Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPMENT*

by Joseph DiChiaro III and Dr. Edward J. Laurance

Joseph DiChiaro III is Senior Research Associate of the Program for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS). Dr. Edward J. Laurance is Professor of International Policy Studies and Associate Director of the Program for Nonproliferation Studies at MIIS and author of The International Arms Trade (1992).

he end of the and the norms can prove a boon, rather than a tual conclusion of a Comprehensive Test conduct and termination of the burden, to national economies. Ban (CTB) . TGulf conflict ushered in the - Extensive linkages between nuclear - Despite the steep costs associated promise of a substantially changed and and non-nuclear proliferation and dis- with dismantling and safe storage of more stable international environment. armament point to the need for a more nuclear weapons retired as a result of With such a promise also came the hope comprehensive approach in order to ef- either unilateral initiatives or bilateral of a substantial diversion of resources fect mutually beneficial and lasting or multilateral disarmament agreements, away from military expenditure and into change. the long-term savings accrued could be human development. Unfortunately, the - While unilateral initiatives, and substantial if the materials released by hope for a peace dividend to be used provisions of the INF, START I, and this process are adequately controlled. for the reinvigoration of the world's START II call for the reduction - The precarious state of civilian economy, by fostering unprecedented of over 20,000 warheads from the arse- worldwide may compli- growth and development, has given way nals of nuclear weapons states, they cate efforts at controlling the spread of to a more sober view reflecting the high make no provision for the ultimate dis- fissile materials. costs inherent in dramatic systemic position of the fissile materials released - Despite the high financial and tech- change. as a result of this process. nical barriers to proliferation, a hand- Focusing on the process of nuclear - Although potentially dramatic, the ful of states continue to harbor clan- disarmament and the efforts to control reductions envisioned in the START I destine nuclear weapons programs or the spread of nuclear weapons technolo- and II treaties have yet to result in the are widely believed to be actively seek- gies, this paper seeks to highlight the dismantlement of a single warhead. ing one. This may bar further reduc- shortcomings that have to date prevented - Although lessening the immediate the anticipated cost savings and diver- threat of nuclear conflagration, these * This manuscript was originally prepared sion of resources to human develop- agreements fail to address the long-term for the Development ment. To summarize, the most impor- environmental and security threats Programme's Human Development Report tant findings of this report include: posed by inadequate storage or the po- 1994 and is intended as a brief summary of - The current export control regime tential dispersal of fissile materials to the current (as of November 1993) nonproliferation landscape and its relation is inadequate and discriminatory over unintended parties. to human development. The authors wish the long-run. Legitimate security con- - Continuing moratoria on the part to thank Inge Kaul and Saras Menon of cerns must be addressed before lasting of the , Britain, , UNDP for commissioning and allowing the reductions can be achieved. and bode well for a suspension reprinting of this report, and Cynthia Miller - Adherence to nonproliferation of the and the even- for her editorial assistance.

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 27 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance tions by the nuclear weapons states and relies almost exclusively on export con- adequacy of the current effort. Even in stall disarmament efforts. trols to deter the spread of nuclear traditionally non-proliferant countries, - Whatever the exact costs, it is fairly weapon technology. Such reliance is the ability to enforce export controls, safe to say that an effective nuclear inadequate in the long-run as it fails to whether they be stringent or lax, can- weapon development program is beyond address the underlying motivations for not always be assumed. the scope of what most aspiring states weapons acquisition. Export controls can afford to spend given the needs of in the nuclear field are designed to limit The North-South Question their civilian population. the spread of key com- Closely related to the issue of export - Finally, indefinite extension of the ponents and, thus, to make it difficult controls is the policy option of levying Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for a state to achieve a nuclear capabil- sanctions against perceived proliferant appears likely as do prospects for a CTB ity. However, a great deal of coordina- activity. Developing states constantly and International Storage tion among supplier states is required charge that such sanctions and controls (IPS) facility. While these may not halt to achieve effective control. Despite the serve to stifle their development by de- proliferation, they will serve to further lessons of the , full coordina- nying them access to technologies vital isolate non-adherents, highlight deviant tion of export control policies is still to their development of a modern activity, and enhance international se- lacking. To effect lasting change, a de- economy. Certainly, many technologies, curity in such a way as to open the door termined attempt must be made to as- such as advanced computing and ma- towards substantive and lasting devel- sure the security of states at the lowest chine tool technologies, have both opment. possible level of armaments by provid- weapon development and peaceful uses. Despite an inauspicious start, substan- ing them a stable and predictable envi- However, there is a growing consen- tial diversion of resources from the mili- ronment within which to act. This will sus among developing countries that, tary to civilian sector could be realized require concerted effort on the part of far from being a hindrance to develop- if the current consensus favoring fur- developed as well as developing nations. ment, cooperation with the nonprolif- ther reductions and prohibitions against While export controls cannot, in and eration regime and adherence to inter- further acquisitions hold. of themselves, eliminate the threat of national norms can prove a boost to a proliferation of nuclear weapons, they country's technological advancement. can raise the price and time required Most recently Argentina, which had pre- ONGOING CONCERNS for a would-be proliferant to develop a viously considered the 1967 Tlatelolco nuclear weapons capability. In the wake Treaty discriminatory against develop- A variety of issues confronts the in- of the Gulf War, many states unilater- ing countries' nuclear programs, rati- ternational community faced with alle- ally tightened up their national export fied the treaty, and plans to join the viating the dangers posed by the spread control laws, and many multilateral ef- NPT.1 of nuclear weapons while dealing with forts were undertaken to prevent another Such a change of heart can be attrib- the amassed arsenals of the current . One example of a multilateral ef- uted not only to the substantial economic nuclear weapons states. Among the key fort was the mandate given to the U.N. incentives being offered to regime-com- issues are: the adequacy of the existing Special Commission on Iraq pliant states, but also to the growing nonproliferation regime based mainly (UNSCOM) to dismantle and indefi- awareness that the major powers are on a system of export controls; the con- nitely monitor Iraq's weapons of mass making good faith efforts to reduce their tinuing North-South divide and the non- destruction capability. Another was the arsenals and provide access to advanced proliferation regime's effect on devel- series of discussions initiated in July technologies to those states which ad- opment; the complex relationship be- 1991 among the permanent five mem- here to basic nonproliferation norms. tween nuclear and non-nuclear prolif- bers of the U.N. Security Council (P-5 Additionally, both the industrialized and eration and disarmament; and the dura- talks) to fashion some form of restraint developing worlds no longer perceive bility of the emerging consensus against on destabilizing arms transfers to the nuclear energy as an economic and safe the further acquisition or use of weap- Middle East. However, the ambiguity source of . Thus, the argu- ons of mass destruction. surrounding 's proliferation policy ment that sanctions stifle growth con- and the economic and political uncer- tinues to shed adherents. Adequacy of Export Controls tainty in the former Soviet republics The current nonproliferation regime leave substantial questions about the

