VOTING and DEMOCRACY REVIEW the Newsletter of the Center for Voting and Democracy
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Document Received by the CA 2Nd District Court of Appeal
No. B295935 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT ______________________________________________________ CITY OF SANTA MONICA, Appellant-Defendant, v. PICO NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION; MARIA LOYA, Respondents and Plaintiffs. ____________________________________________________________ BRIEF FOR FAIRVOTE AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS AND AFFIRMANCE ___________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles The Hon. Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge Presiding Superior Court Case No. BC616804 ____________________________________________________________ *IRA M. FEINBERG PATRICK C. HYNDS (Bar No. 64066) (pro hac vice pending) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP JOSEPH M. CHARLET 390 Madison Avenue (pro hac vice pending) New York, NY 10017 HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP Telephone: (212) 918-3000 555 Thirteenth Street NW Fax: (212) 918-3100 Washington, DC 20004 [email protected] Telephone: (202) 637-5600 Fax: (202) 637-5910 ZACH MARTINEZ (pro hac vice pending) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 1601 Wewatta Street, Suite 900 Denver, CO 80202 February 4, 2020 Telephone: (303) 899-7300 Counsel for Amicus Curiae Document receivedbytheCA2ndDistrictCourtofAppeal. Fax: (303) 899-7333 FairVote CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITES OR PERSONS FairVote is a non-profit organization headquartered in Takoma Park, Maryland that advocates for fairer political representation through election reform. Since its founding in 1992, FairVote has been committed to advancing ranked-choice voting, also known as a single-transferable-vote (“STV”) method, in both single-member-district and at-large voting systems. It does so by conducting original research and advocating for electoral reforms at the local, state, and national levels. FairVote believes that implementing alternative at-large remedies, including ranked-choice and cumulative voting, will allow voters to elect representatives who better reflect their communities’ and society’s diversity. -
Fair Representation Voting – Lessons from Cumulative Voting in Illinois by Rob Richiei Prepared for National Democracy Slam, April 22, 2015
Fair representation voting – Lessons from cumulative voting in Illinois By Rob Richiei Prepared for National Democracy Slam, April 22, 2015 We have more than 7,000 state legislators in the United States today. The great majority of them are elected in single-winner districts, where each legislator represents a group of people that no one else represents in that legislative chamber. But that’s not true in Maryland, where I and most other Maryland voters have three representatives in the House of Delegates, and it didn’t always used to be that way nationally. As recently as the 1950’s, more than half of state representatives shared constituents with other representatives in multi-winner districts, at a time when voters in several states had more than one U.S. House Member as well. One of those states with multi-winner state legislative districts was Illinois. Every voter had three representatives in the Illinois House of Representatives. But unlike other multi-winner state legislative districts elsewhere Illinois did not have a winner-take-all rule. That is, 51% of voters were not able to control 100% of representation in the way that they can today in my three-seat district in Maryland. Instead, if more than a quarter of like-minded voters wanted a certain kind of representation, they had the voting power to win one of the three seats. A 51% majority would have the power to elect two of three seats, but not all three of them. This “fair representation voting rule” was based on providing voters with cumulative voting rights. -
4 Comparative Law and Constitutional Interpretation in Singapore: Insights from Constitutional Theory 114 ARUN K THIRUVENGADAM
Evolution of a Revolution Between 1965 and 2005, changes to Singapore’s Constitution were so tremendous as to amount to a revolution. These developments are comprehensively discussed and critically examined for the first time in this edited volume. With its momentous secession from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, Singapore had the perfect opportunity to craft a popularly-endorsed constitution. Instead, it retained the 1958 State Constitution and augmented it with provisions from the Malaysian Federal Constitution. The decision in favour of stability and gradual change belied the revolutionary changes to Singapore’s Constitution over the next 40 years, transforming its erstwhile Westminster-style constitution into something quite unique. The Government’s overriding concern with ensuring stability, public order, Asian values and communitarian politics, are not without their setbacks or critics. This collection strives to enrich our understanding of the historical antecedents of the current Constitution and offers a timely retrospective assessment of how history, politics and economics have shaped the Constitution. It is the first collaborative effort by a group of Singapore constitutional law scholars and will be of interest to students and academics from a range of disciplines, including comparative constitutional law, political science, government and Asian studies. Dr Li-ann Thio is Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore where she teaches public international law, constitutional law and human rights law. She is a Nominated Member of Parliament (11th Session). Dr Kevin YL Tan is Director of Equilibrium Consulting Pte Ltd and Adjunct Professor at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore where he teaches public law and media law. -
