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Motoya Kitamura

JAPAN’S PROGRAM: A PROLIFERATION THREAT?

by Motoya Kitamura

Motoya Kitamura was formerly a staff writer for the Kyodo News Agency in . He recently completed an M.A. in international relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University, where he undertook this research. Since graduating, he has returned to Japan to continue his career.

he Japanese plutonium pro- the emergence of post- between promotion and control dur- gram continues to dwell on multipolarity, criticism of the Japa- ing the Cold War era. After de- Tthe minds of nuclear nonpro- nese plutonium program tends to be scribing the fluctuation of the non- liferation watchers. Japan remains aimed indiscriminately at every proliferation policy in the past, the the only non- state single aspect of the program. From article examines the concerns raised that is operating enrichment a nonproliferation perspective, we today. and reprocessing plants, all of which must ask instead, what is the most For the development of a nuclear are technically capable of produc- effective approach to take? What are weapon program, both the political ing fissile materials for nuclear the most serious problems with the will and the technology represented weapons. The magnitude of these program? How are they relevant to by the plutonium program are nec- projects exceeds those of other na- nonproliferation, and what is the essary. Of the two, Tokyo’s politi- tions that have either abandoned or role of other countries in influenc- cal will holds the key to preventing postponed similar programs. ing the Japanese plutonium pro- nuclear proliferation in Japan, but The issue of Japan’s capability to gram? In an attempt to describe the nuclear umbrella provided by the acquire a nuclear arsenal is en- accurately the nuclear weapons pro- will have the stron- tangled with Tokyo’s enigmatic di- liferation concerns, this article gest influence on Tokyo’s plomacy. On the one hand, it com- begins with a general overview of decisionmaking. plies with its obligations to the In- the Japanese plutonium program. It ternational Atomic Energy Agency then illustrates the strong driving CHARACTERISTICS OF THE (IAEA), making financial contribu- forces behind the program: an ad- JAPANESE PLUTONIUM tions, being open to inspections, and herence to energy security, past en- PROGRAM crusading for a nuclear-free world couragement from the United States, as the world’s sole victim of nuclear and powerful and interested domes- An Overview attacks. On the other hand, the num- tic nuclear bodies. This article ber of remarks made by political fig- argues that the incentives for pluto- The Japanese plutonium program ures alluding to Japan’s ambitions nium development, especially the is the logical extension of the for developing nuclear weapons has promotion strategy by the United nation’s extensive nuclear energy increased in recent years. States, have made Japan indifferent program, which was first established As nuclear nonproliferation forces to U.S. nonproliferation policy, with the goal of achieving energy continue to grow worldwide amid which has swayed back and forth independence. Since the 1966 open-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 1 Motoya Kitamura

ing of the Tokai Plant, 48 nuclear out only on a case-by-case basis with The Japanese plutonium program reactors have started operation, the prior approval of the United has gathered attention in recent years bringing the nation’s total installed States. However, a 1988 agreement because of the gradual demise of capacity to 38.0 gigawatts electric, between Japan and the United States similar programs in other nations. the third largest in the world after provided for a new arrangement in Cost, technology, uranium availabil- the United States and .1 Four which the United States gave prior ity, safety, and the environment all new reactors are currently under consent for all civilian programs Ja- became causes for concern. The construction. pan proposed for plutonium use United States, Sweden, Italy, and The basic direction of the pluto- during the next 30 years. The Tokai- have abandoned civilian plu- nium program was first outlined in mura plant can produce about 450 tonium programs. Britain and Ger- the 1967 Long Term Program, 11 kilograms (kg) of fissile plutonium many canceled their programs or years after its principles had been per year. The reprocessing plant in halted the operation of breeder re- approved by the Japan Atomic En- Rokkasho-mura, now under con- actors. Although Britain maintains ergy Commission (JAEC).2 The struction, will start operation around a large reprocessing plant, it has no program identified fast breeder re- 2001. According to the 1994 Long plans for domestic recycling. And actors (FBR) and the closed nuclear Term Program, a decision to build although France completed the fuel cycle through uranium enrich- the next reprocessing plant will be world’s largest prototype FBR, ment and plutonium reprocessing as made in 2010.5 Superphoenix, in 1985, it had op- its main goals. Since the mid-1970s, Japan has erated for fewer than 200 days In accordance with these policies, realized that its reprocessing capac- through 1993. The status of the two the Power Reactor and ity would fall short of increasing de- FBRs in the former is Development Corporation (PNC), mand for plutonium. To counteract unclear. While both appear to be op- created by the Japanese government, this shortage, Japanese utilities in erating, technical concerns and ru- began construction on the experi- the late 1970s signed contracts with mored shutdowns have been raised.8 mental FBR JOYO in 1970, which the French state-owned Cogema If this trend continues, the Japanese reached criticality in 1977. The group and with British Nuclear Fuel program will not be able to escape prototype FBR MONJU began op- Ltd. (BNFL) to extract and return close international scrutiny. eration in 1994 and generated elec- plutonium (and high-level radioac- tricity for the first time in August tive waste (HLW) that would be re- Driving Forces 1995.3 The construction of a dem- covered from Japanese spent fuel in onstration FBR is planned to begin their reprocessing plants).6 Thus, What have been the driving forces shortly after 2000, with commer- between 1970 and 1979, a total of behind the Japanese plutonium pro- cialization planned by 2030 (the 13 shipments were made from Brit- gram? Why has it overcome the schedule was pushed back in the ain to Japan. The amount of pluto- economic and political barriers that 1994 Long Term Program). Con- nium carried in those convoys var- have hindered development in other struction started on the advanced ied for 25 kg to 100 kg. In 1981, nations? Why has Japan devoted so thermal reactor (ATR) prototype 190 kg were transported in a single much energy to technological devel- FUGEN in 1970, which reached shipment. In 1984, 253 kg shipped opment? The key to understanding criticality in 1978. The ATR project from France (not all in one ship- such questions lies in the history of had been planned in preparation for ment) began to draw public atten- the nuclear project. the more important FBR project, but tion. The 1992-93 transport, the Japanese interest in in July 1995 the electric utilities de- first case conducted under the 1988 following World War II surfaced for manded its suspension due to its U.S.-Japan Agreement that required the first time with Dietman Yasuhiro prohibitive cost.4 tight physical protection, had 1.7 Nakasone. In 1951, during the Al- As for the , an tons of plutonium; this provoked lied occupation, the future prime experimental reprocessing plant was intense international controversy. minister petitioned then-Ambassa- built in Tokai-mura in 1975 and The most recent shipment in April dor John Foster Dulles for the de- began operation in 1977. In prin- 1995 contained 400 kg of HLW from velopment of a nuclear industry. ciple, reprocessing had been carried Cogema.7 Fueled by President Eisenhower’s

