Thesis Pursues Their Primary Thrust Into Defining the Trinitarian Nature of God

ABSTRACT

The Aristotelian Development of Trinitarian Metaphysics

Through the Thought of Boethius and Aquinas

Andrew Bernard Eberlein

Director: Junius Johnson, Ph.D.

God was declared Trinitarian at the Council of Nicaea in 325 AD. The divine nature is shared amongst all three persons, who are coeternal. This belief was made dogma and thus is held as the universal belief of the Church. This decision instigated a further theological pursuit to clarify this definition of God as Trinity. Boethius engaged in this endeavor in his De Trinitate. First, he determines his own interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics, next how to express God metaphysically as a substance, and then how to define each person metaphysically as a relation. In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas continues and invokes Boethius work. He further classifies God, according to his processions and relations, and then he discusses how to assert personhood of God and the plurality of persons in the divine nature. He finishes by detailing what are appropriate terms for referring to plurality of persons and unity in God. This Thesis pursues their primary thrust into defining the Trinitarian nature of God.

APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS:

______

Dr. Junius Johnson, Great Texts

APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM:

______

Dr. Andrew Wisely, Director

DATE: ______

THE ARISTOTELIAN DEVELOPMENT OF TRINITARIAN METAPHYSICS

THROUGH THE THOUGHT OF BOETHIUS AND AQUINAS

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

Baylor University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Honors Program

Andrew Bernard Eberlein

Waco, Texas

May, 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter One: Boethius on the Metaphysics of the Trinity . . . . 3

Chapter Two: Aquinas on the Divine Processions . . . . . 19

Chapter Three: Aquinas on the Divine Relations . . . . . 32

Chapter Four: Aquinas on the Divine Persons . . . . . 45

Conclusion ...... 71

Bibliography ...... 73

INTRODUCTION

At the Council of Nicaea in 325 AD, the Church defined God as Trinity. The

Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit were declared one substance, and each person was declared equal and coeternal. God's Trinitarian nature was made dogma, and thus was considered the universal belief of the Church. This decision leads to further theological endeavors to further clarify this definition of God as Trinity.

In his De Trinitate, Boethius joins this line of argumentation. He begins by establishing his interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics and then proceeds to define and clarify the Trinitarian nature of God using Aristotle's metaphysics. Next, he discusses how to express God metaphysically as a substance and then how to define each person metaphysically as a relation.

Aquinas continues, invoking Boethius' work in his Summa Theologica. He defines each of God's processions by likening them unto the spiritual processions in man, the intellect and the will. Continuing, he explains how each person is his relation. The Father is fatherhood, the Son is sonship, and the Holy Spirit is procession. Next, he clarifies what he means by the term person. He then discusses the plurality of persons in the one divine nature, and how this is possible and what makes them distinct from one another. He concludes by clarifying what are appropriate terms for referring to the plurality of persons and unity in God.

This thesis is a summation of their primary thrust into defining the

Trinitarian nature of God. Their writings align to form a continuous narrative of what is a fitting metaphysical analysis of the dogma decided at the Council of Nicaea.

1 They write using the metaphysical language of Aristotle and are thus limited to it, but they define and redefine terms in order to bring the Church into a fuller understanding of the Trinitarian God they have chosen to worship.

CHAPTER ONE

Boethius on the Metaphysics of Trinity

The Christian God is Trinitarian. This means that God does not have a single person but three persons. '"The Father," they say, "is God; The Son is God; The Holy

Ghost is God." Therefore Father, Son and Holy Ghost are one, not three Gods.'"1

There are three persons in one divine nature. There are three Beings to correspond to one substance. The possibility of such a dynamic and statement has been excavated and explored by many Christian theologians and bishops, often to preserve the orthodox faith from heresy. Boethius attempts to give a closer definition of the Trinity. His objective is to argue that unity holds together the

Trinity, while relation creates number within it. He takes the Hellenistic approach of employing Aristotelian metaphysics. However, it is important to know Boethius' understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics because it is how Boethius defines things. It is especially important when considering how he is trying to define the metaphysical reality of God and his persons. Therefore, an endeavor to grasp his understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics must be undertaken before any attempt to understand his Aristotelian development of the Trinity is tried. The following explanation of metaphysics is written according to Boethius' interpretation of

Aristotle.

1 Boethius, De Trinitate, I

The Four Causes

Aristotle's Four Causes must first be examined because it is according to them that all substances are created.2 God is unique in this regard because he is the first cause of all things and thus not subject to these causes. However, it is helpful to understand Aristotle's causes and how God is somewhat likened to them and yet not subject to them. This all will be explained in further detail, once the metaphysics in general have been defined by Boethius, but their definition will aid comprehension in general regarding his understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics.

The reason for explaining Aristotle's Four Causes is that everything is subject to these causes, except for God, who is the uncaused cause. It is mentioned here in order to distinguish God from all other things, and to gather a general framework for how other things are categorized. Boethius knows Aristotle's Four Causes and they are present in his reasoning concerning the metaphysics of the Trinity amongst other things. Socrates will be used as a particular example for the purpose of clarifying what is signified by certain terms and explanations.

The first cause is the material cause, that is, the stuff that makes up things.

Socrates' material cause is his matter: his humanness, cells, bones, organs, fluids, hair, and skin.

The second cause, the formal cause, has a two-fold understanding for

Aristotle. First, it is the formal cause that gives shape to a thing. Socrates form is the

2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Vol. II

4 shaping of his body. The second understanding is that form gives being to the nature of a thing. In this understanding, Socrates' formal cause is his soul or form because it gives being to his body, making him this person. When Socrates is dead and his body is separated from his soul. His body is no longer referred to as Socrates, but is simply a corpse. According to Aristotle, Socrates' body is no longer a person and simply a pile of matter shaped as a body, so it is no longer considered Socrates.

However, it still has the form, in the shape-giving sense, of Socrates' body. The corpse could be described as once being Socrates' body, but it could only be associated with Socrates in that temporal sense for Aristotle.

The third cause is the efficient cause, that is the agent of a thing's making.

Socrates' efficient cause was that his parents conceived him.

The fourth cause is the final cause that is the end, intent, or goal of the thing.

Socrates’ final cause is the purpose for which he is. As a Greek Philosopher it was for the sake of arriving at and seeking out the truth. Socrates' final cause is for the purpose that he is, as a Greek philosopher it was for the sake of arriving and seeking out the truth. In a Christian context, it was whatever fate or end God's providence has planned for him.

The causes following accordingly: the stuff that makes up a thing, the conferred shape and given being of a thing, the creator or agency of a thing, and the purpose or end of a thing.

5 The Category of Substance

Now every corporeal or bodily thing is a substance that has both form and matter. Form gives structure and being to a substance. Matter is the stuff that is shaped by form and gives the form physical reality. Without form, matter has no substantial reality: it is simply stuff and thus it needs form to give it shape and being. Substances are thus form and matter composites or hylomorphic compounds.3

According to Aristotelian metaphysics, a primary substance is the most real thing, which is a specific instance of a hylomorphic compound. Socrates is a primary substance. His soul is his form that gives being to his body, which is the matter of this compound. In this regard, the form also gives description to what a substance is, for without the form, the matter is simply stuff. The matter of Socrates, independent of his soul, would be an indiscriminate pile of humanness. It is easier to use a statue of a bronze leopard to imagine the descriptive element of form. In the statue the form is leopard. Without the form, there is simply bronze.4

However, in man the unique case of the soul after death must also be examined because it is a form with an inherent reality, that is to say, it is a form that can survive separate from its matter. Thus if the soul of Socrates, which gives being to his essence (power or character that determines his substance), were separated from his body, then he would be less real than his body soul composite, his

3 hylo=matter, morph=form

4 Boethius, De Trinitate, II

6 hylomorphic compound. He is most real in his hylomorphic compound. Aristotle uses the primary substance as the basic building block of his metaphysic.

A secondary substance derives its being from its primary substances. The most real things are primary substances and thus it follows that secondary substances are less real. A secondary substance receives its reality from its primary substances; it is less real than a particular substance. A secondary substance thus cannot be a hylomorphic compound. It must have no relation to matter, for if it did then it would be a primary rather than a secondary substance. It must exist as only a universal form of primary substances. Secondary substances are taxonomical categories such as genus and species. Humanity would be an example of a secondary substance that derives its reality or being from primary substances, such as

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Humanity has no reality in and of itself, but it must derive its reality from primary substances.5

What Creates Distinction between Substances

At this point it would be good to recognize number as a way of categorizing substances. Number allows for specificity and differentiation. For that which is one thing cannot be two different things. No primary substance could be a different primary substance, nor could any secondary substance be another secondary substance. Everything is particular and exact by nature. However, many primary substances can share one secondary substance.6

5 Boethius, De Trinitate, II

6 Boethius, De Trinitate, III

7 Boethius has thus far discussed issues relating to categorical distinction.

There are other forms of distinction such as mental and numerical distinction. An instance of mental distinction would be that Plato is distinct from the author of the

Socratic dialogues even though they are the same primary substance. However,

Plato and Aristotle are numerally distinct because they create number as two different primary substances. Numbers are meta-categorical.

In addition to substance there are nine other categories which Aristotle calls accidents. Aristotle calls them accidents because they can be attributed to a subject without necessarily affecting the essence of their substance. However, accidents have their own being which is contingent upon inhering in a substance. In

Aristotelian metaphysics there are nine kinds of accidents: quantity, quality, disposition, situation (or position), location, time, action, passion ("being acted on"), and relation. Accidents are predicated of subjects as beings that modify the substance or nature of those subjects. The following is a summation of each accident, using Socrates as an example. For instance: Socrates is mortal. His mortality is a quality. Socrates was seventy years old. His age is a quantity predicated of him. Socrates is sitting. His position is an accident of situation.

Socrates is in Athens. His being in a place is an accident of location. Socrates was alive during 398 B.C. This date is predicated of him as an accident of time. Socrates drank hemlock. The action of "drinking hemlock" is predicated of him. Socrates was put on trial. His being "put on trial" is an accident of passion (something being done to him, like a subject of a passive verb in a sentence). Socrates was Plato's mentor.

His accident of relation in reference to Plato is mentor.

8 Primary substances differ from other substances, by either the variety or number of their accidents. Accidents are predicated of subjects because they have no basis for existence except in a subject. Two men for instance are made separate in substance through a difference in accidents. Accidents individuate primary substances. Accidental individuation is evident in the case of two men because there is such variety in physical characteristics amongst humans, unless they are twins.

For if they are identical, then accidental individuation would not seem to be taking place. However, they would also differ in the accident of location for they could not share the same accident of location, and be in the same place. Two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time.7 Boethius also could have mentioned that they would still remain distinct in substance if they had matching accidents and were in the same location because their accidents would merely be identical and not the same. Substances can still experience accidental individuation if their accidents are identical, but not the same.

