2020 – 2020 2 Issue Australian Naval Review Naval Australian
AUSTRALIAN NAVAL REVIEW 2020 Issue 2 Australian Naval Review 2020 - Issue 2
The Australian Naval Review is the biannual publication of the Australian Naval Institute (ANI). After the retirement of the quarterly Headmark, the ANI transitioned to an annual peer-reviewed journal in 2016. This is alongside the frequent publication of articles on the Institute’s website. Since 2019, the Australian Naval Review has been published biannually.
Editorial Captain Guy Blackburn, RAN (Chair) Committee Sub Lieutenant Ben Page, RAN
Peer Review Professor Rob McLaughlin Advisory Commodore Richard Menhinick, AM, CSC, RAN (Retired) Committee
Copy Editor Ms Kiri Mathieson
Printed by Instant Colour Press, Canberra Set in Calibri 12pt
ISSN 2207-2128 (Hard Copy)
Copyright of the articles published in this issue, unless specified, resides with the authors. Copyright in the form of the article printed in the Australian Naval Review is held by the Australian Naval Institute.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 1 Australian Naval Review 2020 - Issue 2
About the ANI The ANI is the leading forum for naval and maritime affairs in Australia. Formed in 1975, the main objectives of the ANI are:
• to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and • to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession.
Contributing to the Australian Naval Review The ANI publishes articles and comments on naval and maritime issues. Of particular interest are articles concerning naval strategy, operations, capabilities, administration and policy, as well as those concerning the maritime and geopolitical environments, but all articles will be considered.
Contact the ANR Committee at [email protected] for further information (including the Australian Naval Review’s Style Guide for prospective authors) or to submit a contribution to theANR .
Disclaimer The views expressed in this review do not represent the official views of the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Defence Force, the Chief of Navy or the ANI. That said, Headmark, and now the Australian Naval Review, have a proud tradition of over 40 years of contributing informed research, writing, and opinion on naval and maritime matters.
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2 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Council
President Vice Admiral Peter Jones, AO, DSC, RAN (Retired) Vice President Commodore Allison Norris, CSC, RAN Treasurer Captain Nick Tate, RAN Secretary Lieutenant Commander Stephanie Foulkes, RAN Councillors Captain Guy Blackburn, RAN Commander Mike Collinson, RNZN Mr Andrew Gordon Mr Richard Hobbs Professor Robert McLaughlin Sub Lieutenant Ben Page, RAN Lieutenant Commander Ben Piggott, RAN Mr Craig Powell Brigadier Will Taylor, OBE, RM (Retired) Lieutenant Commander Desmond Woods, RAN
Business Manager Ms Sue Hart
Front Cover: HMA Ships Sirius, Arunta, Stuart, Hobart and Canberra depart the Port of Darwin to commence the Regional Presence Deployment 2020 in Southeast Asia and off the coast of Hawaii. Photographer: LSIS Ernesto Sanchez. Inside Back Cover: Able Seaman Musician Phillip Edey from the Royal Australian Navy Band plays ‘Sunset’ during a Ceremonial Sunset ceremony on the flight deck of HMAS Brisbane, whilst alongside Fleet Base East, Sydney. Photographer: ABIS Leon Dafonte Fernandez.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 3 Table of Contents
Foreword by the President...... 5 Vice Admiral Peter Jones, AO, DSC, RAN (Retired)
Navy's engagement with industry partners through the National Shipbuilding Enterprise...... 17 Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN
New Directions in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update...... 21 Ms Melissa Conley Tyler and Mr Iain MacGillivray
War at Sea in the Age of Artificial Intelligence...... 29 Dr Peter Layton
Confused Seas: Searching for Maritime Security in an Insecure World...... 35 Lieutenant Commander Jimmy Drennan, USN
Legal, Ethical and Social Considerations for Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence (RAS AI): What the Royal Australian Navy should consider in its RAS AI Strategy...... 45 Commander Paul Davidson, RAN and Lieutenant Commander Jane Tsakissiris, RAN
The Defence Strategic Update: Maritime Strategy and the Law...... 55 Dr Cameron Moore
Australians prepared for Naval Shipbuilding...... 69 Mr Ian Irving
Destroyer doomed from the start – the rewritten story of USSPeary’s final combat action in Darwin 1942...... 74 Dr Tom Lewis, OAM
4 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Sufficiency of existing legal frameworks for addressing maritime security challenges surrounding autonomous vessels...... 104 Lieutenant Commander Simon Lindsay, RAN
The 1967 Walker–Besslednyi Collision: When History Got It Wrong...... 117 Mr Bill Streifer and Mr Irek Sabitov
Redefining the mission of maritime military geospatial services...... 134 Commander Matthew Houston, RAN
Pacific Step Up versus Pacific Reset: Trans-Tasman Lessons for the Pacific ‘Family’...... 142 Captain Lisa Hunn, RNZN
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 5 Foreword by the President Vice Admiral Peter Jones, AO, DSC, RAN (Retired) This is the seventh edition of the Australian Naval Review and I believe you will thoroughly enjoy reading its very diverse range of articles on maritime affairs. The COVID-19 pandemic has dominated all our lives in 2020. It is, however, still too early for us to grasp its long-term impact in economic, social and strategic terms. What is likely is that it will be significant. Also of great importance in 2020 was the Australian Government’s release of its Defence Strategic Update 2020 and the associated Force Structure Plan. Over recent months the ANI has sought analysis and differing perspectives on these important policy documents. These have, and continue to, appear on the ANI’s much updated website where they are fully available to members and subscribers. Deeper analysis is now starting to appear in these pages of the Australian Naval Review. No doubt the implications of the Government’s policy will be further considered in future editions. This year, because of the pandemic, the Goldrick Seminar on Remote and Autonomous Systems at Sea became a series of eight webinars. Two observations came from that series. The first was how people quickly adjust to, and embrace, the new reality of webinars. The second, more substantially, is what a significant part remote and autonomous systems will play in the RAN going forward. What is encouraging is how proactive the Navy is in this field. There is more exploration of this subject in this edition. I write this Foreword on the day of the Memorial Service for the late Commodore Sam Bateman. An obituary of this remarkable naval officer and maritime strategist is on the ANI website. Sam was a very active ANI member from its outset and was an editor of the Australian Naval Review’s precursor, the ANI Journal. Sam was one of the early RAN writers on strategic affairs who saw that thinking on naval matters must be in a broader maritime and naval security context. That notion is ably reflected in the broad array of articles in this publication. Finally, I acknowledge the hard work of Captain Guy Blackburn, Sub Lieutenant Ben Page, Mrs Sue Hart and Ms Kiri Mathieson in the production of this edition. I trust you enjoy the Australian Naval Review 2020, Issue 2.
6 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 HMAS Sydney (V) Commissioning
Off the coast of New South Wales on the 18th of May, the Australia’s newest warship, HMAS Sydney (V) was commissioned. The occasion marked the first time a warship had been commissioned at sea since the Second World War.
While a traditional commissioning ceremony couldn’t be held due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN, and the Commander of the Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead, AO, RAN, were both able to join the ship at sea for the commissioning.
HMAS Sydney (V) is commanded by Commander Edward Seymour, RAN.
HMAS Sydney (V) is the final of three Hobart-class guided missile destroyers, joining sister ships HMA Ships Hobart and Brisbane.
The keel of Sydney was laid on 19 November 2015, on the 74th anniversary of HMAS Sydney III’s sinking. She was launched on 19 May 2018, by the ship’s sponsor, Mrs Judy Shalders, the wife of former Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Russ Shalders, AO, CSC, RAN (Retired).
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 7 Commander Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead, AO, RAN, presents Commanding Officer HMAS Sydney, Commander Edward Seymour, RAN, with an Australian White Ensign during the ship's commissioning ceremony at sea off the coast of NSW.Photographer : ABIS Benjamin Ricketts
HMAS Sydney (V)’s Inherited Battle Honours
RABUL 1914 ‘Emden’ 1914 NORTH SEA 1915-18 CALABRIA 1940 SPADA 1940 MEDITERRANEAN 1940-43 ‘Kormoran’ 1941 KOREA 1950-53 MALAYSIA 1964-66 VIETNAM 1965-72 KUWAIT 1991 EAST TIMOR 1999-2000 PERSIAN GULF 2001-03 IRAQ 2003
8 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 2020 Goldrick Webinar Series Remote and Autonomous Systems at Sea
With the COVID-19 pandemic forcing the cancellation of the Goldrick Seminar in its traditional form for 2020, the event moved online.
Over eight weeks in October and November, the Australian Naval Institute, in partnership with the Naval Studies Group at UNSW Canberra and the Submarine Institute of Australia, hosted the 2020 Goldrick Webinar Series, proudly sponsored by Thales Australia.
The theme for this year, chosen by the Chief of Navy, was Remote and Autonomous Systems at Sea. The day before his Keynote Address, the Chief of Navy launched Navy’s Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence 2040 Strategy, setting the scene for the next eight weeks.
Over the course of the webinar series, attendees heard from representatives from Navy, Defence’s Science & Technology and Capability & Sustainment groups, industry and academia.
Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN Keynote Address Webinar 1 (Chief of Navy) Professor Jason Scholz (Innovation Professor, RMIT) Webinar 2 Setting the Scene Commander Phil Woodward, RAN (Commanding Officer, 822X Squadron) Rear Admiral Peter Quinn, AM, CSC, RAN Future Capability and (Head Navy Capability) Webinar 3 Integration Dr John Best (Chief Technical Officer, Thales Australia) Commodore Dave Mann, CSC, RAN (Director General Surface Combatants and Webinar 4 RAS in the Air Domain Aviation) Ms Emily Hughes (Director, Phantom Works, Boeing Australia)
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 9 Commodore John Stavridis, CSC, RAN (Director General Littoral) Commodore Darron Kavanagh, CSC, RAN (Director General Combat Management Webinar 5 RAS in the Littoral Domain and Payload Systems) Captain Adam Allica, RAN (Director General Warfare Innovation Navy) Mr Arran Brown (Senior Project Manager – Maritime, Saab Australia) Commodore Tom Phillips, RAN (Director RAS in the Undersea General Submarines) Webinar 6 Domain Mr Darren Burrowes (Chief Technology Officer, Blue Zone Group) Commander Sarah Jane White, RAN (Deputy Director, Directorate of Operations and International Law) Associate Professor Douglas Guilfoyle Legal and Ethical Aspects (Professor of Environmental Politics and Webinar 7 of RAS International Relations, UNSW@ADFA) Associate Professor Kate Devitt (Chief Scientist, Trusted Autonomous Systems, Defence Cooperative Research Centre) Mr Matthew Bradley (Campaign Lead Evaluating and Sustaining – Ranges, Test and Evaluation, QinetiQ Webinar 8 RAS Capabilities Australia) Mr Neil Hodges (CEO, Blue Zone Group)
10 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 2020 Goldrick Webinar Series: Keynote Address Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN Chief of Navy This speech was delivered virtually by the Chief of Navy at the opening of the 2020 Goldrick Webinar Series on 7 October 2020.
There is no doubt this year has presented many challenges. I am pleased that the Australian Naval Institute in partnership with UNSW Canberra, and the Submarine Institute of Australia have been able to adapt the delivery method of this important annual event. In fact, I feel the delivery method, and the rate of change from traditional seminar-style presentations to virtual/digital webinars is entirely apt; considering we are gathering here today for the first of eight webinars across eighteen days to discuss Remote and Autonomous Systems at Sea.
Before I continue, I would like to acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of the lands on which we are meeting today, in Canberra it’s the ‘Ngunnawal People’, and pay my respects to their Elders past, present and emerging. I would also like to pay my respects to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Men and Women who have contributed to the defence of our great country in times of peace and conflict.
As the Chief of Navy, I have the absolute privilege to endorse each year's central topic for the Goldrick Seminar and in 2020 that’s Remote and Autonomous Systems at Sea. Which, in this unprecedent year, I think is entirely pertinent as we search for new ways to answer old problems.
I’m sure most of you would have read the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the accompanying Force Structure Plan that were released by the Prime Minister on 1 July this year. I think that both of those documents are not only pertinent to the current strategic context broadly in our region, but they also absolutely set the mark for where Navy currently is and where we’re going into the future. The rate and speed of changes in technology are driving an already technologically globalised world. There is no doubt the Indo-Pacific region is amid the most significant strategic realignment since the 1940s. Driven by increased strategic competition between world powers we, Australia, no longer have the luxury nor safety that came from the traditional geographic separation that we once enjoyed. Far from it, we are front and centre in what is fast becoming the global geopolitical melting pot. And, the playing field for these tensions is most certainly the maritime domain.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 11 It is, therefore, fundamental that our Navy is able to meet the emerging challenges of regional military modernisation, the risk of state-on-state conflict and technological disruption, to maintain our ability:
• to Shape our Maritime Environment; • to Deter actions against our national interests in the Maritime Domain; and • to Respond with credible Naval Power to defend our Nation, and National Interests.
Robotics, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, while not new to Navyand Defence, are rapidly developing, and their adoption and adaption into our strategic doctrine is now business as usual.
Yesterday, at the Maritime Environment Working Group, I had the honour and privilege of launching Navy's Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence 2040 Strategy. This strategy is a key in articulating Navy’s future, and is nested within Navy’s capstone strategic documents, Plans MERCATOR and PELORUS, and supports the achievement of Navy’s five outcomes towards Headmark 2022. The strategy outlines Navy’s commitment to RAS+AI over the next 20 years as well as sets out the challenges and opportunities that these technologies present. It also explains to Navy, our Joint Force colleagues, the broader Defence Organisation, our allies and industry, the benefits that we seek as a fighting maritime force from RAS+AI, and how we aim to realise them.
So what does RAS+AI success look like?
Our vision is "For RAS+AI to enhance the ability to Fight and Win at Sea by enhancing five fundamental effects – Force Protection, Projection, Partnering, Potential and Control."
Colloquially known as ‘4PC’, these five fundamental effects are designed to provide our forces with the tactical combat edge, which in the rapidly advancing technical theatre of today is vital to our ultimate success.
• Force Protection will utilise RAS+AI to protect our people by increasing situational awareness, providing innovative alternatives to traditional methods of maritime combat, that will ultimately keep our sailors out of harm’s way. • Force Projection will allow Navy to generate mass tempo, on a scale it otherwise could not achieve, enabling a presence in Australia’s maritime reaches that crewed platforms, on their own, could not achieve.
12 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 • Force Partnerships, Navy’s RAS+AI systems will be integrated by design with the Joint Force and prioritise interoperability with strategic partners. • Force Potential, human-machine teaming will maximise Navy's human potential by allowing us to do things better and do better things. Blended capabilities will enhance existing warfighting functions while delivering novel ways to conduct and sustain operations in the future. AI will reduce the cognitive load on our people, helping them make sense of the increasing volumes of big data to achieve improved situational awareness and deliver enhanced decision making. • Sovereign Control, an Australian common control system will support trusted human command and machine controls of multiple robotic, autonomous, intelligent assets across a coalition force in a contested environment.
In terms of the lines of effort we will draw from the strategy, it is built on the principles of a Thinking, Fighting, and Australian Navy. We must leverage these advances to also transform, and improve, our ability to Fight and Win at Sea. Four distinct lines of effort will work towards the realisation of the 4PC – namely: People, Discover, Develop and Deliver.
People, as you would expect, are a fundamental element in the ability of Navy achieving its RAS+AI strategy. Workforce transformation, training systems and the normalisation of human-machine teaming are vital elements across the life-cycle of RAS+AI systems and platforms. The ability for Navy personnel to plan for, acquire, operate and maintain these systems hinges on a deep understanding of the Australian maritime environment and RAS+AI technologies, including their limitations.
Discover and Develop relies upon the combination of, and partnership with, the whole of Defence Enterprise, Defence Industry, Strategic Partnerships and Academia. Cooperation between stakeholders in this rapidly developing field will enable us to obtain, support and lead in the research and development of emerging RAS+AI systems.
Research partnerships with academia such as the Defence Science Partnership 2.0, the Defence Science and Technology agency and collaboration around remote undersea surveillance, quantum assurance, agile command and control and battle readiness – all of these, as well as working with traditional and non-traditional industry partners will ensure we avail the best and brightest minds in Australia, confirming we are forward- leaning in this sector.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 13 Engagement with strategic partners will continue to be an integral part of our development journey. Events such as the NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative and our very own Autonomous Warrior Series will continue to enhance our ability to test and evaluate a wide array of platforms from both within Defence and external, drawing upon valuable lessons of interoperability while testing and evaluating leading systems in the physical maritime domain.
The fourth line of effort is the ultimatedelivery of RAS+AI effects in the maritime domain in synergy and support of our traditional platforms. This, of course, is not new, and as I said earlier, we, our Navy, are already operating RAS+AI systems. What will be new is the seamless interaction between our systems and the leveraging of the collective benefit in supporting Navy's ability to shape, deter and respond in the maritime domain.
Just as our people and machines must operate in teams to enhance their strengths and overcome weaknesses, we must team with Defence as a whole, industry, academia and our international partners, to achieve the potential of these technologies. My vision is for Navy, industry and academia to build upon our established transformational partnerships, allowing us to address the challenges outlined in this strategy, together.
The topic of RAS+AI is an exciting one. We wouldn’t be talking about it today if it wasn’t. And, while some of the technology has and is being developed, it’s the old iceberg model, in that the tip is only showing and it will be the ingenuity, imagination, and technical expertise of our people that will ultimately drive the creation of the unthinkable and look below the waterline at the vast potential that the RAS+AI ‘iceberg’ offers us.
This year's Goldrick Webinar Series is just one step along that journey. Across the eight webinars, you will hear from senior naval experts, industry partners and academics, all working towards the RAS+AI vision.
I encourage you to approach each presenter with an open mind. I’m delighted that we’ve got presenters and moderators from all sectors, ranging from industry, through to Defence and academia. For this topic is not one in which we look to the past for answers, we are firmly in uncharted waters. We are required to challenge the expected norms, combat the assumptions and push the technological boundaries. For, when all else fails, Australia will look to us to protect her interests and safeguard her security and prosperity. And, we will need every advantage at our disposal to Fight and Win at Sea.
14 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 2020 McNeil Prize Professor Jason Scholz
The prestigious Australian Naval Institute McNeil Prize is named in honour of Rear Admiral Percival McNeil, CB, RAN (1883-1951), one of the founding fathers of Australian shipbuilding. Rear Admiral McNeil’s contribution to both the Navy and industry is particularly noteworthy, as was his faith in Australia’s ability to build world class ships.
The McNeil Prize, instituted in 2016, is awarded to an individual or team from Australian industry who has made an outstanding contribution to the capabilities and sustainment of the RAN. Rear Admiral Percival Edwin McNeil, CB, RAN Normally presented at the Institute’s annual Vernon Parker Oration and Annual Dinner, due to COVID-19 restrictions the presentation went virtual this year.
The winner of the 2020 McNeil Prize is Professor Jason Scholz, CEO of the Defence Cooperative Research Centre – Trusted Autonomous Systems.
Professor Scholz was presented the award at a virtual ceremony on 2 December, attended by the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN, and the CEO of Lockheed Martin Australia & New Zealand, Mr Joe North.
Professor Scholz has made an outstanding contribution to Navy capability and its long-term efficacy by consistently applying his world-class expertise, Professor Jason Scholz experience and energy in the field of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 15 He took over as the CEO of the new Defence Cooperative Research Centre for Trusted Autonomous Systems in 2019, where he has been instrumental to developing business partnerships between all levels of industry and academia, working towards innovative autonomous systems and artificial intelligence.
Professor Scholz’s commitment to Navy (and the wider ADF) is reflected in his authorship of the C2 and AI strategy within Navy’s draft Program Execution Strategy. In this work, he was able to articulate a clear vision internationally that navies as a whole will be the leaders in the development of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, dealing as they do with all domains and environments.
His ongoing leadership is well recognised in Australia and internationally by Primes and many Small-Medium Enterprises. One of the leading projects for Navy which Professor Scholz has oversight of is a partnership towards rapid autonomous mine countermeasures.
The influence of Professor Scholz on future on-board combat systems, artificial intelligence and deployable autonomous systems cannot be understated, and will have profound impacts on Navy’s capability long into the future.
McNeil Prize – Previous Recipients
2016 Mr Ian Croser, AM CEA Technologies
2017 Mr Peter Evans Saab Australia
2018 Mr Andrew Whittaker Raytheon Australia Jenkins Engineering Defence Mr Peter Jenkins 2019 Systems Defence CRC - Trusted Professor Jason Scholz 2020 Autonomous Systems
16 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 From the Chief of Navy Navy's engagement with industry partners through the National Shipbuilding Enterprise Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN
In July this year, the Prime Minister, the Hon Scott Morrison MP and Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds CSC, released two capstone documents, namely the Defence Strategic Update 2020 (DSU20) and Force Structure Plan 2020 (FSP20). The strategy will see Australia focus its Defence activities on our immediate region and work with our friends, partners and allies to shape our strategic environment. The plan outlines the capabilities we will need to deter action against Australia’s interest and respond with credible military force, when required.
Importantly, the FSP20 builds on the 2016 Integrated Investment Program and commits to investing over $180 billion in Australian shipbuilding, including design, development, acquisitions, upgrade, sustainment and build projects across 23 different vessel classes. This investment will deliver the future maritime force that will operate in the most complex and contested geostrategic environment since the Second World War.
Transforming this investment into hulls and platforms afloat is a complex task that requires a national approach to delivering the right capability at the right timeto maintain Australia’s competitive edge. The Naval Shipbuilding Plan (NSP) released in 2017 outlined the Government’s commitment to transform Australia’s naval shipbuilding and sustainment industry and to build a truly sovereign capability. At PACIFC in 2019, I released Navy’s Industry Engagement Strategy in recognition of Navy’s equities in supporting the delivery and continuous shipbuilding described in the NSP.
Industry, and particularly the relationship between Defence and Industry, is one of the most critical drivers for the future success of the National Naval Enterprise and our Navy. Since becoming the Chief of Navy in 2018, I am delighted to say that Navy’s relationship with industry is as strong now as it was then, if not stronger.
We have moved away from classical transactional relationships in order to form transparent, mutual, and consistent partnerships. Through these partnerships, we’re
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 17 maintaining our competitive edge by working with industry to keep abreast of evolving technological innovations in several key technology areas.
Through a publicly released Request For Information (RFI), Navy gained more understanding of the sovereign industry capacity and maturity currently available in Australia to support the delivery of the maritime electronic warfare program. This process also helped to create a shared understanding of capability requirements across all stakeholders: Navy, Capability and Sustainment Group (CASG), industry and academia. Over 50 companies responded to the RFI with nearly half of these being wholly Australian owned. Analysis of the responses indicated the sovereign industry has strengths in the radio frequency domain and enabling technologies but was relatively weaker in electro-optical/infra-red and passive decoys. This insight will form the basis of the options provided to Government for consideration.
In order to examine options to maximise Australian industry involvement in Maritime Unmanned Aerial System (MUAS) Continuous Development Program, Defence released an Invitation to Register (ITR) in August 2020. The ITR will investigate the capabilities and capacity of industry to support, through Australian content, all elements of the acquisition and sustainment of the MUAS capability, including air vehicles, sensor payloads, integration, training and data management. As the MUAS program is based on a five-yearly block acquisition and refresh cycle, the ITR will identify opportunities for Defence to assist the Australian MUAS sector to improve participation in future blocks.
Tranche 1 of SEA 1905 Maritime Mine Countermeasures Program will seek to engage with strategic partners for the mission package elements that are central to the integrated maritime mine countermeasures. Initial market analysis indicated that, while integrated systems appear available in the international market that could perform the role of mission package, Australian industry currently can only produce elements of the solution. To keep risk levels manageable and to achieve an integrated capability, it may be that initially, a largely foreign industry-supported system will be necessary with increased Australian industry content over time. Following the initial acquisition process, a continuous ‘evergreen’ acquisition approach will be used to continuously update end-user software, hardware, and the infrastructure supporting the technology. This will provide increasing opportunities for Australian industry over the delivery and sustainment of SEA 1905. Navy will advance ideas gained through SEA 1905 to expand the use of unmanned underwater vehicles. The long term procurement and delivery program for robotics and autonomous systems, such as unmanned aerial, surface and undersea vehicles, will provide ongoing opportunities for Australian industry to grow and contribute to the delivery of future Navy mine countermeasure capability.
18 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Navy is investigating in the potential for Australian industry to design, manufacture and sustain military seaboats. Positive responses to an RFI indicated that there are a number of Australian companies with the ability to support a family of seaboats. This realisation will significantly benefit Navy by streamlining the procurement and sustainment of seaboats, as well as minimise training and currency for operators.
In addition to looking at new ways to deliver future capability, Navy and CASGare testing the traditional methods we use to deliver sustainment. Plan Galileo provides direction to support the development of an integrated continuous sustainment model underpinned by an adaptive enterprise; that is quick to respond to Navy's maintenance and modernisation requirements.
Naval shipbuilding infrastructure was justifiably listed as a separate enabler in the NSP, and industry has a large role to play in making sure the shipyards are ready to support and deliver Navy projects. I attended HMASSydney’s provisional acceptance into service ceremony at the Osborne Naval Precinct earlier this year. I was extremely impressed with the Osborne Naval Shipyard, both the facility as well as the skilled workers there who helped to deliver the Hobart Class Destroyers. Great work there has continued with the joining of two mega-blocks weighing 1,000 tonnes in total to form the complete hull of the first Arafura Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) in May this year. With the recent completion of Osborne South in September, this incredible new facility will be the centre of Australia's largest-ever shipbuilding program.
In Western Australia, the Henderson shipyard demonstrates the excellent partnership between Luerssen Australia, CIVMEC, CASG and Defence's Estate and Infrastructure Group. A significant milestone was reached in September with the keel laying of NUSHIP Pilbara, the first OPV under construction there.
2020 has been a challenging year on a number of significant fronts. I am incredibly proud of the resilience of our relationship with industry partners, whether through adaption and ingenuity during the National Bushfire Crisis or our sustained commitment during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our collective results speak volumes to the impressive inroads that have been made when Industry and Defence come together with common clarity of purpose. Navy remains committed to building upon our transformational partnership as we together work hand in hand on realising the Government's vision as detailed in FSP20. Thus, ensuring our Navy, our Defence Force and our Nation is ready to Shape our strategic environment, Deter actions against our Nation and National interest and Respond with credible military force if and when called upon to do so.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 19 Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN
Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, AO, RAN joined the RAN in 1984, trained as a seaman officer and then subsequently completed Principal Warfare Officers course and specialised in Air Direction and Above Water Warfare.
Throughout his career, he has had experience in a wide range of Navy and ADF operations through various sea and shore postings and operational roles. Highlights have included deployments to the Middle East, Southern Ocean and being the Commissioning Commanding Officer of the Anzac class frigate HMASParramatta .
He has fulfilled leadership positions at all levels of the Australian Defence Force, with senior positions including the Director of Military Strategic Commitments, Director General of Operations at Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Commander Maritime Border Command and Deputy Chief of Navy.
In June 2018, he was appointed as an Officer of the Order of Australia in recognition of his distinguished service in significant senior ADF command roles.
Vice Admiral Noonan assumed command of the RAN on 7 July 2018 and is the 32nd professional head of the Australian Navy, and the ninth officer to hold the title of Chief of Navy Australia. In this role, he is entrusted by Government to be its principal naval advisor, and to raise, train and sustain Australia’s naval forces to execute maritime missions in a dynamic region.
20 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 New Directions in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update Ms Melissa Conley Tyler and Mr Iain MacGillivray
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update was unveiled to much fanfare in July.1 Prime Minister Morrison launched the Strategic Update by comparing today's strategic environment to the 'existential threat we faced when the global and regional order collapsed in the 1930s and 1940s', bringing the need to prepare for ‘a post-COVID world that is poorer, that is more dangerous, and that is more disorderly.'2
To counter these strategic changes, military expenditure was forecast to increase from $195 billion to $270 billion over the next 10 years, with increases to long-range offensive capabilities and capability enhancements, including for the Royal Australian Navy. The rhetoric around the launch and funding announcement led to responses from some Australian foreign policy commentators that the Update represents 'the most hawkish turn in Australia's defence policy since the end of the Cold War'3 and '21st-century gunboat diplomacy'4, with Australia effectively 'beating the drums of war'.5
In fact, the Defence Strategic Update is much more modest. On resourcing, the additional funding announced is essentially an extrapolation of 2016 forecasts a further four years to provide funding certainty.6 Hugh White describes the Update as making only marginal changes to existing force development plans.7
The most interesting new directions in the Update are three changes with implications for Australia's position in the Indo-Pacific and its strategic outlook: a reformulation of the strategic objectives for defence planning, a clear statement of Australia’s prime focus on its region and the cementing of an idea of its region in which Australia isa comfortable part.
1 Minister for Defence Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds CSC. ‘Address - Australian Strategic Policy Institute’, 2 July 2020, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/speeches/speech-australian-strategic-policy- institute 2 Prime Minister the Hon Scott Morrison MP, 'Address - Launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update', news release, 1 July, 2020, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/address-launch-2020-defence-strategic-update. 3 J Camilleri, 'It’s time to strip ‘national security’ of its sacred cow status. Part 1',Pearls and Irritations, 6 July, 2020, https://johnmenadue.com/joseph-camilleri-its-time-to-strip-national-security-of-its-sacred-cow-status-part-1/. 4 M Beeson, 'Indefensible policies - Defence Strategic Update', Pearls and Irritations, 6 July, 2020, https://johnme- nadue.com/mark-beeson-indefensible-policies/#. 5 W Briggs, 'Morrison beating the drums of war', Pearls and Irritations, 5 July, 2020, https://johnmenadue.com/ morrison-beating-the-drums-of-war/. 6 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update Defence Budget Fact Sheet, https://www.defence.gov. au/StrategicUpdate-2020/docs/Factsheet_Budget.pdf 7 H White, ‘Why Australia's strategic situation is far worse than we think.’,Australian Financial Review, 6 July 2020, https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/why-australia-s-strategic-situation-is-far-worse-than-we-think- 20200705-p5594m.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 21 From geographic objectives to 'shape, deter, respond'
‘The Government has set three new strategic objectives for defence planning. These objectives replace the Strategic Defence Framework set out in the 2016 Defence White Paper. The new objectives are: to shape Australia's strategic environment; to deter actions against Australia's interests; and to respond with credible military force when required.’ 8
One of the most significant changes compared to the 2016 Defence White Paper is setting three new strategic objectives for Defence: 'shape, deter, respond'.
This is a departure from past Defence objectives which were previously defined in geographic terms. For example, the 2016 Defence White Paper lists three Defence strategic objectives:
• Deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests, and northern approaches. • Make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime South East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen their security. • Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia's interests in a rules-based global order.9
It thus listed three distinct geographic regions: Australia and its approaches, then the near region, then global threats. With the move away from geographic terminology, Defence strategic objectives are now stated in terms of a broader amorphous projection of Australia's strategic interests.
In the new formulation, the 'deter' and 'respond' objectives continue the standard aims of Australia's strategic defence policy. However, the 'shape' aspect demonstrates a shift in thinking.
Australia has now set the objective of shaping the region proactively through its defence capabilities. The Update states that this will be delivered through being an 'active and
8 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, pp. 24-25 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020). 9 Department of Defence. 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016). https://www. defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-defence-White-Paper.pdf
22 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 assertive advocate for stability, security and sovereignty' and will be facilitated through the use of 'defence diplomacy, cooperation and capacity-building activities, including delivering security-related infrastructure'.10
The use of defence capabilities as a tool for power projection is not novel, but the explicit prioritisation of it as a tool for strategically shaping the region is a new policy direction.11 The Update envisions the Australian Defence Force increasingly engaging in regional humanitarian aid projects, disaster relief and maritime security. This will have implications for material capabilities to obtain realistic outcomes.
The problem is that shaping Australia's strategic environment is a wide endeavour that includes areas that would traditionally have been viewed as diplomacy and development.12 Shaping Australia's strategic environment should be a multidimensional 'whole of nation endeavour'13 and will take more than defence capabilities alone. Realistically, to achieve desired results there will also need to be an investment in diplomacy and development approaches which Defence capabilities cannot fill.14
This suggests that Defence has an interest in working with diplomacy and development – and in advocating for a better-resourced Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – to support Defence’s efforts to shape the strategic environment.
A focus on Australia’s immediate region
‘The Government has decided that planning will focus on Australia's immediate region; ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South-West Pacific.’15
10 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 26. 11 Baldino and ACarr, 'Defence diplomacy and the Australian defence force: smokescreen or strategy?' Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 2 (2016): 140-41, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1113229. 12 M Conley Tyler, 'Australia’s Defence Strategic Update: when all you have is a hammer', East Asia Forum, 19 July, 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/07/19/australias-defence-strategic-update-when-all-you-have-is- a-hammer/; C Wahlquist, 'Australian defence force needs more funding to juggle national disasters and military role, inquiry told', The Guardian, 23 September 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/ sep/23/australian-defence-force-needs-more-funding-to-juggle-national-disasters-and-military-role-inquiry-told. 13 R Moore, 'Into the Dragon’s Mouth: The Dangers of Defence-led Foreign Policy', Australian Outlook, 10 July, 2020, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/into-the-dragons-mouth-the-dangers-of-de- fence-led-foreign-policy/. 14 Oliver, 'A budget of skewed priorities', The Interpreter, 7 October, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-inter- preter/budget-of-skewed-priorities. 15 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 21.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 23 The second notable change in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update is the strong statement that Australia will focus on its immediate region, the Indo-Pacific.
The Update marks a reorientation of Australia's strategic interests from a more global view to a more regional perspective.16 Peter Leahy describes this as a ‘robust pivot to our own backyard’.17
This moves the focus of defence from extensive expeditionary operations to a more regional worldview. According to Paul Dibb, ‘Our new defence policy proposes a decisive refocus on our own immediate region and a move away from distant operations in the Middle East, which have preoccupied us for the last 20 years.’18 It thus has a resemblance to the defence worldview of the 1970s and 80s and the priority given to the immediate neighbourhood in Australia's strategic outlook.