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“” speech in Decem- a completely indigenous fuel cycle, apprehension about recent territo- ber 1953, Nakasone joined three including breeder reactors: rial disputes in the South Sea, other members of the Diet to secure ...it is our basic policy to con- through which these oil tankers pass. suprapartisan support for a supple- duct reprocessing using domes- The second historical explanation mental 235 million yen budget for a tic technology as much as pos- for Japan’s persistent plutonium nuclear power project in March sible and [this] will be exclusively policy is its encouragement by the 1954.9 done by [the] Japan Atomic Fuel United States, especially by the Nuclear power was a treasure box Public Corporation...Mainly [for] Eisenhower administration in the for Japan for two main reasons: 1) effective utilization of nuclear fuel context of the Cold War. Japanese it would provide a more secure en- resources, [the] is efforts could not have been achieved ergy resource than limited domes- the most appropriate type of re- without a U.S. policy of nuclear tic coal reserves; and 2) it would actor for Japan, thus it is our ba- promotion among its allies. While spawn a major new high-technology sic goal to develop such type of Japan was primarily concerned with industry in the then-weak reactor.12 itself, the U.S. concern was inter- economy.10 This reaction differed This basic policy evolved into a national. only slightly from many other coun- more specific one in the 1967 Long The United States saw ideologi- tries that saw this new form of en- Term Program, which described the cal benefits in promoting nuclear en- ergy in a very promising light. nuclear fuel cycle program as an ergy during the Cold War. National However, Japan was more eager “essential” part of the nuclear pro- Security Council (NSC) document to achieve energy security than other gram. Thus, the plutonium program 5507/2 (1955) argues that this policy countries; its defeat in the war was became a national obsession akin to could “generate free world respect still a vivid memory. To state that an industrial religion, and it became and support for the constructive Japan launched and lost the war be- taboo to argue against the Japanese purposes of US foreign policy,” and cause of its blind pursuit of energy nuclear community. Many in this that “such a program will strengthen autonomy is probably not an exag- community have even come to see a American world leadership and dis- geration. It tried to escape from kind of morality in the policy.13 An prove the Communists’ propaganda Western dependence by seeking oil atomic expert confesses, “I must re- charges that the US is concerned control over its East Asian neigh- main quiet on the record when the solely with the destructive uses of bors, attacked Pearl Harbor and consensus is that without the project the atom.”16 Southeast Asia in response to the the nation would collapse.”14 Economic benefits from the Allied oil embargo, and surrendered Energy security has always re- peaceful atomic trade followed. partly due to a serious oil shortage mained a major focus of Japanese Pressure from private industry and after its oil tankers were sunk by foreign policy, as reflected in its plu- the scientific community was mount- U.S. submarines. (A symbolic con- tonium program. One justification ing to exploit nuclear energy. sequence immediately following the for the plutonium program presented American reactor firms would domi- surrender was the bloody suicide- by the Japanese delegates during the nate the European and world reac- attempt of Hideki Tojo, the wartime 1977 U.S.-Japan negotiations on the tor market through direct sales and premier; he lay for two hours in his Tokai-mura reprocessing plant was licensing arrangements with foreign Tokyo residence while the one gas- that “Japan, relying on the Middle firms, supplying 90 percent of the fueled ambulance in the city was East for most of its oil supply, has world market by the end of the found.11 ) the right to commercialize an indig- 1960s.17 Such hard lessons underlay enous plutonium fuel cycle because Japan was a typical example. An Japan’s decision to embark upon a of what Japan had suffered due to economically rejuvenated Japan breeder program. Uranium alone, its oil dependence during World War would provide a potentially large found only in small quantities in II.”15 Even now, the nation contin- new market for US industry. More Japanese soil, did not guarantee en- ues to rely on imports for 80 per- strategically, Japanese economic ergy security. As early as 1956, cent of its primary energy. Seventy- growth would create a basis for do- the JAEC issued a Long Term Pro- five percent of its oil is shipped from mestic political stability and strong gram calling for the development of the Middle East, explaining Tokyo’s political and economic ties with the

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 3 Motoya Kitamura

Western world, creating solidarity Minister of State for Atomic Energy, Relying on this premise, the AEC in East Asia against the communist the first chair of the JAEC, and the in October 1956 decided to allow bloc.18 This geopolitical dynamic founder of many key nuclear-related Japan to conduct research on a small increased in significance after the organizations.22 amount of nuclear waste to extract emergence of communist China and Having overcome the Fukuryu plutonium.28 Thus, the Japanese the outbreak of the Korean War. Maru incident, the NSC for the first plutonium program began modestly. Eisenhower’s eager support for time in April 1955 included the U.S. The U.S.-Japan Nuclear Agreement the Japanese nuclear program is ex- promotion of nuclear energy in a was amended in 1958 to incorpo- plicit in the treatment of the 1954 course of action toward Japan.23 rate a safeguards requirement fol- Fukuryu Maru No. 5 incident, where Two months later, the United States lowing the creation of the IAEA in 23 crew members of a Japanese fish- signed the first U.S.-Japan Agree- 1957.29 ing vessel suffered from radiation ment for peaceful use of nuclear Washington went further toward exposure during the first H-bomb energy, which guaranteed a supply nuclear promotion in July 1968 explosion in the Bikini Islands. The of from the United when the AEC agreed on prompt United States, concerned with citi- States and required that all spent fuel information exchange on FBR tech- zen protest and strong communist be returned to the United States.24 nology. The AEC signed in the fol- influence in Japan, not only decided Proliferation concerns did arise. lowing year the Cooperation Agree- to compensate the men with $2 mil- In December 1955, a task force of ment on FBRs. In 1972, the U.S.- lion (collectively), but also launched the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis- Japan Nuclear Agreement was propaganda projects to diminish sion (AEC) concluded that amended to include a requirement Japan’s nuclear “allergy”:19 Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace policy for a joint decision by the two na- The Japanese Government and might contribute to nuclear prolif- tions to permit startup of a new re- people have an almost pathologi- eration and that fissionable materi- processing plant, giving the United cal aversion to anything connected als (including plutonium) produced States the right to intervene in the with nuclear energy. This results from reactors could be diverted to project.30 These go-ahead signs for from the wartime bombings and military purposes.25 But these res- the Japanese plutonium project were the recent Bikini incident and is ervations were outweighed by dip- not unprecedented for the United directed in large part against the lomatic considerations and the no- States, since it had already reached United States for its presumed tion of proliferation fatalism. The an agreement with EURATOM (in- overemphasis on military security. prevailing argument was that a U.S. cluding West Germany) to supply It is important that the United withdrawal would only invite Brit- 355 kg in 1964: States attempt to instill in the ain or the Soviet Union to enter the The use of this plutonium by the Japanese a fuller understanding of Japanese market, which would re- Germans in an entirely proper nuclear problems, as they relate sult in both a political and an eco- manner within their fast reactor both to international security and nomic defeat for the United States. program will give the Germans to peacetime uses.20 The spread of nuclear power, in this additional experience in pluto- One of Eisenhower’s efforts was view, would eventually occur no nium handling and fabrication to contact Matsutaro Shoriki, then matter which nation became the pro- technology which would also have president of the influential Yomiuri moter.26 Making a similar argument, applicability to a weapons pro- newspaper. Beginning with meet- U.S. Secretary of State Dulles re- gram. However, this technology, ings with an American agent, jected a proposal to abandon plans which has long been unclassified Shoriki would host nuclear exhibi- for building power reactors overseas, since it forms a legitimate part of tions, invite General Dynamics insisting that it would be “altogether the technology for the use of plu- chairperson John Hopkins for a pro- disastrous from the point of view of tonium in power reactors, is al- motional visit, and, most impor- foreign policy.”27 Until the IAEA ready available to the tantly, publish pro-nuclear articles established safeguards requirements Germans...The material...will be in the paper.21 Shoriki would later in 1957, proliferation questions were in the form of plutonium oxide become an icon in the early years covered in U.S.-Japanese bilateral and any conversion of this mate- of Japanese nuclear history as the agreements. rial to plutonium metal,

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which is the material of interest ($150 million per year), its neigh- undisturbed development of the for weapons purposes, would be boring towns about the same Japanese plutonium program has detected.31 amount, and Aomori prefecture been U.S. nonproliferation policy. While memories of such promo- 300,000 yen ($30 million per year) It forms a complicated and ironic tion policies have almost completely for the construction of the reprocess- picture because U.S. nonprolifera- faded away on the U.S. side, the ing plant alone. In addition, there tion policy developed simulta- Japanese nuclear society clearly re- is an enrichment and low-level waste neously with the promotion strat- members the support it received. In facility in Rokkasho-mura.32 Given egy launched by Eisenhower’s “At- fact, the nuclear industries of both this, it is no surprise that the gover- oms for Peace” speech. Understand- nations still enjoy a close relation- nor of Fukui prefecture showed ing the history of U.S. nonprolif- ship, and Washington maintains con- strong resentment when it learned eration policy is as significant as siderable leverage over Tokyo due of the cancellation of plans to build tracing that of the Japanese pluto- to its on-going technological and a prototype ATR in one of the nium program, since the former has material support. Thus, Japanese prefecture’s villages.33 fluctuated, causing conflict with the nuclear organizations still tend to Secondly, the nuclear organiza- static nature of the latter. Only view U.S. nonproliferation advo- tions are closely intertwined with through such analysis can the per- cates as merely politically-biased, each other to enable close and long- ceptions of the Japanese nuclear anti-industry factions. Until re- term cooperation. The Long Term community regarding U.S. nonpro- cently, they have not taken such ad- Programs of the JAEC involve three liferation policy be fully appreciated. vocates seriously. key government agencies—the Sci- But such historical analysis does ence and Technology Agency (STA), Cold War Period not completely explain the reason the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the persistence of the Japanese (MOFA), and MITI, two national During the Cold War period, non- plutonium program. The answer lies research organizations—PNC and the proliferation policy was seldom in part in domestic factors, includ- Japan Atomic Energy Research In- given top priority in American for- ing local politics, nuclear organiza- stitute (JAERI), the nuclear suppli- eign policy. Most of the time, other tions, and industrial interests that are ers industry, and electric utilities. considerations outweighed its im- poorly understood not only by other The members of the JAEC consist portance: evaluation of political nations but also by non-nuclear com- of officials from the government, trends within a problematic coun- munities in Japan. These elements universities, and private corpora- try, the relationship of the United have so far helped to overcome the tions. The large and complicated States with , the state of the economic difficulties and public decisionmaking process guarantees domestic economy, and others. This opposition to the program and en- self-serving and conservative con- resulted in inconsistencies, contra- sured a long-term commitment by clusions.34 dictions, and at times even promo- the Japanese government. Finally, the nuclear cycle program tion of proliferation during the First, local areas surrounding involves huge industrial stakes. All Eisenhower period. Generally, the nuclear fuel cycle program sites have the major Japanese firms, including policy has been seen in the context received economic benefits from the electric utilities, banks, and con- of the United States vis-a-vis for- electric utilities through tax subsi- struction companies, are profoundly eign countries, not of humanity vis- dies and compensation money. The involved in the project. The mag- a-vis nuclear weapons. amount of the former is decided by nitude of the capital costs and the It would require an overly sim- negotiation between the utilities and political influence of these corpo- plistic reading to interpret local governments, and that of the rate giants alone insure the continu- Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” latter according to the size of the ation of the plutonium project.35 speech as simply an arms control project. The figures provided by effort, advocating the diversion of the Japanese Ministry of Interna- U.S. NONPROLIFERATION fissionable material from the pur- tional Trade and Industry (MITI) POLICY TOWARD JAPAN poses of war to the purposes of show, for example, that Rokkasho- peace. In reality, Eisenhower viewed mura receives around 1.5 billion yen Intertwined with the solid and nuclear weapons proliferation as in-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 5 Motoya Kitamura

