Report
Independent Review of All Lane Running Motorways in England
Sarah Simpson
Client: Hyland
Reference: PC1023-RHD-ZZ-XX-RP-Z-0010 Status: Final/P02.00 Date: 29 March 2021
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HASKONINGDHV UK LTD.
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Document title: Independent Review of All Lane Running Motorways in England
Document short title: Independent Review of ALR Reference: PC1023-RHD-ZZ-XX-RP-Z-0010 Status: P02.00/Final Date: 29 March 2021 Project name: PC1023 ALR Project number: PC1023 Author(s): Sarah Simpson
Drafted by: Sarah Simpson
Checked by:
Date: 29 March 2021
Approved by:
Date:
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Unless otherwise agreed with the Client, no part of this document may be reproduced or made public or used for any purpose other than that for which the document was produced. HaskoningDHV UK Ltd. accepts no responsibility or liability whatsoever for this document other than towards the Client.Please note: this document contains personal data of employees of HaskoningDHV UK Ltd.. Before publication or any other way of disclosing, this report needs to be anonymized.
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Table of Contents
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms vi
Smart Motorways Timeline (England) ix
Core Documents x
Executive Summary 1
1 Introduction and Scope of Evidence 4 1.2 Context 5 1.3 Report Scope 5
2 Methodology 7
Part 1 - Considering Intrinsic Safety in All Lane Running Motorways 9
3 The Safe Systems or Sustainable Safety Approach 10 3.2 Sustainable Safety (the Netherlands) 10 3.3 Vision Zero (Sweden) 12 3.4 Safe Systems (Australia) 14
4 British Approach to Road Safety 16 4.2 Transport Select Committee (2008) 16 4.3 Strategic Framework for Road Safety (2011) 17 4.4 Working Together to Build a Safer Road System (2015) 18 4.5 Review of how Highways England Prioritises Investments to Improve Safety Outcomes (2020) 18 4.6 Interpretation 20
5 Design Guidance and Standards 22 5.2 IAN 111/08 Dynamic Use of Hard Shoulder (2008) 22 5.3 IAN 112/08 Through Junction Hard Shoulder Running (2008) 24 5.4 IAN 111/09 Hard Shoulder Running 25 5.5 Managed Motorways Operational Guidance v.2.0 (2010) 29 5.6 Managed Motorways – Dynamic Hard Shoulder (MM-DHS) Concept of Operations v.3.0 (2012) 32 5.7 CHE Memorandum 276/11 Managed Motorway Requirements (2011) 33 5.8 IAN 161/12 All Lane Running (2012) 35 5.9 IAN 161/13 Managed Motorways All Lane Running (2013) 38 5.10 IAN 161/15 Smart Motorways (2015) 40
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5.11 Managed Motorways All Lane Running Concept of Operations v.2.0 (2013) 43 5.12 Smart Motorways Concept of Operations v.3.0 (2016) 45 5.13 GD 301 Smart Motorways 46 5.14 GD 302 Smart Motorways: Upgrading Hard Shoulder Running to All Lane Running Operation 52 5.15 TD 131 Roadside Technology and Communications 52 5.16 Smart Motorways (All Lane Running and Hard Shoulder Running) Initial Incident Response National Operating Agreement (2017) 53
6 Highways England Guidance Relating to the Consideration of Road Safety 55 6.2 IAN 139/11 Managed Motorways Project Safety Risk Work Instructions (2011) 55 6.3 IAN 191/16 Safety Guidance for Highways England (2016) 60 6.4 GD04/12 Standard for Safety Risk Assessment on the Strategic Road Network (2012) 61 6.5 Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running Demonstration of Meeting Safety Objective Report (2012) 63 6.6 Smart Motorways All Lane Running Generic Safety Report (2015) 67 6.7 Smart Motorways All Lane Running GD04 Assessment Report (2015) 69 6.8 Smart Motorways Controlled Motorways Generic Safety Report (2015) 73 6.9 GG 104 Requirements for Safety Risk Assessment (2018) 74
7 Managed Motorways Trials and Studies 76 7.2 M42 Active Traffic Management Pilot Assessment Strategy (2002) 76 7.3 Advanced Motorway Signalling and Traffic Management Feasibility Study (2008) 79 7.4 Future Managed Motorways Concept Development Task 1: Design Comparison Simulator Study 83 7.5 Future Managed Motorways Concept Development Task 2: Design Assurance Simulator Study (2012) 84 7.6 Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running Evaluation of the Provision of Refuge Areas (2012) 86 7.7 Stationary Vehicle Detection (SVD) Monitoring Study report (2016) 87
8 Smart Motorway Safety Reviews 93 8.2 M42 MM Monitoring and Evaluation Three Year Safety Review 93 8.3 Smart Motorway All Lane Running M25 J5-7 Monitoring Third Year Report (2018) 97 8.4 Smart Motorway All Lane Running Overarching Safety Report 2019 99
9 Perception of Smart Motorways 106 9.2 SM-ALR Monitoring M25 J23-27 Twelve Month Evaluation Report (2016) 106
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9.3 Transport Select Committee 108 9.4 Smart Motorways Research (2017) 111 9.5 Transport Focus 113 9.6 All Lane Running Inquiry (2020) 114 9.7 Green Flag & Brake Reports on Safe Driving: Motorway Driving 115
10 Regulations and Guidance to Drivers 117 10.2 The Road Traffic Act 1988 117 10.3 The Highway Code for England, Scotland and Wales 117
11 Smart Motorways Beyond the UK 120 11.2 The Netherlands 120 11.3 Germany 121 11.4 Australia 122 11.5 Road Safety Outcomes in International Smart Motorways 125
12 Interpretation on the Intrinsic Level of Safety in All Lane Running 129 12.2 The M42 Pilot 130 12.3 ALR Design Development 130 12.4 Risk Assessment Methodologies 134 12.5 Public Perception 135 12.6 Driver Behaviour 136 12.7 Compliance 138 12.8 Conclusion 139
Part 2 – Considering the Appropriateness of Consultation 142
13 Managed Motorways in Policy 143 13.2 New Deal for Transport (1998) 143 13.3 Transport Ten Year Plan 2000 143 13.4 The Eddington Transport Study: The Case for Action (2006) 144 13.5 National Infrastructure Plan (2011) 145 13.6 National Policy Statement for National Networks (2014) 145 13.7 Road Investment Strategy for the 2015/16 - 2019/20 Road Period (2015) 146 13.8 Highways England Strategic Business Plan 2015 – 2020 148 13.9 Highways England Delivery Plan 2018 – 2019 148 13.10 Highways England Delivery Plan 2019 – 2020 150 13.11 Road Investment Strategy 2: 2020 – 2025 151
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14 All Lane Running Scheme Consultation Processes 153 14.2 Legislative Context 153 14.3 Consultation Principles 154
15 ALR Managed Motorway Consultation Case Study 159 15.2 M1 J28 – J35a Consultation Documents 159 15.3 M1 J28 – J35a Scope of Consultation 162 15.4 M1 J28 – J35a Consultation Response Pro Forma 162 15.5 M1 J28 – J35a Summary of Consultation Responses 163 15.6 Interpretation of the M1 Junctions 28 – 35: Managed Motorways Consultation 164
16 Comparison of Consultation Processes 167 16.2 A1(M) Junctions 6 to 8 Consultation Document 167 16.3 Interpretation of the A1(M) Junctions 6 to 8 Smart Motorway Consultation 169 16.4 The Variable Mandatory Speed Limits Regulations 170 16.5 Considerations Relating to Public Expectations of Consultation 170 16.6 Consideration of Adequacy of Consultation 172
17 Interpretation on the Appropriateness of Consultation 173
Part 3 – The Decision to Continue ALR Implementation 177
18 Smart Motorway Safety, Evidence Stocktake and Action Plan (2020) 178 18.1 Stocktake Review 178 18.2 Royal HaskoningDHV Safety Review of ALR Smart Motorway 186
19 Conclusions on the Decision to Continue ALR Implementation 190
20 The New Context for Smart Motorways 193
21 Conclusion to the Report 196 21.2 Intrinsic Safety 196 21.3 Consultation 198 21.4 On Continued Implementation of ALR 199 21.5 The New Context 200
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Table of Tables
Table 4.1 Comparison of Traditional and Safe System Approach to Road Safety 20 Table 5.1 Key Differences between IAN 111/09 and IAN 161/12 Compliant Schemes 38 Table 5.2 GD 301 Table E/2.6 Safety Indicators 46 Table 5.3 Summary Table Identifying Key Components of Managed Motorway Design Guidance Documents 49 Table 6.1 Classifying Project Features 56 Table 6.2 Summary of Type B and Type C Project Safety Risk Management Activities 58 Table 6.3 Change in risk score for high risk hazards which may relate to live lane breakdowns 72 Table 7.1 Changes in ERA Design 87 Table 7.2 SVD Alert Classification Matrix 88 Table 8.1 Summary of Live Lane Breakdown Collisions and Collision Rates 103 Table 12.1 Comparison of CD 109 Compliant D3AP and D3M Design Criteria 132 Table 14.1 Criteria for Consultation Established in UK Government Code of Practice on Consultation Documents 154 Table 14.2 Summary of UK Government’s Consultation Principles Documents 157 Table 15.1 Summary of M1 J28 – 35a Consultation Process 159 Table 18.1 Comparison of Casualty and Fatality Rates 2015 – 2018 by Motorway Type 178 Table 18.2 Comparing Before and After Average Collision Rates for Places of Relative Safety 179 Table 18.3 Summary of Annual Average Live Lane Collisions in First Nine ALR Schemes 180 Table 18.4 Average Annual Number and Percentage of Breakdown Incidents on all Motorways Types 2017 – 2018 181 Table 18.5 Summary from All Lane Running Stocktake Review 182 Table 18.6 Summary of M1 Collision Data 1st March 2017 to 28 February 2020 189
Table of Figures
Figure 15.1 M1 J28 – J35a Stated Consultation Principles 160
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
Term Definition
Accident Rate Number of personal injury collisions per billion vehicle miles travelled (bvmt)
ADS Advanced Direction Sign.
All Lane Running. These systems do not provide a traditional hard shoulder, instead providing a motorway environment of permanent running lanes, ALR supplemented with emergency refuge areas and variable mandatory speed limits.
Advanced Motorway Indicators are signs which display the variable speed limits AMI on gantries above running lanes.
APTR All Purpose Trunk Road.
Active Traffic Management. Using variable signage to manage traffic, as distinct ATM from traditional static signage.
Basic Controlled Motorway. Identified in 2008 as a potential form of upgrade to a BCM traditional motorway, using MIDAS and AMI but will less frequent spacing of gantries and therefore not enabling full dynamic management of traffic.
BCR Benefit Cost Ratio.
CCTV Closed Circuit Television.
Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 superseded by the CDM 2015 Regulations.
Controlled Motorway. The earliest form of motorway to use active traffic CM management, this uses variable mandatory speed limits and MIDAS to adjust traffic flows.
A smart motorway which includes the permanent conversion of a hard shoulder to a running lane but includes technology and emergency area provision aligned Controlled all lane running to a hard shoulder running scheme. Commonly combined with hard shoulder running corridor of motorway.
CORE Candidate Operating Regimes. The scenarios tested in the M42 Pilot.
Core Responders Organisations involved in responding to incidents on the network.
Certificate of Professional Competence. Mandatory qualification for professional CPC drivers.
