UN Peace Operations Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic Shannon Zimmerman

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

UN Peace Operations Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic Shannon Zimmerman Zimmerman, S. 2020. Defining State Authority: UN Peace Operations stability Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 9(1): 3, pp. 1–16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.762 RESEARCH ARTICLE Defining State Authority: UN Peace Operations Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic Shannon Zimmerman In a state-based international order, the state is understood as the best actor to protect its population. With this in mind, UN peace operations often have mandates to extend state authority. However, by their very nature, peace operations deploy to states whose authority and legitimacy are contested. Without a clear definition of what that authority entails, peace operations and host states must constantly negotiate the content and approaches taken in extending state authority, some- times resulting in tensions between state and mission. This article examines the process of extending state authority in two cases: the UN Multidimensional Inte- grated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It finds that there are evolving and contesting understandings of state authority across and within peace operations, which can limit mission impact and stress key relationships between peace operations and their host state. The article concludes that there is a need for renewed conversations in the UN as to how state authority is understood and supported by UN peace operations. Introduction states must constantly negotiate the content In a state-based international order, the state and approaches taken in extending state is considered the primary and best actor to authority. With the very nature of the state protect its population. With this in mind, at stake, these negotiations can result in ten- United Nations peace operations are often sions between state and mission and impact deployed with mandates to extend state the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. authority. However, by their very nature, This article argues that UN peace opera- peace operations deploy to states that often tions with mandates to extend state lack both authority and legitimacy with their authority have a priori expectations about domestic populations and that may not have the nature of the recipient states. First, that the capacity to earn them. Lacking a clear the state has legitimate authority with its definition of what state authority entails and population; and second, that the state will how it is earned, peace operations and host attempt to fulfil the requirements of ‘posi- tive sovereignty’ as its capacity and authority increase. These expectations stem from University of Queensland, AU the state-based nature of the UN itself and s.zimmerman@uq.edu.au do not necessarily reflect the realities that Art. 3, page 2 of 16 Zimmerman: Defining State Authority peacekeepers address on the ground. Should Prior to World War II, sovereignty was these expectations not be met, peace opera- based on internal and external legitimacy. tions that focus on extending state authority Internally, state legitimacy rested upon may actually undermine the liberal demo- ‘standards of civilization,’ including culture, cratic ideals promoted by the UN. identity and religion (Gong 1984).1 Implicit The first section of this article outlines in these standards was an assumed level of the evolution of state sovereignty within internal social cohesion that fostered loyalty the UN, particularly how sovereignty to the state and led citizens to accept the has vacillated between authority-based state’s basic right to rule (Lemay-Hébert 2009; Weberian and legitimacy-based Lockean Holsti 1996: 84; Gilley 2006). Legitimacy was variations. As conceptions of sovereignty earned not just through effective govern- change, so too do understandings of how ance and service provision but shared social legitimate state authority is to be achieved. goals and values built over time (Schmelzle This article then details the emergence and Stollenwerk 2018: 450). Legitimacy was of the extension of state authority as a maintained by the government’s ability to mandated goal of peacekeeping and the provide political goods such as services and challenges this poses for peacekeepers. a minimal level of protection to the civilian Next, this article draws on two case stud- population in its territory. While state insti- ies, inclusive from their date of creation to tutions were still important, the degree of the end of 2018: the UN Multidimensional legitimacy achieved depended on how the Integrated Stabilization Mission in the government exercised authority. Once a state Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and was seen as able to uphold international the UN Multidimensional Integrated norms it was awarded external legitimacy, Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). which should guarantee non-intervention These cases will illustrate how peace opera- into that state’s territory or domestic affairs tions understand their mandates to extend (Barnett 1995: 82). This combination of state authority and attempt to negotiate internal and external legitimacy constituted implementation with the host-state gov- ‘positive sovereignty’ (Jackson 1990: 29). ernment. This article concludes by noting The post-World War II rush to decolo- key factors that influence how state author- nize and the Cold War saw the connection ity is understood in particular