evitable.36 Moreover, especially in toward nonproliferation. Signs of tiations, the United States carefully the wake of NATO—where the Suez loosening of Cold War tensions en- studied the potential of Japan acquir- crisis in 1956 fueled the member abled the superpowers to collabo- ing nuclear arms. A 1964 back- nations’ distrust of U.S. military rate with each other and maintain ground paper by the State Depart- support and raised growing concerns the nuclear umbrella over their al- ment and a 1965 memorandum by about Soviet nuclear capabilities—the lies, taking a more interventionist the Arms Control and Disarmament United States endorsed the deploy- policy towards strengthening nuclear Agency (ACDA) both reached the ment of intermediate-range ballistic control. In 1964, negotiations be- same conclusions that: 1) Japan is missiles (IRBMs) abroad, a move gan on the Non-Proliferation technologically and economically that bordered on de facto weapons (NPT). The NPT would enhance capable of becoming a major nuclear proliferation.37 Once this notion IAEA safeguards and symbolically weapon state within six years; 2) was established, Eisenhower out- create a multinational regime against psychological restraints toward weighed the proliferation concerns any further emergence of nuclear nuclear weapons are diminishing of the plutonium program of Japan weapons states.40 and may disappear in a few years; against the importance of embrac- Despite the multilateralism behind and 3) Japan’s evaluation of U.S. ing Tokyo as an ally. the NPT, however, U.S. nonprolif- nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis Chinese Proliferation concerns were eration policy was still pursued on nukes would decide whether it sharply reinforced in the 1960s, a country-by-country basis. This would develop nuclear weapons. during the Kennedy and Johnson would be, and still is, poorly un- Conversely, factors preventing Japa- administrations. Several factors con- derstood by other nations, which in- nese nuclear armament included: 1) tributed to this: 1) France (1960) terpret it as inconsistency on the part the nuclear allergy; 2) the lack of a and China (1964) joined the nuclear of American foreign policy. An in- clear and present danger; and 3) the weapon club; 2) the geographic fo- sightful paper written by then-Di- U.S. nuclear umbrella. Based on cus of U.S. foreign policy shifted rector of Policy Planning Walt this interpretation, both reports rec- from Europe to Asia and the Third Rostow in 1964 after the Chinese ommended that the United States: World; and 3) a closer relationship nuclear test argues: 1) continue with a credible nuclear with the Soviet Union enabled the It is only by reconstructing the deterrent; 2) maintain a mutually superpowers to cooperate on non- complex calculus faced by the beneficial partnership with Japan; proliferation.38 Thereafter, U.S. various governments concerned and 3) maintain cooperation with nuclear promotion policy weakened. and mounting policies of sub- Japan on high-tech projects, such as Evaluation of nations’ political stance and weight to influence the space projects and the peaceful use aspirations to join the nuclear weap- components of that calculus that of nuclear power in order to pro- ons club started, especially where we have a chance of mote Japanese “national unity and access to technology had already shaping the course of events—not pride.” The study by ACDA adds been achieved during the merely in preventing new nations that maintenance of U.S. influence Eisenhower era. For example, a from entering the nuclear club but over Japanese defense planning and memorandum by the State Depart- in influencing their subsequent involvement of Japan in the nonpro- ment to President Kennedy in 1962 course of behavior.41 liferation effort are necessary.42 foresaw a strong potential for China The last phrase suggests that, al- Although dated, this analysis still to acquire a nuclear arsenal, which though the basic idea of prolifera- reveals the pertinent point that would, according to its analysis, lead tion fatalism recognized in the Washington’s bilateral relations with Japan to follow. It also warned that Eisenhower administration still re- Tokyo were viewed as the key to plutonium and mained, international control by the preventing nuclear proliferation in gained from the development of IAEA and the NPT was perceived Japan. As for the civilian nuclear peaceful nuclear programs made it as one of many tools, or an element relationship, one notices dual dilem- easier for nations to develop nuclear in a “calculus” of nonproliferation mas. First, the United States had to weapons.39 which would with luck evolve in the support Japanese nuclear energy The first Chinese nuclear test future. programs to prevent Tokyo from moved the United States to tilt more Moreover, before the NPT nego- acquiring nuclear weapons. Second,

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and more fundamentally, the United the uranium trade under the guise firmly the United States should ex- States could not forcefully or di- of its nonproliferation policy.46 ercise its control over foreign repro- rectly stop Japan if it were to obtain Tokyo’s frustration increased when cessing; 2) in return for approving nuclear bombs, since such an atti- newly-elected President Carter put the limited operation of the plant, tude would disgust Tokyo and poi- nonproliferation near the top of his the United States should receive son the bilateral partnership, includ- foreign policy agenda. He added some concessions from Japan in ing the military relationship. humanitarian, idealistic, and anti- other, less vital, areas; and 3) both Thus, it is not surprising that the militarist language to Ford’s words. nations would wait until the elabo- United States compromised with The plutonium program was directly rate two-year study devised by the Japan and its European allies dur- under fire. In 1977, in addition to United States, known as the Inter- ing the Geneva NPT negotiations in announcing that domestic commer- national Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalu- 1966. Japan had demanded assur- cial reprocessing would be deferred ation (INFCE), provided consistent ance that the treaty would not ad- indefinitely, President Carter indi- and politically sustainable global cri- versely affect its peaceful nuclear cated that the United States would teria for plutonium activities. As a programs by restricting access to attempt to persuade other nations to result, the United States agreed to fissile materials and the full range adopt similar policies.47 allow the plant to begin operations of fuel-cycle technologies. In 1968, Japan, as well as other countries, while imposing several restrictions the United States responded by guar- rejected Carter’s proposal outright. and conditions. The initial agree- anteeing West Germany and Japan The fundamental logic of the Japa- ment was only to last two years, until that, under Article IV, civil nuclear nese nuclear program, which was the outcome of the INFCE delib- programs could be carried into ar- to reduce oil dependency, was un- erations had become clear.49 eas with direct relevance to weap- der siege. Japan perceived Carter’s During the remainder of his term, ons production.43 policy as a betrayal, given its de- Carter extended the interim Tokai- However, the Indian nuclear ex- parture from previous U.S. encour- mura agreement three times. The plosion in 1974 shocked U.S. offi- agement of reprocessing and breeder administration accomplished the dif- cials because the device used pluto- programs. A major gap in percep- ficult task of not destroying an ally’s nium recovered from a research re- tions now existed between the plutonium program, while simulta- actor. Following President Ford’s United States, which viewed nuclear neously discouraging other nations decision to embargo the export of policy as a , and Japan, with nuclear ambitions from em- reprocessing and enrichment tech- which had pursued a step-by-step barking on new ones.50 Carter’s nology, Washington startled the in- domestic strategy of energy security policy had a huge impact on public ternational nuclear community in through nuclear power since 1956. relations; its condemnation of the October 1976 with the declaration The timing of Carter’s announce- plutonium program attracted world- that it no longer viewed reprocess- ment could not have been more in- wide attention, which would later ing “as a necessary and inevitable sensitive, since JOYO had just only increase. Moreover, it came step in the nuclear fuel cycle.”44 reached criticality and the Tokai- as a shock to the Japanese nuclear These decisions were also provoked mura reprocessing plant was ready community that had always been by the increasing availability of ura- for its test run in the spring of 1977, blessed with generous help from the nium and the fact that some Euro- after 14 years of preparation and at United States. The cloud of uncer- pean countries had agreed to sup- a cost of $170 million.48 tainty and the realization of the ply bomb-grade uranium and pluto- Because the 1972 agreement gave United States’ leverage over the Japa- nium to the Third World.45 the United States direct influence on nese nuclear program would never Not surprisingly, Japan was un- the reprocessing program, Japan had disappear. favorable to this policy. It even to go through extensive negotiations President Reagan, following the suspected that the United States, until a compromise was reached in end of detente with the 1979 Soviet fearing Europe and Japan would no September 1977. The delegates invasion of Afghanistan, was devoted longer need the U.S. enriched ura- from both countries made conces- to reasserting American power in the nium after the completion of breeder sions on the basis that: 1) the Carter world. Highly critical of the uni- reactors, was trying to monopolize administration was divided over how versalism of Carter’s policies,

