Zimmerman, S. 2020. Defining State Authority: UN Peace Operations stability Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 9(1): 3, pp. 1–16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.762

RESEARCH ARTICLE Defining State Authority: UN Peace Operations Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic Shannon Zimmerman

In a state-based international order, the state is understood as the best actor to protect its population. With this in mind, UN peace operations often have mandates to extend state authority. However, by their very nature, peace operations deploy to states whose authority and legitimacy are contested. Without a clear definition of what that authority entails, peace operations and host states must constantly negotiate the content and approaches taken in extending state authority, some- times resulting in tensions between state and mission. This article examines the process of extending state authority in two cases: the UN Multidimensional Inte- grated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It finds that there are evolving and contesting understandings of state authority across and within peace operations, which can limit mission impact and stress key relationships between peace operations and their host state. The article concludes that there is a need for renewed conversations in the UN as to how state authority is understood and supported by UN peace operations.

Introduction states must constantly negotiate the content In a state-based international order, the state and approaches taken in extending state is considered the primary and best actor to authority. With the very nature of the state protect its population. With this in mind, at stake, these negotiations can result in ten- United Nations peace operations are often sions between state and mission and impact deployed with mandates to extend state the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. authority. However, by their very nature, This article argues that UN peace opera- peace operations deploy to states that often tions with mandates to extend state lack both authority and legitimacy with their authority have a priori expectations about domestic populations and that may not have the nature of the recipient states. First, that the capacity to earn them. Lacking a clear the state has legitimate authority with its definition of what state authority entails and population; and second, that the state will how it is earned, peace operations and host attempt to fulfil the requirements of ‘posi- tive sovereignty’ as its capacity and authority increase. These expectations stem from University of Queensland, AU the state-based nature of the UN itself and [email protected] do not necessarily reflect the realities that Art. 3, page 2 of 16 Zimmerman: Defining State Authority peacekeepers address on the ground. Should Prior to World War II, sovereignty was these expectations not be met, peace opera- based on internal and external legitimacy. tions that focus on extending state authority Internally, state legitimacy rested upon may actually undermine the liberal demo- ‘standards of civilization,’ including culture, cratic ideals promoted by the UN. identity and religion (Gong 1984).1 Implicit The first section of this article outlines in these standards was an assumed level of the evolution of state sovereignty within internal social cohesion that fostered loyalty the UN, particularly how sovereignty to the state and led citizens to accept the has vacillated between authority-based state’s basic right to rule (Lemay-Hébert 2009; Weberian and legitimacy-based Lockean Holsti 1996: 84; Gilley 2006). Legitimacy was variations. As conceptions of sovereignty earned not just through effective govern- change, so too do understandings of how ance and service provision but shared social legitimate state authority is to be achieved. goals and values built over time (Schmelzle This article then details the emergence and Stollenwerk 2018: 450). Legitimacy was of the extension of state authority as a maintained by the government’s ability to mandated goal of peacekeeping and the provide political goods such as services and challenges this poses for peacekeepers. a minimal level of protection to the civilian Next, this article draws on two case stud- population in its territory. While state insti- ies, inclusive from their date of creation to tutions were still important, the degree of the end of 2018: the UN Multidimensional legitimacy achieved depended on how the Integrated Stabilization Mission in the government exercised authority. Once a state Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and was seen as able to uphold international the UN Multidimensional Integrated norms it was awarded external legitimacy, Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). which should guarantee non-intervention These cases will illustrate how peace opera- into that state’s territory or domestic affairs tions understand their mandates to extend (Barnett 1995: 82). This combination of state authority and attempt to negotiate internal and external legitimacy constituted implementation with the host-state gov- ‘positive sovereignty’ (Jackson 1990: 29). ernment. This article concludes by noting The post-World War II rush to decolo- key factors that influence how state author- nize and the Cold War saw the connection ity is understood in particular contexts. It between internal and external legitimacy contributes to the