This is not to say that there is not a global dimension to the Strategic Update. It recognises that ‘Defence must also remain prepared to make military contributions outside of our immediate region where our interests are sufficiently engaged [...] Therefore, the ADF’s ability to deploy forces globally, where the Government chooses to do so, must be maintained’. But it states clearly that its ‘immediate region is Australia’s area of most direct strategic interest’ as well as ‘the area in which we should be most capable of military cooperation with the United States’.
An early indication that the Strategic Update means what it said is the announcement that the Australian Defence Force ‘will reduce its naval presence in the Middle East to enable more resources to be deployed in our region’, by ceasing the annual deployment of a Royal Australian Navy ship to the Middle East and not extending Australia’s commitment to the International Maritime Security Construct protecting merchant shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.19
The Update emphasises the development of relationships with regional allies such as Japan, India and Indonesia as well as security dialogues through ASEAN and other
16 H White, 'Australia’s new defence geography', East Asia Forum, 9 July, 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum. org/2020/07/09/australias-new-defence-geography/. 17 P Leahy, 'New defence plan is a robust pivot to our backyard', Australian Financial Review, 2 July 2020, https:// www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/new-defence-plan-is-a-robust-pivot-to-our-own-backyard-20200702-p558c1. 18 P Dibb, ‘Is Morrison’s Strategic Update the Defence of Australia Doctrine Reborn?’ The Strategist, 9 July, 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/is-morrisons-strategic-update-the-defence-of-australia-doctrine-reborn/ 19 Minister for Defence Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds CSC, ‘Changes to the ADF's naval presence in the Middle East’, 23 October 2020, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/lreynolds/media-releases/changes-adfs- naval-presence-middle-east
24 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 groupings like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).20 However a regional focus is not in opposition to maintaining and reinforcing the maritime rules-based order, including defending international conventions like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea within the region. 21
What is also apparent with the spotlight on the Indo-Pacific region is that Australia's security relationship with the United States is increasingly viewed within a regional perspective. A focus on the region means that expeditionary operations in multinational coalitions perhaps will not be prioritised with the same vigour as before if these operations do not align with Australia's national interest.
However, this is by no means a shift to a more independent policy for Australian defence. Despite the change of focus, there is a continued dependence on US security in the region. Given the dynamism of the Indo-Pacific, there must be questions about how far Australia will be able to provide for its security by engaging with regional powers.22 The steady-as-she-goes defence budget is also a far cry in terms of financing and material capabilities from what would be needed to entertain the idea of an entirely independent and self-sufficient Australia in defence and security.
Australia as an Indo-Pacific power
‘The Indo-Pacific is at the centre of greater strategic competition, making the region more contested and apprehensive […] The government has directed Defence to implement a new strategic policy framework that signals Australia's ability and willingness to project military power and deter actions against us.’23
The third notable element of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update is in the way that it cements the idea of Australia’s place in its region in policy discourse.
For decades, there was a heated debate on whether Australia was or was not part of Asia. Discussions around Australia's place in Asia for a long-time placed Australia as an outsider to the identity and dynamics of the region.
20 A Greene and S Dziedzic, 'Australia to rejoin ‘quad’ naval exercises in move certain to infuriate Beijing', Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 20 October 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-20/australia-rejoins-na- val-exercise-in-move-certain-to-anger-china/12784186. 21 See for more information on Australia and other regional powers strategy Rebecca Strating,Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order: Regional Responses to the South China Sea disputes, Policy Studies, (Honolulu: East- West Center, 2020). 22 See H White, 'Great Expectations: Can Australia depend on its neighbours',Australian Foreign Affairs, October, 2020. 23 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, pp. 5-6.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 25 Reformulating the description of the regional strategic environment as the Indo-Pacific means that defence policymakers now comfortably see Australia within its region, a region that is at the centre of strategic competition. The Indo-Pacific terminology has superseded these older debates.24
Australia now sees itself as an active player in the dynamics and ever-changing power balances of its region. The Update positions Australia as an Indo-Pacific power (albeit a middle one) that can play an active part in the region rather than seeing the region as something to defend Australia against.
Towards a maritime worldview?
It’s interesting to reflect on whether the three major changes in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update – shaping the strategic environment, focusing on the immediate region and seeing Australia firmly as a part of its region – represent a trend towards what might be seen as a more maritime worldview.
Certainly the Update recognises that practical regional maritime-based operations and engagement are a way of addressing the complex dynamics of an ever-changing Indo- Pacific region to shape the region. Equally, the shift to a focus on the immediate region, away from land-based expeditionary operations, means that the Update is more maritime both in its strategic outlook and capacity development: the Update identifies maritime capability investment, rather than land operations, as the largest single area for defence capability development.25 Finally, positioning Australia as an integral Indo-Pacific power is consonant with a maritime worldview. The Update places Australia between its two oceans at the centre of regional dynamics.
The Indo-Pacific will continue to be a contested strategic environment. An important way Australia can contribute is through its naval power. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update may come to be seen as an important step in viewing defence strategy through a maritime lens.
24 M Tyler, 'The Indo-Pacific is the New Asia',The Interpreter, 28 June, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-in- terpreter/indo-pacific-new-asia. 25 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, p. 35.
26 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Ms Melissa Conley Tyler
Melissa Conley Tyler is a Research Fellow in the Asia Institute of The University of Melbourne, transferring from her role as Director of Diplomacy at Asialink. She came to the University after serving as National Executive Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) for 13 years. Under her leadership, the AIIA was recognised as the Top Think Tank in Southeast and the Pacific and one of the top 50 think tanks worldwide in the University of Pennsylvania’s Global Go To Think Tanks Index for three years running. In 2017, she co-authored Think Tank Diplomacy, the first-ever book length discussion of the role of think tanks in modern diplomacy. Melissa has extensive experience promoting international debate through Track II dialogues involving academics, government officials, media and business. She is a prolific commentator with expertise in Australian foreign policy, Australia’s key relationships across Asia and diplomatic practice.
Mr Iain MacGillivray
Iain is a doctoral candidate, researcher, and foreign policy analyst with over with twelve years’ experience in Australia and overseas and has expertise in Middle Eastern politics and security, along with detailed knowledge of international affairs in the Indo-Pacific. He currently works as a researcher, teaching associate and academic at the University of Melbourne, Australia, and has authored articles in reputable journals and in think tanks on issues related to the Middle East, China, Australia and the United States. Iain has presented his work at a range of Universities, think-tanks and public institutions. He also regularly provides commentary on matters relating to foreign policy and international relations on ABC, BBC and other international media outlets.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 27 28 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 War at Sea in the Age of Artificial Intelligence Dr Peter Layton
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become rather fashionable amongst defence forces globally. Many have devised elaborate AI strategies and plans. In general, these look inwards, aiming to set out how AI will be researched, acquired and introduced into their specific service.1 This article aims to modestly complement these larger strategies and plans by instead looking outwards to place AI within the wider business of warfighting. In particular, the article focusses upon some impacts AI could have on making war at sea.
In the near-to-medium term AI’s principal attraction for military forces is its ability to quickly identify patterns and detect items hidden within very large data troves. The principal consequence of this is that AI will make it much easier to detect, localise and identity objects across the battlespace. Hiding will become increasingly difficult.
However, AI is not perfect. It has well known problems in being able to be fooled, in being unable to transfer knowledge gained in one task to another and being dependent on data. The difficulties with AI are such that for practical purposes AI must be teamed with humans. The upside to this is that the strengths of AI then counterbalance the weakness in human cognition and vice versa: human strengths offset AI shortcomings. For example, world chess champion Garry Kasparov observed of a chess tournament involving human-machine teams that: ‘Teams of human plus machine dominated even the strongest computers. Human strategic guidance combined with the tactical acuity of a computer was overwhelming. We could concentrate on strategic planning instead of spending so much time on calculations. Human creativity was even more paramount under these conditions.’2
In buzz word terms, AI’s main warfighting utility appears ‘find and fool’. AI with its machine learning is excellent at finding items concealed within a high clutter background.
1 An example is the Royal Australian’s Navy’s RAS-AI Strategy 2040 released in early October 2020. In this docu- ment, four lines of effort (LOE) are set out to address “many of the common challenges that RAS-AI adoption faces and key enablers that it will require. These include training and workforce transformation; research & development; and building collaborative partnerships with industry and allies to design and demonstrate RAS-AI capabilities.” The strategy is available at: https://navalinstitute.com.au/wp-content/uploads/RAN_WIN_RA-< SAI_Strategy_2040f.pdf >. 2 Garry Kasparov, ‘The Chess Master and the Computer’, The New York Review of Books, 11 February 2010,
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 29 In this role AI is better than humans and tremendously faster. On the other hand, AI can be fooled through various means. AI’s great ‘find’ capabilities lack robustness.3
AI’s finding abilities moreover provide mobile systems a new level of autonomy. The AI can analyse its surroundings to allow confidently moving within it, for example the US Navy’s AI-enabled Sea Hunter sailed autonomously from California to Hawaii and back again.4 Accordingly, both the ‘find and fool’ tasks can be undertaken using mobile and at-rest AI-enabled systems featuring varying levels of autonomy. AI can consequently bring to modern warfighting enhanced sensors, better data fusion, improved command and control, upgraded kinetic and non-kinetic kill systems, more convincing deception techniques and very many ways to confuse.
In this, it is necessary to remember that AI is not a stand-alone actor, rather it works in combination with numerous other digital technologies. It enlivens these technologies, giving them a form of cognition. AI is therefore a general purpose technology, steadily becoming all-pervasive across society not least through the ubiquitous smartphones. In a similar way, AI will progressively infuse most military machines and systems. This general purpose nature means AI is likely to be initially employed within existing operational thinking. For the foreseeable future, AI will enable the battlefield not remake it.
Wayne Hughes in his seminal book on naval tactics highlights the importance of good scouting. It is ‘more than manoeuvre, as much as weapon range, and often as much as anything else’ the determining factor in war at sea.5 However, accurately ascertaining where ships are in vast ocean battlespaces has never been easy. A great constant of such maritime surveillance is that there never seems to be enough. Against this past, a great trend since the early 20th century is that maritime surveillance technology is steadily improving.6
AI looks set to significantly deepen this great trend, at least in part by bringing Internet of Things (IoT) sensors into general use. Recognising this, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s novel Ocean of Things (OoT) program seeks maritime
3 Peter Layton, Algorithmic Warfare: Applying Artificial Intelligence to Warfighting, Canberra: Air Power Develop- ment Centre, 2018, pp.12-14, 20-23. See also: Aaron Holmes, “These clothes use outlandish designs to trick facial recognition software into thinking you're not human”, Business Insider, 13 October 2019,< https://www. businessinsider.com.au/clothes-accessories-that-outsmart-facial-recognition-tech-2019-10?r=US&IR=T> 4 Jurica Dujmovic, Drone warship Sea Hunter of the U.S. Navy is powered by artificial intelligence, MarketWatch, 3 July 2019,
30 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 situational awareness over large ocean areas through deploying thousands of small, low-cost floats that form a distributed sensor network. Each smart float has a suite of commercially available sensors to collect environmental and activity data; the latter involves automatically detecting, tracking and identifying nearby ships and potentially close aircraft traffic. The floats use edge processing with trained detection algorithms and then transmit the semi-processed data periodically via the Iridium satellite constellation to a cloud computing network for on-shore handling. Real-time analysis using AI machine learning then uncovers insights from the sparse data.7 The OoT concept suggests what is feasible using AI.
In addition to floats, there are numerous other low-cost AI-enabled mobile devices that could noticeably expand maritime situational awareness including: the EMILY Hurricane Trackers, Ocean Aero Intelligent Autonomous Marine Vehicles, Seaglider Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, Liquid Robotics Wave Gliders and Australia’s Ocius Technology Bluebottles.8 In addition to these autonomous surface and sub-surface devices plying the seas there is an increasing number of smallsats being launched into low earth orbit to form large constellations. Most of these smallsats will use AI and edge commuting; some will be able to detect naval vessels using imaging or electronic sensors.9
All this data from new sources can be combined with that from the existing large array of traditional maritime surveillance systems ranging across space-based systems, aircraft, surface ships and undersea sensors. The latest system into service is the long-endurance MQ-4C Triton uncrewed aerial vehicle with detection capabilities able to be enhanced through retrofitting AI.10 The next advance may be the USN’s proposed 8000km range, AI-enabled Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel which could cruise autonomously at sea for two months with a surveillance payload. 11
7 Ocean of Things, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 31 With so many current and emerging maritime surveillance systems the idea of a digital ocean is becoming practical. This concept envisages the ‘big’ data from thousands of persistent and mobile sensors being analysed by AI neural networks trained over time through machine learning and then fused to form a detailed, ocean-spanning, three- dimensional comprehensive digital model. Oceans remain large expanses making this a difficult challenge. However, a detailed near-real time digital model of smaller spaces such as enclosed waters like the South China Sea, national littoral zones or limited ocean areas of specific import appears practical using current and near-term technology.
As this hints at, a key factor in being able to develop a digital ocean is having considerable background data of the desired area, preferably built up over a long period of time across different oceanic and climatic conditions. With such data, a deep understanding can be gained that allows the AI processing to quickly and reliably detect changes in the environment and, in particular, movement of naval forces within it. On the AI-enabled battlefield, pre-conflict data collection and analysis lays the foundation for later combat success.
Being able to create a digital ocean model may prove revolutionary. William Williamson of the USN Naval Postgraduate School declares: ‘On the “observable ocean”, the Navy must assume that every combatant will be trackable, with position updates occurring many times per day … the Navy will have lost the advantages of invisibility, uncertainty, and surprise. […] Vessels will be observable in port [with] the time of departure known to within hours or even minutes. This is true for submarines as well as for surface ships.’12 In a future major conflict, the default assessment by each warship’s captain may need to be that the adversary probably knows the ship’s location.
Moreover, the digital ocean model construct and its underlying data could also change thinking on command and control flows. Today the most commonly used is John Boyd’s OODA loop that steps though ‘observe, orient, decide, act’.13 This flow is inherently backward looking in time; an observation cannot be made until after the event has occurred. AI brings a subtle shift.
With suitable data about the opponent, the friendly force and the operating environment, AI can predict the future actions an adversary might take and from this insight, the actions the friendly force could take to counter these. Such predictions can be made by
12 Williamson, op.cit. 13 David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis”, pp. 357-398 in Phillip S. Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven The Evolution of Airpower Theory, USAF Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Univer- sity Press, 1997, pp.363-370.
32 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 combining the sensor-informed digital ocean model that highlights where the adversary forces are in near-real time with modelling of both side’s capabilities and performance. Such force-on-force modelling is another important pre-conflict task.
A new AI-enabled decision making cycle might then be ‘sense, predict, agree, act’: AI ‘senses’ the environment by analysing the incoming data from many different sensors; AI ‘predicts’ what the adversary might do and thus what future friendly force employment should be; the human part of the human-machine team ‘agrees’ with the AI’s assessment; and the AI ‘acts’ by sending machine-to-machine instructions out to the various friendly forces involved.14
This all cuts both ways. AI is a commercial technology that has widely proliferated. Any assumption that the adversary is not also benefiting from AI appears unwise. With both sides likely to have devised digital ocean models, the importance of deception and confusion operations significantly increases. This ‘fool’ function of AI may become as vital as the ‘find’ function. In the war-at-sea, the multiple AI-enabled systems deployed across the battlespace offer numerous possibilities for fooling the adversary.
Deception involves reinforcing the perceptions or expectations of an adversary commander and then doing something else. However, its effectiveness is rather uncertain as the thinking of the other commander will always be somewhat unknown. Even so, in being a low risk tactic, it’s worth employing whether or not it works. In this, multiple false clues need seeding as some will be missed by an adversary and having more than one only adds to the deception’s credibility.15 For example, a number of uncrewed surface vessels could set sail as a warship leaves port, all actively transmitting a noisy facsimile of the warship’s electronic and acoustic signatures. The digital ocean may then suggest to the commander multiple identical warships are at sea, creating some uncertainty as to which is real or not.
In terms of confusion, the intent might be not to avoid detection as this might be very difficult but instead prevent an adversary from classifying vessels detected as warships or identifying them as a specific class of warship. This might be done using some of the large array of AI-enabled floaters, gliders, autonomous devices, underwater vehicles and uncrewed surface vessels to considerably confuse the digital ocean picture. The aim would be to change the empty oceans - or at least the operational area - into a
14 A broadly similar command and control flow is discussed in: Bryan Clark, Dan Patt and Harrison Schramm,Mosa- ic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence And Autonomous Systems To Implement Decision-Centric Operations, Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020, pp.35-40. 15 Hughes and Girrier, op.cit., p.251.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 33 seemingly crowded, cluttered, confusing environment where detecting and tracking the real sought-after warships is problematic and, at best, fleeting. If AI can find targets, AI can also obscure them.
The AI-enabled battlespace can create a different war-at-sea. Most obvious might be the robotic autonomous systems and vessels made possible by AI and edge computing. However, the biggest change may be to advance the steady scouting improvements of the last century or so to their final conclusion. AI, machine learning, big data, the IoT and cloud computing appear set to create the ‘observable ocean’. From combining these technologies, near-real digital models of the ocean environment could be made that starkly highlight the man-made artefacts present. In an AI-enabled battlespace, warships might become the prey as much as the hunters.
Dr Peter Layton
Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He has extensive aviation and defence experience and, for his work at the Pentagon on force structure matters, was awarded the US Secretary of Defense’s Exceptional Public Service Medal. He has a doctorate from the University of New South Wales on grand strategy and has taught on the topic at the Eisenhower College, US National Defense University. His research interests include grand strategy, national security policies particularly relating to middle powers, defence force structure concepts and the impacts of emerging technology. The author of ‘Grand Strategy’, his posts, articles and papers may be read at: https://peterlayton.academia.edu/research.
34 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Confused Seas: Searching for Maritime Security in an Insecure World Lieutenant Commander Jimmy Drennan, USN
In 2008, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass, argued the world was entering an Age of Nonpolarity. He suggested the world had progressed from the bipolar Cold War era, past the unipolarity that followed the United States’ victory, and even the multipolar era of multiple competing nation states that many believed had emerged in the early 21st century. Although Haass underestimated the rise of China, more than a decade later many of his assertions prove remarkably prescient. He identified cross-border flows (e.g., information, disease, people, energy, and lawful and unlawful goods) as a primary driver of power diffusion, and the importance of pragmatic diplomacy to form situational partnerships based on common interests. Haass’ nonpolar world depicted an international system governed by an undefined number of power brokers – none of whom would be able to establish enduring influence or leadership over the system itself. Much like a ship rocked by waves coming from all about, caused by strong, rapid shifts in wind direction, the international system is experiencing turmoil as a lack of global leadership exacerbates a number of destabilising conditions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the maritime sector.1
Almost all nations have a shared interest in international maritime security, but absent global leadership, individual actors myopically pursuing their own interests are making the seas less secure. The global economy depends on the free flow of shipping through key waterways and the world’s major ports, yet a few coastal states or even small militias could threaten access to these critical chokepoints. State and non-state actors alike exploit weakly governed waters for illicit gain, wreaking havoc on local economies. Beneath the sea floor, massive stores of natural resources invite confrontation among governments that claim dominion under various laws and precedents. Then, there is the ubiquitous power struggle between the United States and China that permeates all of these issues. The specter of armed conflict at sea affects all maritime nations.
Leadership is necessary to steady this tumultuous international system, and since it may be impossible for a single nation to consistently influence the system in Haass’ nonpolar world, groups of nations and actors with common interests must form as needed. While it is impossible to achieve unanimity on any issue in international affairs, the idea that the high seas should be free for use by all is worth defending.
1 R Haass, ‘The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, no. 3, 2008, pp. 44–56.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 35 The Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) exists to foster discussion on securing the seas. Granted, not all of the world’s problems can be solved with dialogue, but without it, solutions often tend to be messy, wasteful, and sometimes tragic. Just as confused seas will eventually yield to a prevailing weather system, today’s turbulent maritime security environment will certainly give way to the most dominant forces. Whether those forces are aligned with the principles most maritime nations share is decidedly less so. CIMSEC aims to facilitate the exchange of international perspectives in order to help establish organizing principles under which groups of likeminded nations and actors can pursue maritime security.
Contributors to Maritime Insecurity
Perhaps the largest contributor to today’s maritime insecurity is the burgeoning competition between the United States and China. The ascendance of China isnot necessarily to blame, but rather the fact that neither country seems particularly motivated to assume global maritime leadership, outside of escalatory naval activities and a burgeoning missile arms race. At the 2020 Singapore Summit in September, foreign policy and economic experts discussed how ‘a leaderless and divided world will be the new normal’. Ngaire Woods, Dean of the University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government, argued the struggle between the United States and China creates ‘an opportunity for other countries to start playing off those superpowers and push further for the changes they've been wanting’.2 This is leading to instability in the maritime sector, and leadership will be required to unite these individual interests into actual progress. As John Konrad, founder of gCaptain.com, put it recently, ‘American shipping interests are an anemic … waste’ and ‘the shipping world is failing’ as a result of ‘a total lack of … leadership’.3 The United States uses preservation of the ‘rules-based international order’ as a rallying cry, yet refuses to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea due to dubious fears of sovereignty infringement. Meanwhile, China appears more concerned with power and wealth accumulation, rather than global leadership, as its Foreign Minister recently stated China has ‘no intention of becoming another United States’.4
2 Y Lee, ‘The U.S. is still a dominant power — but it’s not clear if it remains the global leader’, CNBC [www.cnbc. com], 17 September 2020,
36 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 In fact, China is directly contributing to instability with the activities of its commercial fishing fleet worldwide. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is quickly emerging as a major problem for littoral economies, depleting a resource that has long provided for millions. Without effective international governance mechanisms, illegal fishing and other maritime crime (not just by China) could easily escalate regional tensions into conflict. In the Arctic, tensions are exacerbated as actual changes to the physical environment complicate the geopolitical environment. In Europe, entirely different factors are pressurising the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, as Turkey competes with its neighbors over claims to abundant subsurface hydrocarbon resources, and threatens to rewrite the rules for international access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits.
The COVID-19 pandemic is of course driving enormous instability in the maritime sector. The 2015 migration crisis, which fueled such deep division in areas like the Mediterranean and Andaman Seas, threatens to resurface. Asyura Salleh, Special Adviser for maritime security to the Yokosuka Council for Asia-Pacific Studies, writes that Myanmar’s ‘increased violence is causing mounting civilian fatalities, displacing villagers and pushing migrants out to the Andaman Sea’ while neighboring ‘countries reject migrants for fear of spreading unidentified infections’.5 Opportunistic elements are also taking advantage of global preoccupation with the pandemic and a perceived gap in ocean governance to pursue maritime crime and illicit activities. For example, as of August 2020, piracy and sea robbery incidents in Asia rose by 38 per cent over 2019.6 Furthermore, the pandemic’s economic impact is not only damaging the maritime industry, but it is also forcing countries around the world to divert funds away from national defense, creating more space for instability and maritime insecurity. Aristyo Rizka Darmawan of the Center for Sustainable Ocean Policy at the Faculty of Law University of Indonesia writes:
These effects are already being felt in the realm of maritime security. Indonesia has announced nearly $590 million in cuts to its defense budget. This significant budget reallocation from the defense sector will have a direct impact on the budget of the navy, which is at the forefront of Indonesia’s maritime security and maritime domain awareness. And Indonesia is far from alone—many countries in Asia have cut their 2020 defense budgets in response to Covid-19. Thailand, for instance, has cut its defense budget by $555 million. Other key maritime
5 A Salleh, ‘COVID-19 accelerates maritime insecurity in the Asia–Pacific’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute [www.aspistrategist.org.au], 27 July 2020,
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 37 countries in the region such as Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are also facing the same constraints.7
Bucking the trend, Australia actually raised its defense budget by A$1 billion as part of a COVID-19 economic stimulus package, reflecting a strategic recognition of the need to support regional security in the Indo-Pacific. 8
Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas
Amidst all of these destabilising conditions, CIMSEC seeks to foster international discussion as a catalyst for desperately needed leadership in maritime security. In the spring of 2020, CIMSEC initiated Project Trident, a year-long series of topics covering the future of international maritime security. For each topic, CIMSEC partnered with leading maritime organisations to solicit articles from the CIMSEC community, and featured subject matter experts on its Sea Control Podcast. Project Trident is ongoing, but the results so far are encouraging. The first three topics have produced 45 articles filled with creative, thought-provoking ideas, which in the aggregate, begin to set the conditions for collaborative leadership and illuminate a path toward improved maritime security.
First, Project Trident set the geopolitical stage with the Chokepoints and Littorals Topic
Chokepoints and littorals magnify the influence of nearby states, or even non-state actors, who are traditionally viewed as less influential than global powers. Yet in times of conflict or crisis, it is global powers who could very well come to depend on these littoral nations for critical support and access, nations whose political sensitivities can powerfully constrain diplomatic, economic, and military options. For example, Colonel Kim Gilfillan, Commander of the Royal Australian Army’s Landing Force, discussed on the Sea Control Podcast how the ability to project power into the Indo-Pacific littorals is crucial to Australia’s economic prosperity and national security strategy.9
7 A Darmawan, ‘COVID-19 and Indonesia’s Maritime Security Challenges’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative [www.amti.csis.org], 4 June 2020, https://amti.csis.org/covid-19-and-indonesias-maritime-security-challeng-< es/>. 8 C Packham, ‘Australia boosts defence spending in latest COVID-19 stimulus’, Reuters [www.reuters.com], 26 August 2020,
38 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The world is also witnessing major changes that are redefining the chokepoint and its value. For example, Turkey’s plans to build the Istanbul Canal to bypass the Bosporus Strait between the Marmara and Black Seas could alter the regional balance of power by giving Turkey greater control over which nations can access the Black Sea. In fact, Paul Pryce, the Principal Advisor to the Consul General of Japan in Calgary, suggests ‘the Istanbul Canal may have been introduced to circumvent the Montreux Convention’, the longstanding international agreement that regulates naval access to the Aegean and Black Seas through the Turkish Straits.10 To the north, the Arctic is melting away, revealing a complex mosaic of chokepoints and littorals that will lend themselves toward new lines of communication for global commerce, as well as new zones of competition. Robert C Rasmussen, a Foreign Affairs Specialist with the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, recommends a three-fold policy for the United States to shape the Arctic: increase funding for scientific research; invest with allies inthe economic development of the Northwest Passage to compete with the Russia-dominant Northern Sea Route; and establish NATO military superiority over the Greenland-Iceland- UK Gap and Aleutian Islands. Rasmussen astutely notes ‘promoting consensus prevents room for conflict’.11
Next, Project Trident continued with the Ocean Governance Topic
Maritime powers are employing hybrid tactics that seek to exploit the seams of legal frameworks and norms that constitute ocean governance. Non-state actors such as pirates, smugglers, and others are constantly innovating to advance nefarious activity. On the Sea Control podcast, Professor Christian Bueger described the need for a ‘Blue Crime’ framework that integrates all of these activities to help states more effectively govern the maritime domain.12 Indeed, the trends are troubling. Dr Ian Ralby, Michael Jones, and Errington Shurland used a variety of maritime domain awareness techniques to show that maritime crime in the Caribbean Sea has actually increased amid an overall drop in legitimate activity during the COVID-19 pandemic. They concluded that ‘maritime criminality is relatively unimpeded by the restrictions that have curtailed legal activities during the pandemic,’ and ‘economic hardship may in fact be a growing driver for illicit activity’.13
10 P Pryce, ‘Let Me Get this Strait: the Turkish Straits Question Revisited’, CIMSEC [www.cimsec.org], 1 June 2020,
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 39 The rules and standards that underpin good order on the high seas must keep pace with those who are keen to exploit them. For example, illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing is rapidly emerging as a major driver of instability. According to US Naval Academy Professor Dr Claude Berube, 40 per cent of the world’s population relies on fish as a protein source, and 20 per cent of global fish is caught illegally (worth as much as US$23.5 billion).14 Though not the only culprit, China’s fishing fleet is the world’s most aggressive and is fishing contested waters throughout Asia, Africa, South America, and elsewhere. If revised regimes and norms cannot restore the world’s fisheries, dwindling fish stocks may trigger conflict in regions already suffering from tension. US Marine Corps Captain Walker Mills points to the late 20th century Cod Wars between allied Iceland and the United Kingdom as an example that fisheries can be, in the eyes of some, sufficient justification to go to war.15 Likewise, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing could be an ideal catalyst for multiple nations to pool enough resources and national will to provide a stabilizing influence on maritime security, banding together and pushing back against economically and environmentally destructive behavior. On the Sea Control podcast, the Pew Research Center’s Gina Fiore and Greg Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies note that the world’s exclusive economic zones are far too vast for individual states to patrol and enforce jurisdiction on their own, even with contributions from larger navies. States must employ information sharing agreements like Fish-i Africa, a partnership of eight African countries to fight illegal fishing in the Western Indian Ocean, and commercial remote sensing services such as OceanMind to improve maritime domain awareness and tackle this growing issue.16
Most recently, Project Trident ran a Regional Strategies Topic to examine small and medium maritime powers
The global competition between the United States and China is having a profound effect on smaller powers who, in today’s chaotic maritime security environment, can in turn disproportionately influence geopolitics by seizing the opportunity to advance their own interests. For example, Turkey is leveraging its relative superiority in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to claim ownership of contested hydrocarbon resources beneath the seabed. Retired US Naval War College Professor of Maritime Security Andrew Norris and his son, Alexander, explain that ‘this hegemonic strategy, domestically referred to as “Mavi Vatan” or “blue homeland” … manifested itself in Turkey’s deployment of the seismic
14 C Berube, ‘Stand up a Joint Interagency Task Force to Fight Illegal Fishing’, CIMSEC [www.cimsec.org], 21 July 2020,
40 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 vessel Oruç Reis with a naval escort to disputed waters south and west of Cyprus’, which led to a collision between Greek and Turkish frigates. Turkey appears to be exploiting a vacuum in maritime leadership and although it faces international condemnation, one wonders if it would even attempt to execute Mavi Vatan, particularly against a fellow NATO member, if the United States were not preoccupied elsewhere. Ultimately, all of the nations involved have an interest in avoiding conflict and have expressed a desire to negotiate; however, resolution will likely require Turkey to accommodate the Republic of Cyprus (which it does not recognize).17 This is a prime example of how the leadership of a few likeminded nations could advance international maritime security.
Finally, India’s strategy for securing the Indian Ocean has taken the limelight due to the confluence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the June 2020 border skirmish with China in the Galwan Valley of the Himalayan mountains. David Scott of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies writes:
Paradoxically, though COVID-19 has weakened India’s economic ability to fund its naval infrastructure and assets program for the Indian Ocean, it has enabled India to strengthen its links with Indian Ocean micro-states through the humanitarian assistance delivered by the Navy. Meanwhile, land confrontation with China at Galwan has encouraged India to deepen its military links with other maritime powers operating in the Indian Ocean.18
Even though the pandemic has hindered India’s naval buildup, its apparent willingness to contest Chinese aggression and act as a guarantor of maritime security in the Indian Ocean have attracted international partners. On the Sea Control Podcast, Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow and the Head of Maritime Policy at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, and Collin Koh, Research Fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, point to the strategic value of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Already used by the Indian Navy, these two chains of 572 islands in the eastern Indian Ocean could serve as international economic and naval outposts with southeast Asian partners, providing a key opportunity for cooperative maritime security.19 Meanwhile, India’s cooperation with other international partners has accelerated recently, highlighted by separate trilateral
17 A Norris; A Norris, ‘Turkey’s “Mavi Vatan” Strategy and Rising Insecurity in the Eastern Mediterranean’, www.cim- sec.org, 18 September 2020,
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 41 talks with Australia, France, Japan, and possibly Indonesia, and an invitation for Australia to join Naval Exercise ‘Malabar’ with India, the United States, and Japan. The increased cooperation between India and Australia reflect a mutual strategy of extending maritime security throughout their respective areas of influence and, as David Scott points out, ‘it reduces naval dependence on just cooperation channeled via the United States’.20 This is a prudent approach, especially if one accepts the premise that the world has transitioned from a unipolar, or even multipolar, to a nonpolar era.
Conclusion
Regardless of how many poles comprise the international system today, the turbulence and insecurity in the maritime sector clearly point to a crisis in leadership. Thetwo most capable candidates, the United States and China, seem to have other priorities in mind, and regional powers like India and Turkey adapt to or exploit the leadership void. Combined with the COVID-19 pandemic and hybrid challenges to longstanding ocean governance regimes, including smuggling, migration, piracy, and illegal fishing, these factors could be a recipe for disaster. And as 21st century great power competition begins to take shape, one can look to the world’s maritime chokepoints and littorals for potential flashpoints.
Building consensus based on common interests will be critical to advancing maritime security in such a volatile world. Free and open exchange of ideas is the first step, and CIMSEC will always use its platform to foster discussion on securing the seas. To this end, Project Trident will continue in 2021, addressing topics such as maritime cybersecurity, infrastructure and trade, and emerging technologies. The project will not produce maritime security straight away, but CIMSEC hopes it will expose the ideas and generate the dialogue necessary to align maritime powers to the goal of free, safe, and secure seas.
20 D Scott, ‘India’s Strategy for the Indian Ocean in Light of COVID-19 and Confrontation with China’, www.cimsec. org, 24 September 2020,
42 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Lieutenant Commander Jimmy Drennan, USN
Jimmy Drennan is the President of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and a United States Naval Officer. As President of CIMSEC, he leads a team of 21 volunteers, whose hard work makes maritime security initiatives like Project Trident and the CIMSEC Podcast Network possible. His tours at sea include Navigator aboard USS Anzio (CG 68), and Operations Officer aboard USSGettysburg (CG 64). He has published several articles in various professional journals, including the Naval War College Review and US Naval Institute Proceedings. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, earning a Master of Science in Systems Engineering, and graduated with High Honors from the Georgia Institute of Technology with a Bachelor’s of Science in Industrial and Systems Engineering.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 43 The ANI gratefully acknowledges the ongoing support of our Sponsors.