The Kinds of Accidental Predication

Boethius asserts that there are two different ways accidents can be predicated of a subject. The first way an accident can be predicated of a subject is such that it describes what the substance is.8 This kind of predication is considered internal because it is predicated directly of the substance. In white paint, the accident white is predicated internally. The paint is white. If the predicate white

7 Boethius, De Trinitate, I

8 Boethius, De Trinitate, IV

9 were removed, then the substance would cease to be what it is. The being of the accident determines the being of the substance. The accidental being white determines the being of white paint. White paint is no longer what it is in its essence if it is no longer white.

The second way an accident can be predicated of a subject is such that it describes the circumstances of a substance.9 This kind of predication is external, for it is predicated of something external to the substance. The relation "master" can be predicated of a subject and another subject would have the corresponding relation of "slave." If the master were to die, then the slave would cease to be a slave. If the slave ran away, likewise the master would cease to be a master. The subject is only a master because an accident is predicated of something rooted externally in the substance. For the master does not cease to be himself substantially if he ceases to be a master, unlike the white paint if it lost its accident of whiteness. In the case of the master and slave their accidents are rooted in force, which is external to both their substances. Force is the action by which the relation of slave is predicated of one subject and the correlation of master is predicated of another. The accident of relation in this case is predicated in such a way that it is external to the substances.

An example of internal predication of relation would be the biological relation between a mother and son. In his substance, the son is related to his mother and there are no circumstances that could change his substantial relation to his mother.

9 Boethius, De Trinitate, IV

10 Boethius' Hierarchy of Being

Now that Boethius' understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics has been established, it is time to turn to how he nuances the metaphysics and explains the

Trinitarian nature of God with them. The primary way in which he nuances

Aristotelian metaphysics is by introducing the new category of images.10 He thus reorders the metaphysics in a Platonic fashion. A primary substance is a form and matter compound. A secondary substance is form that is derived as a category from multiple primary substances. The secondary substance is a universal. Socrates would be a primary substance and humanity would be the universal derived from him and other such substances. The particular humanity of Socrates would be an image. An image is a secondary substance that receives matter from a particular primary substance. It is an intermediate between a universal and a particular. This understanding of image leads to a Platonic bent on the Aristotelian metaphysics.

According to Aristotle, the most real things are primary substances, hylomorphic compounds. However, this introduction of the category of image seems to weaken an Aristotelian sense of reality. It creates a participatory chain of being that implies that everything is ordered in a hierarchy, which is a fitting sense of understanding according to Boethius because the medieval mind traditionally understands the world according to hierarchies. Image in an Aristotelian understanding would function in the following manner in his metaphysical hierarchy: first there is a primary substance, which derives an image, and in turn a secondary substance is derived from the image. These forms or secondary

10 Boethius, De Trinitate, II

11 substances would in turn derive God. However, it is odd to act as though God is the ultimate object of derivation, rather it would seem more fitting that God would be the origin from which all is derived. This latter view would be Platonic because Plato assumes that all substances are derived from the forms. Boethius assumes this more

Platonic viewpoint when considering the hierarchy of being. This hierarchy creates a great chain of Being with God at its head, and it incorporates ordered metaphysical participation, for in Plato the most real things are the forms and all substances derive their reality from them. Thus Plato would find the universal form "chair" to be that from which substantial chairs derive their reality. Meanwhile, Aristotle would think that the universal form of chair derives its reality from all of the substantial chairs. Boethius departs from Aristotelian metaphysics when considering the hierarchy of being by creating images and thus this chain of being. A more Aristotelian understanding would simply view God as more real than the categories and not attempt to define him by the categories.

Plato and Aristotle develop two very different metaphysics. Despite these differences, there are instances of compatibility between both metaphysics. These are two different metaphysical languages that are using words to say exactly what things are and thus shape their worlds according to the use of their languages. Since they are both being employed by Boethius to describe a concept beyond our understanding, it is harder to synthesize them, precisely because they express opposing hierarchies of reality. Boethius’ philosophical thought maintains a

Platonic hierarchy; however, his understanding of and God and metaphysical assumptions regarding God function under normal Aristotelian metaphysics.

The Categorical Understanding of God

God is beyond the categories, for by nature he is beyond any sort of causation. Rather he is the primary or first cause of everything. He is not subject to any of Aristotle's causes. However, in trying to form any sort of metaphysical concept of God, it is necessary to liken his divine nature unto form. However, he is not form in the sense that he has a formal cause, or that he is given being by his form, rather he has no matter yet he can have attributes predicated of him, as pseudo-accidents, which will be explained later by Boethius. God is simply self- caused and he is entirely one. He is not a composite subject and therefore he most resembles form, but in reality he is beyond form.

"But divine substance is form without matter, and it is therefore one, and it is what it is: but other things are not what they are. For every single thing has its particular being from those things which it is from its conjoined parts."11

Boethius, thus defines God's nature as 'form.' The divine nature as 'form' works in his idea of a Platonic hierarchy because it can function as the 'form' from which all forms are derived. However, his nature as 'form' also works in Aristotelian metaphysics because it is not a term meant to indicate precisely what his nature is, but rather this term is an approximation because it is the closest of our concepts of the reality of God's nature.

11 Boethius, De Trinitate, II

13 The Predication of Accidents of God

God's nature is simple. He is 'form' and no matter is subjected to him. Since he has no matter, no accidents inhere in him. Attributes are predicated of him as pseudo-accidents, for God is his attributes in the fullest sense.12 For instance, God is just. For him, to be God and to be just are simply one thing. In man, however, a just man and a man are two different things because the accident confers power on his being. God is simply his attributes; nothing can contribute power to his being.

Boethius includes the exceptions of time and location because they are understood differently in reference to God.13 He experiences them differently from us. In other words he is beyond both time and location. A man can be described by an action with reference to the time it occurred as a form of predication. For example, Boethius wrote De Trinitate in 480 AD. God created time. He is not subject to time, unlike creation. Since God existed before his invention of time he has a unique relationship to it. God exists in a simplistic state in which he knows all in one act of knowing. This state surpasses all motions of time. The past is not forgotten nor is the future unknown. Humans experience time as a temporal moment, while God sees and knows all in an eternal present.14 Being outside of the

12 Boethius, De Trinitate, IV 13 Boethius, De Trinitate, IV

14 Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, Book 5, Prose 6: "... following Plato, let us say that God is everlasting and the world perpetual. Wherefore, since every judgment comprehendeth those things which are subject unto it, according to its own nature, and God hath always an everlasting and present state, His knowledge also surpassing all motions of time remaineth in the simplicity of His presence, and comprehending the infinite spaces of that which is past and to come, considereth all things in His simple knowledge as though they were now in doing... But the present

14 system of time, he does not experience it as a linear progression. Time is fixed and every moment is present to him because he cannot be contained within it. Boethius uses the term 'eternity' to describe God's relationship to time. However, man experiences time as a course that if made continual and perpetual would produce what Boethius calls ‘sempeternity.'15

God is beyond location in the sense that every place is present to him at once.

Location cannot be predicated to him as an accident because it would make him dependent upon location. He is infinite and beyond any sort of quantity and can’t be quantified, and therefore cannot be confined to location. Man’s location is merely an added predication to him. Meanwhile, God is said to be everywhere as he is present there but not contained anywhere. He is beyond the accident of location.

The Predication of Persons of God

Now that God's nature has been defined as 'form' and the predication of his accidents has also been clarified, it is time to address the Trinitarian aspect of his nature. God differs from all other substances. Additionally, he does not differ within himself so as to create parts and thus number. He is only himself and thus is a singular 'being.' However, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are predicated of him.

These three predicates do not create plurality because they are predicated of him as three unities.16 A predicating unity of a subject does not create plurality within in

instant of men may well be compared to that of God in this: that as you see some things in your temporal instant, so He beholdeth all things in His eternal present." 15 Boethius, De Trinitate, IV

16 Boethius, De Trinitate, III

15 that subject. A unity is predicated of that subject which it is. A unity is an iteration of a subject. Anicius, (Boethius' first name), is a unity of Boethius. Each unity creates a number by which the unities are counted. This number is simply a way of representing the number of concepts that can be represented of substance. Boethius was a scholar, statesman, and a theologian. He is not three people and yet he is in union with these concepts. Unity does not create countable things in a substance.

Boethius has ten fingers and yet his identity is not in union with the number of his digits. This distinction of counting numbers shows how unity does not create number in a substance.

A number is a listing of multiple things. A unity is the listing of a single thing.

Boethius uses the example of sword. It can be called a brand, blade or a sword.17

Each term is the same thing and thus all three terms are unities predicated of the same substance. The substance is merely predicated with different terms. It would be the equivalent of saying, "sword, sword, sword." In the end three swords are not created. One sword was simply predicated three times. God is predicated thrice of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but according to Boethius' definition this does not create plurality within the Trinity.

This definition avoids the heresy of modalism, which says that the persons of the Trinity are simply different modes or aspects of God. However, Boethius'says that the divine nature is predicated of each unity, in such a way that there are three distinct unities within the Trinity. Each unity forms part of a triple predication and not three different gods. God is the reality beyond reality and thus any unity

17 Boethius, De Trinitate, III

16 predicated of him is more real than any synonymous term predicated of a created substance. The unities as a triple predication are identified as his persons.

A blade, a brand, and sword are synonymous things but the persons of the

Trinity are not. They are the same but not identical. Boethius justifies the number difference as having become a saying among Catholics because these terms for God do not refer to synonymous things. There is not complete lack of difference between members of the Trinity because of a diversity of subjects that leads to number in the Trinity. This means that things are predicated differently of God. The

Father is not identical to the Son.18 They hold much in common, otherwise they could not be predicated as unities. However, there is enough difference between them to allow number to slip in because of a diversity of subjects. The Son is different from the Father because he could not be the begotten and the begetter, likewise the Father could not be the begetter and the begotten.

The Predication of Relation of God

Boethius distinguishes the accident of relation so as to show how it does not affect the essence of a substance. Relational predicates are grounded in something that is in another accident, usually quality. Comparison is another way of showing how the accident of relation is based in something else outside of itself and therefore differs from other accidents.

If Socrates stood on the right of a fire, it would be left in comparison to him. The fire would not be left in its substance but only in comparison to him. If the

18 Boethius, De Trinitate, III

17 fire were to be defined as left in its substance, then its leftness could be equated with an accident like its heat. In other words, its leftness cannot be an essential accident or it would constantly be changing in its substance with respect to accidents external to it. If the fire's accident of heat changed then it would be a different substance and justifiably so because it is an accident internal and essential to its substance. The thing in which relation is grounded in no way changes the essence of a thing. The heat of the fire is an essential accident to the fire. The warmth of the fire felt by Socrates is a relative accident grounded in his position to the fire. This is not how the relations of the Trinity are predicated of God.19

The Father and Son are predicated as relations absolutely of the substance, the divine nature. They are predicated as complete unities, as previously described by Boethius. However, each relation brings out difference from isolation of the relation, in the sense that the Father is fatherhood and the Son is sonship. They are their relations and thus there are persons predicated of the divine nature. They do not differ from one another in anything except this relation and therefore they do not differ in essence. They are unified with the essence and are they themselves the essence, but none of them change the essence.20

If the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God, then their relations are not predicated relative to the divine nature for they would have to be grounded in something else and God could not have real relations dependent upon something.

