How the 1981 Hunger Strike Changed the Republican Movement in Ireland
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The Path to Revolutionary Violence Within the Weather Underground and Provisional IRA
The Path to Revolutionary Violence within the Weather Underground and Provisional IRA Edward Moran HIS 492: Seminar in History December 17, 2019 Moran 1 The 1960’s was a decade defined by a spirit of activism and advocacy for change among oppressed populations worldwide. While the methods for enacting change varied across nations and peoples, early movements such as that for civil rights in America were often committed to peaceful modes of protest and passive resistance. However, the closing years of the decade and the dawn of the 1970’s saw the patterned global spread of increasingly militant tactics used in situations of political and social unrest. The Weather Underground Organization (WUO) in America and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Ireland, two such paramilitaries, comprised young activists previously involved in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA) respectively. What caused them to renounce the non-violent methods of the Students for a Democratic Society and the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association for the militant tactics of the Weather Underground and Irish Republican Army, respectively? An analysis of contemporary source materials, along with more recent scholarly works, reveals that violent state reactions to more passive forms of demonstration in the United States and Northern Ireland drove peaceful activists toward militancy. In the case of both the Weather Underground and the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the closing years of the 1960s and early years of the 1970s, the bulk of combatants were young people with previous experience in more peaceful campaigns for civil rights and social justice. -
TUNE BOOK Kingston Irish Slow Session
Kingston Irish Slow Session TUNE BOOK Sponsored by The Harp of Tara Branch of the Association of Irish Musicians, Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann (CCE) 2 CCE Harp of Tara Kingston Irish Slow Session Tunebook CCE KINGSTON, HARP OF TARA KINGSTON IRISH SLOW SESSION TUNE BOOK Permissions Permission was sought for the use of all tunes from Tune books. Special thanks for kind support and permission to use their tunes, to: Andre Kuntz (Fiddler’s Companion), Anthony (Sully) Sullivan, Bonnie Dawson, Brendan Taaffe. Brid Cranitch, Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann, Dave Mallinson (Mally’s Traditional Music), Fiddler Magazine, Geraldine Cotter, L. E. McCullough, Lesl Harker, Matt Cranitch, Randy Miller and Jack Perron, Patrick Ourceau, Peter Cooper, Marcel Picard and Aralt Mac Giolla Chainnigh, Ramblinghouse.org, Walton’s Music. Credits: Robert MacDiarmid (tunes & typing; responsible for mistakes) David Vrooman (layout & design, tune proofing; PDF expert and all-around trouble-shooter and fixer) This tune book has been a collaborative effort, with many contributors: Brent Schneider, Brian Flynn, Karen Kimmet (Harp Circle), Judi Longstreet, Mary Kennedy, and Paul McAllister (proofing tunes, modes and chords) Eithne Dunbar (Brockville Irish Society), Michael Murphy, proofing Irish Language names) Denise Bowes (cover artwork), Alan MacDiarmid (Cover Design) Chris Matheson, Danny Doyle, Meghan Balow, Paul Gillespie, Sheila Menard, Ted Chew, and all of the past and present musicians of the Kingston Irish Slow Session. Publishing History Tunebook Revision 1.0, October 2013. Despite much proofing, possible typos and errors in melody lines, modes etc. Chords are suggested only, and cannot be taken as good until tried and tested. Revision 0.1 Proofing Rough Draft, June, 2010 / Revision 0.2, February 2012 / Revision 0.3 Final Draft, December 2012 Please report errors of any type to [email protected]. -
Professionalization of a Nonstate Actor
Professionalization of a nonstate actor Article Accepted Version Finnegan, P. (2019) Professionalization of a nonstate actor. Armed Forces & Society, 45 (2). pp. 349-367. ISSN 1556-0848 doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x17741832 Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/74364/ It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing . To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x17741832 Publisher: SAGE Publications All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement . www.reading.ac.uk/centaur CentAUR Central Archive at the University of Reading Reading’s research outputs online Professionalization of a Non-State Actor: A Case Study of the Provisional IRA Abstract: Can non-state militants professionalise? That is the core question of this piece. Discussions of military professionalism have spread to the state military from civilian professions such as education, medicine and law. This piece examines whether non-state actors exhibit the same fundamental processes found within these state-based organisations. These fundamentals are the creation of a recognised internal ethos, which acts as collective standard for those involved. A commitment to expertise and the punishment of those who do not reach these collective expectations reinforces this ethos. To answer this question, this piece will examine the development of the Provisional IRA during the Troubles. It will highlight consistencies and inconsistencies with traditional forces and will argue that groups like the Provisional IRA can professionalise and increase their effectiveness in doing so. -
