RETHINKING AFGHANISTAN: HANIST G A ECHOES OF ULSTER AND F N A THE IRA? MISSION Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English A F N G A The US and NATO sit precariously perched on the precipice of failure in Afghanistan. H A ST As suggested by Lieutenant-General David Richards, former commander of NATO NI forces in Afghanistan, “We need to realize we could actually fail here.” Such a failure could irreparably damage NATO’s credibility and create a regional crisis throughout central and south Asia. In this article, Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English suggest that the lessons drawn from British experience in Northern Ireland might be constructively applied to the situation in Afghanistan — offering a way for NATO to edge back from the brink of failure and regional catastrophe. Les États-Unis et l’OTAN se retrouvent aujourd’hui en équilibre instable tout juste au bord du gouffre afghan. « Nous devons envisager la possibilité d’un échec », prévient à juste titre l’ancien commandant des forces de l’OTAN en Afghanistan, le lieutenant- général David Richards. Un échec qui ferait un tort irréparable à la crédibilité de l’OTAN et provoquerait une crise dans toute l’Asie centrale et du Sud. Thomas H. Johnson et Richard English proposent ici d’appliquer à la situation afghane les leçons de l’expérience britannique en Irlande du Nord. Et d’offrir ainsi à l’OTAN un moyen d’éviter tout autant cet échec qu’une catastrophe régionale. ften maligned, Canada’s commitment in minute fire fight three Afghan political officials were shot Afghanistan as part of the NATO/ISAF alliance is a dead and 11 people wounded. The Taliban claimed responsi- O serious one, in one of the most dangerous parts of bility for the attack, which it attributed to a dedicated six- the country. Now Canadian forces in Kandahar find them- man cell, three of whose members were killed during the selves beset both in the field and at home. Political discus- attack. This event highlights the insurgents’ growing capabil- sions in Ottawa and tribal machinations in Kandahar have ity to attack the Afghan regime and its supporters anywhere created a situation in which the force finds itself hobbled by and at any time, as well as possible fissures in (or at least constraints dictated by Canadian domestic politics, unaided incompetence of) Karzai’s security detail. by other NATO/ISAF allies either facing their own difficul- ties or unwilling to help the Canadians, and under incessant hese disturbing events are compounded by the fact that attack by a resurgent Taliban and their allies. According to T the ongoing political and military crisis in Afghanistan the Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, Canadian soldiers, as of late has been partially eclipsed by contemporary problems in Iraq. 2007, were dying at a rate thrice that of their British coun- But it is arguably Afghanistan, rather than Iraq, that is the terparts and four times that of their American colleagues. more significant theatre for the War on Terror. The depth and Recent debates in Canada have pledged a presence in urgency of the Afghan crisis are evident from the escalation Afghanistan through 2011, and the US “mini-surge” of of insurgent violence, with 2007 being the most deadly year Marines in the south promises to ease some of Canada’s since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom. Last year woes, but the force in Kandahar still has a tough row to hoe, witnessed a significant increase in Taliban and insurgent as do forces in otherparts of the country. operations, making for a destabilization “surge.” On April 27, 2008, during ceremonies near the Things are obviously not well in Afghanistan and it Presidential Palace in Kabul commemorating the 16th seems unlikely that things will improve dramatically in 2008. anniversary of the fall of the Afghan communist government The insurgency has moved significantly beyond the south an assassination attempt was made against President Karzai. and east of the country and is now even closing in on Kabul While Karzai survived the attack, during the subsequent 30- as suggested by the events of April 27. The Senlis Council has 14 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN 2008 Rethinking Afghanistan: echoes of Ulster and the IRA? recently written that “the Taliban has tings we find the profound intersection religious identifications, organizations, shown itself to be a truly resurgent of rival nationalisms with violence, as cultures and grievances. The national- force” with an “ability to establish a well as considerable tension between ism of Irish nationalists was heavily presence throughout the country.” nation and state; in each setting there Catholic in identity and composition, has been the deployment of a mixture while the British state and its unionist he current approach of the US and of terrorist and insurgent violence for adherents and their own associated T its NATO allies, including