediately set about to organize a navy for Chile out of the three ships she possessed, and on January 16, 1819, began his opera¬ tions against Spanish commerce which were to lead to bitter disputes between

Chile and other nations, especially the United States. ^

Before Cochrane began his aggressive operaticns, however, an inci¬ dent occurred which greatly aroused Worthington and occasioned a hurried let¬ ter to Washington. It seems that the United States man-of-war,Ontario, Cap¬ tain Biddle in command, arrived at Valparaiso while Cochrane was there and upon entering the port failed to salute either the Chilean national flag or

Cochrane’s admiral’s flag, both flying from the Chilean "flagship." Further,

Biddle, it was rumored, had on board some Spanish families and a large amount

■^Sir Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee, Editors, Dictionary of National Bio¬ graphy (Oxford, 1917), IV, 621 et seq. -50-

of Spanish property, ostensibly bound for Rio de Janerio. Biddle was re¬

ported to have categorically refused to be visited and searched and suddenly,

without warning, weighed anchor and left. There were two questions involved

in this matter though Worthington recognized only one of them. First, does

a naval salute to a national flag constitute a tacit recognition of that

flag’s independence, and, second, does the right of visit and search extend

to a national vessel of a neutral put in at a belligerent port? In answer

to the second of these questions, to which Worthington attached most importance,

he argued that since it was not then contended that enemy goods were oovered

by a neutral flag on the high seas, muoh less within the territorial limits

of a belligerent, a merchant vessel which was properly visited, searched,

and indemnified for resultant losses could not complain. But since there

seemed to be no precedent wherein a national vessel had been searched for

enemy goods the proper method would be for the offended nation to demand the

goods of the commanding officers, and if the request was refused the belli -

gerent should then represent his oause to the neutral government, demand jus¬

tice and hold it answerable. But by no means should the belligerent "make

a forcible entry and/or search on a neutral vessel anywhere, under any pre¬

tense or reason whatever, unless you intend to violate the sovereignty of

her nation." Though Worthington passed lightly over the question of

naval salutes, it was one of vital importance as it involved the whole ques¬

tion of recognition and has in later years been the subject of at least one

diplomatic exchange between the United States and a foreign state. While no definite principle was found showing that a full naval salute constitu¬

ted or did not constitute recognition the subsequent strict naval injunc¬ tion of 1893 against firing salutes to any government not recognized by the

^Worthington to Adams, Santiago, January 4, 1819, Manning, Independence, II, 1024 et seq . -51-

United States suggests that such salutes must have from time to time been

a source of friction to the United States and accepted by some as at least a partial recognition of a new state. ^ Before Worthington’s note reached the United States he had received an official comrnunication from the Chilean

secretary of state, Joachim de Echeverria, stating that though words had passed between Coohrane and Biddle he did not believe that the latter’s sud¬ den departure was at all connected with these differences; for that act he could give no reason. At the same time he made it clear that although it was known that Biddle carried enemy goods and passengers and that his con¬ duct was prejudicial to the Patriot cause "it never was thought to search by force or otherwise a neutral ship." Echeverria sent along with this note a copy of the correspondence between Biddle and Cochrane, a translation of which was printed in the United States in the hew York Gazette of May 6,

1819, and reprinted in Hiles* Register on May 15.

Worthington in January, 1819, took his leave of Chile but in his final conference ’with O'Higgins the question of recognition was again broached. When asked about the form of government which Chile would even¬ tually take, O'Higgins emphatically replied, "republican." There is also in this despatch the now usual complaint against growing English influence, the assertion being made that Lord Cochrane was a boon to that influence.

There is a hint of growing dissatisfaction in Chile with O’Higgin’s dictator¬ ship. ®

The year 1819 saw the nations of the world become increasingly con-

^For the whole question of naval salutes see Moore, Digest, II, 210 et seq.

2^Echeverria to Worthington, Santiago, January 8, 1819, Manning, Independence, II, 1026.

^Worthington to Adams, Santiago, January 26, 1819, Manning, Independence,II, 1035. * -52-

scious of the fact that the South American struggle, as far as Spain was

concerned, was praotically over. In that year Spain sought to bind the

United States in her future relations with the South American states by having her agree in the Florida treaty not to recognize the independence of those new states. This the United States indignantly refused to do and as that year was drawing to a close, Monroe said in his annual message to Con¬ gress of Deoember 7, that

In the Civil War existing between Spain and the Spanish provinces of this hemisphere the greatest oare has been taken to enforce laws in¬ tended to preserve an impartial neutrality .... The progress of the war, however, has operated ... in favor of the colonies. Buenos Ayres still maintains unshaken the independence whieh it declared in 1816, and has enjoyed since 1810. Like success has also lately attended Chile, and the provinces north of the la Plata bordering on it, and Venezuela .... Should it become manifest to the world that the efforts of Spain to subdue these provinces will be fruitless it may be presumed that the Spanish govern¬ ment itself will give up the contest. In producing such a determination, it cannot be doubted that the opinion of friendly powers, who have taken no part in this controversy, will have their . • . influence. 1

One question might conceivably be asked concerning the meaning of the last statement quoted. Did Monroe mean that by neutral recognition of the independence of the revolting Spanish colonies Spain would be forced, however reluctantly, to admit the same? Or did he mean that by diplomatic representations from the other powers Spain might be persuaded to recognize the colonies as independent and thereby give up the attempt to reconquer them? If Spain had adopted the latter course the other nations would have been quite satisfied in seeing her granted preferential commercial treat¬ ment by her former colonies. Some strength to the belief that Monroe in¬ tended to adopt the former course and present Spain with a fait aocompli is gained from the fact that prior to the preparation of this message Monroe had announced his intention of recognizing Buenos Ayres in the very near

•^Richardson, Messages, II, 58 et seq. -53-

future.

Prévost returned to Santiago in March, 1819 and took up where

Worthington had left off in January. One of the first matters to which he

turned his attention was the Chilean declaration of a blockade of the entire 2 Peruvian coast. In keeping with .American policy Prévost entered a routine

protest against this paper blockade. To this protest the Chilean government

disavowed any claim "of forfeiture for any infraction ... at any place where no actual force was employed." ® To show his sincerity the Supreme

Director issued orders exempting the port of Payta,where American whalers

put in for the winter, fran the blockade. "The Government here," Prévost wrote, "has assumed a character and a stability that I did not anticipate

twelve months ago .... They have now entire possession of Chile to its

ancient boundary the Bio Bio and everything promises success and permanency."

In the meanwhile the depredations of Lord Cochrane upon seafaring

commerce were continuing and now began to attract more and more the atten¬

tion of Provost. The question of the Chilean blockade brought from him re¬

peated protests to the Chilean government and on more than one occasion he wrote to Adams that the Chilean depredations seemed to bear hardest upon

Americans. It was also during this period that United States warships were

oruising in the Western Pacific offering some protection to American com¬ merce plying between the United States and China. Among these ships was the

frigate Macedonian, Captain Downes in command. Captain Downes put into Val-

"Slobertson, Recognition, 1,247.

^The proclamation was published in Niles' Weekly Register for July 3, 1819, XVI, 318. 5 Manning, Independence, II, 1033.

'Prévost to Adams, Santiago, May 16, 1819, Manning, Independence, II, 1037. -54-

paraiso from Peru in the latter part of June, an aot which brought a loud protest from Cochrane. In answer to this protest, Prévost asserted the right of a neutral man-of-war to visit a blockaded port but admitted that this right could be proscribed by the blockading power when that power had reason to believe that the anchoring of the neutral man-of-war was injurious to them. He, nevertheless, claimed this right for Captain Downes on the ground that it had been given by the Chilean government . ^ Yïhile Prévost’s point in international law seems to be well taka* it must be remembered that the prosecution of a blockade is wholly the duty of the naval officer in command and his discretion should supersede any governmental order respecting that blockade, issued without his advice.