44 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Legal, Ethical and Social Considerations for Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence (RAS AI): What the Royal Australian Navy should consider in its RAS AI Strategy Commander Paul Davidson, RAN and Lieutenant Commander Jane Tsakissiris, RAN
‘I’m very sorry’, the drone said, without a trace of contrition. (Sci-Fi author Iain Banks, 2012)
For all their high-tech sophistication, the drones and robots powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) that are likely to be part of future warfare, elicit both positive and negative responses. Robots and autonomous systems (RAS) are claimed to offer significant potential operational advantages. These include reduced cost, longer range, better mission accomplishment through speed of decision making, precision, and immunity to chemical and biological counterforces. More importantly, they offer the potential benefit of distancing the human warfighter from personal harm. They are unable to match humans in creative problem solving and interpersonal relationships. Depending on the degree of autonomy and human involvement, RAS are undistracted by such factors as frustration and fatigue. They do not bring personal bias and prejudice to the task, and they are able to integrate vast amounts of complex data across numerous systems faster than we can. This they do without the stereotyping and intellectual short cuts that degrade our decision making. It is possible that they may also be able to prosecute war without the human atrocities caused by ethical violations, and with fewer civilian casualties.1
Reaper Drone
Autonomous Weapon Systems
While civilian robots build our cars and clean our floors, they become more complex and sophisticated, and pose greater ethical challenges, when we imbue them with artificial intelligence, to make decisions autonomously (RAS AI). This is particularly so when they
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 45 become weapon systems. An autonomous weapon system is ‘based on conclusions derived from gathered information and pre-programmed constraints, (and may be) capable of independently selecting and engaging targets’.2 This paper explores some of the legal, ethical and social considerations that pertain to the strategic use of RAS AI in the military context.
Developments in RAS AI have also brought new legal, ethical and social challenges in the use of technology in warfare. These relate to issues of trust and responsibility for decision making. In particular, there is concern about decisions for a weapon system to engage a target being made without a human ‘in the loop’.
The sentry gun is an example of an autonomous weapon system, at sea or on land, that is able to select and Phalanx Close-In Weapon System engage its own target without human intervention, at a range exceeding two kilometres. It can be deployed to detect human movement (e.g. in a DMZ) and take down the target within seconds, totally autonomously.
Many people conceive of robots in the manner of ‘The Terminator’ and ‘Robocop’ made famous by sci-fi movies, as ruthless, mechanistic, and brutal. They fear them as weapons that are beyond human control and prone to fatal error. Others point to their continuing existence and the trend to their increased use as inevitable, if regrettable. Movies such as ‘Eye in the Sky’ explored the moral conundrums in drone operations.
While robotics and autonomous systems may be efficient and effective, their development has brought questions about compliance with the laws of armed conflict. With artificial intelligence, the decision to launch lethal force may be made in the field by the autonomous system itself, with either minimal or even no human involvement. Their use thus becomes an ethical, legal, and social as well as a technological issue.3
On the one hand, robots do not forget orders, or let emotions drive decision making. A characteristic of robots and autonomous systems is that they sense input, make decisions based on principles and reasoning, and act with variable degrees of autonomy. In moral philosophy, the concept of autonomy invokes the notion of being able to decide with
3 J Galliott, J., & T McFarland, ‘Autonomous Systems in a Military Context (Part 2): A Survey of the Ethical Issues’. International Journal of Robotics and Technologies, 4(2) 2016. doi:10.4018/IJRAT.2016070104
46 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 ethical consequence and act responsibly for the greater social good. In relation to robots and autonomous systems, the questions then occur: ‘Is it the right decision? How was the decision made?’ If the autonomous system makes the decision without direct human involvement, who, if anyone, is responsible for the decision?
Legal Compliance
Technological advances have made it likely that future wars will be fought with the extensive involvement of robots and autonomous systems. This prospect has attracted strong criticism from many quarters about the legal implications. One opponent advocated that ‘within the framework of the UN Weapons Convention, in the case of critical decisions, the highest possible degree of human control is required, and completely autonomous lethal weapons systems should be banned by regulations binding under international law’. 4 The trend to weaponisation of robots and autonomous systems in warfare appears to be technologically inevitable. The argument turns on the degree of autonomy. It brings questions of moral responsibility which must be answered unequivocally, and definitely not neglected. In addressing the legality of robotics and autonomous systems, it has been pointed out that ‘the impossibility of punishing [the] machine means that we cannot hold the machine responsible’.5 Are we to hold accountable the code writer, or the operator, or the government that employs them and owns the asset?
The matter of trustworthiness is significant. How deserving of an operator’s or a nation’s trust are these autonomous weapon systems? Trust is the reasoned expectation that a person or system will behave in accordance with certain rules or procedures, with competence and integrity. It is the willingness to be exposed to the possibility of harm caused by another person – or system. The extent of trust is situationally-dependent and determined by the significance of the consequences of the action of the other agent.
The downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 near Russia by a Soviet fighter in 1983, of Iran Air Flight 655 off Iran by the USSVincennes in 1988, and Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 in the Ukraine in 2014, with hundreds of innocent travellers killed each time, have all strained the trust that people might have had in aviation safety, and in the systems on which it relies. It must be remembered that the missiles responsible were all fired by human operators, not by autonomous systems. However, there are examples to the contrary. In the 1991 Gulf War, the USS Missouri wrongly believed it was under attack by an Iraqi Silkworm missile, and fired chaff as a decoy. A Phalanx Close-in Weapons System,
4 R Geiss, The International-Law Dimension of Autonomous Weapons Systems. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 2015, Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/11673.pdf 5 R Sparrow, ‘Killer Robots’. Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 24 no.1, 2007, pp. 62-77.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 47 operating autonomously on the nearby USS Jarrett erroneously fired at the chaff. Four rounds struck the Missouri. In 2003 an RAF Tornado was shot down by a US Patriot battery, with its two crew lost. There are many other examples of humans on the loop trusting autonomous systems too much.6 Why is trust so important?
Society’s trust in robots and autonomous systems is dependent on the perception of the competence of the technology, and the assessment of the integrity of the system and that it will perform tasks as directed. Figure 1 below depicts the notion that humans may trust decision making in some contexts where the artificial intelligence (AI) is basic and the decision making straightforward, but are less willing to trust systems that are capable of making complex decisions – that may be beyond human capability.7
Trustworthiness of Autonomous Systems8
8 K Devitt, ‘Trustworthiness of Autonomous Systems’, In H Abbass, J Scholz, & D Reid,F oundations of Trusted Au- tonomy. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control 2018 (vol. 117, pp. 161-184.) Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978- 3-319-64816-3_9.
48 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The development of trust is thought to go beyond the obvious questions of reliability of the competence of the technology, to include the warfighter’s understanding of the ‘values, beliefs and dispositions of the Autonomous Warfare System’.9 This deeper level of trust can be approached through customised training in ethics and the legal nuances of the rules of war as applied in particular contexts. Ultimately, there is the critical question of ethical responsibility and legal liability.
Such questions raised by the use of robots and autonomous systems have particular significance for the individual agent in terms of the laws of armed conflict, codesof conduct, and the potential for war crimes to be committed and prosecuted.10 This legal dilemma of responsibility is extended to the question of whether to hold the operator, or the writer of the algorithm in an artificial intelligent system, responsible for the death or injury caused.11 The point is made that because of the threats they pose to humans, killer robots are ‘easily the most visible and contested unmanned weapons in the world’.12 Their use demands careful legislation, ethical restraint, and social debate.
The system of control governing the ADF oversees the deployment of any weapon, ensuring that at its core, its use is controlled by human direction and is compliant with domestic and international law. The priority for Navy relating to robotics and autonomous systems is to support its members by enhancing and supplementing crewed systems, especially in relation to tasks that are ‘dull, dirty and dangerous’.
As a party to the Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, Australia fully supports and undertakes a review of any proposed new weapon, means, or method of warfare. Article 36 reviews are an important component in ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law on the battlefield. There is a requirement to monitor the ongoing United Nations discussions on Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) (noting that the definition is not agreed). The Strategic Policy Division (Counter-Proliferation and Arms Control section) remains the policy lead and is starting to address these issues.13
9 H Roff & D Danks 'Trust but Verify': The difficulty of trusting autonomous weapons systems.Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 17 no.1 2018, doi:10.1080/15027570.2018.1481907. 10 J Galliott & T McFarland, Autonomous‘ Systems in a Military Context (Part 2): A Survey of the Ethical Issues’. International Journal of Robotics and Technologies, 4(2) 2016. doi:10.4018/IJRAT.2016070104 11 A Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and ethicality of autonomous weapons Farnham, Ashgate 2009. 12 I Braverman, Robotic Life in the Deep Sea. In I Braverman, & ER Johnson,Blue legalities: The Life and Laws of the Sea pp. 150-164, Duke University Press 2020. 13 Future Land Warfare Branch. Robotic & autonomous systems strategy, Commonwealth of Australia. Canberra, 2018.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 49 Ethics
Professions typically are guided by codes of ethics, specifying agreed values to help their members distinguish right from wrong.
The military profession above all faces severe ethical dilemmas – precisely its members are given power of life and death over other soldiers (both the enemy’s and its own) as well as over civilians. Where discrepancies in power are great and where action often takes place away from public gaze and beyond legal remedy, the need for strong ethical values is paramount.14 This is particularly relevant in the situation where legal and ethical decisions may be made by autonomous systems deployed to combat in the land, sea or air domains. The degree of autonomy conferred becomes critical in the application of ethical principles to operational decisions. Published research literature indicates that increasing emphasis is being given to developing ethics assessment frameworks for polices, regulations, and values in potential ethical issues raised by military use of emerging AI and robotics technologies.15
In the report, ‘Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots,’ Human Rights Watch concluded that ‘fully autonomous weapons should be banned and governments should urgently pursue that end’.16 In 2016, two high-ranking United Nations experts on the Human Rights Council in Geneva issued a similar report that included a call to ban fully autonomous weapons, recommending that ‘autonomous weapons systems that require no meaningful human control should be prohibited’.17
The criticisms of killer robots have also come from the academic community, with scholars cautioning that autonomous weapons ‘are [both] a progress toward humanizing war and an unprecedented danger to humanity’ in that ‘the more autonomous these systems become, the less it will be possible to properly hold those who designed them or ordered their use responsible for their actions.18 The classic statement of this ‘responsibility gap’ was raised by Sparrow:
14 M Evans, R Parkin, & A Ryan, Future armies Future challenges: land warfare in the information age. Crows Nest: Alan and Unwin, Crows Nest 2004. 15 S Wasilow, & J Thorpe, ‘Artificial intelligence, robotics, ethics, and the military: A Canadian perspective’,AI Magazine, vol. 40 no. 1, 2019 pp. 37-48. 16 Human Rights Watch ‘Losing humanity: The case against killer robots’, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/re- port/2012/11/19losing humanity/case-against killer robots. 17 Guterres, A. ‘Autonomous weapons that kill must be banned, insists UN chief’,2019, UN News, March 25. 18 J Danaher, ‘How To Plug the Robot Responsibility Gap’. 27 March 2017 Retrieved from Institute of Ethics and Emerging Technologies: https://ieet.org/index.php/IEET2/more/Danaher20160327
50 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The more autonomous these systems become, the less it will be possible to properly hold those who designed them or ordered their use responsible for their actions. Yet the impossibility of punishing the machine means that we cannot hold the machine responsible. We can insist that the officer who orders their use be held responsible for their actions, but only at the cost of allowing that they should sometimes be held entirely responsible for actions over which they had no control. For the foreseeable future then, the deployment of weapon systems controlled by artificial intelligences in warfare is therefore unfair either to potential casualties in the theatre of war, or to the officer who will be held responsible for their use.19
An alternative perspective in relation to ethical autonomy for lethal autonomous systems in the military environment is that they will be potentially capable of performing more ethically on the battlefield than are human soldiers.20 This does not answer the criticism from those of the opinion that there should always be a human in the decision loop, thus stopping short of operating fully autonomous systems, with the potential for the ethical nightmare of the out-of-control emotively labelled ‘killer robots’, without the ability to distinguish soldier and enemy combatant from innocent civilian. The contrary response is that there is a duty on the protagonist to protect an agent involved in a justified act from personal harm, to the greatest extent possible. In the example where uninhabited air vehicles (UAVs) are used with lethal force to afford precisely such protection, the case is made forcefully that:
We are obligated to employ UAV weapon systems if it can be shown that their use does not significantly reduce a warfighter's operational capability. Of course, if a given military action is unjustified to begin with, then carrying out that act via UAVs is wrong, just as it would be with any weapon. There is nothing wrong in principle with using a UAV and that, other things being equal, using such technology is, in fact, obligatory.21
Ethical and efficient governance, and responsible research and public engagement, is required for the proper development and application of robotics and autonomous systems. Researchers in the field increasingly refer to AI systems which have decision making capability as intelligent AI, in intelligent autonomous systems (IAS). This reflects the reality that robots and autonomous systems make decisions as if they are ‘intelligent’,
19 R Sparrow, ‘Killer Robots’. Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 24 no. 1, 2007, pp. 62-77. 20 R Arkin ‘The case for ethical autonomy in unmanned systems’ Journal of Military ethics,vol. 9 no. 4, pp. 332-341. doi:org/10.1080/15027570.2010.536402. 21 SB Strawser, ‘Moral predators: the duty to employ uninhabited aerial vehicles. Journal of military ethics, 16 Dec. 2010. doi:10.1080/15027570.2010.536403
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 51 with ethical consequences. This recognition has introduced scholarly debate about guidelines for the ethical development and deployment of IAS.22
Principles for the governance of robotics are commonly asserted as follows:
IAS should:
1. Do no harm, including being free of bias and deception. 2. Respect human rights and freedoms, including dignity and privacy, while promoting well-being. 3. Be transparent and dependable while ensuring that the locus of responsibility and accountability remains with their human designers or operators.23
The first of these (‘do no harm’) came from Isaac Asimov’s famous science fiction stories, in which his three laws of robotics were:
1. A robot may not harm a human being, or through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2. A robot must obey orders given to it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the first law. 3. A robot must protect its own existence, as long as such protection does not conflict with the first or second law.24
Such ethical principles are of significance for the application of robotics and autonomous systems across a range of areas in society, including industry and vocational training, and education.25 These principles have been raised for some decades, informing debates that typically conclude that artificial moral agents need to be programmed to be able to tell right from wrong.26 Deployment of robotics and autonomous systems requires questions of trust and responsibility to be settled.
22 S Baum, ‘Social choice ethics in artificial telligence’in AI and Society, vol 35, pp. 165-176 2020. doi:10.1007/ s00146-017-0760-1. 23 A Winfield & M Jirotka, ‘Ethical governance is essential to building trust in robotics and artificial intelligence systems’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 376(20180085), pp. 1-13.15 October 2018 doi:10.1098/ rsta.2018.0085. 24 I Asimov, Runaround. March, Street & Smith, New York, 1942. 25 T Walsh, N Levy, G Bell, A Elliott, J MacLaurin, I Mareels, & F Wood,The Effective and Ethical Development of Artificial Intelligence: An Opportunity to Improve our Wellbeing. Melbourne: Australian Council of Learned Acad- emies, 2019. Retrieved from http://hdl.voced.edu.au/10707/518873 26 W Wallach, & C Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.
52 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Social
Social attitudes towards the use of robotics and autonomous systems are a background to and influence on their role in the military. A large study of 28,000 Europeans showed that while 61 percent had a positive view and 30 percent expressed a negative view of robots and AI, nine out of ten thought they were technologies that required ‘careful management’.27 In short, the development and deployment of RAS-AI needs to be undertaken in a manner that society can tolerate and support. It is not just a new technology of self-evident value to the world.
Reviewing the published reports in this area of governance indicates widespread concern in society about the ethical nature of the conduct involved.28 At issue is the matter of public trust in standards for regulation of research, development, and their implementation. In short, this invokes the concept of ethical governance: the legal, ethical, and social principles guiding the field.
In this regard, standards have their value in guiding socially acceptable behaviour and by enforcing compliance (such as by government’s regulatory role in refusing to contract with non-compliant suppliers). The British standard (BS)8611:2016 Robots and robotic devices: Guide to the ethical design and application of robotic systems, published in 2016, provides a tool to assess ethical risk. More detailed advice on ‘how to design a moral algorithm’ is given by other authors.29
In summary, there are divergent views about the ethical basis for the development and deployment of robotics and autonomous systems, especially where lethal force is involved. One perspective in society is that robots are less capable than humans in weighing the nuances involved in making ethical decisions. An opposing perspective is that without the variable of human emotion and personal frailty, the robot may actually make a more ethical determination than the human, who may have more limited intellectual resources and experience to draw on, and whose judgment may be impaired by fatigue and other factors.
27 TNS Opinion and Social. Attitudesowards T the Impact of Digitisation and Automisation on daily Life.May 2017 Retrieved from Special Eurobarometer 460 Wave EB87.1: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/communities/sites/jrccties/ files/ebs_460_en.pdf 28 R Arkin, Governing Lethal behavior in Autonomous Robots. Boca Raton: CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2009. 29 D Leben, Ethics for Robots, Routledge, Abingdon, 2019.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 53 The restraints advocated in verifying the implementation of decision making in the deployment of robotics and autonomous systems are given as an ethical standard in society, which is as yet far from commonly agreed by allies or enemies, much less followed. To this lack of common ground must be added the inevitable uncertainty that in the interests of self-serving military advantage, some countries are likely to deviate from any international norms or standards. The plethora of research publications in the area reflect the reality that the use of robotics and autonomous systems in the military context raises profound legal, ethical, and social issues that require attention and debate within the Navy and beyond.
Commander Paul Davidson, RAN
Dr Paul Davidson served as a reservist Commander on the Directing Staff at the Australian Command and Staff College in 2019. In civilian life he was an Associate Professor of Management at QUT in Brisbane, during which time he taught at the RAN Staff College (1997- 2000). In a 30-year university business education career, he has written 10 textbooks on Management, and over 100 other publications. He is now serving as Deputy Director of Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence, within Warfare Innovation Navy.
Lieutenant Commander Jane Tsakissiris, RAN
Dr Jane Tsakissiris has degrees and certifications in company directorship, ICT, business, project management, and education. She was commissioned in 2020 into the RAN Reserve via mid-career entry, after many years in industry as a project manager and academic in civilian life, in private and public sector organisations. Her published works are in management education and technology in higher education. She is now serving in Warfare Innovation Navy, in Canberra.
54 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The Defence Strategic Update: Maritime Strategy and the Law Dr Cameron Moore
In the face of a deteriorating strategic outlook, Australia needs to have a maritime strategy which prevents isolation and preserves its independence. The recent Defence Strategic Update1 and Force Structure Plan,2 together with existing maritime doctrine,3 serve this aim through seeking to defend a rules based international order. As identified in the Update, success in this aim will require considerable international cooperation with both friendly and neutral nations, requiring ‘a focus on strengthened international engagement, particularly with the United States, Japan, India, ASEAN and other allies and partners in our region’4 This demands an approach which carefully applies international and domestic law to provide legitimacy to maritime operations. Put simply, upholding a rules based international order requires upholding the rules. Failing to do so will not only subvert the aim but also alienate international and domestic support. This paper will argue for both the significance and value of a maritime strategy based upon the careful application of the law. It will do so through an analysis of scenarios above and below the threshold of armed conflict. Before doing so it is important first to establish broadly what the Defence Strategic Update says and then outline the rules upon which the international rules based order should depend.
The Defence Strategic Update and the Force Structure Plan
The Defence Strategic Update is clear in its statement that:
Our region is in the midst of the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War, and trends including military modernisation, technological disruption and the risk of state-on-state conflict are further complicating our nation’s strategic circumstances.5
It is direct about the risk of conflict between the United States and China:
While still unlikely, the prospect of high-intensity military conflict in the Indo-Pacific is less remote than at the time of the 2016 Defence White Paper, including high-intensity military conflict between the United States and China.6
1 Commonwealth of Australia, Dept of Defence, 2020. 2 Commonwealth of Australia, Dept of Defence, 2020. 3 Sea Power Centre, Australian Maritime Operations, 2017. 4 p 3. 5 ibid. 6 ibid, 14.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 55 The focus is also on Australia’s immediate region:
That immediate region is Australia’s area of most direct strategic interest. Within it, Australia must be capable of building and exercising influence in support of shared regional security interests. Access through it is critical for Australia’s security and trade. Defence has long-established patterns of deployment and engagement in this region. Our defence relationships with countries in this region are an essential part of our security planning, including with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Pacific Island countries.7 [emphasis added]
The Force Structure Plan details the capability investments to implement the strategic objectives of the Defence Strategic Update. It amplifies the points quoted above from the Update in stating:
The Maritime domain is of particular significance to Australia, an island nation surrounded by one of the world’s largest exclusive economic zones, rich in resources, through which the vast majority of our international trade transits … The 2016 Defence White Paper laid the framework for the largest expansion of the Royal Australian Navy since the Second World War … This expanded maritime force will provide greater capability for anti-submarine warfare, sealift, border security operations, maritime patrol and reconnaissance, air warfare, area denial, sea control and undersea warfare.8
The Defence Strategic Update also clearly links the rules based international order to international law, particularly theLaw of the Sea Convention:
Australia will continue to be an active and vocal advocate for a rules-based international order designed to support economic growth, security, prosperity and our values. This includes support for laws and treaties, such as theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and international institutions that help constrain the exercise of coercive power and support collective responses to challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.9
7 ibid, 21. 8 p 35. 9 p 24.
56 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Maritime Strategy and the Law
There are some key rules which should underpin the rules based international order. The Defence Strategic Update singles out the Law of the Sea Convention, but also refers to international law and institutions generally. The primary set of rules is the system of respect for state sovereignty embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, as the Defence Strategic Update states, ‘Australia must be an active and assertive advocate for stability, security and sovereignty in our immediate region’.10 The principle of non- interference and the prohibition on the use of force expounded in article 2 of theCharter , with its very limited exceptions,11 provide the point from which virtually all other rules in the international order proceed. Even if the Security Council is not able to prevent conflict, no state accepts that it should be the victim of aggression nor have its affairs dictated by a foreign power.
The Jus Ad Bellum
The jus ad bellum, or the law with respect to the use of force in international law, follows from the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Essentially, states may only lawfully use force in self defence or under the authority of a Security Council resolution.12 While Australia has much experience of using force under the authority of a United Nations Security Council Resolution,13 as stated above, the Defence Strategic Update is more focussed on the need to use force in self defence, whether of Australia and its interests or of allies and partners. The use of force in self defence is limited to that which is necessary and proportional.14 The assessment of what is necessary and proportional will vary depending on the nature of the threat. An attack upon Australia will justify a much greater response than an attack upon a single warship in waters far distant from Australia. The single warship will be able to use force to defeat the immediate threat, but not then engage any other targets. The environment of increasing tension described in the Defence Strategic Update demands careful understanding of how to avoid escalating the tension, whilst still protecting against threats of force.
10 p 25. 11 Self defence under art 51 and UNSC authorised operations under Ch VII. 12 ibid. 13 eg UNSCR 1264 (1999) for East Timor, UNSCR 665 (1990) for Iraq, UNSCR 1546 (2004) for Gulf Operations. 14 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States), International Court of Justice, 6 November 2003, p 27.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 57 The Jus in Bello
This leads to the jus in bello, which is the law governing the use of force once an armed conflict commences. The jus in bello permits a much greater degree of force so that, for example, a warship may engage any enemy units, whether they pose a threat or not.15 The law of naval warfare in particular provides protections for medical units and personnel and various other categories of civilian ships, aircraft and people, as well as those who are not in the fight, including the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, religious personnel, and those who have surrendered.16 Critically, unlike the law of land warfare, it is also concerned with protecting the trade of neutral powers.17 The treaty law in this area dates in many cases from 1907 however so the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea currently provides the best guide to the law.18 It is a manual, rather than a formal legal document, written by a group of legal and naval experts and is currently under revision.19 Given the focus of the Defence Strategic Update on state on state conflict, the law of naval warfare could prove essential in ensuring diplomatic support for Australia’s efforts to defend a rules based international order.
The Law of the Sea Convention
To return to the Law of the Sea Convention, it is notable that the Defence Strategic Update singles this treaty out alone for mention. The Law of the Sea Convention establishes a system of maritime zones and navigational regimes. This system can ensure that naval forces are able to manoeuvre freely whilst respecting the security of coastal states, trade can move safely and securely by sea while minimising the risk of pollution, and coastal states can manage their natural resources and environment. Given the maritime geography of Australia, Asia and the Pacific, the law of the sea provides an essential basis for shared understanding on these issues. Any defence of a rules based international order must therefore include a careful regard for the Law of the Sea Convention.
Contested operations below the threshold of armed conflict
The Defence Strategic Update assesses the risk of war as still unlikely but nevertheless increased. What is more likely is increasing tension below the threshold of armed conflict.
15 Louise Doswald-Beck (ed), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea Cam- bridge University Press, 1995 (‘San Remo Manual’) Part III ‘Basic Rules and Target Discrimination’. 16 See, ibid, Rule 47 ‘Enemy Vessels Exempt from Attack’. 17 See, ibid, Part V, ‘Measures Short of Attack: Interception, Visit, Search, Diversion and Capture’. 18 See, ibid, p 61; see also Australian Maritime Operations, 75. 19 David Letts, ‘International Law and Armed Conflicts at Sea: the San Remo Manual – now is the time for a LOTE!’ Australian Naval Review vol. 1, 2020, 57.
58 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Civilian and Military Disruption and Intimidation Operations
A means to exert pressure below the threshold of armed conflict can be through interference operations, sometimes called ‘grey zone’ operations, which the Defence Strategic Update defines in this way:
‘Grey zone’ is one of a range of terms used to describe activities designed to coerce countries in ways that seek to avoid military conflict. Examples include using para-military forces, militarisation of disputed features, exploiting influence, interference operations and the coercive use of trade and economic levers. These tactics are not new. But they are now being used in our immediate region against shared interests in security and stability. They are facilitated by technological developments including cyber warfare.20
For Australia’s maritime environment, this may take the form of heightened civilian activity, such as foreign fishing incursions, people smuggling, or pollution incidents. It may also take the form of disruptive or intimidatory military activity, such as the mining of the Torres or Bass Straits, or unidentified submerged contacts in the territorial sea. With regard to civilian activity, it has most notably occurred recently with Chinese fishing or seismic survey vessels entering the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Vietnam,21 Malaysia,22 the Philippines23 and Indonesia24 under escort of the Chinese Coast Guard. They have also appeared in 2020 en masse just outside the EEZ of Ecuador’s Galapogas Islands, which is a marine protected area.25 With regard to military activity, 2019 saw the unattributed mining of a number of merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.26 These
20 p 12. 21 Nguyen Quang Dy, ‘It’s time for Vietnam and ASEAN to challenge Beijing in the South China Sea’ The Strategist (online), 13 May 2020 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/its-time-for-vietnam-and-asean-to-challenge-beijing-in- the-south-china-sea/; Trinh Le, ‘China’s belligerence under cover of COVID’ Australian Naval Institute (online), 17 May 2020 https://navalinstitute.com.au/chinas-belligerence-under-cover-of-covid/? 22 John McBeth, ‘China plays divide and rule in South China Sea’ Asia Times (online) 3 May 2020 https://asiatimes. com/2020/05/china-plays-divide-and-rule-in-south-china-sea; Robert McLaughlin, ‘The Legal Status and Char- acterisation of Maritime Militia Vessels’EJIL Talk (online), 18 June 2019 https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-legal-sta- tus-and-characterisation-of-maritime-militia-vessels/. 23 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, PCA Case Nº 2013-19, 12 July 2016, paras 296-297. 24 Stanley Widianto and Agustinus Beo Da Costa, ‘Indonesia deploys fighter jets to Natuna in stand-off with China’ Sydney Morning Herald (online), 8 January 2020 https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesia-deploys-fighter- jets-to-natuna-in-stand-off-with-china-20200108-p53ptq.html. 25 ‘Ecuador on alert over huge Chinese fishing fleet off Galapagos Islands’ BBC News (online) 29 July2020 https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-53562439. 26 See David Uren, ‘Will US-Iran Tensions Disrupt the Global Oil Market?’ The Strategist (online), 13 May 2019; James Kraska and Robert McLaughlin, ‘Attribution of Naval Mine Strikes in International Law’EJIL Talk (online), 24 June 2019 https://www.ejiltalk.org/attribution-of-naval-mine-strikes-in-international-law/.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 59 were limpet rather than moored or sea bed mines so they did not close the strait, but nonetheless they caused considerable disruption to shipping.27 Japan has also had a number of submarine incursions into its territorial sea. This infringes the sovereignty of Japan but does not amount to an armed attack.28
Maritime Law Enforcement
The key to these activities is that they are disruptive or intimidatory but are done in a way that is below the threshold of an armed attack, in the case of civilian activity, and also not attributable to a state, in the case of military activity. In order to remain within the law, any use of force in response must remain proportionate. In the case of civilian activity, it must be a careful law enforcement response, preferably using civilian enforcement vessels. Coast guard diplomacy has been a feature of the South China Sea in recent years as there has been an emphasis on asserting maritime jurisdiction without provoking military conflict.29 In Australia’s case, so as to avoid escalation into military conflict in a high tension situation, it would similarly be prudent to emphasise the law enforcement character of operations against civilian vessels. This would be best done by Australian Border Force vessels, paying careful attention to the legal requirements of maritime enforcement at sea. This would support one of the objectives statedin the Defence Strategic Update, to ‘expand Defence’s capability to respond to grey-zone activities, working closely with other arms of Government’.30 This means that if there is any dispute as to jurisdiction, or an accident or misuse of force then it is less likely to be seen as an assertion of military power requiring a military response. This may be difficult for Australia given the extent to which maritime law enforcement relies upon Royal Australian Navy vessels, but it will be an important consideration nonetheless.
Military Activity
In the case of military activity, naval forces should normally provide any response but the scope for the use of force would still be very limited. Any attempt to disrupt passage through the Torres or Bass Straits would be a serious problem but would not necessarily
27 ibid. 28 David Axe, ‘Japan Has A Plan For Dismantling China’s Submarine Fleet’ Forbes Magazine (online) 22 June 2020 https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/06/22/japan-has-a-plan-for-dismantling-chinas-submarine- fleet/#4065168c6d6c; Reiji Yoshida, ‘Beijing's Senkaku goal: Sub 'safe haven' in South China Sea’ Japan Times (online) 7 November 2012 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/07/national/beijings-senkaku-goal-sub- safe-haven-in-south-china-sea/#.XsXmE3tS82z. 29 Theron Godbold, ‘Rise of the white hulls: Indo-Pacific coast guards become diplomatic tools’Stars and Stripes (online) 25 April 2019 https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/rise-of-the-white-hulls-indo-pacific-coast-guards- become-diplomatic-tools-1.578358. 30 p 25.
60 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 amount to an armed attack. There could be a requirement for mine clearance, and possibly escort of vessels through the straits, but the use of force would still need to be proportional. Anyone found to be laying mines could be apprehended but, below the threshold of armed conflict, not attacked with lethal force. Lethal force would only be lawful where there was an immediate threat to life, which would be unlikely given that the effect of mines is usually some time after they have been laid or placed.
The presence of unidentified submerged contacts in Australia’s territorial sea could be an infringement of Australia’s sovereignty. The Law of the Sea Convention requires submarines to be on the surface and flying their flag when in a foreign territorial sea.31 Even if there is malign intent, the presence of a submerged contact in the territorial sea does not necessarily pose a threat to life. It may also be that there is no malign intent and the submarine is not complying with the requirements because there has been a navigational error, there is foul weather or even a situation of distress.32 The response of nations which have experienced repeated unidentified submerged contacts has been to seek to drive them out or to the surface, but not use deliberately lethal force. Japan has used constant pursuit of such contacts33 and Sweden and Norway have even used low power torpedos and depth charges.34 They have not however tried to sink or destroy unidentified submerged contacts, especially given the risk that they might be nuclear powered or armed.35 Australia should take a similar approach if it is concerned to deter the intrusion of unidentified submerged contacts whilst avoiding the escalation of tension.
Maintaining Trade by Sea
A scenario at the highest level of tension short of war is an economic or arms blockade.36 The United States and other nations have already imposed targeted sanctions upon China in relation to the treatment of people in Hong Kong and Xinjiang Province, as well as its conduct in the South China Sea.37 It is plausible that tensions with China could
31 art 20. 32 D. P. O’Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power, Naval Institute Press, 1975, pp 142-145. 33 See above n xxviii. 34 David Froman, ‘Uncharted Waters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in the Territorial Sea’ San Diego Law Review vol. 21, 1984, 625; Gordon McCormick, Stranger Than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters, Rand, 1990; on the Danish experience, Dieter Fleck, ‘Rules of Engagement for Maritime Forces and the Limitation of the Use of Force under the UN Charter’German Yearbook of International Law vol. 31, 1988, 165. 35 Froman; McCormick, ibid. 36 See Australian Maritime Operations pp 95-96. 37 ‘US Sanctions against China’, A Blog by Baker Mackenzie, 12 October 2020, https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie. com/category/us-sanctions-against-china/; Ana Swanson, ‘U.S. Penalizes 24 Chinese Companies Over Role in South China Sea’ The New York Times, (online) 26 August 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/business/ economy/trump-sanctions-south-china-sea.html.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 61 increase to the point where sanctions could expand to a broader base. This could occur if Chinese actions against Taiwan increased to the point of interrupting Taiwanese trade, if continuing incidents in the South China Sea reached the point of impeding commercial navigation or even naval clashes, or events on the Korean peninsula threatened the ceasefire in place there. It is not at all likely that the United Nations could impose sanctions upon China given that China, as one of the permanent five members, has a veto on the Security Council. This could mean that China might retaliate with sanctions of its own against sanctions which the United States, possibly with others, impose upon it. In the worst case, this may see China enforcing trade sanctions at sea, or an arms embargo on Taiwan akin to the Cuban Quarantine in 1962.