literature by shedding increasingly downplayed, including within light on a central question of external state the UN. Exercising their right for self-deter- building: what is the nature of the state mination, decolonizing states pushed for- being built (Richmond 2013: 2)? ward conceptions of legitimacy focused on territorial integrity and control (Spencer State Sovereignty and Legitimacy 1962: 381; Barnett 1995: 82). The resulting The UN has long negotiated the tensions institutional approaches, based on Weberian between its realist state-based composition conceptions2 of the state as separate from and the universal liberal norms enshrined the nation, argued that it was possible to in the UN Charter. As a result, peacekeep- extend state authority without engaging in ing vacillates between supporting differ- the deeply contested socio-political realm of ent types of sovereignty, based either on societal cohesion (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 26). realist military authority or liberal political The general result of such approaches was legitimacy. These different conceptions of a ‘negative sovereignty’ where the state was sovereignty and the subsequent sources awarded freedom from outside interference of state legitimacy have a powerful impact but lacked the capacity to provide political on how state authority is understood and goods and services to its citizens (Jackson pursued by peace operations. 1990: 27). This type of sovereignty does not Zimmerman: Defining State Authority Art. 3, page 3 of 16 require the consent of the governed but is noted that peace operations could play a conferred by the international community ‘catalytic role’ by supporting the ‘activities (Jackson 1990). of state institutions’ (UN 2008: 26–27). Throughout the Cold War, peace opera- Strengthening host-state authority is now tions primarily deployed between two an inherent part of the peacekeeping and previously warring states and only after a peacebuilding system, and peace operation negotiated peace agreement. Therefore, the success is increasingly defined as a mission’s internal legitimacy of a state only mattered ability to craft a viable and legitimate state to the extent that it impacted the state’s (Cohen et al. 2006: 49; Karlsrud 2018: 148; ability to uphold its obligations in the peace Paris and Sisk 2009: 1–6; Sherman 2012; agreement. However, the end of the Cold Piiparinen 2016). Despite its importance, the War brought about several changes that UN does not have a formal definition of what made state legitimacy a major concern for state authority entails or a clear list of tasks peacekeepers. First, the state’s ability to main- which constitute its extension. tain order not only through coercion but also Differing conceptions of state authority with a fair degree of consent, re-emerged are evident in the evolving approaches of as the standard for upholding the inter- peace operations. Extending state authority national order (Chandler 2017: chapter 4; appeared for the first time in the UN Mission Barnett 1995: 82; Jackson 1990). This con- in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (United Nations sent could only be garnered through effec- Security Council [UNSC] 1999a). UNAMSIL tive governance, which, in turn, fostered took a realist approach to authority by sup- legitimacy (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018: porting host-state security structures and 450; Schmelzle 2011). Unfortunately, many emphasising military actions by peace- weak states struggled to achieve effective keepers to create space for the state to levels of governance. Poor or mis-governance reassert itself (Sherman 2012: 13). This combined with an array of country-specific emphasis on security sector reform assumed factors and a lack of Cold War- driven military and perpetuated a Weberian understanding support saw many states descend into civil of the state as the security provider, even war. when the state may not have ever filled this Post-Cold War, Peacekeepers found them- role (Abrahamsen 2016). The result of these selves increasingly deployed within states and actions was often the creation of a negative mandated to extend state authority. Many of sovereignty based on territorial control and a these states modelled Weberian sovereignty monopoly on the use of force (Jackson 1990: focused on the monopoly on the legitimate 26–31). Subsequent early efforts to extend use of violence, yet the prevailing norms of state authority followed similar templates to the UN increasingly promoted sovereignty the one introduced in Sierra Leone (Gao et al. based on a social contract between a state and 2015). its peoples. What type of sovereignty then Efforts to support and extend state authority were peace operations expected to pursue? began to evolve in an ad hoc manner, con- tingent on the mission mandates, host-state Extension of State Authority demands, and peace operations capabilities. A Post-Cold War shifts in peacebuilding 2015 analysis of seven current UN operations strategy has resulted in new multidimen- revealed that state authority ranged from sional peace operations ‘frequently man- ‘functioning administrative structures both at dated as statebuilders, helping to create the national and local levels’ in Liberia (UNSC legitimate, functioning state structures in the 2003), to protecting civilians and rebuilding aftermath of violent conflict’ (Sherman and the security sector in Mali (UNSC 2014d), Tortolani 2009: 3). The 2008 UN Principles and reintegrating refugees in the Democratic and guidelines for peacekeeping operations Republic of Congo (UNSC 1999b) (Gao et al. Art. 3, page 4 of 16 Zimmerman: Defining State Authority