There now began a heavy barrage upon the United States in behalf of the recognition of Chile. Prévost on September 13, wrote that such were the relations between Chile and Spain,that he had no apprehension of a recon¬ ciliation between them and that Chile was then in a position to maintain her independence. Admitting that he knew little of the European complications that might ensue as a result of recognition, Prévost was, nevertheless, posi- 2 tive that such a step would produce the most happy results in Chile. A few weeks later Antonio Jose de Yrisarri, the Chilean foreign secretary, then on a mission in England, communicated through the United States Minister re¬ sident in England his government’s desire for recognition. The impotence of Spain to subjugate Chile and the natural detestation of the Spaniards, he stated, were sufficient guarantees against the little risks of compromise

^Prévost to Adams, Santiago, July 3, 1819, Manning, Independence, II, 1038. g Prévost to Adams, Santiago, Manning, Independence, II, 1040, et seq. such recognition would bring to the United States. He again offered the

United States commercial preference in Chile to pay for recognition and announced that he was then authorised to enter into a commercial treaty on that basis. ^ And in the opening days of 1820 O'Higgins wrote that the free¬ dom of Chile was practically absolute, its commerce was moving freely, a strong navy guarded its shores and its general inaccessibility made attack difficult. O'Higgins asked very pointedly if Spain could "stand upon a dis¬ regarded right and make a demand on the sovereign judgment of your nation, which would recognize us with as great propriety as she recognized the inde¬ pendence of North America." O'Higgins continuéd with youthful exuberance,

Such a supposition would be a sanction that would grant everlast¬ ing life to any tyranny and would hurl your people and others from their lofty position won through justice and bravery and again enslave nations which had wrested the rights of nature from oppressors who based their rights on conquest.

And O'Higgins attempts to present to the United States and other nations a dilemna, but by failing to present clearly the two alternatives falls short of his goalj

... if to Spain be conceded the right to continue her impossible endeavor to bring these countries under her former depredations, does that confer upon her the supreme power to have subservient to her will the will of all powers, even of those whose political interest in recognition of our emancipation would be oonducive to their own national prosperity? 2

The year 1820 was decisive in the Spanish attempt to reconquer the provinces of South America, for in that year a battalion of soldiers, re¬ cruited in Spain to be sent to South America to put down the revolution there, themselves revolted — a garrison revolt which became a national re¬ volution. The revolution in Spain continued throughout the year and the

^Yrissari to Adams, London, Ootober 31, 1819, Ibid, II, 1041. p O'Higgins to Monroe, Santiago, January 5, 1820, Manning, Independence, II, 1044-1045. 56-

nations became almost fully convinced that Spain, unaided, would never

again be able to regain her South American colonies. From 1820 on it can

be truthfully stated that the recognition of the independence of the Spanish

American colonies by the civilized nations of the world was only a matter

of "time and circumstance." But South America in this eventful year was oc¬ cupied with problems peculiarly its own. One of these was the liberation of

Peru from Spanish domination and in this work Chile soon took the lead. It was the popular enthusiasm for the expedition against Peru and the exploits

of Lord Cochrane that kept the growing opposition to the rule of O'Higgins from blazing forth in open rebellion. It was also in this year that the continued rumors of an early attempt to establish a South American monarchy led to friction between the revolutionary leaders and some apprehension in

North American state councils.

Not only was South America preoccupied with its peculiar problems in this eventful year but the other nations of the world were beset by more pressing problems. England was again trying to draw into her shell of iso¬ lation by disavowing the objectives of the Holy Alliance. Metternich, Alex¬ ander and other statesmen of Continental Europe were striving desperately by the Karlsbad decrees and other repressive measures to stem the growing tide of liberalism, and in the United States legislators fought for the adoption of the Missouri Compromise in a vain effort to put a stop gap in the growing expansion of the institution of slavery. Despite legislative preoccupation with slavery that champion of South American independence,

Henry Clay, was again heard in the halls of Congress. In May he introduced two resolutions in the House; the first declaring it to be expedient for the

House to appropriate a sum to outfit and pay the salary of any minister sent by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to any one of the South American provinces; the second providing for the selection -57

by the secretary of state of the most outstanding re voliit ionary general

in South America and presenting him with the sword given Captain Biddle by the Peruvian viceroy. After a heated debate the first resolution was passed by a majority of five. The second resolution was nothing more or less than a studied, deliberate insult to Spain but the Congress was never allowed to vote on this measure as cooler heads prevailed and the motion was withdrawn.

Nevertheless, Clay took occasion during the debate on the first motion to condemn roundly Captain Biddle for his conduct while in South America. In urging passage of the first resolution Clay asserted that only two questions were necessarily preliminary to independence; (l) the fact of independence;

(2) the capacity for self government. On the first no doubt existed, he said, and everything seemed to be in favor of the second. Indeed, in their capa¬ city for self-government and progress he said chey showed themselves, in some respects, in advance of the United States, citing specifically in proof of this their abolition of slavery. Clay very wisely pointed out the two outstanding benefits of early recognition, commercial preference and moral leadership in the Western Hemisphere.-*■ It cannot on the basis of present information be definitely stated that the bitter congressional attack upon

Biddle spurred Adams to action,but sometime after Clay's speech Adams wrote

John M. Forbes, American agent then in Chile, a half apologetic letter in an effort to smooth over the Chilean rancour at Biddle's conduct. Express¬ ing confidence in the sincerity of Captain Biddle, Adams wrote that if one or two incidents had occurred while he was in Chile which had seemed to be¬ lie American friendship they arose out of circumstances over which Biddle 2 had no control.

^For the entire debate on these resolutions see Annals of Congress, 16th Con¬ gress, 1st sess., II, pp. 2223 et seq. farming, Independence, I, 133 et seq. •58

In the meantime Prévost had gone to Buenos Ayres from whence he had

been expelled in the last days of 1820. He returned to Santiago and on Jan¬

uary 6, 1821, wrote Adams that the British fleet commander had intimated Bri¬

tish recognition of a monarchy in Spanish America and had implied that there was considerable belief that such a system was about to be established. Pré¬

vost,nevertheless, expressed his belief in the firm republicanism of San Mar¬ tin and O’Higgins. ^ In subsequent despatches Prévost began to devote more

and more attention to commercial matters, writing in March that the increased

trade of the United States with China via Chile was a boon to American na¬ tional finances. ^ But his attention was quickly turned to the question of blockades when he protested to Echeverria, the Chilean secretary of state, against the English commander’s notice to the effect that he recognized a 3 blockade of the whole coast of Peru south of Lima. The British commander’s notice was a skillful maneuver to offset American influence in Chile, for by recognizing the designated coast as being under a blockade which his

government’s nationals would respect he threw the United States on the de¬ fensive, for her nationals, including the naval commanders, had consistently refused to recognize the Chilean blockade on a mere technicality of inter¬ national law. Hardy, the British commander, knew that by having the English government recognize the Chilean blookade he could give an element of truth to the rumour, already current in Chile, that the Americans cared little for

Chilean independence but only for free trade. Thus Prévost's protest was designed to have the Chilean government pull the United States chestnuts out of the fire by declaring only those ports under blookade where an actual

^Manning, Independence, II, 1046 et seq.

^Prévost to Mams, Santiago, March 10, 1821; May 2, 1821, Ibid.,11,1048 et seq. 1050 et seq. 3 Prévost to Adams, Santiago, June 18, 1821, Ibid., 1051 et seq. -59-

foroe was stationed to prevent entry. Such an action on the part of the

Supreme Director would have reduced the favorable effects (to British pres¬

tige) of Hardy’s declaration. But these things the Supreme Director must

have recognized for he refused to make the declaration sought by Prévost.

While at the same time agreeing in principle with the .American theory of ef¬

fective blockade he asserted that the coast from Posco to Ancon must be so

considered. ^

Throughout this period the activities of Lord Cochrane continued.