An overriding concern at such a high level of tension would be to avoid tipping the scales towards an armed conflict. At the same time, there would be a compelling desire on Australia’s part to ensure that it is able to keep trading. If any economic sanctions, from any party, prevented Australia exporting coal and iron ore to China, Taiwan, Japan or South Korea this would dramatically impact upon Australia’s export earnings.38 The need then to keep trading with other existing and potentially new partners would be commensurately increased. Australia would also need to ensure the protection of the shipping carrying this export trade.
Australian Escort of Australian Exports
The difficulty for Australia is that it has only a small number of surface ships capable of protecting maritime trade.39 In 2018/2019 the number of ship movements carrying Australian exports was in excess of 30,000.40 About 13 of these ships are Australian flagged.41 This creates at least three legal issues. The first is that it would require the request, or at least the consent, of the flag state for Australia to protect these foreign merchant ships once they left Australia’s territorial sea. It is the flag state thathas exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels in international waters.42
38 The Observatory of Economic Complexity, ‘Australia’, 12 October 2020 https://oec.world/en/profile/country/aus/ 39 See Australian Maritime Operations pp 110-111. 40 Ports Australia, ‘Trade Statistics’, 12 October 2020,https://www.portsaustralia.com.au/resources/trade-statistics 41 Rachel Pupazzoni, ‘Shipping out: Unions, industry, defence analysts concerned by shrinking merchant fleet’ABC News (online) 26 April 2019 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-26/shipping-out-unions-industry-concerned- by-run-down-in-fleet/11046456. 42 arts 91 & 92 of the Law of the Sea Convention.
62 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Foreign Escort of Australian Exports
The second issue is that Australia would need the assistance of foreign navies to provide enough escorts for these ships. This would most likely require agreement with nations with the necessary capability, such as India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and the United States,43 to escort this shipping both en route and as it closed its destination. Given the high likelihood that the shipping will be flying flags of convenience, with the top three registries being Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands,44 this will require separate agreement between the foreign navies and the flag states of the merchant ships for operations in international waters.
Escort and Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage
The third issue is that much of Australia’s export shipping passes through the Indonesian and Philippines archipelagos.45 In the case of attacks by armed robbers in recent decades, neither nation was open to the idea of foreign navies escorting merchant shipping through their archipelagic sea lanes.46 It is unlikely therefore they would be open to foreign navies escorting shipping in their waters in order to protect it from Chinese interception. They have good grounds legally and politically to argue that it is for Indonesian and Philippines maritime forces to protect foreign shipping in their respective waters. Whilst neither Indonesia nor the Philippines may close their archipelagic sea lanes,47 Australia would still need to rely upon these nations to protect its exports carried in ships passing through their archipelagic waters. Australian warships would have the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage,48 enabling them to pass through the archipelagos and then resume escort duties on the other side, but this would not extend to escort duties of merchant traffic whilst in these sea lanes without agreement of the archipelagic state concerned.49
Armed Conflict
Even if there are repeated incidents at a level of high tension, or a naval clash in the South China Sea, there still might be no armed conflict. Governments might be extremely concerned to stay back from crossing this threshold because the implications of the
43 See Defence Strategic Update, p. 26. 44 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,Handbook of Statistics 2019, 76 https://unctad.org/ system/files/official-document/tdstat44_en.pdf. 45 See marinetraffic.com https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:-12.0/centery:25.0/zoom:4 46 See Martin Purbick, ‘Pirates of the South China Seas’ Asian Affairs, vol. 49(1), 2018, p. 11 47 arts 53 & 54 of the Law of the Sea Convention. 48 ibid. 49 Escort within a naval task group would not require permission however.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 63 law of armed conflict are profound and potentially highly destructive. Once the law of armed conflict applies then it is lawful to attack the enemy’s forces at sea where ever they may be found, except in the territorial sea, internal or archipelagic waters of neutral states.50 There is no requirement to be protecting against a lethal threat. As much as this permits the use of force on a broad scale, there are still important limits, noted above, concerning civilian and neutral shipping, medical personnel and units, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and so on.
Australia would have the same concerns in relation to protecting shipping as discussed above in relation to situations below the threshold of armed conflict. Protection against mining of straits and submarine incursions would equally be significant. There would however be a range of additional concerns which would require a maritime strategy that pays careful attention to the law.
As was the case in the Second World War, the invasion of the whole of Australia appears unlikely as isolation would be easier to achieve and could have the same effect of compelling Australian subordination.51 In addition, selective attacks on Australian economic targets could also weaken the economy to the same end. This suggests two scenarios for analysis. The first is the conduct of operations in the islands to Australia’s north and east so as to prevent them falling into enemy hands. Much as Japan attempted in the Second World War, this could cut off Australia’s most direct air and sea routes to North America and East Asia. As the Defence Strategic Update states:
The capacity to conduct cooperative defence activities with countries in the region is fundamental to our ability to shape our strategic environment. For defence planning, shaping Australia’s strategic environment includes preventing our operational access in the region from being constrained. Constrained access would limit cooperative activities and the ADF’s ability to deploy military force in support of shared interests.52
50 San Remo Manual, Part II ‘Regions of Operations’ and Part III ‘Basic Rules and Target Discrimination’. 51 James Goldrick and Euan Graham, ‘A fortress with no water supply: Hugh White’s ‘How to defend Australia’’, The Strategist, (online) 18 July 2019 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-fortress-with-no-water-supply-hugh-whites- how-to-defend-australia/. 52 p 26.
64 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Operations to Secure the Islands
A key difference between now and the Second World War is that most of the islands in Asia and the Pacific are now part of independent nations.53 This creates the fundamental requirement that operations on their land territory or in their waters require the consent of their governments and not those of colonial powers (although innocent passage54 and archipelagic sea lanes passage,55 as applicable, would not). It is more than likely that they would not wish to be involved in warlike operations involving Australia unless their own security was threatened, and Australia could help to counter that threat. A lack of respect on Australia’s part for the independence or neutrality of these nations, particularly given Australia’s history of imperialism and racism, may see either a lack of cooperation or a turn to an enemy. This means that any operations should occur with careful regard to the maritime zones, airspace and shipping of those nations, as well as any agreements made for the conduct of operations within those nations.
Operations Against Shipping
Operations to the north and east of Australia may include attempts to disrupt an enemy’s access to these areas. The First and Second World Wars saw unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant shipping despite Hague treaties of 1907 prohibiting such action.56 It might be easy to say therefore that this is likely to occur again, but it is probably unlikely.57 The second half of the last century saw the rise of flags of convenience. This refers to the practice of registering ships in states which have low regulatory requirements in order to reduce costs. As noted above, the largest shipping registries in the world are those of Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, despite the fact that the economies of these nations do not at all reflect the size of their shipping registers. It is also likely that flag of convenience nations, given their character as being uninvolved, would seek to remain neutral in any conflict. This means that a great proportion of modern shipping would be neutral in any conflict at sea. Unrestricted submarine warfare against such shipping would almost certainly carry a high diplomatic cost.58 This would be exacerbated by the fact that the mariners on board such ships tend to be from a range of different nations, but particularly from the Philippines. The Philippines is the largest source of
53 There is the limited exception of the French territories in New Caledonia and Polynesia and the United States in the populated islands of Guam, the North Mariana Islands and American Samoa, and the uninhabited Baker Is- land, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Island, Palmyra Atoll and Wake Island. 54 art 17 Law of the Sea Convention. 55 art 53 Law of the Sea Convention. 56 Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War 1907 and Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War 1907. 57 See Australian Maritime Operations pp 97-98. 58 ibid.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 65 ratings and second largest source of officers in international shipping.59 Australia and the Philippines have a close relationship. It would hardly seem to be in Australia’s interests to send innocent Philippine mariners to their deaths in an unrestricted submarine warfare campaign.
Protection of Australian Economic Targets
This leads to the next point on defending Australian economic targets. This scenario is the conduct of operations to protect Australia’s offshore installations, ports, and undersea cables and pipelines. The Defence Strategic Update states that, ‘the Government will also invest in area denial systems including an enhanced mine warfare capability to secure Australia’s maritime approaches’.60 The defensive mining of harbours and choke points would need to respect the law of naval warfare concerning notice to shipping to prevent indiscriminate effects.61
There could also be a need to prevent possible damage to, or seizure of, remote iron ore and uranium mines. Further, this could extend to protection of islands such as Christmas Island, the Cocos Islands, Norfolk Island or Lord Howe Island as they might also provide bases from which to isolate Australia, much as could occur in the islands of South East Asia or the Pacific. Were the threat to come from foreign naval and military forces then the law of armed conflict would permit the offensive targeting of such units. The difficulty would arise when foreign forces use civilian vessels to close the Australian coast, much as Australian forces used the small fishing vessel Krait to enter Singapore Harbour in 1943 and destroy Japanese shipping.62
It would be difficult for Australia to maintain trade and diplomatic support if it simply treated unidentified shipping as hostile. This means that it would need to investigate all vessels carefully before taking action and use existing legal mechanisms to take action. This may mean using the Maritime Powers Act 2013 to intercept fishing vessels in the EEZ for example, or other vessels in the contiguous zone that may be offloading people or weapons. The law of naval warfare would also permit limited interception of neutral merchant shipping in international waters, ‘where there are reasonable
59 International Chamber of Shipping, ‘Global Supply and Demand for Seafarers’ 12 October 2020h ttps://www. ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade/global-supply-and-demand-for-seafarers. 60 p 37; See Force Structure Plan 40. 61 San Remo Manual Rules 80 – 92. 62 Peter Djokovic, ‘Krait and Operation JAYWICK’Navy: History 12 October 2020 https://www.navy.gov.au/history/ feature-histories/krait-and-operation-jaywick.
66 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 grounds for suspecting they are subject to capture’.63 This essentially means that they are operating on behalf of the enemy, breaching a blockade or not complying with requirements concerning documents or naval regulations in an area of operations.64 Even in the defence of Australia during an armed conflict, careful regard for the law of naval warfare could do much to support Australia’s continued ability to trade and to maintain diplomatic support.
Conclusion
The Defence Strategic Update sets out the basis for Defence strategic planning in an increasingly tense and uncertain region. It makes very clear that defence of a rules based international order is essential to preventing Australia’s isolation and preserving its independence, and that of its allies and partners. A rules based international order however means upholding the rules. The Defence Strategic Update singles out the Law of the Sea Convention as a key source of rules to ‘help constrain the exercise of coercive power’, along with international law and institutions generally. The most obvious of these include the principles of sovereignty and restraint on the use of force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. From these principles, the jus ad bellum invokes the requirements of necessity and proportionality in any use of force below the threshold of armed conflict. Indeed these principles should serve to reduce the risk of crossing that threshold for, once it is crossed, the jus in bello permits much greater destruction. Even then, the jus in bello imposes restraints on the conduct of hostilities particularly in regard to neutrals, civilians and those who are not in fight. The law of naval warfare, the jus in bello at sea, has a distinct regard for the maintenance of neutral trade. A maritime strategy for Australia in a range of conflict scenarios, both below and above the threshold of war, requires careful regard for these laws. Australia needs to keep operating in the region and also trading, and needs the support of partners and allies to do so. For Australia not to be isolated it needs the support of island nations to the north and east, whether friendly or neutral. For Australia to protect its own economy it needs to protect its coasts in a way that ensures shipping can operate predictably within well known rules. All of this supports the rules based international order but also requires upholding the rules. A maritime strategy for Australia that has careful regard for the law then can do much to meet the aims of the Defence Strategic Update.
63 San Remo Manual Rule 118. 64 San Remo Manual Rule 146.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 67 Dr Cameron Moore
Associate Professor Cameron Moore is the Deputy Head of the School of Law at the University of New England. He is also an Honorary Principal Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security at the University of Wollongong and a visiting Associate Professor with the Centre for Military and Security Law and the Centre for Public and International Law at the Australian National University. His publications include the books Crown and Sword: Executive Power and the Use of Force by the Australian Defence Force (2017) and ADF on the Beat: A Legal Analysis of Offshore Enforcement by the ADF (2004), and other articles and chapters on the Australian Defence Force and maritime security. Between 1996 and 2003, Cameron was a Royal Australian Navy Legal Officer. Cameron is still an active Navy reservist, with the rank of Commander.
68 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Australians prepared for Naval Shipbuilding Mr Ian Irving
It is no secret that there are jobs available in shipbuilding. Each week around 155 job vacancies across the sector are advertised. The Minister for Defence Industry stated recently that Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding enterprise will employ over 15,000 people across the nation – and ensuring our naval shipbuilding industry continues to receive the skills and support needed to help them to grow is crucial to the success of our continuous naval shipbuilding plan.
The Naval Shipbuilding College (NSC) is an intrinsic contributor to Australia’s sustainable naval shipbuilding enterprise, providing essential services on behalf of the Shipbuilding enterprise to identify, attract, train and retain a skilled workforce.
The Naval Shipbuilding College welcomes the news that the national Workforce Register had surpassed 1,000 employment-ready candidates – an exciting milestone for both the NSC and the Naval Shipbuilding enterprise – and follows the news in July that NSC’s Workforce Register had surpassed 3,000 registrations.
Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Industry offers some of the most cutting edge and exciting careers available on the planet. This technologically advanced workforce will be exposed to some of the most modern facilities and sophisticated systems on offer, rivalling some of the most complex engineering programs anywhere in the world including NASA’s space program and the world-class Crossrail project, Europe’s largest infrastructure program.
From Trades to PhDs, a total of over 15,000 people will be needed across the country for decades to come to design, build, maintain and upgrade the Royal Australian Navy’s future fleet – thousands of jobs will be available over the next two years in the areas of engineering, supply chain, project management, fabrication and operations. These jobs are very secure, underpinned by Australia’s commitment to the continuous shipbuilding program, and the shipbuilding primes and their supply chain partners continue to hire despite the current situation with COVID-19.
Building a national workforce
Since 2018, the dedicated NSC team has worked closely with government, industry, and the education and training providers to establish a comprehensive definition of the
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 69 sovereign knowledge that is required to truly be considered a naval shipbuilding nation capable of developing and delivering superior naval maritime capabilities. This robust definition and understanding underpins all workforce capability development activities for the enterprise.
On behalf of industry, the NSC collects and collates information as the ‘trusted source of truth’ for the overall shipbuilding time-phased skill demand requirements. Analysed against the country’s geographic market supply capacity; and identifying, enacting and coordinating market interventions where needed to assure supply across the agreed roles to ensure that the naval shipbuilding workforce is established at the required time, in the required numbers, and with the required skills, to succeed with Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Plan.
Providing an overarching national coordination, the NSC ensures that training curriculums of the appropriate standard are available: in the required locations and with the required capacity, within accredited vocational and tertiary institutions to meet the shipbuilding demand requirements. To complement this effort, the NSC coordinates the delivery of specialist shipbuilding courses and specific shipbuilding learning experiences to support candidates to become employment-ready.
NSC provides candidates with personalised career and training guidance and the Candidate Engagement Consultants provide advice on opportunities to upskill through direct connections with education and training providers and connecting candidates directly to current job opportunities.
These capabilities coordinated and delivered by the NSC, in conjunction with the nations’ education and training institutions and the sectors’ shipbuilding industry, are establishing a fit-for-purpose resilient, sustainable and highly effective shipbuilding workforce and talent pipeline.
It is the intention and commitment of both the Commonwealth Government and industry to manage development of the naval shipbuilding workforce collaboratively as an enterprise to ensure that the available resources are established in the most efficient and effective way. The enterprise approach coordinates the establishment of the integrated skills pipelines being developed across the country to ensure the availability of resources for each of the individual programs.
70 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The strengthening of Australia’s naval shipbuilding industrial ecosystem provides a unique opportunity for new careers and career development across a multitude of job categories. From fabrication roles in the construction yards, through to engineering roles in the design bureaus and leadership opportunities within shipbuilding management teams. Employees will have the opportunity to earn training and qualifications across many high-end skills and professions that will provide a solid foundation for rewarding and meaningful careers.
The NSC model for collecting workforce demand data, through ongoing national and regional workforce supply surveys continue to mature. This will support the government and industry to make timely decisions in the establishment and sustainment ofthe enterprise workforce.
The NSC has established a central position across the shipbuilding enterprise, and in conjunction with government, industry, and the education and training sector is delivering on its mission to ensure that Australia has the workforce required as a key enabler to succeed with the Naval Shipbuilding Plan. The workforce development capability which has been established by the NSC is well positioned to deliver services which can now be extended beyond the perimeter of the shipbuilding sector as a powerful capability across other defence domains.
1,000 Employment-Ready
The NSC’s national workforce register is progressively expanding as a repository of potential workforce entrants, focusing on the specific talent groups required bythe shipbuilding industry and providing opportunities for those individuals impacted by COVID-19 redundancies. Ongoing enhancements to the register will provide greater collaboration and connectivity regarding available talent across the enterprise.
I have enjoyed hearing stories of how candidates are finding their individual pathways to a rewarding career in shipbuilding. The capability and enthusiasm they bring to the Enterprise means better outcomes for both people and business, and the long-term success of the Australian Naval Shipbuilding Industry.
Stories of people like Jayden Grigg, a Graduate Engineer, who had a dream to one day join the Royal Australian Navy. But as Jayden worked his way through the Australian Defence Force recruitment process, he received some news during a health assessment that he
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 71 was medically ineligible. Jayden joined the Workforce Register. Jayden said that the team at NSC couldn’t have made it easier for him to become employment-ready and he has now secured a job with Babcock Australasia.
Another story is from an adjacent industry – the aviation sector – a sector hit hard by COVID 19. Craig McDonald, a Customer Service Manager worked for Qantas for over 20 years and unfortunately was stood down twice earlier this year due to the impacts of this global pandemic. Through NSC’s collaboration partnership with Qantas, Craig joined the Workforce Register and discovered his current skills are transferrable to project support in shipbuilding. Craig has now accepted a Voluntary Redundancy with Qantas and has turned his focus to full time project management study to match project management roles in shipbuilding.
The NSC is sharing stories and experiences from people who have joined the national Workforce Register. These stories provide an insight into how NSC can help job-seekers find their pathway – these stories can be found at navalshipbuildingcollege.com.au
Stable and Secure Career for Life
This is a chance to join a stable and secure growth industry which has advanced technology at its heart – and for individuals to become part of a shipbuilding legacy that will serve the nation and Australians for generations to come.
72 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Mr Ian Irving
Ian Irving is chief executive for the Naval Shipbuilding Institute, responsible for delivering Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding College based in the Osborne Naval Shipyard in South Australia and the South Metropolitan TAFE campus at Naval Base in Western Australia.
Over the past three decades Ian has held senior executive positions within industry across many of Australia’s major land, sea and air defence procurement and sustainment programs. This has included responsibility for the delivery of major defence systems, the conduct of leading-edge research and development and the establishment of industrial capabilities delivering key defence exports for Australia. Ian is an Honours Graduate in Electrical Engineering from Sydney University and is a member of the Australian Institute of Company Directors.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 73 © Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence/ADF
Supporting the integrated force from seabed to space
From surveillance capabilities to systems Echo Voyager, the latest and largest undersea development and integration, Boeing helps unmanned vehicle. navies around the world to support regional security and protect national interests in Our 3000-strong Australian team offers a challenging, contested and congested maritime broad range of in-country capabilities including: environments. » Systems Development and Integration Boeing has delivered surveillance and navigation » Sustainment Services systems, communications and sensors, weapons » Autonomous Systems and Remotely Piloted and control systems and self-defence systems Aircraft Systems on ships and submarines throughout the world. » Performance Modelling and Integration Our maritime capabilities also include the Analysis P-8A Poseidon designed for long-range anti- » Surveillance and Communications submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; and » Maintenance Planning intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance » Supply Chain Development and Management missions. » Training Systems and Services The company’s ongoing commitment to » Composite Manufacturing research, development and innovation has created a strong legacy on platforms such as the ScanEagle, the industry-leading ship borne Remotely Piloted Aircraft System and the
74 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Destroyer doomed from the start – the rewritten story of USS Peary’s final combat action in Darwin 1942 Dr Tom Lewis, OAM
Discovery of propellers from the ship explains why Peary was the only warship of several vessels to be sunk
A note on sources1
The discovery in Darwin Harbour of the propellers of the fighting destroyerUSS Peary has rewritten the story of the biggest air raid on Australian soil, the attack of the Japanese Navy on 19 February 1942.
Located around two kilometres from the wreck site of the rest of the ship, and complete with their drive shafts, the propellers lie in a debris field which may yet reveal other items
© Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence/ADF from the ship. But that the stern of the ship should have been forcefully separated from the rest of the vessel when she was subject to a ferocious dive bombing means the story of how the ship sank needs retelling.
The destroyer Peary was one of the largest warships in Darwin on 19 February 1942.2 Supporting the integrated Her four funnels, known as ‘stacks’, made her instantly recognisable as a target for the Japanese. Indeed, from a distance this class of destroyers were sometimes mistaken for force from seabed to space Marblehead-class cruisers, which also had four funnels. All of the merchant ships, and the RAN warships, present in Darwin that morning had just a single funnel, so Peary was From surveillance capabilities to systems Echo Voyager, the latest and largest undersea a stand-out. There was a sister-vessel present, the USS William B Preston, but she had development and integration, Boeing helps unmanned vehicle. navies around the world to support regional been refitted as a seaplane tender, with two stacks. Peary was anchored a little under security and protect national interests in Our 3000-strong Australian team offers a a mile from the main wharves, in the middle of the harbour, not far from the hospital challenging, contested and congested maritime broad range of in-country capabilities including: environments. » Systems Development and Integration 1 This work draws on several hundred sources used in prior works by the same author: Wrecks in Darwin Waters Boeing has delivered surveillance and navigation » Sustainment Services (1990); Darwin’s Submarine I-124 (1995, and 2010); Carrier Attack (with Peter Ingman, 2013), Honour Denied systems, communications and sensors, weapons » Autonomous Systems and Remotely Piloted (2016) and The Empire Strikes South, 2017. There is a deal of assumed knowledge in this article derived from and control systems and self-defence systems Aircraft Systems these works, and also experience as a serving naval officer. Apologies for any assumptions transferred which on ships and submarines throughout the world. » Performance Modelling and Integration may not be clear. The Lowe Report was one of those documents, and was the first comprehensive analysis of the Analysis events of the day. It may be seen online at National Archives of Australia. ‘Bombing of Darwin - Report by Mr. Our maritime capabilities also include the Justice Lowe’. NAA: A431, 1949/687 P-8A Poseidon designed for long-range anti- » Surveillance and Communications 2 Excluding the depot ship HMAS Platypus. Of almost identical size was the seaplane tenderUSS William B Preston, submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; and » Maintenance Planning which had once also been a ‘four stack’ destroyer of the same class as Peary. After her modifications Preston intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance » Supply Chain Development and Management had just two funnels, and had been fitted with aviation fuel tanks above the weather deck, so losing some of her missions. » Training Systems and Services Clemson-class appearance. The Clemson class at 314 feet in length were significantly longer than the RAN’s two sloops at 266 feet, although the sloops were more usefully armed, with four-inch high angle guns as their main The company’s ongoing commitment to » Composite Manufacturing armament: Warrego with three and Swan with four. They probably had numerous MGs fitted as AA defence at research, development and innovation has the time, and at some time likely in 1942 had seven 20mm Oerlikons fitted. (Seehttps://www.navy.gov.au/hmas- created a strong legacy on platforms such as warrego-ii and https://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-swan-ii the ScanEagle, the industry-leading ship borne Remotely Piloted Aircraft System and the
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 75 ship Manunda and the troopship Zealandia. The other warships present were the RAN sloops Swan and Warrego, and the corvettes Deloraine and Katoomba; the latter in the Australian Navy’s floating dock. Altogether, there were 57 vessels in the harbour that morning. All of the warships except Peary survived – an interesting fact for which there have been a number of incomplete/unsatisfactory explanations. The discovery of the propellers finally fits the puzzle together.3
Track of the Japanese air attack leading to the first raid on 19 Feb 1942. © Peter Ingman
On the 19th of February 1942 Darwin was struck by a massive air raid at nearly 10 in the morning. 188 aircraft from four aircraft carriers, in a 17 vessel battle group, hit the town
76 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 and harbour with high level bombing from Kate three-man bombers; Val two-man dive bombers, all escorted by Zero fighters, which demolished the resistance from a mere 10 P-40 Kittyhawk fighters of the United States Army Air Force. Eleven ships were sunk, 30 aircraft destroyed, and 235 people died. The Imperial Japanese Navy lost four aircraft and two aircrew.
This massive raid has been described in detail several times, with the most comprehensive account in Carrier Attack, by this author and Peter Ingman. What has changed the Peary story is the discovery on 15 May 2020 of two propellers on the seabed of the harbour. Discovered, and then subsequently explored in some detail, the fascinating find was made by Grant Treloar, Roland Hugli, and Clive Bartsch, all local scuba divers. They were searching for the lost Sunderland aircraft Corinthian. The propellers, with one blade upright and two within the seabed, had shafts and struts attached. In Grant’s words, ‘There was lots of wreckage, all much smashed up, very difficult to recognise. It looked like a catastrophic event had happened. The wreckage is scattered over 200 metre debris field, but we found one large piece 118m away.’4
Site sketch – courtesy of the dive team
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 77 So, what happened on the day of the action when Peary was sent to her death, along with 88 members of her ship’s company, by the aircraft of the Japanese Navy?
The Peary was a 22 year old destroyer, carrying four funnels which gave her a very dated look. In her original measurements she displaced 1,190 tons and was 314 feet in length. She was armed with four 4-inch low-angle guns; one 3-inch anti-aircraft (AA) gun (nominally – see later notes), and eight machineguns. She also carried twelve 21-inch torpedo tubes in four triple mounts. Launched in 1920 and named after the famous Arctic explorer Robert E Peary, the destroyer was serving in the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines when the Pacific War began. She seemed to have had more than her share of bad luck. Before the Darwin visit she was hit by a bomb in the Philippines which killed eight of her crew, then attacked by three Australian Lockheed Hudsons which mistook her for a Japanese ship.
USS Peary (Source Unknown)
After escorting the USS Langley to the West Australian coast, Peary sped back to Darwin to take part in the Timor Convoy venture. On the night of 18 February, she left port again in company with the cruiser USS Houston but was detached to aid the corvette HMAS Townsville in a submarine search just outside the harbour. The search was unsuccessful,
78 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 but so much fuel was burned up that she needed to return to harbour for fuel. She anchored in berth F-3 at about 1am, early in the morning of 19 February.5
The records of the Peary, and the exact description of her last movements, as given by her command team of officers, are not known, as the captain, Lieutenant Commander John Mark Bermingham, USN, died with the ship, as did all of the officers aboard except Lieutenant RL Johnson, USNR. Her final action was officially described by one ofher officers, Lieutenant WJ Catlett USN, in a report of 6 March 1942 to the Secretary of the Navy.6 Catlett was not on board for the action however; being temporarily detached for medical treatment. He interviewed witnesses from Peary, USS William B Preston, USAT Meigs, and Australian Hospital Ship Manunda. His report reads:
At about 1045, the USS Peary was attacked by single motored Japanese dive- bombers. The first bomb exploded either on the fantail or very close thereto, removing both propeller guards, depth charge racks and flooding the steering motor room. The second bomb landed on the galley deck house and was an incendiary bomb. The third bomb pierced the main deck and went through the hull of number two (steaming) fireroom. It did not explode. The fourth bomb hit forward and set off the forward ammunition magazines. The fifth bomb, an incendiary, exploded in the after engine room. The USS Peary sank, stern first, at about 1300, February 19, 1942.7
Like most of the ships present, the first indication that Peary would have had of an enemy raid was the high level Kate bombers being directly overhead, and bombs falling in the near vicinity. Like all warships present in Darwin that morning, steam pressure was maintained so the ships could get underway at short notice. Anchored, the four- funnel destroyer would be an easy target, but the ship still had steam up. Lieutenant Commander Bermingham would have given orders to raise anchor so he could head for searoom and present the attacking aircraft with a moving target. But raising the chain and anchor slowed down his actions, and the ship was a slow-moving target.
5 1. LT CATLETT - PEARY-Report of engagement with the enemy. National Archives Identifier: 133884510 Container Identifier: Roll A3 HMS Entry Number(s): P 17, UD-WW 46. Creator: Department of the Navy. 2. Action Report,USS Peary, DD-226, 6 March 1942; USS Peary (DD-226) engagement with enemy – report of Lieutenant WJ Catlett. http://destroyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf This extremely lengthy (129 pages) collection of documents was collected by E. Andrew Wilde, Jr. as Editor. In the final page of the col- lection an explanation is given: Wilde, himself retired from the USN, had from 1993 researched WWII destroyers. His findings were not for sale but rather offered to family members of personnel who served on these ships. The PDF file is made up of scans of the original documents; news clippings, and so on. Catlett’s 13 page report listed at 1 is included. 6 Wilde Collection.http://des troyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf 7 Wilde Collection.http://des troyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf (pp: 1-2 of the report)
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 79 Why did Peary not merely slip8 her anchor and chain for a quicker getaway? According to Dallas Widick, an anchor-party survivor who later visited Darwin, the anchor probably was never fully recovered. Instead, he related, chain was taken in but the anchor was never off the bottom. Mel Duke, who was thePeary's bosun's mate, thinks that the anchor was ‘short-stayed’– just resting on the seabed – and the ship lifted it enough to allow the ship some movement, although the drag and weight would have been immediately noticeable to Bermingham and the bridge team.9 Normally a captain would not start manoeuvring until certain that the anchor was clear of the seabed, with the anchor being ‘sighted’. Under the extreme danger facing Peary on that day, it is possible that the captain chose to start moving as soon as he believed the anchor was off the bottom, or very close to it. But he would continue to heave the anchor clear of the water surface as quickly as he possibly could, even as he was making way.
It was likely the destroyer had only one anchor, and that was holding her to the seabed. To let it go and have no anchor at all would have been dangerous: anchors are essential equipment; it’s an oft-quoted maxim at sea, generally after something has gone wrong, that ships don't have handbrakes as cars do. You need an anchor to stay in one place, especially in big tidal areas such as Darwin, with tidal flows of up to seven yards or metres in six hours. If you get into a situation where you lose engine power it's the only way of not running aground in an emergency – that is if the water is not too deep. Having an anchor also allows you to kedge if you run aground: moving the anchor to another place then dragging the ship towards it, although you need two for really efficient warping. If you have no anchor that is to place the ship in a most serious situation. No captain will lose one if they can possibly avoid it.
Bermingham had no way of knowing what he was up against in the raid. Peary had survived level-bombing attacks in the Timor Sea. There she had the protection of Houston’s guns; now her skipper probably reasoned they had protection of the Darwin area guns. Probably the last thing he expected were swarms of low level dive bombers. If he only had one anchor on the foredeck – the other buoyed somewhere or they'd lost it – then he would take the extra minute to raise his last anchor, rather than slip the pin and lose it entirely. Buoying it would take just as much time or even more. The buoy wasn't routinely carried on the foredeck: it was large and light, prone to wind forces as well as
8 Commander Chris Kerr of the Royal Australian Navy advised me: ‘An alternative to heaving up the chain and anchor may have been to “slip the anchor” (ie. release the chain from the ship), either by removing one of the joining shackles that connect the 15 fathom lengths of anchor chain together, or releasing the “bitter end” fitting that connects the inboard end of the chain to the ship. However slipping an anchor can also be a lengthy process if not already prepared to do it.’ (Communication with the author July 2020) 9 Mel Duke, Interview with the author for Wrecks in Darwin Waters, Darwin 1992. Also used in A War at Home, pp 25-26.
80 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 getting in the way of the foredeck party. So the anchor was probably hoisted, and merely short-stayed, and Peary lost vital seconds.10
What is generally agreed is that the ship's guns engaged the Japanese aircraft, but Peary had no really effective anti-aircraft armament. Her four low-angle 4-inch guns were suitable only against surface targets although they would likely have been fired at any possible low-flying aircraft. For AA protection the destroyer had four 0.30 calibre machineguns on the after deck house, and four 0.50 calibre machineguns on the galley deck house.11 She was originally equipped with one – some accounts say two – short- barrelled 3-inch AA gun on the aft deck, but it seems clear this had been removed. There is no mention of it being used in air engagements in USN records. For example, in an action against three Hudson bombers which mistook her for enemy the Peary report described, ‘The .50 and .30 caliber machine guns of the Peary were kept firing during each attack’.12
Peary was the only warship sunk in the action, and this has always been a bit of a mystery. The two RAN sloops Swan and Warrego – armed with high-angle four inch guns rather than the low-angle model on the Peary, plus either quad Vickers machineguns or a formidable array of the excellent 20mm Oerlikon – put up a good defence, and the smaller corvettes too, although Deloraine could not move as she was having her boilers cleaned.13 The ships that were sunk were all relatively unarmed: tankers British Motorist and Karalee;
10 To author Lewis’s knowledge – and he wrote Wrecks in Darwin Waters, requiring years of research and ex- ploration – no anchor from Peary has been discovered. That this would not have been found post-war is not surprising: Darwin harbour is deep, murky, and large. Moreover, Peary’s final wreck site was some considerable distance from where she had started off, as will be explained later. But as Darwin Harbour was cleared of wrecks, and as technology has improved, so too has the exploration of the seabed in this busy port yielded interesting finds. Anchors are significant items: like ships’ bells sacred items, to be displayed and treasured. A destroyer anchor would be large and heavy and not easily taken away. No anchor has been found on the wreck site either, and Fujita Salvage – Japanese and sensitive to reaction against them – would have been more likely to surren- der such an item to the 1960 shore authorities when they were salvaging the ship as part of their operations in 1959-1960. 11 Wilde Collection. http://destroyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf 12 Wilde Collection.h ttp://destroyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf (pp: 443 - typed number rath- er than actual) 13 Warrego had the best and most modern AA armament in the harbour – three 4-inch Mk XVI guns in one twin and one single turret. With recent combat experience in the Timor Sea, it is probable that the effective naval AA fire was led by this ship. Her guns were the very first into action as they had been having a gun drill. As the- ac tion alarm sounded, the cable party rushed to the forecastle where they hurriedly knocked out the anchor cable pin, leaving the anchor and cable on the seabed. Warrego was then able to manoeuvre in the harbour. When the divebombers arrived, Warrego’s fire control system was overwhelmed with so many fast-moving targets, and her guns fired independently.Swan’s guns were able to engage most aircraft attacking the ship. During a hectic period her CO, Lieutenant Commander Travis, reported the sloop was attacked seven times. ‘All bombs that were dropped missed astern’; according to Travis ‘presumably because I was steaming at 14 knots into a fresh breeze and using maximum rudder’. See Bradford, John. In the Highest Traditions. SA: Seaview Press, 2000. (p.61) The secondary armament was likely a quad Vickers .303 system, but at some stage in WWII the sloops were fitted instead with up to seven 20mm Oerlikons.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 81 freighters Neptuna, Mauna Loa, Meigs and Zealandia; lugger HMAS Mavie, and coal hulk Kelat, and several small launches and working vessels. Why a heavily armed destroyer would be sunk is strange considering her fellow warships survived. But as will be seen, Peary was not only anchored, but was crippled: her entire stern was blasted away.