28 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

Nuclear and Non-nuclear Proliferation robust nuclear force rather than divert both promise and predicament for the Extensive linkages between nuclear scarce hard currency to conventional future reduction of nuclear arsenals and non-nuclear proliferation and dis- arms purchases if confronted with a worldwide and the prevention of addi- armament point to the need for a more greater perceived threat.2 tional nuclear weapons states. The sign- comprehensive approach in order to ef- ing of the START I and II agreements fect mutually beneficial and lasting Emerging Consensus on point towards dramatic reductions in change. Linkages between nuclear and Nonproliferation: Will it Last? delivery systems but make no allowance non-nuclear proliferation are substan- Especially in the wake of the Gulf War for dismantlement of warheads. Fur- tial. For instance, a country's buildup and the revelation of just how close Iraq thermore, the failure of Ukraine to ratify of conventional forces may prompt was to a nuclear weapon capability, an START I puts realization of that treaty, another's development of nuclear weap- international consensus seems to be as well as START II, in doubt. Ex- ons to counter the perceived threat, or emerging that further proliferation of amples of the promise of nuclear disar- vice-versa. For example, 's weapons of mass destruction should be mament include the cancellation of mod- nuclear monopoly in the Middle East stopped. In addition, the past few years ernization programs and, at least in the no doubt caused the acquisition of have seen a substantial rise in signato- case of South Africa, the complete aban- chemical weapons and ballistic missiles ries to the NPT (from 138 at the end of donment of a nuclear weapons program. by Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Addition- 1989 to 157 by January 1, 1993).3 This decline in the urge to modernize ally, many conventional systems, espe- However, it is uncertain whether this nuclear forces has led in turn to a mora- cially ballistic missiles and aircraft, can consensus will hold, especially if the torium on nuclear testing and signifi- be reconfigured to deliver nuclear weap- debate in 1995 on the indefinite exten- cant momentum towards the realization ons. Also, if a nuclear weapons pro- sion of the NPT becomes contentious of a CTB. Countering this trend, how- gram already exists, it may be more cost over lingering fears by the developing ever, is the continual, if slow, push to- effective for a state to pursue additional world that the treaty remains discrimi- wards modernization by the People's Re- weapons production rather than costly natory. public of China, resulting in the sole conventional weapons imports. This nuclear test of 1993. Furthermore, may be particularly true in the case of RECENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS 's apparent drive towards . With the no longer DEVELOPMENTS AND THE STATUS acquiring a nuclear weapons capability a source of conventional arms at bar- OF DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS may stall these efforts and drive other gain prices, India, which has large states towards nuclear development. stocks of plutonium, may pursue a more The end of the Cold War has held out A look at the holdings and recent

U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

Type Deployed Range(km)x Warheads x yield Warheads in stockpile

ICBMs Minuteman II 261 11,300 1x 1.2 Mt 261 Minuteman III 507 13,000 3 x 170-335 kt 1,521 MX/Peacekeeper 50 11,000 10x 300 kt 500

SLBMs Trident C-4 336 7,400 8 x 100 kt 2,688 Trident D-5 144 7,400 8 x 100-475 kt 1,152 Bombers B-52H 94 16,000 20 ALCMs/ACMs ~1,500B B-1B 94 19,800 16 bombs 5 kt-1 Mt ~1,400

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993) and SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 29 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance nuclear-related developments of the five production after 20 aircraft are built. submarines that are nearing the end of declared nuclear weapons states, as well Production of the Advanced Cruise Mis- their service lives. as the status of disarmament agreements, sile (ACM) is also to be discontinued By June 1992, the United States com- will serve to highlight these trends. following production of the 460 already pleted the global withdrawal of all its funded. ground and sea-launched tactical nuclear United States In anticipation of the 1991 START weapons. A total of 1,700 ground- In the wake of the Cold War, the Treaty's entry into force, the United launched warheads were withdrawn United States has continued to retire States has continued retiring Minute- from abroad, including some 700 Lance older inter-continental ballistic missiles man II missiles,5 all 450 of which are missile warheads and 1,000 artillery (ICBMs) from service and, in early slated for removal from their silos by shells. These, in addition to 150 Lance 1992, decided to halt further develop- 1995. As of June 1993, approximately warheads and 300 artillery shells stored ment of additional systems. In January 189 Minuteman IIs had been removed in the United States, are scheduled for 1992, then-President George Bush an- from their silos, but, as yet, no mis- dismantlement. nounced the cancellation of the only siles or silos have been destroyed. Ad- Also withdrawn were all 500 war- U.S. ICBM under development, the ditionally, the remaining silo-based Min- heads routinely deployed at sea, includ- Midgetman missile, saving an estimated uteman IIs have been taken off alert. ing 100 W-80 submarine-launched $40 to $50 billion in acquisition costs Under terms of the START II Treaty, cruise missiles (SLCMs) and 400 B-57 for the system. The decision was also all MX/Peacekeeper missiles will be depth bombs and B-61 gravity bombs. made in 1992 to cease all submarine- removed from service, leaving only the In addition, 350 B-57 depth bombs de- launched ballistic missile (SLBM) war- 500 existing Minuteman III missiles ployed with land-based naval anti-sub- head production, canceling further pro- remaining. These missiles will have marine warfare (ASW) aircraft were duction of the W-88 warhead.4 The their loadings reduced from three war- removed from service. About half of U.S. Air Force has decided to retire all heads to one, and will be the only U.S. these 850 naval tactical nuclear weap- nuclear-role B-52G bombers by the end ICBMs deployed beyond the turn of the ons are slated for dismantlement. of 1993. President Bush also called for century. The United States also con- In January 1992, Chairman of the the cancellation of further B-2 bomber tinues to decommission older Poseidon Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell an- nounced that the United States planned to retain 1,600 tactical nuclear war- U.S. TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES heads. These would apparently consist Withdrawn Scheduled for To be retained of 700 B-61 gravity bombs for tactical Dismantlement* air forces in and the United Land-based States, 550 B-61s stored in the United artillery shells 1,000 1,300 - States for aircraft carriers, and 350 W- Lance warheads 700 850 - 80 Tomahawk SLCM warheads stored in the United States for surface ships Naval and nuclear-powered attack subma- W-80 SLCMs 100 n.a. 350 rines.6 B-57 depth/strike ~425 ~425 - bomb Former Soviet Union B-61 gravity bombs ~325 n.a. 550 In terms of force modernization, the SS-25 appears to be the only ICBM still Air in production in the former Soviet B-61 gravity bombs ~700 ~700 700 Union; with its follow-on being the only ______new Russian ICBM under development. Totals ~3,250 ~3,275 1,600 Retirement of SS-11 and SS-17 ICBMs continues with approximately 100 SS- * including those stored in the United States 11s being withdrawn in the year ending Data source: SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University June 1993, and the remaining 40 or so Press, 1993). SS-17s being removed from service