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 7 Motoya Kitamura

Reagan relegated nuclear nonprolif- plutonium program, Washington is “China will follow Japan’s lead and eration to a subordinate position in weighing its nonproliferation con- use the separated plutonium to fuel the new struggle against the Soviet cerns and the cooperation with To- fast-breeder reactors.”56 Other coun- Union. However, the policy was not kyo it has guaranteed. Although the tries might also wish to follow abolished; rather, it was applied in Clinton administration announced in Japan’s example. a selective manner. Washington 1993 that it would “maintain its ex- Third, the stockpile of plutonium weakened its interventionist policy isting commitments regarding the assures the capability of Japan to toward its allies while maintaining use of plutonium in civil nuclear become a nuclear weapon state. In its bilateralism vis-a-vis Third World programs in Western Europe and October 1995, the Science and Tech- countries. Reagan’s policy was also Japan,” it has opposed any other nology Agency announced that the motivated by an emphasis on restor- domestic and international pro- stockpile amounted to 13.1 tons at ing American leadership in the grams.53 The classic incentives of the end of 1994.57 According to one nuclear market.51 supporting high-tech nuclear estimate, over the next two decades Japan, as the main ally, thus en- projects for nonproliferation con- around 89 tons of fissile plutonium joyed Reagan’s flexible, discrimina- cerns (portrayed in the 1964 and (about 125 tons of total plutonium) tory approach to nuclear trade and 1965 reports) seem to be more than will be separated at plants in Japan cooperation. Previous concerns offset by the overall apprehension and Europe, if current plans are about plutonium were dropped al- regarding the Japanese plutonium implemented. (This is compared to together. The United States agreed program. This might explain the 220 tons of separated plutonium in in 1981 to lift the operating restric- U.S. decision in 1994 to phase out the combined American and Rus- tions at the Tokai-mura plant. Al- technological cooperation in pluto- sian arsenals.58 ) China, North Ko- though in 1988 American influence nium reprocessing and FBR devel- rea, and South Korea have all ex- over Japan’s nuclear program was opment as a response to pressed fears that this plutonium strengthened, it also allowed Japan Greenpeace’s claim that the transfer could be used to produce weapons. to reprocess spent fuel for 30 years of the technology was illegal.54 President Clinton also declared in without U.S. permission.52 There are at least six reasons for September 1993 that the United the apprehension. The first four States will seek to eliminate inter- Post-Cold War Period relate directly to the plutonium pro- national plutonium stockpiles.59 gram. First, many recognize Japan’s Fourth, plutonium shipments U.S. nonproliferation policy has capability to convert the civilian pro- from Europe have begun to receive played a significant role in the post- gram into a military one. The plu- international attention. The contro- Cold War period, in which the in- tonium program would, at the very versy over the 1992-93 convoy centives of the “haves” to develop least, make it easier for Tokyo to shocked Japan and resulted in a re- nuclear weapons have weakened and produce nuclear warheads. Some evaluation of its plutonium policy in those of the “have-nots” have been fear that the H-2 rocket program the 1994 Long Term Program.60 strengthened. While the pattern of could contribute to a potential While most nations criticized the meshing nonproliferation with the weapon program. , plan on safety and environmental pursuit of other interests and goals South Korea, and China have al- grounds, the potential for the sei- remains, the United States advocates ready expressed such concerns.55 zure of plutonium by terrorists also more convincingly than any other Second, the United States wor- raised nonproliferation concerns. A country the strengthening of the re- ries about the “demonstration effect,” 1988 study by the U.S. Department gime outlined by the NPT and IAEA of Japan’s program; it justifies other of Defense warned that “even if the safeguards. Arms control agree- countries’ plutonium programs. most careful precautions are ob- ments with have moved North and South Korea have com- served, no one could guarantee the Washington to focus more on non- plained that U.S. policy discrimi- safety of the cargo from a security proliferation. Thus, the concern nates in favor of Japan on nuclear incident, such as an attack on the over Japan’s potential to proliferate issues. When China publicized its vessel by small, fast craft, especially has increased. plan to reprocess if armed with modern antiship mis- As an original promoter of the in February 1995, it announced, siles.”61

8 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Motoya Kitamura

The fifth source of nonprolifera- concern is political. While Wash- skeptics criticized the discriminatory tion concern, the potential export- ington has been aware since the nature and the lack of focus on ing of Japanese nuclear reactors, is 1960s of the potential political will .68 less stated and not directly related of Japan to obtain nuclear warheads, The Clinton administration con- to the plutonium program. Demand it has never heard it expressed as siders U.S.-Japan bilateral security exists both at home and abroad. Do- vocally as it has in the post-Cold ties as the key to hindering Japan’s mestically, the Chernobyl accident War period. At the Tokyo Economic acquisition of nuclear weapons. A in 1986 alarmed the Japanese pub- Summit in July 1993, Japanese lead- report written in November 1994, lic, hitting the nuclear program. ers refused to give unconditional which became the basis for Assis- Though to a lesser degree than in support to an indefinite extension of tant Secretary of Defense Joseph most industrialized countries, the the NPT. Less that a month after Nye’s policy to rejuvenate U.S. mili- growing anti-nuclear movement the summit, an informal statement tary links with Tokyo, notes: “Some forced the dropping of plans outlined made by Foreign Minister Muto in Japan appear to be questioning in the 1986 MITI White Paper to reported: “If North Korea develops old taboos regarding force projec- build 120 nuclear power plants by nuclear weapons and that becomes tion, arms exports and even nuclear 2030. Since December 1986, no a threat to Japan, first there is the weapons.”69 Shortly before, the new sites have been completed. nuclear umbrella of the U.S. upon Japanese prime minister’s special Moreover, equipment investment for which we can rely. But if it comes panel completed a review of Japan’s nuclear power by the nine major down to a crunch, possessing the basic defense posture in August electric utilities dropped 56 percent will that ‘we can do it’ is impor- 1994, emphasizing the importance from 1991 to 1994.62 tant.”65 Since then, similar state- of U.S. nuclear deterrence: “...it is This trend has shifted the atten- ments have been repeated by other absolutely essential for Japan, which tion of Japan’s nuclear industry to high-ranking officials. Even after adheres to a nonnuclear policy, that East Asia, where exploding energy endorsing an indefinite extension in the credibility of the U.S. deterrent demand might be met by ambitious 1995, Japanese officials have noted be maintained.”70 nuclear programs. Nuclear firms pointedly that there “is a clause in Furthermore, the United States see China and Indonesia as major the NPT allowing withdrawal from considers Japan as the threshold potential markets. Other nations, the treaty.”66 country for nuclear nonproliferation such as Vietnam, are also showing Tokyo has responded quickly to in East Asia. Japan’s uncoupling interest. The Japanese nuclear com- the suspicion caused by such com- from the U.S. nuclear umbrella munity has proposed a pan-Asian ments. It has denied having the could signal the end of its reliabil- agreement, nicknamed “Asiatom” or political will to acquire nuclear arms ity for other nations.71 The Depart- “Pacific Atom,” to police the recy- by stressing the social “nuclear al- ment of Defense’s February 1995 cling of and pre- lergy” and the “three nonnuclear East Asia Strategy Report concludes, vent military diversions. This principles” declared in 1968.67 “...it is the maintenance of United would, according to them, provide Some officials in Japan have main- States security commitments, nota- a framework for industrialized na- tained that Japan’s initial hesitation bly to Japan, and America’s force tions to export nuclear reactors to about the NPT indefinite extension levels in the region, which bolster Asian countries.63 Although the is due to its moral crusade to achieve the sense of security and help fore- threat of military use is scarcely im- a “zero-nuclear” world. stall possible attempts to build a mediate, some are already alarmed, Japan’s official position on the nuclear weapons capability.”72 since the promotion of nuclear en- 1995 NPT Extension Conference ergy in tandem with the IAEA safe- was endorsing an indefinite exten- EXAMINING guard systems and “Asiatom” ech- sion and urging the nuclear weapon NONPROLIFERATION oes Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace states to continue nuclear disarma- CONCERNS policy, as well as its possible conse- ment effort. Domestic response was quences in promoting de facto pro- mixed. Supporters of the NPT wel- Discussion on how to approach liferation.64 comed the increasing trend of these potential proliferation forces The sixth and final reason for the nuclear nonproliferation, while the has been largely absent. But with-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 9 Motoya Kitamura