Appendix A: Electoral Rules
Appendix A: Electoral Rules Table A.1 Electoral Rules for Italy’s Lower House, 1948–present Time Period 1948–1993 1993–2005 2005–present Plurality PR with seat Valle d’Aosta “Overseas” Tier PR Tier bonus national tier SMD Constituencies No. of seats / 6301 / 32 475/475 155/26 617/1 1/1 12/4 districts Election rule PR2 Plurality PR3 PR with seat Plurality PR (FPTP) bonus4 (FPTP) District Size 1–54 1 1–11 617 1 1–6 (mean = 20) (mean = 6) (mean = 4) Note that the acronym FPTP refers to First Past the Post plurality electoral system. 1The number of seats became 630 after the 1962 constitutional reform. Note the period of office is always 5 years or less if the parliament is dissolved. 2Imperiali quota and LR; preferential vote; threshold: one quota and 300,000 votes at national level. 3Hare Quota and LR; closed list; threshold: 4% of valid votes at national level. 4Hare Quota and LR; closed list; thresholds: 4% for lists running independently; 10% for coalitions; 2% for lists joining a pre-electoral coalition, except for the best loser. Ballot structure • Under the PR system (1948–1993), each voter cast one vote for a party list and could express a variable number of preferential votes among candidates of that list. • Under the MMM system (1993–2005), each voter received two separate ballots (the plurality ballot and the PR one) and cast two votes: one for an individual candidate in a single-member district; one for a party in a multi-member PR district. • Under the PR-with-seat-bonus system (2005–present), each voter cast one vote for a party list. -
Another Consideration in Minority Vote Dilution Remedies: Rent
Another C onsideration in Minority Vote Dilution Remedies : Rent -Seeking ALAN LOCKARD St. Lawrence University In some areas of the United States, racial and ethnic minorities have been effectively excluded from the democratic process by a variety of means, including electoral laws. In some instances, the Courts have sought to remedy this problem by imposing alternative voting methods, such as cumulative voting. I examine several voting methods with regard to their sensitivity to rent-seeking. Methods which are less sensitive to rent-seeking are preferred because they involve less social waste, and are less likely to be co- opted by special interest groups. I find that proportional representation methods, rather than semi- proportional ones, such as cumulative voting, are relatively insensitive to rent-seeking efforts, and thus preferable. I also suggest that an even less sensitive method, the proportional lottery, may be appropriate for use within deliberative bodies, where proportional representation is inapplicable and minority vote dilution otherwise remains an intractable problem. 1. INTRODUCTION When President Clinton nominated Lani Guinier to serve in the Justice Department as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, an opportunity was created for an extremely valuable public debate on the merits of alternative voting methods as solutions to vote dilution problems in the United States. After Prof. Guinier’s positions were grossly mischaracterized in the press,1 the President withdrew her nomination without permitting such a public debate to take place.2 These issues have been discussed in academic circles,3 however, 1 Bolick (1993) charges Guinier with advocating “a complex racial spoils system.” 2 Guinier (1998) recounts her experiences in this process. -
2018 PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT Cesar Perales, Chair Rachel Godsil, Vice Chair Carlo Scissura, Secretary Matt Gewolb, Executive Director
CHARTER 2018 NYC REVISION COMMISSION 2018 PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT Cesar Perales, Chair Rachel Godsil, Vice Chair Carlo Scissura, Secretary Matt Gewolb, Executive Director LETTER TO THE CHAIR Dear Chair Perales and Commissioners: I am delighted to present this Preliminary Staff Report, which I hope will serve as an informative and useful guide for the ongoing work of the 2018 New York City Charter Revision Commission. As you know, the Commission has been extremely active in engaging with City residents during the initial stages of this revision process. From listening to in-person public testimony to engaging experts at our four Issue Forums to our “Commissioner- in-your-Borough” events, we have engaged the public in a serious—and enlightening— conversation about governance in New York City. We have considered the entire City Charter to identify areas for potential revision. The Commission received hundreds of comments from New Yorkers from across the five boroughs. Advocacy and good government groups, elected officials, academics, and others have made meaningful contributions, and we will continue to consult with stakeholders as this process unfolds. The New York City Law Department, and others within City government, have provided invaluable guidance. We tremendously appreciate their efforts, as well as those of all of the other organizations and individuals who have provided assistance. Ultimately, this Preliminary Staff Report reflects a focus on civic life and democracy in New York City—a theme that is particularly appropriate and relevant in contemporary times. The report also introduces a new and exciting phase in our process—one that I am confident will include a robust public discussion and debate about the future of the City Charter. -