With little regard for governmental orders and policies he began to seize

and impress English and American sailors caught in ports under blockade and,

much to the amazement and horror of the Chilean government, began to secure

provisions by raiding coastà towns much like later day Chinese bandits. Natur¬

ally the government disavowed his acts; they, nevertheless, gave rise to new

problems between Chile and other countries, especially England. The English

withdrew their recognition of the blockade and begem to insist upon its null¬

ity in toto if it were contemplated to cover any portion of the course not

actually guarded by force. Though Chile continued to deny the consequences 2 of the blockade she maintained staunchly the sufficiency of the force.

Thus within a few months the English were compelled to adopt the American

principle of effective blockade later laid down in the Declaration of Paris

in 1856.

Despite the Chilean government’s reiterated denials of responsibi¬

lity and repeated orders to Lord Cochrane to desist, he ocoatinued his hostile

operations. He now began a new practice of selling licenses to ships to trade with certain ports. Prévost, in a letter to Adams, dated Santiago,

^O'Higgins to Prévost, Santiago, June 23, 1821, Manning, Independence, II, 1052

^Prévost to Adams, Santiago, June 30, 1821, Manning, Independence, II, 1053 et seq. July 6, cites two specific instances of such a practice, the Brig Robert

Forge and the tramp, Rebecca, each of which paid $19,000 for the privilege

of trading at closed ports. ^ In the summer of 1821 Michael Hogan, a com¬

mercial agent of the United States to Chile arrived at Valparaiso and on

August 18, wrote Mams that Chile had placed a fifteen per cent duty on all

goods shipped from Valparaiso to Lima. He stated further that he had already

notified O’Higgins that no nation would ever consider recognizing Chile v/hile 2 the acts of Lord Cochrane continued. In October he wrote of the growing

discontent among foreign nations with the activities of Lord Cochrane and

mentioned the restorationj by Chile, of the impressed British seamen. At the

same time he reported that he had received his exequator as consul-general

of the United States. ®

In 1818 the Chilean government had converted the island of San Juan

Fernandez into a sort of Devil’s Island for exiled political refugees, and

in the course of years had transported some few persons there. In a despatch written in Ootober, Hogan reported that an American vessel had anchored off the island and sent eleven men with fifteen casks for water. The inhabitants

seized these men and held them as hostages until the captain had anchored

in the bay. They had then sent him a message saying that they wanted to charter his ship to carry them to the Chilean mainland and that they had

overcome the governor and were holding him prisoner. The captain took alarm at this lest they should try to board him at night and weighed anchor for Val¬

paraiso. ^ A fortnight later, Hogan warned all Americans to avoid the Chilean

^Manning, Independence, II, 1054.

^Ibid», II, 1055 et seq.

3 Hogan to Adams, Valparaiso, October 9, 1821, Manning, Independence, II, 1056 et seq.

^Hogan to Adams, Valparaiso, October 9, 1821,Manning,Independenee,II,1058 et sec -61-

island of Marquipes, citing the case of an English whaler which had put in

there and had lost two boats and had had ten men murdered. Hogan wrote, Adams

that Lord Cochrane had become a problem to the Chilean nation, asserting that

"in publiok estimation ... he borders upon a pirate belongirgto no na¬

tion." 1

In the meantime events had been moving along favorably for the South

-American republic, in the United States. Henry Clay again brought up the

question of recognition in the House by introducing a two-fold motion, one

expressing congressional sympathy for the Spanish -^mierican cause and the

seccmd advising the president that whenever he saw fit to establish ministers

in any of the Spanish American countries the House would lend its constitu¬

tional support. The resolutions were carried after a bitter debate in which 2 the constitutional question of executive functions was again argued. Mon¬

roe looked upon the passage of the resolutions, says Professor Robertson,

as an endorsement of his previous South American policy. In support of this

he cites an inedited portion of one of Monroe’s memorandae which declared

that the "object of the executive has been to throw the moral weight of the

United States into the scale of the revolutionary movement, without such a

deep compromitment as to make them a party to that side." In his message

to Congress on December 3, Monroe gave an inkling of what was soon to come when he declared that

it is understood that the colonies in South America have had great success during the present year D.821J in the struggle for their independence «... It has long been manifest that it would be impossible for Spain to reduce these colonies by force, and equally so that no conditions short of

%ogan to Adams, Valparaiso, November 4,1821,Manning, Independence,III,1059 et seq.

2Annals of Congress, Sixteenth Congress, Second Session, II, 1081 et seq.

^Robertson, Recognition, I, 29S -62-

their independence would be satisfactory to them. It may therefore be pre¬ sumed,tod it is earnestly hoped, that the Government of Spain, guided by liberal counsels, will find it to comport with its interests, due to its magnanimity, to terminate the exhausting controversy on that basis. To pro¬ mote this result by friendly counsel with the Government of Spain, will be the object of the Government of the United States.

Throughout the year 1822 the despatches from American agents in

Chile were concerned mainly with three questions, the Macedonian claims, the favorable benefits to the United States of prior recognition, and the ques¬ tion of commerce. In a despatch dated January 15, Hogan wrote that the

Chilean finances were in good shape, the Chilean paper money being accepted at only a five per cent discount and at par in payment of customs duties.

-An interesting comment found in this despatch is the prophecy that ^hile would be a granary for the people of the north of it until "California is peopled," a prophecy that, strangely enough, came true. A few months later he wrote that the course pursued by Chile during the first quarter of the year had seemed to be designed to annihilate comrnerce in order to gain recog¬ nition by coercion. He expressed a belief that only the presence of American war vessels in or near Chile prevented that government from summarily dis¬ missing him from the country and thereby putting American merchants and com- 3 meroe at the mercy of Chilean officials.

It is interesting to note the dissimilarity of viewpoint of the two representatives of the United States in Chile. While Hogan on numerous oc¬ casions showed a lack of sympathy for the Patriots and blamed the Chilean differences with the United States upon the Chilean lack of sincerity, Pré¬ vost wrote impassioned letters blaming these differences upon the impudence,

^Richardson, Messages, II, 105.

^Hogan to Adams, Valparaiso, Manning,Independence, II, 1061 et seq.

®Hogan to Adams, Valparaiso, May 6,1822,Manning Independence,11,1062 et seq -63-

greed, and sheer stupidity of American seamen, including naval commanders.

In June, the latter wrote that the party spirit and animus had practically

disappeared in Chile and that the spirit of particularism had given away be¬

fore the liberality of the capital. ^ In August, he complained that the

United States man-of-war, Franklin, had created enmity by her stay at cer¬

tain intermediate ports, asserting it to be "a fact that infinite mischief

to the Patriot cause has grown out of this intercourse" and at the same time

regretting the fact that the American naval commanders had not seen fit to

observe the Chilean blockade as had the English. Prévost also wrote of the

joy that was manifest in Chile after every renewed rumour of recognition and

stated his belief that official notification of recognition would result in

a lowering of the Chilean duties by ten or fifteen per cent on importations

from the United States. 2 in September, he wrote that Chile, in anticipa¬

tion of early recognition, had already named her minister to the United

States. In November, he complained that the long delay in recognition was

working to decrease its importance and the ultimate amount of influence which 4 such a recognition would give. In the same month he informed Adams of Chile'

refusal to enter into an armed alliance with Brazil unless the negotiations 5 7/ere preceded by recognition, and on November 28, he wrote of the terrific

earthquake which had practically destroyed Valparaiso ten days earlier. ®

^Piwost to Adams, Santiago, June 12, ]822Jbid., II, 10S3 et seq.

2Prevost to Adams, Santiago, August 22, 1822, Ibid., II, 1066. . 3 Prévost to Adams, Santiago, September 11, 1822, Ibid., II, 1067.

^Prévost to Adams, Santiago, November 2, 1822, Ibid.,11, 1069 et seq.