Clemson-class Blueprint. Possible line of hull severance shown at the red line. © US Navy
The timing of Peary’s last movements
In this analysis, we are interested in the precise details of Peary’s last moments, for this can lead to how accurate we can be in assessing whether the propellers belong to the destroyer. The accounts given below have been arranged from the briefest duration afloat to the longest; accounts which do not specify a time are given last.
• Preston’s Officer of the Deck, Lieutenant Wood said that they were about 300 yards from the Peary when it was hit: ‘... the Peary was struck and immediately burst into a complete envelope of flames and sunk shortly thereafter.’14
14 Lieutenant LO Wood, USN. Report to CO of USS William B Preston, 21 Feb 1942, p. 2. (In the possession of the author)
82 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 • Lieutenant Herb Kriloff of theP reston said: ‘USS Peary was now abeam to starboard, perhaps three to four hundred yards distant. The both of us made fine targets. Two groups of fighters and dive bombers now launched a co-ordinated attack. We were to port, and just forward of Peary, starting to pull further ahead, when we were both strafed and bombed. In seconds, Peary was enveloped in a ball of flame. She continued detonating until disappearing from view. The explosion was blindingly bright, and when you opened your eyes, it took time to adjust.’15 • Len Gable saw Peary subjected to very heavy bombing and then sinking quickly with water awash on her weather deck and guns firing. He thought she then was suddenly enveloped in flames and then sank fast.16 • Gunner Jack Mulholland, up in the cliffs only some hundreds of yards away, thought her sinking happened ‘within 10 minutes’ of the raid commencement.17 • Pat Forster, sightingPeary ‘only 300 metres away from us’ related that ‘she sank into the flames, disappearing without trace within fifteen minutes’, and later thought that ‘the USS Peary was sunk first; I saw the bow sticking out of the water’.18 19 • Able Seaman George Ireland on board HMAS Platypus said: ‘We tried to cover Peary as best we could, but we couldn’t ... we watched the dive bombers come in one in after another. And the first hit amidships, and then she got one on the bridge, and then she broke in two. The for’d gun was still firing …’20 • Dallis (sic) Widick: ‘The ship went to battle stations, but we were at anchor, which had to be raised. That was part of my job. The front of the ship was coming out of the water. All of the officers onboard were dead, so the chief boatswain’s mate gave the order to abandon ship. We all jumped over the side.’21 • Stoker Frank Marsh who was on the Deloraine nearby, says the Peary was anchored not far from his own ship, and was ‘hit early’, being quickly set on fire. ‘It definitely moved around in a semi¬circle but was moving22 astern.’
15 Commander Herb Kriloff, USN, (Rtd) Officer of the Deck. California: Pacifica Press, 2000, p. 131. 16 Northern Territory Archives Service. Gable, Leonard – NTRS 2855. Unpublished eyewitness account. Box PB 107, pp. 2-3. Mr Gable was only willing for a paraphrase of his exact remarks to be made. 17 Mulholland, Jack. Interview with the author. 25 November 2011. 18 Pat Forster, Interview with the author, 10 Jan 2012. 19 Pat Forster, The Navy in Darwin. Darwin: Museums and Art Galleries of the Northern Territory, 1992, p. 22, and p. 24. 20 GW Ireland, ‘HMAS Platypus in Darwin during blitz 19 February 1942‘, Naval Historical Society of Australia. http:// www.navyhistory.org.au/hmas-platypus-in-darwin-during-blitz-19-february-1942/ Accessed May 2012, p.5. 21 Wilde Collection.http://des troyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf (p. 123 of the report, quoting an article from thePortsmouth Herald, 21 June 1988.) 22 Frank Marsh, Diary Entries. Supplied to the author in the 1990s. Published originally in Lewis, Tom. A War at Home, Darwin: Tall Stories, 2000. Extract from third edition, 2007, p. 25.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 83 • Peary crewmember Mel Duke remembered: ‘Then the divebombers came in. We tried to get under way, but we got one hit amidships, then a couple in the after section, and she caught on fire 23…’ • Able Seaman Harry Dale on board Karangi said that ‘Peary who is only a few hundred yards away from us is putting up plenty of flack and machinegun fire … there are five divebombers they seem to be hidden in the cloud, they are dropping everything at her.’24 • George Boniface, 5th Engineer of the Neptuna, recalled: ‘The destroyer USS Peary was on fire and sinking although we could see the flash of her guns still firing; an oil tanker was on fire while smoke from theBarossa , plus the smoke from the Neptuna explosion, blanketed the harbour.’25 • The captain of HMAS Southern Cross, Lieutenant Commander Symonds, reported Peary sinking fast as the very first part of the harbour action he saw: ‘The examination vessel HMAS Southern Cross, an unarmed ship except for two rifles, slipped from the buoy [600 yards from Darwin’s main jetty] as the first bombs fell on Main jetty, [all] hands at stations for air attack and proceeded at full speed away from the vicinity of Jetty. The US destroyerPeary was seen on the Port side fiercely ablaze from stem to stern, sinking and with two men already in the water.’26
Conclusion as to the timing of the sinking
It is notable that all of those who place a timing on the sinking have it within 15 minutes from the raid start at 095827 as a maximum. How Lieutenant Catlett arrived at 1300 hours (1pm) is not known. In fact, the whole report of Peary’s sinking within the US Navy is extremely short on detail: dated 6 March 1942, two weeks after the sinking, it covers only two pages, but the ship’s movements and combat actions in the two months beforehand cover scores of pages.
23 ‘Peary lost but Mel’s back to tell’. News clipping from unidentified newspaper, in possession of the authors. 24 Able Seaman Harry Dale. Diary extracts. ‘Life in Darwin on 19th February 1942 and after as experienced by Able Seaman Harry Dale F3298 and by part of the crew on board HMAS Karangi’. North Australia Collection, NT Library, p. 4. 25 George W Boniface, Personal recollections of the bombing of Darwin – 1942 / written in 1987. Northern Territo- ry Library. http://hdl.handle.net/10070/229921. Accessed November 2011. 26 John Bradford, In the Highest Traditions. SA: Seaview Press, 2000, p. 69. 27 The raid actually started two minutes earlier in Darwin. Six Zeroes had been tasked to attack Bathurst Island, where a C-53 transport aircraft was on the runway. They strafed it, with some of the machinegun fire hitting a small radio hut in which missionary Father McGrath was radioing a warning, and then set off for Darwin directly, rather than following the circular track of the main force, which would attack the town with the element of sur- prise a south-east strike would give. The six Zeroes attacked ships at the boom net, some eight kilometres from the town. (See Carrier Attack, pp: 95-98)
84 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Frustratingly, Catlett did not name the witnesses he spoke to. How the witnesses from the Preston were interviewed is not known: she left harbour later that morning; proceeded down the west coast of Australia, and finally ended up many weeks later in Sydney for repairs, after trying without avail to have the ship’s extreme damage – the stern nearly fell off – fixed in other ports.Preston’s people could have given some indication ofPeary’s sinking to Catlett by radio Morse code, but there is no indication of this in first hand accounts such as Lieutenant Kriloff’s extremely detailed book which recounts Preston’s adventures day by day for several months afterwards.28
Who and what sank the ship? (See explanatory footnote29)
• Peary crewmember Dallas Widick said: ‘The first bomb was aft … the third bomb hit the bridge.’30 However in a newspaper interview he said the Peary ‘took five hits, from the stern – rear – to the bridge. The fifth and final hit struck the magazine. The ship exploded.’31 • Peary crewmember Laurence T Farley was thrown into the sea by one explosion and burnt, dived overboard, to be recovered by the Manunda. However, the headline of the article carrying his interview stating five hits was not borne out by his comments.32 • Peary crewmember Mel Duke on board the Peary was in ‘the well deck between the bridge and the galley deck’ when ‘the first bomb hit aft’. Within ‘seconds one more hit the bridge and another the galley deck house’.33 He said the galley roof machineguns definitely engaged.34 • Duke in another interview thought that the ship was ‘hit five times from the stern up to the bridge, and the one that hit the bridge went in down to the forward
28 Commander Herb Kriloff, USN, (Rtd) Officer of the Deck. California: Pacifica Press, 2000. Kriloff was well known to this author, and the events of the harbour were discussed between us several times. He provided no more detail, during such conversations, than is given in this article as to the last moments ofPeary . Whether there is some additional document within US Navy records with a more detailed report from Catlett is unknown, but it would seem unlikely: the level of detail of the Peary files contained in the Wilde Collection would suggest a thorough search was done. 29 There are 986 articles about Peary in Australian newspapers and gazettes as contained in the Trove database. Many contain extremely wild reporting, and appear generated by the excitement of the bullion story. An analysis of them has been made for this article. 30 Northern Territory Archives Service. Duke, Melvin & Widick, Dallas - NTRS 1942. Reference copies of oral history sound recordings on compact disks, 1999-n.d. CD 531. (6.20 – 6.30) 31 Wilde Collection. Portsmouth Herald. ‘Guns quiet not memories’ 21 June 1988. http://destroyerhistory.org/as- sets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf , p. 123. 32 Townsville Daily Bulletin. ‘LOSS OF USS PEARY Suffered Five Direct Hits’. 11 April 1942 - p. 4 33 Robert Rayner, The Army and the Defence of Darwin Fortress, NSW: Rudder Press, 1995, p. 199. 34 Mel Duke, Interview with the author for Wrecks in Darwin Waters, Darwin 1992. Also used in A War at Home, pp 25-26.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 85 magazine and the forward magazine exploded, and I believe at that time it broke the ship in two.’35 • A somewhat melodramatic report in the Washington Evening Star reported four bombs hit the ship, and a fifth near-missed near the bridge.36 • Gunner Mulholland, on the clifftops above the harbour, with a task of spotting enemy aircraft for his AA gun to target, was in an excellent position to see the harbour fight. He thought Peary was hit by the divebombers.37 In his book Darwin Bombed he said Peary ‘did not appear to be moving or taking evasive action and was hit several times’. • The Japanese report, which goes into extensive detail about what targets they hit, is specific about ship type. ‘A unit of Val carrier-based bombers from Sôryû (led by Lieutenant-Commander Egusa Takashige) - The 1st Company (nine carrier-based bombers): ‘Sank one destroyer on fire, set one destroyer on fire, set one medium- sized merchant ship on fire, and set a heavy oil tank on fire; our side received no damage.’38 • George Haritos said: ‘I saw the Peary get hit, and I saw the British Motoristcop one practically down the funnel, or it looked like it from over there – she was an oil tanker. The Peary was an American destroyer, and it was going down and still firing the for’ard guns.’39 • Able Seaman Harry Dale on board Karangi noted after seeing the Peary hit repeatedly that ‘the ships along side the wharf have just blown up … we have ducked for cover, shrapnel is falling everywhere.’40 AB Dale had seen the US destroyer firing and then recalled ‘the Peary has just been hit again, she is on fire, she never managed to get up any speed.’ Later he recorded: ‘she’s sinking stern first nearly under now, the forward turret is still firing41 …’
35 Northern Territory Archives Service. Duke, Melvin & Widick, Dallas - NTRS 1942. Reference copies of oral history sound recordings on compact discs, 1999-n.d. CD 531. (3.45 – 4.00) 36 Wilde Collection. ‘Destroyer Peary, Creaky Navy “Tin Can” Sank Gamely Fighting Swarm of Japanese Bombers.’ 6 April 1942. http://destroyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf , p. 109. 37 Jack Mulholland, Interview with the author. 25 November 2011, p.131. 38 Bôeichô Bôei Kenshûjo Senshishitsu (p. 351) Also see the Combined Fleet website. http://www.combinedfleet. com Combined Fleet movements 15 February 1942: DesRon 1's Abukuma departs Palau with the Carrier Striking Force's CarDiv 1's AKAGI, Car Div 2's Hiryu and Soryu, CruDiv 8's Chikuma and Tone and DesDiv 17's Urakaze, Isokaze, Tanikaze and Hamakaze and DesDiv 18's Kasumi, Shiranuhi and Ariake. Accessed May 2012. 39 Northern Territory Archives Service, NTRS 226, Typed transcripts of oral history interviews with 'TS' prefix, 1979- ct, George Haritos, TS 662, p. 7. 40 Able Seaman Harry Dale, Diary extracts. “Life in Darwin on 19th February 1942 and after as experienced by Able Seaman Harry Dale F3298 and by part of the crew on board HMAS Karangi”. North Australia Collection, NT Library, p. 4. 41 Able Seaman Harry Dale, Diary extracts. “Life in Darwin on 19th February 1942 and after as experienced by Able Seaman Harry Dale F3298 and by part of the crew on board HMAS Karangi”. North Australia Collection, NT Library, pp. 4-5.
86 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 • Frank Marsh recalled: ‘… there were several explosions aboard Peary but not a final big sinking. It sank nearer to the hospital ship Manunda … It went down stern first.’42 • Pat Forster said: ‘The Peary … slowly slid stern first into a huge oil slick which had already caught alight.’43 • Machinegunner Bill Chipman was in action on HMAS Kangaroo, a boom defence vessel, near the Peary. He saw the ship dive-bombed – in fact he engaged the Val to no effect – ‘then after the loud explosion on the Peary we saw some of the crew on the forward deck; the after part of the ship was under water, and the chaps on the forward deck were still firing their guns as she drifted away, and eventually she went completely under.’44 • Chief Officer Minto on the bridge of hospital ship Manunda, 10 minutes after the first bomb, noted: ‘Another American destroyer was on our port side, a solid mass of flame with burning oil all round her and what was left of the crew jumping into the burning oil.’45 • Don Clegg, on board the Australian corvette Warrnambool, recalls: ‘the nearest ship was the Peary which was an American four-stacker destroyer and it was hit, and I must say I had a lot of time for the American sailors, when you see these fellows still manning their anti-aircraft guns with their ankles under water46 …’ • Bill Eacott was at the Esplanade ‘overlooking the jetty, and saw the ships burning. It has been said that the Peary went down with its guns blazing, but I don‘t know that can be so, because there was nothing to blaze away at when I saw it going down. The Japanese had gone.’47
The Peary story of guns firing until the last is logically true enough if one accepts that the battle was over for her in 10-12 minutes. The sinking was so quick that there was probably no abandon ship order given, and her gunners would necessarily have stayed at their posts. But it is difficult to get a fully accurate picture; she certainly did not fight for long, and accounts such as a Wikipedia entry for October 201248 saying she fought until
42 Frank Marsh, Diary Entries. Supplied to the author in the 1990s. Published originally in Lewis, Tom. A War at Home, Darwin: Tall Stories, 2000. Extract from third edition, 2007, p. 26. 43 Pat Forster, The Navy in Darwin. Darwin: Museums and Art Galleries of the Northern Territory, 1992, p. 24. 44 Northern Territory Archives Service. Chipman, Bill - NTRS 226. Typed transcripts of oral history interviews with ‘TS’ prefix. TS 177, p. 7. 45 G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942. Melbourne: Collins, 1957, p. 593. 46 Northern Territory Archives Service. Clegg, Don - NTRS 226. Typed transcripts of oral history interviews with ‘TS’ prefix. TS 177, p. 8. 47 Northern Territory Archives Service. Eacott, W.E. (Bill) - NTRS 226. Typed transcripts of oral history interviews with ‘TS’ prefix. TS 758, Tape 3, p. 3. 48 Wikipedia entry on USS Peary, accessed 6 October 2012: ‘A .30 caliber machinegun on the after deck house and a .50 caliber machinegun on the galley deck house fired until the last enemy plane flew away.Peary suffered 88 men killed and 13 wounded; she sank stern first at about 1300 on 19 February 1942.’
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 87 1pm – probably derived from Catlett – are ridiculous. No-one except Catlett, who wasn’t there, says that.
Peary was hit by several aircraft bombs, dropped from the Vals. Crewmembers Duke, Widick, the commander of nine Vals Lieutenant Commander Takashige, and Bill Chipman all specified dive bombers. It was not hit by one of the 800kg bombs carried by the Kates, but rather several of the 250kg bombs carried by the dive bombers.
Aircraft No. Aborts Total Ordnance Ordnance Tonnage launched attacking load released (kgs) B5N2 81 Nil 81 One x 81 x 800kg 64,800kg Kates 800kg bomb D3A1 71 Nil 71 – one One x 69 (2 x hang- 17,250kg Vals lost after 250kg ups – Vals release bomb returned with bombs)
A6M2 36 Nil 36 Nil Nil Nil Zeroes Totals 188 Nil 188 152 bombs 150 bombs 82,050kg
It is indeed logical to conclude the Vals hit the destroyer, rather than the Kates. The bigger bombers’ attack run took them in a straight line over town and harbour, and indeed the left flank of the flights may well have sunk the US transports Mauna Loa and Meigs. But an 800kg bomb hitting a much smaller ship such as the Peary would likely have resulted in her wholesale destruction, although admittedly a near miss would have caused less damage. Two witnesses, both on the bridge of the USS William B Preston, Lieutenant Herb Kriloff and Lieutenant Wood, the Officer of the Deck, thought there was one explosion which sunk the ship, but four witnesses thought several divebombers inflicted the damage; two witnesses – Dale and March – said there were respectively two and ‘several’ hits. (The very big explosion might have been the destroyer’s stern-placed depth charges detonating.) The Kate overflight was through in a few minutes, with 9 x 9 aircraft flights from the south-east taking place at the beginning of the raid. It was after the Kate release the 71 Vals moved in to attack targets of opportunity; the smaller aircraft could not strike before that as they would have been underneath the falling ordnance of the higher aircraft.
88 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 How many Peary people died?
The Killed In Action number for Peary has been the subject of much change over the years since the sinking. The original figure given in many histories is 80 or 81 sailors killed in the action. However, around the time of the 1992 commemoration of the Darwin raids it was revised by survivor Dallas Widick, who after finding his own name on a memorial plaque, set the number at 91. He counted those of the crew who survived the sinking and said that 91 died – a substantial amount of the total of 235 people lost in the Darwin attack. Given further revision through the highly researched Northern Territory Roll of Honour website, operated by the NT Library, it now stands at 88.49
Incidentally the fatality count of United States citizens and men contracted by the country – for example, the crews of the freighters Don Isidro and Florence D, both sunk in the afternoon off the Tiwi Islands – was higher than those from Australia. One hundred and twenty-eight out of 235 who died were from the USA.50
Finding the wreck
Efforts through the war and immediately afterwards failed to locate the wreck of the destroyer. The author of Darwin Drama, Owen Griffiths, writing in 1943, commented that ‘although a party from the ship later dragged for her systematically the only relic recovered was a part of one of the hawsers’. A USA Graves Registration Service unit also spent a week endeavouring to locate the ship in 1948, but to no avail.51
Some of the efforts to find the sunken destroyer may have been motivated by popular reports that the Peary contained a ‘fortune in gold bullion’ when she sank. Douglas Lockwood's book Australia's Pearl Harbour, Darwin 1942 suggested that Peary took the gold aboard before sailing from the Philippines.52 Various other contemporary sources also reported the story. The tale still circulated even after the salvaging of much of the destroyer. As late as 1970, a Neville Harding of Sydney ‘... and his diving team’ were reported by the West Australian Department of Shipping & Transport to be coming to Darwin to attempt the search for bullion. A 1975 edition of the Victorian RSL magazine
49 NT Roll of Honour. http://www.ntlexhibit.nt.gov.au/exhibits/show/bod/roh/location 50 Lewis, Dr Tom. ‘The American Alliance – founded in blood and sacrifice in Darwin.’Headmark , No. 149, Sep 2013. (pp: 44-45). The NT Roll of Honour also lists the names of the fallen – see http://www.ntlexhibit.nt.gov.au/ exhibits/show/bod/roh/location 51 Find a Grave. https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/87967748/willis-charlie-shook National Archives of Austra- lia. Sinking of US PEARY. MP138/1, 603/295/2022. Contains correspondence from 1949 advising the US Navy had no further interest in finding the wreck. 52 Douglas Lockwood, Australia's Pearl Harbour. Melbourne: Cassell, 1966, pp. 164-165.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 89 Mufti reported of the Peary ‘... with her wreckage to the Harbour bottom went a fortune in Dutch bullion’. The question had been resolved 18 years previously however when the Director of Naval History for the USN wrote to a Mrs Palermo, whose son had died in the action. He advised that (by-then) Captain Catlett had reported, in answer to the question, the destroyer had indeed transported gold bullion across Manilla Bay, on 26 Dec 1941, for the Philippines Government into General MacArthur’s fortress of Corregidor. However, Catlett had personally supervised the transfer of the gold ashore.53
As the war ended Darwin moved back to being a working port. Several of the wrecked ships were visible at low tide, and one – the Neptuna – lay on her side near the main wharf. It would appear that as part of an effort to clear the harbour some of the wrecks were sold, but the exact details of the sale has not been fully investigated here.54 Peary was finally found in 1956 by the naval vessel HMAS Quadrant, which passed across the top of the wreck by accident, but with suitable equipment functioning and alert watchkeepers. After Peary was located she was officially declared not to be a hazard to navigation. But the wreck did lie in the port's quarantine area where it was considered by the harbourmaster to be a possible hazard to anchoring vessels. This may have been a factor in Peary's eventual disposal in 1960 to – ironically – a Japanese company, Fujita Salvage, who contracted to remove most of the harbour wrecks when two Australian companies failed to arrive as tendered.
The salvage process was probably started in the 1950s by Carl Atkinson, a commercial diver who maintained a workshop in Doctor’s Gully, only a little way from the wreck site. Atkinson was an entrepreneurial diver. He bought some of the harbour wrecks, and landed parts of their cargo.55 Deccaville tracking – the metal mesh used by the Allies to lay down airstrips in the jungle – tools, salvageable metal; all were recovered by Atkinson and often sold. He landed the Peary’s binnacle and wheel and at least one of her guns, although it is unsure if he actually owned the wreck: a letter from the USN to a crewmember’s parent disputes that he did.56
53 Wilde Collection.http://des troyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf, pp. 121-122. 54 For example: “Oceanic Salvage Company Pty. Ltd” was reported in The Advertiser, 25 Apr 1953, p. 4, ‘now in receivership’ as selling the wrecks of Peary and other vessels, despite the destroyer being acknowledged as not found. Other reports name Meigs, Mauna Loa, and Zealandia. A USN LST was reported as being involved in the Peary search in 1948. 55 Japanese salvage operations - Fujita Salvage Company Darwin - Part 1. Contents range 1956 – 1960. Series num- ber A6980. Control symbol S250368. Barcode 7115269. Copy of a letter from Atkinson to the Commonwealth where he asserts he owns Meigs, Mauna Loa, Zealandia and Peary, p. 168-169 and proposes bringing Fujita Salvage to town. 56 Wilde Collection.http://des troyerhistory.org/assets/pdf/wilde/226peary_wilde.pdf, pp. 121-122. Rear Admiral Eller, USN, said in the letter a report in theSunday Star-Ledger, of 2 December 1956, where Atkinson was report- ed as selling the wreck to the Okadagumi Japanese company was incorrect, as ‘the USS Peary belongs to the US Navy’.
90 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Carl Atkinson with the binnacle and wheel from the USS Peary. They are now in the Australian War Memorial. (Lewis Collection)
The US Navy was concerned about the disturbance of any human remains of their sailors who had died with the ship, and the return57 of any cipher equipment. After some negotiation through the Australian federal government, it was agreed that if the ship was searched for human remains, and any found were recovered, then salvage would be acceptable.
Peary’s final resting place, in a 30 metre deep hole almost directly out from what was originally the Novatel Atrium Hotel on Darwin's Esplanade, is some kilometres from her supposed58 original anchorage, which would account for the US Graves Registration Service's fruitless attempt to locate her. It was there over the top of the wreck that divers from the RAN anchored in 1959, and commenced their search, which lasted several days.
57 National Archives of Australia. ‘Japanese salvage operations - Fujita Salvage Company Darwin’ - Part 1: Contents range 1956 – 1960. Series number A6980. Control symbol S250368. Access status Open. Barcode 7115269. p. 88.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 91 Bill Fitzgerald, a ex-Royal Australian Navy Diver, recalls that the diving was almost all completely carried out in zero-visibility conditions, with the searches conducted by feel.59 They dived at slack water to clear the torpedo impact pistols and other material. The team was tasked with recovering the warheads from the torpedoes, but these had so much salt-water damage they had disintegrated. There were 12 torpedo tubes present minus one which, Bill recalled, Carl Atkinson had taken to make into a recompression chamber. The team took the propellers off the torpedoes and mounted them on a polished board and ‘gave them to the RSL for beer’.
Bill thought the Peary had five hits from bombs – there had been explosions near the ship’s magazines, and big holes had been blown through the hull in places. They removed the remains of ‘quite a few’ of the deceased for the US Navy.
Asked about the propellers, Bill said he had the impression ‘some of it’ was there. The destroyer was vertical; only listing a little to the starboard side. The divers swam into the after end of the ship through the ship’s hull on both sides. He did not notice whether the props were present as the bottom of the hull was ‘well into the mud’, and it was very hard to dive because of tides and mud. It was ‘pitch black’ on many penetrations and the divers navigated by feeling their way around.
Following the RAN dives, Fujita Salvage cut away the top hull and deck steel of the wreck, finishing their operations in early 1961. The wreck site today does not resemble the remains of a ship at all.60 The destroyer’s keel sections are thought by local divers to remain under the seabed, with the rest of the site consisting of various loose items such as ladders, pieces of piping, and pieces of largely unidentifiable metal. Empty brass shell cases of the Peary’s bigger guns, showing they were fired in the action, have often been found on the site, as have various smaller artefacts.
In 1992, one of the four-inch guns, either the forward weapon, or one of the two midship guns, recovered from Carol Atkinson, was mounted on the Esplanade, pointing out to sea to the spot where the Peary's wreck remains lie, for 50th anniversary commemoration ceremonies. On the seaward side of the gun is a plate presented by former crewmember Dallas Widick, displaying his revised list of the 91 crew lost. The captain of the USS Robert E Peary, an American Knox-class destroyer – the descendent of the WWII ship, albeit with
59 Interview with Bill Fitzgerald, ex-RAN diver, in a nursing home in Sydney, and T Lewis, 23 June 2020, by tele- phone. 60 See author Lewis’s book Wrecks in Darwin Waters. He dived on the Peary several times to gain material for the book. Well known diver Phil Franklin dived the wreck probably scores of times, and produced a sketch map of the entire site.
92 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 a slightly changed name – present for the 1992 commemoration, was presented with a brass shell casing and the original wardroom keys, recovered from the wreck by local scuba divers Warren Allen and Phil Franklin.
Herb Kriloff and a gun from the USS Peary, sister-ship to his USS William B Preston, in 2012. Photographer: Jared Archibald
In 2008, the last surviving crew member of the ship, Dallis Widick, passed away. His family travelled to Darwin from the United States to scatter his ashes over the shipwreck. ‘That’s exactly what my husband wanted. He wanted to be buried with his friends in Darwin’, his widow, Lorna Widick, told local news.61
What does the find of stern sections of the ship add to the story? The three divers contacted the Heritage Department of the Northern Territory, who began extensive investigations into the possibilities, driven primarily by their responsibility to safeguard items of historical significance.
61 ABC News. ‘Bombing survivor gets his dying wish’.19 Feb 2009. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-02-19/ bombing-survivor-gets-his-dying-wish/301680 ‘Dallis’ is also reported as ‘Dallas’ in numerous articles.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 93 One of the primary questions was whether separation of the wreck into two sites was possible. The immediate answer was yes, for this has happened in many sinkings, of both warships and civilian vessels. Perhaps the most famous is the Titanic disaster of 1912. The liner gradually settled by the bows after her collision with an iceberg, and in her final plunge to the seabed broke in half. The bow of the warship HMAS Sydney broke away in her last combat action.62 This confirms the German account of her being torpedoed during her 1941 fight with the German raider Kormoran. The destroyer USS Abner Read hit an enemy mine on 18 August 1943. The stern and a five inch gun were detached in the ensuing explosion, although the rest of the ship remained afloat.63 About 35 feet of the German battleship Bismarck’s stern became detached and fell off in her final battle against the Royal Navy in 1941. She was struck in the stern by one air-launched torpedo, and then later in a gun battle by numerous shell strikes before turning turtle.
Internal explosions can account for severe structural damage resulting in sections becoming detached. The Japanese battleship Musashi, with her sister-ship Yamato the most heavily armed battleships ever built, likely suffered an explosion from a magazine which resulted in her stern becoming separated; it now rests at the wreck site upside down.64 The same cause – battle damage resulting in a magazine explosion – caused the loss of HMS Hood in World War II. (Differentiating between external blast and internal, and the attendant damage of structural failure falls within a scientific analysis known as Battle Damage Assessment.)
However, such massive destruction as the stern of a warship becoming detached generally receives an incredulous reaction from people unused to ships. Some of this seems to reflect a thinking that ships are entire pieces of steel, rather in fact being a series of compartments, usually held together by riveting or welding. These fasteners can break if sufficient force is used. The sides or the horizontal surfaces of the compartments can be ruptured by impact, whether from natural obstacles such as rocks, or by man-made means such as gun shells or missiles. Indeed, guns for the last few centuries have featured different types of shells: some ‘armour-piercing’ being solid steel ‘slugs’ propelled by the explosive charge set off in the gun; or explosive, designed to cause damage once inside the target.
62 Tom Lewis, ‘What the wrecks of the Sydney and Kormoran tell us about the battle.’ Published in various journals, magazines and newspapers following the discovery of both ships in 2008. 63 The Washington Post. ‘Searchers find the sunken stern of a doomed World War II destroyer off the coast of Alaska.’ 16 August, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/08/15/searchers-find-the- sunken-stern-of-a-doomed-world-war-ii-destroyer-off-the-coast-of-alaska/ Accessed July 2020. 64 Phys Org. ‘Japanese battleship blew up under water, footage suggests.’ 13 March 2015.https://phys.org/ news/2015-03-underwater-blast-japan-wwii-battleship.html Accessed July 2020.
94 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The type of bombs employed by the Val dive bombers which targeted Peary were ‘Type 99, No. 25’ weapons used widely against sea targets. They contained approximately 133 pounds of trinitroanisol.65 This is an explosive with a detonation velocity of 7,200 meters per second, therefore making it a high explosive, with a wave front moving faster than sound. Trinitroanisol was a stable composite similar to TNT (trinitrotoluene) an excellent, inexpensive explosive. It was therefore suitable for life at sea, and fairly rough handling, being subject to the forces generated on a moving ship, and comparable shocks beneath an aircraft.
The high weight of the bomb at 250 kg, with only 60 kg of explosive inside the casing, provided penetration of the hull by the bomb when it met initial decking. To operate effectively the Type 99 No 25, had a tail fuse and so it generally detonated below the upper deck of the ship so the blast effect was further enhanced by being constrained below deck.
The damage caused by such weapons would be devastating in an open air blast without obstacles: it would cause blast damage due to over-pressure at 50 ft (16 m) of 17 psi, and at 100 ft (31 m) of 5 psi. Penetration of steel armour plate of up to 32 mm thickness would occur, as would penetration of concrete of up to 518 mm.66 People standing around 100m One of the Val bombs, an unexploded 250kg device. (from a display at the Darwin Military away from such a blast in the open would have Museum) been killed.
These bombs would have been sufficient to have caused massive damage to an unarmoured ship such as a destroyer if a weapon struck the weather deck centrally. Several bombs striking directly would have caused even more, and if they were striking the same spot their effect would have been a tearing action for the plates making up the stern hull. We cannot know exactly what happened, due to the wreck being partly salvaged. But it would appear the extremely heavy propellers became separated from the rest of the ship, perhaps due to the collapse of the surrounding hull.
66 Ordtech. Mk82 500 Lbs Aircraft Bomb.http://www.ordtech-industries.com/2products/Bomb_General/Mk82/ Mk82.html
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 95 The newly discovered wreck site has two propellers which are still attached to their shafts, both with their brace to the hull attached, one of 12.5m in length attached to a five metres metal mass, and one of 12 metres. Whether the entire stern was severed from the end of the ship to 17 metres forward, or even more, is unknown. Peary was made up of 176 vertical frames, with roughly one every .5 of a metre.67 This shows us that the longest propeller shaft takes us to frame 143. Therefore, roughly one-fifth of the overall length of 96 metres, or 17%, became detached.