2015). Combining these diverse approaches, state. There are great variations between the assessment concluded that state author- how states were formed in Europe and the ity is now best understood as a state that is construction of post-colonial states (Herbst both effective and legitimate, with legitimacy 2014: 36–37; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 226). stemming from the state’s ability to provide While there may be superficial similarities in essential services (Gao et al. 2015: 5). This formal organization, the different and often broadening understanding of state authority abbreviated history of state formation and reflects a more Lockean conception of sover- the cultural and structural context in which eignty, which emphasises a state’s function they operate have profound consequences as providing positive political and economic for actors attempting to (re)build a state goods to its inhabitants (Roberts 2008: 545– (Egnell and Haldén 2009: 36). Mandates to 48). The political and welfare functions of the extend state authority are given without con- state are key variables in securing the consent sideration of the current nature and inter- of the governed peoples (Milliken and Krause nal legitimacy of the host-state government 2002: 761; Laslett 1988). (Baranyi, Beaudet and Locher 2011). The ina- bility to distinguish between non-European Challenges to Extending State variations of the state means that context Authority and history are overlooked. The UN, as a state-based organisation, is Colonial governance structures, by design, going to attempt to strengthen, rather than were based on force and used to exploit change, existing regimes (Jones, Gowan and the general population and leverage state Sherman 2009: 10). Therefore, UN missions resources to enrich the political elites. Many are deliberately designed to extend state of these exploitative state structures remain authority. However, peace operations, by as part of the existing state apparatus. Rather their very nature, deploy where state author- than providing a neoliberal basis in popular ity is deeply contested (Chesterman, Ignatieff support, extending state authority in these and Thakur 2005: 2). These states do not — cases may result in the perpetuation of and may never have had — legitimacy in the predatory governments and coercive struc- eyes of most of their citizens. Regardless, the tures, foster illegitimate governmental con- UNSC must acknowledge the juridical sov- trol over state institutions, exacerbate ethnic ereignty of incumbent governments, even and political divides, and increase the exclu- if empirical, capacity-based sovereignty is sion of already-marginalized communities lacking. These states are legitimate by the (Chesterman 2007: 7; Richmond 2013: 16; standards of the international system, are de Coning 2015: 49). represented in international institutions Even when the UN may disagree with the such as the UN, and are the UN’s first port actions, past and present, of the host state, its of call when negotiating a peacekeeping ability to put pressure on how a host govern- mission’s status agreement (Piccolino and ment operates is curtailed by the importance Karlsrud 2011: 450). of consent in peace operations.3 Consent of This disconnect between what is expected the major parties to the conflict, along with of the state and the reality of the state non-use of force and impartiality, make up illustrate a major criticism of post-conflict the three ‘core principles’ of peacekeeping. state building — its Western technocratic Peace operations cannot deploy without approaches (Chandler 2010; Richmond 2013; host-state consent and, should consent be Pugh 2004). Giddens (1985: 17) argues that withdrawn, deployed missions must with- the Weberian concept of the state conceived draw — regardless of whether or not they by the UN and assumed by peace operations have achieved their mandated objectives. The relies too heavily on the modern Western continued need for consent in these contexts Zimmerman: Defining State Authority Art. 3, page 5 of 16 is a major challenge for current operations began to push them from northern Mali. (Curran 2017: 72). Frustrated at a perceived lack of support The more expansive the mission’s man- from the Malian government, a small group date is, the more important host-state buy-in of soldiers staged a mutiny, which unexpect- becomes (Johnstone 2011: 176). When con- edly overthrew President Amadou Toumani sent is coerced or limited, states may see the Touré in March 2012 (Luengo-Cabrera UN presence as undermining their sovereign 2012: 13). Several Islamist groups that had prerogatives (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011: been loosely aligned with the MNLA took 448). Incumbent governments can impose advantage of the military coup and subse- restrictions on the margin of manoeuvre quent disorder to take control of vast areas of a UN mission, as was the case in the of Mali’s north (Pezard and Shurkin 2015).4 Central African Republic (CAR) and Darfur As the relationship between the MNLA and (International Refugee Rights Initiative 2016: the Islamist groups deteriorated, the latter 18–20). Or, in extreme cases, the govern- pushed the former out of many sections