Dynamic Hard Shoulder Running, also referred to as Hard Shoulder Running. When the hard shoulder is opened as a running lane on the motorway DHS periodically to respond to traffic conditions. The lane is retained as a hard shoulder at all other times.
DMRB Design Manual for Roads and Bridges.
Emergency Refuge Areas. These short lay-by-type arrangements are provided ERA off the running lanes on Smart Motorway sections. They have associated advanced signage and include an emergency roadside telephone.
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Term Definition
Emergency Roadside Telephone. These are provided within the hard shoulder ERT on a traditional motorway, and in ERAs on a Smart Motorway.
Fatal and Weighted Injury. Being (number of fatalities) + 0.1 x (number of serious FWI casualties) + 0.01 x (number of slight casualties)
Globally at Least Equivalent. The means of balancing safety risk from composite GALE hazards on projects which are not safety related.
Highways Agency. Responsible for the strategic road network, i.e. the road HA network for which the Secretary of State is the traffic authority.
Highways Agency Digital Enforcement Camera System. The system developed HADECS by the Highways Agency to enforce variable speed limits. The system is linked to the AMI which display the speed limits.
Highways England. New organisation naming for the former Highways Agency. HE Responsible for the strategic road network, i.e. the road network for which the Secretary of State is the traffic authority.
HGV Heavy Goods Vehicle.
HMVM Hundred Million Vehicle Miles.
HOV High Occupancy Vehicle. A vehicle with two or more occupants.
HSE Health and Safety Executive
IAN Interim Advice Note.
Intelligent Transport Systems. A catch all term for technology used in the road ITS environment to inform and/control users. The term is also used to refer to in- vehicle technology which controls or informs.
KSI Killed or Seriously Injured
Lane Below Signal. The standardised approach to referring to lanes on DHS LBS schemes. LBS1 is the nearside lane, regardless of whether it is operating as a hard shoulder or running lane, on a DHS scheme.
Link Length of road between junctions.
LRU Local Road Users.
Motorway Incident Detection and Automatic Signalling. This system uses inductive loops in the road to detect slow moving or queuing vehicles. MIDAS is MIDAS linked to variable message signs on the motorway to display signals and legends to protect the back of the queue from secondary collisions.
Managed Motorway. A non-traditional form of motorway which incorporates MM active traffic management. Forms of managed motorway in the UK include Controlled Motorways, Dynamic Hard Shoulder, and All Lane Running.
Alternative acronym for ALR, used by the Highways Agency and Highways MM ALR England.
Alternative acronym for DHS, used by the Highways Agency and Highways MM HSR England.
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Term Definition
Message signs which display text, signals and signs to drivers. They can be set MS4 automatically or manually by operators.
NLRU Non-Local Road Users.
NPS National Policy Statement for National Networks.
PIC Personal Injury Collision
Place of Relative Safety. A place which is considered to be appropriate for a PRS vehicle to stop in an emergency/ breakdown comprising ERA, motorway service areas, hard shoulder sections.
Pan Tilt Zoom CCTV enables operators to adjust the visible image feed on PTZ CCTV CCTV.
The use of traffic signals on a motorway’s on-slip to regulate traffic flows joining Ramp Metering the mainline.
Regional Control Centre. The Highways England network is divided into regions, RCC each of which is controlled operationally by its RCC.
Road Infrastructure Strategy. Government document setting out the vision for RIS strategic roads from 2015.
Semi-Automatic Control System – the means by which operators are led through SCS a process to open the hard shoulder.
Severity Index Ratio of fatal and serious casualties or collisions to all casualties or collisions
SMS Safety Management System.
Strategic Road Network. The roads for which the Highways Agency/ Highways SRN England.
STATS19 Collision data recorded by the Police.
Stationary Vehicle Detection. Technology developed for smart motorway SVD environments.
SWOV Dutch Institute for Road Safety.
TJR Through Junction Running.
TOS Traffic Officer Service.
TSRGD Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions.
Temporary Traffic Management. The traffic signs and signals used temporarily to TTM manage traffic during roadworks.
VMS Variable Message Sign.
Variable Mandatory Speed Limits. The use of temporary adjustments to VMSL mandatory speed limits on the running lanes. These speed limits are enforceable.
VPH Vehicles per Hour.
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Smart Motorways Timeline (England)
Year Scheme Type
1995 First VMSL Scheme M25 J10-15
2002 First Controlled Motorway Scheme M25 J15-16
M42 J3A-71 Pilot Scheme for Active Traffic Management with Variable Mandatory Speed November 2005 Limits
September 2006 M42 J3A-7 Pilot of DHS operations commenced
May 2008 IAN 111/08 published. First design guidance relating to Dynamic Hard Shoulder running
First permanent Dynamic Hard Shoulder Running motorway schemes opened on M6 J4- July 2009 J5, M40 J16 – M42 J3A (northbound), and M42 J3A (eastbound).
November 2009 IAN 111/09 published revising design guidance for Dynamic Hard Shoulder running
2011 CHE Memorandum 276/11 first mandate for All Lane Running.
2012 IAN 161/12 published. First design guidance relating to All Lane Running.
2013 IAN 161/13 published revising design guidance for All Lane Running.
M25 J5-6/7 first All Lane Running Scheme, of which J5 – J6 became ALR and J6 – J7 2014 was converted to CM with a hard shoulder retained.
2015 IAN 161/15 published revising design guidance for All Lane Running.
March 2020 Smart Motorways Evidence Stocktake and Action Plan published.
October 2020 GD 301 published revision design guidance for All Lane Running.
1 Road Traffic Technology, (undated). M42 Active Traffic Management Scheme, Birmingham.
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Core Documents
Policy, Legislation and Governmental Proceedings 1 APPG for Roadside Rescue and Recovery, (2020). All Lane Running Inquiry 2 Cabinet Office, (2000). Code of Practice on Written Consultation 3 Cabinet Office, (2004). Code of Practice on Consultation 4 Cabinet Office, (2012). Consultation Principles. Available at: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130704005431/https://www.gov.uk/government/public ations/consultation-principles-guidance 5 Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, (2008). Code of Practice on Consultation 6 Department for Transport, (1998). A New Deal for Transport: Better for everyone 7 Department for Transport, (2000). Transport Ten Year Plan 2000. 8 Department for Transport, (2011). Strategic Framework for Road Safety. 9 Department for Transport, (2014). National Policy Statement for National Networks 10 Department for Transport, (2015). Road Investment Strategy: for the 2015/16 – 2019/20 road period. 11 Department for Transport, (2015). Working Together to Build a Safer Road System British Road Safety Statement. 12 Department for Transport, (2017). Shaping the Future of England’s Strategic Roads: Consultation on Highways England’s Initial Report 13 Department for Transport, (2018). Shaping the Future of England’s Strategic Roads: Summary of Consultation Responses. 14 Department for Transport, (2019). The Highway Code 15 Department for Transport, (2020). Road Investment Strategy 2: 2020 – 2025. 16 Department for Transport, (2020). Smart Motorway Safety Evidence Stocktake and Action Plan. 17 Explanatory Memorandum The M1 Motorway (Junctions 28 to 35a) (Variable Speed Limits) Regulations 2015 (2015 No. 1701). 18 Highways England, (2015). Highways England Delivery Plan 2015 – 2020. 19 Highways England, (2015). Road Investment Strategy for 2015/16 – 2019/20 Road Period 20 Highways England, (2015). Strategic Business Plan 2015 – 2020. 21 Highways England, (2017). Connecting the Country Planning for the long term 22 Highways England, (2017). Strategic Road Network Initial Report. 23 Highways England, (2018). Highways England Delivery Plan 2018 – 2019. 24 Highways England, (2019). Highways England Delivery Plan 2019 – 2020. 25 HM Government, (2013). Consultation Principles. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2 55180/Consultation-Principles-Oct-2013.pdf
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26 HM Government, (2016). Consultation Principles. Available at: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160811143903/https://www.gov.uk/government/uploa ds/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492132/20160111_Consultation_principles_final.pdf 27 HM Government, (2018). Consultation Principles: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6 91383/Consultation_Principles__1_.pdf 28 HM Treasury, (2011). National Infrastructure Plan 29 HM Treasury and the Department of Transport, (2006). The Eddington Transport Study: The case for action. 30 House of Commons Transport Committee, (2008). Ending the Scandal of Complacency: Road Safety beyond 2010, Eleventh Report of Session 2007-08. 31 House of Commons Transport Committee, (2016a). All Lane Running: Government Response Fifth Report of Session 2016-17 32 House of Commons Transport Committee, (2016b). All Lane Running Second Report of Session 2016-17 33 National Audit Office, (2011). National Audit Office briefing for the Transport Select Committee: Effective road and traffic management. 34 Road Traffic, The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002. (2002 No. 3113) 35 Royal HaskoningDHV, (2021). Verbatim Transcript – Parliament Live Transport Committee – Responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Transport 3 February 2021. 36 The Road Traffic Act 1988 (c.50). 37 Transport Committee, (undated). All Lane Running Inquiry – Publications. https://old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport- committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry/publications/ (Accessed 27 November 2020) 38 UK Parliament, (2016) All Lane Running the government response https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmtrans/654/65403.htm#_idTextAnchor00 7
UK Design Standards and Guidance 39 Highways Agency, (2008). IAN 111/08 Managed Motorway Implementation Guidance Dynamic Use of the Hard Shoulder. 40 Highways Agency, (2008). IAN 112/08 Managed Motorway Implementation Guidance Through Junction Hard Shoulder Running. 41 Highways Agency, (2009). IAN 111/09 Managed Motorways Implementation Guidance Hard shoulder running. 42 Highways Agency, (2010). Managed Motorways Operational Guidance Version 2.0. 43 Highways Agency, (2011). CHE Memorandum 276/11 Managed Motorway Requirements. 44 Highway Agency, (2011). IAN 131/11 Managed Motorways Project Safety Risk Work Instructions. 45 Highways Agency, (2011). IAN 139/11 Managed Motorways Project Safety Risk Work Instructions. 46 Highways Agency, (2012). GD 04/12 Standard for Safety Risk Assessment on the Strategic Road Network.
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47 Highways Agency, (2012). IAN 161/12 Managed Motorways All lane running. 48 Highways Agency, (2012). IAN 167/12 Guidance for the Removal of Road Lighting. 49 Highways Agency, (2012). Managed Motorways – All lanes running Demonstration of Meeting Safety Objective Report version 1.0. 50 Highways Agency, (2012). Managed Motorways – Dynamic Hard Shoulder Running (MM-DHS) Concept of Operations (to accompany IAN 111/09) version 3.0. 51 Highways Agency, (2013). IAN 161/13 Managed Motorways All lane running. 52 Highways Agency, (2013). Managed Motorways All lane running Concept of Operations (to accompany IAN 161/13) v2.0. 53 Highways Agency, (2013). Managed Motorways Purpose Factsheet 1. 54 Highways England, (2015). IAN 161/15 Smart Motorways. 55 Highways England, (2015). Smart Motorways all lane running GD04 assessment report. 56 Highways England, (2015). Smart Motorways all lane running Generic safety report. 57 Highways England, (2015). National Safety Control Review Group and Project Safety Control Review Group: NSCRG and PSCRG Remit for Organisation and Governance. 58 Highways England, (2015). Smart Motorways: Controlled motorways Generic safety report. 59 Highways England, (2016). IAN 131/11 Safety Governance for Highways England. 60 Highways England, (2016). IAN 191/16 Safety Governance for Highways England. 61 Highways England, (2016). Smart Motorways Concept of Operations (to accompany IAN 161/15). 62 Highways England, (2016). Stationary Vehicle Detection System (SVD) Monitoring. 63 Highways England, (2017). Smart Motorways (all lane running and hard shoulder running) Initial Incident Response Emergency Services and Highways England National Operating Agreement. 64 Highways England, (2018). GG 104 Requirements for safety risk assessment. 65 Highways England, (2020). CD 109 Highway Link Design, Design Manual for Roads and Bridges 66 Highways England, (2020). GD 301 Smart Motorways. 67 Highways England, (2020). GD 302 Smart Motorways: Upgrading hard shoulder running to all lane running operation. 68 Highways England, (2020). TD 131 Roadside technology and communications. 69 The Stationary Office, (2008). Traffic Signs Manual Chapter 3 Regulatory Signs.
