Motoya Kitamura JAPAN’S PLUTONIUM PROGRAM: A PROLIFERATION THREAT? by Motoya Kitamura Motoya Kitamura was formerly a staff writer for the Kyodo News Agency in Japan. He recently completed an M.A. in international relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University, where he undertook this research. Since graduating, he has returned to Japan to continue his career. he Japanese plutonium pro- the emergence of post-Cold War between promotion and control dur- gram continues to dwell on multipolarity, criticism of the Japa- ing the Cold War era. After de- Tthe minds of nuclear nonpro- nese plutonium program tends to be scribing the fluctuation of the non- liferation watchers. Japan remains aimed indiscriminately at every proliferation policy in the past, the the only non-nuclear weapon state single aspect of the program. From article examines the concerns raised that is operating uranium enrichment a nonproliferation perspective, we today. and reprocessing plants, all of which must ask instead, what is the most For the development of a nuclear are technically capable of produc- effective approach to take? What are weapon program, both the political ing fissile materials for nuclear the most serious problems with the will and the technology represented weapons. The magnitude of these program? How are they relevant to by the plutonium program are nec- projects exceeds those of other na- nonproliferation, and what is the essary. Of the two, Tokyo’s politi- tions that have either abandoned or role of other countries in influenc- cal will holds the key to preventing postponed similar programs. ing the Japanese plutonium pro- nuclear proliferation in Japan, but The issue of Japan’s capability to gram? In an attempt to describe the nuclear umbrella provided by the acquire a nuclear arsenal is en- accurately the nuclear weapons pro- United States will have the stron- tangled with Tokyo’s enigmatic di- liferation concerns, this article gest influence on Tokyo’s plomacy. On the one hand, it com- begins with a general overview of decisionmaking. plies with its obligations to the In- the Japanese plutonium program. It ternational Atomic Energy Agency then illustrates the strong driving CHARACTERISTICS OF THE (IAEA), making financial contribu- forces behind the program: an ad- JAPANESE PLUTONIUM tions, being open to inspections, and herence to energy security, past en- PROGRAM crusading for a nuclear-free world couragement from the United States, as the world’s sole victim of nuclear and powerful and interested domes- An Overview attacks. On the other hand, the num- tic nuclear bodies. This article ber of remarks made by political fig- argues that the incentives for pluto- The Japanese plutonium program ures alluding to Japan’s ambitions nium development, especially the is the logical extension of the for developing nuclear weapons has promotion strategy by the United nation’s extensive nuclear energy increased in recent years. States, have made Japan indifferent program, which was first established As nuclear nonproliferation forces to U.S. nonproliferation policy, with the goal of achieving energy continue to grow worldwide amid which has swayed back and forth independence. Since the 1966 open- The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 1 Motoya Kitamura ing of the Tokai Plant, 48 nuclear out only on a case-by-case basis with The Japanese plutonium program reactors have started operation, the prior approval of the United has gathered attention in recent years bringing the nation’s total installed States. However, a 1988 agreement because of the gradual demise of capacity to 38.0 gigawatts electric, between Japan and the United States similar programs in other nations. the third largest in the world after provided for a new arrangement in Cost, technology, uranium availabil- the United States and France.1 Four which the United States gave prior ity, safety, and the environment all new reactors are currently under consent for all civilian programs Ja- became causes for concern. The construction. pan proposed for plutonium use United States, Sweden, Italy, and The basic direction of the pluto- during the next 30 years. The Tokai- Canada have abandoned civilian plu- nium program was first outlined in mura plant can produce about 450 tonium programs. Britain and Ger- the 1967 Long Term Program, 11 kilograms (kg) of fissile plutonium many canceled their programs or years after its principles had been per year. The reprocessing plant in halted the operation of breeder re- approved by the Japan Atomic En- Rokkasho-mura, now under con- actors. Although Britain maintains ergy Commission (JAEC).2 The struction, will start operation around a large reprocessing plant, it has no program identified fast breeder re- 2001. According to the 1994 Long plans for domestic recycling. And actors (FBR) and the closed nuclear Term Program, a decision to build although France completed the fuel cycle through uranium