Thesis Pursues Their Primary Thrust Into Defining the Trinitarian Nature of God
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
ABSTRACT The Aristotelian Development of Trinitarian Metaphysics Through the Thought of Boethius and Aquinas Andrew Bernard Eberlein Director: Junius Johnson, Ph.D. God was declared Trinitarian at the Council of Nicaea in 325 AD. The divine nature is shared amongst all three persons, who are coeternal. This belief was made dogma and thus is held as the universal belief of the Church. This decision instigated a further theological pursuit to clarify this definition of God as Trinity. Boethius engaged in this endeavor in his De Trinitate. First, he determines his own interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics, next how to express God metaphysically as a substance, and then how to define each person metaphysically as a relation. In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas continues and invokes Boethius work. He further classifies God, according to his processions and relations, and then he discusses how to assert personhood of God and the plurality of persons in the divine nature. He finishes by detailing what are appropriate terms for referring to plurality of persons and unity in God. This Thesis pursues their primary thrust into defining the Trinitarian nature of God. APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS: ________________________________________________________________________ Dr. Junius Johnson, Great Texts APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM: _________________________________________________________________________________________ Dr. Andrew Wisely, Director DATE: _________________________________ THE ARISTOTELIAN DEVELOPMENT OF TRINITARIAN METAPHYSICS THROUGH THE THOUGHT OF BOETHIUS AND AQUINAS A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Baylor University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Honors Program By Andrew Bernard Eberlein Waco, Texas May, 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction . 1 Chapter One: Boethius on the Metaphysics of the Trinity . 3 Chapter Two: Aquinas on the Divine Processions . 19 Chapter Three: Aquinas on the Divine Relations . 32 Chapter Four: Aquinas on the Divine Persons . 45 Conclusion . 71 Bibliography . 73 ii INTRODUCTION At the Council of Nicaea in 325 AD, the Church defined God as Trinity. The Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit were declared one substance, and each person was declared equal and coeternal. God's Trinitarian nature was made dogma, and thus was considered the universal belief of the Church. This decision leads to further theological endeavors to further clarify this definition of God as Trinity. In his De Trinitate, Boethius joins this line of argumentation. He begins by establishing his interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics and then proceeds to define and clarify the Trinitarian nature of God using Aristotle's metaphysics. Next, he discusses how to express God metaphysically as a substance and then how to define each person metaphysically as a relation. Aquinas continues, invoking Boethius' work in his Summa Theologica. He defines each of God's processions by likening them unto the spiritual processions in man, the intellect and the will. Continuing, he explains how each person is his relation. The Father is fatherhood, the Son is sonship, and the Holy Spirit is procession. Next, he clarifies what he means by the term person. He then discusses the plurality of persons in the one divine nature, and how this is possible and what makes them distinct from one another. He concludes by clarifying what are appropriate terms for referring to the plurality of persons and unity in God. This thesis is a summation of their primary thrust into defining the Trinitarian nature of God. Their writings align to form a continuous narrative of what is a fitting metaphysical analysis of the dogma decided at the Council of Nicaea. 1 They write using the metaphysical language of Aristotle and are thus limited to it, but they define and redefine terms in order to bring the Church into a fuller understanding of the Trinitarian God they have chosen to worship. 2 CHAPTER ONE Boethius on the Metaphysics of Trinity The Christian God is Trinitarian. This means that God does not have a single person but three persons. '"The Father," they say, "is God; The Son is God; The Holy Ghost is God." Therefore Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one, not three Gods.'"1 There are three persons in one divine nature. There are three Beings to correspond to one substance. The possibility of such a dynamic and statement has been excavated and explored by many Christian theologians and bishops, often to preserve the orthodox faith from heresy. Boethius attempts to give a closer definition of the Trinity. His objective is to argue that unity holds together the Trinity, while relation creates number within it. He takes the Hellenistic approach of employing Aristotelian metaphysics. However, it is important to know Boethius' understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics because it is how Boethius defines things. It is especially important when considering how he is trying to define the metaphysical reality of God and his persons. Therefore, an endeavor to grasp his understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics must be undertaken before any attempt to understand his Aristotelian development of the Trinity is tried. The following explanation of metaphysics is written according to Boethius' interpretation of Aristotle. 