English Smart Motorway Scheme Documents 70 Highways Agency, (2005). Active Traffic Management M42 Junction 3A to 7 (HA23/05). 71 Highways Agency, (2011). M42 MM Monitoring and Evaluation Three Year Safety Review. 72 Highways Agency, (2012). M1 J32 to J35a Managed Motorway Consultation Document. 73 Highways Agency, (2013). M1 J31 to J32 Variable Mandatory Speed Limits. 74 Highways Agency, (2014). M1 J28 to J31 Managed Motorway Consultation Document.
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75 Highways Agency, (2015). M1 J28 to 31 Smart Motorway M1 Junctions 31 to 32 Variable Mandatory Speed Limits M1 Junctions 32 to 35a Smart Motorway Summary of Consultation Responses. 76 Highways England, (2015). M6 Junction 16 to 19 Smart Motorway All Lane Running Scheme Consultation document for statutory instrument. 77 Highways England, (2016). SM-ALR Monitoring M25 J23-27 Twelve Month Evaluation Report. 78 Highways England, (2018). Smart Motorway All Lane Running M25 J5-7 Monitoring Third Year Report. 79 Highways England, (2018). Smart Motorways Programme M20 J3-5 Smart Motorway: Response to Statutory Instrument Consultation The Introduction of variable mandatory speed limits. 80 Highways England, (2018). Smart Motorways Programme M62 Junction 10-12 Smart Motorway Statutory Instrument Consultation Document The introduction of variable mandatory speed limits. 81 Highways England, (2019). Smart Motorway All Lane Running Overarching Safety Report 2019. 82 Highways England, (2019). Smart Motorways Programme A1(M) Junctions 6 to 8 Smart Motorway Statutory Instrument Consultation The introduction of variable mandatory speed limits.
Other Governmental Documents 83 Department for Transport, (2008). Advanced motorway signalling and traffic management feasibility study. 84 Department for Transport, (2017). Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain: quarterly provisional estimates year ending June 2017. 85 Department for Transport, (2019). Accidents by Severity since 1979 (DfT Dataset RAS10013) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/9 22505/ras10013.ods (Accessed 3 February 2021) 86 Department for Transport, (2019). Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain: provisional estimates year ending June 2019. 87 Gov.uk (undated). Information about Highways England Traffic Officer Services and Free Recovery through Roadworks, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/highways-england/about-our- services (Accessed 15 September 2020) 88 Gov.uk, (undated). What Qualification Levels Mean. https://www.gov.uk/what-different-qualification- levels-mean/list-of-qualification-levels (accessed 27 November 2020) 89 Gov.uk, (2020). Run a Driver CPC Training Course https://www.gov.uk/guidance/run-a-driver-cpc- training-course (Accessed 27 November 2020) 90 Highways England, (undated) About our Services. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/highways-england/about-our-services (Accessed 17 November 2020) 91 Highways England, (2017). M271 Redbridge Roundabout Public Consultation Report. 92 Highways England, (2019) A303 Stonehenge – non-statutory consultation. https://highwaysengland.citizenspace.com/cip/a303-stonehenge/ (Accessed 24 April 2020) 93 Highways England, (2020). A66 Northern Trans-Pennine project. https://highwaysengland.citizenspace.com/cip/a66-northern-trans-pennine/ (Accessed 7 December 2020)
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94 Office of National Statistics, (2019). Overview of the UK Population: August 2019. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimate s/articles/overviewoftheukpopulation/august2019 (Accessed 28 November 2020) 95 Road Safety Foundation for the Office of Rail and Road, (2020). Review of how Highways England Prioritises Investments to Improve Road Safety Outcomes.
Smart Motorways Trials and Research 96 Brake, (2020). Green Flag & Brake Reports on Safe Driving: Motorway driving. 97 Highways Agency and Transport Research Laboratory, (2002). Assessment Strategy for the Active Traffic Management Pilot. 98 Highways Agency, (2012). Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running Evaluation of the Provision of Refuge Areas. 99 Illuminas for Transport Focus, (2017). Smart Motorways Research. 100 Road Safety Observatory, (2017). Motorways Research Synthesis 101 Transport Focus, (2017). Getting to the Heart of Smart: Road user experiences of smart motorways. 102 Transport Research Laboratory and Highways Agency, (2002). Assessment Strategy for the Active Traffic Management Pilot. 103 Transport Research Laboratory, (2012). Future Managed Motorways Concept Development Task 1: Design Comparison Simulator Study. 104 Transport Research Laboratory, (2012). Future Managed Motorways Concept Development Task 2: Design Assurance Simulator Study. 105 Transport Research Laboratory, (2012). Future Managed Motorways Concept Development Task 3: Synthesis of Evidence.
Other Research and Datasets 106 Choi, J., Tay, R., Kim, S., Jeong, S., Kim, J. & Heo, T. (2019). Safety Effects of Freeway Hard Shoulder Running, Applied Sciences 9(17). 107 Department for Transport, (2019). August 2019 GB Driving Licence Data. http://data.dft.gov.uk/driving-licence-data/Driving-Licence-data-%20August%202019.xlsx Accessed 28 November 2020 108 International Transport Forum, (2010). Road Safety 2010. 109 International Transport Forum, (2011). Road Safety Annual Report 2011. 110 International Transport Forum, (2013). Road Safety Annual Report 2013. 111 International Transport Forum, (2014). Road Safety Annual Report 2014. 112 International Transport Forum, (2015). Road Safety Annual Report 2015. 113 International Transport Forum, (2020). Road Safety Annual Report 2020. 114 Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and Effort. Prentice-Hall. 115 Marsden, G., Anable, J., Docherty, I. and Brown, L. (2021). At a crossroads: Travel adaptations during Covid-19 restrictions and where next?. Centre for Research into Energy Demand Solutions.
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116 OECD and International Transport Forum, (2008). Towards Zero: Ambitious road safety targets and the Safe System approach. 117 YouGov, (2020). Most Workers Want to Work from Home after Covid-19 https://yougov.co.uk/topics/economy/articles-reports/2020/09/22/most-workers-want-work-home- after-covid-19 (Accessed 25 February 2021)
Local Highway Authority Documents 118 Bristol City Council, (undated). A4018 consultation: report on the results. https://democracy.bristol.gov.uk/documents/s32720/190618%20Appendix%20B%20- %20consultation%20results%20report.pdf (Accessed 24 April 2020) 119 Norfolk County Council, (undated). About Consultation. https://www.norfolk.gov.uk/roads-and- transport/major-projects-and-improvement-plans/great-yarmouth/third-river-crossing/your-questions- answered/consultation (Accessed 24 April 2020) 120 Transport for London, (undated). Consultation & Surveys. https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/how- we-work/planning-for-the-future/consultations-and-surveys (Accessed 24 April 2020)
International Highways Documents 121 Austroads, (undated). Traffic Management Training, https://austroads.com.au/network- operations/traffic-management/traffic-management-training (Accessed 2 February 2021) 122 Austroads, (2016). Guide to Smart Motorways. 123 Austroads, (2016). Safe System Assessment Framework. 124 Austroads, (2018). Research Report AP-R570-18 Benefits of Safety and Traffic Management Technologies. 125 CEDR Working Group Traffic and Network Management, (2018). Hard Shoulder Running Fact Sheet 126 Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, (2015). Road safety programme 2011 127 Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, (2016). The 2030 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan. 128 Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development, (2012). ITS Action Plan for the Roads. 129 Infrastructure Australia, (2009). Australian Infrastructure Audit 2009. 130 Infrastructure Australia, (2011) 2010-2011 Project Assessment Brief. 131 Project Information System (PRINS) (undated). On the Federal Transport Route Plan 2030 (A 63 AS Klein-Winternheim – AS Saulheim, https://www.bvwp-projekte.de/strasse/A63-G10-RP/A63- G10-RP.html#h1_uebersicht (Accessed 01 February 2021) 132 Rijkswaterstaat Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, (2017). Ontwerp en Inrichting Spitsstroken. 133 Royal HaskoningDHV, (2021). Approximate Translation Differentiation of Road Safety Rush-Hour Lanes. 134 Swedish Transport Administration, (2018). Analysis of Road Safety Trends 2018, Management by objectives for road safety work towards the 2020 interim targets. 135 Swedish Transport Administration, (2019). Action Plan for Safe Road Traffic 2019 – 2022.
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136 SWOV, (undated). Road Deaths in The Netherlands https://www.swov.nl/feiten- cijfers/factsheet/verkeersdoden-nederland (Accessed 1 February 2021) 137 SWOV, (2006). Advancing Sustainable Safety, National Road Safety Outlook for 2005-2020. 138 SWOV, (2018). Sustainable Safety 3rd Edition – The advanced vision for 2018-2030. 139 Trafikverket, (2018). Digital Short Course in Vision Zero, http://public.elogin.se/visionzero/story_html5.html (Accessed 3 February 2021) 140 Trafikverket, (2020). Management by Objectives, https://www.trafikverket.se/en/startpage/operations/Operations-road/vision-zero- academy/management-by-objectives/ (Accessed 3 February 2021) 141 Trafikverket, (2020). Origin and Background Vision Zero, https://www.trafikverket.se/en/startpage/operations/Operations-road/vision-zero- academy/Background-Vision-Zero/ (Accessed 3 February 2021) 142 Trafikverket, (2020). This is Vision Zero, https://www.trafikverket.se/en/startpage/operations/Operations-road/vision-zero-academy/This-is- Vision-Zero/ (Accessed 2 February 2021) 143 Transport and Infrastructure Council, (2016). National Transport Technology Action Plan (2016- 2019). 144 U.S. Department of Transportation, (2017). Efficient Use of Highway Capacity Summary Report to Congress https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop10023/chap4.htm (Accessed 15 November 2020) 145 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration Office of Operations (HOP), (2010). Efficient Use of Highway Capacity Summary. 146 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, (2011). Freeway Geometric Design for Active Traffic Management in Europe.