Their relations cannot be predicated as essential accidents of the divine substance,

19 Boethius, De Trinitate, V

20 Boethius, De Trinitate, V

18 for then the nature of the divine substance would be dependent upon their relations.

God is simply his divine nature and not a composition of relations. These relations must be predicated of the divine nature absolutely, so that the divine nature is wholly one with each member and yet not a composition of parts. They each are absolute processions of the divine nature and each is unique according to his procession. Boethius says, “Then this predicate does not produce a difference of things in that of which it is spoken, but indeed – if it can be said – it produces something that can scarcely be understood: a difference of persons."21

Boethius now distinguishes how no relative can refer to itself because a predicate that refers to itself cannot relate to itself. Otherwise, self-referential relational predication could be infinite and would not lead to any real sort of categorizing of a substance. For example, if the relation "master" referred to the subject of that which it was predicated and did not refer to its co-relation "slave," then it would be a meaningless term. Essentially any relative term could be predicated of a substance if no co-relation was implied leading to an infinite regress of meaningless terms. The predication of relation indicates a plurality in the Trinity but the lack of difference in substance, workings, or predication preserves the unity amongst the substance. Unity holds together the Trinity, while relation creates number within it. Each member of the Trinity is different from the other, so “those things which are brought forth in isolation and separately are of relation."22 Each member brings different things to the Trinity and yet all are God. These are forms of

21 Boethius, De Trinitate, V

22 Boethius, De Trinitate, VI

19 relation that are dependent upon similarity or sameness and not necessarily on differences, like the slave and the master. God is unique according to relative predication because there is sameness shared amongst his persons. This sameness is that which they are, which is the divine nature.

There are no accidents predicated in God that give him being. Rather he is eternal and his relations are eternal and thus he is not dependent upon them as accidents. For instance the Father never began to be a Father, but rather his begetting of the Son has always been a part of his substance and was never an accidental part of his nature. However, it is by the production of the Son that the relation of Father is substantial to the Father. The relation of Father remains a relative predicate and thus he is dependent upon the Son to be the Father. Without the Son, the Father would not be the Father.

The relations that are unique to each person are the same as the person. The relations do not change the divine essence. The persons are predicated in relation to one another. However, the unique difference of each person creates difference between the relations. But the unique difference of each person does not create difference between the persons and the divine essence. The divine essence itself is identified with each relation fully because each is predicated of what the divine essence truly is. The divine essence itself is immutable as are its persons. Boethius has just begun the topic of relation being predicated absolutely of God, his processions, and the difference of his persons. He has set the metaphysical stage and the basic framework, allowing Aquinas to pick up the role of directing further analysis of these topic.

CHAPTER TWO

Aquinas on the Divine Processions

The Meaning of Procession

Aquinas continues the metaphysical composition left by Boethius, except he first approaches it from a point unexplored Boethius, procession. An objector indicates that typically, when the term procession is used, it means for a thing to go forth from some sort of origin. For instance, a son processes forth from his father's loins. The son bears relation to his father, but he is a separate substance from his father. He processes out from his father, rather than being contained within the same substance as his father. This definition would seem to exclude the inward procession of persons within God. Sabellius sought to evade this issue by describing the Son and the Holy Spirit as merely different expressions of the Father. This expression of the Trinity was called modalism or sabellianism and was condemned as heresey.

Aquinas begins by examining the precise definition of 'procession.' Aquinas defines procession as a sort of activity.1 Some thought of procession as the coming of effect from cause.2 The Son comes from the Father as a creature from its maker, which would deny that the Holy Spirit and Son are truly God. Sabellius thought that procession was like a cause going into effect. For example the Son was God insofar

1 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, a. 27, a. 1, reply

2 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, a. 27, a. 1, reply

22 as the Father took on the flesh of the Virgin. This definition of procession is an expression of a cause in an outward effect.

Procession as an Inward Activity

The activity of procession is not limited to an effect coming from a cause.

Activity that remains in the originator is a form of inward procession.

"The best example of this appears in the intellect where the action of understanding remains in him who understands. Whenever anyone understands because of his very act of understanding, something comes forth within him, which is the concept of the known thing proceeding from his awareness of it."3

In other words, there is an idea of something in a person, but once he understands the idea a concrete concept comes forth in the mind that arises from him understanding the idea. There is the idea that exists, and then there is the understanding of the idea that exists. The understanding of the idea is the procession that comes from the idea in the intellect. Aquinas likens the Son unto the intellect of the Father. He is a perfect absolute procession of the Father's likeness as an act of self-understanding, which is how Aquinas describes him as an inward form of procession.

The divine persons are forms of inward procession because God is an incorporeal reality. His movement of persons cannot be likened appropriately to a burner conducting heat to a kettle, for it is not a procession of corporeal persons or physical entities.4 Outward procession requires a manifestation of the thing being processed outside of its origin. If the Son were an outward procession of the Father,

3 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 1, reply

4 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 1, reply

23 then he would be a different substance other than the Father. If this were so then

Arius would be right and the Son would simply be the first of God's creations. An outward procession might not necessarily be corporeal, but it will always have a physical manifestation according to its form. For example, words process from the mouth in the physical manifestation of sound waves. Rather the procession of the

Trinity is more like the procession of an idea in the mind because it remains in the original agent of procession. Aquinas wants his reader to realize that the processions of the Trinity are not manifested outwardly and therefore there is a case for inward procession.

Outward procession is often quite diverse from its source. However, with inward procession, this is not a necessity. In fact the more the procession represents its origin, the more complete it is. "For clearly the better a thinker understands something, the more personal is the idea he conceives and the more a part of himself it is; since in its act of understanding the mind becomes one with what it understands."5 The previous quotation exemplifies why Aquinas thinks the

Son's procession is a perfect likeness of the Father. God is omnipotent and therefore his self-understanding is perfect in its complete fullness. Aquinas argues that any procession in God, like his Word, will be in perfect and absolute union with himself.

Thus, God’s simplicity will be preserved. Diversity is evaded in his processions because each one maintains absolute union with the origin of its procession. Each is

5 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 1, resp. 2

24 a full understanding of its origin and therefore the divine nature is shared completely between each of its processions.6

The Procession of the Son

The Word or the Son proceeds from the Father. He is thus secondary to the

Father. The Father is the first principle of the divine nature. "To come forth as something external and diverse from a principle is incompatible with being the first principle. But the spiritual coming forth of what is intimate and in no way diverse is included in the very idea of the first principle."7 The Son remains in full unity with the first principle, but remains separate and thus is the second principle. A writer is the first principle of his work, which should include the idea for his literary design of his work. “Now God, who is the first principle of things, is to creatures as the craftsman to the products of his craft.”8 The Word is the creative person of the

Trinity in this instance.

The Word is thus the perfect understanding and conception of the Father. He is an absolute and perfect procession of the Father. He is a different person because he is the procession of the origin, rather than the origin of the procession. In order to further understand the Son, his procession must be examined. The Son's act of processing is often referred to as being begotten of the Father. Aquinas seeks to clarify what it means to say the Son is begotten or generated.

6 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 1, resp. 3 7 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 1, resp. 3

8 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 1, resp. 3

25 He defines generation in two ways. First, in general it refers to something that comes into being and then decays from nonexistence into existence. The second definition arises when a “living thing originates from a principle which is alive and conjoined to it; this process is properly called ‘birth.’ But we do not in every such case speak of something begotten unless the thing which comes forth reproduces the likeness of its originator.”9 Being begotten does not refer to the production of hairs or cells on the body but a reproduction of offspring. Generation in this sense refers only to something issuing from something that shares its nature.

Rather, being begotten refers to generation, in the sense that a child is generated from its parent, which is called birth.

In God there is no development from potential to actual. He shares the property of begetting that is akin to birth. In God, the begetting is like an action in the mind, “a vital activity and from a conjoined source.”10 The Word’s resemblance is specific because, as discussed before, God’s procession of the Son is understood so perfectly that it bears the Father’s likeness. "It reproduces specific resemblance, since what the intellect conceives is the likeness of what is understood; and it exists in the same nature, because to be and to understand are identical in God."11 The Son is begotten of the Father such that he reproduces his likeness. He is the full understanding of the Father. This understanding is synonymous with existence in

God because the activity of procession exists in God. The activity of procession

9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 1, reply

10 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 2, reply

11 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 2, reply

26 could not be taking place without simultaneously existing. “The procession of the

Word in God is called ‘generation’ and the Word itself proceeding is called ‘Son.’”12

Generation must be taken in the sense of a begetting, or the issuing forth of a nature identical to its originator.

The Conception of the Son, as the Divine Intellect

Procession and generation have been likened unto an intellectual process thus far by Aquinas. Intellectual processes are not really referred to as generation in humans. The intellectual process of understanding is not the substance of a human being's intellect because the concepts a person creates from his or her understandings do not resemble himself or herself. What is understood is not understood as a likeness of the origin from which the understanding processes.

Generation cannot be the same as the procession of a concept of the intellect. However, as was already shown, God’s act of understanding is the very substance of him who understands. Therefore, the Word processes forth as subsisting of the same nature. This means that the Son is made or called begotten in the most exact terms. Aquinas defends this preciseness of definition as the reason why scripture so often refers to the begetting of the Son. He also mentions the rhetorical tool of using the word "conception" to refer to the concept of grasping the likeness of something understood. "Concerning our intellect we use the word

'conception' because in our mental word is found the likeness of the thing

12 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 2, reply

27 understood, though not a physical identity."13 The act of conceiving is the act of understanding in the intellect. In the same way, the Son's activity of procession is conception.

The Son as Another Iteration of the Divine Nature and a Procession in God

The Father generates the Son but they both are absolute instances of subsistence in the divine nature. Everything that is generated receives its existence from its originator. No existence subsists of itself. The Son's existence is dependent upon the Father begetting him. He receives his being from the Father, and receives the entirety of his divine nature.

"Not everything accepted is received into a subject; otherwise one could not say that the whole substance of the creature is accepted from God, since there is no subject capable of receiving a whole substance."14 A man could not claim to accept his existence from God or to have a divine nature because he could not receive God’s entire substance; rather a man is created by an extension of God's power. Aquinas addresses the creation of man by power later. However, this point needed to be examined in order to show how the Son's existence is unique in this regard and not to be equated to the existence of creatures.

The Begotten one receives his existence from his Begetter, Father, but his existence is not received into a material or other subject, he is not just a separate being from the Father or the Father manifested in the incarnation. "For both the

Word which comes forth spiritually and its source are contained in the perfection of

13 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 2, resp. 2

14 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 2, resp. 3

28 the divine existence itself."15 The Son receives his existence from his Begetter, but he is also received into the same nature as his Begetter.

In other words, His self-grounded existence cannot be disputed and therefore the Begotten receives his divine nature from the Father, not for another existence other than the divine nature. If that were so then he would be reduced to a creature with a nature similar to the divine but not identical.

In the incarnation, the Son assumes a human nature into his divine nature. Thus Jesus is a subject, whose human nature comes from without God’s nature through the Virgin Mary. The human nature of Christ could not receive the

Son. However, the divine nature can receive the human substance of Christ.

