Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS REQUIRED BY AN INSURGENT FORCE A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, Manawatu, New Zealand. Kelly Nicole Jackson 2011 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my mother and my sister for their support. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Dr John Moremon, for his patience and guidance as a supervisor, and especially his attention to detail when it came to preparing the thesis for examination; and for his additional willing assistance as the postgraduate coordinator. With fond memory, I would also like to acknowledge the late Piers Reid, Maj Gen (rtd), who was a willing mentor since I was an undergraduate student. I would, lastly, like to also thank the Massey University Library staff for their exemplary service and assistance. 1 CONTENTS Acknowledgements 1 Introduction 3 Chapter 1: A Definition of Insurgency 14 Chapter 2: Superior Strategy and Tactics 42 Chapter 3: Superior Will 82 Chapter 4: External Assistance 115 Conclusion 151 Bibliography 164 2 INTRODUCTION With insurgent warfare increasingly being the form of warfare faced by the world’s major powers, the subject of counter-insurgency has lately been given due recognition. Often, however, there is insufficient importance given to understanding the intricacies of insurgent warfare from the insurgent’s perspective - in essence why the insurgents react in a certain way or implement a particular strategy or tactic. How can one type of military force hope to defeat another type of force if it does not understand it? This work seeks to answer the question ‘What are the essential elements required by an insurgency when fighting a superior resourced conventional force’? In order to answer this question this research will analyze three very different insurgent wars fought during the period of the latter half of the twentieth century and the closing years of the Cold War. The conflicts in Chechnya – both the first Russo-Chechen War 1994-19961 and the second Russo-Chechen War 1999-20022 - and the French Indochina War (1946-1954)3 and the French Algerian War (1954-62)4 have been chosen as they represent three distinctly different theatres of operation on three different continents. Chechnya, with its plains, mountains, extremely harsh winters and close proximity to its Russian aggressor; French Indochina with its jungles, heat, monsoon rains and its distance from its French aggressor and Algeria with its arid deserts, mountains and proximity to its supporters in the form of newly independent Morocco and Tunisia. 1 Richard H. Shultz, & Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 124. 2 Hodgson Quentin, ‘Is the Russian Bear Learning? An Operational and tactical Analysis of the Second Chechen War, 1999-2002’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2003, pp. 64-91. 3 David Saul, Military Blunders: The How and Why of Military Blunders, Robinson Publishing, London, 1997, pp. 279, 285. 4 Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win, Potomac Books, Washington, 2009, p. 58. 3 Despite the geographical, climatic and cultural differences, these three insurgent wars illustrate the fact that all three conflicts depended on an identical set of elements in order to defeat a superior resourced force. As stated above, the analysis of these three conflicts will be examined through the exploration of three fundamental elements: These three essential elements are, Superior Will; Superior Tactics and Strategy and, finally, External Assistance. I have deliberately characterized these as elements as to mark them as principles is too constrictive and is contrary to the very uniqueness and flexibility of the nature of insurgency. One of the definitive differences between insurgency and conventional warfare is the fact that conventional warfare is dictated by the principles of war. These principles are not hard and fast rules which must be strictly adhered to and different situations allow for one or more of the principles not to be met without having an adverse effect on the outcome. The conventional forces’ principles are, however, far more rigid than the rules governing the insurgent force. In fact, one of the enduring features of insurgency warfare is that there are no rules.5 This appears to be one of the concepts military commanders find difficult to grasp - the fact that insurgent forces do not follow what they consider to be a conventional way of fighting, instead refusing to react or engage in a conventional manner. This is evident with most insurgent forces when they refuse to engage in battle but rather disperse into surrounding countryside following an ambush such 6 as the Algerian rebels successfully employed against the French forces in the mountains. 5 Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power, Potomac Books, Washington, 2008, p. 20. 6 Martin S. Alexander & J. F. V. Keiger, France and the Algerian War 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy, Frank Cass, London, 2002, p. 9. 4 Insurgents will utilise every element in order to gain an advantage over their opponent and the uniqueness of each insurgency highlights the impact local conditions have on the implementation of many of the insurgents’ tactical moves. Take, for example, the Vietminh in Indochina. The natural elements of Indochina negated many of the French forces technological advantages as the country’s topography and meteorological conditions provided the insurgent force with numerous advantages, especially against an opponent which relied on technological superiority.7 Insurgency, obviously, is not a new military phenomenon. Since Sparta defeated Athens,8 it has been a constant and effective form of warfare. Throughout the history of warfare the military machine has evolved, employing mechanisation and utilising ever larger forces which covered vast areas of land and sea. When large armies met in strict formations on open fields, the art of insurgency was often ignored by those in command of these new and powerful forces.9 It was not, however, forgotten by those who had to defend themselves against superior forces and often proved very problematic for those in command of what were considered more dominant and experienced armies. Warfare mythology has centred around the stories of the Scottish10, Irish11 and Welsh12, whose insurgent forces utilised non-conventional forms of warfare in an attempt to defeat the far superior-resourced forces of the British Empire. 7 Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy, The Stackpole Company, Mechanicsburg, 1964, p. 322. 8 Record, Beating Goliath, p. vii. 9 John R. Elting, The Super Strategists: Great Captains, Theorists, and Fighting Men Who Have Shaped the History of Warfare, W.H. Allen, London, 1987, p. 89. 10 Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, Millennium: A History of Our Last Thousand Years, Black Swan, London, 1996, p. 324. 11 Reader’s Digest, Family Encyclopaedia of World History, Berkeley Square, London, 1996, p. 319. 12 John Ellis, From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counter-Insurgency Warfare from the Romans to the Present, Greenhill Books, London, 1995, p. 44. 5 Insurgent forces or militia of the early American settlers, who fought against the British for their independence, used guerrilla tactics such as hit and run, their knowledge of the surrounding terrain to hide and utilised the very effective method of multiple simultaneous engagements which forced the British to disperse across the country and prevented them forming up in numbers and fighting a conventional battle.13 Insurgency has continued to be effective in modern times where major military forces experience great difficulty in countering insurgent forces and their techniques. Insurgency today is just as powerful a tactic as it has always been. In more modern times the topic of insurgent warfare has been brought back into the mainstream. It has now been given the in-depth analysis it should have received following America’s humiliating withdrawal from South East Asia.14 This withdrawal highlighted the Western military’s inability to assimilate to an insurgent war, instead continuing to implement conventional tactics and rely on technological advantages. The growth in active terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and its offshoots and the West’s desperate attempts to stem the flow of recruits and financial aid to these groups has led to an increase in insurgent wars in which the Western nations have immersed themselves. Ten years on from September 11th in 2001, the West and its supporters are still in Afghanistan with little to show for their efforts. Almost immediately following the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq a simultaneous Improvised Explosives Attack or IED. The West now faces the 13 John Keegan, A History of Warfare, Pimlico, London, 1994, p. 348. 14 Bernard C. Nalty (ed.), The Vietnam War: The History of America’s Conflict in Southeast Asia, Salamander Books, London, 1998, p. 10. 6 problem of not only dealing with the issues in Afghanistan but with its politically unstable nuclear neighbour, Pakistan. Pakistan also seems unwilling or unable to protect its borders and repel the unwanted insurgent movements or to remove those Madras which openly teach and feed the Jihadist movements.15 This was highlighted in 2011, when American Special Forces successfully killed Osama Bin Laden at his compound inside Pakistan. The Pakistani government and its intelligence agency, the ISI, still maintain that they had no knowledge of the fact that bin Laden was hiding in its country, incidentally, just down the road from a major military base.16 All is not lost, however.