Focus on Trade
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Focus-on-Trade is a regular electronic bulletin providing updates and analysis of trends in regional and world trade and Focus on Trade finance, with an emphasis on analysis of these trends from an integrative, interdisci- plinary viewpoint that is sensitive not only to economic issues, but also to ecological, political, gender and social issues. Your contributions and comments are welcome. Number 101, July 2004 THE OTHER RECONSTRUCTION: THIS issue of Focus on Trade marks the meaningless How private contractors are trans- “handover of sovereignty” by the US to their handpicked forming Iraq’s society “interim government” in Baghdad. The Financial Times called By Herbert Docena the ceremony an “embarrassing last act by a departing US authority and an unfortunate reflection of the troubles it WHAT TO EXPECT FROM US leaves behind.” Far from being the last act, however, the “DEMOCRACY PROMOTION” IN handover simply marks another phase in the US’ overall IRAQ* strategy to gain political and economic domination of Iraq By William I. Robinson and the whole region. The secrecy in which the ceremony took place was an inauspicious — but fitting — start to the NICARAGUA´S AND LATIN new era sham sovereignty. AMERICA´S “LESSONS” FOR IRAQ By Alejandro Bendaña THE FINAL UN RESOLUTION ON IRAQ’S INTERIM GOVERNMENT By Phyllis Bennis WAR: TRADE BY OTHER MEANS: How the US is getting a free trade agreement minus the negotiations By Marylou Malig THE US’ STRATEGY OF DESPERA- TION By Walden Bello Please contact us c/o CUSRI, Wisit Prachuabmoh Building, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok 10330 Thailand. Tel: (66 2) 218 7363/7364/7365, Fax: (66 2) 255 9976, E-Mail: [email protected], Website: http://focusweb.org. Focus on the Global South is an autonomous programme of policy research and action of the Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute (CUSRI) based in Bangkok. THE OTHER RECONSTRUCTION: How with the US-led rebuilding of Iraq’s bridges and private contractors are transforming Iraq’s power plants is the construction and transfor- mation of the economic, political, and social state and civil society institutions that will make up the new Iraqi By Herbert Docena state and civil society. After the transfer of ‘sovereignty’ in Iraq, Assuming that the war on Iraq was waged for among those staying behind - aside from oil, for opening domestic markets, for main- 160,000 coalition troops - is a battalion of taining military presence in a strategic region, private contractors attempting to construct or for promoting a certain ideology, then it economic and political structures most condu- would be safe to conclude that the United States cive to US and transnational corporate interests would - given the choice - prefer not to “cut even after direct occupation ends. Their mission and run” without first getting what it invaded is crucial for the “exit plan”: these contractors Iraq for. are trying to make sure that that the US still gets what it went to war for before it recedes The US could have ensured securing its objec- from the scene. Working silently in the back- tives by keeping Iraq under direct occupation ground, their impact on Iraq’s future may be indefinitely through a colonial government run more significant than that of the more contro- by the US, but this was out of the question versial reconstruction contractors such as from the outset. First, the US was fully aware Bechtel or Halliburton. that this arrangement would not be sustainable for the long-term because it would only fuel the SHEIK MAJID AL-AZAWI was one proud and resistance and it would most likely be resisted happy Iraqi. His office might look more like a by the international community. Second, it military base than an administrative building, would be unstable because such an exercise of with sandbags, barbed wire, and tall concrete power would rest only on coercion, not on walls surrounding it. It might be pitch-black consent. Finally, the US has no interest in dark in the corridors most of the day. But that running the affairs of government other than did not dampen the sheik. “We are very happy those in which it has a stake. to be part of this council even if we have simple equipment,” says Al-Azawi, one of the mem- Hence, in order to secure what its soldiers are bers of the Rusafa District Council in central dying for, the US is trying something more Baghdad. “It’s the first time for all the members subtle and more sophisticated: It is attempting of the government because it was impossible to erect Iraq’s legal, economic, political, and before.” [1] social institutions according to its own specifi- cations in order to ensure that they will be The Rusafa District Council is one of hundreds conducive to US interests even after the occupa- of local proto-governing political entities which tion authority formally withdraws from the the