contexts. It between internal and external legitimacy contributes to the literature by shedding increasingly downplayed, including within light on a central question of external state the UN. Exercising their right for self-deter- building: what is the nature of the state mination, decolonizing states pushed for- being built (Richmond 2013: 2)? ward conceptions of legitimacy focused on territorial integrity and control (Spencer State Sovereignty and Legitimacy 1962: 381; Barnett 1995: 82). The resulting The UN has long negotiated the tensions institutional approaches, based on Weberian between its realist state-based composition conceptions2 of the state as separate from and the universal liberal norms enshrined the nation, argued that it was possible to in the UN Charter. As a result, peacekeep- extend state authority without engaging in ing vacillates between supporting differ- the deeply contested socio-political realm of ent types of sovereignty, based either on societal cohesion (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 26). realist military authority or liberal political The general result of such approaches was legitimacy. These different conceptions of a ‘negative sovereignty’ where the state was sovereignty and the subsequent sources awarded freedom from outside interference of state legitimacy have a powerful impact but lacked the capacity to provide political on how state authority is understood and goods and services to its citizens (Jackson pursued by peace operations. 1990: 27). This type of sovereignty does not Zimmerman: Defining State Authority Art. 3, page 3 of 16 require the consent of the governed but is noted that peace operations could play a conferred by the international community ‘catalytic role’ by supporting the ‘activities (Jackson 1990). of state institutions’ (UN 2008: 26–27). Throughout the Cold War, peace opera- Strengthening host-state authority is now tions primarily deployed between two an inherent part of the peacekeeping and previously warring states and only after a peacebuilding system, and peace operation negotiated peace agreement. Therefore, the success is increasingly defined as a mission’s internal legitimacy of a state only mattered ability to craft a viable and legitimate state to the extent that it impacted the state’s (Cohen et al. 2006: 49; Karlsrud 2018: 148; ability to uphold its obligations in the peace Paris and Sisk 2009: 1–6; Sherman 2012; agreement. However, the end of the Cold Piiparinen 2016). Despite its importance, the War brought about several changes that UN does not have a formal definition of what made state legitimacy a major concern for state authority entails or a clear list of tasks peacekeepers. First, the state’s ability to main- which constitute its extension. tain order not only through coercion but also Differing conceptions of state authority with a fair degree of consent, re-emerged are evident in the evolving approaches of as the standard for upholding the inter- peace operations. Extending state authority national order (Chandler 2017: chapter 4; appeared for the first time in the UN Mission Barnett 1995: 82; Jackson 1990). This con- in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (United Nations sent could only be garnered through effec- Security Council [UNSC] 1999a). UNAMSIL tive governance, which, in turn, fostered took a realist approach to authority by sup- legitimacy (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018: porting host-state security structures and 450; Schmelzle 2011). Unfortunately, many emphasising military actions by peace- weak states struggled to achieve effective keepers to create space for the state to levels of governance. Poor or mis-governance reassert itself (Sherman 2012: 13). This combined with an array of country-specific emphasis on security sector reform assumed factors and a lack of Cold War- driven military and perpetuated a Weberian understanding support saw many states descend into civil of the state as the security provider, even war. when the state may not have ever filled this Post-Cold War, Peacekeepers
Recommended publications
  • Côte D'ivoire
    CÔTE D’IVOIRE COI Compilation August 2017 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Representation for West Africa - RSD Unit UNHCR Côte d’Ivoire UNHCR Regional Representation for West Africa - RSD Unit UNHCR Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire COI Compilation August 2017 This report collates country of origin information (COI) on Côte d’Ivoire up to 15 August 2017 on issues of relevance in refugee status determination for Ivorian nationals. The report is based on publicly available information, studies and commentaries. It is illustrative, but is neither exhaustive of information available in the public domain nor intended to be a general report on human-rights conditions. The report is not conclusive as to the merits of any individual refugee claim. All sources are cited and fully referenced. Users should refer to the full text of documents cited and assess the credibility, relevance and timeliness of source material with reference to the specific research concerns arising from individual applications. UNHCR Regional Representation for West Africa Immeuble FAALO Almadies, Route du King Fahd Palace Dakar, Senegal - BP 3125 Phone: +221 33 867 62 07 Kora.unhcr.org - www.unhcr.org Table of Contents List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 4 1 General Information ....................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Historical background ............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Immeuble CCIA, Avenue Jean Paul II, 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01 Cote D'ivoire