^Prévost to Adams, November 15, 1822, Ibid., II, 1071.

£ Prévost to Adams, Santiago, Ibid., II, 1073. -64-

Thus from the despatches of American agents in Chile it is evident that at the end of the memorable year 1822 the Chilean g>vernment knew nothing of the events which had taken place in the United States vith regard to recognition, and Chile continued to pursue a policy sometimes of coercion and sometimes obeisance in order to secure the one thing she desired most recognition. CHAPTER IV

RECOGNITION AND THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER

"Recognition1*, says Rivier in his classic definition of the term, "is

the assurance given to a new state that it will be permitted to hold its place

and rank, in the character of an independent political organism, in the societj

of nations." ^ But "premature recognition," says Moore, "constitutes an

act of intervention." Mams clearly set forth the American principle of

recognition in the draft of his reply to Aguirre and he showed his cogni¬

zance of the pitfalls of premature recognition when he wrote to Smith Thomp¬

son, the secretary of the Navy, that

. . . every question of national sovereignty and independence, is a complicated question of right, and of fact — and accordingly the words of our own Declaration were that these United Colonies, are and of right ÇoughtJ to be, free and independent States. So long therefore as this question re¬ mains at stake upon the issue of flagrant war no third party can recognize the one contending for independence as independent without assuming as de¬ cided the question, the decision of which depends upon the issue of war; and without thereby making itself a party to the question, no longer neutral to the question, the recognizing power can no longer claim the right of being neutral to the war — these positions are clear in principle, and they are confirmed by the experience of our own revolutionary history. 3

The exchange of ratifications between Spain and the United States

of the Florida purchase treaty on February 22, 1321, practically cleared

the last obstacle to United States recognition of the independence of the

revolting Spanish provinces. Adams and Monroe now no longer seemed to doubt

^■As quoted by Moore, Digest, I, 72.

2Ibid., I, 73.

^Manning, Independence, I, 105 -66-

the fact of independence but waited only for the expedient moment to accord

recognition. A hint of the future course of American action is seen in Mon¬

roe’s message to Congress of December 3, 1821. ^ Harly in January, 1822,

Adams and Monroe became convinced that the opportune time for recognition was at hand and Adams informed Manuel Torres, Colombian agent in the United

States, that the president was seriously considering early recognition. 2

At the same time Daniel Brent, undersecretary of state, was writing to John

M. Forbes, the American agent in Buenos Ayres, and outlining what he expect ed to be the future course of events though admitting that he had no definite knowledge as to which way "the cat paw might pump." The anticipated call from Congress came on January 30, when the House asked the President to lay before it such information as he had on the Spanish colonial struggle as well

as all information he might have respecting the political condition of the new nations and the state of war between them and Spain. ^ To this call

Monroe answered 'with his message to Congress of Maroh 8, declaring that

The revolutionary movement in the Spanish Provinces in this hemisphere attracted the attention and excited the sympathy of our fellow citizens from its commencement .... As soon as the movement assumed such a steady and consistent form as to make the success of the Provinces probable, the rights to which they were entitled by the law of nations as equal parties to a war were extended to them .... This contest has now reached such a stage and been attended with such decisive success on the part of the Provinces that it merits the most profound, consideration whether their right to the rank of

^•See above pp. 61-62.

^Robertson, Recognition, I, 251 et secj.

3Ibid., I, 252. 4 Annals of Congress, Seventeenth Congress, First Session, I, 825, 828. ■67-

independent nations, with all the advantages incident to it in their inter¬ course with the United States, is not complete .... Chile declared its independence in 1818 and has since enjoyed it undisturbed; and of late, by the assistance of Chile and Buenos Ayres, the revolution has extended to Peru .... It is manifest that all of QjheJ Provinces are not only in the full enjoyment of their independence but considering the state the war and other circumstances, that there is not the most remote prospect of their be¬ ing deprived of it ... . When the result of such a contest is manifestly settled, the new governments have a claim to recognition by other powers which ought not to be resisted .... The delay which has been observed in making a decision on this important subject will, it is presumed, have afforded an unequivocal proof to Spain, as it must have done to other powers, of the high respect entertained by the United States for her rights and of their deter mination not to interfere with them. The Provinces belonging to this hemis¬ phere are our neighbors, and have successfully, as each portion of the coun¬ try acquired its independence, pressed their recognition by an appeal to facts not to be contested, and which they thought gave them a just title to it. To motives of interest this Government has invariably disclaimed all preten¬ sions, being resolved to take no part in the controversy or other measure in regard to it 'which should not merit the sanction of the civilized world. To other claims a just sensibility has always been acknowledged, but they in themselves could never became an adequate cause of action .... When we re¬ gard, then, the great length of time which this war has been prosecuted, the complete success which has attended it in favor of the provinces, the present condition of the parties and the utter inability of Spain to produce any change in it, we are compelled to conclude that its fate is settled, and that the Provinces which have declared their independence and are in the enjoyment of it ought to be recognized .... In proposing this measure it is not con- templatéd to change thereby in the slightest manner our friendly relations with either of the parties, but to observe in all respects, as heretofore, ^ should the war be continued, the most perfect neutrality between them ....

Immediately upon reading the president's message Joachin de %iduaga sent a sharply worded protest to Adams against the proposed recognition of the new states. "Where", he sarcastically asked, "are those governments which ought to be recognized? Where the pledges of their stability? ....

Where the right of the United States to sanction and declare legitimate a re¬ bellion without cause, and the event of which is not even decided." Such a recognition, he continued, can "in no way now, or at anytime, lessen or in¬ validate in the least, the right of Spain to the said provinces." Nor could auch a broad policy be used to prevent or deprive Spain of her right

Richardson, Messages, II, 117-118. -68-

"to reunite them to the rest of her dominions." ^ In reply to this protest

Adams wrote that "the Civil War in which Spain was for some years involved with the inhabitants of her colonies has ceased to exist." He continued,

The Government of the United States, far from consulting the dic¬ tates of a policy questionable in its morality yielded to an obligation of duty of the highest order, by recognizing as Independent States, Hâtions which, after deliberately asserting their right to QxheJ character have maintained and established it against all the resistance which had been or could be brought to oppose CM .

In direct reply to Andauga*s reassertion of the rights of Spain to reconquer the colonies, Adams wrote that "this recognition is neither intended to invalidate any right of Spain, nor to affect the employment of any means which she may yet be disposed or enabled to use, with the view of reuniting those Provinces to the rest of her daninions." Thus spoke John Quincy Adams one year before the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. By this statement

Adams did not exclude foreign aid to Spain for the purpose of reoonquest for he categorically stated that the United States would not object to the employ¬ ment of any force which Spain might be "enabled to use"in the reconquest of her colonies.

In accordance with the usual House procedure that portion of the

Presidential message dealing with foreign relations was referred to the com¬ mittee on foreign affairs which, after some hearings, presented two resolu¬ tions to the house, one, declaring the South American states of Chile, Ar¬ gentina, Peru, Colombia and Mexico to be, in fact, independent and their recognition by the United States to be expedient, and a second, proposing that the House Appropriations Committee introduce a money bill appropriating

“A. 8. P., F. R., IV, 845, 846.

2Ibid., IV, p. 846.

3AnnaIs of Congress, Seventeenth Congress, First Session, I, 1314-1320. -69-

not more than $100,000 for the purpose of consummating that recognition. A

In its report urging this action the Committee declared that

The province of Chile, since it declared its independence, in the year 1818, has been in the constant and unmolested enjoyment of the sovereign¬ ty which it then assumed .... For a nation to be entitled, in respect to foreign states ... to figure directly in the great political society, it is suffient that it is really sovereign and independentj that is, that it governs itself by its own authority and laws. The people of Spanish Ameri- oa do notoriously so govern themselves and the right of the United States to recognize the Governments which they have instituted is incontestable.