The Son’s existence is from within his nature. However, he receives his divine existence from another. His existence is none other than divine. In other words, the

Son is not a creature. The spiritual begetting of the Word is so perfect that it is contained within its nature.

The Procession of the Holy Spirit, as the Final Procession in God

Thus far Aquinas has dealt with the person of the Son. How can there be any other procession than the generation of the Word? God could not have multiple intellects, and if the Holy Spirit also proceeds from God then it seems that persons could be added indefinitely to God. If the Son were the full self-understanding of the

Father, any other procession would seem unnecessary or redundant. Thus the adding of another procession would only seem to instigate an infinite regress of

15 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 2, resp. 3

29 persons. None of God's processions would really seem to matter at that point because they would no longer be that unique. He would only seem to have infinite manifestations of his nature.

The Word is the procession of God’s intellect. However, the Holy Spirit is the absolute and perfect procession of his will. Therefore, if the Father loves his children, the Word is the procession of the concept to love his children, while the procession of the will to love his children, or simply the procession of love, is the

Holy Spirit.

An indefinite number of processions is not possible because there are no more inward processions to be accounted for after the procession of the will.

Aquinas is working from the metaphysical reality of inward processions within human persons, and using it to describe God. In this way his metaphysical process is limited because processions in God are being likened to inward processions in human beings. Aquinas assumes there are only two inward processions of a spiritual nature in a rational existence, and therefore the procession of the Holy

Spirit or the will is the final procession in God.

God is simple and possess no accidents, as proven by Boethius, and whatever procession is in God is God, as proven by Aquinas. God’s nature is incorporeal and each inward procession is a perfect and full understanding of its origin, thus each procession is identical with its nature. Every procession is identical with its nature and thus because of God's simplicity every procession must be God. This phenomenon is unique to God. Every procession that is not outward in God is an expression of the divine nature. "One must bear in mind that in God procession

30 corresponds only to an action which remains within the agent himself, not to one bent on something external."16 Each procession must be contained within and solely of the divine nature and not contingent upon something other than their person of origin. Aquinas goes beyond Boethius in the sense that he also accounts for the distinction and number of persons, but he justifies the processions as God, by asserting God's simplicity. The processions must be identical with God's nature because of his simplicity.

The Holy Spirit, as the Procession of Love in God

The procession of love is dependent upon the procession of the will because no love can be conceived without the intellect. Therefore, since what is in God’s intellect and what is conceived by the mind is the same substance. "Similarly, though in God will and intellect are the same, nevertheless because the very meaning of love implies an issuing forth from what the mind conceives, the procession Love in him is distinct by its connection with the procession of the Word."17 The Holy Spirit thus processes out of both other persons of the Trinity.

The Holy Spirit processes differently from the Word, which is begotten or generated, because within its nature, as the intellect, it possesses the likeness of its originator. The intellect differs from the will. “There is actual understanding when what is understood is in the intellect through its likeness, whereas there is actual willing, not because of likeness of what is willed as such as in the person who wills,

16 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 3, reply

17 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 3, resp. 3

31 but because the will in some way tends to what is willed.”18 The Holy Spirit proceeds forth not as a likeness, because it moves as an impulse or a living motion towards something. It is less like a generation and more like a breathing forth of spirit. “As when somebody is said to be driven or impelled by his love to do something.”19 The

Holy Spirit is still an inward procession within God. It is simply a contained impulse of love within him.

Aquinas proved earlier how God begets or generates the same nature, as like from like. The procession of the “will’s action” is an “urging or a movement towards something,” and therefore does not process forth in the form of likeness. Aquinas says that the third procession is the breathing of spirit. "This word indicates a living motion and impulse, as when somebody is said to be driven or impelled by his love to do something.”20 It is an inward procession of feeling, like love. By analogy of inward processions in a human, love process forth from a person as well as his or her intellect making it a procession of impulse, which is a procession of the will and not intellect. In God, the person is the Father or the origin of the other two persons, who function as the intellect and the will. The will processes from the intellect, but it is not its sole avenue of procession, showing it to be a separate procession from the intellect and not merely a product of the intellect.

The Word functions as the intellect and the Holy Spirit as the will. Each processes differently, for the Word is begotten and the Spirit is spirated.

18 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 4, reply

19 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 4, reply

20 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 4, reply

32 Likeness relates to the Word in a way that it is a likeness of a “known reality, just as what is born is the image of its parent, but with love inasmuch as likeness is the beginning of loving, not because love itself is a likeness."21 The procession of love follows the begetting of the Word because a complete understanding of the first person is necessary before a reasonable expression of love can process. God is perfect and so his processions are perfectly ordered, and therefore the Father’s likeness processes first. His self-understanding is realized in the Son and his love is expressed appropriately from his person and his understanding in the

Son. Therefore love is not begotten and is not a likeness of its origin of its procession that is why it is called spiration since it is not a form of generation.

There are only Two Processions in God

Now that it has been established that there are at least two processions,

Aquinas defends the Trinitarian nature of God and explains how there are not an indefinite number of processions. Processions within the divine nature must correspond to those within an agent of which there are only two actions: understanding and willing. These are the only spiritual processes that we are cognizant of occurring in man and therefore they are the only two we can be aware of in God. Aquinas limits our understanding of God because it is possible that there are more spiritual processes in God than there are in man. However, it is a great metaphysical analogy for creating an understanding of processions in God that coincides with Scripture. He is not necessarily limiting God but adopting an

21 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 4, resp. 2

33 appropriate understanding of procession in God, by using an understanding of inward procession found in man. There are only two processions available in man, which are filled by the intellect and the will. Aquinas thus employs the Son and Holy

Spirit to this analogy of inward processions. He is relying upon the revelation delivered by the council of Nicaea and the only spiritual faculties available to him for proof of God’s Trinitarian nature.

Aquinas brings up the objection that there clearly seems to be other processions in God, and uses the example of power. "Power is the principle of acting upon something else, which is why we take externalized action as pointing to power."22 Power is seen as an attribute of the divine nature. However, it is attributed to him to account for his actions in the created world, which is external to him. This attribute of power corresponds to the procession of creatures and not as an act of procession internal to the divine nature. “And thus only the coming forth of creatures and not the procession of a divine person is linked with the attribute of power.”23

This principle applies to the rest of God's attributes, like goodness. Boethius said, “Good has to do with nature, not with activity, except perhaps as the object of will.”24 In other words, based upon goodness and similar attributes God needs no other processions than the Son and the Holy Spirit, for God knows and loves his nature, truth and goodness.

22 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 5, resp. 1

23 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 5, resp. 1

24 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 5, resp. 2

34 In the divine nature, all affectual and intellectual processions are absolutely expressed in his procession of the Holy Spirit and the Son. “God understands everything by one simple act, and in this way, too, he loves all things.” 25 This negates all possibilities of a succession either of affectual or intellectual processions. He only has the Word and Love that manifest in two perfect processions.

25 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 5, resp. 3

CHAPTER THREE

Aquinas on the Divine Relations

Real Relation in God

Aquinas has now created a detailed justification for the two processions in

God and how they are both perfect and absolute manifestations of the divine nature.

He is now able to return to where Boethius left off with relation in God, but first the nature of the relations in God must be examined.

Aquinas affirms that there are real relations in God. In the category of relation are the terms real, logical, and not real. Relation differs from other categories such as quantity and quality, which signify an absolute reality within the nature of a substance. “But relative terms by their very meaning indicate only a reference to something.”1 Sometimes these relations refer to certain parts of a substance’s nature that can relate to one another. One medieval physics example is that every body tends towards a position of rest and thus has a reference to its center in the chain of being. There are logical references within the mind that link the species man to its genus animal.

God's relations within himself are real. “Now when something springs from a principle which has the same nature, then necessarily both that which issues and that from which it issues belong to the same order; and so must have real

1 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 1, reply

36 relationships with each other.”2 Each procession within God shares the same nature with him and therefore necessitates that the relationships between the processions be real.

Real relations cannot be anything other than the divine essence in God. God is able to have real relations within himself because all of his relations share the same nature. His relations are not merely correlative terms. The Son's nature is that of the divine nature. His nature is not simply son of the Father. He is God, and his relation. The Son is the divine nature, and he is sonship. He has the same nature as the Father, yet his relation contrasts in opposition with that of the Father. The Son contrasts with the Father, by the identity of his relation. They are not identical and yet they are the same God.

Each Relation is an Iteration of the Same Nature, yet Each Relation is Distinct

The term 'same' seems to only imply logical relation between things, whereas

'identical' would seem to imply a real relation, for if they were 'identical' then they would be one thing, sharing one identity, God. 'Same' can be used to describe what is absolutely the same. The relation ‘same’ can compare the thing to itself from different angles or points of view. God is being referred to as the same by ‘specific nature’ and not number. “Hence Boethius compares divine relations with the relation of identity, not in every respect, but only inasmuch as such relations diversify substance no more than does the relation of identity.”3 Aquinas is referring

2 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 1, reply

3 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 1, resp. 1

37 to Boethius' De Trinitate, when he uses the analogy of a sword, brand, and a blade as a repetition of the same thing or an iteration of unities. The members of the Trinity are an iteration of unities for Boethius and in this sense they are the same, but only by comparison and they are not identical.4 Each member is predicated of the same essence, the divine nature; at the same time each one differs from the others, because each relation is predicated differently of the Trinity, creating a distinction in persons. This is why Aquinas says that the persons are referred to by the same

‘specific nature,’ because it is the same nature. They must be of the same specific nature; for if they differed in nature, then diversity would create number in

God. Boethius says they are more than a predication of terms of the same thing, as in sword, blade, and brand. However, they do not diversify the substance by more than a relationship of identity. Each predicated relation is of the same nature, but the identity that is the predicate or relation is different from the other identities predicated. The persons are diverse from one another in the sense that they are their relations. The Father is his fatherhood; the son is his begotteness, the Holy

Spirit is his spiration.

Relations in the Trinity versus between Divine Person and Creature

Aquinas will argue that the relations between divine persons and those between a divine person and a creature will differ. God has real relations with himself because each person is formed by a real procession within himself.

However, God's relation to man must be different because man is not another

4 Boethius, De Trinitate, III

38 iteration of the divine nature, rather he is something created by God. God therefore gives personhood to his rational creations. Horizontal relations ascribe God’s personhood with himself, while created persons receive their personhood from God by vertical relations.

Aquinas differentiates God's relations to creatures, by examining the procession of the Divine intellect or reason, the Son. Reason has real relation to the mind because the mind has real relation to what processes from it intellectually, as the relation between an idea and its source. In contrast, the relation between two ideas or objects of understanding created by the mental activity of reason lead to only logical relations between them.5 The Word processes forth as the self- understanding of God and in understanding himself God understands all things.

Therefore, creatures are understood in God as objects of understanding. Thus, he relates himself as an object of understanding to his creatures as objects of understanding. His relation to himself as an idea of self-understanding that process from its source is real, however, his relation between himself as an object of understanding to creatures as other objects of understanding is logical.

