RETHINKING AFGHANISTAN: HANIST G A ECHOES OF ULSTER AND F N A THE IRA? MISSION Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English A F N G A The US and NATO sit precariously perched on the precipice of failure in Afghanistan. H A ST As suggested by Lieutenant-General David Richards, former commander of NATO NI forces in Afghanistan, “We need to realize we could actually fail here.” Such a failure could irreparably damage NATO’s credibility and create a regional crisis throughout central and south Asia. In this article, Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English suggest that the lessons drawn from British experience in might be constructively applied to the situation in Afghanistan — offering a way for NATO to edge back from the brink of failure and regional catastrophe.

Les États-Unis et l’OTAN se retrouvent aujourd’hui en équilibre instable tout juste au bord du gouffre afghan. « Nous devons envisager la possibilité d’un échec », prévient à juste titre l’ancien commandant des forces de l’OTAN en Afghanistan, le lieutenant- général David Richards. Un échec qui ferait un tort irréparable à la crédibilité de l’OTAN et provoquerait une crise dans toute l’Asie centrale et du Sud. Thomas H. Johnson et Richard English proposent ici d’appliquer à la situation afghane les leçons de l’expérience britannique en Irlande du Nord. Et d’offrir ainsi à l’OTAN un moyen d’éviter tout autant cet échec qu’une catastrophe régionale.

ften maligned, Canada’s commitment in minute fire fight three Afghan political officials were shot Afghanistan as part of the NATO/ISAF alliance is a dead and 11 people wounded. The Taliban claimed responsi- O serious one, in one of the most dangerous parts of bility for the attack, which it attributed to a dedicated six- the country. Now Canadian forces in Kandahar find them- man cell, three of whose members were killed during the selves beset both in the field and at home. Political discus- attack. This event highlights the insurgents’ growing capabil- sions in Ottawa and tribal machinations in Kandahar have ity to attack the Afghan regime and its supporters anywhere created a situation in which the force finds itself hobbled by and at any time, as well as possible fissures in (or at least constraints dictated by Canadian domestic politics, unaided incompetence of) Karzai’s security detail. by other NATO/ISAF allies either facing their own difficul- ties or unwilling to help the Canadians, and under incessant hese disturbing events are compounded by the fact that attack by a resurgent Taliban and their allies. According to T the ongoing political and military crisis in Afghanistan the Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, Canadian soldiers, as of late has been partially eclipsed by contemporary problems in Iraq. 2007, were dying at a rate thrice that of their British coun- But it is arguably Afghanistan, rather than Iraq, that is the terparts and four times that of their American colleagues. more significant theatre for the War on Terror. The depth and Recent debates in Canada have pledged a presence in urgency of the Afghan crisis are evident from the escalation Afghanistan through 2011, and the US “mini-surge” of of insurgent violence, with 2007 being the most deadly year Marines in the south promises to ease some of Canada’s since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom. Last year woes, but the force in Kandahar still has a tough row to hoe, witnessed a significant increase in Taliban and insurgent as do forces in otherparts of the country. operations, making for a destabilization “surge.” On April 27, 2008, during ceremonies near the Things are obviously not well in Afghanistan and it Presidential Palace in Kabul commemorating the 16th seems unlikely that things will improve dramatically in 2008. anniversary of the fall of the Afghan communist government The insurgency has moved significantly beyond the south an assassination attempt was made against President Karzai. and east of the country and is now even closing in on Kabul While Karzai survived the attack, during the subsequent 30- as suggested by the events of April 27. The Senlis Council has