    REQUEST FOR EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP Immeuble CCIA, Avenue Jean Paul II, 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01 Cote d’Ivoire Gender, Women and Civil Society Department (AHGC) E-mail: i.konan@afdb.org; m.koffi@afdb.org; r.ijimbere@afdb.org Telephone: +22520264246 Title of the assignment: Consultant-project coordinator to help the Department of Gender, Women and Civil Society (AHGC) in TSF funded project (titled Economic Empowerment of Vulnerable Women in the Sahel Region) in Chad, Mali and Niger. The African Development Bank, with funding from the Transition Support Facility (TSF), hereby invites individual consultants to express their interest for a consultancy to support the Multinational project Economic Empowerment of Vulnerable Women in three transition countries specifically Chad, Mali and Niger Brief description of the Assignment: The consultant-project coordinator will support the effective operationalization of the project that includes: (i) Developing the project’s annual work Plan and budget and coordinating its implementation; (ii) Preparing reports or minutes for various activities of the project at each stage of each consultancy in accordance with the Bank reporting guideline; (iii) Contributing to gender related knowledge products on G5 Sahel countries (including country gender profiles, country policy briefs, etc.) that lead to policy dialogue with a particular emphasis on fragile environments. Department issuing the request: Gender, Women and Civil Society Department (AHGC) Place of assignment: Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire Duration of the assignment: 12 months Tentative Date of commencement: 5th September 2020 Deadline for Applications: Wednesday 26th August 2020 at 17h30 GMT Applications to be submitted to: i.konan@afdb.org; m.koffi@afdb.org ; r.ijimbere@afdb.org For the attention of: Ms.
    [Show full text]
  • History, External Influence and Political Volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR)
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies Economics Department 2014 History, External Influence and oliticalP Volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR) Henry Kam Kah University of Buea, Cameroon Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/jade Part of the Econometrics Commons, Growth and Development Commons, International Economics Commons, Political Economy Commons, Public Economics Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons Kam Kah, Henry, "History, External Influence and oliticalP Volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR)" (2014). Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies. 5. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/jade/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Journal for the Advancement of Developing Economies 2014 Volume 3 Issue 1 ISSN:2161-8216 History, External Influence and Political Volatility in the Central African Republic (CAR) Henry Kam Kah University of Buea, Cameroon ABSTRACT This paper examines the complex involvement of neighbors and other states in the leadership or political crisis in the CAR through a content analysis. It further discusses the repercussions of this on the unity and leadership of the country. The CAR has, for a long time, been embroiled in a crisis that has impeded the unity of the country. It is a failed state in Africa to say the least, and the involvement of neighboring and other states in the crisis in one way or the other has compounded the multifarious problems of this country.
    [Show full text]
  • Building Resilience in Africa's Drylands
    REGIONAL INITIATIVE FOR AFRICA Building resilience in Africa’s drylands FOCUS COUNTRIES Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. OVERALL GOAL Enhance the capacity of dryland countries to anticipate, mitigate and respond to shocks, threats and crises affecting their livelihoods. ABOUT THE REGIONAL INITIATIVE Populations in Africa are increasingly exposed to the negative impact of natural and human-induced disasters such as drought, floods, disease epidemics and conflicts which threaten the agriculture production systems and livelihoods of vulnerable communities. The initiative on “Building Resilience in Africa’s Drylands” was developed to enhance the capacity of these communities to withstand and bounce back from these crises. It aims to strengthen institutional capacity for resilience; support early warning and information management systems; build community level resilience; and respond to emergencies and crises. ZIMBABWE Vegetable farming in Chirumhanzi district. ©FAO/Believe Nyakudjara ZIMBABWE Emergency drought mitigation for livestock in Matabeleland province. ©FAO/Believe Nyakudjara practices and knowledge in the region. The Regional MAKING A DIFFERENCE Initiative also seeks to support countries in meeting one of the key commitments of the Malabo Declaration on The Regional initiative strengthens institutional capacity reducing the number of people in Africa vulnerable to for resilience; supports early warning and information climate change and other threats. management systems; builds community level resilience; and responds to emergencies and crises. Priority actions include: IN PRACTICE > Provide support in areas of resilience policy development and implementation, resilience To achieve resilience in Africa’s drylands in the focus measurement, vulnerability analysis, and strategy countries, the initiative is focusing its efforts on: development and implementation.