God is beyond the world of creatures because he has no real relations to his creation, only logical ones. He does not produce humans through compulsion. Man is created through his attribute of power, which is done purely through his mental activity–unlike the Son, who processes as an idea of self-understanding. His relations with man are therefore purely logical because they are a product of his cognitive faculties and produced as a separate nature. The divine processions are

5 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 1, resp. 4

39 within him and are thus of a shared nature, which are instances of real relations for

God. This actually means God has no real relation with creatures, as they do with each other. However, they have real relation him because they are subordinate and in their nature dependent upon him. Their existence is dependent upon his logical relation to them. Since he is the origin of their production, they have real relations of dependency upon him. God does not need man to exist, but man needs God to exist; therefore man bears real relation to God, whilst God only bears logical relation to man. He is not a product of man’s logical thought.

In order for humans to have real relations with God, they would have to be

God, because God can only have real relations within himself, for nothing in God is not God. If God had real relations with man, then man would not be a creation but a divine procession. God's persons share their nature together in perichoresis, and if man were involved in this dance, it would seem to imply that the members of the

Trinity were dependent upon man in some way. Real relation between man and God would then be greatly unfitting, for it would undermine the sufficiency of the divine nature itself.

God's relations to men are logical because they are products of his intellect.

The same applies to concepts produced by the intellect. Relations between concepts understood are not real but simply logical. Mental activity creates logical relations between understood objects, by drawing connections between them. Ideas that spring from the mind are real, just as a corporeal thing produces another corporeal

40 thing.6 Reason has real relation to things born of intellectual nature, as the Word does from the Father.

The divine nature is predicated completely of each relation in God. Relation in God is the same thing as his nature, for anything that is not in the divine nature is a creature.7 God has real relations within himself. Each of his processions shares his nature and is of the same order, resulting in real relations. His relations to humanity are only logical, for they are products of his intellect and will, which are his cognitive faculties.

The Nature of Relation in God

Aquinas continues to examine the nature of relation to clarify the dichotomy of what it means to say that there are relations in God and relations in substances.

Essentially, he begins to examine what it means to predicate relation of God and relation of substances. He decides to begin by reexamining the accidental being of relation.

There are two aspects to consider. Aquinas asserts, "The first of them is the existence which belongs to each as to an accidental entity. This always is existence in a subject, since for an accident to exist is to exist in a subject."8 Secondly, each category has its own specific character. Categories receive their definition of character from their subjects as well, for instance "quantity is said to be the measure

6 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 1, resp. 4 7 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, contra

8 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, reply

41 of the substance and quality its disposition"9–except for logical relation, which receives its character from being thought or referred to something else, not its subject.

However, by this definition relations are only logical. Aquinas continues to address the subject of relation in order to include real relations. Relations accompany subjects but are not found within them, “for they signify a reference superimposed in some way on the thing and bearing on something else.”10 Thinking of the Trinity, if relation is viewed in the category of relation, “it is inherent in the subject in which it has accidental existence.”11 When relation is present within a subject such that it has real existence and not simply a mental connection between two things, it is a real relation. A man as a subject is inherently a son, because it is a relational accident that exists within him and is therefore real.

Whatever is accidental in creatures is substantial in God because the divine nature has no accidents. "Consequently from this point of view, while relation in created things exists as an accident in a subject, in God a really existing relation has the existence of the divine nature and is completely identical with it."12 Essentially, relation is different from nature in God in so far as nature does not imply a reference to a correlative term. Therefore, in God nature and relation are the same but only differ in the connotations of terms in the understanding of the mind.

9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, reply 10 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, reply

11 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, reply

12 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, reply

42 Aquinas asserts that relation and nature are the only things that can be ascribed to God because they apply to God only by attributing existence and specific character. They are applicable because everything attributed to God must be identical with him, for he is utterly simple.13

The relation between God and his creatures must not only be referential but also absolute. Nonetheless, the relations are only logical for the Creator and real for the creatures. It is different for both parties because a creature has another reality besides the relative category. God cannot have another reality in him besides his nature that is synonymous with his specific character signified by relation, as stated earlier. This is the only metaphysical reality that Aquinas is willing to ascribe to God.

In contrast, in the creature there is a substantial reality besides his relation to God.14

Regardless, God cannot be reduced metaphysically to relation. His existence would be imperfect and based on his relation to something else. He needs to be an absolutely subsisting thing. In other words, his existence must be both complete and simple. His perfection cannot be described by any mere category or word, and therefore he cannot be an amalgam of substance and accident.

"The perfection of the Godhead is greater than can be conveyed by the meaning of any word, and so it does not follow that because a relative or any other term used of God does not signify what is perfect, therefore the divine nature has imperfect existence, for the divine nature comprehends within itself every kind of perfection, as already said."15

13 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, resp. 1

14 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, resp. 2

15 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 2, resp. 3

43 Each of his relations is an iteration of the divine nature. However, each of

God's relations are distinct from each other. Boethius said, “In divine matters substance contains unity, relation unfolds trinity.”16 According to him the Trinity cannot merely be a mental distinction, which is the heresy of modalism or the error of Sabellius.

Distinction between Trinitarian Relations

Aquinas examines what it means to call God Trinity. "To attribute anything to a thing involves attributing to it everything included in the definition."17 Calling someone a man implies that he possesses reason because reason is a part of man’s definition. In the Trinity there is real relation and therefore there must be opposition, which also means there must be real distinction. Relation implies a relationship between two things in such a way that they are in opposition with another, creating distinction. These distinctions are not merely logical but have to do with origin of procession. The Son is sonship because he is begotten of the

Father, who is fatherhood. These are real distinctions based upon processions of opposition–in this case the Begotten and the Begetter. "Therefore, there must be real distinction in God, not indeed when we consider the absolute reality of his nature, where there is sheer unity and simplicity, but when we think of him in terms of relation."18 Therefore distinction is real between his relations, but not to the

16 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 3, contra

17 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 3, reply

18 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 3, reply

44 absolute extent that distinction is created in his nature, for each relation is an absolute iteration of unity with the divine nature.

Aristotle asserts: “that all things identical with one and the same thing are identical with one another, holds good wherever there is identity both in reality and meaning, as when the same thing is called a ‘tunic’ and a ‘garment', but not where there is a difference of meaning.”19 Later in that passage, Aristotle asserts that changing, change, and being changed are the same thing, but that does not mean that changing and being changed are identical things. Changing implies to cause change in another thing, while being changed implies change being caused to something by another thing. Aquinas asserts that sonship and fatherhood also imply opposing distinctions, and yet they are the same thing in the divine nature.20 They are the begotten, begetting, and begetter; in a sense they are the same thing and yet there is still distinction. Begotten implies being begotten by another. Begetting implies begetting another. Begetter implies having begotten someone.

Other things are predicated of the divine nature as pseudo-accidents. For instance his attributes are not predicated as relations. They do not create correlations, as relations do when they are predicated of something, and thus do not create opposing accidents. If there are no opposing accidents to the accident predicated, then no distinction is created. Thus, things such as power and goodness are not opposing relationships, so they do not form the same distinction in God.

19 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 3, resp. 1

20 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 3, resp. 1

45 The persons of the Trinity are distinct from one another because they are their relations. Since each person is his relation, there is opposition between each person that creates distinction between each person. Aristotle and Boethius assert relations proceed from one another. In the divine nature relations are considered opposed to one another because of that act of procession.21

God has Four Distinct Relations

It has been established God is his real relations and there are real distinctions between them. In God there are only four real relations: fatherhood, sonship, spiration, and procession. The Holy Spirit is spirated by the Father through the Son and thus he processes from both of them. It seems that it was just proven that Begetter and Begotten are two different relations and not the same because they are of distinct opposition. Aristotle offers a counter argument saying, "It is the same road that leads from Athens to Thebes and from Thebes to Athens.”22 The objection is implying that in God the relationships of sonship and fatherhood are the same. According to this logic there are not four relations in God. Aquinas rejects the road from Athens to Thebes argument because the directions are different, as the direction of procession is different between the Father to the Son.

Aristotle thinks all relation is based in quantity, for instance, changing something and being changed or the master and the slave. Augustine wrote that God

21 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 3, resp. 3

22 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 4, contra

46 is "great without having quantity."23 If God had quantity, then he would not be simple for he would be dependent upon parts. Following in his theology, Aquinas asserts that real relation can only be found in the actions that are directed towards the divine nature. Actions, such as creating man, which are directed outside of his nature, are exempted from his category of real relation. God only has real relation with his inward processions. Within the divine nature there are only two such relations that fall into that category: generation of the Word and the spiration of the

Holy Spirit. In each procession are opposite relations: the relation of one processing from its origin and the origin itself.

Other than the Holy Spirit, who processes forth as Love (a spirit of impetus), real relations in God are taken to correspond to the mental formation of the

Word. Since the origin of procession, the Father, in God, has real relations to the Son because of the activity of mental formation. It seems that there could be infinite relations within God because he could have a mental formation for every concept. In the mind there is a difference between understanding and what is understood and there can be a relationship between the two. The same goes for the will and what is willed. In understanding himself, God understands all other things. Therefore, understanding and what is understood are the same things in the divine nature as is the will and what is willed.24

Aquinas clarifies that the mind relates to what it conceives in itself. For example, the mind has a real relationship to the word ‘stone’ because it is what the

23 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 4, reply

24 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 4, resp. 1

47 mind relates to when it grasps what a stone is. In the human mind there is no end to mental relations because “we may know stone by one act, and by another that we know stone and yet by another know that we know what we know.”25 For humanity, the acts of knowing could go on indefinitely, but God knows everything in one single act. Thus, a human mind can have an infinite amount of logical conceptions within itself. In God, the Son processes forth as act of self- understanding, and in understanding himself God understands all things. The Holy

Spirit processes forth as an act of will and through that act of will God's will is complete. There are no more things to be understood or willed by God, leaving no further acts of knowing or willing to be expressed by God. These are the only spiritual processions that we know to be present in a being. According to this formulation by Aquinas there cannot be any more processions in God, which is to say there cannot be any more persons in addition to the Trinity.

Aquinas continues to negate the idea that God has concepts of things that exist separately from the things and thus has real relation with those concepts. He already explained his stance on this by his position mentioned earlier "in God the understanding and what is understood are completely identical, since he understands other things in understanding himself."26 By that formulation of the divine intellect, there is no need for concepts of understanding to exist or process separately from the divine intellect. In the procession of self-understanding in the

Word, God understands all concepts. This idea that concepts process separately in

25 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 4, resp. 2 26 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 4, resp. 1

48 God comes from the Platonic notion that there are “divine ideas” in God, which are

“intelligible forms in the mind of God which are both patterns of created things and the concepts by which God knows them.”27These relations and ideas are known by

God but they are not within him as processions because they are not actual movements from within, for instance the intellect (Word) and the impetus of love

(Holy Spirit). Aquinas merely responds, “Relationships implied by ideas exist as understood by God."28 God knows many relationships but they do not exist in his divine nature. Things in God, such as equality and likeness, are logical relations in

God because they are not processions but only logical relations of comparison.

Aquinas finishes his response to relation in God by asserting that there are four real relations in God. They are distinct from one another because they oppose one another in procession. However, they only create distinction in God as terms of identity for his nature, for they share the same nature completely. Each of these relations is an identity manifested as a person, for each person is its relation. The

Father is fatherhood; the Son is sonship; and the Holy Spirit is spiration and procession.