Media 147 Auto Express, (2019). UK Electric Cars will Require Twice the World’s Supply of Cobalt. https://www.autoexpress.co.uk/car-news/107058/uk-electric-cars-will-require-twice-the-world-s- supply-of-cobalt 148 Auto Express, (2020). Road Bosses Approve 138 miles of new smart motorway with no hard shoulder. https://www.autoexpress.co.uk/news/107769/road-bosses-approve-138-miles-new-smart- motorway-no-hard-shoulder (accessed 17 November 2020) 149 Easyway, (undated). Temporary Hard Shoulder Running A 63 in Germany. https://www.its- platform.eu/sites/default/files/EW2_HL_TSF_A63_011_eng.pdf#:~:text=In%202002%20temporary% 20hard%20shoulder%20running%20(HSR)%20has,2011.%20It%20has%20replaced%20a%20per manent%20HSR%20scheme. (Accessed 22 January 2021) 150 Highways Magazine, (2021). Exclusive: Errors in report cast doubt on smart motorway safety system. https://www.highwaysmagazine.co.uk/Exclusive-Errors-in-report-cast-doubt-on-smart- motorway-safety-system/8925 (Accessed 26 March 2021). 151 ITS International, (2013). Traffic monitoring and hard shoulder running. https://www.itsinternational.com/its4/feature/traffic-monitoring-and-hard-shoulder-running (Accessed 16 January 2021)
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152 Logistics UK, (undated) Driver CPC – Smart Motorways. https://logistics.org.uk/training/driver- certificate-of-professional-competence-cpc/classroom-face-to-face-driver-cpc-courses/smart- motorways#:~:text=Smart%20motorways%20are%20a%20technology,use%20of%20the%20hard% 20shoulder (Accessed 26 February 2021). 153 New Civil Engineer (2021), Highways England may face manslaughter charges over smart motorway death https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/highways-england-may-face- manslaughter-charges-over-smart-motorway-death-05-01-2021/ (Accessed 25 February 2021) 154 The Consultation Institute, (2019). Smart Motorways – has there been enough consultation? https://www.consultationinstitute.org/smart-motorways-has-there-been-enough-consultation/ (Accessed 24 April 2020) 155 Transport Focus, (undated). About our goals. https://www.transportfocus.org.uk/about/our-goals/ (Accessed 29 November 2020) 156 Transport Futures Institute, (2010). Smart motorway management: what is happening with traffic in Australia? https://transportfutures.institute/smart-motorway-management-what-is-happening-with- traffic-in-australia/ (Accessed 2 February 2021)
Correspondence 157 CrashStats Support, Department for Transport (Victoria), (2021). email to Simpson, S. 2 February 2021 158 Minister of State for Transport to Chair, (2017). Letter to Transport Select Committee. 10 February 2017 159 Transport Focus, (2019). Letter to Secretary of State for Transport. 4 November 2019, 160 Department for Transport, (2010). Letter to Transport Focus. 11 November 2019 161 Transport Focus, (2020). Letter to Secretary of State for Transport. Dated 11 January 2020
Other 162 Campaign for Better Transport, (2017). Rising to the Challenge A shared green vision for RIS2. 163 Coroner Area of South Yorkshire West, (2021). Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths. 164 R. v. Szuba 2020, Sheffield Crown Court Proceedings (2020). 165 Road Traffic Technology, (undated). M42 Active Traffic Management Scheme Birmingham. https://www.roadtraffic-technology.com/projects/m42/ (Accessed 24 February 2021) 166 Royal HaskoningDHV, (2020). Review of All Lane Running Smart Motorway: M1 Junction 28 to Junction 31 and Junction 32 to Junction 35a. 167 TRICS, (2021). Guidance Note on the Practical Implementation of the Decide and Provide Approach.
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Executive Summary
In June 2019, a road collision occurred on the M1 All Lane Running (ALR) smart motorway in South Yorkshire, in which two people died; Mr Mercer and Mr Murgeanu. The solicitors for Mr Mercer’s niece have instructed me to prepare a report to review the design development and implementation of smart motorways. I have conducted my review on the basis of an extensive literature review to evidence my answers to three questions.
What is the level of intrinsic safety in ALR smart motorways?
I am in no doubt that the ALR smart motorway has the lowest level of intrinsic safety of any form of motorway. It is my view that this is due to best practice in road safety, known as the Safe Systems approach, having not been adopted or fully implemented by Highways England (formerly the Highways Agency) in considering the implementation of smart motorways.
The Safe Systems approach focuses on eliminating and reducing the most deadly of hazards, with the specific aim of reducing the numbers of people who are killed or sustain life-changing, serious injuries on the road system. Unlike the traditional approach to road safety, Safe Systems accept that people are fallible with physical vulnerabilities, and that human error occurs. As well as the safety of ‘compliant’ road users, it therefore aims to ensure that people using the road transport system do not die or are seriously injured as a consequence of an unwise decision.
Despite the Transport Select Committee identifying Safe Systems as warranting proper exploration for adoption as long ago as 2008, this approach was adopted by Highways England only in 2015. More recently, in 2020 a report for the Office of Rail and Road found significant shortfalls in the way that Highways England have implemented Safe Systems. This latter report also found that improvement schemes are consistently identified on the basis of capacity and not on the basis of improving safety. This characteristic aligns with the ‘value engineering’ approach used to compromise safety in order to secure cost savings in developing the ALR motorway format. As a result, ALR presents a controlled environment by design, which can give people the impression that they are safe, even when they are not.
I have found that a traditional approach to road safety has been taken throughout smart motorways’ design development, with a mathematical balance being sought across all risks. In practical terms, the risk of being in a live lane breakdown increases by 216 percent in an ALR scheme over and above the level of risk for the same hazard on a standard motorway. However, instead of addressing this risk in physical design terms, the risk assessment approach has used the reduced risks associated with other elements of ALR to mathematically offset this risk. It is unfortunate that this approach has persisted, despite the findings of multiple Transport Select Committee and All-Party Parliamentary Group inquiries which have repeatedly raised substantive concerns relating to road safety in smart motorways.
Thus the dialogue and debate regarding smart motorways is ill-informed and overly reliant on a reduced numbers of slight collisions resulting from using variable mandatory speed limits (VMSL) being used to offset, what is in multiple cases, an increase in serious or fatal collisions. This offset is embedded in the safety objective for ALR which, unlike that for Controlled Motorways, has until very recently required only that the ALR road is no worse in safety terms than its predecessor road. This mathematical risk management approach accords with the traditional approach and contrasts with the Safe Systems focus on eliminating serious injury or death.
It is clear from the data that people are more likely to be involved in the most dangerous of hazards on ALR schemes: a live lane incident. When this happens, people are more likely to die or be seriously
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injured as a result. There is abundant evidence to show that the real world implications of this approach to risk assessment have been understood by Highways England for some time. However, I have found that decisions made in developing design criteria for smart motorways have consistently weakened and compromised their intrinsic level of safety, and have removed prompts for designers to consider how people could foreseeable behave in on these roads. As a result, as has been acknowledged by Highways England, some people have died in collisions which could have been avoided.
How adequate have the consultation processes associated with smart motorways been?
There is a long-established, codified practice of public consultation to inform decision making large and small. Given that local highway authorities frequently consult on new bus stops, and Highways England consults on major changes, such as the A303 at Stonehenge, it is my opinion that the public reasonably expects meaningful consultation for proposals which materially change the transport infrastructure they use. Based on my reading, aside from the M42 pilot and despite the need for strong public engagement being identified in 2009, this has not been provided in relation to smart motorways.
Consultation typically takes place either in establishing a policy or strategic basis for a measure, or at scheme stage in developing the proposed design. For this reason, I have reviewed how smart motorways have been dealt with at both strategic and scheme level.
The policy basis for smart motorways was established as early as 2000, with reports including the Eddington report developing the concept incrementally in national roads strategies. I can find no evidence of public or stakeholder engagement on the matter of smart motorways until the RIS2 consultation in 2019 some ten years following the opening of the first permanent smart motorway schemes. I have concerns with the quality of information provided in the RIS2 consultation regarding smart motorways, and subsequently the ability of respondents to make an informed response.
The provision of incomplete information thereby rendering respondents ill-informed is, in my view, a characteristic of consultation processes at scheme level also. It is clearly the case that Highways England have taken the view that non-statutory consultation is not required for smart motorways. This is because all the individual parts of the design are already in Highways England’s remit to deliver as they are established in relevant regulations and legislation. The use of VMSL however, must be consulted upon as they require a separate Statutory Instrument to be implemented, and therefore the consultation that I have reviewed has been carried out only to progress the VMSL.
How sound is the decision to continue to implement ALR smart motorways?
In considering this question, I am struck by the paucity of data and analysis underpinning the decision. The evidence provided in the 2020 Smart Motorways Evidence Stocktake is partial and does not enable direct comparison of the various forms of smart motorway. It is also telling that ALR is subject to most analysis, with controlled motorway and dynamic hard shoulder (DHS) dealt with in a somewhat peripheral manner. As a result, the decision to continue with the type of smart motorway which is associated with the highest rate of people killed or seriously injured is not justified.
The Action Plan which is set out in the same report is also unqualified, with little discussion on how the changes in the plan are envisaged to reduce the impact of the most dangerous hazards. For example, the spacings of emergency refuge areas is again amended, but with no explanation for the decision and not reduced to a spacing equivalent to that provided in schemes internationally. In addition, the Stocktake does not take present the risks and imperfections associated with the ALR stationary vehicle and queue detection technologies and is therefore silent on any changes to design criteria to resolve these risks.
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Even with the identified changes implemented, I am led to conclude that the infrastructure associated with ALR in the UK will still have less provision associated with safety compared with the same infrastructure in other countries which have adopted Safe Systems, such as Australia. It is also notable that the UK’s decision runs counter to similar reviews in the Netherlands and Germany, which both recognise the importance of the hard shoulder and use DHS systems as a temporary measure.
The Stocktake presents the decision to continue with ALR as a means to resolve driver confusion resulting from having DHS and ALR smart motorways on the network. The simple fact is that a decision to implement DHS rather than ALR would also have resulted in the same reduction in confusion. However, it is my view that this perceived confusion is due, at least in part, to the number of changes to design criteria that have taken place for smart motorways. I can think of no other body of design guidance or standards which have been revised seven times in twelve years.
As a result of the quality of the analysis and the lack of explanation relating to the decision making, I find that the decision to continue to implement ALR is unsound. I am of the view that there is an over- emphasis on information campaigns to mitigate some of the most problematic elements of the ALR design, and there is no recognition that unless and until measures are retrofitted on the network, people using smart motorways will continue to be put at risk of death or serious injury.
The New Context
The development of smart motorways was in response to a perceived need to increase road capacity on the SRN using a ‘predict and provide’ model. By contrast, there has been a long-established understanding in the transport planning profession that building new roads can induce traffic and that, at some point, a shift to a ‘decide and provide’ model will be more appropriate.
Given the current safety levels of the existing smart motorways, as well as the limits on efficacy of the technology they rely on, I would submit that a ‘decide and provide’ approach is warranted now and that the changes in commuting travel patterns that are forecast over the coming years as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, will provide the rare opportunity to do so.
The development of smart motorway design standards and guidance was carried out over a period in which there were fewer governmental obligations in relation to Climate Change; the Safe Systems approach to road safety was not embedded in Highways England; there were no coroner verdicts relating to smart motorways; and the world was untouched by Covid. Given the wider context in which the English motorway network now operates it is my view that a fresh approach on the continued implementation of smart motorways would be timely and, as is evident, necessary to reduce avoidable road fatalities.
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1 Introduction and Scope of Evidence
1.1.1 My name is Sarah Simpson. I am Associate Group Director for Transport Planning at Royal HaskoningDHV, a multi-disciplinary engineering and environmental consultancy with its British headquarters in Peterborough. I have a Bachelor’s degree in Linguistics, a Master’s degree in Science and Engineering and am a Fellow of the Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation. I have been registered as a Chartered Engineer since 2009 and regularly act as reviewer for Chartered and Incorporated Engineer registrants.