out it, criticism of the Japanese plu- years, suffered from technological program remains. Moreover, posi- tonium program remains hollow and difficulties, excessive cost, and pos- tive pressures also exist in the inter- irrelevant to existing problems. To sibly, international pressures. Ex- national nuclear community. prevent nuclear proliferation in Ja- amples include the 1994 Long Term Nuclear experts from Europe have pan, it is necessary to examine each Program that announced the post- expressed high expectations that concern, assess its significance, and ponement of the second commercial MONJU will succeed in initiating provide the most effective prescrip- reprocessing plant and FBR com- electric generation.79 Some are at- tion. mercialization schedule, as well as tracted by the idea that the Japanese Nuclear weapons capability. If a delay in the Rokkasho-mura re- and European plants could recycle the nuclear weapons capability per processing plant. Furthermore, the plutonium from dismantled nuclear se of the Japanese plutonium pro- coming deregulation of the Japanese warheads in the United States and gram were to deliver such a devas- electric industry has increased its former Soviet Union.80 tating blow to nonproliferation ef- flexibility on the cost issue. De- More essentially, abolishing the forts that either the United States or regulation resulted in the atypical plutonium program would not guar- the international community would rejection by the electric utilities of antee that Japan could not become voice the need to discontinue the the prototype ATR construction in a nuclear weapon state. The tech- project, how might such an event July 1995. Utilities have also ex- nical know-how and experience of take place? Which nation or orga- pressed their reluctance to order a producing nuclear arsenals have al- nization has the authority to curtail demonstration FBR if the construc- ready been acquired with existing directly the energy policy of sover- tion cost exceeds 1.5 times that of a plants. Not only is the disinvention eign Japan? How could another light water reactor (LWR).75 Some of nuclear arms impossible, but in- country’s concern outweigh the even argue that Tokyo intends to use formation on their design is also strong domestic forces driving the the August 1995 report published widely available.81 But most nuclear program? The right of the IAEA is by the Massachusetts Institute of weapon states did not develop their limited to inspecting materials in de- Technology (MIT), discouraging arsenals from commercial programs. clared nuclear facilities; all such further development of the Japanese This suggests the irrelevance of the facilities in Japan are safeguarded. plutonium program, as an excuse to civilian plutonium program to any The United States is so far the only reverse the program; this specula- potential weapon program. Never- power to negotiate a freeze in the tion is caused by the partial funding theless, with or without the cancel- operation of nuclear reactors in an- of the report by PNC.76 lation of the plutonium program, other nation, as it did in North Ko- The leakage of two to three tons Japan would retain its capability to rea in 1994.73 However, the 1988 of non-radioactive liquid sodium acquire nuclear weapons, through U.S.-Japan Agreement gave compre- coolant in MONJU in December the continued existence of the civil- hensive approval to Japan’s pluto- 1995 further sobered the advocates ian nuclear program.82 nium program for the next 30 years. of the program. PNC officials an- Demonstration effect. If the Japa- Moreover, as seen in President nounced that this prototype FBR nese plutonium program is sus- Carter’s anti-recycling policy in might have to cease its operation for pended, to what extent might it 1977, opposition from the pro- two years.77 This will delay not only serve as a positive example of the nuclear, pro-plutonium, yet pro-non- the construction of a demonstration nonproliferation? With no nation proliferation factions in the United FBR but also the whole recycling having a strong FBR program, jus- States may soften such intervention- program due to the increased skep- tification for such a program would ist actions.74 ticism about the technology and the be difficult. Canceling it might dis- The only forces that might poten- safety measures. The apprehension courage countries such as China, tially stop the plutonium program could be reflected in a higher O&M , or South Korea, which have in Japan exist within Japan. Even cost, which would discourage the expressed ambitions for plutonium though Tokyo has stuck to energy electric utilities from continuing the programs.83 But while its cancella- security, such a scenario cannot be plutonium program.78 tion would reduce the risk of prolif- totally ruled out. The Japanese On the other hand, the fundamen- eration to a considerable extent, the project has, especially in recent tal commitment to the plutonium rationale for plutonium reprocess-

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ing or recycling would remain, since an international IAEA repository; an action. other countries such as Germany, this would require shipment of the Political will. With or without Britain, France, and Russia pursue material. Without such a transfer, the plutonium program, Tokyo could one or the other of these.84 Repro- the stockpile issue—and therefore acquire nuclear weapons, if it de- cessing plants produce separated Tokyo’s weapons capability and the veloped the political will. Although plutonium, which is usable for negative demonstration effect—would the probability is small under cur- mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fabrication remain even if the program were rent circumstances, it could grow if for LWRs as well as for nuclear terminated. Finally, the completion the international balance of power weapons production. Therefore, of the recycling and reprocessing were to shift. Japan’s nuclear as- abolishment of the Japanese pluto- programs would erase the need for sessment could be influenced by nium program would substantially— shipments from Europe; as in the foreign relationships with: 1) the but not fully—erase the nuclear pro- stockpile case, the recycling program United States, which provides the liferation risks posed by the dem- (this time reprocessing plants) would nuclear umbrella; 2) China and Rus- onstration effect of existing pluto- remain a solution to the shipment sia, neighboring nuclear weapon nium programs. issue. states; and 3) North Korea or a uni- Stockpile. Ironically, speeding up Export of nuclear reactors. If fied Korea, if either entity acquired the plutonium program would re- Japan gave up its export ambitions nuclear arms. duce the stockpile of plutonium. in Asia, would it spell the end of It would be unwise to believe that The stockpile exists in Japan in part the nuclear energy dreams of China, economic interdependence would because of the delay in use of MOX Indonesia, and other nations? More prevent Tokyo from acquiring fuel in the LWR and FBR pro- likely, it would only lead to a domi- nuclear weapons. First, if economic grams.85 If Japan were to put a top nation of the market by the United reasons were a real deterrent, Ja- priority on reducing the stockpile, States, France, Russia, and/or pan, or any trading state, would accelerating its FBR program would Canada. French and Russian firms never go nuclear. Second, interde- be a theoretical step in the right di- have already signed contracts to pendence could have adverse effects; rection, if not a total solution. It is build nuclear reactors in China, pro- other countries would not retaliate, also difficult to argue exclusively voking the chairpersons of for example, by closing their mar- against the presence of the stock- Westinghouse (WH) and General kets against nuclearized Japan, pre- pile in Japan since: 1) it is under Electric (GE) to visit .87 cisely because of their economic IAEA safeguards; and 2) other na- Both American companies benefit dependence on Japan. Third, pre- tions, especially nuclear weapon not only by building their own re- vious retaliatory economic measures states, also have plutonium stock- actors but also by Japanese firms against nuclear activities, such as the piles. Any stockpile reduction mea- selling reactors in China, since WH recent boycott of French products, sure would therefore have to embrace and GE have licensing agreements have never caused serious long-term all other non-nuclear club nations with them. From a nonprolifera- damage to the weapon states. Thus, with stockpiles (i.e., Germany, Bel- tion point of view, this situation ech- economic interdependence should gium, and Switzerland), as well as oes that of the Eisenhower period, not be overestimated in analyzing the nuclear weapon states, in order when the administration competed Tokyo’s decision to acquire nuclear to create sufficient international for civilian nuclear markets with the weapons. pressure on Japan. Otherwise, the Soviet Union. Therefore, to halt Currently, the U.S.-Japan Peace FBR program would remain the only nuclear energy programs in the rest Treaty guarantees to Tokyo extended solution to the stockpile issue.86 of Asia, the United States or an in- U.S. nuclear deterrence. This is the Shipments. If the plutonium pro- ternational organization must in- basis of Japan’s present nuclear gram were to terminate, where clude not only Japan but other ex- policy. In other words, without the would the remaining plutonium go? porting countries as well. Since the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Japan’s ac- If it were to stay in Japan, the stock- export of LWRs is not perceived as quisition of nuclear arms would be- pile issue would remain as a prob- a direct proliferation threat (as evi- come more likely. There are still lem. The other option would be to denced by the North Korean case), well-understood motivations for the shift the stockpiles, for example, to it will be difficult to implement such U.S. military presence, such as