In the subsequent debates on the expediency of recognition, Joel a.

Poinsett, who had now entered Congress, declared in a speech to the House that

Immediate recognition of these states by the United States would assure the triumph of their cause, win their eternal gratitude, and more¬ over, serve the commercial interests of the United States. It has been sup¬ posed by some . . . that the independence of these colonies would injure the prosperity of the United States £that3 possessing a more fertile soil, and raising tbs same ([products^ , they would drive us from the markets of Europe. It has been said that colonies are safer neighbors than free states, and that so long as they were bound down by the oppressive restrictions of Spain, they would neither be dangerous rivals or formidable competitors: This doctrine was manifestly false; in is our interest that they should be free. With an extensive line of coast, with numberous navigable rivers facilitating inter¬ nal trade, with a population of more than fifteen millions almost without manufactures . . . and without the means of carrying on their foreign com¬ merce, these countries present a market for the skill and industry of our merchants, which promises the greatest advantages. 3

Congress passed on May 4, the two resolutions brought forward by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the first by a vote one hundred sixty- 4 five to one and the appropriation bill by a unanimous vote. Thus Chile gained in this eventful year (1822) the recognition she had sought since

1818. Though it was two years before an American Minister arrived in Chile

Annals of Congress, Seventeenth Congress, First Session, I, 1314*1320. o Manning, Independence, 149,150,151, also published in Niles* Weekly Regis¬ ter, XXI or IX (new series), Haroh 16, 1822, p. 49. flippy, Poinsett, p. 77

^Annals of Congress, Seventeenth Congress, First Session, I, 1518-1525. -70-

and six years before Chile reciprocated by sending one to the United States,

it was confidently expected that this United States recognition opened up new vistas in the relations of the two nations, ^

Having made the fateful decision and recognized the new states the president and secretary of state proceeded tothe exercise of the functions necessary to the consummation of that recognition. Manuel Torres, the Colom¬ bian representative to the United States, was formally presented to the pre¬ sident on June 19, and thus diplomatic relations were actually begun between 2 the United States and the nations of the south. Though the act of recog¬ nition strained the relations between the United States and Spain during

•2 this year little fear was felt in the United States that Spain would make the issue a cause for war between them due to the aotual state of revolu¬ tion which then enveloped Spain. Towards the close of that year Monroe wrote to Congress that

A strong hope was entertained that peaoe ’would, ere this, have been concluded between Spain and the independent Governments south of the United States in this hemisphere. Long experience having evinced the competency of those Governments to maintain the independence which they had declared, it was presumed that the consideration which induced their recognition by the United States would have had equal weight with other powers, and that Spain herself, yielding to those magnanimous feelings of which her history furnishes us so many examples, would have terminated on that basis, a controversy so unavailing and at the same time so destructive. We still cherish the hope that this result will not long be postponed. ^

From this study of the question of recognition of the Latin-Ameri- can states by the United States, Professor Robertson has concluded that the

^See Riles1 Weekly Register for the months of March, April and May.

^Robertson, Recognition, pp. 258 et seq.

3 For a discussion of the Spanish attitude see especially the article by Pro¬ fessor W. S. Robertson, "The United States and Spain in 1822", American Historical Review, XX (July, 1915), 786-791.

^Riohardson, Messages, II, 192-193 -71-

policy of the United States was one of promoting "the development of an inter¬ national policy of recognition . . . which repudiated the European policy of legitimacy and heralded the principle that when a new state had established its independence de facto, it ought to be admitted into the society of nations

The United States recognition of Chile was in line with this general policy.

The year 1823 is a dividing line in the foreign relations of the

United States applicable to any one of the Latin-American nations. It was in this year that Monroe in a message to Congress gave utterance to certain statements which have become a dogma in American foreign policy and are generally associated with his name in the form of a doctrine. Probably an no other phase of United States foreign policy has such a distinguished group of historians, both American and foreign, laboured as on the Monroe Doctrine.

Among these are Kraus, ^ Edgington, 3 Hart, ^ Alvarez, ® Reddaway, ® and 7 most important of all, Perkins, Only the bare essentials can be given here.

There are four distinct phases of the Monroe Doctrine, the North

American, the Spanish-American, the Russian, and the European. In 1808

^■Robertson, Recognition, p. 269.

^Herbert Kraus, Die Monroe-doktrin in ihren Beziehungen Zur amerikanisohen Diplomatie Und Zum Vblkerrecht (.Berlin, Ï915), cited by '.Perkins as being particularly good for its bibliography.

3The Monroe Doctrine(Boston, 1905).

4lhe Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation (Boston, 1916).

^The Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1905).

^The Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1905)

^The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826 (Cambridge, London, 1927); The Monroe Doctrine 1826-1327 ~( BaItimore, London, 1933); these two books are the students' Bible on the subject. -72-

Napoleon dominated Spain and the Spanish provinces in America, in order to

resist French domination, established their own juntas to rule in the name

of Ferdinand VII. About 1810 this movement to establish independent juntas

had become a general revolt in Spanish-America against the mother country.

The revolts continued with varying degrees of success down to 1821 and dur¬

ing this time the colonies had constantly sought recognition of their inde¬

pendence from the other nations. By 1821 the question of recognition had

become acute. As has been seen, recognition was accorded by the United States

in the following year. But the Spanish American states lived in almost con¬

stant fear of a general European attempt to resubjugate them in the name of

Spain.

In 1820 a revolution broke out in Spain v/hich lasted until 1823

when at the explicit direction of the Congress of Verona a French army

marched into Spain for the express purpose of putting down the revolt there,

restoring Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne a- d thereby preserving a tot¬

tering standard of legitimacy. By the summer of 1823 the French army had

penetrated Spain to the Atlantic Coast from which point a quick embarkation

could be made for South America for the purpose of putting down the revolt

there. Ferdinand, therefore, appealed to the banded monarchs of Europe to

save his wayward children for him. ^ As early as 1822, Castlereagh, the

British foreign secretary,. had said that the question of recognition of the

Spanish American colonies was only "one of time and circumstance" and it is

probable that he would have recognized their independence forthwith upon

United States recognition.^ But Castlereagh oommitted suicide in the summer

^Samuel Flagg Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States (iTew Haven, 1936), p. 203 ? Sir A. W. Ward and G. Jr. Gooch, eds., The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1322), II, 65. -73-

of 1822 and Canning, the new foreign secretary, was more cautious. He feared

the establishment of a general transtlantic league of republics to counter¬

balance the European league of monarchies and he did not want to embarass 1 Portugal, the traditional British satellite. Upon hearing of the appeal

from Ferdinand and the subsequent call from the Holy Alliance for a European

Congress to discuss the colonial situation, and knowing the position of the

French army in Spain, as well as commercial opinion in England, Canning sent

for Eichard Rush, the United States minister resident to England. To Rush,

Canning proposed the joint declaration to the effect that (1) the recovery

Spain of the colonies was hopeless; (2) the recognition of the colonies’

independence was a matter of time and circumstancé; (3) neither country was

disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an amicable settlement of the

question between Spain and the colonies; (4) neither country desired any

portion of the colonies for herself; and (5) they could not see, with in-

difference, the transfer of any portion of them to any other power.

To the overtures of Canning, Rush offered an ad referendum approval

provided England would immediately recognize those Spanish-American countries 3 already recognized by the United States. This, Canning was hot ready to

do but Rush, nevertheless,, sent his proposals to his government at Washing¬ ton. Receiving no definite assurance from the United States, Canning,on

October 9, called in the French Ambassador, Polignac, and handed him the famous Polignac memorandum which declared "that the junction of any foreign power in an enterprise of Spain against the colonies" would be a“question

^■For the best work on the foreign policy of Canning see that by Harold V. Tem- perlym The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827 (London, 1925); see also the article by the same author "^he Later American Policy of George Canning," American Historical Review, XI (July, 1906), 779-797.

^Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826, p. 64.

^Ibid., p. 66. -74-

upon which (Ênglancf} must take such decision as the interests of Great Britain might require," 1 To this memorandum Polignac, acting under instructions, replied by disclaiming any French indention to settle the Spanish colonial 2 struggle by force of arms. Thus stood the European phase of the doctrine 3 at the end of November, 1823.

While the Russian Czar was the promulgator of the Holy Alliance and staunch defender of the principle of legitimacy, the Russian phase of the

Monroe Doctrine is distinctly not a part of the general European phase. It found its origin in the conflicting claims of the Pacific northwest. By a

Ukase issued in July 1799, a Russian American company was given the trading rights and right of settlement on the Paoific northwest as far south as fifty- 4 five degrees latitude. The operations of the company were early affected by the exploits of irresponsible traders and after repeated protests to the

United States government which proved of no avail, Russia in 1812*established 5 a post, Fort Ross, on Bodega Bay, In September, 1321, by an imperial de¬ cree the Russian government renewed the company1s privileges, established a new boundary line at 50 degrees latitude, and forbade all foreign vessels trading between Behring Straits and the new boundary line to come within one 0 hundred Italian miles of the shore on penalty of eonfiscation. A Russian

1Ibid., p. 117. p ^Gaston Nerva}, Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1934), p. 91.

3lbid., pp. 73 et seq.

4Perkins, Doctrine 1823-1826, p.3.

5 Ibid., p. 4.

°J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine ^Washington, 1930), p. 83. -75-

warship was sent to enforce the decree and the United States issued a sharp

protest to the Russian government in 1823. No further immediate action was taken by either country. Thus stood the Russian phase of the Monroe Doc¬

trine at the end of November, 1823.

President Monroe debated among his cabinet members the advisability

of joining with England in the proposition submitted by Canning to Rush.

There was considerable difference of opinion in the Cabinet on the proposal

with Adams leading the opposition to acceptance. Monroe, in a quandary,

wrote to ex-presidents Jefferson and Madison for advice. Both of these

men urged acceptance of the joint declaration proposal. But Adams protested

against this policy of following like "a cockboat in the wake of the Bri-

>» o tish Man-of-War and strongly urged a unilateral declaration of principles.

What Monroe and Adams considered to be a threatening situation in the fall

of 1823 forced them to conclude that some sort of declaration was needed

and consequently in his message to Congress of December 2, President Monroe

in two widely separated and disjointed passages enunciated the Monroe Doc¬

trine® whose only new principles were those of non intervention and non¬

colonization. The latter is a monument to Adams who had made non-coloniza- 4 tion a oardinal feature of his foreign policy and showed an early deter¬ mination to insert it in the Presidents* unilateral declaration. Any under-

"bperkins, Doctrine, 1823-1826, p. 5.

2 These debates have been preserved in the Adams diary. See Adams, Memoirs Volumes III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII are particularly valuable for a study ,of the American attitude towards the Latin American nations throughout the early period.

^Richardson, Messages, II, 207-220.

^Perkins, Doctrine 1823-1826, ascribes the non-colonization feature of the message to Adams. ■76

standing of the North American phase of the Monroe Doctrine must be based upon a knowledge of the fact that the American statesmen acted in 1823 ac¬

cording to their sincere beliefs of the moment and that they knew nothing of the Polignac Memorandum and the French reply. *

Of all the Spanish American nations Chile was the one in which Mon¬ roe’s bfoad pronunciamento was most cordially or enthusiastically received.

The message was made known to that g over rune nt in April, 1824, when it was published in part in the Santiago papers. On April 24, El Avisador Chileno took editorial notice of the message by quoting from it a brief passage, and describing it as embodying "a policy which was truly profound and farsighted.”

While Professor Robertson states that there is little evidence to show that

Monroe’s message attracted any great attention in Chile, b Professor Perkins has adduced the Chilean reception of Heman Allen, the first United States minister to Chile, the Chilean foreign secretary’s statements that Chile uni¬ formly regarded the United States as its best friend and that she was grate¬ ful for the early recognition and "for the recent pronouncement which placed it beyond the reach of European monarchs" as evidence of a most cordial re¬ ception of the doctrine. Allen wrote that the message had"cheered all

^■Reoent writers have attempted to show that the Monroe Doctrine was a belated effort on the part of the United States to take the lead in the protection of the Spanish-American nations. These writers assert that Canning's blunt declaration to Polignac on October 9, and the subsequent French reply defi¬ nitely dashed all danger of European intervention in Spanish American affairs. Representatives of this viewpoint are Webster, Temperly, Nerval and Alvarez. On the other hand Professor Perkins has conclusively proved, after the most intensive and extensive research, that the news of the Polignac Memorandum and French reply were not known in Washington before Monroe sent his message to Congress on December 2, 1823.

2W. S. Robertson, "South America and the Monroe Doctrine 1824-1828", Poli¬ tical Science Quarterly, XXX, 98.

3 Perkins, Doctrine,1823-1826, p. 160. -77-

If 1 hearts. A Perkins concludes from the cordial Chilean offer of an alliance with the United States, which showed a belief in American protection not general in South .America, that Chile received the Dootrine with some en- 2 thusiasm. It must be noted, however, that Allen in his first despatch mentioned the general belief in Chile that the Monroe Doctrine was a bilateral 3 affair between England and the United States. While the Chilean foreign secretary, Egana, at first professed an ignorance of the Canning-Rush cor* respondenoe, Allen wrote sometime lat9r that the Chileans were still firm 4 in their belief in the bilateral nature of the Monroe Doctrine. It is quite possible, however, that Egana actually knew nothing of the Canning-

Rush negotiations and the Polignac Memorandum when they were first mentioned by Allen, but since it is now known that Canning sent confidential copies of this correspondence to the British agents in South America as early as

February, 1824, it is quite probable that this information was given to the

Chilean authorities and thereby strengthened their belief in the bilateral nature of Monroe’s warning. Sinoe Canning made public this information in

March, 1824, it is also possible, but far less probable, that the Chilean g authorities might have read it in some of the newspapers.

^Allen to Adams, Santiago, April 29, 1824, Manning, Independence, 11,1091 et se

2 Perkins, Doctrine 1823-1826, p. 160.

3Allen to Adams, see note 1. 4 Allen to Adams, Santiago, May 26,1824,Manning, Independence,II, 1095 et seq.

Temperly, Canning, p. 136.

£ °There were several prominent daily newspapers in South America at this time. In Chile, El Avisador, Chileno; in Buenos Ayres, La Gaceta Mercantile and El Argos ; and in Colombua, La Gaceta de Columbia were particularly note¬ worthy fbr their comments onToreign relations. .78-

But there is a particular reason why 1823 is a good dividing line in the relations between the United States and Chile and that reason is to be found in the political history of Chile during that year. As has been noted, the American agents in Chile, particularly Hogan, from time to time intimated that there was a growing opposition to the rule of O’Higgins. In

1819 and 1820 this opposition had been overshadowed by the exploits of Lord

Cochrane and the prosecution of the Peruvian campaign. On July 28, 1821,

Peru was proclaimed independent and a few months later Lord Cochrane quit the Chilean Navy. Thus at the end of 1821 Chilean attention was turned more forcibly upon internal affairs. Throughout 1822 the growing opposition to

O’Higgins continued, and in the latter part of that year General Ramon

Freire, hero of the campaign to free southern Chile, took the initiative at Conception and opened hostilities against the supreme director. O’Higgins resigned in the early part of January, 1823, and the vacillating Chilean

Congress, sitting at Santiago, very prudently elected the advancing Freire supreme director of Chile. At first Freire refused the office but after a 1 provisional junta resigned on March 28, he accepted the office on April 4.

