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The Structure of Games Florida International University FIU Digital Commons FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School 10-18-2007 The trS ucture of Games David Michael Kaiser DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI08081528 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd Part of the Other Computer Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Kaiser, David Michael, "The trS ucture of Games" (2007). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2 This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY Miami, Florida THE STRUCTURE OF GAMES A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in COMPUTER SCIENCE by David M. Kaiser 2007 To: Interim Dean Amir Mirmiran College of Engineering and Computing This dissertation, written by David M. Kaiser, and entitled The Structure of Games, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment. We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. ______________________________________ Malek Adjouadi ______________________________________ Geoffrey Smith ______________________________________ Ana Pasztor ______________________________________ Tao Li, Major Professor Date of Defense: October 18, 2007 The dissertation of David M. Kaiser is approved. _______________________________________ Interim Dean Amir Mirmiran College of Engineering and Computing _______________________________________ Dean George Walker University Graduate School Florida International University, 2007 ii © Copyright 2007 by David M. Kaiser All rights reserved. iii DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to my angelic wife Adrienne. Her steadfast love, endless support and unwavering encouragement made the completion of this work possible. This dissertation is also dedicated to my children Alexander and Katherine. Get yours done early rather than later. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost I thank my wife Adrienne. Although she has had cause to regret suggesting a Ph.D. in the first place, she has never wavered in her support. I also thank my ten year old son Alexander, and my eight year old daughter Katherine. They have both given up many hours of play time, pool time, and story time so that daddy can do his homework. I am grateful for their unconditional love, and continual support. They are a delight and have been a constant source of energy and motivation. I am very grateful to Alex Pelin for encouraging me nearly a decade ago to follow a line of research that I found really fascinating. His thoughtful advice and guidance were invaluable. I would like to thank my major professor Tao Li for shepherding me through to the finish line with extreme passion. His boundless energy and enthusiasm have kept me motivated. I thank the committee members Ana Pasztor and Geoffrey Smith for their continuous support and encouragement. I also need to thank Raimund Ege for stepping in for a short but critical period of time. And I would like to thank Malek Adjouadi for committing his time and help in a pinch. Many warm thanks go to Maria Monteagudo, Olga Carbonell and Martha Soledad who have been of invaluable help in dealing with the many details associated with my studies. I also want to express my deep gratitude to Roberto Hernandez for willingly falling into the trap of keeping me in line. v ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION THE STRUCTURE OF GAMES by David M. Kaiser Florida International University, 2007 Miami, Florida Professor Tao Li, Major Professor Computer Game Playing has been an active area of research since Samuel’s first Checkers player (Samuel 1959). Recently interest beyond the classic games of Chess and Checkers has led to competitions such as the General Game Playing competition, in which players have no beforehand knowledge of the games they are to play, and the Computer Poker Competition which force players to reason about imperfect information under conditions of uncertainty. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the area of General Game Playing both specifically and generally. On the specific side, we describe the design and implementation of our General Game Playing system OGRE. This system includes an innovative method for feature extraction that helped it to achieve second and fourth place in two international General Game Playing competitions. On the more general side, we also introduce the Regular Game Language, which goes beyond current works to provide support for both stochastic and imperfect information games as well as the more traditional games. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE 1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 2. INTRODUCTION TO PART I .................................................................................. 4 3. COMPUTER GAME PLAYING ............................................................................... 5 3.1 Game Related Concepts...................................................................................... 5 3.2 Game Tree........................................................................................................... 6 3.3 Search.................................................................................................................. 8 3.4 Iterative Deepening........................................................................................... 10 3.5 Transposition Tables......................................................................................... 11 4. GENERAL GAME PLAYING................................................................................. 13 4.1 Game Description Language............................................................................. 14 4.2 Survey of Previous General Game Playing Systems ........................................ 16 5. FEATURE EXTRACTION...................................................................................... 22 6. AUTOMATIC THEOREM PROVING ................................................................... 25 6.1 Inference ........................................................................................................... 25 7. OGRE........................................................................................................................ 28 7.1 The Design........................................................................................................ 28 7.2 HTTP Interface ................................................................................................. 29 7.3 Parser................................................................................................................. 30 7.4 Game Analyzer ................................................................................................. 30 7.5 Search Engine ................................................................................................... 31 7.6 Inference Engine ............................................................................................... 32 7.7 Identifying Static Clauses ................................................................................. 34 7.8 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................. 35 8. EXTRACTING FEATURES.................................................................................... 36 8.1 Extracting Features by Variance....................................................................... 37 8.2 Sorting By Variance.......................................................................................... 38 8.3 Motion Detection .............................................................................................. 40 8.4 Piece Identification ........................................................................................... 41 8.5 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................. 43 9. EVALUATION FUNCTION CONSTRUCTION .................................................. 44 9.1 Game Structure Evaluators ............................................................................... 44 9.2 Game Definition Evaluators ............................................................................. 45 9.3 Combining Evaluators ...................................................................................... 46 vii 10. RESULTS ................................................................................................................. 48 10.1 Assessment........................................................................................................ 49 11. SUMMARY OF PART I .......................................................................................... 52 12. INTRODUCTION TO PART II ............................................................................... 53 13. GAMES..................................................................................................................... 54 13.1 Game Theories.................................................................................................. 54 13.2 Games Taxonomy ............................................................................................. 56 13.3 High Level Abstraction....................................................................................
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