US military and the United States Agency scene and hands over power to a new govern- for International Development (USAID) - ment. At the same time, the US is also recruit- through its private contractor Research Triangle ing, mobilizing, and building the capacity of Institute (RTI) - have been painstakingly setting Iraqis who will push for, implement, and defend up all over Iraq since the end of “major com- its preferred policies - both within the state and bat” last year. RTI’s role in Iraq came to light in in civil society - in the new sovereign Iraq. One November last year when Coalition Provisional of them was Sheik Azawi. Authority (CPA) head L. Paul Bremer unveiled his original plan - since scrapped - for transferring Contracted mostly by the USAID but also by the “sovereignty” back to Iraqis: the interim National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and government would be chosen through complex the State Department, these contractors’ efforts caucuses in local councils whose members were are funded as foreign aid - and, as the USAID constituted and vetted by RTI. In effect, Iraq’s is first to admit, “all aid is political.”[2] It has government would have been chosen by an been and will continue to be “a key instrument American contractor. of foreign policy in the coming decades,” declares its aptly titled report Foreign Aid in the The incident drew attention to a battalion of National Interest. US foreign aid, says the private contractors hired by the US government USAID, will continue to have a two-fold pur- for Iraq’s other reconstruction: Side by side pose: “furthering America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free the final say.[8] markets while improving the lives of citizens of the developing world.”[3] The military can kick out anyone for whatever unstated and unverified reason. In a number of Working quietly in the background - though not cases, “Baathists,” “criminals,” or “terrorists” in secret, the role of each of these contractors have been shown the door. Given how such in the division of labor in Iraq reveals the terms have been loosely used to refer to anyone components of the US’ comprehensive, system- opposed to the occupation, it is difficult to atic, and highly evolved strategy for an “exit ascertain whether or not those that have been plan.” The broad strokes may be coming from kicked out simply did not meet RTI’s criteria for the higher-ups, but it is these private contrac- “legitimate” leaders. At the Baghdad City tors working to achieve US foreign aid’s larger Council, RTI instructed council members to kick objectives that are drawing the finer details. out the “terrorists” through “democracy” by voting them out.[9] As the would-be behind-the-scenes king-maker Prior to RTI’s selection process, the CPA in Bremer’s aborted plan, RTI’s work in Iraq is actually abolished all councils that had been illustrative. formed by the Iraqis after the war without any interference from RTI. “I’m not opposed to Among the first batch of contractors to arrive [elections], but I want to do it in a way that after the invasion, RTI employees have been takes care of our concerns,” Bremer said. “In a roaming around the country searching for what situation like this, if you start holding elections, its contract with USAID calls, “the most the people who are rejectionists tend to win,” he appropriate ‘legitimate’ and functional lead- explained.[10] Another CPA official was more ers.”[4] (Quotes around ‘legitimate’ in original direct when asked why elections couldn’t be contract.) Aside from setting up a five-level held soon enough: “There’s not enough time for system of local councils all over the country, the moderates to organize.”[11] RTI is also creating, funding, and supporting dozens of civil society organizations and NGOs Under the plan, RTI’s task is to make sure the that are sprouting-up across the country. How “legitimate” leaders - and not the rejectionists RTI - and its employer, the US government - and the non-moderates - prevail. Its mission is defines “legitimate” is evident in the way it went part of a bigger goal to build a social base of about constituting these councils and determin- Iraqis that will stand up for the occupation - or ing what types of NGOs get supported. “What at least passively bear with it - in order to we are trying to do,” said Fritz Wenden of the offset those other bases that are hostile to or USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, “is to uncooperative with the occupation authorities identify those groups, those leaders that you and its plans. “Beneath the new interest of the can work with.”[5] United States in bringing democracy to the Middle East,” points out Thomas Carothers, It was not a simple case of RTI knocking on the director of the Democracy Project at the doors of all pro-occupation Iraqis willing to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, serve the occupiers.