14 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN 2008 Rethinking Afghanistan: echoes of Ulster and the IRA? recently written that “the Taliban has tings we find the profound intersection religious identifications, organizations, shown itself to be a truly resurgent of rival nationalisms with violence, as cultures and grievances. The national- force” with an “ability to establish a well as considerable tension between ism of Irish nationalists was heavily presence throughout the country.” nation and state; in each setting there Catholic in identity and composition, has been the deployment of a mixture while the British state and its unionist he current approach of the US and of terrorist and insurgent violence for adherents and their own associated T its NATO allies, including Canada, political ends; and there have also been national identities were in turn deeply in Afghanistan is simply not working, some more mechanical or organiza- influenced by Protestantism. and our strategy in this vital setting for tional similarities between the two Parallel to the conflict in Ireland is the struggle against terrorism urgently cases (involving the dynamics of rele- that of Afghanistan; proto-nationalist requires rethinking. This article is vant international support for vio- Taliban and other insurgent groups are seeking to overthrow the The Taliban, reliant on external funding, have managed to democratically elected maintain strong financial ties outside Afghanistan’s borders, Afghan government in and gun-running has been closely linked to financial support favour of a state run almost exclusively by leaders of the in the Afghan as in the Irish case. Again the Taliban have Ghilzai tribe of the Pashtun enjoyed the benefits of secure and reliable areas of ethnicity, along a very spe- geographic safe haven in Pakistan. cific (and bastardized) code of Deobandi Islam. Fiercely based on the assumption that such a lence; porous borders; safe havens; the xenophobic and long the rivals of rethinking requires both a deep con- local autonomy of violent operatives; other ethnicities in Afghanistan, the textual knowledge of the Afghan polit- and the business of intra-communal Taliban have also sought to construe ical and security situation, as well as an control on the part of violent agents). their opponents as un-Islamic for their ability to learn from the lessons of belief in other sects or schools of post-conflict and violence-plagued here exist sufficient similarities Islamic law. zones elsewhere. We draw on lessons T between the Irish and Afghan cases learned from recent Irish experiences for consideration of the former to illu- learly, both the IRA and the Taliban of terrorism and counter-terrorism and minate our reading of the latter. In both C also exemplified the way in which consider these in relation to how best settings we have witnessed the pro- ethno-religious nationalism could inter- we might proceed in the current and found and durable strength of ethno- sect with violent struggle, and both future situation within Afghanistan. religious identity. The Provisional IRA groups pointed also toward the political There are, of course, some signifi- emerged and fought as an explicitly importance of historic tensions between cant differences between the two set- nationalist movement, pursuing the nation and state, and the significance of tings considered here. The timeline is goal of national self-determination and fierce opposition toward foreign rule. In different, with the Northern Ireland attempting to further the communal Ireland, the IRA felt that the six-county conflict erupting in the late 1960s and interests of the Irish people as such. But state in the northeast was wrongly incor- the immediate Afghan crisis emerging it did so with backing from a very partic- porated into a hostile state (the United as a 21st-century phenomenon; the his- ular ethnic community within Kingdom) and that violence was legiti- torical contexts of the Afghan state and Northern Ireland — the nationalist mate as the only effective means of liber- the Northern Ireland state are different; community there — and this communi- ating that territory from British control. the religious cultures involved in the ty was overwhelmingly drawn from one The IRA sought the establishment of an combatant groups diverge in some key side of a starkly drawn religious divide independent and united Ireland: a state respects; and the respective scales of dis- between Catholics and Protestants. In comprising the whole of the Irish island order, crisis and military engagement terms of membership, the IRA was and one that was fully independent of have been different in the two places. almost exclusively Catholic; Irish British power. Similarly, the Taliban seek Equally, however, there are striking nationalism had, since the early 19th to establish an Islamic Emirate in echoes and similarities between the century, effectively been a Catholic phe- Afghanistan, of the type they almost had Northern Irish and Afghan cases and nomenon. The conflict during the 19th from 1996 to 2001. To their minds, all between, for example, the violent and 20th centuries, between Irish that prevents them is the presence of for- resistance characterizing the Irish nationalism and its unionist/British eign troops, even if the majority of Republican Army (IRA) and the opponents in Ireland, was a battle Afghans have no desire to return to Taliban. In each case, we find the between two rival national or ethnic Taliban rule either. extraordinary power of religiously groups. But these two national tradi- Both the IRA and the Taliban have infused ethnic identity; in both set- tions were profoundly influenced by practised violence that has straddled the