1.1.2 I have 19 years’ experience in transport planning, the majority of which has been providing technical advice relating to new transport infrastructure. I have worked on major infrastructure projects in relation to English motorways, all purpose trunk roads, and principal roads in Yorkshire, Norfolk, and Greater London amongst others, and I have provided transport planning strategy, advice, and peer review for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. Most recently I have provided peer review in relation to transport matters for the AQUIND Interconnector project in Portsmouth.
1.1.3 My experience covers transport planning including for roads as well as walking and cycling infrastructure, consideration of human behaviour in our interaction with the built environment, and matters relating to road safety as they pertain to new developments and infrastructure projects’ planning strategy.
1.1.4 In recent years I have worked on many projects which have been required to specifically consider human safety and driver behaviour in relation to new or existing infrastructure. These include:
◼ Checker/ Approver of reports providing comprehensive road safety reviews of all Caledonian MacBrayne ferry terminals and slipways in the Scottish Highlands and Islands;
◼ Provision of expert opinion at Planning Appeal relating to the intrinsic level of safety associated with the existing highways infrastructure in a rural village in Suffolk; and
◼ Expert Witness at Planning Appeal on the consideration of conflict between user groups on a rural highway network as a result of a proposed Minerals and Waste Application in Hertfordshire.
1.1.5 In the past seven years I have acted as Expert Witness at various appeals and hearings relating to proposals predominantly across the East of England. These have included planning appeals by written representation, hearing and Public Inquiry. I have also provided expert opinion on transport planning matters to counsel for local government, and to court appointed Regulators and Administrators for infrastructure projects within the energy sector.
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1.2 Context
1.2.1 I received a request from Irwin Mitchell, for an expert report relating to smart motorways. Their client, Ms Eryn Hyland, is the niece of Jason Mercer who was killed on the M1 All Lane Running smart motorway close to Junction 34. He had been involved in a minor collision with another vehicle, driven by Mr Alexandru Murgeanu. Both drivers stopped to exchange details and during this time their vehicles were stopped in the nearside lane. Approximately six minutes later, an HGV collided with both Mr Mercer and Mr Murgeanu, killing them both. At this time, the overhead signals to close the lane had not been activated.
1.2.2 Ms Hyland’s solicitors have requested an expert report which provides an analysis of the decision by Highways England to implement and continue to operate the All Lane Running smart motorway system. In so doing, I have been requested to address the following areas of interest:
◼ Provide a forensic analysis of the intrinsic level of safety in the ALR system to include the consideration of the design in isolation and by way of comparison between different smart motorway schemes and with traditional motorway environments;
◼ Provide an opinion on the premise that a design standard has to be intrinsically safe;
◼ Set out my opinion on the policy, consultation, process and strategic level detail as to how All Lane Running smart motorways have been risk assessed and rolled out; and
◼ Consider such track record as may already exist of smart motorways in the UK and abroad including an analysis of what risk assessments and safety impact assessments have been carried out. Set out what I consider to be a reasonable level of assessments, testing and consultation in these circumstances.
1.2.3 In addition, I have been asked to review the continued implementation of smart motorways in the light of the changing context as the UK emerges from the Covid-19 pandemic.
1.3 Report Scope
1.3.1 In addressing these matters, I have consolidated the areas of interest into three main questions which I deal with in this report: 1. What is the intrinsic level of safety associated with the All Lane Running system including the relevant design standards? 2. How appropriate has consultation been in the implementation of All Lane Running motorways? 3. How sound is the decision by Highways England to implement and continue to operate All Lane Running?
1.3.2 In order to provide my view on the above questions, I must by necessity present an evidence base on which my opinion is drawn. Since 2002 a considerable body of
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information, guidance, research and design has been produced in relation to smart motorways. Much of this is publicly available, some is available in technical libraries held by organisations and businesses such as my own, and others are available only through Freedom of Information requests to relevant bodies. Nowhere does there exist a register or complete bibliography of these documents, nor is there a single point of reference in relation to smart motorways; their policy basis; rationale and development; their design and implementation; and the evidence for their continued use.
1.3.3 As a consequence, the majority of the work presented in my report comprises a literature review in which I indicate points of note, and provide interpretation and conclusions. It is these points which are drawn together and inform my opinion at key points highlighted at the end of each section, and in the overall conclusions towards the end of the report.
1.3.4 This report is divided into three parts. Following these preliminary sections which outline my methodology, the first part of this report addresses the question of intrinsic safety in smart motorway design and implementation. The second part of the report reviews how consultation processes associated with smart motorways have been carried out and the third part draws together my interpretation and conclusions relating to the continued implementation of smart motorways. In this last part I also consider the new context for smart motorways and present my overall conclusions to the report.
1.3.5 This review is as comprehensive in breadth as time and resources allow, reflecting the many areas of interest identified by Irwin Mitchell. This review therefore covers: policy; design development including the various trials, pilot studies and research that has been carried out; a review of the consultation processes associated with smart motorway schemes; the safety considerations and risk assessment; the implementation of smart motorways elsewhere in the world; and a review of literature relating to ‘compliant’ driver behaviour.
1.3.6 Consideration of the following detailed matters are specifically excluded from the scope of this evidence as being outside the bounds of my expertise: details pertaining to road safety auditing methodologies; detailed design of smart motorway infrastructure; the appropriateness of specific design criteria; Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015; and the technical appropriateness of the technologies associated with the smart motorway.
1.3.7 I confirm that I have made clear which facts and matters referred to in this report are within my own knowledge and which are not. Those that are within my own knowledge I confirm to be true. The opinions I have expressed represent my true and complete professional opinions on the matters to which they refer.
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2 Methodology
2.1.1 Managed motorways have had an evolving use in the United Kingdom’s strategic road network (SRN) since the first trial of a managed motorway system was carried out on the M42 in 2006. Since then, three forms of managed motorway have been implemented on the UK network:
◼ Controlled motorway (CM) – with three or more lanes, a hard shoulder and variable speed limits
◼ Dynamic hard shoulder running (DHS) – where the hard shoulder is temporarily opened as a live running lane;
◼ All Lane Running (referred to as ALR) – where the full width of the road is usable with the permanent removal of the hard shoulder and emergency refuge areas (ERA) provided at intervals; and
2.1.2 Over the lifetime of the smart motorways system, this type of road has been referred to by a variety of different names. In this report I use ‘managed motorway’ (or MM) and ‘smart motorway’ synonymously and variously depending on the period of time under consideration managed motorways terminology preceded that of smart motorways. Both terms refer to the form of motorway which incorporates variable mandatory speed limits (VMSL) and which includes CM, DHS, and ALR motorways.
2.1.3 The majority of this report comprises a literature review. This literature review has been conducted iteratively to ensure that gaps in literature are resolved through checking references and cross-references. All documents referred to in this report are listed in the Core Documents index at the front of this report as is a timeline of key events in the implementation of smart motorways.
2.1.4 In each section of the report, I provide interpretation including cross-referencing where it is useful in aiding understanding, and set out my view or conclusion as it relates to the matters presented. These individual observations have been drawn upon to develop my opinion which is provided throughout the report, and to respond to the three questions set out in Section 1.3.1.
2.1.5 My main areas of focus in this report are:
◼ Overarching safety principles;
◼ Evidence-led and data-led design development including associated risk assessment;
◼ Consideration of the component parts of smart motorway schemes only as they relate to the guidance or such that they indicate a design approach;
◼ Consultation processes associated with managed motorways policy and implementation;
◼ Public perception of smart motorways as reported by the public, the media and roads authority documents;
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◼ Driver behaviour, trends and hazard identification and mitigation as it relates to the identified trends;
◼ The rationale exhibited in the implementation and continued roll-out of smart motorway schemes;
◼ Comparison of examples within the UK and overseas to explore any intrinsic differences in approach which are relevant to the instructions; and
◼ The current situation for smart motorways in England, considering the Covid-19 pandemic and recent decisions including those relating to Climate Change.
2.1.6 Given the scope of work and density of material covered, I have endeavoured to present information salient to the scope, from all source materials, in an accessible way. Key findings and opinion is provided in summary form at the end of each section and where I cite or reference documents, the references are provided in the body of the text or parenthetically at the end of the relevant paragraph. Cross-references made to other material within this report are presented in bold type for clarity.
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Part 1 - Considering Intrinsic Safety in All Lane Running Motorways
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3 The Safe Systems or Sustainable Safety Approach
3.1.1 Historically, road safety aims in the UK have sought to address the worst collision sites (black spots) first, thereby creating a reactive approach to addressing road safety. This has gradually evolved into proactive programme and treatments based on identified collision risks. By contrast, since the mid-1990s an alternative systems’ based approach to road safety has been developed predominantly in the Netherlands and Sweden. The Sustainable Safety approach developed in the Netherlands, and Sweden’s Vision Zero, is predicated on the principal that people will make mistakes but that the system’s design should minimise the consequences in the event that an error occurs.
3.1.2 This approach, developed initially in Sweden and the Netherlands, has become known as the ‘Safe Systems’ approach. The use of Safe Systems has been recognised internationally as best practice in addressing road safety matters at least since 2008 when the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Transport Forum published their findings from a road safety working group which included road safety experts from 21 countries, the World Bank, the World Health Organisation and the FIA Foundation2.
3.1.3 Although Highways England (HE) adopted a Safe Systems approach to road safety in 2015 (see Section 4.4) this system is not yet embedded in the organisation’s approach to schemes as I discuss in Section 4.5. To understand the differences and commonalities between the Safe Systems approach and the traditional and current approach in the UK, this Section presents summary information relating to the Netherlands, Swedish, Australian, and UK systems.
3.2 Sustainable Safety (the Netherlands)
3.2.1 According to the Dutch Institute for Road Safety’s (known as SWOV) Advancing Sustainable Safety3 a sustainably safe road traffic system prevents road deaths, serious road injuries and permanent injury by systematically reducing the underlying risks of the entire traffic system. Road designs are therefore developed cognisant of human physical vulnerability as well as our cognitive limitations. This therefore relates to designs taking account of unintentional errors as well as people’s intentional violation of rules with the latter being taken into account through enforcement to a level where a “reasonable chance” of being caught is perceived. The guidance states that, “By tailoring the environment (e.g. the road or the vehicle) to human characteristics, and by preparing the road user for traffic tasks (by training and education), we can achieve an inherently safe road traffic system” (p.13).
3.2.2 In addition, the report notes that inherently Safe Systems prevent latent errors as far as possible, and generate an environment in which road safety depends as “little as possible on individual road user decisions” (ibid). The report also stresses that road
2 OECD and International Transport Forum, (2008). Towards Zero: Ambitious road safety targets and the Safe System approach. 3 SWOV, (2006). Advancing Sustainable Safety, National Road Safety Outlook for 2005-2020.
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users should not bear the full responsibility for safe road use, but that this is a responsibility shared by “those who are responsible for the design and operation of the various elements of the traffic system.”