Stern view of Clemson-class destroyer USS Farragut (DD-300) in dry dock, circa 1925. Note three-blade twin screws, brace forward and above, single rudder and prominent propeller guards. © US Navy
The propellers and braces match photos of the Clemson class screws, although no exact size has been found from blueprints and plans. There are no other war or cyclone damaged ships of the same size which could have been the source.68
68 Cyclone Tracy levelled Darwin in 1974, and resulted in the sinking of several vessels, the largest being a Navy patrol boat, HMAS Arrow. No other cyclone saw the sinking of a large vessel, nor did the other raids – the North- ern Territory was attacked 77 times – see the sinking of large vessels. See the same author’sWrecks in Darwin Waters, Boolarong, 1991, and The Empire Strikes South, Avonmore, 2017.
96 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 There are many objects in the debris field near the propellers. They include:
• A circular item, perhaps the base plate of a 3-inch AA gun mount, of 1.3 metres across. This is likely the deck plate of the landed 3-inch gun. The plate is too small to be one of the four-inch mounts. There was one aft four-inch gun on the Clemson class. That gun, weighing 2.725 short tons, would likely be buried in the seabed.69 • A possible mast, or a boom, of approximately eight metres. The Clemson class destroyers carried a mizzen mast. • Several large metallic masses, perhaps part of the ship’s superstructure, including one of eight metres in length 2.5 high, and another 15-18m three metres high. These could be the turbines of the ship.
Of interest is that the propellers and shafts are lying on a west-east axis, with the screws themselves to the west. The tide on 19 February at 1000 was going out, with high tide at 0730 (6.607 metres), and the next low tide at 1400 (0.280). In Darwin Harbour on that day (see chart below) the tide was running from the east to the west.70 When the propellers became detached, their extreme weight of several tonnes each would have meant they would have descended immediately at speed to the seabed only tens of metres below. They would not have had time, nor was the tidal movement been strong enough to turn them around. However, the tidal movement of nearly six metres, pushing many thousands of tonnes of water outwards, would have been enough to carry the sinking destroyer to its eventual location.
One problem with this is that Lieutenant Kriloff’s account of the sinking has Peary and Preston both with their ships’ heads pointing in the same direction: roughly to the west. How therefore could the bows of the Peary be pointing to the east? Here is a step by step analysis of what may have happened.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 97 Time Ship’s head Speed Action in Amplifying remarks Other (pointing to) Peary relevant ships 0957 East – Nil Nil anchored against ebbing tide 0958 North east – One Start of Anchor bumping the Preston ship begins knot the attack seabed, degrading approaching to swing at this passage from the location east
Anchor begins to be raised but only short- stayed
Defensive gunfire
0959- West 2-3 Trying to Preston 1000 knots increase starts to (with speed but overtake tide dragging being anchor one prevents knot) effective movement 1001 West 2-3 First bomb Ship settles lower in the Preston knots strikes near water. Anchor degrades overtakes the stern her passage more as now more effective.
98 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 1003 West-North- 2-3 Second Ship settles lower in the West knots bomb water. Anchor has more strikes near effect and begins to the stern stop the ship’s head so stern swings to port. 1004 North-East 0 knots Third Ship settles lower in Note the bomb the water. Anchor position strikes near now stopping ship of the two the stern. completely, and propellers Stern “hanging off the with a breaks off. anchor”. 290° angle between the northerly and the southerly 1005 West 0 knots; Fourth Stern separated. Ship Passes then 2 bomb now begins to drift Manunda knots strikes with the tide. Anchor carried midships probably detached only by as this stage as later tide. photos show bow well up. 1010- West 2 knots AA fire Stern separated. Ship Passes 1012 carried from MGs settling British only by continues Motorist tide.
The debris field around the propellers suggest much of the stern hull steel went with them. The fact that the drive shafts connected to the propellers are pointing to the east is significant. It suggests that the ship’s bow was pointing east when the propellers and shafts, along with other parts of the stern, became detached. But east is the last direction Lieutenant Commander Bermingham would have chosen: the main imperative for a warship captain under attack would have been to obtain maximum sea room so he could manoeuvre at high speed, and in Darwin Harbour that lay to the north and west. As the table above shows, it was likely there was a temporary check due to the anchor becoming more effective. Being completely stationary likely enabled the fourth or fifth strike on the ship, which most accounts say happened midships. This likely detached the anchor, enabling the destroyer to drift away. Once again the lack of manoeuvrability was Peary’s downfall.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 99 Modelled tidal current magnitude at 1000 on 19/02/1942. Courtesy( of David Williams)
Being attacked by aircraft in World War II took a cool head to manage. One of the best fighting commanders of the Royal Australian Navy was ‘Hec’ Waller. In battles in the Mediterranean in the early part of the war he showed great courage under enemy attack, waiting for the bombs to detach from the aircraft, and calculating how best to manoeuvre the ship.
The cooks & stewards nicknamed Waller ‘Hard Over Hec’ as most of his wheel orders, in action, were 'Hard a Stbd or Hard a Port’. Waller would lay back in his chair, with pipe in mouth, on the bridge [wing] and actually wait for the dive-bombers to release their bombs before ordering the wheel hard over one way or the other!71
71 Noel Watkins, (Son of Chief Yeoman Watkins) ‘Extract from my father's diary, Chief Petty Officer Watkins … his own personal interpretation of the Battle and his feelings whilst on board the famous Australian destroyer HMAS Stuart during the 'Battle of Matapan': a naval battle between ships of the Allied and Italian fleets’.http://www. gunplot.net/matapan.html March 2001.
100 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Given that her bows were pointed east, this means that Peary was at anchor when she was hit. Mel Duke’s comment that the anchor was ‘short-stayed’ is borne out: the anchor was underneath the bow, and still holding the vessel to the seabed. It is not surprising therefore, that the destroyer was hit four or five times by the divebombers: she could not manoeuvre at all. Her sister-ship USS William B Preston could: she was evading the Vals while under power, and her collection of a dozen .50 machineguns, landed from her Catalina charges and mounted on rails on her stern, was proving most effective at keeping them off her. Instead of being sunk, Preston survived, although being hit twice by bombs; with the loss of 14 men, and at a cost of nearly having – coincidentally – her own stern detached.72
72 Commander Herb Kriloff, USN, (Rtd) Officer of the Deck. California: Pacifica Press, 2000, pp. 134-140.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 101 The Peary then eventually did move west, but she could not have been under power. Analysis of the known photographs of her last moments show her very heavily down by the stern, and on fire. The first photograph (left to right, above) chronologically shows the ship very heavily on fire, with a massive plume of smoke being emitted. To the right, as identified by Herb Kriloff of her ship’s company, is thePreston .
The second photograph shows Peary near the Manunda, still on fire. A plot of the bigger ships in the harbour on the day suggests that the drifting Peary would have reached Manunda first. She then (photo 3) neared the tanker British Motorist. In this photo, the fire seems to have diminished, and the rearmost stack of the destroyer to have collapsed. The next two photographs show her sinking by the stern, with the last two showing just the bow.
Conclusion
So what has the discovery of the propellers told us? They have given us the reason why this warship – of several fighting vessels in Darwin Harbour on 19 February 1942 – was the only one to be sunk. The other eight ships that were lost were all freighters or almost unarmed small vessels. The other warships in the harbour survived, due to a combination of more effective armament being used, and being able to manoeuvre. Peary however, was immobile at the outset, and therefore presented an easy target. She was then dealt
102 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 her death blow: her stern was so smashed it fell off, and the remainder of the ship drifted down the harbour, sinking steadily. She covered a few kilometres in this way, and settled by the end of the raid, probably around 1030. Peary’s sinking was therefore due to a number of factors. The first was her inability to raise, or release, her anchor. The second factor was the product of the first – she was unable to manoeuvre. Was Peary then probably the very first ship hit, within too short a time from first sighting of enemy aircraft to do anything about getting underway? Third, her lesser armament of her low angle four inch guns and machineguns – rather than the much more effective high angle guns and Oerlikons¬ gave her reduced firepower. All of this made her an easy target for the Val divebombers, and their pilots knew their work well. Peary may have fought to the end, but she was doomed, and the loss of the destroyer and 88 of her ship’s company was testimony to all of this.
Thanks to the following for their assistance in this research: Dr Peter Williams, Ric Fallu, Dr Samantha Wells, Lieutenant Commander Des Woods, RAN, Clinton Bock, Peter Ingman, Alice West at NT Archives, Rex, Bruce, Digger and others of my regular blog; Vice Admiral Russ Crane, AO, CSM, RAN (Ret'd), Michael Wells of the NT Heritage Department, and David Williams of the NT Government.
Dr Tom Lewis, OAM
Dr Tom Lewis, OAM, is a military historian. A retired naval officer, he is the author of 15 books, the latest being The Empire Strikes South, an analysis of the Japanese air raids across northern Australia in WWII, and Atomic Salvation, sub-titled ‘How the A-Bombs saved the Lives of 32 million people’.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 103 Sufficiency of existing legal frameworks for addressing maritime security challenges surrounding autonomous vessels Lieutenant Commander Simon Lindsay, RAN
Introduction
Autonomous vessels are potential ‘game changers’ in a way not seen since vessels were fitted with engines.1 Far from being a remote possibility, they are already here.2 Recent years have seen rapid advancement in the design, development and construction, and the use of unmanned autonomous and semiautonomous vehicle technology;3 so much so that their use in the military and civilian contexts is becoming ubiquitous.4 The last few years alone have seen the world’s first remotely operated vessel,5 the first autonomous vessel signed to the UK Ship Register,6 the first autonomous commercial shipping operation,7 and the launch of the first fully electric and autonomous container ship;8 while unmanned underwater vessels have been used for decades for oil and gas industry repair and exploration, laying pipelines and submarine cables, salvage, and scientific exploration.9
Autonomous vessels are increasingly being designed for and employed in a wide variety of military, commercial and scientific roles, from port and maritime security, reconnaissance and force projection, hydrographic and ocean research, environmental
1 Paul W Pritchett, ‘Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace Unmanned Vessel Technology’,Tulane Maritime Law Journal vol. 40, no. 1, 2015, p. 199. 2 Craig H Allen, ‘The Seabots are Coming Here: Should they be Treated as ‘Vessels’?’, Journal of Navigation, vol. 65, no. 4, 2012, p. 750; Sean T Pribyl and Alan M Weigel, ‘Autonomous Vessels: How an Emerging Disruptive Technology Is Poised to Impact the Maritime Industry Much Sooner Than Anticipated’,RAIL: The Journal of Ro- botics, Artificial Intelligence & Law, vol. 1, 2018, p. 18. 3 Trudi Hogg and Samrat Ghosh, ‘Autonomous merchant vessels: examination of factors that impact the effective implementation of unmanned ships’,Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs, vol. 8, no. 3, 2016, p. 218; Pritchett (n 1) 197; Michael N Schmitt and David S Goddard, ‘International Law and the Military Use of Unmanned Systems’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 98, no. 2, 2016, p. 570. 4 Melissa de Zwart, ‘New Technologies and the Law of Naval Warfare’ in Dale Stephens and Matthew Stubbs (eds), The Law of Naval Warfare, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2019, p. 308 (citations omitted). 5 ‘Rolls-Royce demonstrates world’s first remotely operated commercial vessel’,Rolls-Royce.com [website], 20 June 2017,
104 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 monitoring, search and rescue and disaster relief.10 There is also significant variation in the level of autonomy.11
Introducing disruptive technology in any new context has the capacity to generate new and unintended consequences.12 The use of autonomous vessels is no different. Their increased deployment, particularly in contested zones, may create or exacerbate particular tensions as risk tolerances change in response.13 Autonomous vessels have already been used to commit crimes at sea, and the use of this technology to engage in further and more sophisticated crimes is expected to increase.14 Further, there are questions over the legal status of autonomous vessels, as there is no specific legal or regulatory framework for their operation.15 This may see States, in the context of a perceived legal vacuum (or at least ambiguity) react in an unanticipated manner to this new technology.16
This article will first define ‘autonomous vessels’ and consider whether an autonomous vessel can be considered a ‘ship’ within the existing legal framework; applying this to determine applicability of passage rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)17 and requirements to conform with the ‘rules of the road’.18 It will then consider the benefits of autonomous vessels; particularly within the maritime security field. Next, it will continue examining maritime security issues within the existing legal structure, including categorisation as warships, rights of visit, and search and rescue obligations. The article will conclude by observing that while the existing legal regime may not have been designed with autonomous vessels in mind, it retains sufficient flexibility to incorporate them.
10 Allen, ‘Seabots’, above n 2, p. 750; Kara Chadwick, ‘Unmanned maritime systems will shape the future of naval operations: is international law ready?’ in Malcolm D Evans and Sofia Galani (eds),Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, Help or Hindrance?, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, p. 136; Hitoshi Nasu and David Letts, ‘The Legal Characterization of Lethal Autonomous Maritime Systems: Warship, Torpedo or Naval Mine?’,International Law Studies, vol. 96, no. 1, 2020, p. 81. 11 Christopher C Swain, ‘Towards Greater Certainty for Unmanned Navigation, a Recommended United States Military Perspective on Application of the “Rules of the Road” to Unmanned Maritime Systems’,Georgetown Law Technology Review, vol. 3, no. 1, 2018, p. 130. 12 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 318. 13 Ibid. 14 Allen, ‘Seabots’, above n 2, p. 750; Natalie Klein, ‘Maritime Autonomous Vehicles within the International Law Framework to Enhance Maritime Security’, International Law Studies, vol. 95, no. 1, 2019, pp. 247, 260; Anna Petrig, ‘The commission of maritime crimes with unmanned systems: an interpretive challenge for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in Malcolm D Evans and Sofia Galani (eds)Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, Help or Hindrance? , Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, pp. 108–10. 15 Allen, ‘Seabots’, above n 2, p. 750; De Zwart, above n 4, p. 306; Hogg and Ghosh, above n 3, p. 209; Nasu and Letts, above n 10, p. 83; Pribyl and Weigel, above n 2, p. 20; Robert Veal, Michael Tsimplis and Andrew Serdy, ‘The Legal Status and Operation of Unmanned Maritime Vehicles’,Ocean Development & International Law, vol. 50, no. 1, 2019, p. 40. 16 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 308. 17 Opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’). 18 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at, Sea opened for signature 20 October 1972, 1050 UNTS 16 (entered into force 15 July 1977) (‘COLREGS’).
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 105 Defining Autonomous Vessels
Autonomous, or unmanned, vessels can be broadly classified into three categories: remote vessels, automated vessels, and truly autonomous vessels.19 Regarding a universal definition of autonomous vessels, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) have defined four degrees of automation,20 while Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (UK) proposed a more detailed six levels of autonomy;21 both ranging from automated processes with human operators to fully autonomous with no supervision.
A challenge in defining autonomous vessels arises from the fact the term encompasses many different things. There are currently very few (if any) truly autonomous vessels, however the IMO uses the term ‘autonomous’ to encompass all levels of autonomy within unmanned maritime systems.22 This article adopts this approach and will use ‘autonomous’ to include all forms of unmanned maritime vehicles, regardless of their autonomy levels.
When considering the interaction of autonomous vessels within the existing legal framework, it is clear the more truly autonomous a function is, the greater the departure from traditional navigational practices, and, arguably, the greater the legal issues.23 As there is currently no specific treaty governing the use of autonomous systems it will be crucial to consider the purpose and scope of the instrument when determining its applicability to autonomous vessels.24 This will be considered further below.
Autonomous Vessels and Maritime Security Challenges
Applicability to Passage Regimes and COLREGS
International law has thus far been silent in relation to whether autonomous vessels can or should be considered ships or vessels;25 understandable as the relevant treaties and
19 Michael Chwedczuk, ‘Analysis of the Legal Status of Unmanned Commercial Vessels in US Admiralty and Mar- itime Law’,Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, vol. 47, no. 1, 2016, p. 128; De Zwart, above n 4, p. 309 (citations omitted). 20 ‘IMO takes first steps to address autonomous ships’,International Maritime Organization [website], 25 May 2018,
106 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 regulations were drafted without contemplation of autonomous vessels.26 Unhelpfully, there is no general definition of ‘ship’27 and there is inconsistency in the usage of key terminology and concepts;28 for example, UNCLOS uses the terms ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ synonymously without defining either.29 Article 94 of UNCLOS does, however, discuss the manning of ships in the context of Flag State duties, and so it may be arguable the presence of a human crew may be the defining factor, meaning autonomous vessels would not qualify as ‘ships’,30 though it may also be argued shore-based controllers and programmers constitute ‘crew’ for the purposes of UNCLOS.31
Article 94 is by no means prescriptive, and if the presence of mariners onboard is not a prerequisite for ‘ship’ status, then it arguably makes no difference whether the vessel is remotely operated or operating autonomously.32 Further, the IMO has defined a maritime autonomous surface ship as ‘a ship which, to a varying degree, can operate independently of human interaction’,33 and the fact they have used the word ‘ship’ suggests their members do not consider unmanned status an impediment to ship status.34 Further, by way of analogy, when comparing the aviation industry, every form of flying vehicle may be considered an ‘aircraft’ for the purposes of regulation.35
The variety of autonomous vessels may mean a definitive general answer as to whether they are ships or not remains elusive, and instead be something determined on a case- by-case basis.36 It may also be that determination of ‘ship’ status will be left to individual States.37 However, the author considers autonomous vessels will comply with the definition of ‘ship’ in the majority of relevant international conventions,38 and therefore, existing international law may be applied mutatis mutandis to autonomous vessels.39 As such, if an autonomous vessel is a ‘ship’, it will enjoy the relevant navigational rights
26 Pribyl and Weigel, above n 2, p. 21; Swain, above n 11, pp. 120–1. 27 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 138; Nasu and Letts, above n 10, p. 84; Schmitt and Goddard, above n 3, p. 575; Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 26. 28 Ringbom, above n 23, p. 142. 29 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 138; Schmitt and Goddard, above n 3, p. 575; Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 26. 30 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 312; Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 36. 31 Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 36. 32 Ibid p. 29. 33 Craig H Allen, ‘Determining the Legal Status of Unmanned Maritime Vehicles: Formalism vs Functionalism’,Jour- nal of Maritime Law and Commerce, vol. 49, no. 4, 2018, p. 501. 34 Ibid p. 503; Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 29. 35 Klein, above n 14, p. 250. 36 Ibid p. 251. 37 Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 26. 38 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 155. 39 Ibid p. 156.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 107 under the UNCLOS passage regime, as well as being bound by the relevant obligations and conditions.40
Turning to the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, (COLREGS), while the question of human crew or control is not relevant to its definition of vessel, it does require a vessel to be capable of being used as a means of transportation upon water.41 However, it is arguable rules such as the lookout rule do still require human presence.42
It may be argued the term ‘capable of being used as a means of transportation’ should be read broadly to include the internal equipment and sensors carried by autonomous vessels.43 It may also be pointed out the lookout requirements have evolved with technology, including enclosed bridges and the use of radar, and retain sufficient flexibility to evolve further with autonomous vessels.44
However, the author considers these the wrong questions. The purpose of COLREGS is to ensure consistency in the application of good seamanship and predictability between vessels to prevent collision, and therefore, it should be considered essential to include autonomous vessels within its reach.45 A compromise may be reached by amending COLREGS to include a sui generis light and shape pattern for autonomous vessels to warn other vessels of their unique status.46
Benefits of Autonomous Vessels in Maritime Security
Operating in the maritime environment brings unique challenges and operational complexities, not least of which is the need to operate at sea for lengthy 47 periods. Autonomous vessels are considered a ‘silver bullet’ for addressing crewing challenges (including fatigue and replenishment), cutting costs, increasing load capacities, reducing emissions, and improving efficiency and safety more generally.48 Most marine accidents
40 Klein, above n 14, p. 269; Schmitt and Goddard, above n 3, pp. 577–8. 41 COLREGS, above n 18, r 3(a); De Zwart, above n 4, p. 313; Swain, above n 11, p. 144. 42 COLREGS, above n 18, r 5; Pribyl and Weigel, above n 2, p. 21; Ringbom, above n 23, p. 155; Swain, above n 11, p. 142. 43 Rob McLaughlin, ‘Unmanned Naval Vessels at Sea: USVs, UUVs, and the Adequacy of the Law’, Journal of Law, Information and Science, vol. 21, no. 2, 2011, p. 112; Swain, above n 11, p. 134. 44 Ringbom, above n 23, p. 153; Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 39. 45 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 140; Pritchett, above n 1, p. 206; Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 38. 46 Swain, above n 11, pp. 147–9. 47 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 309. 48 Chwedczuk, above n 19, pp. 125–6; Hogg and Ghosh, above n 3, pp. 206, 219; Pribyl and Weigel, above n 2, pp. 17, 22–3; Pritchett, above n 1, p. 201.
108 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 can be attributed to human error,49 and autonomous vessels may remove, or at least mitigate, human error and the resulting accidents and environmental disasters.50 However, there is no guarantee they will be completely accident free, and human monitoring in some form may be required.51
Their appeal in the maritime security space is obvious. They reduce the risk to human life while simultaneously being able to be operated continuously for longer periods in expanded areas of operation, and so are perfectly suited to undertake the dangerous, dull or dirty missions while filling capacity gaps and cutting 52costs. Also, while their unmanned status may render them more vulnerable to piracy, the lack of potential hostages and the potential difficulties in hijacking the systems may make themless attractive.53 Autonomous vessels are also likely to offer cheaper and more persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance abilities,54 and will therefore greatly expand the monitoring capability of law enforcement and naval forces during maritime security operations,55 though may also increase the likelihood of States using them to engage in riskier actions.56
Broad Maritime Security Challenges
In January 2019, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea announced intentions to use autonomous vessels for coastal border patrols, surveillance, mine detection, and search and rescue activities,57 while China has recently announced development of a range of autonomous naval craft, including an autonomous amphibious landing vehicle, submarine, and oceanic combat vessel.58 The United States Navy has also publicly announced autonomous vessels programs in maritime surveillance and reconnaissance.59
States are not the only parties enjoying the benefits of autonomous vessels. Houthi rebels used remote-controlled boats to carry out attacks against various targets, notably the Saudi oil frigate Al Madinah, a Saudi-flagged oil tanker, and an oil depot and distribution
49 Chwedczuk, above n 19, pp. 126, 149; Hogg and Ghosh, above n 3, p. 213; Pribyl and Weigel, above n 2, p. 22; Pritchett, above n 1, p. 201. 50 Chwedczuk, above n 19, p. 149. 51 Ibid; Hogg and Ghosh, above n 3, p. 207; Pritchett, above n 1, p. 202. 52 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 136; Klein, above n 14, p. 246. 53 Hogg and Ghosh, above n 3, p. 211; Pritchett, above n 1, p. 211. 54 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 151; Klein, above n 14, pp. 246, 266. 55 Schmitt and Goddard, above n 3, p. 569. 56 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 318. 57 Klein, above n 14, p. 245. 58 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 308 (citations omitted). 59 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 137.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 109 station near the Yemeni border.60 Autonomous vessels also provide significant advantages for smugglers and drug traffickers, as no crew means no one to arrest and interrogate, and the vessels offer higher levels of stealth.61
As the use of autonomous vessels increases, it is apparent there will also be repercussions for the international legal framework in place to promote maritime security.62 Their benefits may well see an escalation of autonomous vessels used for freedom of navigation operations and assertion of maritime freedoms in contested areas.63 However, while the risk to personnel is negated, these reduced stakes may incentivise coastal states to take more provocative action against an autonomous vessel than they may be prepared to against a manned vessel.64 It is yet to be seen if their employment in contested zones will be more likely to reduce tensions or exacerbate them, however past incidents may hold some lessons.
The first diplomatic incident involving autonomous vessels occurred on 15 December 2016, when a Chinese Navy Dalang-III-class ship seized a US Navy ‘ocean glider’ unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) while being recovered by USNS Bowditch in the Philippines EEZ, approximately 50 nm northwest of Subic Bay in the South China Sea. While Bowditch immediately identified the UUV as theirs and sought its return, China claimed to have recovered the UUV in order to prevent the device from causing harm to the safety of navigation and personnel of a passing vessel, though later agreed to return it.65 The US considered the UUV a sovereign immune vessel, while China considered it an unidentified ‘device’.66 This incident ably demonstrates the opposing arguments which may be posed, in part exacerbated by the lack of certainty or at least nation State positions taken in regard to autonomous vessels in international law.67
Categorisation as Warships
It remains open whether autonomous vessels may be characterised as warships; an important question for navies, as only warships are able to exercise belligerent rights
60 Petrig, above n 14, p. 108. 61 Allen, ‘Seabots’, above n 2, p. 750; Ibid p. 109. 62 Klein, above n 14, p. 245. 63 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 318. 64 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 154; Klein, above n 14, p. 266; McLaughlin, above n 43, p. 114. 65 ‘Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Incident in South China Sea’, US Dept of Defense [web- site], 16 December 2016,
110 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 during armed conflict at sea.68 Article 29 of UNCLOS strictly defines ‘warships’ as having four cumulative requirements, the pertinent of whichmanned is‘ by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline’ (such definition ultimately derived from the 1907 Hauge Convention VII relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into69 Warships ). While arguably the definition (particularly the manning requirement) is outdated,70 it remains prescriptive and, on a plain text reading, autonomous vessels prima facie do not meet this definition due to not meeting the manning requirement.71
It could be argued the manning requirement might be interpreted liberally, to include remote-control and pre-programming.72 In the aviation world, those who fly unmanned aircraft from ground stations are held to be in command of, or manning, those aircraft. Arguably, this is analogous to remotely controlled autonomous vessels.73
Ultimately, however, from a maritime security perspective, the question need notbe resolved. Provided an autonomous vessel qualifies as a ‘ship’ and is operated bya government for exclusively non-commercial purposes then it will effectively enjoy the same rights and sovereign immunity as a warship under UNCLOS, including, importantly, the same rights of visit.74 However, in such a case, as an ‘auxiliary’ vessel, the autonomous vessel would be liable to attack under the laws of naval warfare but without the same belligerent rights and privileges attaching to warships.75 In any event, regardless of the possible legal interpretations, as States increase their use of military and government autonomous vessels, the emerging State practice will provide the best indicators of how they intend to resolve this issue.
Rights of Visit
Whether categorised as warships or government vessels on non-commercial service, relevant autonomous vessels will possess the right of visit.76 However, without a manned crew, exercising the right of visit presents as problematic. While autonomous vessels
68 Nasu and Letts, above n 10, pp. 86, 94–5; Schmitt and Goddard, above n 3, p. 581. 69 Nasu and Letts, above n 10, p. 85. 70 Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 30. 71 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 313 (citations omitted); McLaughlin, above n 43, pp. 110–11; Schmitt and Goddard, above n 3, p. 579; Swain, above n 11, pp. 157–8. 72 Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 30. 73 Chadwick, above n 10, pp. 143–4. 74 UNCLOS, above n 17, arts 32, 96, 110, 111, 236; Chadwick, above n 10, pp. 145–6; De Zwart, above n 4, p. 313; Klein, above n 14, p. 252; McLaughlin, above n 43, pp. 110–11; Schmitt and Goddard, above n 3, pp. 579–80; Veal, Tsimplis and Serdy, above n 15, p. 31. 75 Louise Doswald-Beck (ed), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, Cam- bridge University Press, 1995, p. 90. 76 UNCLOS, above n 17, art 110; Klein, above n 14, p. 256.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 111 are capable of being used for surveillance, hot pursuit, and even stopping a vessel,77 the challenge arises once the vessel has been stopped. Based on an understanding of current and near future technologies, only a human crew will likely be capable of boarding the stopped vessel and conducting searches and enquiries, gathering evidence, and conducting repressing or enforcement measures (including seizures and arrests) as required.78 Even a ‘base level’ task such as verifying a flag may prove impossible without a human crew.79 These difficulties remain present across the spectrum of maritime security tasks, including piracy, counter-narcotics,80 smuggling,81 and repression of slavery.82
As such, while it is likely autonomous vessels will be used increasingly for surveillance and reporting activities, at this stage they will be ineffective in exercising anything beyond the first stage of the right of visit.83
Search and Rescue Obligations
The duty to rescue and render assistance to persons and vessels in distress at sea is not only a fundamental tenet of maritime law—enshrined in treaty and customary international law84—but is also a moral obligation that ordinarily rests on the master of a vessel.85 Operating on the basis that autonomous vessels are indeed vessels to whom these laws and obligations apply, then they will have the same search and rescue obligations as any other vessel.86 However, autonomous vessels are likely to have unique difficulties in exercising these obligations compared with regular manned vessels.
The first question is with whom does the duty rest? If the vessel is being operated or monitored remotely then it will not have a master onboard, and so this duty may then be deemed to rest with the operator (as the functional equivalent to the master).87
77 Chadwick, above n 10, pp. 153–4; Klein, above n 14, pp. 253–4, 264. 78 Allen, ‘Formalism vs Functionalism’, above n 33, p. 491; Chadwick, above n 10, p. 151; Klein, above n 14, pp. 254, 257, 259. 79 Klein, above n 14, pp. 257–8. 80 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 153. 81 Klein, above n 14, p. 264. 82 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 153. 83 Klein, above n 14, p. 257. 84 See, eg, UNCLOS, above n 17, art 98; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1184 UNTS 278, 1 November 1974 (entered into force 25 May 1980), as amended, ch V, reg 10; International Convention on Mari- time Search and Rescue, 1405 UNTS 118, 27 April 1979 (entered into force 22 June 1985), as amended, [2.1.10]; International Convention on Salvage, 1953 UNTS 165, 28 April 1989 (entered into force 14 July 1996) art 10(1). 85 Luci Carey, ‘All Hands Off Deck? The Legal Barriers to Autonomous Ships’, Working Paper No 2017/011, National University of Singapore Law, 24 August 2017, pp. 17–18, 20; Klein, above n 14, pp. 264–5; Pritchett, above n 1, p. 208. 86 Robert Sparrow, Rob McLaughlin and Mark Howard, ‘Naval robots and rescue’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 99, no. 906, 2017, p. 1156. 87 Carey, above n 85, pp. 17–18; Klein, above n 14, pp. 264–5.
112 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The second question is, practically, what assistance is an autonomous vessel capable of providing? Given the anticipated unmanned nature of autonomous vessels, any obligations beyond alerting other manned vessels of search and rescue authorities of the relevant coastal state are likely to be practically unrealistic.88 However, an obligation for the operator ashore to raise the alarm is expected to be very real indeed.89 Any further obligation is still uncertain at this time, as the existing legal framework is silent on this issue. It may be that there is a further obligation on the designers of autonomous vessels to ensure they are provided with the capacity to assist with search and rescue operations, perhaps by carrying life rafts and other contrivances that may sustain survivors in the short term.90
While the duty to render assistance is usually discharged once the vessel has provided the assistance it is in a position to be able to provide, unless and until further guidance is provided on the requirements for autonomous vessels to go further, assistance at this stage is likely going to be limited to alerting other vessels and authorities.91 Query also the corresponding duty of other mariners to render assistance to an autonomous vessel without any crew—it may be that practically the duty may be discharged by notification alone.92 It may be the case that an increase in the operation of autonomous vessels may see a corresponding increase in the risk to mariners of reduced availability of assistance should they come into difficulty. Further regulation in this area will be required to mitigate this risk.93
Pilotage
A preponderance of attention has been paid to the use of autonomous vessels and the challenge they pose to the existing legal framework while underway and in use. However, just as importantly are the challenges faced at the beginning and end of a passage, in particular pilotage. Compulsory pilotage areas are imposed in most of the world’s ports, and, also, some environmentally sensitive waters.94 An autonomous vessel may be a maritime security (or commercial) game-changer, but potentially would be rendered useless if unable to comply with compulsory pilotage regimes.95 While a pilot uses their specialist knowledge to ensure the safety of the vessel in pilotage areas, how will they be able to do
88 Carey, above n 85, pp. 17–19. 89 Ibid pp. 17–18; Klein, above n 14, pp. 264–5; Sparrow, McLaughlin and Howard, above n 86, p. 1158. 90 Klein, above n 14, p. 265; Pritchett, above n 1, pp. 209–10; Sparrow, McLaughlin and Howard, above n 86, pp. 11156, 1158. 91 Carey, above n 85, pp. 17–18; Klein, above n 14, p. 265; Pritchett, above n 1, pp. 209–10. 92 Carey, above n 85, pp. 18–19. 93 Sparrow, McLaughlin and Howard, above n 86, p. 1158. 94 Carey, above n 85, p. 22. 95 Ibid p. 32.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 113 so with an autonomous vessel? The issue is one of control; how can a pilot take control of an autonomous vessel, whether controlled or simply observed remotely?96 Some potential solutions include exempting autonomous vessels from pilotage requirements or introducing remote or shore-based pilotage.97 Dedicated autonomous berths are unlikely to be a solution though, as they do not address the issue of the transit through the relevant waters. Unlike some of the other challenges discussed above, this one is more practical than legal in nature. What is clear, however, is that international agreement will almost certainly be required to resolve this issue broadly in the future.
Cyber-security
While one of the advantages of autonomous vessels is a reduction in crew, at this stage of technological development there remains the requirement for personnel ashore either controlling or, at the very least, monitoring the vessel’s operation and progress. As such, autonomous vessels will likely be highly dependent on secure communications links and the ability to conduct constant high-volume data transfer.98
This may prove a disadvantage, as the increased reliance on these communications means the loss of a secure communications link may impair, or potentially even disable, the autonomous vessel.99 Congested or pilotage waters may be particularly susceptible, where time lags due to data-delay or data-loss may inhibit timely actions to ensure appropriate collision avoidance.100
From a cybersecurity perspective, it also means an increased risk in vulnerability of the autonomous vessel to cyber-attack or disruption, or even criminal elements taking complete control of the vessel’s systems.101 While the cybersecurity threat is not unique to autonomous vessels—particularly as systems in manned vessels become more automated—the lack of crew onboard to respond in the event of a cyber-attack is what renders this risk significantly higher for autonomous vessels. Again, this is more a practical than a legal challenge, but still one worth highlighting. Developers and operators must ensure appropriate attention is paid to cyber-security and the protection of communication links to mitigate this threat.