POLICY OPTIONS 15 JUNE 2008 Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English

division between terrorism and insur- challenge requires honest recognition maintain strong financial ties outside gent or guerrilla warfare. This is a vital of such a reality. Afghanistan’s borders, and gun-run- point. If terrorism is defined as the US There are also numerous mechani- ning has been closely linked to finan- State Department has defined it cal or organizational similarities between cial support in the Afghan as in the (“Premeditated, politically motivated our two case studies. Both the IRA and Irish case. Again the Taliban have violence perpetrated against non- the Taliban have benefited very signifi- enjoyed the benefits of secure and reli- combatant targets by sub national cantly from international support. In the able areas of geographic safe haven in groups or clandestine agents, usually IRA’s case, this involved both the back- Pakistan. intended to influence an audience”), ing of some US sympathizers and the The Provisional IRA, particularly then it is clear that both the IRA and the help offered by sympathetic regimes from the mid-1970s onwards, gave great Taliban have indeed practised terrorism, (most significantly, that of Libya’s organizational autonomy to local opera- but also that not all of their violence has Colonel Gaddafi). Such international tives. Initially organized along tradition- been terrorist in nature. The IRA did kill support networks provided money, al military lines (into brigades, battalions hundreds of civilians, many of them weaponry and other forms of important and so forth), the IRA then moved dur- murdered in unambiguously terrorist backing for the IRA’s lengthy campaign. ing the 1970s toward a more flexible cel- fashion. But it also more frequently The IRA also made good use of the lular structure, with the result that killed military or security person- considerable initiative and nel, and the history of the IRA In both the Irish and Afghan cases, autonomy were enjoyed by local has in practice involved some- therefore, we have seen a units. This reflected and rein- thing between terrorism and deployment of violence for political forced the varied pattern of IRA irregular or guerrilla warfare. activity (with some areas, such as ends, in ways that include (but that south Armagh, becoming partic- he Taliban tread the line are not neatly contained by the ularly dynamic and active), and T between terrorism and term) terrorism. And, despite an it is a pattern echoed in insurgency as well. understandable tendency for Afghanistan too. During the Undoubtedly they would like period of Taliban control in to be insurgents, but without Western governments to highlight Afghanistan, the Kandahar true popular support they are the terrorist complexion of their Shura controlled by Mullah relegated to terrorist and crimi- enemies’ campaigns, this Omar was able to exert its will nal acts in order to perpetuate combination of different forms of throughout much of the area their organization. This can controlled by the Taliban. In the most easily be seen in the surge violence is very commonly what we current insurgent environment, in the use of improvised explo- actually face when dealing with however, it has proved much sive devices (IEDs) and in sui- terrorism across much of the world. more difficult for the Taliban to cide attacks, as well as their An effective response to this maintain any effective central increasing reliance on narcotics control over the various com- as a source of revenue. challenge requires honest manders throughout the Additionally, the Taliban have recognition of such a reality. provinces. Today’s Taliban are been attacking in much larger being forced once again to units than they were previously and porous border between Northern Ireland depend on operations originated and over-running district centres with and the Irish Republic, storing weapons executed at the local level, with the alarming frequency. in the latter (beyond the jurisdiction of shuras attempting to at least exude the In both the Irish and Afghan cases, the UK state), and often launching appearance of control. This has led to a therefore, we have seen a deployment attacks from or establishing safe havens number of localized political and tribal of violence for political ends, in ways in the Republic rather than in the more accommodations and complexities. that include (but that are not neatly deeply hostile atmosphere of the north. contained by the term) terrorism. And, ithin Northern Ireland, much despite an understandable tendency for utside support and areas of safe- W IRA energy and activity has Western governments to highlight the O haven have also been vital for been devoted to intra-communal efforts terrorist complexion of their enemies’ the Taliban. In terms of comparison, at control, a phenomenon that has campaigns, this combination of differ- one could easily equate the financial existed long into the peace process peri- ent forms of violence is very common- support of Irish-Americans for the IRA od of the 1990s and beyond. ly what we actually face when dealing to that given the Taliban by the Saudis Punishment beatings, shootings, intim- with terrorism across much of the and Pakistan’s ISI. The Taliban, reliant idation and murder have all been used world. An effective response to this on external funding, have managed to in order to establish, maintain and

16 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN 2008 Rethinking Afghanistan: echoes of Ulster and the IRA?

