­chapter 7 Enforcement of Proliferation Security Initiative (psi) and Challenges

I Evolution of the Proliferation Security Initiative

Emergence of New Security Threats and Counter-​Proliferation During the post-​ period of the , the threat of massive de- struction from conflict between nuclear-armed​ superpowers has significantly diminished. But in its place, the contemporary world has witnessed the rise of non-​conventional threats posed by terrorist groups or rouge states which seek to have weapons of mass destruction (wmd) for use as a tool of terrorism. Rogue states and transnational terrorist groups now threaten the security of the world. Challenged by these evolving threats, the international community has come up with new security strategies to strengthen the traditional regime of non-​proliferation of wmd. Over the past three decades, the international community has established a number of legally binding agreements against nuclear proliferation as well as biological, chemical and radiological. Those non-​proliferation , which focus on preventing the spread of wmd, weapons technology, and re- lated materials, include: (i) the 1968 Non-Proliferation​ (npt)1; (ii) the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention2; and (iii) the 1993 Chemical Weapons ­Convention.3 Despite its contribution to the prevention of proliferation of

1 The Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to as the ‘Non-​Proliferation Treaty’ (npt) is an international treaty established to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving disarmament. The npt entered into effect in March 1970. The parties in May 1995 agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. , which acceded in 1985, announced its withdrawal from the npt and never came into compliance. As of 2017, the members of npt are up to 191. 2 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bac- teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction is commonly referred to as the ‘Biological Weapons Convention’ (bwc). Effective in March 1975, the btc is the first multilateral disarmament treaty which aims to ban the development, production and stock- piling of an entire category of weapons. As of 2017, the number of btc parties is 179. 3 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, referred as the ‘Chemical Weapons Con- vention’ (cwc), comprehensively prohibits the use, development stockpiling and transfer of

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2019 | DOI:10.1163/9789004389908_​ 008​ Enforcement of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 229 wmd over the past decades, the traditional non-​proliferation regime has ex- posed its limitations and shortcomings in addressing the new contemporary security environment. Of those, importantly, the non-​proliferation regime is applicable only to the state parties to the conventions and sovereign states, but limited to non-​state parties and non-​state actors. More specifically, the three categories of actors that lie outside the international community constitute a proliferation threat more dangerous and difficult to control than at any time in the past.4 First, North Korea and both defied international norms of nuclear non-​ proliferation and respect for treaties and the Security Council Resolutions by conducting a series of missile launches and pursuing nuclear development. Second, terrorist groups are actively pursuing wmd, and are not likely to be deterred or dissuaded from using them. Third, despite successes in dismantling the Al Qaeda network, facilitators of proliferation still exist, moti- vated by financial gains. The problem is compounded by states such as North Korea, which views proliferation as an important revenue source — ​including as a way to finance their own wmd programs.5 Fourth, adding to the complex- ity and the danger is the widespread availability of the materials, technology, equipment and basic knowledge required to develop and produce wmd and delivery systems.6 Against this backdrop, the international community has engaged in de- veloping new strategies to address the shortcomings of the existing non-​ proliferation regime. As such, the strategy of counter-proliferation,​ which builds on non-proliferation,​ has been developed. The Proliferation Security Initiative (psi) has constituted a key policy instrument to implement the strat- egy of counter-​proliferation. The counter-​proliferation strategy focuses on intelligence, law enforce- ment and sometimes military action to prevent and deter the spread of wmd —​ as opposed to non-​proliferation, which relies primarily on tradi- tional measures such as , arms control, and multilateral agree- ments that seek to dissuade or impede proliferation states and terrorist net- works. The counter-proliferation​ strategy involves more aggressive actions

chemical weapons. Any chemical used for warfare is considered a by the convention. The cwc was effective in April 1997. The number of parties to the convention is 192 as of 2017. 4 U.S. Department of Defense, National Institute, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: A ­Model for Future International Collaboration,’ released in August 2009. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.