of ment can request the UN operation leave or the north. be downsized, such as in Côte d’Ivoire, Chad With negotiations under way, an AU mis- and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. sion was mandated to deploy in the autumn To maintain a good relationship with the of 2013; however, the negotiations broke host state, peace operations may be forced down and the Islamists began advancing to engage in ‘peacekeeping bargains,’ where south towards the capital of Bamako in they concede some of their objectives in January 2013. It quickly became clear that order to be able to pursue others. a more urgent intervention was needed. The next two sections of this article provide At the request of the transitional govern- an overview of two UN operations with man- ment, France deployed Operation Serval, an dates to extend state authority: MINUSMA explicit counterterrorism mission with the and MINUSCA. These missions have a objectives of stopping the jihadist advance, remarkably similar genesis — beginning as an preventing jihadist groups from endanger- African Union (AU) operation, transitioning ing Mali’s stability, protecting European to a UN stabilisation operation, and work- nationals, and restoring Mali’s territorial ing alongside French parallel forces. Despite integrity (UNSC 2012; UNSC 2013a: 24). their similarities, the missions in Mali and Operation Serval’s mandated tasks and prac- CAR understand and pursue the extension of tice of restoring Mali’s territorial integrity state authority in disparate ways. The follow- embodied a Weberian understanding of state ing two sections provide an overview of how authority, emphasising the capacity of the actors in Mali and CAR have understood and state to maintain a monopoly on violence, pursued state authority. deter spoilers, and ensure territorial integ- rity. Pursuing the extension of state authority The UN Multidimensional Integrated from a counterinsurgency perspective, Serval Stabilization Mission in Mali followed a modified version of ‘clear, hold (MINUSMA) and build,’ where the French focused on The most recent crisis in Mali was a clearing Mali’s territory of terrorist and insur- combination of an insurgency and a coup gent threats, then relied on UN peacekeepers in 2012. Existing rebel groups and Malian to fulfil the broader tasks of ‘hold’ and ‘build’ Tuareg fighters returning from Libya coa- in their wake (Owens 2015: 25; Boutellis lesced to form the National Movement 2015: 3). for the Liberation for the Azawad (MNLA) In April of 2013, the struggling AU mission (Lotze 2015). In January 2012, the MNLA was replaced by MINUSMA (UNSC 2013b). engaged the Malian security forces and MINUSMA had an unprecedented mandate Art. 3, page 6 of 16 Zimmerman: Defining State Authority to use proactive force to support the exten- After the 2011 violence, rebel groups and sion of state authority into northern Mali. It the Malian government crafted a preliminary was authorised to act: (i) in support of the agreement to ‘solve some imminent issues’ transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize (UN 2013). However, rebel groups were reluc- the key population centres, especially in the tant to commit to a new peace agreement north of Mali and, in this context, to deter and, once signed, the government struggled threats and take active steps to prevent the to implement the 2015 Agreement on Peace return of armed elements to those areas; and Reconciliation in Mali, choosing instead (ii) to support the transitional authorities of to focus on bolstering their military authority Mali to extend and re-establish state admin- (Boutellis 2015: 4). Fearing to legitimize non- istration throughout the country; (iii) and to state actors, the Malian government also lim- support national and international efforts ited MINUSMA’s ability to re-establish any towards rebuilding the Malian security sector sort of basic services where the state was not (ibid.: 7). present (ibid.: 6). MINUSMA supported the Within the resolution creating MINUSMA, swift redeployment of Malian Defence and the Security Council assumed that the Malian Security Forces (MDSF). However, rather than state had a certain level of legitimacy and stopping violence against civilians, Malian capacity. MINUSMA’s mandate referred to forces sought revenge for their earlier defeat supporting Mali’s military authority and the in the north, targeting potential rebel col- political legitimacy (through the re-establish- laborators and civilians from northern ethnic ment of state administrations). Importantly, groups (Razza 2018: 15; World Bank 2013). MINUSMA was instructed to undertake all Arab and Tuareg populations were particu- of its tasks ‘in support of the transitional larly at risk of human rights abuses (UNSC authorities,’ implying an inherent level of 2016b). state capacity (UNSC 2013b). This is despite To clarify understandings of state authority the fact that the capacity of the Malian state between the UN, MINUSMA, and the Malian was limited, particularly in the north, and government, the UN called for the crea- the legitimacy of the government had been tion of ‘shared visions for the way forward’ contested in various ways since the country’s in Mali (UNSC 2014a: para 70 (b)). Then independence in 1960 (Bøås and Torheim Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 2013). Intermittent conflicts resulted in Operations Hervé Ladsous articulated a peace agreements in 1991, 1992, and 2009, broad