Among his first acts as supreme direotor, Freire showed himself to be at least a politician. He permitted the Congress to promulgate a new con¬ stitution and promised to pay the army and navy regularly, without regard to sectional preference. ^ Equally important was his assumption of the finan¬ cial obligations of the previous government aid confirmation of the impending

Chilean loan from England for which Chilean bonds were then being floated in

■^See Dawson, Republics, II, 191-196; Williams, People and Politics, pp. 584- 589; Wilgus, Hispanic America, pp. 317-319.

%ogan to Adams, Valparaiso, April 7, 1823, Manning, Independence, pp. 1080 et seq. -79-

London. It may be noted that Chile had turned to London as a source of financial aid only after efforts to float a loan in the United States had o failed. Freire served as supreme director for five months and all the time there was grov/ing restlessness among the populace against his rule. He called for elections to a Congress and promised not to interfere with them but the people were so skeptical that they stayed away from the polls, ex¬ cept a few in Santiago. But even this rump parliament was not favorable 3 to Freire and on August 20, he resigned his office. Despite his shortcom¬ ings Freire was asked to retain his office for an additional eight days.

Before the eight-day limit was up, however, Freire again resigned and this time departed from Santiago whereupon he was overtaken by a group of soldiers and almost forcibly brought back to Santiago. He was severely "punished" for taking this unauthorized absence by being re-elected supreme director of a Chile for a period of three years.* The election of Freire as supreme direc¬ tor in 1823 ushered in a period of political anarchy and kaleidescopic gov¬ ernments which was to last until 1830 when Chile was made stable and in the course of years, came to be called the most stabilized government in all

South America.

^Loc.cit.

^Evans, Chile, p. 39. g Hogan to Adams, Valparaiso, August 20, 1823, Manning, Independence, pp. 1085 et seq.

4 Dawson, Republics, pp. 191 et seq., Williams, People and Politics, pp. 587 et seq.; ^ilgus, Hispanic-America, pp. 317 et seq. CONCLUSION

The Spanish colonial system in. the early part of the nineteenth

oentury was based on an outmoded economic system, the continuation of which provoked increasing discontent in the Spanish American colonies.

Rigid class distinctions, economic and religious oppression were the causes of the wars for independence in the Spanish colonial empire; the Napoleonic wars the occasion.

The news of the Napoleonic domination of Spain reached Chile in the summer of 1809. Immediately there was indecision among the ruling of¬ ficials. The effort to wring order out of confusion led to the overthrow.' of the Spanish authorities and to the establishment of an independent govern¬ ment. The new Chilean government was at first favorable to the United

States as is shown, by its early appeal to this country' for aid.

The early activities of Poinsett while in Chile were favorably re¬ ceived and the appearahee of American warships in Chilean ports greatly added to American prestige. But the failure of the United States actively to fur¬ nish aid to the insurgents, the action of Poinsett in allowing his influence upon Chilean officials to become too pronounced and his later action in de¬ finitely allying himself with one faction in the ensuing Chilean civil war plus the activities of British agents in the region in urging a peaceful settlement of the struggle, and in secretly furnishing aid to the insurgents, led to a decline of American influence in Chile. The subsequent end of the first phase of Chilean revolution came too quickly to permit the United

States to attempt to bolster that rapidly declining influence.

-80. -81-

The renewal of the struggle for independence in 1817 found the

Chilean leaders less favorable to the United States but the populace still inclined towards friendliness. The belief was prevalent in Chile that the

United States would offer some active support to the Chilean cause. Again, however, it was the activities of American citizens who caused a decline in American influence in Chile. The flagrant violation of the Chilean sen¬ sibilities by American naval commanders, and the persistent efforts of the

United States to present and collect claims from Chile for its alleged ac¬ tions against these violators of the Chilean sympathies, the failure of the

Chileans to secure a loan in the United States, the action of the United

States government towards Aguirre, the Chilean agent, the continued refusal to extend recognition to Chile and its firm insistence upon the observance of a strict neutrality caused the Chilean people gradually to veer away from their belief that the United States, as a nation born out of a revolution, occupying the same hemisphere and exercising the republican form of govern¬ ment towards which Chile aspired, was the natural friend and proteotor of the South American colonies struggling towards nationhood. The activities of Lord Coohrane in behalf of South American national liberties, the success¬ ful flotation of a Chilean loan in London, the surreptitious and unofficial aid to the Patriot cause received from England, the very tangible efforts of the British governmental agents and merchantmen plus the scrupulous re¬ gard for Chilean sensibilities exhibited by the British naval commanders caused the Chileans to lean toward England for support in their struggle against Spain. This tendency to depend upon England for support resulted in a further decline of American influence in Chile.

But the deepseated belief of the Chilean people that the United

States was their natural friend was somewhat strengthened in 1824 when news of American recognition arrived. But Chile had already entered a chaotic -82-

period in her national history and the stern instructions of the puritani¬

cal John Quinoy Adams and an attempt by an equally puritanical minister to

obey scrupulously those instructions only served to irk Chile’s transitory

governments and lead to a renaissance of the latent distrust of the United

States. Minister Allen’s presentation speech in which he made mention of a

settlement of the claims held by American citizens against Chile and the wel¬

coming address of the Director Delegate in which he completely disregarded

the question of claims but expressed a desire to see established a spiritual

union between the two countries presaged a new disagreement.

The reception of the Monroe Doctrine in Chile was more enthusiastic

than in any of the other South American states. It does not follow from this,

however, that the Chileans did not share the belief, general in South America,

that the doctrine was a joint pronouncement of England and the United States

against the Holy Alliance. But the doctrine did rouse new hopes in Chile.

Believing in the sincerity of Monroe, Chile, therefore, offered to join with

the United States in an alliance against the dangers of European invasion.

The Chilean offer of an alliance was based upon the knowledge of the inabi¬

lity of the United States to singly withstand, until British aid arrived,

assuming England to be sincere in her pronouncement, a concerted European

attack upon South America. Thus at the end of 1824 Chile, while believing

in the temporary protection afforded by the British fleet, had definitely

come to the conclusion that the United States was the only ally upon whose friendship she could rely and she sought to give actuality to that belief by the formation of alliance with the United States. BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Printed Documents

American State Papers, Foreign Relations Series. 6 V. Washington. 1823-1834.

While containing invaluable material this series has been robbed of much of its value to a study of this kind by the publication of Manning*s series on Latin-American relations. They, nevertheless, still contain much material for a general study of United States foreign relations.

Annals of Congress. Fifteenth through the eighteenth congresses. Washington.

Clarke, J. Reuben. Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine. Y/ashington. 1930.

Madison, James. The Writings of James Madison. 9 V. Edited by Gailard Hunt. New York” London. ~l508”

Manning, W. R. Editor. The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations. 3 V. Washington. T925.

Professor Manning has performed an invaluable service to the re¬ search student by bringing together, in three volumes, the diplo¬ matic correspondence of the United States relating to the indepen¬ dence movement in Latin America. These volumes lack only one thing, the correspondence between the United States and the Latin-American nations growing out of the pre-recognition claims of the United States.

Monroe, James. The Writings of James Monroe. 7 V. Edited by Stanislaus M. Hamilton. Mew York. London. 1898-1903.

Moore, John Bassett. A Digest of International Law. 6 V. Washington. 1908. The best work7in Ènglisïï, on International law prior to 1900.

Richardson, James B. Compiler. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of The Presidents 1789-18977 11 V. Washington. 1896-1912.

B. Memoirs

Adams, John Quincy. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams. 12 V. Edited by Charles Francis Adams. Philadelphia. 1874-1877.

Indispensable for a study of the early Latin-American policy of the

-83- United States, and especially for a study of the background of the Monroe Doctrine and the recognition policy of the United States. Volumes three through eight are the most useful for this period.

Hall, Captain Basil. Extracts from_a Journal Written on the Coasts of Chile, TO.Peru, and Mexico in the Years 1820, 1821, 182127 2 V. Edinburgh. One of the best souroes for a study of those events taking place in the three countries visited during the years covered. Especially good for a study of the efforts of British naval commanders to raise British influence in South Amerioa.