3.2.3 The safe system approach was first established by SWOV’s Sustainable Safety in the 1990s and evolved in 2005 to identify five principles as essential for a sustainably safe transport system:
1. Functionality – roads have a single hierarchical function;
2. Homogeneity of mass or speed and direction – there should be equality in mass, speed and direction at medium and high speeds. In high speed locations, different users and directions of travel should be separated to reduce conflicts;
3. Predictability – the road environment and user behaviour supports user experience through consistency and continuity in design;
4. Forgiving – Injury is limited by a forgiving road environment and anticipation of road user behaviour. This also particularly includes the concept of forgiving hard shoulders relating to infrastructure within those areas;
5. Awareness – users are able to assess their own ability.
3.2.4 It is notable that Advancing Sustainable Safety also stresses that “traffic has to be sustainably safe for everybody, and not just for ‘the average road user’” (p.14). This is supported by the objectives and central issue of Safe Systems. The objectives of Safe Systems aim to prevent collisions and if that is not possible, to reduce the severity of collisions in a way that “severe” injury risk is almost excluded. Further, the central issue as noted in Advancing Sustainable Safety is that, “people, even if they are highly motivated to behave safely while using the road, make errors that may result in crashes” (p.28). Unless the design of the road environment is taken into account, it is acknowledged that ITS could mitigate some of the issues but errors can be “punished with severe outcomes” (p.48) i.e. that normal and foreseeable human error can result in serious injury or death.
3.2.5 These objectives and central issue defined above leads to the conclusion that, “infrastructure has to be designed such that it meets human capacities and limitations, that the vehicle supports the performance of traffic tasks and provides protection in the event of a crash, and that the road user is well informed and trained, and is controlled wherever necessary in the correct performance of the traffic task” (p.28).
3.2.6 The need for the driver to be well-informed means that sustainable safety deems driver education to be intrinsic to the provision of a safe system and therefore complementary to infrastructure rather than exclusive from it.
3.2.7 The principles of Sustainable Safety were refined further in the 2018 edition, to generate an aim of a “maximally safe traffic system” (p.8) whereby everything possible
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is done to achieve a road that is as intrinsically safe as possible, while recognising that some types of vehicles are less safe than others and some categories of user are more vulnerable. This latest evolution of the Sustainable Safety approach also separated the over-arching principles into three design principles and two organisational principles. The design principles relate to:
1. Functionality of roads
2. (Bio)mechanics – limiting differences in speed, direction, mass and size and affording appropriate protection to users;
3. “Psychologics” (p.4) – which align the design of the road with user competencies;
3.2.8 The organisational principles established comprise:
4. Responsibility is effectively allocated; and
5. Learning and innovating takes place within the transport system.
3.2.9 A notable change in the latest edition is the acknowledgement of organisational responsibility in creating Safe Systems. The principle of shared responsibility extends to the concept of adapting the system to the users, including those people who are involved in the development, implementation and management of those systems. Recognising the human limitations of designers and therefore taking ownership of enabling that essential learning goes some way, in my view, to establishing why Trafikverket (the Swedish Transport Administration)4 has a publicly available entry-level course on Vision Zero and Austroads includes Safe Systems in its publicly available traffic management short course5.
3.2.10 This shared responsibility is reinforced in the 3rd edition of Sustainable Safety by the duties placed on professionals to create maximally Safe Systems whereby the various elements of a system, “complement and reinforce each other, making it as fail-safe as possible. If one element in the system fails, it should be substituted or compensated for by other elements. This applies for unsafe situations – such as if a part breaks or temporarily malfunctions – as well as for human behaviour. It applies during the process of traffic participation as well as in the work processes of traffic professionals” (p.12).
3.3 Vision Zero (Sweden)
3.3.1 Vision Zero was presented for the first time in 1995 by the Swedish Road Administration, and established the concept that zero deaths in traffic is the only conceivable option6. This led to, in 1997, the Swedish Government determining that Vision Zero should form the basis of Swedish road safety work going forward. As a
4 Trafikverket, (2020). This is Vision Zero. 5 Austroads, (undated). Traffic Management Training. 6 Trafikverket, (2020). Origin and Background Vision Zero.
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result, Vision Zero has become a national long-term goal for road safety in Sweden.
3.3.2 The current position in Sweden in relation to Vision Zero is that safe roads are designed, operated and used on the basis of three principles: accidents should not lead to loss of life or serious health loss; human limitations should be taken into account; and safety is a shared responsibility. Specifically, “the basic starting point for Vision Zero is the ethical standpoint that no-one should be killed or suffer lifelong injury in road traffic”.
3.3.3 It is therefore less of a concern that collisions, in general, occur but whether those collisions lead to serious injury or death. Recognising that road transport is a system, Vision Zero states that it is “essential for the roads, and the vehicles they carry, to be adapted to match the capabilities of the people that use them” i.e. consideration must be paid to human capabilities and limitations, and in designing and operating these systems, designers, roads authorities, vehicle manufacturers and others share the responsibility for safety with users.
3.3.4 Vision Zero recognises that there are several factors which affect the severity of injury in a collision: the speed of impact and the degree of protection afforded to the road user. It stresses that in designing the road system, “the fundamental concern must be what force of impact the human body can be subjected to without becoming severely injured. That insight is simple, but crucial”7.
3.3.5 Vision Zero plans for the mistakes and accidents that will likely occur and, “adapt the system in consideration of people’s capabilities and limitations so that accidents don’t lead to fatalities or severe injuries.” This is in contrast to the traditional approach which seeks to eliminate human error or which assume a ‘compliant’ driver (see Section 5.8 for a UK example of this latter approach with respect to smart motorways). In R. v. Szuba8, sentencing remarks noted that “when an emergency arises, drivers in the heat of the moment do not react in exactly the way they would in ordinary circumstances. Sometimes unwise decisions are made due to stress and pressure” (p.3). In my view it is this human limitation in acting under pressure that the Safe Systems approach seeks particularly to respond to.
3.3.6 Following the Swedish Parliament’s decision in 1997 to adopt Vision Zero, road safety targets were set of halving the number of road fatalities per annum by 2007. This objective was not met, and an independent assessment was carried out to identify reasons underlying this failure. As a result, it was concluded that;
◼ “stakeholders, other than the Government and public authorities, with a potential to contribute to the objective were not involved in the development of the targets
◼ setting an objective on fatalities did not give enough guidance for taking effective measures
◼ the management of the road safety work had been unclear and insufficient
7 Trafikverket, (2018). Digital Short Course in Vision Zero. 8 R.v. Szuba 2020, Sentencing Remarks, Sheffield Crown Court, (2020).
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9 ◼ the monitoring and evaluation of the ongoing work had been inadequate” .
3.3.7 Consequently, in 2008 the Swedish Road Administration revised its approach to Vision Zero, which established management of road safety through the use of objectives and the development of a collaborative approach to address the preceding shortfalls. This objectives-led approach uses annual systematic reviews of collision data measured using road safety performance indicators. There are currently 11 performance indicators which cover fundamentals such as the proportion of traffic volume within speed limits on the national network, use of helmets, or rule compliance by motorcyclists10.
3.3.8 Interim targets are set for the number of KSI collisions and the road safety performance indicators and these are analysed each year. The analysis is presented at annual conferences to discuss and agree practical improvements to take forward.
3.3.9 The commitment to Vision Zero was reiterated by the Swedish Government in 2016. As a result, annual structured evaluations of road safety performance are to be carried out, and the country’s first action plan11 to support Vision Zero was published in 2018 to support this approach. This action plan seeks to save between 40 and 50 lives annually after 2022 as a result of measures identified. As part of this action plan, the Swedish Transport Administration is tasked with increasing global awareness of Vision Zero and therefore provides extensive information on its public-facing website.
3.4 Safe Systems (Australia)
3.4.1 The Australian Safe Systems approach is detailed in Austroad’s Safe System Assessment Framework12. This approach involves shared responsibility, between road users and road managers, in achieving a road system which eliminates death and serious injury. A key objective of the framework is to “ensure that when driver errors do occur, they do not result in high severity outcomes” (p.i.). The Framework has been developed as a result of the National Road Safety Strategy specifying that all new roads projects consider safe system principles. The Framework document provides a methodology to assess how closely design and operation align with the Safe Systems approach, with the intention to modify elements as necessary to generate closer alignment.
3.4.2 The Framework is to be applied to all project types and all stages including planning, design, operation, maintenance and use. The depth of the assessment to be carried out is differentiated, so that a high level assessment is appropriate at the planning stage, becoming more detailed in considering individual project components as a scheme progresses towards implementation and use.
3.4.3 The Framework sets out a risk assessment framework which includes consideration of
9 Trafikverket, (2020). Management by Objectives. 10 Swedish Transport Administration, (2018). Analysis of Road Safety Trends 2018, Management by objectives for road safety work towards the 2020 interim targets, 11 Swedish Transport Administration, (2019). Action Plan for Safe Road Traffic 2019 – 2022. 12 Austroads, (2016). Research Report AP-R509-16 Safe Systems Assessment Framework
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road user exposure, crash likelihood and crash severity. The report acknowledges that while exposure and severity are important factors in fatal and serious crash outcomes, the matter of likelihood is often overlooked in the Safe Systems approach, although noting it “was perhaps the main issue considered prior to Safe Systems thinking” (p.10).
3.4.4 Turning to the practitioners who undertake the Safe Systems assessment, the Framework notes that they should have varied types and levels of experience. To this end, training and experience in road safety, road design and traffic management are deemed essential for the analysis.
3.4.5 The analysis itself uses a Safe Systems matrix which considers safe roads, roadsides and speeds in relation to the three Pillars of Safe Systems: road users, vehicles, and post-crash care. A multiplicative approach is applied to the risk assessment, with each of the components given a score between zero and 64. The closer to zero the outcome, the more aligned with the Safe Systems approach the road environment is deemed to be both operationally and for post-crash conditions.
3.4.6 This risk assessment approach is subjective and therefore the Framework notes that it is more suitable to assessing options for a site, rather than assessing different sites. Mention is also made of “more objective assessment” methodologies which can use a more quantitative approach based on the ANRAM national risk assessment model which is based on a traditional likelihood and severity model of assessment. Following the risk assessment process, a solutions focussed step follows.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ The Safe Systems approach to road safety has been recognised internationally as best practice since at least 2008.
◼ The Safe Systems approach seeks to prevent road deaths and serious road injuries rather than the more traditional approach of focusing on numbers of collisions regardless of severity of injury.
◼ The approach systematically reduces the risks of the whole traffic system in a way which takes account of human physical vulnerability as well as our cognitive limitations. The approach considers the whole system including in-vehicle safety, safe roadsides, speed and post-crash care.
◼ Safe Systems designs should be maximally safe to take account of users’ unintentional errors as well as intentional violations of rules on the basis that death or serious, life changing injury is too high a price to pay for an unwise decision in using road infrastructure.
◼ Highways England adopted the Safe Systems approach in 2015.
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4 British Approach to Road Safety
4.1.1 As transport in the UK is a devolved power and given that this report is concerned with smart motorway delivery in England, this section focuses on road safety in relation to DfT and HE commitments and processes, with these authorities having jurisdiction and oversight of the English motorway network.
4.2 Transport Select Committee (2008)
4.2.1 Road safety targets were first introduced to the UK in 1987 and sought to reduce casualties by one third by 2000. This target was exceeded13 with road fatalities reducing by 39 percent and serious injuries by 45 percent over the period. New targets were set in 2000, which sought a 40 percent reduction in KSIs, 50 percent reduction in child KSIs, and 10 percent reduction in the slight casualty rate to 2010. Although by 2008 there was progress against targets, it was reported by the Transport Select Committee that the reduced rates of serious injuries were masking a lack of progress in reducing road deaths.