understanding of the role of the state but none of these accords were fully imple- when he argued that: mented and governance in the region remained variable (Pezard and Shurkin 2015; Inter-community tensions and weak Lecocq 2010). Systematic corruption, broken governance have created fertile ground peace agreements, and increasingly hollow for terrorism and transnational crime government institutions resulted in a state to develop. It is clear that if a lasting incapable of providing basic services beyond agreement is to be reached, those the capital region (Whitehouse 2012). While underlying causes must be dealt with. governance conditions improved with Mali’s During the past 50 or 60 years the return to democracy in 1991, in large swaths crisis in Mali has gone through various of the north the government remained stages, including several negotiation absent or had devolved power to non-state phases, but none of them have really actors (Baldaro 2018). Where the govern- addressed the underlying causes… I ment did exist, it was often represented think the difference between this stage by predatory security forces and customs of the crisis in Mali and the previous officials (International Crisis Group 2016b; ones is that for the first time the inter- International Crisis Group 2016a). national community, with the United Zimmerman: Defining State Authority Art. 3, page 7 of 16

Nations as the forefront, is directly of violations of international human right involved and actively engaged. We law and international humanitarian law by must try not to repeat past mistakes. MDSF in the conduct of counterterrorism (UNSC 2015b) operations,’ it continued to affirm the impor- tance of extending state authority through UN emphasis on broader state building did the redeployment of the MDSF (UNSC not sit particularly well with the new Malian 2018b: para 43–44) and overlooked abuses government and tensions between the UN by state security forces in its protection strat- and the government as to the definition of egies (Razza 2018: 23). At the same time, state authority began to grow. For example, in an important move that recognised that the UN Secretary-General warned the Malian the Security Council’s expectations for state government against branding non-signato- behaviour were not being met, MINUSMA’s ries as spoilers to justify using military force continued support for the extension of state against them. In response, the president of authority was made contingent on ‘inclusive Mali accused MINUSMA of partiality, reveal- and consensual reform of the security sector ing ‘substantial divergences with the host and national reconciliation measures’ (UNSC country on the process that should follow the 2018b: para 25). Until then, the mission has signing’ (International Crisis Group 2015). been mandated to reprioritize its resources The presence of a French counterterrorism to focus on political tasks. mission in Mali only served to facilitate the The complex and chaotic environment divisions between MINUSMA and the Malian in Mali saw the UN and MINUSMA continu- government’s understandings of state ally needing to redefine their understanding authority. Operations Serval and its succes- of state authority. Dire security conditions sor, Operation Barkhane, focused on military and the presence of a French counterterror- dominance over the Islamist threat. Their ism mission prioritised an initial focus on actions, though not connected to state build- Weberian state authority. However, once the ing, supported the Malian government’s view Islamist and insurgent threat was addressed, that military authority was the prime objec- the multiple actors in Mali struggled to find tive and political legitimacy was secondary. a shared understanding of state authority. For example, during joint counterterrorism The UN and MINUSMA increasingly pro- operations with French forces, the Malian moted authority based on legitimate political army was accused of extrajudicial executions, backing and service provision by the state forcible disappearances, and torture (Human — including civilian protection. Waxing and Rights Watch 2017; UNSC 2016b: para 31–2). waning violence in Mali has kept the embat- Such abuses only confirmed the local popu- tled Malian government focused on physical lations’ sense of injustice and resentment security, though there have been increased against the state (Cold-Ravnkilde 2017). efforts at national reconciliation, particularly MINUSMA’s broad mandate and poten- since the election of the new prime minister, tially long-term deployment required the Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga. It is likely that operation to continually renegotiate how it how state authority is understood and enacted understood and pursued state authority — in Mali will continue to evolve in response to particularly in response to pressures from the ever-changing conditions on the ground. the Malian transitional government and changing conditions on the ground. Faced The UN Multidimensional Integrated with an increasingly hostile government Stabilization Mission in the Central and the continuation of violence in Mali, the African Republic (MINUSCA) Security Council found itself juggling under- The UN mission to CAR was launched standings of state authority. While it did roughly a year after MINUSMA. Even before express concern about ‘repeated allegations the fresh outbreak of violence in 2013, the Art. 3, page 8 of 16 Zimmerman: Defining State Authority government in CAR could, at best, have been implementing its mandate, shifted its support described as a ‘phantom state’ (International to the UN forces (UNSC 2013c). MINUSCA’s Crisis Group 2007). Emerging from an first priority was to protect civilians. While exploitative, ‘terror-based’ French colonial MINUSCA’s resolution acknowledged the sov- regime, CAR has struggled to distinguish ereignty of CAR, no reference was made that itself as a viable political entity (Smith 2015: the mission should work through or in sup- 22). Since independence in 1958, the country port of the CAR authorities in order to under- has lurched from coup to coup, solidifying take its mandated tasks — an implicit but civil-political violence as a preferred method important acknowledgement of the lack of for political change (ibid.: 134). Previous CAR state capacity. The mission’s second-priority governments deliberately kept the popula- task included extending state authority but tion insecure and elites preyed on their own in relation to supporting the political tran- populations (Carayannis and Lombard 2015). sition and electoral process, addressing the State ‘authority,’ as it was understood, barely root causes of the conflict, and supporting extended past the outskirts of the capital national dialogues (UNSC2014c: para 30 (a), of Bangui (United Nations Development (b)). This mandate anchored state authority Programme (UNDP) 2015). in CAR on an inclusive political process first, In 2012, a rebel coalition of several pre- before emphasis could or should be placed existing rebel groups in the north merged on redeploying CAR military forces. This con- to form the Séléka (Sango for ‘alliance’).5 This sideration was likely influenced by the fact ‘heterogeneous consortium of malcontents’ that Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) had were united by their rejection of the existing essentially ceased to exist. Therefore, rede- government, their frustration over unmet ploying CAR security forces to extend mili- peace promises, and a desire for spoils tary authority was impossible. (International Crisis Group 2013; Pezard and MINUSCA interpreted extending state Shurkin 2015). The Séléka began to march authority as ‘enhanc[ing] state-society rela- south and the feeble CAR military forces tions and social cohesion’ (Karlsrud 2018: folded before them. The rebels eventually 149). Peacekeepers and Sangaris forces filled took the capital in March 2013, forcing CAR key protection tasks while the Transitional president François Bozizé to flee (Vircoulon Council devoted its limited resources to 2013). The cobbled-together transitional providing service provision and fostering government was short-lived. The recently democratic legitimacy and administrative disbanded Séléka began to attack former capacity (UNSC 2014e). MINUSCA also pro- government supporters and the Christian vided political support, good offices, and majority formed self-defence groups known technical assistance to the Transitional as the anti-balaka. Violence between the two Council’s efforts (UNSC 2014b). For example, groups escalated and took on a sectarian the mission mainstreamed civilian protection tone, pitting Muslims against Christians. The into its integrated electoral security plan to impoverished CAR government collapsed, facilitate civilian participation in upcoming and the country plunged into a ‘state of elections (UNSC 2016a: 23). The mission also anarchy’ (Vogt 2013). supported government efforts to organise Suffering from weak institutional capacity, popular consultations, which eventually dependency on international support, and reached roughly 19,000 participants across infighting between its troop-contributing CAR (Murray and Mangan 2017). Though far countries, the struggling AU mission to from perfect, the transitional government’s CAR transitioned to MINUSCA in April 2014 efforts were the most inclusive peace efforts (International Crisis Group 2013; UNSC in CAR to date. 2014c). French operation Sangaris, which A strategic review of MINUSCA in 2016 had been deployed to assist the AU mission in articulated state authority as the state’s Zimmerman: Defining State Authority Art. 3, page 9 of 16

‘effectiveness and responsiveness to local not representative of the CAR population needs’ rather than its monopoly on vio- and those who perpetrated violence during lence and control of territory (UNSC 2016c: the 2012–2013 fighting have yet to be held para 37). MINUSCA worked closely with the accountable (International Peace Institute newly elected president, Faustin-Archange 2018). Touadéra, creating a strategy for extending MINUSCA’s prioritization of civilian protec- state authority that focused on develop- tion resulted in the pursuit of state authority ing a road map for providing services, and based on society-state relations. The mission redeploying civil servants (UNSC 2016a: actively supported the CAR Transitional para 4). This included MINUSCA, alongside Council’s efforts to build legitimacy with Operation Sangaris, engaging in targeted CAR’s population. This initially placed the counterinsurgency clearing tactics to remove bulk of protection on the peace operation armed groups from government posi- but allowed for the most inclusive politi- tions and facilities (UNSC 2015: para 10). cal process in CAR to date, the election of MINUSCA also supported local consultation a new government that is focused on legiti- and dialogue