enrich- the next reprocessing plant will be world’s largest prototype FBR, ment and plutonium reprocessing as made in 2010.5 Superphoenix, in 1985, it had op- its main goals. Since the mid-1970s, Japan has erated for fewer than 200 days In accordance with these policies, realized that its reprocessing capac- through 1993. The status of the two the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel ity would fall short of increasing de- FBRs in the former Soviet Union is Development Corporation (PNC), mand for plutonium. To counteract unclear. While both appear to be op- created by the Japanese government, this shortage, Japanese utilities in erating, technical concerns and ru- began construction on the experi- the late 1970s signed contracts with mored shutdowns have been raised.8 mental FBR JOYO in 1970, which the French state-owned Cogema If this trend continues, the Japanese reached criticality in 1977. The group and with British Nuclear Fuel program will not be able to escape prototype FBR MONJU began op- Ltd. (BNFL) to extract and return close international scrutiny. eration in 1994 and generated elec- plutonium (and high-level radioac- tricity for the first time in August tive waste (HLW) that would be re- Driving Forces 1995.3 The construction of a dem- covered from Japanese spent fuel in onstration FBR is planned to begin their reprocessing plants).6 Thus, What have been the driving forces shortly after 2000, with commer- between 1970 and 1979, a total of behind the Japanese plutonium pro- cialization planned by 2030 (the 13 shipments were made from Brit- gram? Why has it overcome the schedule was pushed back in the ain to Japan. The amount of pluto- economic and political barriers that 1994 Long Term Program). Con- nium carried in those convoys var- have hindered development in other struction started on the advanced ied for 25 kg to 100 kg. In 1981, nations? Why has Japan devoted so thermal reactor (ATR) prototype 190 kg were transported in a single much energy to technological devel- FUGEN in 1970, which reached shipment. In 1984, 253 kg shipped opment? The key to understanding criticality in 1978. The ATR project from France (not all in one ship- such questions lies in the history of had been planned in preparation for ment) began to draw public atten- the nuclear project. the more important FBR project, but tion. The 1992-93 transport, the Japanese interest in nuclear power in July 1995 the electric utilities de- first case conducted under the 1988 following World War II surfaced for manded its suspension due to its U.S.-Japan Agreement that required the first time with Dietman Yasuhiro prohibitive cost.4 tight physical protection, had 1.7 Nakasone. In 1951, during the Al- As for the nuclear fuel cycle, an tons of plutonium; this provoked lied occupation, the future prime experimental reprocessing plant was intense international controversy. minister petitioned then-Ambassa- built in Tokai-mura in 1975 and The most recent shipment in April dor John Foster Dulles for the de- began operation in 1977. In prin- 1995 contained 400 kg of HLW from velopment of a nuclear industry. ciple, reprocessing had been carried Cogema.7 Fueled by President Eisenhower’s 2 Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1996 Motoya Kitamura “Atoms for Peace” speech in Decem- a completely indigenous fuel cycle, apprehension about recent territo- ber 1953, Nakasone joined three including breeder reactors: rial disputes in the South China Sea, other members of the Diet to secure ...it is our basic policy to con- through which these oil tankers pass. suprapartisan support for a supple- duct reprocessing using domes- The second historical explanation mental 235 million yen budget for a tic technology as much as pos- for Japan’s persistent plutonium nuclear power project in March sible and [this] will be exclusively policy is its encouragement by the 1954.9 done by [the] Japan Atomic Fuel United States, especially by the Nuclear power was a treasure box Public Corporation...Mainly [for] Eisenhower administration in the for Japan for two main reasons: 1) effective utilization of nuclear fuel context of the Cold War. Japanese it would provide a more secure en- resources, [the] breeder reactor is efforts could not have been achieved ergy resource than limited domes- the most appropriate type of re- without a U.S. policy of nuclear tic coal reserves; and 2) it would actor for Japan, thus it is our ba- promotion among its allies. While spawn a major new high-technology sic goal to develop such type of Japan was primarily concerned with industry in the then-weak reactor.12 itself, the U.S. concern was inter- economy.10 This reaction differed This basic policy evolved into a national. only slightly from many other coun- more specific one in the 1967 Long The United States saw ideologi- tries that saw this new form of en- Term Program, which described the cal benefits in promoting nuclear en- ergy in a very promising light.