30 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

FSU STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

Type Deployed Range(km) Warheads x yield Warheads in stockpile

ICBMs SS-17 40 10,000 4 x 750 kt 160 SS-18 302 11,000 10 x 550-750 kt 3,020 SS-19 290 10,000 6 x 550 kt 1,740 SS-24 rail/silo 36/56 10,000 10 x 550 kt 920 SS-25 340 10,500 1 x 550 kt 340

SLBMs SS-N-8 268 9,100 1 x 1.5 Mt 268 SS-N-18 224 6,500 3 x 500 kt 672 SS-N-20 120 8,300 10 x 200 kt 1,200 SS-N-23 112 9,00 4 x 100 kt 448

Bombers Tu-95MS6 27 12,800 6 x AS-15A ALCMs, bombs 162 Tu-95MS16 62 12,800 16 x AS-15A ALCMs, bombs 992 Tu-160 20 11,000 12 x AS-15B ALCMs or 240 AS-16 SRAMs, bombs

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993) and SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). within the next two years. Addition- of the AS-15, Russia's long-range air- weapons had been withdrawn from ships ally, six SS-18s deployed in Russia have launched cruise missile (ALCM), has and submarines.7 been eliminated. also been announced. Despite the withdrawal of a large num- Apparently for both economic reasons In terms of tactical nuclear weapons, ber of systems from active service, there and compliance with coming treaty ob- Yeltsin has announced he will uphold is no evidence that any warheads have ligations, Russia has halted, at least tem- former Soviet President Gorbachev's been dismantled or their component porarily, production of new ballistic October 5, 1991, commitment to de- parts safely stored. missile submarines. One Delta I class stroy all nuclear warheads associated and two Yankee I class SSBNs were with tactical ground-launched systems. France recently retired as well. However, de- He also went beyond Gorbachev, stat- The French Government canceled de- velopment of a follow-on to the SS-N- ing that no replacement warheads would velopment of the mobile S-45 interme- 20 SLBM continues and is likely to be generated and that Russia would also diate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), become operational before the end of destroy one-third of its tactical sea- which was slated to replace its 18 silo- the decade. launched nuclear warheads, half of its based S-3D IRBMs by the end of the tactical air-launched nuclear warheads, decade. As a result, the French may Russian President Boris Yeltsin an- and half of the nuclear warheads used consider replacing the S-3Ds with an nounced in January 1992, that Russia for its anti-aircraft missiles. In addi- ICBM version of the M-5 SLBM which, would also discontinue production of tion, all tactical nuclear weapons were in the event the START II treaty is strategic bombers, including the Black- withdrawn to Russia from all the former implemented, would leave France with jack and Bear-H. He later announced Soviet republics by May 1992. Fur- the world's only MIRVed ICBM. a halt in the production of Backfire thermore, Russia announced on Febru- Due to financial constraints, France bombers. However, further production ary 4, 1993, that all tactical nuclear has also decided to build only four new

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 31 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES

Type Deployed Range(km) Warheads x yield Warheads in stockpile Land-based S-3D 18 3,500 1 x 1 M 18 Hadès - 480 1 x 80 k 30

SLBMs M-4 64 6,000 6 x 150 kt 384

Aircraft: land-based Mirage IVP 18 93 1 x 300 kt ASMP 18 Mirage 2000N 45 690 1 x 300 kt ASMP 42

Aircraft: carrier-based Super Etendard 24 650 1 x 300 kt ASMP 20

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993) and SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Triomphant class SSBNs instead of the deploy it in the field. Britain six originally planned. These will re- Lastly, France's development of the The is in the pro- place France's current fleet of five air-launched Air-Sol-Longue-Portée cess of replacing its four Polaris sub- SSBNs. (ASLP) to replace currently deployed marines with four Trident submarines; In terms of tactical systems, the army's Air-Sol-Moyenne-Portée (ASMP) has this process should be completed by the Pluton surface-to-surface missile (SSM) been thrown into doubt due to financial turn of the century. In May 1992, it has been completely withdrawn from constraints and the withdrawal of Brit- decommissioned one Polaris, the HMS service. Its units are being disbanded, ain from the program. Overall expen- Revenge. The first Trident, the HMS and the missiles dismantled. Also, a diture on nuclear forces has been re- Vanguard, is scheduled to become op- decision was made to reduce produc- duced 17 percent compared to that of erational in late 1994. tion of its scheduled replacement, the 1990. In June 1992, the British Ministry of Hadès SSM, and to store it rather than Defence stated that all (approximately

BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES

Type Deployed Range(km) Warheads x yield Warheads in stockpile

SLBMs A3-TK Polaris 48 4,700 2 x 40 kt ~100

Aircraft Tornado (GR.1) 72 1,300 1-2 x 200-400 kt Buccaneer (S2B) 27 1,700 1 x 200-400 kt ~100 (total)

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993) and SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

32 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

25) of the WE-177C nuclear strike/ Kingdom asked the U.S. firm Martin velop its nuclear- capable forces. Little, depth bombs carried by ASW helicop- Marietta to carry out preliminary defi- however, is known of developments ters and carrier-based aircraft will be nition studies for the TASM, and con- within the PRC. Nonetheless, China is removed from service and destroyed. sidered joint development of the French expected to field a new mobile missile Additionally, the U.S. withdrawal of B- ASLP. However, the government de- in the next few years. This missile, the 57 depth bombs from Europe makes cided on October 18, 1993, to scrap DF-31, will apparently be a land-based them no longer available for the U.K.'s plans for a new air-launched nuclear version of the new 8,000 kilometer JL- Nimrod ASW planes. As a result, missile, canceling a project which would 2 SLBM. China may also be develop- Britain's tactical nuclear force will con- have cost an estimated $4.5 billion. It ing another mobile ICBM, the three- sist of Tornado and Buccaneer aircraft appears likely, therefore, that after the stage, solid propellant DF-41, to be armed with the WE-177A/B gravity turn of the century the United King- deployed after the turn of the century.19 bomb. The remaining Buccaneer squad- dom will rely solely on its Trident The new JL-2 is expected to be de- rons will be retired by 1994, and the nuclear submarines. Cancellation of the ployed aboard the second-generation 09- Tornado squadrons will be reduced from project by Britain also places the future 4 Xia Class nuclear-powered submarine 11 to eight. of France's development of the ASLP in the mid- to late-1990s. China also The Ministry of Defence had indicated in doubt.8 recently deployed the 1,700 to 1,800 a need to replace the WE-177 bomb, kilometer DF-21, a mobile, land-based which is approaching the end of its ser- China version of the JL-1 SLBM. Also, China vice life, with a tactical air-to-surface Unlike other nuclear weapons states, apparently has six trucks with TELs to missile (TASM). To this end, the United China continues, albeit slowly, to de- transport and launch the two-stage,

CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES

Type Deployed Range(km) Warheads x yield Warheads in stockpile

Land-based missiles DF-3A (CSS-2) 50 2,800 1 x 3.3 Mt 50 DF-4 (CSS-3) 20 4,750 1 x 3.3 Mt 20 DF-5A (CSS-4) 4 13,000 1 x 4-5 Mt 4 DF-21 (CSS-6) 36 1,800 1 x 200-300 kt 36 DF-31 in devel. 8,000 1 x 200-300 kt - DF-41 in devel. 12,000 MIRV -

SLBMs

JL-1 (CSS-N-3) 24 1,700 1 x 200-300 kt 24 JL-2 (CSS-N-4) - 8,000 1 x 200-300 kt -

Bombers

H-5 30 1,200 1 x bomb H-6 120 3,100 1 x bomb 150 (total) Q-5 30 400 1 x bomb H-7 0 n.a. 1 x bomb

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993) and SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 33 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance solid-propellant IRBM. The Chinese Air Force continues work on the H-7, possibly a strategic bomber designed to replace the aging Q-5C. The H-7 is reportedly entering series production at the Xian Aircraft Factory.

Nuclear Testing Current moratoria on the testing of nuclear weapons bode well for the end of the nuclear arms race and the pros- pect of a CTB. In concert with the de- cline in new weapon development out- lined above, annual nuclear weapon test- ing has also declined substantially in nounced a one-year moratorium. A year has no choice but to follow the U.S. the past seven years. In fact, of the five later, on October 2, 1992, then-Presi- moratorium. This situation may have declared nuclear weapon states, only dent George Bush signed a bill halting influenced the United Kingdom's deci- China has conducted a test this year. U.S. tests for nine months, limiting tests sion to forego development of an air- The United States, Britain, France, and for the next three years to a maximum launched nuclear missile, which would Russia continue to uphold moratoria on of five per year and committing to no eventually require testing, and to rely testing announced over the past two further tests after September 30, 1996, solely on the soon to be deployed U.S.- years. unless another state conducts a test af- supplied Trident missile with a fully The former Soviet Union was the first ter that date.10 This in turn prompted tested U.K. warhead. to halt testing when on October 5, 1991, Boris Yeltsin on October 19, 1992, to In April 1992, France also announced then-President Mikhail Gorbachev an- extend the Russian moratorium until a moratorium until the end of 1992. In July 1, 1993. In July 1993, the U.S. January 1993, President François INF REDUCTIONS moratorium was further extended for at Mitterrand further stated that France least another 15 months, provided other would forego additional testing as long Type Eliminated nations do not conduct tests during that as the United States and Russia re- period. frained.12 U.S. This condition was challenged on Oc- In spite of the Chinese test, the cur- Pershing II 234 tober 5, 1993, when China tested a 20 rent moratora by the other four declared GLCM 443 to 40 kiloton device at the Lop Nor test nuclear weapon states bode well for the Pershing IA 169 site in Xinjiang province.11 However, negotiations on a CTB, which will be- Total 846 as this was only China's 39th test com- gin in January 1994 in Geneva.13 pared to about 1,900 tests for the other U.S.S.R. four states combined, it is unlikely to Status of Disarmament Agreements SS-20 654 spur the United States to resume test- SS-23 239 ing. Further Chinese testing, or even a INF SS-4 149 test by a heretofore nuclear-weapon-free The Intermediate-range Nuclear SS-5 6 state, however, would most likely re- Forces (INF) treaty, signed in Decem- SS-12 718 sult in additional U.S., U.K. and French ber 1987 by the United States and the SSC-X-4 80 testing. China, for its part, has ex- Soviet Union, called for the elimina- Total 1,846 pressed support for negotiation of a CTB tion by June 1, 1991, of all nuclear- treaty by 1996. capable missiles with a range between Data source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Ar- The United Kingdom, which conducts 500 and 5,500 kilometers, launchers, maments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 404. its testing in conjunction with the United support structures, and equipment. States at the Nevada test site, currently Both states met this obligation within

34 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

START I: BASIC PROVISIONS stroyed. Thus, theoretically at least, 1992, by Russia on November 4, 1992, the 2,692 warheads freed up as a result and by Belarus on February 4, 1993. of this agreement could be rebuilt in Russia's ratification was accompaniedby Both sides are limited to 6,000 ac their entirety, or refashioned, using their a stipulation that actual exchange of in- countable warheads deployed on no component parts, into new weapons. struments of ratification (thus bringing more than 1,600 strategic nuclear The treaty did greatlyreduce the imme- the treaty into force) would not occur delivery vehicles (SNDVs: includes diate threat of an accidental or inten- until the other former Soviet republics ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bomb- tional nuclear exchange in Europe; how- acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear ers). ever, it failed to account for the long- weapons states and agreed to START I term threat posed by the resulting ma- implementation measures. Only Belarus Of these 6,000 warheads, no more terials. has joined the NPT. The major con- than 4,900 may be carried on bal- cern at this point is Ukraine's failure to listic missiles and no more than START I ratify the treaty, which is delaying not 1,100 on mobile ICBMs. The U.S.-Soviet Treaty on the Reduc- only entry into force of the START I tion and Limitation of Strategic Offen- treaty but also ratification of START No more than 1,540 warheads may sive Arms (START I), concluded on July II. be carried on heavy ICBMs. This 31, 1991, seeks to reduce the total num- Despite the failure of Ukraine to ratify provision applies solely to reduc- bers of strategic warheads possessed by the treaty, reduction of U.S. strategic tions in Soviet SS-18s from 308 to the two states, the total number of de- forces, which began in October 1991, 154. Increases in throw-weight, livery vehicles, and also specific types is on-going. Approximately 189 Min- launch weight, and the number of of delivery systems. Its provisions are uteman II ICBMs have been removed warheads on existing heavy missiles to be met over a period of seven years from their silos, and the remaining silo- are also prohibited. after the treaty enters into force. Be- low is a summary of its basic provi- Limits are also placed on non-de- START II: BASIC PROVISIONS sions. ployed mobile missiles and launch- The dissolution of the former Soviet ers. By the year 2003, both states must Union posed a host of problems for the reduce the number of deployed stra- implementation of the START I treaty. Design, testing, and deployment of tegic warheads to between 3,000 Though signed in July 1991, it has yet new systems with more than 10 re- and 3,500 each. to enter into force. The creation of entry vehicles and flight testing of four states with strategic nuclear weap- existing systems with more than Both parties are required to elimi- ons on their territories, where one had their current number of re-entry nate their MIRVed ICBMs. previously stood, severely complicated vehicles are also prohibited. treaty implementation. The issue was SLBM warheads are limited to seemingly resolved with the signing of Several means of treaty verifica- 1,700 to 1,750 each. a protocol to the START I treaty (the tion are provided for, including Lisbon Protocol) by the United States, transfer of missile test flight data, The counting practice for bombers Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and on-site inspection, and monitoring is changed to include the number Kazakhstan. In the protocol, the four of mobile ICBM production facili- of nuclear weapons that they are ac- former Soviet republics agreed to as- ties. tually equipped to carry, although sume the obligations of the U.S.S.R. up to 100 strategic bombers are ex- under the treaty. Additionally, Ukraine, empted for re-orientation to conven- 14 the required time. Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to join tional role. However, neither the INF treaty nor the NPT as non-nuclear states "in the 15 the later START I and II treaties specify shortest possible time." All SS-18 missiles, both deployed that nuclear warheads themselves be and non-deployed, must be elimi- dismantled. The INF specifies only that Kazakhstan was the first to ratify the nated either through destruction or the warhead be removed from its deliv- treaty on July 2, 1992. Ratification by use as space-launch vehicles. ery system and that the system be de- the U.S. Senate followed on October 1,