with armed groups focused macy through responsiveness to local needs, on addressing the underlying political, eco- and the creation of the necessary political nomic, and social issues that fomented the frameworks needed to re-deploy a reformed conflict (UNSC 2016a: para 86). In this way, FACA focused on serving the CAR popula- the use of force for state authority was not tion. Though the CAR government remains avoided but rather used strategically to critically weak, it models the characteris- pursue broader objectives for capacity and tics of a legitimate sovereign state that sees legitimacy building. civilian protection as both a priority and sov- Even when renewed violence broke out at ereign duty. the end of 2016 and MINUSCA was forced to adjust to a more offensive posture, the Discussion mission worked with the International The above assessment of the UN peace oper- Organization for Migration to facilitate ations in Mali and CAR has shown that exten- several ‘peace caravans.’ These caravans sion of state authority remains a variable brought high-level government officials out concept contested between UN operations to affected areas to engage in direct talks and host states. This ambiguity provides with the local population and officials (UNSC space for peace operations to accommo- 2017: para 38). date conflict context, varying levels of host- With support from the UN and MINUSCA, state capacity, legitimacy and consent, and the CAR government was able to adapt a mandate prioritisation. These factors can National Defence Plan, a National Security either limit or facilitate mission flexibility in Policy, and a National Security Sector Reform acknowledging and addressing assumptions Strategy in 2017. These provided a political about host-state legitimacy. framework within which MINUSCA was able to engage with the reformed FACA (Henry Conflict Context and Mandate Priorities 2018). Operating with a clear function and The nature of the conflict strongly impacts under an elected government, the FACA was international responses. In Mali, the threat redeployed and focused on civilian protec- posed by the creation of what the then tion and stabilisation. The reformed forces French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian ‘demonstrated an encouraging degree of called a ‘terrorist state at the doorstep of discipline, transparency and cooperation France and Europe’ (Dixon 2013) triggered with MINUSCA’ (UNSC 2018a: para 26). a strong international response. France However, the FACA remains deeply dis- deployed a counterterrorism operation and trusted by many Central Africans as they are self-interested external intervenors pushed Art. 3, page 10 of 16 Zimmerman: Defining State Authority for a peacekeeping mandate focused on legitimacy and military authority. This placed Malian security capacity and territorial con- a heavy protection burden on intervening trol as a way to ensure their own security actors but also created valuable political (Olsen 2014: 302; Chandler 2006; UNSC space for state actors to pursue legitimacy 2013a: 24). To prevent state overthrow and through non-military means and begin the creation of a possible terrorist haven, building the much-needed social contract MINUSMA’s mandate prioritized territo- between itself and its citizens. Admittedly, rial integrity and military authority. Even the situation in CAR is unique in that the when MINUSMA recognised the need for a existing governance structures had virtually more legitimacy-focused approach to state disappeared, transitional and previous gov- authority, these efforts were hindered by ernments agreed not to contest elections, the continued need for physical security and and there was limited self-interest by major the prioritisation of military-based authority powers, factors that would complicate many by the Malian government. As Egnell and other efforts at politically building state Haldén (2009) argue, exclusively military authority (Vircoulon and Lesueur 2014). approaches to extending state authority are However, the fact that the CAR government unlikely to create states that are both stable started with such a low level of capacity and and democratic. was able to craft relationships with its people Unlike Mali, CAR’s rebellion turned into and foster a nascent military force that with- an intercommunal conflict, which — while stood subsequent violence indicates that this highly destabilizing for neighbouring coun- approach has great potential for extending tries — posed little threat to distant interna- legitimate state authority. tional actors. The subsequent intervention was therefore primarily motivated by a desire Host-State Military Capacity to protect civilians from violence, indicating The viability of particular approaches to a prioritisation of broader sovereign respon- extending state authority depended, to sibilities. MINUSCA and Operation Sangaris some extent, on the basic capacity of the had civilian protection as their first priority, host state. On the one hand, Mali possessed with state authority a subsequent task. As a fairly developed military, despite its failure such, the missions understood state authority to stop the jihadist advance. This fostered as premised on civilian protection. The inter- the perception that state authority both communal nature of the conflict in CAR existed and could be restored by redeploy- also necessitated addressing the deep fault ing military forces. After additional atroci- lines