Reality Check: the Real IRA's Tactical Adaptation and Restraint in the Aftermath of the Omagh Bombing
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 14, Issue 6 Reality Check: The Real IRA’s Tactical Adaptation and Restraint in the Aftermath of the Omagh Bombing by John Morrison Abstract The Real IRA (RIRA) has been the most consistently active of all of the violent dissident republican (VDR) groups in a post-Troubles Northern Ireland, including in its contemporary guise as the New IRA. This group’s violence has claimed the lives of police officers, soldiers, suspected-drug dealers, its own members, and innocent civilians. Shortly after its formation, the group’s members were responsible for the single worst atrocity of the Troubles—the Omagh bombing of August 1998. From that attack to the group’s resurgence in 2007, its violent activity changed in focus. This was largely a result of the post-Omagh response from the legislature and security services. These external pressures worked in parallel with internal brakes to violent activity. The present article utilises the internal brakes typology alongside political organisational theory to assess the non-violent decision-making processes during this period. Central to this analysis is the consideration of the primacy of organisational survival. In the article, primary source interviews and organisational statements are assessed. Keywords: Northern Ireland, Real IRA, terrorism, restraint, dissidents Introduction The Troubles in Northern Ireland are over. The conflict that claimed the lives of more than 3,600 people [1] was ostensibly brought to an end with the signing of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in April 1998. Alongside the subsequent St. Andrew’s Agreement, this has brought Northern Ireland on a slow transition into a post- conflict society. -
Rethinking Afghanistan
Rethinking Afghanistan: International Lessons for the War on Terror * Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English THE AFGHAN CRISIS The ongoing political and military crisis in Afghanistan has been partially eclipsed by contemporary problems in Iraq. But it is arguably Afghanistan, rather than Iraq, that is the more significant theatre for the War on Terror. The depth and urgency of the Afghan crisis are evident from the escalation of insurgent violence, with 2007 being the most deadly year since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom. Last year witnessed a significant increase in Taliban and insurgent operations, making for a destabilization “surge.” It seems unlikely that things will improve dramatically in 2008. The insurgency has moved significantly beyond the south and east of the country and is *THOMAS H. JOHNSON is a Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs as well as Director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. He has published widely on Afghanistan and frequents the country on a regular basis. His commentaries have appeared in the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek and on NPR. RICHARD ENGLISH is Professor of Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast. His books include Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (2003) and Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland (2006). He has for many years commented on terrorism and political violence, including work with the BBC, NPR, Newsweek, the New York Times, the Times Literary Supplement and the Financial Times. 1 now even closing in on Kabul. The Senlis Council has recently written that “the Taliban has shown itself to be a truly resurgent force” with an “ability to establish a presence throughout the country.” The current approach of the U.S. -
Articulating a Culture of Silence in Northern Ireland DOI
