Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: CONSEQUENCES FOR DEVELOPMENT* by Joseph DiChiaro III and Dr. Edward J. Laurance Joseph DiChiaro III is Senior Research Associate of the Program for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS). Dr. Edward J. Laurance is Professor of International Policy Studies and Associate Director of the Program for Nonproliferation Studies at MIIS and author of The International Arms Trade (1992). he end of the Cold War and the norms can prove a boon, rather than a tual conclusion of a Comprehensive Test conduct and termination of the burden, to national economies. Ban (CTB) treaty. TGulf conflict ushered in the - Extensive linkages between nuclear - Despite the steep costs associated promise of a substantially changed and and non-nuclear proliferation and dis- with dismantling and safe storage of more stable international environment. armament point to the need for a more nuclear weapons retired as a result of With such a promise also came the hope comprehensive approach in order to ef- either unilateral initiatives or bilateral of a substantial diversion of resources fect mutually beneficial and lasting or multilateral disarmament agreements, away from military expenditure and into change. the long-term savings accrued could be human development. Unfortunately, the - While unilateral initiatives, and substantial if the materials released by hope for a peace dividend to be used provisions of the INF, START I, and this process are adequately controlled. for the reinvigoration of the world's START II treaties call for the reduction - The precarious state of civilian economy, by fostering unprecedented of over 20,000 warheads from the arse- nuclear power worldwide may compli- growth and development, has given way nals of nuclear weapons states, they cate efforts at controlling the spread of to a more sober view reflecting the high make no provision for the ultimate dis- fissile materials. costs inherent in dramatic systemic position of the fissile materials released - Despite the high financial and tech- change. as a result of this process. nical barriers to proliferation, a hand- Focusing on the process of nuclear - Although potentially dramatic, the ful of states continue to harbor clan- disarmament and the efforts to control reductions envisioned in the START I destine nuclear weapons programs or the spread of nuclear weapons technolo- and II treaties have yet to result in the are widely believed to be actively seek- gies, this paper seeks to highlight the dismantlement of a single warhead. ing one. This may bar further reduc- shortcomings that have to date prevented - Although lessening the immediate the anticipated cost savings and diver- threat of nuclear conflagration, these * This manuscript was originally prepared sion of resources to human develop- agreements fail to address the long-term for the United Nations Development ment. To summarize, the most impor- environmental and security threats Programme's Human Development Report tant findings of this report include: posed by inadequate storage or the po- 1994 and is intended as a brief summary of - The current export control regime tential dispersal of fissile materials to the current (as of November 1993) nonproliferation landscape and its relation is inadequate and discriminatory over unintended parties. to human development. The authors wish the long-run. Legitimate security con- - Continuing moratoria on the part to thank Inge Kaul and Saras Menon of cerns must be addressed before lasting of the United States, Britain, France, UNDP for commissioning and allowing the reductions can be achieved. and Russia bode well for a suspension reprinting of this report, and Cynthia Miller - Adherence to nonproliferation of the nuclear arms race and the even- for her editorial assistance. The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 27 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance tions by the nuclear weapons states and relies almost exclusively on export con- adequacy of the current effort. Even in stall disarmament efforts. trols to deter the spread of nuclear traditionally non-proliferant countries, - Whatever the exact costs, it is fairly weapon technology. Such reliance is the ability to enforce export controls, safe to say that an effective nuclear inadequate in the long-run as it fails to whether they be stringent or lax, can- weapon development program is beyond address the underlying motivations for not always be assumed. the scope of what most aspiring states weapons acquisition. Export controls can afford to spend given the needs of in the nuclear field are designed to limit The North-South Question their civilian population. the spread of key nuclear weapon com- Closely related to the issue of export - Finally, indefinite extension of the ponents and, thus, to make it difficult controls is the policy option of levying Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for a state to achieve a nuclear capabil- sanctions against perceived proliferant appears likely as do prospects for a CTB ity. However, a great deal of coordina- activity. Developing states constantly and International Plutonium Storage tion among supplier states is required charge that such sanctions and controls (IPS) facility. While these may not halt to achieve effective control. Despite the serve to stifle their development by de- proliferation, they will serve to further lessons of the Gulf War, full coordina- nying them access to technologies vital isolate non-adherents, highlight deviant tion of export control policies is still to their development of a modern activity, and enhance international se- lacking. To effect lasting change, a de- economy. Certainly, many technologies, curity in such a way as to open the door termined attempt must be made to as- such as advanced computing and ma- towards substantive and lasting devel- sure the security of states at the lowest chine tool technologies, have both opment. possible level of armaments by provid- weapon development and peaceful uses. Despite an inauspicious start, substan- ing them a stable and predictable envi- However, there is a growing consen- tial diversion of resources from the mili- ronment within which to act. This will sus among developing countries that, tary to civilian sector could be realized require concerted effort on the part of far from being a hindrance to develop- if the current consensus favoring fur- developed as well as developing nations. ment, cooperation with the nonprolif- ther reductions and prohibitions against While export controls cannot, in and eration regime and adherence to inter- further acquisitions hold. of themselves, eliminate the threat of national norms can prove a boost to a proliferation of nuclear weapons, they country's technological advancement. can raise the price and time required Most recently Argentina, which had pre- ONGOING CONCERNS for a would-be proliferant to develop a viously considered the 1967 Tlatelolco nuclear weapons capability. In the wake Treaty discriminatory against develop- A variety of issues confronts the in- of the Gulf War, many states unilater- ing countries' nuclear programs, rati- ternational community faced with alle- ally tightened up their national export fied the treaty, and plans to join the viating the dangers posed by the spread control laws, and many multilateral ef- NPT.1 of nuclear weapons while dealing with forts were undertaken to prevent another Such a change of heart can be attrib- the amassed arsenals of the current Iraq. One example of a multilateral ef- uted not only to the substantial economic nuclear weapons states. Among the key fort was the mandate given to the U.N. incentives being offered to regime-com- issues are: the adequacy of the existing Special Commission on Iraq pliant states, but also to the growing nonproliferation regime based mainly (UNSCOM) to dismantle and indefi- awareness that the major powers are on a system of export controls; the con- nitely monitor Iraq's weapons of mass making good faith efforts to reduce their tinuing North-South divide and the non- destruction capability. Another was the arsenals and provide access to advanced proliferation regime's effect on devel- series of discussions initiated in July technologies to those states which ad- opment; the complex relationship be- 1991 among the permanent five mem- here to basic nonproliferation norms. tween nuclear and non-nuclear prolif- bers of the U.N. Security Council (P-5 Additionally, both the industrialized and eration and disarmament; and the dura- talks) to fashion some form of restraint developing worlds no longer perceive bility of the emerging consensus against on destabilizing arms transfers to the nuclear energy as an economic and safe the further acquisition or use of weap- Middle East. However, the ambiguity source of electricity. Thus, the argu- ons of mass destruction. surrounding China's proliferation policy ment that sanctions stifle growth con- and the economic and political uncer- tinues to shed adherents. Adequacy of Export Controls tainty in the former Soviet republics The current nonproliferation regime leave substantial questions about the 28 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance Nuclear and Non-nuclear Proliferation robust nuclear force rather than divert both promise and predicament for the Extensive linkages between nuclear scarce hard currency to conventional future reduction of nuclear arsenals and non-nuclear