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 11 Motoya Kitamura

countering the Chinese threat to Japan to counter Moscow’s nuclear Most mainstream strategists, includ- , countering the North Ko- capability with its own arms. ing the Japan Defense Agency— rean threat, policing the Spratly Is- Tokyo feels a stronger threat from which stressed that the crisis was a lands, muting East Asian fears of China. It is apprehensive about “most acute threat to Japanese secu- Japan’s large, high-tech military, and Beijing’s continued nuclear tests, its rity”—advocated defensive measures, containing the smaller (but still ex- rapidly expanding military budget, like a theater missile defense sys- tant) Russian threat. Unlike the and the vast size of the People’s Lib- tem. In response to arguments that Cold War era, however, all of them eration Army. Coupled with these North Korea is an abnormal, ter- are too indirect to pose a clear and capabilities, China’s claims on the rorist state, they expressed the view present danger to the United States. Spratly and Senkaku Islands directly that a Japanese nuclear defense Therefore, they do not guarantee a provoke Japan’s sense of vulnerabil- would not be as effective as U.S. commitment of indefinite length. ity. A regional war over both is- nuclear deterrence. However, Moreover, countering North Korea lands, as well as over Taiwan, would former Defense Minister Taku and patrolling the Spratly Islands are interfere with its oil tankers. Tokyo’s Yamazaki stated in May 1994 that more or less viewed as doing a fa- apprehension of Beijing’s military he would oppose the indefinite ex- vor for Japan. Containing Japanese strength was recently evoked in the tension of the NPT if North Korea militarism is also increasingly seen Diet by Foreign Minister Yohei were to be permitted to develop as allowing Japan a “free-ride” on Kono.91 China, on the other hand, nuclear weapons.95 U.S. taxpayers. Such beliefs are is also wary of Japanese military Seoul is as critical of Japanese gaining momentum in Washington capacity, especially naval projection, politicians’ insensitive remarks as as traditional isolationism grows in and the potential of its uncoupling Pyongyang is. On the other hand, the post-Cold War period, worsen- from the U.S. security umbrella; this many Japanese, especially the older ing bilateral trade frictions and caus- suspicion has its roots in Japan’s generation, are disturbed by the ing Americans to view Tokyo as an continued failure to come to terms Koreans’ emotional reaction. Each economic rival.88 Even voices ques- with its imperial past in World War considers the other untrustworthy, tioning the need for the U.S. nuclear II.92 In the aftermath of the loss of and, therefore, a potential threat. umbrella have started to be heard.89 the U.S. nuclear deterrent, Tokyo Thus, if unification, even peacefully, If the credibility of the U.S. might judge that nuclear weapons were to take place in the future, the nuclear deterrent diminishes, Japan would be a cheap way to balance hostility of North Korea would not could feel the need to fill the gap. the giant size of the Chinese army. mellow greatly. Tokyo might reconsider its response North Korea’s distrust of Japan Moreover, if the U.S. security to Russian and Chinese nuclear ca- resembles China’s distrust of Japan. alliance is weakened after the dis- pabilities, which until now has been Although the military threat it poses appearance of the North Korean verbal at most. This reassessment is smaller, North Korea's is also threat, South Korea might acquire a would depend on the stability of more direct. Tokyo never felt a dan- nuclear arsenal for the same reasons Russo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese ger during the Cold War as imme- that could theoretically drive Japan relations. In its relations with Mos- diate as when in 1993 Pyongyang in that direction. Since many in cow, Tokyo has recently been en- flight-tested the medium-range No- Tokyo view a unified Korea as an hancing its economic ties, includ- dong 1 ballistic missile, capable of economic rival and a possible mili- ing participation in Sakhalin oil and carrying nuclear, chemical, or bio- tary threat, it may respond by ac- gas projects. This has occurred logical weapons. The missile could quiring its own nuclear weapons.96 despite the conservative uproar in reach western Japan, including the Still, even without the U.S. Japan over the Northern Territories Osaka metropolitan area.93 Japan’s nuclear umbrella, Tokyo would need dispute during the early years of sense of insecurity surfaced in 1994 tremendous political strength and a Yeltsin’s presidency.90 However, the during the North Korean crisis, persuasive excuse to mute the likely possible reversal of Russian reforms, when a survey showed that 71.4 international criticism for withdraw- given the nationalistic trends dem- percent of Japanese expressed “anxi- ing from the NPT regime. Whereas onstrated by Zhirinovsky’s popular- ety” about the possible existence of deploying nuclear weapons against ity in the 1993 elections, could move nuclear arms in North Korea.94 China or Russia would be especially

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difficult, Japan has made sure that declared the principles, had a pro- intentions; and (3) the program's its withdrawal from the NPT is le- nuclear ideology, which was ex- creation of a double standard in ef- gally possible. Nuclearization pressed privately to the U.S. ambas- forts to stop plutonium programs in against North Korea or a unified sador in December 1964: rogue countries. This article has Korea would be politically easier for If the other fellow has nuclear sought to suggest that Japan’s pluto- Tokyo because in each case Korea weapons, it is only common sense nium program is only partially re- would have to withdraw from the to have them oneself. The Japa- sponsible for these concerns. NPT before Japan would. nese public is not ready for this, As for Japan joining the nuclear Liberals argue that the domestic but would have to be educated. weapons club, Tokyo’s political di- nuclear allergy will prevent Tokyo The younger generation is show- rection will play the key role. from going nuclear. The legacy of ing hopeful signs of going this Japan’s efforts to improve relations the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb- way(...). Nuclear weapons are with its neighbors point in the most ings is heavily reported every Au- less costly than is generally as- positive direction for nonprolifera- gust. Many politicians and bureau- sumed, and the Japanese scien- tion efforts in the region. Domesti- crats have voiced the responsibility tific and industrial level is fully cally, Japan should start discussing of Japan, as the world’s sole nuclear up to producing them.99 how to maintain the balance of power victim, to lead the drive for the abol- Thus, there are good reasons to in a region of multiple nuclear ishment of nuclear arms. Tokyo has believe that Japan’s anti-nuclear sen- weapon states, in case the U.S. pledged itself to the “three non- timent is merely a product of the nuclear deterrent disappears; in do- nuclear principles”: that Japan would U.S. security umbrella. These are ing so, Japan could avoid panicking not produce, not introduce, and not exemplified in a November 2, 1995 when the time comes. Washington possess nuclear weapons. quote from a Yomiuri newspaper and Tokyo should work together in Overlooked in this analysis is article: sorting out how to counter nuclear Japan’s adherence to the U.S. nuclear Without the U.S.-Japan Treaty, threats in the region. Weapon states umbrella. The nuclear allergy, anti- how can we counter the three-mil- must realize that Japan would like nuclear commitment, and the three lion People’s Liberation to see greater commitment from principles are all discussed in the Army in China? What can Japan them to reduce the number of context of “humanity vs. nuclear do if something happens on the nuclear warheads, not only in the weapons” or “weapon states vs. non- Korean peninsula? Without the United States and in Russia, but also weapon states,” resting on the com- treaty, the only way Japan can in China. The current NPT regime fort provided by U.S. nuclear deter- survive is to multiply its defense has its limitations. It could be used rence. But they should not be con- budget and to develop its own effectively to create an anti-nuclear fused with Tokyo’s nuclear capability.100 political climate, but it does not policy. An anti-nuclear commitment These views are not those of a cover all the complicated factors af- is not unique to Japan, being com- sensational journalist, but those of fecting international nuclear rela- mon to other non-weapon states, Satoshi Morimoto, a well-known tions. such as . However, the military strategist and the former States that are uneasy about nuclear allergy is a flexible phenom- head of the security policy office in Japan’s plutonium program have es- enon; even a poll as recent as 1976 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sentially distrustful relationships shows 48 percent of Japanese citi- (MOFA). with Tokyo. Again, Japan has room zens felt “quite a bit” or “somewhat” to improve its partnership with its uneasy about Japan not having its CONCLUSION neighbors. Tokyo should realize the own nuclear weapons.97 In fact, the militaristic fears that the program famed three principles do not have Nonproliferation concerns sur- encourages among its neighbors. a legal basis and were produced by rounding the Japanese plutonium Unless Japan improves its overall Tokyo to broaden public support for program have been voiced in three diplomatic relations and becomes the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in main areas: 1) the possible acquisi- more open and vocal about the ob- 1968.98 Moreover, Prime Minister tion of nuclear weapons by Japan; jectives of its plutonium program, Eisaku Sato, the very person who 2) other states’ fears about Japan's nonproliferation concerns will not