C00053 6930 Carroll Ave., Suite 610 the Center for Takoma Park, MD 20912 - (301) 270-4616 (301) 270-4133 (Fax)
STATE OF HAWAII OFFICE OF ELECTIONS 802 LEHUA AVENUE PEARL CITY, HAWAll 96782 www.hawaii.gov/elections KEVIN B. CRONIN CHIEF ELECTION OFFICER TESTIMONY OF THE CHIEF ELECTION OFFICER, OFFICE OF ELECTIONS TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY ON SENATE BILL NO. 2898, S.D.I RELATING TO AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE March 20, 2008 Chair Waters and members ofthe House Committee on Judiciary, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Senate Bill No. 2898, S.D.I. The purpose ofthis bill is to allow states to determine the winner ofa presidential election by "national popular vote". The Office ofElections knows the contents ofthis bill and believes this bill presents a policy issue for the Legislature to resolve in its sound judgment. The Office ofElections remains available to provide, on request, any technical assistance arising from this bill. Please let us know ifthis office can be ofassistance to you. Respectfully Submitted: By Kevin Cronin C00053 6930 Carroll Ave., Suite 610 The Center for Takoma Park, MD 20912 - (301) 270-4616 (301) 270-4133 (fax) . [email protected] Voting and Democracy www.fairvote.org Written Testimony of Rob Richie, Executive Director On Behalf of Hawaii's SB2898 SD 1, March 19,2008 Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide written testimony in support of SB 2898 SI, legislation to enter Hawaii into an interstate compact designed to guarantee the election of the presidential candidate who wins the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. My name is Rob Richie. -
Intervenor Alaskans for Better Elections, Inc
Scott M. Kendall Alaska Bar No. 0405019 J ahna M. Lindemuth Alaska Bar No. 9711068 Samuel G. Gottstein Alaska Bar No. 1511099 FILED in the Tri~! Courts Holmes Weddle & Barcott, P.C. State of Alaska Third ;.)1stnct 701 West 8th Avenue, Ste. 700 Anchorage, AK 99501 .APR U 2 202"1 Phone: 907.274.0666 Clerk of the Trial courts Fax: 907.277.4657 By______ Deputy Attorneys for Intervenor Alaskans for Better Elections, Inc. IN THE SUPERJOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT ANCHORAGE SCOTT A. KOHLHAAS, THE ALASKAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY, ROBERT M. BIRD, AND KENNETH P. JACOBUS, Plaintiffs, V. STATE OF ALASKA; STATE OF ALASKA: DIVISION OF ELECTIONS; Case No. 3AN-20-09532 CI LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR KEVIN MEYER, in his official capacity as Supervisor of Elections; and GAIL FENUMIAI, in her official capacity of Director of the Division of Elections Defendants. ALASKANS FOR BETTER ELECTIONS, INC. Intervenor. 61NTERVENOR ALASKANS FOR BETTER ELECTIONS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Intervenor Alaskans for Better Elections, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment Scott A. Kohlhaas, et al. v. State of Alaska, et. al., Case No. 3AN-20-09532 CI Page 1 of 39 I. INTRODUCTION After voters approved an election reform initiative in November 2020, Plaintiffs Scott A. Kohlhaas, the Alaskan Independence Party, Robert M. Bird, and Kenneth P. Jacobus ( collectively "Plaintiffs") filed this facial challenge seeking to invalidate the entirety of the popularly-enacted law. 1 Through this law, the public adopted comprehensive reforms to give voters and individual candidates more choices in elections, and to ensure that the candidates with the most support - regardless of party affiliation ( or lack thereof) - would represent Alaskans. -
Top Four Primary Ranked Choice Voting for U.S
Top Four Primary Ranked Choice Voting for U.S. House Elections What It Is and How It Performs on Key Democracy Criteria Prepared by Rob Richie1for the National Democracy Slam on April 22, 2015 Summary of Evaluation of Impact on Criteria Voter turnout and political participation: 3 Fair representation of parties and political groups: 2 Fair representation of racial minorities and women: 3 Electoral competition: 4 Reduction of polarization in Congress: 4 Impact Scale Definitions 1 No impact or negative impact 2 Low impact or impact likely only if coupled with other reforms 3 Moderate impact 4 High impact, including significant long-term impact 5 Problem substantially solved, even without other reform Description of Top Four Primary with Ranked Choice Voting The Top Four primary combines the best features of two electoral rules: the Top Two Primary and ranked choice voting. Congress could enact it nationally for congressional elections or individual states could adopt it for their federal and state elections. It involves three changes: Adopting ranked choice voting for both primary and general elections: Ranked choice voting (RCV, known also as “instant runoff voting” and “preferential voting”) is a voting method that can address a range of defects derived from our current electoral rules when more than two candidates run for an office. Voters are given the option to rank candidates in order of preference. Their vote is counted initially for their first choice. If no candidate has more than half of those votes, then the last-place candidate is eliminated. The votes of those who selected the defeated candidate as a first choice are then added to the totals of their next choice. -
