UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 413-iii HOUSE OF COMMONS ORAL EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE SECURING THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN TUESDAY 30 OCTOBER 2012 LT GENERAL DAVID CAPEWELL, BRIGADIER DOUG CHALMERS, DAME MARIOT LESLIE DCMG and BRIGADIER JAMES STEVENSON Evidence heard in Public Questions 139 - 229 USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT 1. This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and reported to the House. The transcript has been placed on the internet on the authority of the Committee, and copies have been made available by the Vote Office for the use of Members and others. 2. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither witnesses nor Members have had the opportunity to correct the record. The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these proceedings. 3. Members who receive this for the purpose of correcting questions addressed by them to witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Committee Assistant. 4. Prospective witnesses may receive this in preparation for any written or oral evidence they may in due course give to the Committee. 1 Oral Evidence Taken before the Defence Committee on Tuesday 30 October 2012 Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair) Mr Julian Brazier Mr Dai Havard Sandra Osborne Sir Bob Russell Bob Stewart Ms Gisela Stuart Examination of Witnesses Witnesses: Lt General David Capewell, Commander Joint Forces, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, returning Commander Task Force Helmand, Dame Mariot Leslie DCMG, UK Permanent Representative to NATO and Brigadier James Stevenson, NATO Afghan National Training. Chair: I welcome all of you to our evidence session on Afghanistan, which we are using today to look at the current state of operations there, how well the Afghan national security forces are doing, and how we will plan for withdrawal from Afghanistan. I would welcome evidence as full as you are able to give at the current state of planning, but we recognise that some of that planning may not yet be mature. Would you like to introduce yourselves, and would you like to begin, Dame Mariot? Dame Mariot Leslie: I am Mariot Leslie, and I am the UK permanent representative to NATO. Lt General Capewell: I am David Capewell, the Chief of Joint Operations. I work out of the Northwood headquarters. Brigadier Chalmers: I am Doug Chalmers, Commander, 12th Mechanized Brigade. I commanded Task Force Helmand between April and October this year. Brigadier Stevenson: I am James Stevenson. I am currently a member at the Royal College of Defence Studies. I came out of Afghanistan about two and a half months ago, having been Deputy Commander Army within the NATO training mission in Afghanistan. Q139 Chair: Thank you very much indeed. Let us begin with a general question. How are things going in Helmand in terms of the level of violence? Give us a rundown of how things are going and whether you think that it will get better, stay the same or get worse. Who would like to begin? Lt General Capewell: I will start and then I should give the recent Task Force Commander the floor. My judgment is that progress is being delivered. We are increasingly seeing an Afghan security apparatus that is becoming more confident and vibrant. The levels 2 of violence are beginning to go down. We are also seeing much more ownership by the Afghan National Security forces across the whole of Helmand. That is true also across the rest of Afghanistan. We are seeing much more independent thought by the Afghans, both in political terms in the provinces and by the security apparatus. To get a better sense of what it feels like on the ground, Doug should speak. Q140 Chair: Before I come to Brigadier Chalmers, you say that the levels of violence are beginning to go down, Lt General Capewell. But the Ministry of Defence memorandum says, “violence levels in 2012 remain broadly similar to 2011.” Of course, we saw in September the destruction of Harrier jets. Why do you say that violence levels are beginning to go down? Lt General Capewell: You are right to say that the levels of attack are broadly the same. We are beginning to see a 1% or 2% decline in the activity levels from the insurgents. This is a judgment about Helmand rather than a judgment about the rest of Afghanistan where there is more improvement. Q141 Chair: Yes, I did ask about Helmand. You are right. Brigadier Chalmers. Brigadier Chalmers: In the three central districts, the city of Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and a number of market towns, you are right that the level of violence has only dipped very slightly. What has changed is where that violence is taking place. There has been a significant change over time. The violence has been displaced out of the market town areas and the deeply farmed areas, more into the dasht or the desert areas outwith those areas. That has allowed Afghan local and economic confidence to grow over the summer, and that is now being secured by Afghan security forces. Q142 Chair: So the violence hasn’t gone down, it has just moved position. Why is it better that it should be out in the more desert areas? Brigadier Chalmers: It is away from the larger bulk of the population. We have mapped the heat—the level of incidents over the last couple of years—and the area that houses about 70% of the population is three central districts covering those cities and market towns. The violence is away from those areas, so the bulk of the population in those centres is now able to get on with the business of life and enjoy some form of economic move forward. Q143 Chair: How much of Helmand is still under Taliban control? Brigadier Chalmers: If you looked at a map, and looked at a geographical space, you could colour in parts of the outlying areas. If you look at the population centres, you will find that the bulk of the population now is under Government control. Q144 Mr Havard: The memorandum that we have reflects what you have just said, but it expresses it by saying that they are not able to concentrate attacks; it is more dispersed. It is as you describe, but it is so partly because the ANSF operational design is to do this, and they are effectively driving the process that creates what you describe. It is their priority to deploy their forces in order to achieve the effect you just described. Is that right, or is it because of circumstance? Is it because it is the only thing they can do? And what happens when the lights go out? What happens at night? 3 Brigadier Chalmers: On the displacement, I think that is exactly right. Throughout my tour—this is different from my previous tours there—I very much worked in support of Afghan intent and Afghan priorities. They have prioritised the larger populated areas and those market towns, and that is where they are concentrating their efforts to make sure that those gains can be sustained. At night, in the more densely populated areas, the pickets—if we can call them such— of particularly the Afghan police around the market towns remain very much in place. One of the things that has changed over the years I have been there is that when you do fly at night, the level of electricity and the sense of growth that you get is quite stark. Lt General Capewell: I look in the eyes of most of the Afghan leadership in Helmand, and I have done so for a number of years now. We are really now beginning to see a sense of ownership by that leadership—army leadership in particular—in the sense that they understand how they want the security apparatus to settle, and they know and can visualise what they see as an enduring footprint. That is their own design, which is, in my view, a very clear indication that they understand what they want to get out of their own security institutions. They understand how they want to police it and secure it, and they have a very clear understanding about where the edges of this footprint are. Doug’s point about pushing the violence out to the edges is absolutely clear in their minds. They keep it away from the population and deal with the insurgency at the edges. I do not think that we can, at the moment, ask any more of them than that in terms of their design for operations—to use a military phrase—over the years. Q145 Chair: What about Camp Bastion? The attack on Camp Bastion in September— was that a worrying phenomenon, or was it difficult to deal with or unexpected? How would you describe it? Lt General Capewell: I would describe it as a tactical setback. I do not know how recently you have been to Bastion, but it is a camp with a 40 km radius. It is now absolutely secure in terms of the redoubled efforts that have been put into trying to get to grips with where the gaps are. I am sure in my own mind that although the enemy got lucky on this occasion, it is no more than that. This is not a strategic threat in any sense. Q146 Mr Brazier: If I may, I would like to shift the discussion to civilian casualties. Clearly, as you are describing, if you are moving the trouble away from the populated areas, that is progress.