Canada, political ends; and there have also been national identities were in turn deeply in Afghanistan is simply not working, some more mechanical or organiza- influenced by Protestantism. and our strategy in this vital setting for tional similarities between the two Parallel to the conflict in Ireland is the struggle against terrorism urgently cases (involving the dynamics of rele- that of Afghanistan; proto-nationalist requires rethinking. This article is vant international support for vio- Taliban and other insurgent groups are seeking to overthrow the The Taliban, reliant on external funding, have managed to democratically elected maintain strong financial ties outside Afghanistan’s borders, Afghan government in and gun-running has been closely linked to financial support favour of a state run almost exclusively by leaders of the in the Afghan as in the Irish case. Again the Taliban have Ghilzai tribe of the Pashtun enjoyed the benefits of secure and reliable areas of ethnicity, along a very spe- geographic safe haven in Pakistan. cific (and bastardized) code of Deobandi Islam. Fiercely based on the assumption that such a lence; porous borders; safe havens; the xenophobic and long the rivals of rethinking requires both a deep con- local autonomy of violent operatives; other ethnicities in Afghanistan, the textual knowledge of the Afghan polit- and the business of intra-communal Taliban have also sought to construe ical and security situation, as well as an control on the part of violent agents). their opponents as un-Islamic for their ability to learn from the lessons of belief in other sects or schools of post-conflict and violence-plagued here exist sufficient similarities Islamic law. zones elsewhere. We draw on lessons T between the Irish and Afghan cases learned from recent Irish experiences for consideration of the former to illu- learly, both the IRA and the Taliban of terrorism and counter-terrorism and minate our reading of the latter. In both C also exemplified the way in which consider these in relation to how best settings we have witnessed the pro- ethno-religious nationalism could inter- we might proceed in the current and found and durable strength of ethno- sect with violent struggle, and both future situation within Afghanistan. religious identity. The Provisional IRA groups pointed also toward the political There are, of course, some signifi- emerged and fought as an explicitly importance of historic tensions between cant differences between the two set- nationalist movement, pursuing the nation and state, and the significance of tings considered here. The timeline is goal of national self-determination and fierce opposition toward foreign rule. In different, with the Northern Ireland attempting to further the communal Ireland, the IRA felt that the six-county conflict erupting in the late 1960s and interests of the Irish people as such. But state in the northeast was wrongly incor- the immediate Afghan crisis emerging it did so with backing from a very partic- porated into a hostile state (the United as a 21st-century phenomenon; the his- ular ethnic community within Kingdom) and that violence was legiti- torical contexts of the Afghan state and Northern Ireland — the nationalist mate as the only effective means of liber- the Northern Ireland state are different; community there — and this communi- ating that territory from British control. the religious cultures involved in the ty was overwhelmingly drawn from one The IRA sought the establishment of an combatant groups diverge in some key side of a starkly drawn religious divide independent and united Ireland: a state respects; and the respective scales of dis- between Catholics and Protestants. In comprising the whole of the Irish island order, crisis and military engagement terms of membership, the IRA was and one that was fully independent of have been different in the two places. almost exclusively Catholic; Irish British power. Similarly, the Taliban seek Equally, however, there are striking nationalism had, since the early 19th to establish an Islamic Emirate in echoes and similarities between the century, effectively been a Catholic phe- Afghanistan, of the type they almost had Northern Irish and Afghan cases and nomenon. The conflict during the 19th from 1996 to 2001. To their minds, all between, for example, the violent and 20th centuries, between Irish that prevents them is the presence of for- resistance characterizing the Irish nationalism and its unionist/British eign troops, even if the majority of Republican Army (IRA) and the opponents in Ireland, was a battle Afghans have no desire to return to Taliban. In each case, we find the between two rival national or ethnic Taliban rule either. extraordinary power of religiously groups. But these two national tradi- Both the IRA and the Taliban have infused ethnic identity; in both set- tions were profoundly influenced by practised violence that has straddled the POLICY OPTIONS 15 JUNE 2008 Thomas H.