Eu Conditionality and Balkan Compliance: Does Sovereignty Matter?
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EU CONDITIONALITY AND BALKAN COMPLIANCE: DOES SOVEREIGNTY MATTER? by Gergana Noutcheva BA, University for National and World Economy, Sofia, 1996 MA in European Integration, University of Limerick, 1997 MA in Political Science, Central European University, Budapest, 1998 Submitted to the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS This dissertation was presented by Gergana Noutcheva It was defended on April 17, 2006 and approved by Alberta Sbragia, PhD, Professor of Political Science Davis B. Bobrow, PhD, Professor of Public and International Affairs and Political Science Ronald H. Linden, PhD, Professor of Political Science Dissertation Directors: Alberta Sbragia, PhD, Professor and Davis B. Bobrow, PhD, Professor ii Copyright © by Gergana Noutcheva 2006 iii EU CONDITIONALITY AND BALKAN COMPLIANCE: DOES SOVEREIGNTY MATTER? Gergana Noutcheva, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2006 The Balkan states have all responded to the EU’s conditional offer of membership with domestic institutional and policy changes in line with the EU requirements. Yet, there is a remarkable variation among the countries from the region in terms of their formal sovereignty, both with regard to domestic governance independent of external actors (internal sovereignty) and internationally recognized status (external sovereignty). Does sovereignty affect the conditionality-compliance dynamic? The dissertation offers an explanation of how the statehood of a prospective EU member affects the policy and politics of conditionality at EU level and the politics of compliance at domestic level. It argues that in semi-sovereign countries, the EU conditionality can incur higher compliance costs as it can intervene in the sovereignty of an aspiring candidate suggesting a redefinition of internal and/or external statehood structures. The security nature of such interventions has an effect on the EU foreign policy behavior involving two agents of conditionality - the European Commission and the Council – and creating risks for inconsistency in EU policy execution. Domestic politics hold the key to compliance with sovereignty-sensitive conditions as the political space tends to be very fragmented and political opposition to EU conditions may arise. In countries where sovereignty is not contested, the EU conditionality prioritizes democratic and economic reforms, the politics of conditionality hides less dangers for incoherence as the EU is inclined to speak with one voice and the politics of compliance are more consensual rendering the compliance trend more sustainable. The dissertation employs the comparative method of analysis and examines the compliance patterns of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro and Bulgaria as cases representing the full variation along the sovereignty variable. The argument is situated at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics. It extends the sovereignty debate in the International Relations (IR) literature to the specificity of the EU relations with the Balkan countries. In so doing it links the IR debate to the Europeanization literature exploring the EU’s impact on domestic changes in EU candidate countries. Sovereignty as a variable is neglected in the Europeanization literature and this dissertation is an attempt to address this gap. iv PREFACE Many people and institutions have contributed to my dissertation and to all of them I extend my sincere thanks. Without their support, I would not have been able to advance and complete my study of the EU- Balkans relations. I am thankful to the PhD program of the Graduate School of Public and International Affaires (GSPIA) for giving me the opportunity and freedom to pursue my theoretical interests and research questions. Through an Alumni Grant of GSPIA, I was able to do empirical research in Brussels in 2002 which proved critical not only for the direction of my dissertation but also for my entire professional career. The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels provided an excellent facilitative environment for the entire duration of my dissertation research and writing. I am particularly indebted to Daniel Gros and Michael Emerson for this unique chance and for their intellectual availability through the years. I benefited from their comments and reactions to real world developments which shaped my interpretations of critical events in the EU-Balkans relations. Through numerous conversations with them, I also developed a feel for the policy-relevant and got real insights into EU policy analysis. My dissertation advisors Prof. Bobrow, Prof. Sbragia and Prof. Linden made sure that my approach is methodologically sound and my conclusions are theoretically important. I am grateful for their patience with me and for their constructive critique of earlier drafts which helped me sharpen key arguments and improve the presentation of the material. I also thank them for being demanding which proved a great advantage for the quality of the work. Special thanks are due to the people whom I interviewed in Brussels, Washington DC, Sofia, Belgrade, Podgorica, Sarajevo and Banja Luka. Without their generosity in spending time to answer my questions, the final product would have looked differently. I would like to acknowledge the support of the European Integration Directorate of the Prime Minister’s Office in Sarajevo which provided assistance to all aspects of my field mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. I appreciate the help of Osman Topcagic and Valida Repovac in particular. My field work in Serbia and Montenegro was supported through a joint CEPS-VUB (Free University of Brussels) project on secessionist conflicts in the European periphery. I benefited from the v discussions and brainstorming that took place in the framework of the project and I thank the whole team for that – Bruno Coppieters, Michel Huysseune and Tamara Kovziridze from the VUB and Michael Emerson, Nathalie Tocci and Marius Vahl from CEPS. I am also grateful to the Social Science Research Council of the US (SSRC) which provided a grant for my research in Washington DC in March-May 2003. Above all, I would like to express my gratitude to my family, my parents Maria Noutcheva and Kostadin Noutchev and my sister Iva Noutcheva, for their never-failing support and their faith in me. Many friends contributed to my doctoral endeavors with words of encouragement and practical advice. I thank them all for being there for me when I needed them most - Kalina Kamenova, Julia Bolotskikh, Senem Aydin, Marco Incerti, Anna Turmann, Regina Sauto, Rym Ayadi, Svetla Tsolova, Justus Schonlau, Ptarik Zoltvany, Julia Ferger, Andreas Schneider, Sally Scott. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMPLIANCE PATTERNS OF BALKAN STATES.1 1.1 DEFINING THE SOVEREIGNTY VARIATION AMONG THE BALKAN STATES .....3 1.2 WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS .....................................................................................5 1.3 EXPLAINING BALKAN COMPLIANCE...........................................................................8 1.4 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS ....................................................................................9 1.5 MODELING THE COMPLIANCE PATTERNS OF BALKAN STATES........................16 1.6 CASE SELECTION.............................................................................................................21 1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION..........................................................................25 2.0 CONCEPTUALIZING THE EU INFLUENCE ON SOVEREIGNTY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE BALKANS .......................................................................................29 2.1 SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE.............30 2.2 CONDITIONALITY AND SOCIALIZATION AS MECHANISMS OF EUROPEANIZATION..............................................................................................................34 2.2.1 How EU Conditionality Works.....................................................................................37 2.2.2 How EU Socialization Works.......................................................................................44 2.3 CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................49 3.0 THE POLICY OF EU POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY.........................................50 3.1 EU POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AND STATE-BUILDING IN BIH ......................54 3.1.1 The Dayton structure of the Bosnian state....................................................................54 3.1.2 The EU Political Conditions: The Two ‘To Do’ Lists..................................................58 3.2 EU POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AND STATE-BUILDING IN SCG......................65 3.2.1 The Dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation and the Montenegrin Question ..............65 3.2.2 The EU Political Conditions: The EU Factor in the Belgrade-Podgorica Constitutional Dispute ...................................................................................................................................67 3.3 EU POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BULGARIA ...72 3.3.1 The Political Context of Bulgaria’s application for EU Membership ..........................72 3.3.2 The EU political conditions: The Copenhagen Political Criteria .................................78 3.4.