Jason Ransom, PMO President Hamid Karzai and Prime Minister Stephen Harper at a formal ceremony at the presidential palace in Kabul. A government per- ceived as weak and corrupt is part of the problem in winning the hearts and minds of Afghans. enforce control in areas populated by republican areas with petty (and with much of the country. Today the Taliban republican constituencies. This intra- not so petty) crime; and it also seems are forced to deal with a number of rival communal dimension of the IRA’s long clear that in some cases people’s real internal and external factions oft-times war was often eclipsed by its conflict crime was to have defied the writ of the with competing interests: Gulbuddin with the British state and with the IRA. Intracommunal vendettas and Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami (HiG), the unionists of Northern Ireland. But power struggles played their part in Tora Bora Front, the Haqqani network, intracommunal punishment attacks these gruesome IRA policing methods. various warlords and other groups occupied much of the Provisionals’ In Afghanistan, a significant part of linked to the former Northern Alliance. energy, as those Catholics in the north the Taliban’s appeal and strength has While the Taliban may show a willing- who were deemed to be engaged in been its willingness and ability to ness to cooperate with some of these antisocial action (such as repeated impose law and order amid chaos. Prior groups due to a shared animosity house robberies, car thefts or joy-riding) to their ouster in 2001, many crimes in toward the Karzai government and were brutally policed with, for example, areas they controlled were punished international forces, they harbour no beatings or kneecappings (the shooting summarily and brutally. It may not have long-term power-sharing plans with of victims through their knees). These always been the guilty party punished these factions. The result is occasional were extremely numerous, Irish repub- for the crime, but someone was always violent clashes between these groups licans carrying out 1,228 punishment punished. Despite economic reliance on and a willingness to betray their tempo- shootings between 1973 and 1997, and opium production, the Taliban did wage rary partners to the coalition or the a further 755 beatings from 1982-97. a short yet successful campaign, against Karzai government. Indeed, groups such Clearly, there was a problem in some the cultivation of poppy throughout as HiG are consistently formulating

POLICY OPTIONS 17 JUNE 2008 Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English

plans to supplant the Taliban in case the the Catholic working class in 1970s, or in Guantanamo Bay or Abu Karzai government falls. and Derry during 1970-72 pushed peo- Ghraib more recently, might be con- Just as those deemed to be cooper- ple toward rather than away from the sidered slight when set against the ating with the IRA’s enemies in Ireland Provisional IRA and made the IRA a far atrocities of either the Provisional IRA, were frequently targeted and punished more significant force than they other- al-Qaeida or the Taliban. But this miss- as a result, so too the Taliban wages a wise would have been. es the central issue: namely, that our constant campaign against those who In Afghanistan there is a similar primary objection to such human may sympathize or work with the dynamic in effect. As one Pakistani rights abuses should be that they Karzai government, international diplomat told the International Crisis demean both state and victim, and forces, or even international aid organ- Group, “When a child is killed in one of that they simultaneously widen the izations. Ignoring the Taliban’s threats these villages, that village is lost for 100 pool of disaffected opponents willing has often resulted in bombings, assas- years. These places run on revenge.” to join precisely those terrorist groups sinations, public executions, and Given the current methods of dislodg- we want to stifle. increasing levels of threats. ing hostile elements via long-range In Northern Ireland the embryon- weaponry, civilian casualties have ic IRA told people that the British state hat lessons can we draw from plagued US and NATO efforts since the was a brutal colonial power, hostile to W reflection on these significant beginning of Operation Enduring the Catholic community. The one- Afghan-Irish comparisons? Are there Freedom in 2001. The Taliban and sided of 1970 in Belfast, broader implications for how to deal other groups have used this to their the internment of many innocent with the crisis in Afghanistan, and advantage by sheltering themselves Catholics from August 1971 onwards, indeed with the problems posed by within civilian areas, using the popula- and the fatal shooting by the Parachute terrorist and insurgent violence in tion as a shield. Some villages have Regiment of fourteen Catholic civilians other settings? Five points are especial- resisted these Taliban incursions, but on Bloody Sunday in January 1972, all ly important. many are unable to do so, so that when seemed to make the IRA’s case more First, in both the Northern Irish artillery and aerial bombardment strike plausible. IRA recruits swelled as a 1970s and the post-9/11 era of the War the village, it bears a US stamp. result, and the lessons for our own on Terror, we can clearly see the counter- The metric the US has used in times are clear enough. productive dangers of over-militarizing Afghanistan for “collateral damage” In a counterinsurgency, it is impor- our response to terrorism. In this sense, has been disastrous. As noted on CBS’s tant that civilian casualties be kept to the War on Terror model has arguably been an obstacle First, in both the Northern Irish 1970s and the post-9/11 era rather than an advantage in of the War on Terror, we can clearly see the counter- recent years. Superior mili- tary force, well-suited to the productive dangers of over-militarizing our response to winning of formal military terrorism. In this sense, the War on Terror model has arguably conflict, has proved repeat- been an obstacle rather than an advantage in recent years. edly counter-productive in Superior military force, well-suited to the winning of formal settings where the state faces embedded terrorist and military conflict, has proved repeatedly counter-productive in insurgent violence. settings where the state faces embedded terrorist and In 1970s Northern insurgent violence. Ireland the British Army did eventually help to contain the worst 60 Minutes in October 2007, up to 30 an absolute minimum. When they do excesses of inter-communal disorder, civilians may be killed in order to kill occur, it is important that the military but at a high price in terms of the anti- or capture a high-value target. This is force involved take responsibility for its state disaffection that they had gener- absolutely unacceptable and extremely actions, and if necessary make restitu- ated in the process. One-sided curfew detrimental to the stated mission of tion or punish the guilty parties. and internment policies in 1970-71 — the US government in Afghanistan. While the military response to combined with heavy-handed treat- There is a very counter-productive insurgency is far from ideal, coupled ment of internees and of suspect com- set of effects that can be produced with good intelligence it can produce munities beyond the jails — helped to when states drift across the Weberian very successful counter-terrorist stimulate precisely the kind of anti- line of legitimacy that divides them efforts. By the latter days of the state terrorist violence that such meas- from their terrorist opponents. The Northern Ireland conflict, the state ures had been intended to uproot. abuse of human rights in settings such had developed an extensive range of Friction between the British Army and as Northern Irish internment in the agents and informers within paramili-