    [Show full text]
  • Mali – Beyond Cotton, Searching for “Green Gold”* Yoshiko Matsumoto-Izadifar
    Mali – Beyond Cotton, Searching for “Green Gold”* Yoshiko Matsumoto-Izadifar Mali is striving for agricultural diversification to lessen its high dependence on cotton and gold. The Office du Niger zone has great potential for agricultural diversification, in particular for increasing rice and horticultural production. Tripartite efforts by private agribusiness, the Malian government and the international aid community are the key to success. Mali’s economy faces the challenge of Office du Niger Zone: Growing Potential for agricultural diversification, as it needs to lessen Agricultural Diversification its excessive dependence on cotton and gold. Livestock, cotton and gold are currently the In contrast to the reduced production of cotton, country’s main sources of export earnings (5, 25 cereals showed good progress in 2007. A and 63 per cent respectively in 2005). However, substantial increase in rice production (up more a decline in cotton and gold production in 2007 than 40 per cent between 2002 and 2007) shows slowed the country’s economic growth. Mali has the potential to overcome its dependence on cotton (FAO, 2008). The Recent estimates suggest that the country’s gold government hopes to make the zone a rice resources will be exhausted in ten years (CCE, granary of West Africa. 2007), and “white gold”, as cotton is known, is in a difficult state owing to stagnant productivity The Office du Niger zone (see Figure 1), one of and low international market prices, even the oldest and largest irrigation schemes in sub- though the international price of cotton Saharan Africa, covers 80 per cent of Mali’s increased slightly in 2007 (AfDB/OECD, 2008).
    [Show full text]
  • Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
    BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER Vulnerability to COVID-19 Containment Measures Thematic report – April 2020 Any questions? Please contact us at info@acaps.org ACAPS Thematic report: COVID-19 in the Sahel About this report is a ‘bridge’ between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is an area of interaction between African indigenous cultures, nomadic cultures, and Arab and Islamic cultures Methodology and overall objective (The Conversation 28/02/2020). ACAPS is focusing on Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger because these three countries This report highlights the potential impact of COVID-19 containment measures in three constitute a sensitive geographical area. The escalation of conflict in Mali in 2015 countries in the Sahel region: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. It is based on ACAPS’ global exacerbated regional instability as conflict began to spill across the borders. In 2018 ‘Vulnerability to containment measures’ analysis that highlights how eight key factors can regional insecurity increased exponentially as the conflict intensified in both Niger and shape the impact of COVID-19 containment measures. Additional factors relevant to the Burkina Faso. This led to a rapid deterioration of humanitarian conditions (OCHA Sahel region have also been included in this report. The premise of this regional analysis 24/02/2020). Over the past two years armed groups’ activities intensified significantly in the is that, given these key factors, the three countries are particularly vulnerable to COVID- border area shared by the three countries, known as Liptako Gourma. As a result of 19 containment measures. conflict, the provision of essential services including health, education, and sanitation has This risk analysis does not forecast the spread of COVID-19.