27 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 4, resp. 3 28 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 28, a. 4, resp. 3

CHAPTER FOUR

Aquinas on the Divine Persons

The Meaning of the Word Person

In order to further discuss the predication of personhood for each member of the Trinity in God, Aquinas first addresses the meaning of the word “person.” He examines how person should be defined. He chooses Boethius’ definition of person, which is “an individual substance of a rational nature.”1 The following is Aquinas' defense of Boethius' definition of person.

Aquinas begins by justifying the use of the term 'substance.' "Although we find the universal and the particular in all categories the individual belongs in a special way to the category of substance."2 Substances are individual in and of themselves. Accidents are made individual by being present in a substance. Aristotle defines individuals, which are substances, as first substances.3

Aquinas starts to justify the term 'individual' in Boethius' definition of person. All substances act. However, the individual is more pronounced in rational substances, which have the ability to control their actions and to act of their own initiative. “For to act is proper to individuals or singular substances."4 The term person is designated to those individual substances of rational natures. In Boethius”

1 Geddes, Leonard. “Person.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11.

2 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, reply

3 Aristotle, Categories, 3. 2aII

4 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, reply

50 definition 'individual substance' refers to a “singular being in the category of substance” and “rational nature is added to mean the singular being among rational substances.”5

The singular thing cannot be defined, wherefore Aquinas refers to Aristotle's first substance or Boethius' person. Hypostasis is another such word that he uses to refer to a person.

Adding the word individual to the definition specifies a particular substance. When the Word assumes a human nature, he is not assuming a person, a particular individual.6 The addition of individual indicates a first substance or person being discussed.

Individual is a necessary term of classification because we do not know all substantial differences, and thus they are not named, making it necessary to use accidental differences instead of substantial differences to classify a substance. Fire for instance, “is an elemental body, warm and dry.”7 Individual is an example of using words of classification to define what we do not have words for, such as

“singular thing.” Individual indicates “the mode of subsisting proper to particular substances.”8

In order to defend Boethius' use of 'nature' in his definition of person,

Aquinas invokes Aristotle's definition of nature, who says that it applies to the

5 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, reply

6 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, resp. 2

7 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, resp. 3

8 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, resp. 3

51 “generation of living organisms.”9 “And since generation of this kind is from an intrinsic principle, the meaning of this word was stretched to cover the intrinsic principle of any kind of change."10 This principle can be either formal or material, and thus form and matter both fall under nature. “And since it is through the form that the essence of everything is made complete, this essence, which is what a definition signifies, is generally called 'nature.'” 11 This is what nature means in

Boethius’ definition. Boethius also writes: “Nature is for each thing what gives it its form through the specific differences.”12 The definition is incomplete without

'specific difference.' The specific difference comes from the thing's special form.

Aquinas recognizes that it seems like 'essence' could be substituted for

'nature.' He defends his stance against essence by referring to its etymology. It is simply derived from esse 'to be.' Therefore he says that essence is simply 'to be.'

This is too general of a term in comparison to nature. Nature is a generative principle of change, which is intrinsic to the form and matter of a substance. It thus accounts for growth and maturation of a person, making it a more specific term.13

Aquinas also addresses the issue of a soul being a person apart from its body.

Though the soul itself has a rational nature and it can exist apart from the body in death, the state of the soul, being separated from its body, in death is unnatural. The

9 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 4.

10 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, resp. 4

11 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, resp. 4

12 Geddes, Leonard. “Person.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11.

13 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, resp. 4

52 soul is meant to be unified with its body, so it is not meant to be described as an

'individual substance,' and is therefore not a person on its own.14

Interchangeable terms with 'Person'

Now that Aquinas has defended Boethius' definition of person as “an individual substance of a rational nature,”15 he now turns towards a clarification of terms that seem to be used interchangeably with person. The terms he chooses to examine are hypostasis, subsistence, and essence.

He examines 'substance,' because Aristotle uses it in two different ways. First he uses it as the 'what-ness' of a thing, which is the same as the Greek word ousia, what we call essence. The second sense is as follows: "we call

'substance' the subject or the underlying thing subsisting in the category of substance."16 This use of substance is circular and thus not a precise substitution for the term that refers to the subject. The 'underlying thing,' by which Aquinas means the suppositum (the antecedent that presupposes the attributes of a substance), is an even more precise term for the subject.

Aquinas points out three other terms that represent the subject use of substance. The first is subsistence, which means it exists within itself. It is the mode of existence by which a substance is individuated, "for we say that those entitles

14 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 1, resp. 5

15 Geddes, Leonard. “Person.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11.

16 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, reply

53 subsist which exist, not in something else, but in themselves."17 The second is “a thing of nature,” which reveals a common nature. For instance: “this man is a thing of human nature."18 The third term is used insofar as it supports accidents. It is the

Greek term hypostasis, which is the underlying reality that supports all else in a subject. It is also used interchangeably with the Latin term substantia, which is the concrete substance of an individual excludes all accidents, for Boethius says, "We see that accidents cannot constitute a person."19 Both terms signify the primary thing that individuates a substance from all other substances, while supporting the accidental qualities of the substance. The term “person” is also a term used for the subject use of substance, however it strictly applies to only the subject use of rational substances.

The term hypostasis amongst the Greeks was used to refer to any individual substance, but Aquinas asserts that hypostasis now has been dignified as a term. It is used in theology to refer to an individual being of a rational nature.20 In this sense, hypostasis is considered interchangeable with person. By definition, hypostasis is also interchangeable with suppositum, but Aquinas would say that it would not be fitting to refer to the suppositum of an irrational nature as a hypostasis because it is now a dignified term to be used fittingly of persons or rational natures.

17 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, reply

18 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, reply

19 Geddes, Leonard. “Person.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11.

20 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, resp. 1

54 The term subsistence is also used of the divine nature. In God there are three persons or subsistences. The Greeks translate subsistence to hypostasis rather than substance because substance can mean either hypostasis or essence, as explained earlier with Aristotle's two uses of the term substance. Subsistence and hypostasis are the preferred terms for referring to persons. Substance, on the other hand, is not the preferred term for a person. Rather, substance is used in the sense that it is the essence of a thing.

Essence is what is expressed by the definition. "A definition comprises specific principle, but not individual principles."21 Essence refers to what is composed of matter and form in general, and not to individual instances of form and matter. For instance essence refers to form and matter, such as the soul and body that compose a man. Hypostasis refers to this soul and this body and therefore adds individuality to the definition of essence.

How Subsistence and Hypostasis can both mean 'Person'

Aquinas addresses how both hypostasis and subsistence have been approved as terms for person, but they mean two different things. Subsistence comes from the word 'subsisting,' which refers to an individual mode of existence. Hypostasis is derived from 'standing under.' Aquinas invokes Boethius, who says, "That genera and species are subsisting things inasmuch as to subsist applies to certain individual beings because they belong to the genera and species included in the category of

21 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, resp. 3

55 substance."22 He is indicating that genera and species exist of an individual substance inasmuch as that individual belongs to those categories. A Platonic reading of genera and species would be that they subsisted apart from particular individuals. Aquinas takes Boethius' reading and agrees that individuals are the only subsisting things. This conclusion allows for both a hypostasis and subsistence to represent an individual thing.

“These same individual things are substant in relation to accidental qualities, which are left out of the definitions of genera and species."23 Aquinas is clarifying that an individual things, as subsistences, are made substantial through relation to accidental beings. Secondary substances, such as genera and species, are only substantial insofar as they are derived from primary substances. However, it is the composition of accidents that make the individual thing is own particular substance.

If the individual thing were made of a different composition of accidents, then it would not be the same particular substance. Nevertheless, accidents are not subsisting things in and of themselves. They must adhere to matter. However, this particular explanation by Boethius leads Aquinas to conclude that the subsistence is the same thing as the hypostasis. The hypostasis exists in and of itself, as an individual thing, while it is also the thing that stands under every thing else that contributes to a subject’s substance. The subsistence is also that thing which exists in and of itself, but it is also the thing that stands under everything else that contributes to the subject's substance. They both have different derivations but they

22 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, resp. 4

23 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, resp. 4

56 both imply the meaning of the other's derivation. They represent the same thing that makes a thing a person.

"The individual thing composed of matter and form supports accidental qualities because of the nature of matter."24 Since matter is the stuff that makes up a thing, it does not affect the being or shape of a thing. The nature of matter is such that accidents can inhere in it without changing the being or shape of a substance. It is form that confers being and shape upon a substance. Form gives existence to an individual thing. However, Boethius said, “Simple form cannot be a subject.”25 Form can subsist of itself, and while it does not force itself upon already existing matter, it can give existence to matter so that an individual substance might subsist. "This is the reason why he associates hypostasis with matter, and usiosis or subsistence with form, since being a subject arises from matter and being a subsisting thing from form."26 The term person is associated with both hypostasis and subsistence.

Boethius associates hypostasis with a subject that is produced when form supervenes over matter and a subject arises from the matter in the hylomorphic compound. On the other hand, he associates subsistence with form because form can subsist in and of itself. Person is applied to God with both of these terms, while

Boethius' associations with those terms are not.

24 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, resp. 5

25 Boethius, De Trinitate, II

26 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, resp. 5 He is referencing Boethius” De Trinitate, IV

57 The term 'Person' being used of God

Aquinas begins his defense of ascribing the term person to God by quoting the Athanasian Creed: “The person of the Father is other than that of the Son and that of the Holy Ghost."27 He defines person as that which “is most perfect in the whole of nature, namely what subsists in rational nature."28 Therefore, since God is perfect, it is only fitting that person should be used to describe God, but person will be used in a higher sense when referring to the Trinity than when referring to a creature, as are other terms used to describe the divine nature.

While God is not referred to in scripture with the term person, the meaning of the term is expressed through other terms. The meaning of person when it is said of God, according to Aquinas, is that he is the “acme of self-existence and most perfect in knowledge."29 He also adds that Christians would become seriously limited in debating with heretics and atheists if they were limited solely to terms found in Scripture.

According to Aquinas, the Greeks first used the word person in comedies and tragedies to refer to men of dignity or rank. "It then became customary in the ecclesiastical world to refer to personages of rank."30 Thus, the Church adopted the term person because its connotations of dignity helped emphasize hierarchical structure within it. Some theologians even say person means "a hypostasis

27 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, contra

28 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, reply

29 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, resp. 1

30 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, resp. 2

58 distinguished by dignity."31 “To subsist in rational nature is a characteristic implying dignity and hence, as already mentioned, every individual rational nature is called person."32 The divine nature surpasses all natures in dignity and thus the term person is used fittingly of God.

The term hypostasis is used interchangeably with person in theology.

Aquinas says that hypostasis became a fitting term for referring to person in God as a subsisting substance, once it is accepted that he cannot have accidents like other substances.33

God is called a rational nature in the sense that he has an intelligent nature, not that he follows processes of thought like man. God can only be called an individual in the sense of incommunicability. He is not an individual in the sense that implies matter individuates him as a subject. He is his own incommunicable entity. The divine nature can be referred to as a substance inasmuch as it is only a substance in the sense that substance refers to its self-grounded existence. 34

Person implies Relation in the Divine Person

Aquinas now addresses how person in the divine person implies relation.