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tary groups such as the IRA and this and some form of compromise deal. The Pashtun nationalist wing, however, proved of greater value in countering But the essence of that deal was the has proved more willing to negotiate. their terrorist campaign than had the creation of a Northern Ireland state Many former pre-9/11 Taliban all-out deployment of the Parachute that could command the allegiance of have been incorporated into the pres- Regiment. By the late stages of the the majority of both warring commu- ent government. It is entirely possible Northern Ireland Troubles, many (if nities. This necessitated significant that the neutralization of the Taliban not most) IRA operations came to be reform, and it involved recognition of insurgency in Afghanistan will require thwarted on the basis of prior state the rival ethno-national aspirations the co-option of some of their leaders information; while the IRA’s campaign and interests of the competing groups. by the national government. was not ended as a result, a ceiling was Also related to the overlap between put on its capacity. his leads to a third point: if we do terrorism and insurgency is a fourth T acknowledge (and seek) the possi- point: the vital question of state credibil- t the beginning of the Iraqi inva- bility of a lasting settlement, then we ity in response to terrorism. Clearly, ter- A sion in 2003, many US units with have to recognize both that this will rorist violence — whether that of the Provisional IRA or of al-Qaida In Afghanistan, the Taliban has fractured to a certain extent — lacks moral or political between Pashtun nationalists (for lack of a better term) and legitimacy when considered global “jihadists,” seeking a greater Islamist state. The jihadist in terms of its supposed justi- fications and efficacy. But faction shows an increasing reliance on foreign fighters, there are dangers also in suicide tactics and harsh terror as a means of enforcement. states drawing implausibly The Pashtun nationalist wing, however, has proved more stark, Manichaean contrasts willing to negotiate. between their own violence and that of terrorist oppo- language and cultural training were involve protracted negotiation and also nents. In terms of the terrorists’ support shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq. The that it will result in disagreeable ex- community, a depiction of the terrorist overall value of such experience and opponents being in power and pursu- group as merely criminal, gangsterish, training became quickly evident as ing what might seem unappetizing inherently evil, fanatical or insane will intelligence collection declined precip- policies. In Northern Ireland’s recently make it more difficult for the state to win itously in Afghanistan. Evidently, the established power-sharing government, the vital battle of hearts and minds with- US has ignored the value of experience a prominent ex-IRA man (Sinn Fein’s in that constituency. in the theatre of war, deploying divi- Martin McGuinness) is the Deputy First sions to Afghanistan, then Iraq, then Minister. McGuinness is on record as he Northern Irish experience is back to Afghanistan. having been a proud member of the T telling here. During the late 1970s Second, in many of the settings in IRA, an organization that killed more and early 1980s the UK authorities which the War on Terror is being people than did any other group in the attempted to present the IRA and other fought, we face in fact a combination Northern Ireland conflict. Yet his inclu- terrorist groups in Northern Ireland as of the terrorist and the communal- sion in government exemplifies two ordinary criminals, and they sought to insurgent, and we have to recognize key and encouraging realities: first, that deal with paramilitary prisoners just as the frequently ethno-national basis for the method of campaign previously any other prisoners were treated. the resistance that we encounter. espoused by such figures has been Prisoners refused to conform with The implications of this under- judged by them not to be successful; the prison system, friction escalated standing are huge if what we seek is second, that such figures have the between prison warders and inmates, the basis for an end to conflict in set- capacity to bring with them into peace- and by 1980 and 1981 they had tings such as Afghanistan. Not all con- ful politics a constituency previously reached such a stand-off that republi- flicts can be resolved, of course. Where hostile to the state and previously sup- can prisoners embarked on two hunger they can, however, it seems clear that portive of anti-state violence. strikes in pursuit of political status, the durable and pervasive state legitimacy In Afghanistan, the Taliban has latter strike involving ten prisoners is the truly vital foundation for such fractured to a certain extent between famously starving themselves to death. resolution. This was certainly the case Pashtun nationalists (for lack of a better It was quite understandable that in Northern Ireland. The failure of the term) and global “jihadists,” seeking a the UK authorities wanted to delegit- IRA’s violence to achieve its ostensible greater Islamist state. The jihadist fac- imize the actions of groups such as the goals (British withdrawal or the tion shows an increasing reliance on IRA. And it is important to remember defence of Catholic communities) foreign fighters, suicide tactics and that, while the funeral of an IRA established the basis for peace talks harsh terror as a means of enforcement. hunger striker like gained