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 13 Motoya Kitamura fade away, with or without the pro- or Great Britain, it is carried back to Japan to be 54. used in nuclear reactors or to be disposed. The 25 Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms gram. latter shipment receives most of the publicity for Peace and War 1953-1961 (Berkeley, CA: Double standards have always because it includes the separated, weapons-us- University of California Press, 1989), pp. 316- been present in the area of nuclear able plutonium. 318. 7 Emiko Terazono, “Mixed Welcome Awaits N- 26 Ibid. policy, not only with North Korea cargo,” Financial Times, April 25, 1995, p. 6. 27 Memorandum of Discussion, National Secu- but also with France, Britain, , 8 Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, rity Council, February 10, 1955 (Top Secret), Russia, , and others. The very with Even S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Prolif- cited in Clausen, p. 34. eration (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 28 Genshiryoku Iinkai (JAEC), ed., Genshiryoku premise of non-weapon states and for International Peace, 1995), pp. 69-70; Kaihatsu 30 Nen Shi (“Thirty-year History of weapon states in the nonprolifera- “Kazakhstan: Nuclear Reactors,” CIS Nuclear Nuclear Development”) (Tokyo: Genshiryoku Profiles Database, Monterey Institute of Interna- Iinkai, 1986), p. 491. tion policy framework is itself a tional Studies, January 1996. 29 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, p. 7. double standard. Rather than stick- 9 Nakasone recently admitted thinking then, 30 Ibid. ing to a universal approach, a con- “Without nuclear development, Japan would re- 31 Letter from the AEC Chairman Glenn T. main forever as an agricultural nation,” in an in- Seaborg to Special Assistant to the President for tinuation of the U.S.-Japan bilateral terview in Asahi Shimbun, October 30, 1995; National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Sep- alliance may be more appropriate to Nihon Genshiryoku Sangyo Kaigi (JAIF), ed., tember 30, 1964, in Nuclear Non-proliferation avoid proliferation. Nihon no Genshiryoku: 15 Nen no Ayumi, v.1 Declassified Documents, Document No. 996 (Japan’s Nuclear Power: Fifteen Years of (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, As this article has suggested, abol- Progress) (Tokyo: Nihon Genshiryoku Sangyo 1991). ishing the Japanese plutonium pro- Kaigi, 1971), pp. 3-6. 32 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 42-46. 10 Richard K. Lester, “U.S.-Japanese Nuclear 33 Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 1995, p. 3. gram through outside pressure is not Relations: Structural Change and Political Strain,” 34 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 46-48. only unlikely, but also would not Asian Survey XXII (May 1982), p. 419. 35 Ibid., pp. 48-49. solve all nonproliferation concerns. 11 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for 36 Clausen writes, “In short, the controls that Oil, Money & Power (New York: Touchstone, emerged from the IAEA deliberations were es- Japan’s nuclear capability, foreign 1991), pp. 351-367. sentially a lowest-common-denominator outcome, skepticism, regional tensions, as 12 Cited in Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, p. 2. which the United States ‘regarded as minimal.’ 13 well as the double standard in Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 49-50. But U.S. officials rationalized accepting this re- 14 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 18, 1995, sult on several grounds: the spread of atomic nuclear policy would all remain. p. 15. information and the existence of other sources Free criticism of the program should 15 Ryukichi Imai, IAEA Sasatsu to Kaku Kakusan of assistance (especially Great Britain and the (IAEA Inspection and Nuclear Proliferation) USSR) made it impossible and self-defeating for be encouraged, but should remain (Tokyo: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun Sha, 1994), pp. the United States to insist on maximum controls; verbal. More significantly, nonpro- 110-114. the system obtained was preferable to none and liferation watchers should not be so 16 “Statement of Policy on Peaceful Uses of Atomic could be strengthened incrementally over time; Energy,” NSC 5507/2, March 12, 1955 (Secret), some proliferation was likely to occur regardless concerned about the plutonium pro- in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Declassified Docu- of the IAEA system; and proliferation on a small gram as to overlook the more im- ments, Document No. 191 (Washington, D.C.: scale was probably manageable in light of the portant factors in Japan’s future National Security Archive, 1991). clear superiority of the existing weapon states.” 17 Peter A. Clausen, Nonproliferation and the Clausen, pp. 36-37. nuclear decisionmaking: its bilateral National Interest (New York: HarperCollins, 37 Ibid., pp. 43-60. relations with China, Russia, the two 1993), pp. 29-42. 38 Ibid., pp. 74-99. 18 Lester, p. 419. 39 Memorandum for the President, Department Koreas, and most importantly, the 19 “Progress Report on US Policy Toward Japan,” of State, July 27, 1962, pp. 2, 3, in Nuclear United States. NSC 5516/1, October 19, 1955 (Top Secret), Non-Proliferation Declassified Documents, Docu- pp. 1-2, in Declassified Documents 1993, Docu- ment No. 892 (Washington, D.C.: National Se- ment No. 481 (Woodbridge, CT: Research Pub- curity Archive, 1991). lication, 1993). 40 Clausen, p. 74-81. 1 Energy Information Administration, 1994 World 20 “Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far 41 W.W. Rostow, “A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Outlook (Washington, D.C.: Department East,” White House, April 26, 1954 (Top Se- Nuclear Proliferation,” Internal Paper, Novem- of Energy, 1994), pp. 4-17. cret), pp. 8-9, in Declassified Documents 1988, ber 19, 1964 (Confidential), p. 1, in Nuclear 2 This overview of Japan’s plutonium program is Document No. 1113 (Woodbridge, CT: Research Non-Proliferation Declassified Documents, Docu- basically drawn from Eugene Skolnikoff, Publication, 1988). ment No. 1046 (Washington, D.C.: National Tatsujiro Suzuki, Kenneth Oye, International 21 “Genpatsu Donyu No Scenario” (“The Scenario Security Archive, 1991). Echoing Rostow’s ar- Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs of Introducing Nuclear Power”) (Nihon Hoso gument is Joseph S. Nye in 1978: “We are some- (Cambridge, MA: Working paper from the Cen- Kyokai documentary, March 16, 1994). times told that the goal is hopeless because the ter for International Studies Massachusetts Insti- 22 Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japa- nuclear ‘horse is out of the stable.’ But prolif- tute of Technology, August 1995), pp. 2-26. nese State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, eration is a matter of degrees, not absolutes. Our 3 Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 1995, p. 3. 1987), pp. 234-244. policy can affect the number of horses, which 4 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 12, 1995, p. 1. 23 Memorandum, White House, April 20, 1955 horses, and when horses leave the barn.” Joseph 5 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 7-12. (Top Secret), p. 2, in Declassified Documents S. Nye, “Nonproliferation: A Long-Term Strat- 6 Thus, ships that carry spent nuclear fuel from 1994, Document No. 482 (Woodbridge, CT: egy,” Foreign Affairs 56 (April 1978), p. 602. Japanese nuclear reactors, leave Japan for Eu- Research Publication, 1994). 42 “Background Paper on Factors Which Could rope. After the spent fuel is reprocessed in France 24 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, p. 7; JAIF, pp. 48- Influence National Decision Concerning Acqui-