Leszek Drong* Northern Reticence: Articulating a Culture of Silence in Northern Ireland DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LC.2020.043 Everybody is communicating in secret. Everybody is speaking in silence. (Keenan 2019: 237) Ironically, and paradoxically, too, what I want to discuss here – “a culture of silence” – has been widely publicised, and often talked about – by many loquacious individuals. It seems 153 that any discussion of silence is fraught with such paradoxes. The theme for this essay comes from a poem by Seamus Heaney, a poem that came out in his 1975 North collection. The poem is called “Whatever You Say, Say Nothing”. I want to quote its third part, which yields an image of Northern Irish society prior to and during the Troubles. What comes to the fore in Heaney’s description is an injunction to preserve a conspiracy of silence imposed on 3(35) 2020 society by paramilitary organizations, especially by the Irish Republican Army. The repub- licans demanded that their members never disclose any information about their organiza- tion or about their membership (and thus their actual identity) to people outside the inner circle, not even to their own families. The republican code of silence constituted a supreme law, trumping any other obligations and commitments, very much like the Sicilian omerta or the secret codes of loyalty within the Catholic Church which prevent the clergy from talking openly about sexual harassment or the paedophiles in their midst. * Associate professor in the Institute of Literary Studies at the University of Silesia in Katowice. His primary interest is in Irish cultural studies; he has also published on rhetoric, American pragmatism and literary theory. -
Tactical Innovation and the Provisional Irish Republican Army Abstract This Paper Provides an Overview of Provisional Irish Repu
Tactical Innovation and the Provisional Irish Republican Army Abstract This paper provides an overview of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) innovations with regards to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It situates PIRA’s tactical innovations within the broad organizational psychology literature focused on the nature and drivers of creativity and innovation. This discussion helps frame the two empirical analyses that follow. The first analysis provides a graphical timeline of PIRA’s radical innovations (and their drivers) in relation to IED technology. This helps provide a sense of the specific occasions in which PIRA innovations were numerous and when they were sparse. The second analysis looks at the locations in which PIRA radical innovations debuted. This provides us with an understanding of the specific PIRA units responsible for these innovations. The results demonstrate that whilst PIRA operations spanned the six counties of Northern Ireland for 29 years, radical IED innovations were conceived, developed and initially implemented within only two areas of operations for only seven of those years. Introduction In November 1971, the London-based Institute for the Study of Strategic Conflict published a booklet entitled ‘The Spreading Irish Conflict’. The authors refer to Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members as “clumsy”, “disorganized” and unimaginative terrorists”. PIRA deployed “amateurish” tactics. “Their bomb attacks up till mid-1971 often amounted to nothing more than a man nervously lobbing a petrol bomb so badly made that the wick falls out before it reaches its target”.1 Fast forward to the past decade and synopses of PIRA’s capabilities look very different. Jackson’s in-depth study of terrorist learning outlines, “PIRA developed a reputation for its capabilities with explosives ad the application of advanced technologies in the construction and use of bombs, mines, and other devices. -
WHY INSURGENTS NEGOTIATE by Colin P
THROWING IN THE TOWEL: WHY INSURGENTS NEGOTIATE By Colin P. Clarke B.A., Loyola University Maryland, 2002 M.S., New York University, 2007 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Pittsburgh in partial fulfillment Of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2012 i UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS This dissertation was presented By Colin P. Clarke It was defended on 18 October 2012 and approved by Professor Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Lecturer, University of Pittsburgh (GSPIA) Dr. Donald M. Goldstein, Professor Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh (GSPIA) Dr. Forrest E. Morgan, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation Dr. Phil Williams, Professor/Director of Ridgway Center, University of Pittsburgh (GSPIA) ii THROWING IN THE TOWEL: WHY INSURGENTS NEGOTIATE Colin P. Clarke, B.A., Loyola University (’02); M.S., New York University (’07) University of Pittsburgh, 2012 Copyright © by Colin P. Clarke 2012 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................. 1 1.2 METHOD ............................................................................................................. 4 1.2.1 Case Selection ................................................................................................... 4 1.2.2 Analytic Framework....................................................................................... -
Transforming Northern Ireland