between ethnic and religious groups. ties were committed by Malian forces, the This required a state with enough legitimacy Security Council began to emphasise not to bring both sides together and provide only military capacity but also expectations safe spaces for dialogue. This helped justify for security sector reform. MINUSCA’s robust actions to protect civilians, On the other hand, the severe limitations despite acknowledging the primary responsi- of the CAR government made it clear that bility of the CAR government for providing the redeployment of CAR forces would do protection. It also emphasised to the transi- little to restore security. Instead, interna- tional CAR government that support from the tional intervenors took on the bulk of protec- UN mission would be focused on legitimacy- tion duties. There was the expectation that based efforts to extend state authority. the transitional CAR government would take MINUSCA’s broader approach to extend- on its sovereignty duties eventually, but the ing state authority allowed the mission time pressures that were present in Mali to to acknowledge and address the fact that push forward security sector deployment the CAR government lacked both political were removed, and emphasis was instead Zimmerman: Defining State Authority Art. 3, page 11 of 16 placed on crafting a legitimate political basis to promote consent of the governed and from which to govern these forces. related internal legitimacy. It is likely that peace operations will continue to receive Unified Visions for State Authority extension of state authority mandates. There Perhaps the most important takeaway from needs to be renewed conversations in the the cases of MINUSMA and MINUSCA is the UN as to how state authority is understood importance of a collaborative relationship and supported by UN peace operations. between the UN and the host-state govern- This includes addressing the a priori expec- ment. The initial disconnect between how tations around the capacity and legitimacy MINUSMA and the Malian transitional gov- of host states. The UN and the Security ernment understood the nature and role Council must politically engage with host of the state hindered the peace operation’s states to ensure a shared vision for the roles ability to fulfil its mandate. The subsequent and responsibilities of the state the UN failure of the UN and the Malian government peace operations will be helping to build. to craft a shared vision for mission support Without such a shared vision, peace opera- to the state has seen MINUSMA’s support tions have the potential to operate at odds to extending Mali’s state authority limited with the host state and their impact will be to good offices and has likely slowed pro- limited. gress towards implementing the 2015 peace agreement. Notes Conversely, MINUSCA has met with a sur- 1 There were undoubtedly racial connota- prising level of success, due in no small part tions to this conception of ‘civilization,’ to its ability to work closely with the new CAR which was premised on white, masculine, government. MINUSCA initially supported European conceptions of civilization. the government in consultations and hold- 2 Max Weber (1946) famously defines the ing inclusive elections. It then worked closely state ‘as a human community that suc- with the elected government to craft several cessfully claims the monopoly of the national plans, which provided the political legitimate use of physical force within a frameworks necessary for the UN operation given territory.’ to fulfil key aspects of its mandate. Several 3 For a full investigation of the importance factors had to come together in order for of host-state consent for peace opera- MINUSCA to have such a constructive rela- tions, see Sebastián and Gorur (2018). tionship with a host-state government, but 4 This group included al-Qaeda in the the positive outcomes of such relationships Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had are clear. To ensure a collaborate relation- been present in Mali for several years; ship, an acceptable set of common goals and the Tuareg Islamist organization Ansar a vision for crafting state authority should be Eddine, which was a splinter of the agreed upon between the UN and the host- MNLA based off of Salafi-jihadi ideology; state government prior to peace operation and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in deployment. West Africa (MUJAO). 5 The Séléka includes fighters from the Conclusion Convention of patriots for Justice and The UN needs to acknowledge the some- Peace (CPJP), the Patriotic Convention for times dual mission of peace operations Saving the Country (CPSK), the Union of where they are mandated to assist the host Democratic Forces for Unity (UDFR), the country in establishing or maintaining sta- Democratic Front of the Central African bility while simultaneously encouraging and People (FDPC), and the new Alliance pour facilitating the rise of democratic practices la refondation. (A2R). Art. 3, page 12 of 16 Zimmerman: Defining State Authority

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How to cite this article: Zimmerman, S. 2020. Defining State Authority: UN Peace Operations Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 9(1): 3,X(X): X, pp. 1–16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.762

Submitted: 26 November 2019 Accepted: 20 February 2020 Published: 19 March 2020

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