4.2.2 The eleventh report on the Transport Select Committee session 2007-08 noted that although the UK had a low number of deaths per capita, the country’s international ranking was slipping. Indeed, between 2001 and 2006, the UK slipped by five places on this scale. It was noted that of the top ten ranked nations (those with the least deaths per capita), all had made bigger reductions in road deaths than had the UK over the period.
4.2.3 The report quotes the then Managing Director of SWOV as follows, “Until 2000 we were always looking to the United Kingdom when it came to road safety. You were the inventors of many good activities and policies. All of a sudden, somewhere in 2000, you stopped doing things and we [the Netherlands] continued with our efforts” (p.15).
4.2.4 Having reviewed the International Transport Forum’s Annual Safety Reports it is notable that over the course of the past ten years up to 2020, the UK’s position in the global rankings on road safety (based on road fatality rates per billion veh-km) have been subject to a downward trend. The DfT’s dataset for fatalities over time14 shows that in absolute terms road fatality rates have fluctuated between 1,608 and 1,797 fatalities per annum since 2010. This fluctuation reinforces the perception that the negative trend in ranking is as much to do with other countries making advances in road safety while the UK effectively treads water.
4.2.5 By contrast, as substantial gains in improvements were secured in Sweden and the Netherlands, those countries’ roads authorities found it increasingly challenging to make further improvements in safety. As a result, in these countries in the 1990s, road safety began to be considered differently using a Safe Systems approach, as had been the
13 House of Commons Transport Committee, (2008). Ending the Scandal of Complacency: Road Safety beyond 2010, Eleventh Report of Session 2007-08, 14 Department for Transport, (2019). Accidents by Severity since 1979 ras10013.
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case for other modes of transport such as aviation and rail. It is this system, codified respectively in the Sustainable Safety and Vision Zero approaches I discuss at Section 3, that led to the Netherlands’ increased road safety performance quoted in the Select Committee report.
4.2.6 The Transport Select Committee sessions in 2008 therefore identified key actions as needed to reduce casualty rates beyond 2010, including a step-change in approach and oversight by an independent body. The principal priority identified was for the UK’s adoption of a Safe Systems approach to be explored, and for the public to be engaged in the discussion.
4.2.7 The second priority identified by the Select Committee, “roads”, speaks of the need to create forgivingness in roadsides, to reflect the fact that many collisions and casualties “are the result of momentary lapses of concentration or a coincidence of events” (p.17) rather than due to reckless rule-breaking. It further concludes that “the Government’s main duty should be to try to protect road users from risks imposed by others and then to protect road users from the worst consequences of their own mistakes” (p.34).
4.2.8 As a result, the Transport Select Committee’s report concludes with respect to highways infrastructure that the “emphasis needs to shift from treating localised problems to one of long-term improvements to the safety of the infrastructure” (ibid). Both Sustainable Safety and Vision Zero are acknowledged in the report to provide a strong sense of the ultimate objective for road safety with the intent being to “restore the UK to its position as a world leader in road safety” (p.165).
4.3 Strategic Framework for Road Safety (2011)
4.3.1 In 2011, the DfT published its Strategic Framework for Road Safety. This Strategy removed the national road safety targets, and reinforced the needed for cost-benefit analysis based decision making. The Strategy acknowledged that much of the improvement on safety in years preceding its publication was due to “the steep changes in vehicle safety delivered by manufacturers” (p.13).
4.3.2 Through devolving some decision making to local government, the Strategy states that localism can drive “decisions on enforcement, what sort of roads and neighbourhoods we want, and the examples we set on road use” (p.14).
4.3.3 In establishing an approach for road safety, the Strategy identifies both the “systems” approach and the public health approach. Although combining these approaches, the Strategy notes that the public health approach is the pre-eminent in the strategy. This approach focuses on prevention, is based on science and is collaborative in its approach. It uses a four stage model: problem identification, analysing cause and risk factors, assessing options and developing a scalable implementation that can be evaluated.
4.3.4 It is not made clear how the Safe Systems approach integrates with the public health
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approach and this approach is not implied in the content of the strategy, beyond consideration of vehicles, education, enforcement and engineering. The practicalities of a Safe Systems approach is not encoded in the Strategy nor are its features evident in the Action Plan and Framework which form the Strategy’s appendices.
4.3.5 It is notable that the discussion relating to road safety outcomes is presented in absolute figures rather than in levels of safety i.e. road fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres.
4.4 Working Together to Build a Safer Road System (2015)
4.4.1 In 2015, the DfT published its British Road Safety Statement which set out the DfT’s “vision, values and priorities” (p.4) for road safety in the UK. Some 15 priorities for road safety are identified in the Statement, of which the first is to adopt the Safe Systems approach. The Statement further notes that “this is clear in the framework we have set with Highways England and which it is now implementing”.
4.4.2 The Statement reinforces the position that road safety decision making should be led by local areas, and that national road safety targets are not required.
4.4.3 Section 1.26 onwards identifies the incorporation of the Safe Systems approach into the Highways England Health and Safety five year plan. However, rather than using the United Nations’ five pillars approach to Safe Systems to establish a framework for addressing each pillar within individual schemes (as is presented in the Australian risk assessment model discussed at Section 3.4) the pillars are used as the basis for a checklist approach in the Delivery Timetable at Annex A. The Delivery Timetable effectively acts as a checklist without targets or timescales for individual actions to be delivered.
4.4.4 The Statement is silent on how these actions have been identified or developed, and there is no supporting information relating to how the Safe Systems approach is to be embedded practically into the project design process.
4.5 Review of how Highways England Prioritises Investments to Improve Safety Outcomes (2020)
4.5.1 Most recently, in 2020, the Road Safety Foundation conducted this independent study for the ORR. A key finding of the study was that the organisation’s leadership and its corporate aim that no one should come to harm on the network by 2040 means that Highways England has world class level safety management. However, the report also concludes that there are significant short falls.
4.5.2 In particular, the study noted that, “It is clear, however, that the desired road safety performance of the strategic road network (SRN) necessitates intervention, not just by Highways England, but by the wider road safety partnership to deliver the internationally recognised and multi-sectoral Safe System approach of Safe Roads and Roadsides,
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Safe Speeds, Safe Vehicles, Safe Road Use and Post-Crash Care” (p.2).
4.5.3 The review drew a series of conclusions relating to the current level of safety maturity within Highways England, including:
◼ Adopting a “towards zero” approach is important but the use of safety performance metrics is a work in progress;
◼ In the wider organisation beyond the HE safety specialists there were “unrealistic expectations” as to what softer safety programmes, vehicle automation or design standards might achieve and an expectation in officers that continuing to use established procedures would make the SRN as safe as it could be. These expectations were not shared by road safety professionals;
◼ The 2020 and 2040 goals are unlikely to be met;
◼ The five pillars as set out in the British Road Safety Statement need to be “pursued as a comprehensive and systematic approach. No single pillar is a cure-all” (p. 4);
◼ Investment in specific casualty reduction is “very small” compared with the total HE investment;
◼ If the same safety level were secured on the SRN as that expected in Sweden to 2025, the KSI rate on the SRN may reduce by more than 50 percent;
◼ There are useful parallels with, and lessons to be learned from, the VicRoads Safe Systems approach, Vision Zero and Sustainable Safety;
◼ HE Safe Systems definitions should include Safe Speeds; and
◼ A Safer Roads Task Force should be established to transform HE policies, practices and designs.
4.5.4 In order to quickly reach road safety maturity within the HE organisation, the report identified a need to develop measures to motivate staff and accelerate learning and understanding of how to implement a Safe Systems approach.
4.5.5 In examining how the RIS programmes would impact on road safety, the report notes that the legacy projects inherited by Highways England were forecast to create only ten percent of the 40 percent reduction target by 2020. This was because “investment appears to be targeted on a small proportion of the network selected largely on the basis of reducing congestion and improving capacity: even the short lengths targeted may not necessarily be priorities in respect of their potential for serious and fatal casualty reduction” (p.6).
4.5.6 In addition, while the report noted that a small number of teams within HE have begun to incorporate fence to fence treatments in maintenance schemes, it acknowledges a number of practical means by which the Safe Systems approach can be realised. These include the consideration of whole life costing and portfolio analysis to appraise safety, establishing a Safer Roads Task Force, review and revise Highways England’s Safe Systems definitions so that appraisal procedures are in line with other major transport
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appraisal as well as international good practice, and work to embed the Safe System so it becomes mainstream practice in Highways England.
4.5.7 In relation to smart motorways specifically, the report notes that the unrealistic expectations for softer measures to affect KSI rates, should instead be viewed as “hygiene” measures to focus users on their responsibilities. As an example, the report notes that the campaign to raise awareness of Red X compliance “cannot itself be expected to reduce the number of total KSI casualties significantly” (p.6)
4.5.8 In answering the study question relating to smart motorways, the review found that a “lack of robustness in previous safety appraisal and evaluation processes is evident in Smart Motorway schemes” (p.27). This comment is linked to the recommendation that Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) reports are more robust in their statistical monitoring. However, the review found that the increased use of enforced VMSL and retrofit of proven technology may afford “some mitigation”.
4.6 Interpretation
4.6.1 The Australian Safe Systems Assessment Framework provides a useful table (reproduced at Table 4.1) which compares the traditional and Safe Systems approach to road safety,
Table 4.1 Comparison of Traditional and Safe System Approach to Road Safety Issue Traditional Approach Safe System Approach
Understanding of critical speeds at which FSI [fatal Information on biomechanical tolerances Biomechanical tolerances are core to the and serious injury] crashes was available, but was not core to vision of eliminating FSI crashes. occur for different crash understanding of how to address risk. types
A ‘forgiving’ road and roadside is core to the Safe System. FSI crashes should not Human error was often seen as the occur as a result of driver error. Vehicle excuse for inaction, and energy was and infrastructure improvements should Road user error focused toward improving driver be used to reduce impact forces (should behaviour rather than infrastructure. a crash occur) to below human tolerances, and therefore reduce crash severity.
The focus was on driver education to Road managers/designers share the address road user error, which Shared responsibility responsibility for safe travel outcomes by consequently lowered the responsibility accommodating road user error. of road managers.
It is paramount that new infrastructure assists in eliminating death and serious Treatment types were often selected injury. This also includes speed Design requirements based on high BCRs rather than management and separation of road eliminating death and serious injury. users travelling in different directions or of different mass.
FSI crashes should be the main aim and Total crashes (of all severities) was Crash severities addressed starting point in site identification. Minor often used to identify problem sites. and non-injury crashes may be useful to
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Issue Traditional Approach Safe System Approach provide additional information, but are not the core focus. (Source: Safe Systems Assessment Framework, Table A.1)
4.6.2 Based on my review of the above documents as well as the Highways England design guidance and standards including GG 104 (see Section 6.9), I am of the view that there has been an inconsistent roll out of the Safe Systems approach which has therefore not led to a transformation in the way that road safety is considered by Highways England. As a result, these best practice techniques are not embedded into Highways England’s mainstream work.