    [Show full text]
  • Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Mali
    May 2021 Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet Mali Dormino UN Photo/Marco Photo: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: Mali is characterised by short-term climate variability, and is vulnerable to long-term climate change due to high exposure to the adverse effects The UN Security Council (UNSC) should task the United Nations of climate change, but also high population growth, diminished resilience Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali and multiple violent conflicts. Mali is forecast to become hotter with (MINUSMA) with incorporating climate, peace and security more erratic rainfall, impacting seasonal regularity and increasing the risks as a higher-order priority in its mandate. MINUSMA should risk of droughts and floods. Moreover, conflict, political instability and report to the UNSC on climate security, its effects on the mission weak government institutions undermine effective adaptation to climate mandate, and actions taken to address these problems. change. The UNSC should encourage MINUSMA to work with UN • Climate change may impact seasonal regularity and jeopardise Environment Programme (UNEP) to appoint an Environmental natural resource-based livelihoods. Livelihood insecurity can Security Advisor for prioritising climate, peace and security risks interact with political and economic factors to increase the risk within MINUSMA and for coordinating effective responses with of conflicts over natural resource access and use. the rest of the UN system, the Malian government, civil society, international and regional partners. The Advisor should support • Conflict, agricultural development and changing environmental capacity-building for analysis, reporting and coordinating conditions have affected migratory livestock routes, pushing responses to climate, peace and security risks – particularly in herders into areas where natural resources are under pressure the Malian government and MINUSMA divisions that regularly or shared use is not well defined.
    [Show full text]
  • Grant Implementation in Western and Central Africa (WCA) Overcoming Barriers and Enhancing Performance in a Challenging Region
    Advisory Report Grant implementation in Western and Central Africa (WCA) Overcoming barriers and enhancing performance in a challenging region GF-OIG-19-013 May 2019 Geneva, Switzerland Chapter Contents 1. Executive 3. Challenging 4. Global Fund 5. Performance 6. Key focus areas Summary Region Investments PAGES 26 - 41 PAGES 43 - 87 PAGES 3 - 8 PAGES 12 - 18 PAGES 20 - 24 2. Objectives and Methodology 5.1. MALARIA 6.1. GLOBAL FUND PROCESSES 3.1. LIMITED FISCAL SPACE 4.1. FINANCIAL RESOURCES PAGES 9 - 10 5.2. AIDS 6.2. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS 3.2. LOW HEALTH FINANCING 4.2. HUMAN CAPITAL 5.3. TB 6.3. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND RSSH 3.3. LARGE FUNDING GAP 4.3. STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 6.4. ACCESS TO HEALTH 3.4. WEAK HEALTH SYSTEMS 6.5. SUMMARY OF KEY ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS 3.5. FRAGILE ENVIRONMENT 2 1. Executive Summary Background 70% of countries in the region have a low utilization of past allocations In May 2018, Program Finance assessed corporate absorption rates across the Global Fund portfolio. Against the target Key Performance Indicator of 90%, the assessment highlighted that the Western and Central African (WCA) countries are below target. While some countries were very close to meeting the KPI, many of the countries in WCA were far off: Eleven Countries are between 70-90%; and Six countries are below 70% (Mali, Chad, Liberia, Congo, Mauritania, Gabon) The assessment suggested that there are potential opportunities to improve portfolio performance and therefore grant absorption of countries within the Western and Central Africa region. It also pointed out that some of the reasons for the low absorption are DISEASE LANDSCAPE specific to the region and not sufficiently understood to enable the development of effective solutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Sub-Saharian Immigration in France : from Diversity to Integration
    Sub-Saharian immigration in France : from diversity to integration. Caroline JUILLARD Université René Descartes-Paris V The great majority of Sub-Saharian African migration comes from West - Africa, more precisely from francophone countries as Senegal, Mali, and into a lesser extent Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania. There are also migrants from other francophone African countries such as : Zaïre (RDC), Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Niger. Migrants consist mostly of workers and students. I shall speak principally of West-African migration for which sociolinguistic sources are not many. My talk will have three main parts. I General characteristics of this migration. A/ Census data First of all, I will discuss census data. The major trend of immigration to France nowadays comes from Sub-Saharian Africa ; it has tripled between 1982 et 1990 and almost doubled according to the last census of 1999 (Cf. Annexes). According to 1999 census, this migrant population counts more or less 400.000 persons. Official data are multiple and differ from one source to the other. Variations are important. Children born in France from immigrant parents do not participate to the immigrant population and, so for, are not included in the migration population recorded by the national census. They are recorded by the national education services. Moreover, there might be more persons without residency permit within the Sub-Saharian migration than within other migrant communities. I 2 mention here well-known case of “les sans-papiers”, people without residency permit, who recently asked for their integration to France. Case of clandestines has to be mentioned too. Data of INSEE1 do not take into account these people.