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 35 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance based Minuteman IIs have been taken nuclear exchange. European and other cess of warhead dismantlement involves off alert. However, no missiles or silos states also benefit from the relaxation three basic stages: 1) gathering together have been destroyed yet. of tensions resulting from the conclu- and storing warheads at dismantling sion of the START I and II treaties be- sites, 2) dismantling the warheads and START II cause of the ranges of the systems be- storing the components, and 3) process- The U.S.-Russian Treaty on Further ing limited and reduced. The extensive ing of fissile components, which in- Reduction and Limitation of Strategic reductions to be undertaken by the volves bringing the plutonium and Offensive Arms (START II), signed in United States and Russia also signal to highly-enriched (HEU) to a on January 3, 1993, if imple- the international community that both form that is suitable for long-term stor- mented will be the most sweeping countries are finally making progress age, recycling, or disposal.20 nuclear arms reduction treaty in history. on their NPT obligation to "pursue ne- Current U.S. Department of Energy The treaty, however, does not enter into gotiations in good faith on effective (DOE) plans call for the dismantlement force until ratification of the START I measures relating to cessation of the of approximately 2,000 warheads per treaty by all parties; Ukraine has yet to nuclear arms race" (art. VI of the year, yet only cover the first two phases ratify it. The limitations and reduc- NPT).19 Also, non-party states may of the dismantlement process as defined tions to be carried out under the treaty begin to incur indirect savings in the above. These plans appear to be overly are dramatic and indicative of a changed form of reduced military expenditures optimistic, however. The DOE's Pantex world. Its most important provisions as a result of the reduced need to counter Plant near Amarillo, Texas (where al- are listed below. a Russian or U.S. threat. most all weapons are currently dis- What these reductions mean in terms Unfortunately, these reductions may mantled) dismantled only 1,274 war- of the overall holdings of the two par- also have a negative effect. As noted heads in FY 1992 and will dismantle ties is insightful. Full treaty compli- above, neither the INF, START I, nor approximately 1,430 during the current ance will require the United States to START II treaty specifies that warheads FY 1993.21 Plutonium "pits" from the reduce its deployed strategic nuclear be dismantled; merely that the warheads dismantlement process are stored at warheads by more than 70 percent of be removed from their delivery system Pantex, while the HEU is shipped to its September 1990 level and nearly 60 and, in some cases, the delivery system the Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge, Tennes- percent from planned deployments un- destroyed. Given, as a recent U.S. Of- see for storage. While no decision has der the START I treaty. Included in fice of Technology Assessment report been made concerning the long-term this reduction is the downloading of all suggests, that "neither the United States disposition of these materials, some of Minuteman IIIs from three warheads to nor Russia has developed a technically the HEU can and will most probably one, the elimination of all MX/Peace- and politically feasible plan to dismantle be used as naval reactor fuel.22 While keeper missiles, and the reduction of warheads and dispose of the nuclear ma- little information is available on the to- deployed SLBM warheads to no more terials from them,"19 the long-term con- tal yearly costs of this dismantlement than 1,750.16 Russia will be required trol (or lack thereof) of retired warheads process, the U.S. Office of Technology to reduce its strategic forces also by or their component parts may pose both Assessment puts the DOE budget allo- about 70 percent of its September 1990 security and environmental threats not cated to warhead dismantlement and deployments and by about 50 percent only to the United States and Russia, materials disposition in the range of of deployments under START I.17 but also to surrounding states. $500 million to $1 billion for FY 1993.23 Effects of Reductions on Non-Treaty : Short-term costs, Little is known about Russia's dis- Parties long-term benefits mantlement plans or even its total stock- The effects of these treaties on the While the initiatives of the pile of nuclear warheads. If taken at security of non-parties is difficult to United States and Russia to remove tac- face value, recent statements by Viktor quantify. Certainly the INF treaty, tical nuclear weapons from service and N. Mikhailov, the head of Russia's Min- which removed an entire category of the dramatic reductions embodied in the istry of Atomic Energy, reveal that nuclear weapons from Europe, contrib- START treaties concerning strategic Russia's inventory of HEU may be twice utes to the stability of the European the- systems are encouraging, the burden of the amount originally estimated by the ater and decreases the danger to Euro- the actual dismantlement of the war- West -- some 1,200 metric tons.24 pean states of becoming embroiled in a heads may prove prohibitive. The pro- Mikhailov has also recently indicated