20 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN 2008 Rethinking Afghanistan: echoes of Ulster and the IRA?

Canadian Armed Forces Photo Canadian forces training Afghan troops in southern Kandahar province, where the Canadian component of the NATO mission is based. The Taliban insurgency has become increasingly bold, as evidenced by the attack in late April on the presidential precincts in the heart of the capital, Kabul. much attention, the funerals of the 472 as political (and therefore legitimate) or The Taliban movement initially people killed by the IRA during the criminal (and therefore illegitimate). came into being in an anarchic void; years of the 1976-81 prison protests But a far more persuasive and credible they had popular support because the should demand at least as much atten- way of presenting matters would have southeast of the country existed with- tion when we reflect on this era. been to acknowledge the political out law or order, and the Taliban’s jus- Yet this prison war reflected the nature of a group such as the IRA, but tice, however harsh, was still justice. problems of states when they present to point out that not all political cam- One Afghan farmer tellingly remarked, terrorist opponents in ways that lack paigns are legitimate. History abounds after the chaos of the early 1990s, that credibility. Even those Irish nationalists with clearly political movements that at least with the Taliban, one could who did not support the IRA (and this are rightly denied legitimacy for their leave their plow outside overnight, represented the majority of Irish brutal actions (Hitler was unambigu- and in the morning it would still be nationalists) knew that the IRA’s activi- ously political), and such an approach there. This is precisely why the Taliban ties were primarily motivated by politi- would have allowed the government to are trying to destabilize the security cal rather than merely criminal retain more sympathy among the IRA’s situation to the greatest extent possi- ambition. When the government potential support community. ble, instead of focusing on strikes forced people to decide between starv- against foreign forces. They want to ing IRA prisoners’ claim to be political, n fighting terror, states damage recreate the anarchic circumstances and Prime Minister Margaret I themselves if their rhetoric, policies that led them to power in the first Thatcher’s denial of such status, very and pronouncements lack credibility, place. It was also this power vacuum many non-IRA nationalists lost sympa- among one’s own backers as well as that encouraged so many capable men thy with the government, and UK cred- among the potentially disaffected. The to join the Taliban’s ranks; it was sim- ibility in the counter-terrorist presentation of widespread support for ply the only game in town. These men campaign was undermined. Moreover, violent movements must resonate may not be in complete agreement there were alternatives. The state pre- with what people will see on the with the Taliban leadership, but they sented a choice between seeing the IRA ground to be the case. have goals that can be utilized by the

POLICY OPTIONS 21 JUNE 2008 Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English