96 Ibid p. 26. 97 Ibid pp. 26, 29. 98 Hogg and Ghosh, above n 3, pp. 210–11; Pribyl and Weigel, above n 2, p. 23; Pritchett, above n 1, p. 211; Kimberly Tam and Kevin Jones, ‘Cyber-Risk Assessment for Autonomous Ships’, Conference Paper, International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security), 11–12 June 2018, pp. 1–2. 99 Schmitt and Goddard, above n 3, p. 570. 100 Pritchett, above n 1, p. 200. 101 Hogg and Ghosh, above n 3, pp. 210–11; Pribyl and Weigel, above n 2, p. 23; Pritchett, above n 1, pp. 211–12; Tam and Jones, above n 98, p. 1.
114 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Conclusion
There are no doubts future maritime security operations will increasingly involve autonomous vessels.102 The challenge remains in ensuring the legal framework can appropriately accommodate them. Fortunately, this task should not prove as daunting as it may first appear. There is near unanimous agreement that while the specific legal status of autonomous vessels remains unsettled, the general principles of maritime law will be sufficient to regulate these emerging systems.103 As demonstrated above, while these treaties and agreements were not designed with autonomous vessels in mind, they retain sufficient flexibility to be able to be adapted and applied to this emerging technology. This is not to say nothing further should be done; there are clearly gaps in the regulations and some additions and amendments will be required to fully integrate this new technology and provide certainty for users.104 Certainly the emergence of State practice in this area over time should provide clear trends highlighting the path being taken and what further work needs to be done. In the meantime, by focusing on a purposive approach to each instrument, and adopting a forward-thinking approach, the task of integrating autonomous vessels into the existing maritime security legal framework will be achievable.
102 Chadwick, above n 10, p. 155. 103 De Zwart, above n 4, p. 311 (citations omitted); McLaughlin, above n 43, p. 103. 104 Pritchett, above n 1, p. 223.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 115 Lieutenant Commander Simon Lindsay, RAN
Lieutenant Commander Simon Lindsay, RAN, is a Navy Legal Officer and former Maritime Warfare Officer. He has served in HMA Ships Brisbane, Warrnambool, Ballarat, Arunta and Anzac, as well as at Fleet Headquarters and Headquarters Joint Operations Command, and has also practised in a civilian capacity as a commercial and international human rights law in London, United Kingdom while providing Reserve service. He holds a Bachelor of Arts (Economics), Master of Arts (International Relations) and Juris Doctor (1st Class Honours and Valedictorian) (UNSW), Graduate Diploma of Legal Practice (College of Law), and a Graduate Certificate of Military Law (ANU). He is currently posted as the Legal Officer to Commodore Flotillas and the Fleet Battle Staff, focusing on legal aspects of maritime security, oceans law and policy, and the laws of naval warfare and armed conflict.
116 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The 1967 Walker–Besslednyi Collision: When History Got It Wrong Mr Bill Streifer and Mr Irek Sabitov
Abstract
On May 10, 1967, during the heart of the Cold War, two destroyers collided in the Sea of Japan: the USS Walker and a Soviet one, mistakenly referred to as Besslednyi in American (and later in Russian) publications. The truth came to light in 2005 thanks to an article in a Vladivostok newspaper, when the commander of that Soviet ship, Anatoly Sobolev, described the incident in detail. But he was not in fact in command of the Besslednyi but rather another destroyer, the Veskii.
Nevertheless, describing the incident from May 1967, American authors and the website of the US Navy’s Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) continue to refer to that Soviet destroyer as Besslednyi.
American publications placed blame on the Russians just as the Soviet press had placed blame squarely on the US. Pravda, the official Soviet newspaper of the Communist Party, wrote, ‘... American ships do not respect existing international norms and grossly violate international rules for preventing collisions at sea ...’. Izvestia, the Soviet newspaper of record, wrote, ‘... The collision was committed by an American ship intentionally ...’.
This article cites various publications that refer to aWalker-Besslednyi ‘ ’ collision, from a 1967 US Navy press release to more recent English-language books and articles. Also included is that Soviet commander’s recollections; a likely explanation for how the US Navy could have misidentified the Soviet destroyer from the start; and how the collision in the Sea of Japan almost led to an international crisis. In response to this collision and another the following day, US Senator John G. Tower, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said they ‘indicate either a very stupid Soviet sea captain ora deliberate Soviet attempt to cause an international incident of far-reaching implications’.
The authors recently requested that the National Archive and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C. revise the caption of a photo that incorrectly identifies the Soviet destroyer involved in that May 1967 collision as ‘Besslednyi’.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 117 History is replete with stories, though partially or entirely untrue, that continue to be retold decades later. Such is the case of a well-publicized Cold War incident at sea— the collision in the Sea of Japan on 10 May 1967 between the American destroyer USS Walker (DD-517) and a Soviet Kotlin-class destroyer, incorrectly identified by the US Navy as Besslednyi (DD-022).
The Squadron Commander congratulates the crew of the destroyer Besslednyi. (Source Unknown)
These two naval adversaries had supposedly met up for the first time nine months prior. In April 1966, when the Walker took part in an operation in which she supplied direct, indirect, harassment, and interdiction support for Operation ‘Osage’, a combined amphibious assault at Chu Lai, South Vietnam. During this operation, the Walker fired over 1,000 rounds. Support was also provided for the South Vietnamese 8th Airborne Battalion. She also escorted a US marine supply and an equipment truck convoy from Da Nang to Phu Bai.1 Later, Walker conducted a month-long patrol duty in the Taiwan Strait,2 the 110 mile-wide waterway separating the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China (aka Communist China).
1 ‘Kenneth C. Kimbal, USN, on duty at Pearl Harbor’, Vestnik (Herald), Feb. 22, 1967, p. 3. 2 http://www.usswalker.com/historydetail.htm; This information was provided by Dick Purvis, TM3 (DD-517, March 1962 to May 1965).
118 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 But instead of returning to her home port at Pearl Harbor upon completion of her Vietnam and China missions,3 Walker was instead ordered to replace the USS Walke (DD-723), an Allen M Sumner-class destroyer, in anti-submarine exercises in the Sea of Japan on 8 July 1966.4 During that mission, she was to work in cooperation with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and naval units of the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
On 24 July 1966, about two weeks after the operation began, a Soviet Kotlin-class destroyer, identified by the US Navy as Besslednyi with pennant (i.e. hull) number 022, was sighted as it began shadowing the allied task group. Besslednyi had recently joined up with the allied task force to assume a tailing role.5
Meanwhile, Walker was designated to shoulder the Soviet vessel. The naval term ‘shouldering’ refers to the practice of maneuvering your ship in contact with an opposing vessel in an attempt to cause the opposing vessel to turn away.6 Ultimately, Walker was successful in preventing the attempted penetration of the screen by Besslednyi and her replacement.7
Under orders to screen away the snooping Soviet vessel should she try to charge toward the center of the allied ship formation,Walker kept an eye on Besslednyi. As a Lieutenant (junior grade), on board the Walker later recalled, during this transit, the Soviet warship was hardly persistent in her attempts to break into the formation, but the screening efforts were effective enough to draw a formal Soviet protest issued on 10 August 1966.8
Nine months later, in May 1967, Walker and a Soviet destroyer, presumed to be Besslednyi, reportedly met again in the Sea of Japan. Details of the 1967 Walker-Besslednyi collision
3 J Finney, ‘A US Destroyer in Far East Bumped by Soviet Warship’, New York Times, May 11, 1967, pp. 1, 5; http:// www.usswalker.com/historydetail.htm 4 A month prior, USS Walke (DD-723) had departed Long Beach, California for deployment to the western Pacific. However, while passing the outer breakwater, a major fire broke out in her aft fire room, the boiler room at the rear of the ship. Although the destroyer's damage control efforts succeeded in putting out the blaze, while being towed back into Long Beach the next day, her towline parted and she ran aground. Later that day, she finally en- tered the Long Beach Naval Shipyard for repairs to her hull and main propulsion plant; Walke III (DD-723), Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC); https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/ walke-iii.html 5 Ibid. 6 See David Winkler’s ‘Shouldering Incident Reminiscent of Sea of Japan Bumpings’, Naval Historical Foundation, 2016. 7 Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC); https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/ danfs/w/walke-iii.html 8 David Winker, ‘Shouldering Incident Reminiscent of Sea of Japan Bumpings’, Naval Historical Foundation, June 30, 2016; AmEmbassy MOSCOW telegram 716,10 August 1966 with MFA Note No. 33/USA RG 59, State Depart- ment Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 2874, folder POL 33-6 US-USSR 1/1/66, NA. The note stated that on July 25, 1966, a Soviet destroyer (Hull No. 66) had to stop twice to avoid collisions. The first incident occurred with the USS Radford and the second with the Walker.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 119 were provided at the time by John W Finney, a journalist at the Washington Bureau of the New York Times, who wrote widely on foreign policy.9 In ‘A US Destroyer in Far East Bumped by Soviet Warship’, a front-page story in the New York Times dated 11 May 1967,
Finney described the incident as only the most recent in a ‘long period’ of harassment of task groups by Soviet ships. As a result, the US quickly lodged a diplomatic protest. The moment the collision was disclosed to the public, Finney said Charge d’Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, Yuri N Chernyakov, was called to the State Department at midday to receive an oral protest from Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leddy.10
In that same New York Times article, Finney covered the Government’s various explanations for the collision. One line of speculation at the State Department was that the Captain of the Soviet destroyer, under general orders to harass the task group, had accidently maneuvered too close to the Walker. Another theory was that the Soviet Union was intent on provoking a political incident to demonstrate their hostility over intensification of the American military effort in Vietnam. Some officials thought the incident might have been in retaliation for what the Russians charged was ‘buzzing’ by US planes of its ships headed for North Vietnam.11
A former Besslednyi crewman recently appeared confused by the American assertion that his ship had collided with an American destroyer in 1967. When Boris Karasev12 saw a photo that purported to show Soviet destroyer 022 just moments prior to her collision with the USS Walker,13 he remarked, ‘I served on the destroyer Besslednyi in 1968, but I did not hear about this collision from my shipmates; it may be secret, but it is unlikely, a case of an incomprehensible fake. Also, I can’t see the RBU 2500 [a jet bomb launcher model] of the BCh3 [mine torpedo department] in the photo.’14 Karasev said he hadn’t heard from anyone about a Besslednyi collision, let alone twice.15
9 S Labaton, ‘John Finney, 80, of The Times; Wrote Widely on US Policy’, New York Times, 30 Oct 2004, p. A17. 10 ‘A US Destroyer in Far East Bumped by Soviet Warship’, pp. 1, 5. 11 Ibid. 12 Boris Karasev’s profile and photo on Odnoklassniki, the Russian social network;https://ok.ru/pro- file/566743605371 13 Photo: Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) No. K-36401 USS Walker (DD-517) 14 ‘Я служил на эм Бесследный в 1968 г но про это столкновение от сослуживцев не слышал может быть это секретно но вряд ли Кокая то утка непонятная Да на фото не вижу РБУ 2500 БЧ3’. 15 A conversation among formerBesslednyi crewmen on Odnoklassniki, the Russian social network; The discussion began on June 4, 2016; https://ok.ru/group/52838105022581/topic/65458764546165.
120 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 A Well-Publicized Incident
The 10 May 1967 collision at sea between the USS Walker and a Soviet destroyer in the Sea of Japan has been covered in numerous publications. Among these are the 13 May 1967 issue of The Age, an Australian newspaper, in an article titled ‘Russian Ships ‘Harassed US Destroyer’’, and in two of the most popular magazines of the day: TIME and LIFE. Both US magazines, which presumed the name of the Soviet ship involved in the collision was Besslednyi, may have based their faulty information on US Navy and US Defense Department press releases, both of which identified the ship asBesslednyi ‘ ’.
The Soviet Kotlin-class destroyer Besslednyi (pennant number 022) as seen from the deck of the USS Walker, photographed by a US Navy cameraman a short time before the two ships collided in the Sea of Japan on the morning of 10 May 1967. © US Navy
TIME magazine described the incident as like a ‘game of chicken’ on the sea, with the Besslednyi coming within 50 feet of two US destroyers ‘dispatched to drive it away’.16 LIFE, known for its award-winning photography, described a photo of the collision this way: ‘Eyeball to eyeball, US seaman on the destroyer Walker looked at Russian sailors on the deck of the destroyer Besslednyi, as the Soviet vessel scraped against her in the Sea
16 ‘High Seas: A Game of Chicken’, TIME, Vol. 89, No. 20, May 19. 1967, p. 35.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 121 of Japan 375 miles off Vladivostok.’17 Soviet newspaper Izvestia said the ‘clash’ occurred ‘115 miles off the Soviet coast, east of Vladimir Bay’.18
An error in identifying the name of the Soviet ship was also made by the US Navy’s Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), which described a US Navy photograph, taken one day prior to the collision, as ‘BESSLEDNYI (Soviet Kotlin class destroyer)’,19 and in the ‘World’s Naval News’ section of Warship International (1967), which described the incident this way: ‘Besslednyi sideswiped US destroyer Walker off Hokkaido causing slight damage 10 May 67’.20
Numerous US newspapers also covered this Cold War story. Some, like ‘Red Warship Sideswipes US Vessel’, a front-page story in the Chicago Tribune,21 or the New York Daily News story with the headline ‘COLD WAR: Soviet Ships Rub Ours the Wrong Way’,22 referred to this Soviet Project 56 vessel by name. Others simply referred to it by its NATO designation: a Kotlin-class destroyer.
Built in 1954-57, these fast, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine Kotlin-class destroyers, each with a complement of 284 men, including 19 officers, were designed for mass- production. In the end, the Soviet Navy completed 27. Many later had their anti-aircraft and anti-submarine armament extensively modified, several were fitted with a helicopter platform at the rear of the ship, and two were modified with surface-to-air twin missile launchers.23 Russian Navy historian Alexander Pavlov states that only three vessels were considered for upgrade, only one of which was considered as a potential helicopter carrier: ‘Of great importance for future developments, the tests and the helicopter take- off and landing training were on the destroyers Svetly, Dal’nevostochnyi Komsomolets and Veskii. For use on the first was the Ka-15 (helicopter); an unmanned vehicle on the others.’24
17 ‘A US-Soviet Bump on the High Seas’ (On the Newsfronts of the World), LIFE, Vol. 62, No. 21, May 26, 1967, p. 36. 18 ‘Указанное столкновение произошло в 115 милях от советского побережья, к востоку от залива Владимира’ (‘What Happened in the Sea of Japan? Interview with Commander-in-chief of the Navy S G Gorsh- kov’), Izvestia, issue 115 (15509), May. 17, 1967. 19 https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/ nhhc-series/nh-series/USN-1123000/USN-1123797.html 20 Warship International, Toledo, Ohio:International Naval Research Organization (1967), Vol. 4, p. 92. 21 F Farrar, ‘Russians Hit US Warship Second Time’, Chicago Tribune, May 12, 1967, pp. 1-2. 22 ‘COLD WAR: Soviet Ships Rub Ours the Wrong Way’, (New York) Daily News, May 14, 1967, p. 40. 23 ‘USSR’, Jane’s Fighting Ships 65-66, 1969, p. 458. 24 A Pavlov, The Project 56 Destroyers (Yakutsk, 1999) / А. С. Павлов, ‘Эскадренные миноносцы проекта 56’, Якутск, 1999.
122 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 The incident, which sparked a diplomatic protest from both sides, was also referenced briefly in authoritative publications including the US Naval Institute’sProceedings (196925 and 1973),26 and in the Neptune Papers (1989),27 published by Greenpeace/Institute for Policy Studies. The story also appeared in US News & World Report. The latter remained suspicious, asking, ‘What Are The Russians Up To Now?’28 Incidentally, all four publications referred to Soviet destroyer Besslednyi by name.
Accidents and incidents at sea during the Cold War were far more common than generally believed. A June 1989 study in Neptune Paper No. 3 by William M Arkin and Joshua Handler, documented 1,276 accidents of the major navies of the world between 1945 and 1988. Of these, nearly half occurred in the Atlantic Ocean (excluding the Mediterranean Sea), while 25 percent took place in the Pacific. Of these 1,276 accidents, nearly 800 involved US naval ships.29 Arkin, the lead author of the study, is an award-winning journalist and author of a dozen books on national security issues.
At one point, the authors of the Neptune Paper study offered a word of caution. This preponderance of US naval ship accidents, they pointed out, didn’t mean a higher rate than other navies, particularly the Soviet Navy. Many hundreds of other Soviet naval accidents were known to have occurred, but the authors of the study understood this was due to ‘inadequate data and excessive secrecy’, and therefore they were unable to determine their specific dates or circumstances.30
A UPI story, which covered four such accidents, including the 1967 Walker collision, appeared in various US newspapers in early-February 1968, including the Madera Daily Tribune31 (Madera, CA) and the Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh, PA).32 Incidentally, about ten days prior to publication of the above, that is, on 23 January 1968, North Korea famously seized the USS Pueblo, a lightly-armed US spy ship, and her crew of 83 while in international waters, in what is now known as the Pueblo Incident.
25 CMDR T Martin (USN), ‘Dangerous Maneuverings – The Russian View’, Professional Notes, Proceedings, US Naval Institute (USNI), Feb. 1969, pp. 144-146. 26 ‘Soviet Ships in the News’ Notebook, Proceedings, US Naval Institute (USNI), Feb. 1973, Vol. 99 No. 2, pp. 118- 119. 27 W Arkin and J Handler, ‘Naval Accidents 1945-1988’, Neptune Paper No. 3, Greenpeace/Institute for Public Stud- ies (Washington, D.C.), 1989, pp. 36-37; https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/NavalAccidents1945-1988. pdf 28 ‘What Are The Russians Up To Now?’ US News & World Report, 1967, Vol. 62, p. 8. 29 ‘Naval Accidents 1945-1988’, pp. 36-37. 30 Ibid. 31 Washington (UPI): ‘American Destroyer Rams Red’, Madera Tribune, Vol. 76, No. 185, Feb. 2, 1968, p. 1. 32 Washington (UPI): ‘US-Russian Vessels Collide’, Pittsburgh Press, Feb. 2, 1968, p. 8.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 123 Following the collision on May 10, Soviet harassment continued. A front-page story in the Washington Post, titled ‘2d Day, 2d Scrape’, described how theWalker had reportedly collided with a Soviet warship in the Sea of Japan for the second time in so many days. Following that second collision, the US lodged a second ‘severe’ protest, charging the Soviet vessel, an unidentified destroyer, with harassing naval units conducting exercises on the high seas and with creating ‘dangerous situations’.33 According to Russian sources, that ‘unidentified’ Soviet ship was the Gordyi (‘Proud’),34 an older Krupny-class guided- missile destroyer with pennant 025.35
Besslednyi was purportedly relieved by Gordyi at the break of dawn on May 11, following Besslednyi’s departure from the area. Shortly after Gordyi’s arrival, she transmitted a flashing light message to the US aircraft carrier Hornet, for the commander of the task force, accusing the USS Taylor (DD-468) and the Walker of ‘systematically and roughly’ violating international rules of the road at sea, by making dangerous manoeuvres that caused the danger of collision with a Soviet naval ship.
As a result of such ‘hooligans action’, the message read, Walker ran down the Soviet destroyer, causing damage to her port (left) side. The message, from the Commander of the Soviet task force, concluded: ‘SUCH ACTIONS OF NAVAL SHIPS CANNOT BE AFFORDED. REQUEST STOP THE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RULES OF SHIPPING AT OPEN SEA IMMEDIATELY’.36
As in the case of the May 10 Walker-Besslednyi collision, a Soviet oral and written protest followed. Llewellyn Thompson, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was ordered to follow up the protests in Moscow. Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill, House Republican Leader Gerald R Ford, a Navy veteran (and future President of the United States37), said, ‘we certainly can’t tolerate other such incidents’. Ford believed that President Lyndon B Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should decide what action should be taken to protect American ships.38
33 J Smith, ‘2d Day, 2d Scrape’, Washington Post, May 12, 1967, pp. A1, A22. 34 ‘Edges’ (a noun) is not a Russian word. Besides, Soviet destroyers during the Cold War mainly had adjective names, with endings such as ‘-ий’ or ‘-ый’ that may be transcribed in English as ‘-y’, ‘-yi’, ‘-ii’, and so forth. Examples include ‘Веский’ (‘Veskii’), ‘Бесследный’ (‘Besslednyi’), and ‘Гордый’ (‘Gordyi’). Perhaps, the line should have read something like this: ‘The US destroyer Walker sideswiped the ‘edges’ of the Soviet destroyer Besslednyi’. 35 ‘Shouldering Incident Reminiscent …’ 36 Ibid. 37 Following the 1974 resignation of Richard M Nixon, Gerald Ford became the 38th President of the United States. 38 ‘2d Day, 2d Scrape’, pp. A1, A22.
124 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Senator John G Tower, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the two collisions ‘indicate either a very stupid Soviet sea captain or a deliberate Soviet attempt to cause an international incident of far-reaching implications’, adding that the Pentagon should ‘restudy its contingency plans in case it becomes necessary to use force’.39
There Are Two Sides to Every Story
Not long after the May 1967 collisions at sea, three Russian-language newspapers ran stories on the incidents: two Soviet daily broadsheets (Pravda and Izvestia) and one American (Novoe Russkoe Slovo), but the stories, of course, were covered differently in the Soviet Union and in the US. Pravda was an organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; whereas Izvestia was the newspaper of the Councils of Workers' Deputies, and as such was the organ of government power. The word ‘izvestiya’ is derived from the Russian word meaning ‘to inform’. The following are excerpts from the two major Soviet newspapers:
Pravda, ‘Note from the Soviet Government’, May 14, 1967 on page 4:
The ships participating in the exercise repeatedly approached the Soviet coast at close range. By conducting such exercises in the Sea of Japan, American ships do not take into account existing international norms, grossly violate international rules for preventing collisions at sea and commit a number of illegal actions against Soviet ships located in this sea, approaching them at a dangerously close distance.
As a result, the American destroyer, side number 517, collided first with one and then with another of the Soviet destroyers, causing them a number of damages. [It is not clear from the text exactly when the mentioned collisions occurred; previously it is noted that the US Navy carrier force began exercises in the Sea of Japan on May 8, and on May 13, the Soviet party protested about the dangerous maneuvering of the US destroyer].
There can be no doubt that these actions of American warships were deliberate, provocative and a gross violation of international law, and the very conduct of the US-Japanese exercise near the Soviet coast cannot be regarded as anything other than a deliberately organized provocative military demonstration.
39 Ibid.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 125 Boris Karasev (Source Unknown)
Izvestia, issue 115 (15509), May 17, 1967, article ‘What Happened in the Sea of Japan? Interview with Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S G Gorshkov’:
Moreover, at 12 am on the same day [May 10, 1967], the American destroyer 517, with a speed of about 25 knots, came close to the Soviet ship and, leaning on her left side, tore the boat from the davits, and pierced it with her superstructures. The collision occurred 115 miles off the Soviet coast, East of Vladimir Bay.
At 17:33 on May 11, while overtaking another Soviet ship, the same destroyer hit her in the aft part of the port side. As a result of the strike, the Soviet ship received two holes and damage to the railings.
The fact that the same USS Walker collided with two Soviet ships speaks for itself. It is obvious to anyone who knows anything about the sea that if two collisions occur during an overtaking run in less than one day under favorable meteorological conditions and clear weather, as the commander of the USS 517 McClendon did, then this can only be done with malicious intent. The fact that the collision was committed intentionally
126 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 by an American ship is also evidenced by the fact that the American destroyer approached the Soviet ships with the fenders already lowered at the side to protect the lower part of her side from impact during the collision.
The incident was also covered at length in Novoe Russkoe Slovo (‘New Russian Word’), an American Russian-language newspaper published in New York City for a readership of Russian émigrés. Unlike Pravda and Izvestia, however, only Novoe Russkoe Slovo (NRS), a pro-democratic daily covering US and Soviet news, as well as Russian cultural topics, mentioned the Soviet destroyer by name; it was also the only Russian-language newspaper that held the Soviet ship responsible for the collision.
According to an article in Novoe Russkoe Slovo (‘A New Clash in the Waters of the Sea of Japan: An Attempt to Provoke a Major Incident?’), ‘No sooner had the Soviet charge d'affaires in Washington, Yuri Chernyakov, returned to the Embassy, where hewas protested against the attempts of the Soviet destroyer Besslednyi to interfere with the maneuvers of the American squadron in the Sea of Japan, which led to her collision with the American destroyer Walker […] when news came of a second collision in the Sea of Japan between a Soviet destroyer and the Walker.’40
Commander Sobolev Speaks Up
In the minds of American naval historians, the vessel that clashed with the USS Walker in 1967 was Besslednyi (‘Traceless’), a Soviet Kotlin-class destroyer. Russian authors and historians, however, know otherwise. In 2005, nearly 40 years after the collision between Walker and a Soviet destroyer in the Sea of Japan, there was a remarkable turn of events, when Anatoly Sobolev, Captain I rank (Post Capitan) (ret.), the former commander of Veskii (‘Convincing’), told his story for the first time.Veskii is the Project 56 destroyer that actually had collided with Walker. Russian journalist Oleg Kaptsov retold Sobolev’s story in 2012.41
According to Sobolev, it was customary in such cases for the Americans to try and create a scandal and blame the Soviet side. ‘When our ‘observers’ [destroyers and spy ships] approached the carrier strike group, [Walker] broke ranks suddenly … maneuvering
40 A Sobolev, ‘Новое столкновение в водах Японского моря: Попытка спровоцировать крупный инцидент?’ (‘A New Collision on the Water of the Sea of Japan: Is it a Try to Provoke a Major Scandal?’), Novoe Russkoe Slovo, May 12, 1967, p. 1. 41 Ibid.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 127 dangerously.’ But the American destroyer didn’t stop there. According to Sobolev, the next day, on May 11, Walker struck and made a hole in the side of Soviet destroyer Gordyi.42
The Americans tried to make a scene following the May 10 collision, Sobolev said, accusing the Soviet side; but seamen of the Soviet Pacific Fleet reacted more discreetly. A documentary film by an operator of a reconnaissance group, staff of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, left no doubt of US guilt. Once the film was shown to US representatives in Moscow, the Americans renounced all claims against the Soviet side; the Commander of US Navy’s 7th Fleet describing the US-Soviet naval encounter as ‘a pleasant event’.43
LIFE Magazine, 26 May 1967
Sobolev’s memoir on the Walker-Veskii collision began as follows: ‘In March 1967 [that’s two months before the collision at sea], I was appointed commander of the destroyer Veskii, which was part of the 201st brigade of the 9th division of ASW (anti-submarine warfare)’.44
44 Sobolov’s memoir later appeared as Chapter VIII: ‘10th OPESK (Operative Squadron of the Pacific Fleet) in the Memory of Shipmates’ from a book by I Khmelnov, E Chukhrayev, et al. ‘The Pacific Squadron’ (‘Тихоокеанская_ эскадра’): Moscow: Oruzhiye i tekhnologii: 2017; 25region.info/glava-viii
128 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 On 4 February 2005, The Daily News, a Vladivostok newspaper,45 published Sobolev’s first- hand account. His narration appeared later that year as a chapter in a book by Mikhail Khramtsov, Captain I rank (Post Capitan), a retired Soviet naval officer, titledThe ‘ Tragedy in the Immediate Vicinity: From the Brigade Commander’s Notebook’. The title of the chapter on Sobolev is a quote from the Commander of the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet in the Pacific: ‘The Voyage Together with Soviet Ships was a Pleasant Event’.46 Khramtsov had previously written two books on his experience in the Soviet Navy.
Sobolev’s memoir described in detail how Veskii had collided with Walker on 10 May 1967, putting to rest the long-held view by the US Navy, the US Defense Department, and others, that the Soviet ship involved in the collision with Walker was Besslednyi. Had Sobolev remembered wrong? Unlikely, since a Soviet Navy commander is more likely to forget his wife’s name than the name of his own ship.
According to Sobolev, on 9 May 1967 (one day prior to the collision), Veskii was ordered to monitor the maneuvers of the aircraft carrier Hornet strike group (Task Group 70.4), which had appeared not far from the Soviet shore. According to the US Navy, Walker joined the USS Taylor and the USS Davidson, a new type of destroyer escort, to provide a screen for the Hornet.47
At one point, Sobolev said, a group of intelligence officers from the Staff of the Soviet Pacific Fleet came on board the Veskii. But for Soviet intelligence to photograph the Davidson, he said, would require that his ship approach from a distance of no more than 1-2 cable lengths (or 200–300 meters). ‘The Americans tried to avoid this, but Veskii did the job’, Sobolev said.48
Sobolev continued: When Hornet increased her speed to 20 knots, destroyers Taylor and Walker began maneuvering to prevent Veskii from monitoring Hornet’s movements. This continued the whole afternoon of May 9, Sobolev said. But the next day [May 10], Walker began operating even more blatantly, when at 12:20 that afternoon, at a speed of about 28 knots, Walker ran with her starboard side onto the port side of Veskii. In doing so, a 10-meter-long rod antenna bracket, which was attached to her aft superstructure (where the ship’s Radio Room is located), ripped a rowboat aft gig tackle from the Soviet
45 M Khramtsov, Трагедия была рядом : из записных кн. Комбрига (The Tragedy in the Immediate Vicinity: From the Brigade Commander’s Notebook), Владивосток (Vladivostok), Aug, 1, 2005. 46 Ibid. 47 ‘Shouldering Incident Reminiscent …’; ‘The Voyage Together with Soviet Ships Was a Pleasant Event …’ 48 Ibid.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 129 destroyer; and the bracket, together with the antenna, fell onto the deck of Veskii. After the collision, Taylor approached Veskii and Walker, and went toward Hornet at full speed.49
According to Sobolev’s memoir, the ship in the foreground (022) is Veskii. The USS Walker can be seen through the haze in the right background. Observing refueling operations between USS Hornet (CVS-12) and USS Taluga (AO-62) in the Sea of Japan, 9 May 1967. © US Navy (NHHC Photo # USN1123797)
That evening, when Gordyi arrived, Veskii went to a Soviet tanker for refuelling. The next morning, however, when Veskii returned, her crew saw Gordyi and Walker with their engines stopped; As Sobolev explained, the ‘restless Walker’ had rammed her nose through Gordyi’s aft a couple minutes earlier. Fortunately, Gordyi wasn’t damaged seriously.50
How the Navy Got it Wrong
What might seem at first to be one of the great mysteries of naval history may have any number of simple explanations. Alexander Rozin, a Russian Cold War history researcher, described the collision between Walker and Veskii this way: ‘On 10 May, at a speed of
50 Ibid.
130 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 about 28 knots, [Walker] landed with his starboard [right] side on the port [left] side of the Soviet destroyer Veskii (side number 022)’.51
On the other hand, David Winkler, a historian at the Naval Historical Foundation and author of Cold War at Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), said Besslednyi displayed pennant number 022 during an incident with the Walker in the summer of 1966, and so assumed that the Soviet destroyer with pennant number 022 in May 1967 was also Besslednyi. If the US Navy was unaware that Besslednyi and Veskii bore the same pennant number (022), but at different times,52 this could have led to the erroneous conclusion that Besslednyi, and not Veskii, had collided with Walker in 1967.
Another possible cause of confusion was intentional trickery on the part of the Soviet Navy. According to an historian with the Naval History and Heritage Command, Soviet Operational Security included various means of deception—the Russians would change hull or sail numbers, or blacken them out, just to keep the US Navy confused as to the true state of affairs of the Soviet Navy. And on occasion, the Russians would go so far as to rename their ships. In the case of the 10 May 1967 collision between the USS Walker and a Soviet destroyer, the Soviet practice of changing hull numbers to confuse their adversary could easily have led to an error on the part of the US Navy.
Assigning Blame
Now that more than half-a-century has passed since the USS Walker collided with a Soviet destroyer in the Sea of Japan, one key question remains: Who was responsible for identifying the Soviet destroyer as Besslednyi ? It now appears the culprit was likely a Public Affairs Officer in Washington or at the US Navy’s 7th Fleet headquarters. Aware of a similar incident involving the Walker and Besslednyi (022) in 1966,53 the individual responsible for creating that May 1967 press release must have naturally assumed that the Soviet destroyer involved, with ‘022’ painted on her hull, was also Besslednyi, when in fact it was not.
On May 23, Captain Earl E Buckwalter, USN, Commander of Destroyer Squadron 11 (San Francisco), relayed the results of an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the collision between the USS Walker (DD-517) and Soviet DD-022 on 10 May 1967, and
51 ‘10 мая он, при скорости около 28 узлов, [Walker] навалился своим правым бортом на левый борт советского эсминца «Веский» (бортовой 022)’. 52 A Russian-language military forum: https://forums.airbase.ru/2004/07/t26907_2--opoznavanie-sovetskikh- korablej-i-katerov-po-bortovym-nomera.html 53 ‘Shouldering Incident Reminiscent …’
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 131 between Walker and Soviet DDGS-025 on 11 May 1967 during a Sea of Japan transit of Task Group 70.4. The investigation set forth the finding of fact, opinions, and recommendations as to the cause of the subject collisions, the resulting damage, responsibility for the collision and recommended administrative and disciplinary action.54
The Commander of 7th Fleet concluded that ultimate responsibility for both collisions rested with DD-022 and DDGS-025, respectively, and that Stephen W Mc Claran, USN, Commander of the USS Walker (DD-517), acted ‘intelligently and competently throughout his encounters with the Soviet vessels, and that no blame whatsoever should be attached to him’. Likewise, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet commented that Walker ‘competently and professionally performed his assigned mission’.55 And yet, nowhere in that entire 100+ page investigation report, is DD-022, the Soviet destroyer that collided with Walker on May 10, 1967, mentioned by name—let alone Besslednyi‘ ’.