36 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance that approximately 10,000 warheads through the end of the decade. Reflect- balance between safety and economic have been dismantled in the former So- ing this more cautious approach, Spain necessity will be a great concern dur- viet Union. The U.S. Department of and Switzerland have placed prohibi- ing the coming decade. Nowhere is this Defense estimates that 2,000 warheads, tions on further reactor construction; tension more evident than in former at best, are being dismantled annually. the United States has placed no new Eastern bloc countries where decisions However, a great deal of skepticism still nuclear plant orders since 1975; and are being made to continue operation surrounds Russia's dismantlement ef- Italy has abandoned nuclear power al- of plants despite serious safety concerns. forts as no means of verification are together.27 Since currently available. The United States 1989, a total of 37 NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN COMMERCIAL has provisionally agreed to purchase 500 commercial reac- OPERATION metric tons of excess Soviet HEU for tors have been shut about $11.9 billion,25 although it may down worldwide. consider additional purchases if the re- As of June 1993, Country Units NetMWe vised stockpile figures prove accurate. there were 415 Despite the steep costs associated with commercial Argentina 2 935 dismantling and safe storage of nuclear nuclear reactors in Belgium 7 5,484 weapons retired as a result of either operation globally Brazil 1 626 unilateral initiatives or bilateral or mul- with a total capac- Bulgaria 6 3,666 tilateral disarmament agreements, the ity of 328,308 22 15,442 long term savings accrued could be sub- MWe,28 an in- Czech Republic 4 1,632 stantial. Again using the U.S. example, crease in capacity Finland 4 2,310 the U.S. Congressional Budget Office of only 2 percent France 55 56,488 has estimated that the United States over the previous Germany 21 22,508 could save more than $50 billion over year. As the indus- Hungary 4 1,729 the next 15 years in the improved po- try downsizes in India 9 1,834 litical climate fostered by the START II the coming years, 43 33,171 treaty. Russian officials have also ac- the threat of a Kazakhstan 1 135 knowledged that, while dismantlement "brain drain" of Korea 9 7,220 costs may be substantial, they will be skilled scientists or Lithuania 2 2,760 exceeded in the long term by savings the leaking of sen- Mexico 1 654 from reduced operations and support sitive materials will Netherlands 2 507 costs.26 become all the 1 125 more acute and Russia 25 19,799 The Status of Civilian Nuclear Power will require ex- Slovakia 4 1,632 The future of the civilian nuclear treme vigilance. Slovenia 1 620 power industry was dealt a severe blow This is especially South Africa 2 1,840 by the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and true in the former Spain 9 7,110 public concern over the safety of nuclear Soviet Union Sweden 12 10,002 power continues to be significant. Ad- where the distribu- Switzerland 5 2,936 ditionally, assessments of the feasibil- tion of both mili- 6 4,884 ity of new projects are increasingly tak- tary and civilian Ukraine 14 12,095 ing into account a number of hidden nuclear facilities United Kingdom 35 11,950 costs, such as the disposal of radioac- across 15 succes- United States 108 98,214 tive waste and the decommissioning of sor states poses older plants. Unless significant strides real problems for Total 415 328,308 can be made over the next few years effective technical regarding plant safety and materials dis- and material con- Source: "World List of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News (September 1993), posal, the nuclear power industry is trol.29 pp. 43-62. likely to decline or, at best, hold steady The precarious

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 37 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

THRESHOLD AND ASPIRING STATES

Region Country Comment Middle East/ Algeria Possibly interested in weapons development, but currently lacks facilities; has agreed to IAEA inspection of formerly secret, Chinese supplied ; not party to the NPT.

Iran Reportedly pursuing nuclear weapons, but little public evidence of progress; CIA testimony estimated production unlikely before the end of the decade without foreign assistance.

Iraq Massive program uncovered after Gulf War; U.N. has required destruction of most infrastructure, but knowledgeable personnel still in country.

Israel Widely believed to have a clandestine nuclear arsenal of approximately 100 weapons; ample delivery capability (both ballistic missile and aircraft).

South Asia India Exploded nuclear device in 1974; probably has sufficient materials for several weapons.

Pakistan Undoubtedly has nuclear weapons program, probably successful; U.S. President no longer certifies to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device, suggest ing high likelihood that it does.

Korean North Korea Suspicious reactor and reprocessing laboratory; submitted to some IAEA inspections in 1992 and 1993, but refused others; on March 12, 1993, denied IAEA access to suspected reprocessing waste sites and declared its intention to withdraw from NPT (since rescinded).

Latin America Argentina In agreement with Brazil, seems to have ceased weapons program; no disclosure of progress towards weapons, but suspected of having developed clandestine enrichment plant.

Brazil In agreement with Argentina, has apparently ceased weapons program; in 1987, re vealed it had developed the ability to enrich uranium. (Brazil has also had a nuclear power submarine program requiring highly fuel.)

Africa South Africa Widely suspected to be very near nuclear-weapons capability, South Africa declared in March 1993 that it had in fact constructed six nuclear weapons, but dismantled them in 1990. The South African president promised that South Africa would cooper ate fully with the IAEA to assure the world that it was complying with the NPT, which it joined in 1991, placing declared weapons-grade uranium under IAEA inspection and presumably dropping nuclear weapon ambitions.

Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), p. 64 (with some changes made by the authors).