14 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Motoya Kitamura sitions of Nuclear Weapons,” Department of State, April 23, 1995, Week in Review, p. 4. Protection and Management of Plutonium, (La December 12, 1964 (Secret), pp. 12-16, in 65 Charles A. Radin, “In Japan, Quiet Talk of Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society Nuclear Non-Proliferation Declassified Docu- Nuclear Arms,” The Boston Globe, September Special Panel Report, August 1995). During ments, Document No. 1079 (Washington, D.C.: 19, 1993. Carter’s anti-plutonium crusade, the U.S. nuclear National Security Archive, 1991); “Memorandum 66 Ivo H. Daalder, “What Vision for the Nuclear establishment became an obstacle, eventually for the Members of the Committee of Principals,” Future?” The Washington Quarterly 18 (Spring forcing the administration to build consensus by ACDA, June 25, 1965 (Secret), pp. 1-16, in 1995), p. 130. prompting a two-year study of INFCE. Clausen, Declassified Documents 1994 Document No. 67 Seiichi Kondo, “Japan’s Nuclear Stance” (letter pp. 144-145. 1807 (Woodbridge, CT: Research Publication, to the editor), The Washington Post, November 75 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, p. 4. 1994). 14, 1993, p. C6. 76 Asahi Shimbun, October 31, 1995, p. 4. 43 Clausen, pp. 87-89. 68 For example, the editor in chief of Asahi 77 “Saiaku Nara Ninengo,” (“In Worst Case, Op- 44 Ibid., p. 132. Shimbun writes, “NPT is a discriminatory treaty. eration Could Start Two Years From Now”), Asahi 45 Ibid., pp. 127-133. If only five people in the classroom were allowed Shimbun, December 12, 1995, p. 1. 46 Charles K. Ebinger, “US-Japanese Nuclear to possess knives, all the others would demand, 78 “Denryoku Gyokai Ni Hamon,” (“A Blow to Energy Relations: Prospects for Cooperation/ naturally, either to let the others have one each Electric Industry”), Asahi Shimbun, December Conflict,” in Charles K. Ebinger and Ronald A. or to have the knives taken away from the five. 15, 1995, p. 13. Morse, eds., US-Japanese Energy Relations: NPT resembles this situation.” Kiyofuku Chuma, 79 Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 1995, p. 3. Cooperation and Competition (Boulder, CO: “Kokusaiteki Na Kanshi Kikan O” (“Establish an 80 Frank von Hippel, Marvin Miller, Harold Westview Press, 1984), pp. 153-156. International Monitoring Organization”), Asahi Feiveson, Anatoli Diakov, and Frans Berkhout, 47 Lester, p. 421. Shimbun, May 13, 1995, p. 1; Daalder, p. 130. “Eliminating Nuclear Warheads,” Scientific Ameri- 48 Clausen, pp. 142-143; Ryukichi Imai, “US- 69 Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Re- can 269 (August 1993), p. 47. Japan Nuclear ,” in Michael Blaker, defining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s Na- 81 David Kay, “The IAEA,” in Mitchell Reiss and ed., Oil and the Atom: Issues in US-Japan En- tional Defense Program (Washington, D.C: Na- Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation after ergy Relations (New York: The East Asian Insti- tional Defense University Institute for National the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wil- tute, , 1980), pp. 61-62. Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 2. son Center Press, 1994), p. 312. 49 Imai (1980), pp. 64-66; Ebinger, p. 156. 70 Ibid., p. 52. 82 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 23-24. 50 Imai (1994), pp. 112-114. 71 Michael Mandelbaum, “Lessons of the Next 83 Ibid., pp. 13-17. 51 Clausen, pp. 156-160. Nuclear War,” Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 84 Tatsujiro Suzuki, “Japan’s Nuclear Dilemma,” 52 The strengthening of U.S. influence was a re- 1995), pp. 24-28. Technology Review 94 (October 1991), p. 42. sponse to the passage of the 1978 Nuclear Non- 72 Office of International Security Affairs, United 85 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 18-19. Proliferation Act (NNPA), which required the States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific 86 Lawrence Scheinman and David A.V. Fischer, President to renegotiate all existing nuclear agree- Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of De- “Managing the Coming Glut of Nuclear Weapon ments to satisfy the more stringent requirements fense, 1995), p. 22. Materials,” Arms Control Today 22 (March 1992), of the NNPA. Tighter regulations were imple- 73 In the case of North Korean crisis, Japan, South p. 12. mented, for example, over plutonium shipments. Korea, and arguably China also contributed to 87 Shenon, “Energy-Hungry, Asia Embraces Ibid., pp. 160-162; Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, p. the framework agreement. However, it was the Nuclear Power.” 7. United States that had the power to negotiate di- 88 For example, see: Chalmers Johnson and E.B. 53 Fact Sheet, Non-proliferation and Export Con- rectly with North Korea and reach an agreement; Keehn, “The Pentagon’s Ossified Strategy,” For- trol Policy, White House, September 27, 1993. and was that precisely not what Pyongyang eign Affairs 74 (July/August 1995), pp. 103-114. 54 Kyodo News Service, September 9, 1994. wanted to see? Mandelbaum writes, “The course 89 Ted Galen Carpenter, “Closing the Nuclear 55 R. Manning, “Rethinking Japan’s Plutonium of nuclear nonproliferation in the post-Cold War Umbrella,” Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April Policy: Key to Global Non-Proliferation and era, however, will depend less on what happens 1994), pp. 8-13. Northeast Asian Security,” The Journal of East at the in 1995 than in Washing- 90 Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan and the Strategic Asian Affairs IX (Winter/Spring 1995), pp. 114- ton thereafter. The main obstacle to the spread Quadrangle,” in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The 131; Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 19, 22. of nuclear weapons is not the NPT but the United Strategic Quadrangle (New York: Council of 56 Satoshi Isaka, “China Unveils Plan to Process States....” Mandelbaum, p. 23. One might also Foreign Relations Press, 1995), pp. 145-146. Plutonium,” Nikkei Weekly, March 13, 1995, p. argue Israel has the same power to halt other 91 Terumasa Nakanishi, “Kawaru Anpo No Kozu 1. nuclear weapon programs given the raid on the To Nichibei Kankei,” (“Changing Structure of US- 57 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 25, 1995, p. Iraqi Osiraq reactor in 1981. However, that sort Japan Peace Treaty and US-Japan Relations”), 6. of “power” could be obtained by any nation as Asahi Shimbun, November 18, 1995, p. 4. 58 William Walker and Frans Berkhout, “Japan’s long as it has a military force. Here the power 92 Mochizuki, pp. 138-139; David Shambaugh, Plutonium Problem - And Europe’s,” Arms Con- refers to an overall diplomatic influence that en- “China’s Challenge to Asian Security,” Survival trol Today 22 (September 1992), p. 6. ables the nation to prompt a negotiation exclu- 36 (Summer 1994), pp. 48-51. 59 Fact Sheet, Non-proliferation and Export Con- sively on nuclear nonproliferation, be it in a bi- 93 Spector and McDonough, with Medeiros, pp. trol Policy; Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 19, 22. lateral manner, or by gathering a multinational 105-106. 60 Skolnikoff, Suzuki, Oye, pp. 5-7, 24-26. support. Moreover, Mandelbaum argues, 94 Mike M. Mochizuki, Japan’s Nuclear Policy 61 Walker and Berkhout, p. 7. “Would-be proliferators can insure themselves and Regional Security (Santa Monica, CA: 62 Peter Dauvergne, “Nuclear Power Development against a single crippling strike, such as that Is- RAND paper prepared for the Center for Na- in Japan,” Asian Survey XXXIII (June 1993), pp. raeli warplanes delivered, in the same way that tional Security Studies of the Los Alamos Na- 578-582; “Asia Genshiryoku Shijo Wa Hyakka the United States and the Soviet Union during tional Laboratory project, June 1994), p. 2. Ryoran No Yoso,” (Asian Nuclear Market is Blos- the Cold War protected their nuclear programs 95 Ibid., pp. 4-5. soming), Engineering Business 14 (November from a disarming first strike. They can multiply, 96 Thomas L. McNaugher, “Reforging Northeast 1994), p. 6. disperse, conceal, and shield the component parts Asia’s Dagger?” Brookings Review 11 (Summer 63 “Asian Nuclear Market is Blossoming,” pp. 6- of the program so that a single raid could not 1993), pp. 14-15. 9. entirely destroy it. This is exactly what pro- 97 Joseph A. Yager, “Japan,” in Joseph A. Yager, 64 Philip Shenon, “Energy-Hungry, Asia Em- ceeded to do after 1981....” Ibid., p. 35. ed., Nonproliferation and US Foreign Policy braces Nuclear Power,” , 74 For example, see: American Nuclear Society, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980),

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 15 Motoya Kitamura pp. 25-26. 98 Mochizuki (1995), p. 119. 99 Memorandum for the Members of the Com- mittee of Principals, p. C3. 100 Satoshi Morimoto, “‘Okinawa Mondai’ To Nichibei Anpo,” (“Okinawa Issue” and US-Japan Peace Treaty), Yomiuri Shimbun, November 2, 1995, p. 8.

16 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996