54 Investigation Report concerning the 10-11 May 1967W alker collisions; FOIA (JAG) DON-NAVY-2020-007742 (partial grant/partial denial). 55 Ibid.
132 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Mr Bill Streifer
Mr Bill Streifer, a resident of Crestview, Florida, is a freelance journalist and researcher; and the only American on the Editorial Board of Vostok (East), Journal of Oriental Studies, published by the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.
Streifer’s publications have included the following: ‘Anything Could Happen: Newly Declassified CIA Documents Tell an Entirely Different North Korea ‘Pueblo Incident’’ in the North Korean Review (Sept. 2016); ‘The Pueblo Incident: Locating the ‘Hidden’ Spy Ship’ and ‘The Scissored ‘Pueblo’ Record’ in the International Journal of Naval History (Sept. 2020). Recently, Streifer’s article, ‘Dr. Fritz J Hansgirg and Heavy Water Production: The Untold Story’, was published in The Bulletin of the History of Chemistry, a peer-reviewed journal.
Mr Irek Sabitov
Mr Irek Sabitov, a resident of Ufa, Bashkiria, South Urals (Russia), is a journalist. In May 2015, his interviews of Russian WWII veterans earned him the Privolzhsky (Volga) Federal District newspaper journalism contest ‘Victory’, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of Victory in the war against Germany.
Sabitov has worked for the following Russian publications:Vecherniaya Ufa (Evening Ufa) daily newspaper; editor of the Bashkir Regional Supplement of Trud-7 and vice editor of the Bashkir Regional Supplement of Arguments and Facts, large Russian weeklies. He currently works for Republic Bashkortostan newspaper (Ufa) as a freelancer. He’s been published in various Moscow newspapers and has co-authored articles with Bill Streifer (in English and Russian) including, ‘The Flight of the Hog Wild’ in Arguments of the Week (August 12, 2010, Russia), ‘The Shock of ‘First Lightning’: An Intelligence Failure?’ in the American Intelligence Journal (2013), and ‘The Public Pueblo’, in Arguments of the Week (February 8, 2018, Russia).
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 133 Redefining the mission of maritime military geospatial services Commander Matthew Houston, RAN
In February 2020, the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Michael Noonan, formally commenced the HydroScheme Industry Partnership Program (HIPP). Through the HIPP, Defence’s intent is to engage industry to undertake the role of collection of hydrographic information to support the national hydrographic charting program. This approach will resolve the enduring resource dilemma of conflicting demands upon Navy hydrographic capability to support both national charting needs and provide maritime geospatial support to military operations. This significant shift in purpose effectively removed the historic raison d’etre that saw the formation of the hydrographic service in 1946. Consequently, the mission and role of naval hydrographic capability moving forward requires redefinition.
The existing strategic purpose to support freedom of manoeuvre and battlespace awareness remains unchanged. However, Australia now faces a strategic environment of increasing competition driven by the introduction of more capable systems enabled by technological change and the increasingly aggressive use of diverse grey-zone tactics. The strategic competition places greater emphasis on capability optimisation within its operating environment. An examination of military support operations conducted in recent times shows an approach by Defence to re-task hydrographic capability to roles of general maritime utility support that do not necessarily require the unique capabilities found in hydrographic vessels. This points to an inefficient allocation of resources that is not sustainable and does not represent value for money. A redefined mission for the hydrographic service is necessary to continue to contribute to Defence’s broader mission and reflect the current and forecast strategic environment.
This paper will review the historical context which led to the formation of the HIPP. It will propose a redefined Defence maritime geospatial information model that places the context of hydrographic capability as part of an acoustic intelligence workflow. This model is consistent with strategic principles and leads to an alternate view of the hydrographic mission with a focus less on hydrography and more upon the collection of oceanographic and meteorological environmental data. Finally, a forecast of future capability will be provided to fulfil the redefined mission.
Historical context
The current hydrographic force disposition reflects the historical evolution of the Australian Hydrographic Service (AHS) that was formed in 1923 and formally established
134 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 through a 1946 Cabinet decision.1 The formation of the AHS was to address the threat to the nation, specifically through trade, from poorly surveyed coastal waters. Naval seagoing elements of the AHS collected hydrographic and oceanographic data while the Hydrographic Office cartographers collated the data into the Australian chart series necessary for safe navigation. This function was, and remains, a Defence obligation for the provision of national hydrography as required by the United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea, and as directed through Section 223 of the Navigation Act 2012. The lexicon of the current AHS is heavily oriented to ‘hydrography’ and is reflective of the historic role.
The seagoing element of the AHS incorporates naval ships and personnel with professional mariner skills combined with the science of hydrographic survey. The role of collecting hydrographic data for national charting not only addressed the need to chart the coastline, it was beneficial in providing exposure of Navy hydrographers to the demands of the profession, ensuring the highest level of expertise and experience. Indeed, it is reasonable to say that in Australia up until the mid-1990s, Navy Hydrographers were regarded as the top of the profession.
There has always been tension between the demand to conduct coastal survey and the requirement to support Defence’s military functions. This tension was clearly demonstrated in World War II when national coastal survey was suspended, and hydrographic units were reassigned to support the landing operations of the Allies in the Pacific campaign. A more recent example has been the reassignment of hydrographic ships HMA Ships Leeuwin and Melville during operations RELEX, RELEX II and RESOLUTE for border protection duties at the expense of the national charting program. These two examples provide distinct insight into the resource dilemma of military hydrographic capability. During World War II, hydrographic support to military operations in the South West Pacific was essential to and deemed more important than maritime trade. The wartime mission to support freedom of navigation was potentially decisive and remains a powerful justification for Defence to maintain an enduring hydrographic capability. Alternatively, the more recent border protection missions drew upon the valuable utility role of hydrographic vessels, but not their unique survey capabilities. In this case, while acknowledging the benefit of the utility, there is insufficient justification to maintain a long-term capability that could equally be achieved by other more cost-effective means. For both case studies, while providing tremendous benefit to national military needs, the national charting effort was curtailed and for the duration of these military operations Defence was failing in its statutory charting obligations. A similar failure occurs on each
1 1946 Cabinet Decision. Navy File No 1893/2/167 dated 5/7/1946.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 135 occasion hydrographic units are reassigned to military support operations, albeit on a smaller scale of impact.
The environmental missions
Freedom of manoeuvre is a concept associated with safe navigation in the marine environment. Until recently the concept has largely been viewed within a two-dimensional perspective of vessel navigation upon the sea surface. A broader view rightly considers the impact of meteorological and oceanographic information on safe navigation as part of the geospatial information suite. The increasing application of undersea warfare and subsurface technologies has seen the two-dimensional appreciation expand to a three-dimensional appreciation of the water space. The evolution of military needs to provide support to the enduring mission of freedom of navigation has evolved to also see development of an increasingly demanding mission for battlespace situational awareness. Commanders should be able to exploit maritime conditions to gain advantage. Changes in environmental conditions frequently cause significant variation in sensor ranges and weapon performance. Therefore, tactics must be revised in order to respond to these changes that can occur over short intervals of time and distance. Because of the dynamic nature of the environment, it is necessary to accurately analyse the current environmental conditions and then forecast the state of the environment at some time in the future and/or at some distant location. Tactical use of the environment requires an appreciation of hydrographic, oceanographic and meteorological environmental parameters.
Recent conflict has displayed technological advances in detection and guidance sensor systems in the continental environment. An ambition to achieve a similar level of system accuracy in the undersea warfare environment is highly desirable and points to a renewed geospatial collection mission. Sound is used for detecting underwater targets because at useful wavelengths and frequencies it is absorbed far less than any electromagnetic transmission.2 The primary determinant for acoustic propagation is the water column temperature/salinity/density profile. Further, sound transmission has the distinct disadvantage of being readily absorbed and scattered by a number of environmental qualities within the water column. The sonar equation combines the physics of sonar transmission (this includes both active and passive acoustics that each use tailored equations) and identifies the design of acoustic transmitters, range of target, target return strength and a number of environmental effects as significant factors. Of critical interest are the environmental factors that impact the strength of the sensor receive signal. This includes specific acoustic parameters of reverberation (that includes backscatter from
2 DSTO Report WSRL-GD-48/88 Significant Developments in Defence Oceanography of Australia’s Area of Interest, 1988.
136 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 surface mixing, marine life, and bottom type) and ambient noise (from shipping traffic, wave-generated noise, and biological noise). Underwater acoustic propagation is also largely affected by the reflective properties of the seafloor. Improved acoustic prediction requires knowledge of the seafloor topography and acoustic properties including tensile strength, grain size and roughness. Added to the dimension of change for these geospatial environmental factors are seasonal effects that are required to be modelled for long- range forecasting and prediction. These geospatial environmental factors are critical to undersea sensor performance and will be key battlespace capability enablers.
Undersea battlespace awareness collection
The requirement for battlespace situational awareness utilising recent technological advances leads to the need for a maritime environmental collection program. Such a program should be defined by a prioritised area of operations and by environmental data types that meet user requirements. The collection plan should not only capture the activities of Defence platforms but would also leverage off commercial availability of data. Extensive scientific community networks exist that seek to improve the understanding of the marine environment. Data sharing arrangements with Defence partners, other Government agencies, industry and academia must augment military-specific collection activity. The existing cooperation between Defence and the Bureau of Meteorology through Bluelink is an example of the advantage to be gained through inter-agency cooperation.
Reliance on civil collection activity alone to meet Defence needs is short-sighted. While all environmental data is of scientific interest, not all data types required for undersea warfare are a priority for civil agencies. As an example, the international collaboration ARGO float program3 has been operating for twenty years to provide for the collection of ocean temperature and salinity data. The primary aim of the program is to understand the effect of the oceans on climate. The program allows for any global participant to fund a float. Data is quality controlled and shared by two global regional centres. This resource is of tremendous value to Defence’s undersea warfare needs but critically limited. Figure 1 provides a graphic display of global float deployments. Of specific interest for Australian Defence planners is the lack of data collection occurring in the sea lane approaches to the north of Australia.
3 ARGO Float Program https://argo.ucsd.edu/about/ viewed 14 July 2020
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 137 Figure 1: ARGO Float distribution June 2020
Maritime geospatial information model
The demand for maritime geospatial environmental information has introduced an increased need for knowledge and the practice of hydrography, oceanography and meteorology to build foundation geospatial environmental datasets. The demand is not only limited to the Navy; there is a growing requirement from each of the other services, the broader Australian Defence Organisation, other Government agencies and, importantly, Five Eye partners (FVEY). A workflow model requires a strategic capability that is coordinated across a number of Defence agencies, including: Navy as a tactical data collector; Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (incorporating the Australian Hydrographic Office) to collate and disseminate data; and individual capability systems designers who will need to ensure their sensor systems are interoperable with the foundation geospatial environmental databases. Further Defence coordination will be required from a Joint Headquarters to set collection priorities and inter-agency data exchange, including Defence exchange with international partners.
138 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Figure 2: Maritme Environment Collection Workflow
To support the model, Navy’s Hydrographic Service will be required to adopt a tactical mission that prioritises maritime environmental information collection based onthe acoustic data priorities identified in this paper. This effort must be coordinated with the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation, which is responsible for the collation and dissemination of geospatial data. The act of dissemination will effectively transform collected environmental information into acoustic intelligence. To complete the workflow model, Defence maritime systems must possess data interoperability such that individual capability systems can access, exploit, and represent data to operators to support their tactical decision-making process.
Future systems
Hydrographic, oceanographic and meteorological systems are characterised by those systems commercially available and proven within industry. Globally there is a viable commercial industry that continues to drive innovation and design that Defence can leverage benefit. This state is unlikely to change. Therefore, ongoing dependence on commercial innovation is anticipated. Future environmental collection activities should employ new demanding technologies. In the past, surface vessels have formed the centrepiece of effort. This should change with the ability to embark in ships, and employ within teams, autonomous systems. These systems offer not only significant potential in the rate of effort of deployed assets and extend the reach of data collection, they have the potential to remove personnel from the proximity of threats. Capability acquisition should initially focus on mature technologies and be directed toward specific tasks and include autonomous underwater vehicles capable of high-resolution shallow and deep-water survey, ocean gliders to commence a deliberate program of oceanographic information collection, and ocean floats similar to the ARGO program described.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 139 The proposed mission will require a realignment of the existing workforce. While not removing the ability to conduct hydrographic survey, Navy hydrographic specialists will be required to become more competent in oceanographic sciences. The current training balance of predominant hydrographic skills that places emphasis on achieving International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) qualifications should be reviewed, noting that Navy surveyors will have limited opportunity to undertake hydrographic survey for the purpose of national charting. A revised training standard directed toward management of environmental risk in terms of freedom of manoeuvre to military operations and battlespace environmental data management is required. The relevance of IHO Category A and B standards should be reviewed. Similarly, a reversal of the current approach that requires all Navy hydrographers to be certified under the civil certification panel should be reviewed. A revised balance in meteorological specialist’s skills, with greater emphasis on oceanographic data collection, will be required that is cognisant of the growth in demand for aviation forecasting. Both categories of geospatial specialists should be required to develop higher levels of data management skills.
Conclusion
The commencement of the HIPP in February 2020 presents a significant inflexion point for the Navy’s hydrographic service. The program has removed the historic purpose for the Navy's capability and demands a strategic review of the mission and roles of the Service if it is to continue to provide value to Australia’s Defence. Changes in strategic competition between maritime regional powers, combined with rapid technological growth in undersea warfare, point to a redefined mission that has the hydrographic service recast from providing for coastal hydrographic survey to geospatial environmental collection. Geospatial environmental collection has its foundations in the science of oceanography, and specifically that application of the sonar equation such that military commanders may gain tactical advantage. The speed of strategic change arguably has placed Defence at a disadvantage from failing to address undersea environmental capability needs. However, an opportunity is present that could see a realignment of current maritime geospatial support to operations focused on enabling future capability systems with accurate and comprehensive oceanographic datasets.
140 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Commander Matthew Houston, RAN
Commander Matthew Houston is a hydrographic surveyor and qualified project manager. Matthew joined the Navy in 1983 and specialised as a hydrographic surveyor in 1986. His postings in the Hydrographic Service included the Detach Survey Unit, HMASFlinders based in Cairns, the Hydrographic School at HMAS Penguin and Executive Officer in HMAS Paluma. He assumed command of HMAS Benalla in 1996. Subsequent postings included: Executive Officer of NUSHIP MELVILLE and Operational Test Director for the Hydrographic Ships and Digital Hydrographic Database. He attended the Australian Command and Staff Course in 2003. Matthew assumed command of HS White Crew embarking in HMA Ships Melville and Leeuwin in January 2006. He resigned from the Navy in 2007 to assume a position with the Defence Materiel Organisation as Survey Motor Launch Upgrade Project Manager. Matthew returned to naval service in 2008 initially serving as the Officer in Charge of the Hydrographic School, HM Group Capability Manager Representative, Deputy Director Hydrographic & Meteorological Capability and now is on the Directing Staff at the Australian War College. Matt has completed a Master of Systems Engineering and Project Management.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 141 Pacific Step Up versus Pacific Reset: Trans-Tasman Lessons for the Pacific ‘Family’ Captain Lisa Hunn, RNZN Both Australia and New Zealand have adopted a National strategy emphasis towards the South Pacific to counter Chinese influence in the near region. Australia announced the ‘Pacific Step Up’ at the Pacific Islands Forum in September 2016 and published the Australian 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. This White Paper outlined a focus on: enhanced engagement with Papua New Guinea, other Pacific countries, Timor-Leste, regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum as well as a commitment to ‘engage with the Pacific with greater intensity and ambition, deliver more integrated and innovative policy and make further, substantial long-term investments inthe region’s developments’. In March 2018, the New Zealand Government followed with the announcement of the Pacific Reset strategy in a speech to the Lowy Institute in Australia. In the ‘first steps’ speech two months later, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade indicated a Pacific Reset policy that would result in a shift from a ‘donor-recipient relationship into genuine and more mature political partnerships’. It signalled a return to respectful, back to basics diplomacy, a restoration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s lost capacity and an increase in overseas development assistance for the Pacific.
For Australia and New Zealand, this re-focus towards the Pacific has afforded an opportunity to collaborate and build on the close relationship the two countries have enjoyed since forging the Australia-New Zealand Army Corps bond during World War II. Trans-Tasman alignment was highlighted within the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, but notably absent in New Zealand policy relating directly to the Pacific Reset. In light of this collaboration, the purpose of this essay is to compare Australia and New Zealand’s strategies for the Pacific and draw out any key lessons. My proposition is that Australia could learn from New Zealand’s soft power approach within the Pacific region and leverage New Zealand’s soft power strength to further Australian aims. Comparing a traditional middle power with a small power is challenging given the disparity in hard power economic and military instruments to Australia’s advantage. However, to limit the impacts of this disparity, this essay assumes that both New Zealand and Australia have ‘regional power’ status within the Pacific Region. Given the length of this article, the intent is to focus on key divergences between Australia and New Zealand’s soft power approach to support the proposition.
To establish the conceptual framing for this article , I have anchored my analysis in the following definitions. The National strategy definition is synonymous withthe grand strategy definition namely: ‘the intellectual framework guiding how a political
142 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 community develops and applies different forms of power to achieve its political ends’. The intellectual framework is defined as ‘commonly shared ideas that shape the way that power is developed and used in a political community (rather than documents or speeches)’ and the different forms of power are defined as the diplomatic, information, military and economic instruments. Finally, the definition of soft power, according to Nye, is ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.’1 He further states that:
A country derives its soft power primarily from three resources: its culture (in places that find it appealing), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).2
Reviewing each of these key ‘resources’ for Australia and New Zealand, in reverse order, will form the majority of the analysis to support the proposition.
Firstly, to address the first ‘resource’ of soft power, it is useful to describe the Foreign Policy objectives for Australia and New Zealand’s Pacific-oriented strategies andhow they would be seen as legitimate from the Pacific Islands point of view. For Australia, Chapter 7 of the Foreign Policy White Paper 2017 states that:
Australia recognises that new approaches will be necessary. Our support will focus on three priorities: promoting economic co-operation and greater integration within the Pacific and also with the Australian and New Zealand economies, including through labour mobility; tackling security challenges and a focus on maritime issues; and strengthening people-to-people links, skills and leadership.
It also outlines a commitment to work with Pacific governments to ‘respond to climate change, bolster resilience, strengthen emergency responses and improve governance, education, health and gender outcomes’. The goals described above are broad, ambitious and signal a significant commitment to a stepped-up approach but the question of legitimacy is raised based on whether Australia will deliver a true partnership approach as defined by the Pacific. This will be discussed further below when addressing the cultural ‘resource’ of soft power. Undoubtedly ‘Australia’s increased engagement in the
1 J Nye, 2008 ‘Public diplomacy and soft power’,Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 94-109, doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699, p. 94 2 J Nye, ‘What are the limits of China’s soft power?’, 2015,World Economic Forum, retrieved 22 Jun 2020,
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 143 South Pacific constitutes a genuine attempt to balance China’s increased presence in the region’.3 To obtain legitimacy, the key aspect to address here is ‘genuine’ and the recent feedback from the Pacific in the 2020 Whitlam Institute research indicates that:
The research participants see Australian engagement with the region, including the Pacific Step-up, predominantly as unilateral initiatives of Australia. They comprise things that are done for or to the Pacific, not with it. Pacific people are looking for reassurance that Australia shares their concerns and is working alongside them, as an equal partner, to address shared challenges.4
As Wallis and Powles (2018) conclude, ‘relationships are the greatest currency in the Pacific Islands and that Pacific Islander agency will determine robust regionalism.’5 The ability for either Australia or New Zealand to relate, build trust and work alongside Pacific Island nations in a genuine partnership over time, is not only what Pacific Islanders desire, but it requires a more collaborative engagement approach to achieve it. This is an area where New Zealand could be used as an example or advisor.
By comparison, New Zealand does not have an equivalent Foreign Policy White Paper, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018-2019 Annual Report details a specific Pacific goal to ‘promote a stable, prosperous and resilient Pacific in which New Zealand’s interests and influence are safeguarded’. In response to the Pacific Reset, the Defence Department issued the 2018 Defence Strategic Policy Statement and followed with the 2019 ‘Advancing Pacific Partnerships: A Framework for Defence’s Approach to the Pacific’. This policy outlines the need to build ‘deeper partnerships with Pacific Island countries and other key partners and institutions in the region’. What differs from the Australian approach is the use of softer language within the policy. It states:
Our Defence people are our single greatest asset. It is their cultural intelligence, be they Maori, Pasifika or other New Zealanders, that have built the genuine
3 White (2019) cited P Kollner, 2019, ‘Australia and New Zealand recalibrate their China policies: convergence and divergence’, The Pacific Review, doi: 10.1080/09512748.2019.1683598 4 Whitlam Institute 2020, Pacific perspectives on the world: listening to Australia’s island neighbours in order to build strong, respectful and sustainable relationships, Sydney, retrieved 28 Jun 2020,
144 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 bonds and strong people-to-people connections that provide the foundation of our Pacific engagement.6
This careful use of language within the policy context is important and sets the foreign policy tone for future engagement.
Both Australia and New Zealand have demonstrated advocacy for the rules-based global order within their foreign policy documents yet domestic inconsistencies in the approach to climate change are evident. In Australia’s case this is impacting the credibility of Australia’s foreign policy efforts in agreements such as the 2015 Paris Agreement and the more recent 2018 Boe Declaration confirmed at the South Pacific Defence Minister’s meeting in 2019. While Australia has demonstrated commitment towards the creation of climate adaptation initiatives to build resilience in the South Pacific, the soft power approach to addressing the Pacific’s number one security threat is less obvious. Domestic climate policy does not appear to attract importance and became a hot political topic during the recent bushfire season. According to the Climate Analytics website, an independent group of scientists who track national climate change progress, Australia’s current approach is insufficient to meet agreed targets. Additionally evidence suggests that:
Australia’s emissions from fossil fuels and industry continue to rise. The rapid ramp-up in the production of liquified natural gas (LNG) for export means LNG processing has driven huge increases in greenhouse gas emissions in Australia.
This increase signals that Australia is not serious on delivering against international agreements and this is creating a negative perception for Australia. According to the 2020 Whitlam Institute research ‘Pacific Perspectives on the World’ conducted in Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, Australia’s inconsistent approach to climate policy is creating unease. Australia is one of many potential relationships in the region, and committing to taking tangible steps to address the domestic climate change policy agenda within the post COVID-19 recovery planning would be seen as a welcome outcome within the Pacific region.
New Zealand’s response to the Boe Declaration has been proactive with the release of two Defence policy documents: the 2018 ‘The Climate Crisis: Defence Readiness and Responsibilities’ and the 2019 Implementation Plan ‘Responding to the Climate Crisis’. In
6 New Zealand Ministry of Defence/ New Zealand Defence Force 2019, Advancing Pacific Partnerships: A Frame- work For Defence’s Approach to the Pacific, MOD/NZDF, retrieved 9 Jun 2020, https://www.defence.govt.nz/ assets/publication/file/5f6dd307e7/Advancing-Pacific-Partnerships-2019.pdf, p. 2.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 145 each case, the policy demonstrates an emphasis on not only understanding the security impacts of climate change, but also outlines the plans to respond, adapt, mitigate and engage in this crisis area. New Zealand has acknowledged the seriousness of the threat by labelling it the climate ‘crisis’ and has responded at least with policy intent at the Defence and National level. Wallis and Powles (2018) conclude that:
At the domestic level, strong support for climate change action as a defining aspect of New Zealand’s foreign policy indicates that, like New Zealand’s anti- nuclear stance, climate change will become embedded in New Zealand’s identity.7
As with Australia, a Climate Analytics assessment of New Zealand’s policy approach indicates that there is further work to do:
While New Zealand is showing leadership by having passed the world’s second- ever Zero Carbon Act in November 2019, under currently policy projections, it is set to miss its ‘insufficient’ 2030 unconditional target by a wide margin, as it lacks the strong policies required to implement it.
Like Australia, it is clear that New Zealand must also focus on designing effective climate policies to meet agreed targets so as to retain legitimacy at home and in the eyes of the Pacific. The process of securitisation of the climate change and categorisation as a crisis has certainly signalled a strong commitment by the New Zealand Government to addressing the Pacific’s number one security threat which directly aligns with New Zealand’s interests. While Australia may not wish to be as bold, it is suggested that Australia should consider taking a more prominent policy stand on climate change to address both Pacific Islander’s concerns and the domestic audience. While it is accepted this may be difficult during the COVID-19 pandemic recovery, the Royal Commission inquiry into the 2019-2020 bushfire season may offer the right catalyst.
The final soft power ‘resource’ to examine for each nation is culture with a particular focus on identity. Despite Australia and New Zealand’s long-standing alliance relationship, cultural rivalry and shared values base, each nation’s culture differs and impacts how soft power is exercised. While geographical size is a likely factor, a national identity within a national culture contributes to the attractiveness of a nation and thus the effectiveness of its soft power. Given the geographic location of Australia between the Pacific and
7 J Wallis and A Powles, 2018, ‘Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific Islands: Ambiguous Allies?’,Centre of Gravity Series, retrieved 7 Jun 2020,
146 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Indian Oceans coupled with the adoption of an Indo-Pacific geostrategic framing, it is difficult for Australia to claim either a Pacific or Asian identity. Australia’s alliance with the United States also colours the perceptions of other nations as Thomson (2018) suggests: ‘Australia is the pugnacious and reliable US ally that “punches above its weight” whereas
New Zealand is the principled and independent global citizen’.8 Since the Pacific Step Up, Australia’s externally-viewed identity appears to have been forged through a reputation of delivering hard-edged actions through numerous Pacific Step Up initiatives and not in a partnered approach. According to the 2020 Whitlam research:
In Fiji, participants reflected an overall sense that Australia’s approach is, at times, overbearing, paternalistic and, as a consequence, ineffective. In Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, participants referred to a perception of Australia’s tendency to heavy-handedness when it comes to engaging with their countries. This was seen as being coupled with the adoption of a transactional approach to the bilateral relationship rather than a focus on developing deeper relationships.
Understanding other nations’ perspectives is incredibly important to building a strong relationship. To understand how perceptions are formed, it is important to understand the cultural framing of the audience. Australia’s establishment of the ‘Fiji-Australia Vuvale Partnership’ in early 2019 is a step towards the adoption of a more Pacific-oriented cultural approach and offers a model that could be used with other Pacific Island Nations.
New Zealand’s history and identity as a Pacific Island influences the approach taken to foreign policy and forming people-to-people links in the Pacific Region and could be used to Australia’s advantage. Within this Pacific identity ‘the question of [New Zealand’s] independence is central’9 and this resonates with the Pacific Island communities who value their own independence. New Zealand’s Maori and Pasifika cultures resident within New Zealand continue to influence foreign policy, and this is reflected clearly in the language of the 2019 ‘Advancing Pacific Partnerships: A Framework for Defence’s Approach to the Pacific’. This policy introduces the ‘Vaka Tahi Pacific Partnership Model’ and declares respect for the sovereignty of Pacific Nations, defines the partnership between New Zealand and the Pacific Island nations and highlights the use of ‘Tala Noa’ or storytelling as the engagement approach. The key component of this approach is taking
8 M Thomson, 2018, New Zealand, Australia and the ANZUS alliance: Interests, identity and strategy, Special Report, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, retrieved 7 Jun 2020, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.ama-< zonaws.com/ad-aspi/2018-02/SR 117 NZ Aus and ANZUS Alliance.pdf?3f_B5swJ3nlQAqTIVdIr6_kN_H6PRgpb website>., p. 28. 9 Ibid.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 147 time to listen and understand what is being said to gain a more in-depth appreciation of local concerns and ideas. Given New Zealand’s approach and positive reputation within the Pacific Islands community, Australia could leverage New Zealand’s experience within the region to bolster its soft power capacity.
Both Australia and New Zealand have turned their attention to the Pacific region in recent years to undertake a counter-influence strategy against China and rebuild influence with Pacific Island neighbours. Australia’s harder-edged Pacific Step Up strategy has been employed alongside New Zealand’s softer Pacific Reset strategy and both are in the early stages of implementation. In order to determine opportunities for Trans-Tasman lessons to be shared between Australia and New Zealand, a comparison of both nations’ application of soft power within these strategies has been undertaken. This analysis has provided evidence to support the proposition that Australia could learn from New Zealand’s soft power approach within the Pacific region and leverage New Zealand’s soft power strength to further Australian aims. To summarise the key points, New Zealand’s Pacific identity alongside a uniquely more subtle approach to engagement, offers an example for Australia to emulate and a strength that Australia could leverage to its advantage. Additionally, to increase overall attractiveness within the Pacific and legitimacy in the eyes of the Pacific Island Nations, Australia should also consider stepping up the development of climate policy to ensure it delivers on promises made.
Looking to the future Wallis and Powles’ (2018) recommendation that Australia and New Zealand could be more creative by capitalising on the combination of New Zealand’s soft power and Australia’s hard power in the Pacific by ‘identifying issues of shared concern and creating the enabling environment in which to discuss them’ 10has merit. A co- ordinated ‘Trans-Tasman smart power approach’, although more complex to negotiate, is likely to deliver more sustainable outcomes and build a strong and resilient regional identity where both New Zealand and Australia are considered integral and influential members of the Pacific family. Within a context of COVID-19 pandemic recovery and strategic competition, regional coherence and collective action will be key to maintaining a stable peace so as to rebuild regional prosperity. As Gyngell (2020) puts it, ‘If Australia and New Zealand can’t navigate the uncertain new environment successfully, who can?’11
10 J Wallis and A Powles, 2018, ‘Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific Islands: Ambiguous Allies?’,Centre of Gravity Series, retrieved 7 Jun 2020, http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attach- ments/2018-10/cog_43_web.pdf p.11. 11 A Gyngell, 2018, ‘New trans-Tasman vision needed’, The Interpreter, retrieved 4 Jun 2020,
148 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 Captain Lisa Hunn, RNZN
Born in Wellington, Captain Hunn completed secondary schooling in Auckland before joining the Royal New Zealand Navy in 1990. During her thirty-year Naval career, she has served at sea as a warfare officer primarily in the Naval Combat Force and gained maritime operational experience in the Arabian Gulf and Asia-Pacific Regions. Captain Hunn completed both Anti-Submarine Aircraft Controller and Principle Warfare Officer training in Australia. Her most recent sea experience was Command of Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship Te Mana where she was the first women to Command a RNZN Frigate. During her Command she gained experience in defence diplomacy, leadership of multi-national Task Groups in large maritime exercises and circumnavigated the Pacific Ocean to deliverTe Mana to Victoria, Canada for the Frigate Systems Upgrade programme.
In between periods at sea, she has served in capability and staff roles with an emphasis on Communications and Information Warfare. In 2015 she re-established the Director Naval Safety role to introduce change associated with the new Health and Safety at Work Act. A highlight in 2016 was an opportunity to serve as the Chief of Staff of a New Zealand-led multi-national battle staff for the Commander Amphibious Task Force during Exercise RIMPAC 2016.
Post Command, Captain Hunn was promoted and appointed as Captain Fleet Operational Readiness and was responsible for ensuring the Naval fleet’s readiness for planned and contingency operations.
Captain Hunn is an alumnus of the University of Auckland (Bachelor of Science), the University of New South Wales (Diploma in Information Management), the United States Naval War College, the Asia Pacific Centre For Strategic Studies and Whitecliffe College of Arts and Design (Diploma in Fine Arts and Design). She is currently completing the Defence Strategic Studies Course at the Australian War College in Canberra where she will complete a Masters in Strategic Studies.
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 149 New Entry Officer’s Course 63 Graduation Royal Australian Naval College HMAS Creswell
At the Graduation of each New Entry Officer’s Course (NEOC), the Australian Naval Institute sponsors two prizes, the ANI Sea Training Deployment Prize and the ANI Creswell Cup.
The NEOC 63 Graduation took place on Thursday, 26 November 2020. The Reviewing Officer was former ANI Vice President and Councillor, Rear Admiral Lee Goddard, CSC, RAN. The Parade signified Rear Admiral Goddard’s last parade before he transitions to the Royal Australian Navy Reserves in 2021.
ANI Sea Training Deployment Prize The ANI Sea Training Deployment Prize is awarded to the NEOC graduate who demonstrates the most outstanding qualities, exceptional leadership, unequalled good influence and diligent application to task book, journal work and other specific tasks and assignments while on Sea Training Deployment.
For NEOC 63, the ANI Sea Training Deployment Prize was awarded to Midshipman Matthew Hubbard, RAN. Mr Craig Powell, ANI Councillor, presented the award on behalf of the Institute.
150 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 ANI Royal Australian Naval College Prize
The ANI Creswell Cup is awarded to the NEOC graduate who demonstrates the most performance in leadership and dedication to the Naval values whilst on course.
For NEOC 63, the ANI Creswell Cup was awarded to Midshipman Terez Lofts, RAN. Mr Craig Powell, ANI Councillor, presented the award on behalf of the Institute.
Photographer: CPOIS Cameron Martin
Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2 151 The Australian Naval Review
Edition Year Issue Chair, Australian Naval Review Committee 1 2016 1 2 2017 1 Rear Admiral Lee Goddard, CSC, RAN 3 2018 1 4 2019 1 Commodore Justin Jones, CSC, RAN 5 2019 2 6 2020 1 Captain Guy Blackburn, RAN 7 2020 2
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HMA Ships Sirius and Stuart sail in company with RSS Supreme, KDB Daruleshan and USS Rafael Peralta through the Pacific Ocean on the way to Exercise RIMPAC2020 in Hawaii.Photographer : LSIS Christopher Szumlanski.
152 Australian Naval Review 2020 Issue 2
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