38 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

An example of this is the continued op- plant may also go against U.S. inter- partially transformed into plutonium. eration of the Ignalina nuclear power ests. In a recent letter to members of The spent fuel rods must then be repro- plant in Lithuania. Consisting of two Congress, U.S. President Bill Clinton cessed to extract plutonium through a RBMK, or "Chernobyl-type," reactors characterized continued production of series of chemical processing steps. the plant supplies 85 percent of the plutonium, even for civilian purposes, Despite the declassification of informa- country's electricity needs in addition as "not justified on either economic or tion about both these procedures in the to exporting half of its output to neigh- grounds, and its accu- United States and France as early as boring Latvia, Belarus, and Russia's mulation creates serious proliferation the 1950s, they are still complex proce- Kaliningrad region. Shutting down the and security dangers."31 Germany is dures that few nations have been able plant is impossible. Yet, continued op- also in the throes of a serious debate to undertake without external assis- eration, absent even the most basic concerning the future of its nuclear tance.34 Western safety provisions, and with se- power program. The cost of developing a nuclear rious structural deficiencies, is all the weapons capability, choosing either the more unthinkable. Fortunately, Swe- HEU or plutonium route, can be pro- den has heeded the concerns of the The Problem of Aspiring and Threshold hibitive. The cost of an enrichment plant's management and its own citi- States plant (for HEU production) can vary zens and has paid SKr70 million ($8.4 Despite the consensus of major pow- widely depending on the separation million) to date, and will contribute an- ers on the need to curtail the spread of method chosen and the size and extent other SKr53.2 million ($6.4 million) weapons of mass destruction, includ- of separation work undertaken. As an in 1994, to improve reactor safety and ing acknowledgement by the U.N. Se- example, by the end of 1984, the total train workers. The Swedes, however, curity Council that "the proliferation of investment in plant and capital for all anticipate a shutdown of the plant in all weapons of mass destruction consti- three U.S. plants was eight to 10 years and consider such mea- tutes a threat to international peace and $3.86 billion (an average of $1.28 bil- sures only a stopgap. Security is an- security,"32 several states continue to lion each).35 Plutonium production in- other problem at Ignalina. In the sum- harbor undeclared nuclear weapons pro- cludes the cost of reactor construction mer of 1993, a seven-meter-long spent grams or aspire to such a capability. and maintenance, as well as construc- fuel shell, full of radioactive material, The process of acquiring a nuclear tion and maintenance of a reprocessing disappeared from the plant. Yet, in spite weapon capability, and of ensuring its facility. At a bare minimum, produc- of all these concerns, plant director safety, security, and survivability is no tion of enough plutonium for two weap- Viktor Shevaldin asserts that the plant small task -- even for those states with ons annually (10 kilograms), would re- will remain open another 30 years.30 the requisite financial, technical, and quire between $75 and $100 million in Even in relatively economically stable material resources. It is generally ac- capital costs alone. To obtain enough countries, the growing environmental knowledged that designing a nuclear for 10 to 20 weapons annually would costs and safety concerns associated weapon is well within the capabilities require up to $1 billion and some 50 to with reactor operation are fueling a of most states. However, it is the pro- 75 engineers and 150 to 200 skilled tech- battle over nuclear energy's future. In cess of acquiring the nicians.36 Moreover, if such a program England, the dispute centers on the for the weapon's core that poses the were developed in secret, the costs Thorp reprocessing plant whose future, greatest challenge. Acquisition of ei- would skyrocket. Iraq, for example, and that of additional new reactors in ther HEU or plutonium requires the spent about $10 billion for the construc- the United Kingdom, is currently un- construction and operation of expensive tion of complex and redundant facili- der government review. The trouble and highly complex facilities. To pro- ties in pursuit of multiple uranium en- with Thorp is that it is planned to pro- duce HEU for example, natural uranium richment technologies, before its efforts duce about 60 metric tons of plutonium must be mined, milled, and enriched to were interrupted.37 for customers in Switzerland and Japan a concentration of 90 percent or more The costs, however, do not stop there. over the next decade at a time when U235 (natural uranium contains less than Unless a state is merely trying to de- there is a glut of plutonium on the world one percent U235).33 Plutonium acqui- velop a one-shot, very crude terror market and growing concern over di- sition requires the existence of a nuclear weapon, provision must be made for the version to terrorists or rogue govern- reactor, through which natural or low- safety, security, survivability and com- ments. A decision to go ahead with the enriched uranium can be burned and mand and control of a state's nuclear

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 39 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance force in order to render it an effective ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: WHERE (art. X.2 of the NPT) -- the latter is deterrent. Add to this the development DO WE GO FROM HERE? most likely to occur given the current of an advanced, dedicated delivery sys- balance of opinion. However, if sig- tem, and the costs far exceed most coun- Given the foregoing problems and nificant debate and disruption of the pro- tries' capacity for investment. What- prospects concerning the state of nuclear cess are to be avoided, a package of ever the exact costs, it is fairly safe to disarmament and the production of ci- concessions may be necessary to allay say that an effective nuclear weapons vilian nuclear power, a host of policy the concerns of many non-nuclear weap- development program is beyond the choices must be made to channel con- ons states. Such a package might in- scope of what most aspiring states can cerns into positive developments. The clude security assurances to non-nuclear afford to spend given the needs of their following constitutes a partial list of po- weapon states, revamping of the safe- civilian population. In addition to the tential policy choices and outcomes to guards system, and further disarmament material costs of nuclear weapons, a be faced by the international commu- commitments on the part of nuclear country would have to devote its best nity in the decades ahead. weapon states. human and technical assets, which oftentimes can scarcely be afforded. A World of Many Nuclear Powers Transparency in Armaments Despite the high financial and tech- While no state, not even a potential The suggestion has been put forward nical barriers to proliferation, a hand- proliferant, has argued for the unim- that the current U.N. Register of Con- ful of states continue to harbor a clan- peded spread of nuclear weapons, some ventional Arms be expanded to include destine nuclear weapons program or are have argued forcibly for "managed pro- weapons of mass destruction, or at the widely believed to be actively seeking liferation" of nuclear weapons in the very least that a parallel register be es- one. Concern about states' acquiring hopes of stabilizing certain regions of tablished to track the status of such nuclear weapons is focused on three conflict.38 However, the acceptance of weapons. Such an approach is consis- regions: the Middle East and North a nuclear weapons capability in Ger- tent with the goal of the Register to pre- Africa, South Asia, and the Korean many, Japan, and Ukraine (to name but vent "excessive and destabilizing accu- Peninsula. Aside from the five acknowl- a few suggestions) is not likely to be mulations" of arms. However, such an edged nuclear powers (the United States, welcomed by all relevant parties and approach, within the context of the cur- Russia, France, Britain and China) and could erode the growing, but fragile, rent Register, is likely to meet with sub- the three non-Russian former Soviet consensus towards nonproliferation stantial resistance from nuclear weap- republics that still have nuclear weap- norms and adherence to the NPT. ons states, and it could jeopardize the ons on their territory (Belarus, gains made to date in making the trade Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), only three The 1995 NPT Review Conference and in conventional weapons more transpar- states are believed to either possess Indefinite Extension ent. nuclear weapons or have the ability to Of the three different options avail- The Argentinean delegation to the deploy them on short notice (Israel, able for extension of the NPT treaty in Conference on Disarmament (CD) in India, and Pakistan). At least four coun- 1995 -- a single fixed period, additional Geneva proposed a more likely ap- tries are suspected of aspiring to nuclear fixed periods, or an indefinite period proach, the development of a "nuclear weapons status (Algeria, , Iraq, and North Korea). Three other states ap- pear to have halted or reversed an ear- ESTIMATES OF CIVIL AND MILITARY INVENTORIES OF PLUTONIUM AND lier decision to pursue weapons devel- HEU opment (Argentina, Brazil, and South end of 1990 (in metric tons) Africa). Two other states, Syria and , are feared to have nuclear ambi- Civil inventory Military inventory Total tions but lack the resources to mount a credible threat. Plutonium 654 257 911 HEU 20 1,310 1,330

Source: , Frans Berkhout and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 197.