    [Show full text]
  • Cotton from UEMOA
    Cotton from UEMOA The White Gold from West Africa Conquering the World Market Summary The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) ................................................................................. 3 West African cotton producing countries map ...................................................................................................... 4 Cotton growing in the UEMOA ............................................................................................................................... 5 The cotton sector in the UEMOA ........................................................................................................................... 6 West African fibre : specifications and values ....................................................................................................... 7 The quality approach : towards zero contamination ............................................................................................. 8 Cotton ginning in the UEMOA ............................................................................................................................... 9 Lint cotton marketing ........................................................................................................................................... 10 Cotton-textile industry in the UEMOA.................................................................................................................. 11 Benin ...................................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • On the State of Peace and Security in Africa
    On the State of Peace and Security in Africa BY OLUSEGUN OBASANJO ecent developments and security threats in Mali, Central African Republic and Nigeria are alarming. And we cannot forget South Sudan and the endless conflicts in Somalia R and the Great Lakes. The African Union (AU), at its 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, pledged not to bequeath to future generations of Africans a legacy of wars and conflicts, by silenc- ing the guns by 2020. But 2020 is around the corner. What is the way out of this situation? Background to Today’s Security Concerns The African continent has no doubt witnessed many transformations in the last several decades, ranging from advances in the use of communication technology, to rapid economic growth trig- gered by an expanding market for Africa’s commodities, and a burgeoning youth population able to innovate in this environment. At the same time, our potential to translate these transformations into stable peace and development for African people is hampered by the continuing threat of armed conflict, along with its transmutations. Armed conflicts have become a recurrent reality in Africa since independence. From 1960 until the present day, fifty percent of Africa’s states have been ravaged by one form of conflict or another. The post-Cold War conflict resurgence is particularly disturbing. Peace and security scholars have attempted to classify armed conflicts on the continent into various catego- ries – some of which understandably only feature in our discourses in a historical sense. Categorization at this point is necessary, if only as an indication of how far we have come as a continent.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mali Migration Crisis at a Glance
    THE MALI MIGRATION CRISIS AT A GLANCE March 2013 The Mali Migration Crisis at a Glance International Organization for Migration TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 I Mali Migration Picture Prior to the 2012 Crisis 4 1. Important and Complex Circular Migration Flows including Pastoralist Movements 4 2. Migration Routes through Mali: from smuggling to trafficking of people and goods 4 3. Internal Migration Trends: Increased Urbanization and Food Insecurity 4 4. Foreign Population in Mali: Centered on regional migration 4 5. Malians Abroad: A significant diaspora 5 II Migration Crisis in Mali: From January 2012 to January 2013 6 1. Large Scale Internal Displacement to Southern Cities 6 2. Refugee Flows to Neighbouring Countries 6 3. Other Crisis-induced Mobility Patterns and Flows 7 III Mobility Patterns since the January 2013 International Military Intervention 8 1. Internal and Cross-Border Displacement since January 2013 8 2. Movements and Intention of Return of IDPs 8 IV Addressing the Mali Migration Crisis through a Holistic Approach 10 1. Strengthening information collection and management 10 2. Continuing responding to the most pressing humanitarian needs 10 3. Carefully supporting return, reintegration and stabilization 10 4. Integrating a cross-border and regional approach 10 5. Investing in building resilience and peace 10 References 12 page 2 Introduction INTRODUCTION variety of sources, including data collected through the Com- mission on Population Movement led by IOM and composed MIGRATION CRISIS of two national government entities, several UN agencies, and a number of NGOs. In terms of structure it looks at the Mali migration picture before January 2012 (Part I); the migration IOM uses the term “migration crisis” as a way to crisis as it evolved between January 2012 and the January refer to and analyse the often large-scale and 2013 international military intervention (Part II); and the situa- unpredictable migration flows and mobility tion since the military intervention (Part III).
    [Show full text]