Boethius also believes that all terms that refer to person signify relation in the

31 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, resp. 2

32 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, resp. 2

33 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, resp. 3

34 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 3, resp. 4

59 divine person, and what word could refer more to person than person. Therefore person in the divine person implies relation.35

In a general sense person means an “individual substance of a rational nature.”36 "An individual is that which is undivided in itself and distinct from others.

Hence 'person' in any kind of nature signifies what is distinct in that nature."37 For instance, a human person implies a particular relation to human nature, such as this flesh, this mind, and these bones. Specifying accidents of a particular in the species man is a part of a human person, but it is not what Aquinas means by a divine person.

He now begins to define the divine persons. Distinction between persons is created in the Trinity through relation of origin. Relation in the divine nature is not merely an accident, it is the divine nature. This means that relation subsists in the divine nature. “Consequently just as the Godhead is God, so God's fatherhood is God the Father who is a divine person. Hence 'divine person' signifies relation as something subsisting."38

Relation is analogous to "substance, which is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, though what is subsisting in the divine nature is nothing other than the divine nature."39 Relation as a subsistence in God is a person, who is none other

35 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, contra

36 Geddes, Leonard. “Person.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11.

37 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, reply

38 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, reply

39 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, reply

60 than the divine nature. “And in this sense it is true that 'person' signifies relation directly and nature indirectly, yet relation is signified, not as relation, but as hypostasis.”40 However, person only signifies the divine nature directly and relation indirectly, inasmuch as nature is identical with hypostasis. God's nature cannot be reduced to relation, because once relation is posited in God it can no longer simply be a relation. Relation, which is created by procession, is signified as a hypostasis because a real relation creates a person in God. Nothing can be in God, other than the divine nature. Any relation in God is a hypostasis that must be an iteration of the divine nature. Thus, real relation cannot be posited in God, without creating another iteration of the divine nature as a hypostasis.

Person in God can therefore also signify nature directly and relation indirectly, insofar as nature is identical with hypostasis. In God, the word hypostasis refers to what is “distinct through a relation.”41 The hypostases are iterations of the divine nature, but they are made distinct subjects through relation, as in the precise meaning of relation and not as real relation predicated of God. The hypostases, who are their relations, are made distinct through opposition in procession. The Son, who is sonship, is not synonymous with the Father, who is fatherhood; rather they are relations of opposition. The relations in God constitute persons. However,

"relation precisely as relation comes into the definition of person indirectly."42

These relations are the relations of contrast previously discussed.

40 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, reply

41 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, reply

42 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, reply

61 Augustine says, “When we speak of the person of the Father, we are speaking of nothing other than his substance… for indeed he is called 'person' in regard to himself, not to the Son."43 Here Augustine uses the definition of person, which refers directly to the substance of the divine nature, “which is a hypostasis."44 “Hence

Augustine says that it signifies nature, inasmuch as in God nature is identical with hypostasis, since in him there is no difference between 'what it is' and 'through which it is.'”45

Aquinas writes that Augustine also says, “There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, 'Three what?' the answer is, 'Three persons.'”46 This question was not one of definition. For instance, one might ask, “what is man?” The answer would be "a rational mortal animal." However, the question was not asked from a view-point of definition but of

'existential subject,' such as "What corporeal nature reasons?" The resulting answer would be "man.” In the same sense the question “Three what?” was answered

“Three persons.”47

“According to Aristotle the meaning of a word coincides with its definition.”48 Therefore, using Boethius' definition of person, "an individual

43 Augustine, De Trinitate, VII

44 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, resp. 1

45 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, resp. 1

46 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, arg. 2

47 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, resp. 2

48 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, arg. 3

62 substance of a rational nature,"49 person is substance. Aquinas has already explained that substance has two uses according to Aristotle.50 This use of substance is the less fitting use, which defines 'substance' as a subject or the underlying thing that supports everything else in a substance. However, he uses 'substance' this way in this instance. Each 'substance' is a distinct and incommunicable person.51 Each

'substance' is his relation (i.e. the Father is fatherhood) and thus real relation enters through the distinction formed by their opposition in procession.

Aquinas defends the implication of relation in the persons in God. “A different meaning of words with narrower denotation does not make for equivocation in the words with wider denotation."52 Person has a wider denotation than the terms for specific species. For instance, animal applies both to a horse and an ass, but they are not the same animal. In the same way person is applied to God, angels, and men. Therefore person is not used equivocally of God and his creatures.

Although in most cases person means "what subsists in its own right in an intellectual nature,"53 Aquinas asserts that relation is implied in the meaning of

'divine person.'

49 Geddes, Leonard. “Person.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11.

50 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 2, reply

51 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, resp. 3

52 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, resp. 4

53 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 29, a. 4, resp. 4

63 There are Several Distinct Persons in God

Having defended the use of person for the Trinitarian supposits in God,

Aquinas addresses why it is necessary to believe that there are several divine persons in the Godhead. He begins by invoking Athanasius, who says, “One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.”54 In other words, Athanasius agrees that there must be several divine persons.

In the most recent progression of arguments Aquinas has shown that there are several persons in the divine nature. In God, person means a relation as a subsisting thing in the divine nature. It was also shown that there are several relations in the divine nature. Thus there must be several persons in the divine nature.

Aquinas clarifies his use of person, for although person is defined as “an individual substance of a rational nature,”55 this does not mean that since there are several divine persons there must be several divine substances, because substance does not refer to nature here. In Boethius' definition of person, substance refers to subject. His addition of the word “individual” makes this specification clear. Aquinas reminds us of the utility of the Greek term for hypostasis, which is used to refer to substance in this way. The Trinity can be referred to as three hypostases. Since substance can be used equivocally with nature, hypostasis is the preferred term for referring to the number of persons in the Trinity.56

54 The creed Quicumque (DENZ. 39)

55 Geddes, Leonard. “Person.” The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 11.

56 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 1, resp. 1

64 Absolute attributes that are predicated of God, like goodness and wisdom, do not create distinction between one another because there is no opposition between either term. They are simply attributes predicated as pseudo-accidents of the divine nature. God is both of these attributes in an absolute sense. Thus they are synonymous in God in that sense. However, each person is his relation, which is a subsisting thing in the divine nature. The Son is begotten by the Father and the

Father begot the son. The act of begetting cannot be applied to both persons in the same sense. It is an active action for the Father and a passive action for the Son. The relations that are predicated of God are opposed to one another and are therefore distinct. The plurality of persons is also justified by this account of distinction between relations.

Boethius says of God: “that is truly one in which there is no number.”57 God has complete simplicity and unity in his nature. This rules out plurality of divine attributes, but not of relations. "For relations are predicated 'of a thing' as 'to another,' and so they do not connote compositeness in their subject, as Boethius tells us."58 The way relation is predicated does not result in plurality in the divine nature.

There are only Three Distinct Persons in God

Aquinas transitions from proving that there are multiple persons in the divine nature to asserting that there are only three persons in the divine nature.

57 Boethius, De Trinitate, II

58 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 1, resp. 3

65 Based upon the previous arguments, there are several persons subsisting as distinct relations in the divine nature. “Now real distinction between divine relations can come only because of relative contrast."59 In two persons there must be two contrasting relations, for if the relations are not contrasting then they must belong to the same person. “Therefore subsisting fatherhood is the person of the Father, and subsisting sonship is the person of the Son."60 It is impossible that these relations belong to the same person. Thus, the Father and the Son are contrasted to one another. Earlier it was asserted that there is no procession that precedes the procession of the Word.61 Thus, the Holy Spirit must process after the procession of the Son. Neither the Son nor the Father are processions of the Holy Spirit. So the

Spirit must process from the Father and the Son in such a way that it does not create contrast between their relations.62 The Holy Spirit is spirated by the person of the

Father through the Son, and thus he processes from both of them. The Holy Spirit is the relation of procession. He is opposed in relation to the Father and the Son because he cannot spirate, for he is spirated by them. The opposing relation of procession is produced to describe his act of coming forth.

There are four divine relations, and yet there are only three persons. Aquinas says that spiration belongs to both the Father and the Son. Spiration does not go with one person only and therefore it is not a property or a personal relation that

59 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 2, reply

60 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 2, reply

61 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 27, a. 3, resp. 3

62 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 2, reply

66 constitutes a person. The personal properties of the Trinity are fatherhood, sonship, and procession. Each of these constitutes a person. The Father is fatherhood, the Son is sonship, and the Holy Spirit is procession. Procession is the one who comes forth.63

The Word by nature proceeds by the way of the divine intellect and comes forth as likeness. The procession of the Word is generation by way of nature. Love, the Holy Spirit, does not proceed as a likeness linked with intellect, despite sharing the divine nature, which is why the Holy Spirit is not generated.64 The Holy Spirit proceeds as an impetus, a spirit, or willing out the will of the origin and intellect. The Father is the origin, the Son is the understanding of the Father and the concept of love, and the Holy Spirit is the procession of that love.

The Distinct Processions of the Trinity do not Create Plurality in God

God's reality is his nature and it is his only activity. Angels are simpler than humans but more perfect because they have neither imagination nor sensation. Man is the highest of earthly creatures because he is rational and more complex.65 God knows all and realizes all in and of himself. His nature is complete in its activity. Angels are created with a nature that understands all that their nature could allow and through God they can realize all of it. Man knows only by his reasoning and sensation, manifests what he understands and senses, and realizes

63 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 2, resp. 1

64 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 2, resp. 2

65 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 2, resp. 3

67 what he can through empirical evidence. He imagines what he does not know, understand, or realize.

Number does not quantify the Trinity. Each member shares the entirety of its being. Numbers refer to a part or a whole. Things are numbered, such as three men. Things are also numbered of a whole, for instance, one man is a part of two men and two men are a part of three men. However, the Trinity is not numbered as such, for each person is just as much the whole divine nature.66

Thus, an attribute, such as goodness, is not reproduced or multiplied amongst the Trinity, rather it is shared amongst its members. The Father, in infinite goodness, gives himself infinitely to the producing of another being, the Holy

Spirit. The Holy Spirit has the same goodness as the Father and therefore does not need to bestow himself on another as the Father has. The goodness the Holy Ghost has as possessed of another is the same goodness that the Father has as he who bestows on another.67 The Holy Ghost's relation prevents him from being the origin of more persons; rather his relation is proceeding from the other persons in the divine nature.68

The number of divine persons does not indicate a measurement of God.

Athanasius wrote, “The Father is immeasurable, the Son is also and so is the Holy

66 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 1, resp. 4

67 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 2, resp. 4

68 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 2, resp. 4

68 Ghost.”69 This means the Trinity is not measurable in number because they are each identical in greatness. Aquinas will explain how nothing is its own measure later.

Three persons as expressed of God invoke the discussion of whether or not numerical terms posit anything in God. Aquinas paraphrases Hilary: “By acknowledging fellowship we rule out the idea of isolation and loneliness.”70 He also paraphrases Ambrose, saying: “When we speak of one God, unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not assert quantity in God.”71 Both of these statements are examples of apophatic rather than cataphatic theology.