40 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance logbook" to track nuclear weapons hold- Integrated and Comprehensive Arms Financial Times, November 12, 1993, p. 5. ings and the pace of reductions. The Control and Disarmament Regime 2 See Lewis A. Dunn, "New Nuclear Threats to U.S. Security," in Robert D. Blackwill and proposal has earned a great deal of sup- Though undeniably the most desir- Albert Carnesale, eds., New Nuclear Nations: port from influential members of the able outcome, an all-inclusive regime Consequences for U.S. Policy (New York: developing world represented at the CD. may not be entirely practicable. Al- Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. though states may pursue nuclear weap- 25. 3 A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ons in response to not only accumula- U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Despite the recent test by China, tions of other types of weapons of mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 progress towards a CTB treaty appears destruction, but also accumulations of (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing more likely in light of the continuing conventional weapons by an adversary, Office, August 1993), p. 17. Hereafter referred moratoria by the United States, the agreement to control acquisition of the to as "OTA, Proliferation of Weapons." 4 About 400 W-88 warheads have been United Kingdom, France, and Russia. entire spectrum of weapons of mass produced. See Dunbar Lockwood and Jon B. Negotiations are scheduled to begin in destruction and conventional arms may Wolfsthal, "Nuclear weapon developments and January 1994 at the CD in Geneva. prove divisive. While a general con- proliferation," in SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Given the support (however reluctant) sensus exists against the further acqui- Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford of the five acknowledged nuclear sition of nuclear, chemical, and biologi- University Press, 1993), p. 223. 5 A process which started in October 1991. weapon states for a CTB treaty, the cal weapons, no such consensus holds 6 SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and treaty is likely to garner even greater regarding conventional weapons, which Disarmament (New York: Oxford University support in the developing world. De- are seen (within limits) as the inherent Press, 1993), p. 225. spite the great political significance of right of states to acquire in ensuring 7 Lockwood and Wolfsthal, op. cit., p. 228. 8 David White, "Britain to drop project for new such an agreement, it will likely have their own security. £3bn N-missile," Financial Times, October 16, little or no effect upon actual arms con- In the euphoria following the end of 1993. trol and disarmament efforts. Those the Cold War, what was expected to 9 John W. Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic aspiring to nuclear status are unlikely appear was a comprehensive collective Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, to sign, and those who have conducted security regime based on the United Na- Goals," International Security, 17 (Fall 1992), p. 29. substantial testing can effect significant tions. Confronted with the reality of 10 IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994 modernization or development short of divergent national interests, however, (London: Brassey's, 1993), p. 15. a large-scale test. such a regime has failed to emerge. 11 David White, "China defies Clinton with What is more likely to develop is a co- underground nuclear test," Financial Times, October 6, 1993. International Plutonium Storage operative security regime premised on 12 Mitterrand reinforced this statement in the Discussions regarding the establish- five principle elements: a strong nor- wake of the Chinese test in saying that, if ment of an international plutonium stor- mative base, inclusiveness and nondis- "countries other than China" resumed testing, age capability began in the 1970s and crimination, transparency, regime man- France would have to follow suit. See David have recently gained renewed vigor agement, and well-defined sanctions or Buchan, "Mitterrand risks Paris split on N- weapons tests," Financial Times, October 7, 41 given fears over the long-term security other coercive measures. Such a re- 1993. of stockpiles created as gime would foster increased reductions 13 The Conference on Disarmament, at its 659th a result of the disarmament process in in armaments and curtail the incentives plenary meeting of August 10, 1992, gave its the former Soviet Union. Storage of to acquire them through reassurance of Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear materials would be the first step in the participants' security. While this pa- test ban treaty. See Report of the Conference process of a verified cut-off of produc- per has shown that certain of these ele- on Disarmament, U.N. General Assembly tion of fissile materials39 and their trans- ments are well-developed in the case of document A/48/27, September 23, 1993. fer from military to non-military appli- nuclear weapons (e.g. a strong norma- 14 Some questions continue to surround actual cations. Materials would be stored ei- tive base), others such as nondiscrimi- Soviet compliance, however, which were buttressed by the Czech government's discovery ther in internationally or nationally nation, transparency, and sanctions will of a cache of 24 SS-23 missiles in mid-1992. monitored sites under strict scrutiny.40 need further development for a truly co- Soviet troops apparently left them behind (after Such a facility would also serve to allay operative security regime to evolve. removing the nuclear warheads) when they fears regarding the ultimate intentions withdrew from Czechoslovakia. See "Missing the Missiles," U.S. News & World Report, July of, for example, Japan's breeder reac- 6, 1992, p. 26. 1 John Barham, "Argentina to sign N-treaty," tor program. 15 See the Protocol to Facilitate the

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 41 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance

Implementation of the START Treaty (Lisbon 35 Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, Protocol), May 23, 1993, art. V. Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. General 16 For a complete listing of both U.S. and FSU Assembly document A/45/373, July 6, 1990, reductions under the terms of the START I and para. 246. II treaties, see IISS, The Military Balance 1993- 36 Ibid., para. 244. 1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 235-236. 37 OTA, Proliferation of Weapons, pp. 33, 72. 17 See Dunbar Lockwood, "Nuclear arms 38 See especially Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread control," in SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International University Press, 1993), p. 555. Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1981) and 18 OTA, Proliferation of Weapons, p. 17. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: 19 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Instability in Europe after the Cold War," Assessment, Dismantling the Bomb and International Security 15 (Summer 1991). Managing the Nuclear Materials, OTA-O-572 39 The United States ceased production of (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing plutonium in 1988 and HEU for nuclear weapons Office, September 1993), p. 2. Hereafter in 1964. referred to as "OTA, Dismantling the Bomb." 40 Helen Leigh-Phippard, "The Physical 20 David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Protection of Nuclear Material," in Darryl Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Howlett and John Simpson, eds. Nuclear Non- Highly Enriched Uranium 1992 (New York: Proliferation: A Reference Handbook (Essex: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 207. Longman Group, 1992), p. 61. 21 OTA, Dismantling the Bomb, p. 23. 41 Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, 22 Matthew Bunn of the National Academy of "Cooperative Security Regime Architecture -- Sciences, conversation with author, November Elements and Principles," unpublished paper, 4, 1993. July 30, 1992. 23 OTA, Dismantling the Bomb, p. 45. 24 William J. Broad, "Russia Says Soviet Atom Arsenal Was Larger Than West Estimated," New York Times, September 26, 1993, pp. 1, 7. 25 Bunn conversation, loc. cit. 26 Lockwood, op. cit., p. 560. 27 Darryl Howlett, "The Current Status of Nuclear Power," in Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, eds., Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A Reference Handbook, (Essex: Longman Group, 1992), p. 79. 28 "World List of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News (September 1993), pp. 43-62. 29 For a complete list of these facilities, see William C. Potter, Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States (Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1993). 30 Matthew Kaminski, "Lithuania's pressure cooker," Financial Times, November 10, 1993, p. 12. 31 George Graham, "Clinton stiffens stance on plutonium," Financial Times, November 10, 1993, pp. 1, 16. 32 From the statement adopted by the Security Council at its first ever summit meeting at the level of heads of state or government, held January 31, 1992. U.N. Security Council document S/23500. 33 A variety of methods exist for enriching uranium, including the use of gas technology, laser , and aerodynamic separation techniques. See OTA, Proliferation of Weapons, pp. 35-36. 34 Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), p. 450.

42 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994