Syracuse University SURFACE Dissertations - ALL SURFACE December 2016 THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: TRANSFORMING NORTHERN IRELAND Ronit Berger Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Berger, Ronit, "THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: TRANSFORMING NORTHERN IRELAND" (2016). Dissertations - ALL. 559. https://surface.syr.edu/etd/559 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ABSTRACT The main goal of this project is to gain a better understanding of the process of conflict transformation. More specifically, I wish to examine what are the circumstances that push Dual Wing Resistance Organizations (DWRO), and particularly, the Irish Provisional Republican Movement to behave in one of four different ways: convergent towards violence, convergence towards cooperation, divergence and confusion. My main argument is that in order to understand conflict transformation processes and what pushes an organization to behave in a particular way one must look into the interaction between factors at three levels of analysis: the context, organizational dynamics and leadership. Beyond this claim, my analysis focuses on answering a couple of other questions as well: Can studying a process and not just snap-shots in time lead to better understanding of organizational -
Lost in Transition? Republican Women's Struggle After Armed
Lost In Transition? Republican Women’s Struggle After Armed Struggle. A thesis submitted by Niall Gilmartin B.A., for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Sociology Department, Faculty of Social Science, Maynooth University, Ireland. Date of Submission: March 2015. Head of Department: Prof. Mary Corcoran Research Supervisors: Dr. Theresa O’Keefe. Prof. Honor G. Fagan This research is funded by the Irish Research Council Table of Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. vi Summary ............................................................................................................................... viii Chapter One-Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Women & Conflict Transition: Contextualising the Study.................................................... 2 Why Republican Women?: The Purpose, Significance & Limitations of the Study ............. 7 Terms and Definitions.......................................................................................................... 12 Organisation of the Chapters ............................................................................................... 16 Chapter Two -‘Does the Body Rule the Mind or the Mind Rule the Body?’: The Perpetual Dilemmas of Men Doing Feminist -
MISSION Thomas H
RETHINKING AFGHANISTAN: HANIST G A ECHOES OF ULSTER AND F N A THE IRA? MISSION Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English A F N G A The US and NATO sit precariously perched on the precipice of failure in Afghanistan. H A ST As suggested by Lieutenant-General David Richards, former commander of NATO NI forces in Afghanistan, “We need to realize we could actually fail here.” Such a failure could irreparably damage NATO’s credibility and create a regional crisis throughout central and south Asia. In this article, Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English suggest that the lessons drawn from British experience in Northern Ireland might be constructively applied to the situation in Afghanistan — offering a way for NATO to edge back from the brink of failure and regional catastrophe. Les États-Unis et l’OTAN se retrouvent aujourd’hui en équilibre instable tout juste au bord du gouffre afghan. « Nous devons envisager la possibilité d’un échec », prévient à juste titre l’ancien commandant des forces de l’OTAN en Afghanistan, le lieutenant- général David Richards. Un échec qui ferait un tort irréparable à la crédibilité de l’OTAN et provoquerait une crise dans toute l’Asie centrale et du Sud. Thomas H. Johnson et Richard English proposent ici d’appliquer à la situation afghane les leçons de l’expérience britannique en Irlande du Nord. Et d’offrir ainsi à l’OTAN un moyen d’éviter tout autant cet échec qu’une catastrophe régionale. ften maligned, Canada’s commitment in minute fire fight three Afghan political officials were shot Afghanistan as part of the NATO/ISAF alliance is a dead and 11 people wounded. -
Collection: North, Oliver: Files Box: 14
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: North, Oliver: Files Folder Title: Terrorism: US-British (03/25/1985-05/15/1985) Box: 14 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES Withdrawer DLB 12/29/2006 File Folder TERRORISM: UNITED STATES-BRITISH (03/25/1985- FOIA 0511511985) F02-071/3 Box Number 14 COLLINS 29 ID DocType Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 31550 LETTER HANNAY TO JOHN POINDEXTER 1 3/25/1985 Bl R 4/10/2012 F2002-071/3 Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIA) B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA) B-7 Release would disclose Information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(B) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] C.