It is through division that plurality is made. There are two kinds of division. Material division, the division of a continuum, results in numbered quantities. Material things have quantity in and of themselves. Formal division is made from the opposition or diversity of forms, resulting in the plurality of transcendentals, as in 'one and many.' Only this kind of 'many' applies to spiritual realities.72

Negative numerical expressions arose about God because this expression of

'many' is a discrete quantity and therefore could not refer to God in a positive sense. Others disagree and assert that this 'many' functions like knowledge, which is “attributed to God in the proper meaning of the term."73 Knowledge does not

69 The creed Quicumque (DENZ. 39)

70 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, contra

71 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, contra

72 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, reply

73 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, reply

69 apply as a category to God because qualities are inapplicable to him. In the same way a numerical term is given to the divine nature “in the proper sense of number,” not as applying the category of quantity or class.74 The proper sense of number would be to describe him with number but not in a categorical function.

Numerical terms must be taken metaphorically of God, unlike the properties of bodies, which are measured by width or length. Quantity is used transcendentally of God. For instance, these metaphorical uses of numerical terms are taken from the transcendental use of 'many.' “This 'many' has the same relationship to the many things of which it is predicated that 'one' has to 'being,' with which it is convertible.

In this sense then, 'one' adds to 'being' only the denial of division; for 'one' means

'undivided being.'"75 As 'one' signifies an undivided being, so does 'many' signify more than one undivided being. Aquinas admits that number does have an inherent reality. “Number as a special kind of quantity posits an additional reality supervening on substance, and so does 'one' taken as the starting point of numbering.”76

When God is referred to as 'one,' Aquinas means that the divine nature is one and undivided. To says that the person is 'one' means that the person is undivided. When several persons are referred to in the Trinity, then 'many' is signifying the undivided unities that make up the Trinity.77

74 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, reply

75 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, reply

76 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, reply

77 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, reply

70 The terms 'one and 'many' are transcendentals and therefore can apply to a wider range of meaning than substance or relation and do not posit anything in God.

There is versatility in meaning for these terms because of their transcendental nature. Thus, depending upon context, either term can stand for substance or relation. As written above, these terms deny dividedness in both nature and relation.

Terms applied like 'one' or 'many' in creatures posit numbers in creatures. In God these terms have transcendental meaning, which is to say that the number of persons of the Trinity are an iteration of unities with the divine nature.

Distinction occurs through the contrast of relations in each person. Therefore there is 'one' divine nature and 'many' persons. The term 'many' does not posit anything in God as a result. The 'one' and 'many' only refer to the undivided nature of God.78

“One does not exclude the 'many' but the division which can be thought of prior to one or many. And 'many' does not exclude unity but division between the realities forming the whole.”79 Plurality excludes isolation in God and unity excludes a plurality of gods, but this is also not their exclusive definition. For instance, whiteness excludes blackness, but by definition whiteness does not solely mean the exclusion of blackness. However, since both 'one' and 'many' can be predicated of

God, unity and Trinity are preserved in the divine nature.

78 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, resp. 2

79 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 3, resp. 3

71 'Commoness' is Held Amongst the Divine Persons

In the Trinity the divine nature is common to all three. Aquinas also asserts that the word person is common to all three members of the Trinity. Aquinas condenses

Augustine saying, "that when someone asks, 'three what?' we answer, 'three persons,' since being a person is what is common to them."80

When someone says three persons, it is meant in the sense that three men hold being a 'man' in common. This is not real commonness because there is not just one nature common to all three, rather there are three who are one nature. In God there is real commonness because there are three who are the one nature.

Some say this commonness was by negation, because being a person includes incommunicability. Others say this was logical commonness because being a person includes individuality, as when one says to be in a species is common to an ox.

Aquinas asserts that person is an ontological term and not one of negation or logic.

"And so it should be said that 'person' is a common term by reason of conceptual commonness, not as a genus or species, but as referring to an indeterminate or vague individual thing."81 Person does not have the common logical status of genus or species, which are terms that refer to a common nature.

"Now a term of indeterminate individuality, such as 'a certain man,' refers to the common nature as having that definite mode of existence which is proper to singular things, namely to be something subsisting by itself and distinct from

80 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 4, contra

81 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 4, reply

72 others."82 However, the name of an individual, such as Socrates, refers to something both definite and particular, such as these bones and this flesh. "A certain man refers to an individual instance with that mode of existence which is proper to individual beings."83 However, Person "is used to signify a subsisting thing in a given nature and not an individual instance of that nature."84 The commonness shared between the divine persons is the concept that each "subsists in the divine nature and is distinct from the others,"85 making person common to all three conceptually.

Aquinas asserts the incommunicability of a person, while asserting that multiple entities can share the property of incommunicability. In the Trinity there is conceptual commonness between persons.

Commonness of personhood is predicated of God, but universals, like genus and species, are not because the divine persons exist in and of themselves, while genus and species are predicated of many existences. There is only one divine existence, which is held by all three persons.

Trinity is the Fitting Term for God's Persons in Unity

Aquinas addresses the issue of saying there is “trinity” in God. He begins by invoking

Athanasius, who says: "Unity is to be worshipped in trinity, and trinity in unity."86

82 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 4, reply

83 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 4, reply

84 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 4, reply

85 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 30, a. 4, reply

86 Creed Quicumque (DENZ. 39)

73 Trinity shows determinate number of the plurality of persons predicated of God, which makes specific what plurality does not. He continues to defend the term

“trinity” as opposed to other terms and thus further elucidates what it means to call

God Trinity.

Trinity is not a relative term that refers to their “tri-unity”, which would be the same as saying the Father is Trinity. It in fact refers to the three persons of the

Trinity, making it a nonrelative term.87

A collective term, like Trinity, implies a plurality of subjects and their unity, while a 'people' refers to an ordered unity of men. In the Trinity there is ordered unity but also a unity of nature. 88

Three is an absolute term that refers to the number of persons. It is not

“Triplicity”, which Boethius showed to be a proportion of inequality. The members are equal in nature and are not proportioned, as triplicity would imply.89

"In the divine Trinity we understand both the number of persons and the persons numbered."90 Trinity in unity does not imply that their nature is multiplied by three; rather it is stating that there are three subjects in one nature. Unity in

Trinity suggests that nature exists in subjects.

When it is said that God is trinal, it implies that there are three subjects of the

Trinity. Thus to say that the Trinity is trinal would be to say that each person of the

87 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 1, resp. 1

88 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 1, resp. 2

89 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 1, resp. 3

90 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 1, resp. 4

74 Trinity has three subjects. Therefore, the Trinity cannot be called trinal, otherwise, one is claiming that there are nine subjects in God.

The Divine Persons are of the Same Nature and yet 'other' than One Another

Aquinas has now established Trinity in God and Trinity as the proper term for referring to God and his three persons. He now turns to the question of whether or not it can be said that the Son is other than the Father. He invokes Augustine, who says: "The Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost have one nature, in which the

Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another, although the

Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another."91

In the following discussion Aquinas says that there are two possible errors, and the middle way must be chosen between them. They are the error of Arius, who

"paralleled a trinity of substances by the trinity of persons, and the error of

Sabellius, who paralleled unity of person by the unity of nature."92

In order to avoid Arius' mistake, theologians must use the word 'distinction' to account for relative opposition between the persons and preserve unity in the

Trinity. Words to be avoided would be 'difference' or 'diversity' because they tend to disrupt or compromise the unity of the Trinity.93 Simplicity in God must also be preserved, and therefore 'division' or 'separation' must be avoided because it would imply that the divine nature was being made into parts. 'Inequality' must be avoided

91 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 2, contra

92 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 2, reply

93 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 2, reply

75 as term so that the equality of persons in the Trinity is not compromised. Likeness is preserved as well between the Father and Son by not using the words 'alien' or

'dissimilar.' Aquinas then quotes Ambrose, who says: "the Godhead is not discrepant but one."94 He then quotes Hilary, who says the same thing: "There is nothing alien, nothing that can be parted."95

To avoid Sabellius' error, theologians must stop using the term 'singularity,' which compromises the sharing in the divine nature. Aquinas quotes Hilary, who says, "It is sacrilege to call the Father or the Son a single God."96 The enumeration of persons is impossible if the term 'unique' is used of the Trinity. Aquinas asserts that

Hilary also says, "the idea of something singular and unique is inapplicable to

God."97 “The only Son” is used of the Son because there are not several sons. However, he is not referred to as “the only God” because the Godhead is

'common' to three persons. The nature of the persons is compromised with the term

'indistinct.' Aquinas invokes Ambrose, who writes, "What is one is not indistinct, and what is undifferentiated cannot be manifold."98 'Solitary' should not be used of God, for it compromises the fellowship of the Trinity. Aquinas quotes Hilary, who says,

"We should profess belief in neither a solitary nor a diversified God."99

94 Ambrose, De Fide, I, 2.

95 Hilary, De Trinitate, VII

96 Hilary, De Trinitate, VII

97 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 2, reply

98 Ambrose, De Fide, I

99 Hilary, De Trinitate, IV

76 Aquinas now returns to how one can say that the Son is other than the

Father. 'Other' in the masculine gender of Latin "implies a distinct subject, suppositum."100 The Son is another subject or hypostasis of the divine nature, therefore it is fitting to say the Son is other than the Father.

'Other' refers to a subject because of its particular nature. Its meaning is therefore rooted in a person or hypostasis. 'Diversity,' on the other hand, refers to a distinction of substance in nature, which means it is unfitting to call "the Son diverse from the Father."101 The Son is other than the Father.

'Difference' seems to refer to a distinction of form. God has only one form so it cannot refer properly to God. John of Damascus, however, uses the word

'difference' because he is using a relative property as though it were a form. In this way, he describes the hypostases, differing by definitive properties instead of substance. He uses 'difference' as Aquinas and Boethius use 'distinction.'102

When 'other' is used in the sense that the subject is other than the object,

'other' has no implication for the subject being external or dissimilar from the object. However, 'alien' and 'foreign' do imply that the subject is external or dissimilar from its object.

Aquinas finishes by discussing what terms of gender are fitting of God and his persons. The divine nature has no gender because it is indeterminate. The

Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are referred to with a masculine gender because of its

100 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 2, reply

101 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 2, resp. 1

102 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 2, resp. 2

77 determination according to scripture and tradition. Socrates' definition is asked by the question "What is he?" The same line of questioning is found with regard to the persons of God, who create distinction between his persons rather than his nature.

The Father is “he” who is other than the Son, and not an “it.” They are one “it”, and not one “he.”103

Here, Aquinas finishes his metaphysical discourse on the Trinity. He continued Boethius' endeavor to give a categorical explanation of God of and the divine persons. He also gave explanation regarding his processions, relations, plurality of persons, and he defended the use of person and Trinity of God. He also defended the distinction between persons and their unity in the divine nature.

Finally, he finished by defending fitting terminology that allowed for distinction, but did not compromise the persons or their unity.

103 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 31, a. 2, resp. 4

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