1 Boethius, De Trinitate, I 3 The Four Causes Aristotle's Four Causes must first be examined because it is according to them that all substances are created.2 God is unique in this regard because he is the first cause of all things and thus not subject to these causes. However, it is helpful to understand Aristotle's causes and how God is somewhat likened to them and yet not subject to them. This all will be explained in further detail, once the metaphysics in general have been defined by Boethius, but their definition will aid comprehension in general regarding his understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics. The reason for explaining Aristotle's Four Causes is that everything is subject to these causes, except for God, who is the uncaused cause. It is mentioned here in order to distinguish God from all other things, and to gather a general framework for how other things are categorized. Boethius knows Aristotle's Four Causes and they are present in his reasoning concerning the metaphysics of the Trinity amongst other things. Socrates will be used as a particular example for the purpose of clarifying what is signified by certain terms and explanations. The first cause is the material cause, that is, the stuff that makes up things. Socrates' material cause is his matter: his humanness, cells, bones, organs, fluids, hair, and skin. The second cause, the formal cause, has a two-fold understanding for Aristotle. First, it is the formal cause that gives shape to a thing. Socrates form is the 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Vol. II 4 shaping of his body. The second understanding is that form gives being to the nature of a thing. In this understanding, Socrates' formal cause is his soul or form because it gives being to his body, making him this person. When Socrates is dead and his body is separated from his soul. His body is no longer referred to as Socrates, but is simply a corpse. According to Aristotle, Socrates' body is no longer a person and simply a pile of matter shaped as a body, so it is no longer considered Socrates. However, it still has the form, in the shape-giving sense, of Socrates' body. The corpse could be described as once being Socrates' body, but it could only be associated with Socrates in that temporal sense for Aristotle. The third cause is the efficient cause, that is the agent of a thing's making. Socrates' efficient cause was that his parents conceived him. The fourth cause is the final cause that is the end, intent, or goal of the thing. Socrates’ final cause is the purpose for which he is. As a Greek Philosopher it was for the sake of arriving at and seeking out the truth. Socrates' final cause is for the purpose that he is, as a Greek philosopher it was for the sake of arriving and seeking out the truth. In a Christian context, it was whatever fate or end God's providence has planned for him. The causes following accordingly: the stuff that makes up a thing, the conferred shape and given being of a thing, the creator or agency of a thing, and the purpose or end of a thing. 5 The Category of Substance Now every corporeal or bodily thing is a substance that has both form and matter. Form gives structure and being to a substance. Matter is the stuff that is shaped by form and gives the form physical reality. Without form, matter has no substantial reality: it is simply stuff and thus it needs form to give it shape and being. Substances are thus form and matter composites or hylomorphic compounds.3 According to Aristotelian metaphysics, a primary substance is the most real thing, which is a specific instance of a hylomorphic compound. Socrates is a primary substance. His soul is his form that gives being to his body, which is the matter of this compound. In this regard, the form also gives description to what a substance is, for without the form, the matter is simply stuff. The matter of Socrates, independent of his soul, would be an indiscriminate pile of humanness. It is easier to use a statue of a bronze leopard to imagine the descriptive element of form. In the statue the form is leopard. Without the form, there is simply bronze.4 However, in man the unique case of the soul after death must also be examined because it is a form with an inherent reality, that is to say, it is a form that can survive separate from its matter. Thus if the soul of Socrates, which gives being to his essence (power or character that determines his substance), were separated from his body, then he would be less real than his body soul composite, his 3 hylo=matter, morph=form 4 Boethius, De Trinitate, II 6 hylomorphic compound.