C. Magazine and Other Articles

Chandler, Charles Lyon. "United States Commerce With Latin America at the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine." Quarterly Journal of Economics XXXYTII (May, 1924), pp. 466-487.

Cox, Issac J. "Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents." Annual Report American Historical Association for 1911." Washington. "T31TT." T: -\W-2Tr.

"Emancipation of Spanish America," Edinburgh Review XIII (January, 1809), pp. 277-311.

Hackett, Charles Wilson. "The Development of John Quincy Adams Policy with Respect to an American Confederation and the Panama Congress." His- panio-Amerioan Historical Review VIII (November, 1928), pp. 496-526.

Douglas - Irvine, Helen. "The Landholding System of Colonial Chile." Hispanic- American Historical Review VIII (November, 1928), pp. 449-495.

Maiming, W. R. "The Nootka Sound Controversy." Annual Report American His¬ torical Association for 1904. Washington^ T905. pp. 279-478.

Niles* Weekly Register.

One of the most important newspaper sources in all American history. Relied upon frequently by Richardson in the compilation of his Messages.

Robertson, William Spence, "The United States and Spain in 1822." American Historical Review XX (July, 1915), pp. 82-105.

Robertson, William Spence. "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionising of Spanish America." Annual Report American Historical Association for 1907. Washington. 1908. I, 189-539.

Shephard, W. R. "Bolivar and the United States." Hispanic American Histori- cal Review I (August, 1918), pp. 270-298.

Temperley, Harold V. "The Later American Policy of George Canning." American Historical Revievif XI (July, 1906), pp. 779-797.

■84 II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Monographs

Alvarez, Alejandro. The Monroe Doctrine. New York. 1924.

The doctrine as viewed by one of Chile’s ablest scholars. Though making a valiant effort to be fair Alvarez tends towards the tra¬ ditional South American viewpoint that England was the real pro¬ tector of the Spanish American colonies from attack by the Holy Alliance.

Evans, Henry Clay, Jr. Chile and the United States. Durham. 1927.

Merely exploratory.

Hart, Albert Bushnell. The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation. Boston. 1910.

The title is correct.

Heckscher, Eli F. Mercantilism. 2 V. Translated by Mendel Shapiro. London. New York. 1935.

The accepted work on the subject. The chapter on mercantilism as a unifying force xs especially good for an understanding of the early colonial systems.

Perkins, Dexter. The Monroe Doctrine 1825-1826. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London. 1927.

A most thoroughgoing and authoritative examination of the origin and application of the doctrine from 1823 to 1826,

Reddaway, William Fiddian. The Monroe Doctrine. New York. 1905.

The best work on the subject until the publication of Perkins’ work.

Rippy, J. Fred. Rivalries of the United States and Great Britain Over Latin America. Baltimore. New York. 1928.

The best because it is the only one on the subject.

Temperley, Harold V. The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827. London. 1925.

The best work on this critical period in British foreign policy. The author attempts to justify Canning’s famous statement about hav¬ ing called the New tforld into existence.

B. Biographies

Angel, Hildegarde. Simon Bolivar. New York. 1930. A good treatment though at times eulogistic.

-85- Rippy, J. Fred. Joel R. Poinsett; Versatile American. Durham. 1935.

The best, if not the only, complete biography of Poinsett. Pro¬ vides invaluable information on the mission to Chile that could only be found in the private papers of Poinsett used for the first time.

Schoellkopf, Anna. Don Jose de San Martin 1778-1850. New York. 1924.

A condensation of Bartholome-Mitre*s larger work.

C. General Works

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. Editor. The American Secretaries of State and Their Foreign Polica^. 10 V. New York. 1927-1929.

The best summary of American foreign policy from 1776 to 1925.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York. 1937.

The best one volume study on American diplomatic history.

Bourne, Edward Gaylord. Spain In America 1450-1580. New York. 1904.

Portends to become a classic on the subject though already super¬ seded in parts.

Calderon, Francisco Garcia. Latin-America: Its Rise and Progress. New York. 1918.

A refutation of those writers who would make Latin America a hotbed of instability.

Cheney, Edward Potts. European Background of American History 1300-1600. New York. London. T§04.

A standard work.

Dawson, Thomas C. The South American Republics. 2 V. New York. 1908.

Though published early and suffering from certain shortcomings, this is still one of the better works on the early history of the South American states.

Frank, Waldo. America Hispana. New York. London. 1931.

A discussion in social geography.

Haring, C. H. South American Progress. Cambridge. 1934.

A collection of lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston.

-86- Hart, Albert Bushnell. The Foundations of American Foreign Policy. Hew York. 1901.

One of the earlier works greatly in need of revision.

Latane, John Halladay. ^he United States and Latin America. Hew York. 1988.

Thoroughly inadequate though long accepted as the standard work on the subject.

Lockey, J. B. Pan Americanism; Its Beginnings. Hew York. 1920.

Besides being the last word on the subject of Pan Americanism and its origins this is one of the best works on the general re¬ lations between the United States and the Latin American nations.

Martin, Percy A. and James, Herman G. The Republics of Latin America. New York. 1924. Revised edition.

A strictly college text.

Merriman, Roger B. The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the Hew. 4 V. Hew York. 19

Merriman has not yet reached the period of the empire in the Hew World but only the age of exploration and discovery.

Ilerval, Gaston. Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine. Hew York. 1934.

Very fascinating reading and at the same time very well written. It is not a question of killing the doctrine, says Nerval, but only one of when to bury it.

Oman, Char les.A History of the Peninsular Y/ar .6 V.Qxford. 1902-1922.

A most detailed analysis of the peninsular campaigns of the Napo¬ leonic wars. While emphasizing the military aspects of the cam¬ paigns some attention has been given to the political events of the period.

Pierson, William Whatley, Jr. Hispanic American History; A Syllabus. Chapel Hill. London. 1921.

A good outline of study and bibliography.

Rippy, J. Fred. Latin America in World Politics. Hew York. 1928.

Very good on the early period.

Rippy, J. Fred. Historical Evolubion of Hispanic America. New York. 1932.

Puts most stress on the period after the evolution from colonies to national states but is, nevertheless, good.

-87- Robertson, Yfilliam Spence. Hispanic American Relations With the United States. New York. Melbourne. London. Bombay! 1923.

Woefully weak on the early relations.

Ross, Edward A. South of Panama. New York. 1917.

Ross believes that the Spanish Americans are inferior in those countries where there is considerable admixture of blood.

Stephen, Sir Leslie and Lee, Sir Sidney. Compilers. Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford. 1917.

Stuart, Graham H. Latin America and the United States. New York. London. 1928.

Good for the period after 1823.

Ward, Sir A. W. and Gooch, G. ?. Editors. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy. 3 V. Cambridge. 1Ô22.

Particularly strong on this period. Good for a study of British foreign policy as a whole.

Wilgus, A. Curtis. A History of Hispanic Anerica. ’Washington. 1931.

A multigraphed text which needs revision in parts. The appended bibliography is indeed of great value to the research student for the author is the recognized authority on Latin American bib¬ liography.

Wilgus, A. Curtis. The Histories and Historians of Hispanic Anerica: A Bib¬ liographical Essay. Washington. 1936.

A revised and printed edition of the author's earlier multigraphed Histories of Hispanic America (Washington, 1932).

Wilgus, A. Curtis, Compiler. A Selected List of Books and Magazine Articles on Inter American Relations. Washington. March 1, 19'33| April 15', 1934.

An up-to-date and ready reference book on current discussions and new books on inter-American affairs.

Williams, Mary Wilhelmine. The People and Politics of Latin America. Bos¬ ton. New York. London. 1930.

Especially strong in its discussion of the social life of the people ■— the aborigines included.

-88-