Afghan government, namely the hope insurgent force again, so perhaps can ments through political accommoda- for a better Afghanistan. With the some part of their force be persuaded to tion wherever possible; and recogniz- exception of the hard-core extremists, present their ideas in a civilized, demo- ing and co-opting the rationality of the Taliban can be co-opted. Karzai has cratic manner. the insurgents’ platform — are all publicly stated that all but a few of the Were the Taliban to participate notions that have carried the day in Taliban are “reconcilable.” fully and openly in the democratic the durable peace created in Northern Fifth, we must recognize and uti- process in Afghanistan, there is a signif- Ireland, and can work in Afghanistan. lize the essential rationality of our icant chance they could eventually Delaying the implementation of opponents and their support group. push their politics to the dominant the points presented here will prolong The lesson of the Northern Irish peace position in the state. If this were to the Afghan insurgency and keep NATO process is that it was (in the end) the happen, if they were slowly to be inte- troops, including Canada’s, in harm’s way, and as the British In fighting terror, states damage themselves if their rhetoric, learned, every trooper on policies and pronouncements lack credibility, among one’s the ground, every armoured own backers as well as among the potentially disaffected. The vehicle patrolling a neigh- bourhood was a victory for presentation of widespread support for violent movements the insurgent propaganda. must resonate with what people will see on the ground to be In Afghanistan the circum- the case. stances are even more dire: a successful insurgency in pragmatic rationality of the IRA that grated into the process, they might Afghanistan affects not only the nation allowed for establishing an end to the eventually buy in to the system, having itself, but its neighbours as well. And as conflict. The IRA had mistakenly some stake in it. This could result in we have seen, failure there can easily thought that their violence was neces- their attempting to protect the system and quickly result in death and sary and that it would produce victory. and prevent their more zealous compa- destruction on our own shores. When (by the late 1980s) they recog- triots from subverting the government. The parallels of the two conflicts nized that violence would produce are true for many insurgencies. lasting stalemate rather than victori- here are those who would argue Ethnic, political and religious grudges ous success, they began to be open to T that no understanding can be are not so dissimilar from one another the possibility of alternative means of reached with the opponents in a coun- that certain themes cannot be isolat- achieving political momentum. States terinsurgency, and that victory can ed. By doing so, we can not only bet- are often wary of acknowledging that only be won when the last insurgent is ter understand the nature of the their terrorist opponents act with the in his grave. Unfortunately, insurgen- insurgent and insurgency, but we can same mixture of the rational and the cies are not tangible things; they exist seek to minimize that disagreement. visceral that motivates most other peo- in the minds of men, and their physical To paraphrase Mao, if an effective ple in politics. But we should, in fact, manifestations are but extensions of insurgent must move among the peo- use this reality to our advantage. In that thought process. In order to truly ple as a fish in the sea, the trick then Ulster, when the IRA recognized that pacify a troubled land such as Northern is to get the fish out of water. In elections would yield greater results Ireland or Afghanistan, opponents Northern Ireland the British eventual- than car bombs, they eventually must be co-opted whenever possible, ly produced conditions within which swapped the latter for the former. and force used only as a last resort. popular support for IRA violence As previously stated, the Taliban is The British experience and time could be eroded. In Afghanistan, we an organization with methods that served in pacifying Northern Ireland must strive to do the same. Only then serve articulated goals, even if there is holds a number of valuable lessons for will the insurgency wither. dissension among the ranks. To a cer- foreign forces in Afghanistan today. tain extent, these goals are those of a Over decades the British sought Thomas H. Johnson is a research profes- legitimate government: the safety, secu- through a combination of carrots and sor and director of the Program of rity and independence of Afghanistan. sticks to bring that fractured territory Culture and Conflict Studies, Department These aims, then, can be presented in to heel, and their lessons learned of National Security Affairs at the US such a way as a function of the present deserve careful study for students of Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, government of Afghanistan as to counterinsurgency. The five points California. [email protected] induce some insurgents to pursue their mentioned above — avoiding an over- Richard English is professor of politics at goals through other means. Just as the militarized response whenever possi- Queen’s University, Belfast, and the Taliban have moved from an insurgent ble; understanding the ethno-national author of Armed Struggle: The History force to a national government to an nature of the conflict; seeking settle- of the IRA. [email protected].

22 OPTIONS POLITIQUES JUIN 2008