Alternative Voting in Alabama
1 Alternative Voting in Alabama Alternative voting ( also called ‘modified at-large voting’ ) was first used as an election procedure in Alabama during the 1980s. When the procedure was introduced, it was as novel and as questionable as the first Caesarians used to deliver babies. Today, after several election cycles, alternative voting systems in Alabama are as politically acceptable as C-sections are in delivery rooms. In Alabama today, thirty-two different governing bodies use some form of alternative voting. Three are county governments, one is a county Democratic Committee, and twenty-eight are municipalities. Of these governing bodies, twenty- three use limited voting, five use cumulative voting, and four replaced numbered posts with pure at-large [see glossary.] With the exception of the Conecuh County Democratic Executive Committee and the city of Fort Payne, all of the alternative voting systems in Alabama were first used in 1988 as a result of settlement agreements in the landmark, omnibus redistricting lawsuit, Dillard v. Crenshaw County, et. al. In that case, the Alabama Democratic Conference sued 180 jurisdictions in the state, challenging at-large elections. First Run: Conecuh County, Alabama The first known application of an alternative voting system in Alabama was in the election of members to the Conecuh County Democratic Executive Committee in the September 1982 primary election. It came as a result of a federal lawsuit filed by blacks challenging the discriminatory manner by which members were being elected to the committee. Prior to the court challenge, the Conecuh County Democratic Executive Committee elected members by a strange system which divided the county into two separate malapportioned districts, with each district electing 15 members at-large from numbered places [see glossary] and with a majority vote requirement. -
The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the K-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Abdelmonaim Tlidi
The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Abdelmonaim Tlidi To cite this version: Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Abdelmonaim Tlidi. The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency. 2018. halshs-01817943 HAL Id: halshs-01817943 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01817943 Preprint submitted on 18 Jun 2018 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. WP 1812 – June 2018 The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Abdelmonaim Tlidi Abstract: For committee or multiwinner elections, the Chamberlin-Courant rule (CCR), which combines the Borda rule and the proportional representation, aims to pick the most representative committee (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983). Chamberlin and Courant (1983) have shown that if the size of the committee to be elected is k = 1 among m ≥ 3 candidates, the CCR is equivalent to the Borda rule; Kamwa and Merlin (2014) claimed that if k = m − 1, the CCR is equivalent to the k-Plurality rule. In this paper, we explore what happens for 1 < k < m − 1 by computing the probability of agreement between the CCR and four k- scoring rules: k-Plurality, k-Borda, k-Negative Plurality and Bloc. -
Why Women Matter Summit
WWhhyy WWoommeenn MMaatttteerr LESSONS ABOUT WOMEN’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FROM HOME & ABROAD Summit Materials National Press Club, Washington, DC March 3, 2003 Crowne Plaza, San Francisco, CA March 6, 2003 WHY WOMEN MATTER SUMMIT THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT 110 Wall Street, 2nd floor New York, NY 10005 (212) 785-6001 - 1 - Find further information about The White House Project and our other research and programs online at: www.thewhitehouseproject.org The White House Project would like to thank the following for their contributions to this Briefing Book: Ann Burroughs Georgia Duerst-Lahti, Beloit College Morgan Hanger & Erin Vilardi, WHP Interns Anat Maytal, former WHP Intern Karen O’Connor, Women & Politics Institute at American University Rob Richie and Steven Hill, Center for Voting & Democracy The Proteus Fund Women’s E-News Briefing Book for “Why Women Matter” Summit © 2003 by The White House Project Edited by Shauna L. Shames Research Director, The White House Project WHY WOMEN MATTER SUMMIT THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT 110 Wall Street, 2nd floor New York, NY 10005 (212) 785-6001 - 2 - Table of Contents Introduction 3 The White House Project Overview 5 PART I: SUMMIT MATERIALS Why Women Matter Summit Schedules 6 Why Women Matter Speaker Biographies 9 Summit Partner Organizations 15 Summit Postscript 18 PART II: U.S. RESEARCH Women in Politics: National Statistics 20 Research Overview: Do Women in Local, State, and National Legislative Bodies Matter? 21 A Definitive Yes Proves Three Decades of Research by Political Scientists PART III: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES & STRATEGIES Women in Politics: International Overview 26 Women in Politics: Country Rankings 28 Strategies for Equality: Initiatives from a Selection of Countries 33 PART IV: U.S.