4.6.3 As a consequence, in relation to smart motorways, the dialogue and debate is ill- informed and is overly reliant on a mathematical balance of risk i.e. reduced numbers of slight collisions being used to offset what is in multiple cases an increase in serious or fatal collisions as I set out in Sections 6.7 and 18. This mathematical risk management approach accords with the traditional approach as set out in Table 4.1 and contrasts with the focus on eliminating serious injury or death which underpins the Safe Systems approach.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ The UK has historically been at the forefront of road safety globally but over the course of the past ten years up to 2020, the UK’s position in the global rankings on road safety has fallen. Other world-leading countries adopted the Safe Systems approach from the mid- 1990s, and the UK’s Transport Select Committee recommended exploring its use in the UK 2008.
◼ Despite this recommendation, the traditional approach to road safety persisted which assumes a linear relationship between collision severity, and therefore seeks to reduce all collision types often on a “black spot” or cluster site basis. Measures to be implemented are selected based on Benefit : Cost Ratios rather than their ability to eliminate serious injury or death.
◼ Twenty years after its development, the Safe Systems approach was adopted in 2015 as the approach to road safety on the SRN.
◼ In 2020, the ORR found significant shortfalls in HE’s approach to road safety, and that investment appears to be selected on the basis of reducing congestion and improving capacity. “Even the short lengths targeted may not necessarily be priorities in respect of their potential for serious and fatal casualty reduction”.
◼ I am of the view that there has been an inconsistent roll out of the Safe Systems approach in HE. As a result, these best practice techniques are not embedded into HE’s work.
◼ In relation to smart motorways, the dialogue and debate is ill-informed and is overly reliant on old-fashioned mathematical balance of risk rather than a focus on eliminating serious injury or death which underpins the Safe Systems approach.
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5 Design Guidance and Standards
5.1.1 In this section, I provide details of the evolution of the managed motorway design, and the design considerations in their implementation. This review includes the DHS design guidance in 2008 through to the most recent 2020 design guidance for ALR schemes. I also consider concept of operations documents as salient to this report.
5.2 IAN 111/08 Dynamic Use of Hard Shoulder (2008)
5.2.1 This guidance document set out the first guidance on how dynamic hard shoulder running could be implemented. The “Objective” section of the IAN makes it clear that, “each scheme must be individually designed taking into account local conditions. This also means that new schemes could be more innovative than those that exist or are being planned.” Further, this section sets out that it captures lessons from the M42 pilot and provides a baseline “for future schemes which delivery teams should further refine and value engineer.”
5.2.2 IAN 111/08 provides a “This Guidance in Context” section which states that it must not be assumed that the design components of the M42 pilot “can be ‘transferred” to a new location or that standards can be applied without due consideration.”
5.2.3 In providing an overview of the DHS approach, IAN 111/08 notes that it “requires a unique set of operational procedures to manage the scheme. Effective training and adherence to these procedures is fundamental to successful operation.” It later explains that before the hard shoulder can be opened on any given link, that length of hard shoulder must be completely checked for obstruction and debris. Only once it is confirmed as clear can the gantry signs be altered to open the hard shoulder for running.
5.2.4 At section 3.3.3, IAN111/08 acknowledges that driver experience is important in terms of scheme consistency and how the scheme physically is presented to users. Specifically, the IAN notes that it may be appropriate in certain locations to implement DHS on links where consistency rather than congestion is a key consideration. I interpret this to mean that where decision making may typically take note only of traffic conditions to determine locations for DHS schemes, the guidance allows for DHS to be implemented on connecting links to ensure a consistent treatment along the highway corridor.
5.2.5 With regards to road safety, IAN 111/08 sets out at section 4.3 that it “should be assumed that introducing [DHS} will lead to a 15% reduction in accidents compared with the implementation of queue detection on its own… This assumption will also be applicable to the full widening option if it also includes VMSL” and it goes on to note that this assumption will be updated when longer term collision data is available.
5.2.6 The principal consideration of road safety is at section 6 of the IAN. This section details the tools that are available to designers and which should be used in the design
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development, including the Project Safety Risk Management System, and it also sets out “generic risks” associated with some of the component parts of the smart motorway including:
◼ ERA – the IAN sets out a range of risks associated with the ERA and identifies them as a new feature of the motorway environment. The IAN specifies at section 6.3.1 that ERA must be long enough to “contain at least one heavy recovery vehicle and one HGV” and that it should be sufficiently wide to accommodate the widest vehicle foreseeable, and allow its occupants to open doors and safely step out. Additionally, it specifies that “ERA should not be located where there is significant risk of incursion of passing vehicles (e.g. not on the outside of sharp bends.”
◼ Carriageway – these risks relate to the geometry of the lanes, lining and signing, and visibility provision as it relates to weaving, the interaction of vehicles at junctions. I note that the generic hazard of live lane breakdowns or stoppages is not mentioned;
◼ Maintenance – maintenance risks identified largely relate to the protection of workers undertaking maintenance activities from ERA rather than from a hard shoulder and the processes required to be in place to enable safe working;
◼ Operations – operational risks considered in this section include the opening of the hard shoulder and the setting of the associated speed limit, the design of processes to ensure that RCC operators are suitably competent to work in that environment, and the need for a highly reliable system to reduce the potential for human error; and
◼ Entry and exit from the DHS scheme – risks identified include the continued use of the hard shoulder once a driver has left the scheme’s demise.
5.2.7 The IAN also provides details at section 7.2 on the consultation that should be carried out to progress a DHS scheme. Section 7 makes clear that the component parts of a smart motorway are legal by virtue of previous changes to various regulations. This consultation therefore is stated to relate only to the legislative changes required in relation to the 1982 Regulations as they pertain to VMSL, ERA and actively managed hard shoulder running. I note that this section includes for “meetings with stakeholders as required” during the 14 week consultation period. This section considers the design of the scheme only in so much as the subsequent Statutory Instrument would need to accurately convey the length and nature of the scheme to be implemented.
5.2.8 It is my view that this is a marked departure from the 2008 feasibility study. There is no consideration of consultation extending to the public or how the public could be engaged which is a change from the suggestion, as I identify at paragraph 7.3.15, which identified a potential future need for direct engagement with the public to ensure compliance. The guidance to carry out consultation only in relation to the statutory instrument also runs counter to the preceding methodology.
5.2.9 Section 8 sets out the operational requirements for DHS as they relate to opening up the hard shoulder:
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◼ Conditioning – the hard shoulder can only be opened once the three running lanes are operating under VMSL and running speed is reduced. This is designed to smooth the transition to hard shoulder running;
◼ Flow threshold – to reduce the likelihood of flow breakdown a minimum level of traffic running through the link must be established, the meeting of which would present a threshold for the use of DHS; and
◼ Hard Shoulder check – the hard shoulder is checked for obstruction and debris prior to the Red X gantry sign being replaced by the relevant VMSL roundel. The implementation of these signals is controlled to migrate upstream with the flow of traffic.
5.2.10 In closing the DHS once the flow threshold is reached (that is, closing the hard shoulder as a running lane to respond to reduced traffic flows and lower need for congestion relief) the transition to three lane running under VMSL uses lane divert right arrows to afford remove traffic from the hard shoulder migrating from downstream prior to the Red X lane closure gantry sign being presented above the hard shoulder.
5.2.11 The procedure for closing the hard shoulder in the event of an incident is also set out. This includes the use of additional Lane Divert signage preceding the incident location, and Stop signal triangulation.
5.2.12 My interpretation of IAN 111/08 leads me to conclude that the DHS design and operational parameters identified result in a scheme with an embedded safety measure in the retention of the hard shoulder. The demarcated hard shoulder is always physically present, even if being used temporarily as a running lane, and the procedures for opening the hard shoulder result in its use being controlled, monitored and subject to stringent controls. However, the consideration of other safety factors, such as driver behaviour (as discussed in Section 5.3), is not considered in this IAN.
5.3 IAN 112/08 Through Junction Hard Shoulder Running (2008)
5.3.1 This document set out guidance on implementing through junction hard shoulder running (TJR) on a motorway. This document is to be read in conjunction with IAN 111/08 as TJR was intended only to be provided as part of a wider DHS scheme. As such, IAN 112/08 refers to IAN 111/08 for all design criteria to be considered. I note that the document considers both full time TJR and part time, with the latter using the hard shoulder as a “part time running lane.”
5.3.2 Whereas IAN 111/08 considers safety in relation to the hazards presented by each component part of the DHS scheme, IAN 112/08 considers the hazards that could be impacted by TJR. A key difference between the two IAN documents, is the consideration in IAN 112/08 of driver behaviour which represents causal factors in collisions including:
◼ Loss of control of a vehicle – caused by the driver being distracted by road signs and signals due to the presence of “ambiguous messages that presented to drivers [sic].”
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IAN 112/08 states this can be mitigated by the “careful placement of signs and gantries”.
◼ Vehicle drifts off carriageway – due to vehicles travelling closer to the edge of the carriageway for an extended period of time;
◼ Driver confusion – identified as a potential hazard if a number of different solutions are presented in the same scheme, or in neighbouring schemes. The document notes the importance of considering each junction in the context of the scheme to ensure a consistency in approach. Further, it notes that the removal of chevrons at the diverge may increase the likelihood of vehicles using the hard shoulder when it is not being used as a running lane;
◼ Driver behaviour – IAN112/08 notes that “TJR is a new concept in the UK and as a result relatively few drivers will have encountered it.” The document presents several suggestions for the means by which driver behaviour can be better understood and managed, including providing advanced publicity; conducting a driver behaviour study including the possible use of driver simulators; and running a pilot or “series of pilots” prior to TJR being adopted more widely.
5.3.3 Section 9 of the report consolidates the need for additional work pertaining to driver behaviour, as it re-states the need for a further study to be conducted “prior to the preparation of detailed design and subsequent construction of TJR”.
5.3.4 While this document is ancillary to the considerations and guidance set out in IAN 111/08, I note that it presents an alternative and expanded view regarding road safety matters in relation to the use of DHS. In particular, the report specifically considers the impact of scheme design on driver behaviour and acknowledges where understanding is poor.
5.3.5 My view of this IAN is that it concedes where additional information is needed, and sets out several means by which the gaps in understanding could be resolved. I note that the need to achieve this more complete understanding prior to detailed design is also identified in the recommendations for further work.
5.4 IAN 111/09 Hard Shoulder Running
5.4.1 This IAN superseded IAN 111/08 and established new advice for:
◼ Minimum lengths of DHS;
◼ Level of safety management required for these schemes via Project Safety Risk Management. Whereas IAN 111/08 identified the DHS schemes as likely to be classified as Type C (i.e. the highest level of safety management), IAN 111/09 expects all new DHS schemes to be classified as Type B, with some elements as Type C “to deal with scheme specific issues not previously experienced/tested” (6.2.1).
◼ Maximum speed on opened hard shoulders at 60mph and advice regarding sign legends;
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◼ ERAs including their geometry and sight stopping distances.
5.4.2 Importantly, this Note establishes the obligation to undertake certain design interventions, with mandatory elements in the IAN highlighted in black boxes as per the standard DMRB presentation. As the document by definition does not constitute a Standard, the status of the black box text is somewhat ambiguous. This ambiguity is compounded by the introductory text which at 1.1 makes clear that this document is Guidance, with text within Section 1 referring to departures from standards as being required for certain clauses.
5.4.3 With regards to safety risks at Section 6, IAN 111/09 follows a similar format with some marked changes:
◼ ERA – the IAN removes the previous specification in IAN 111/08 relating to length and width of ERA and their locations. In relation to the provision of ERA, 111/09 makes the provision of ERA at appropriate frequency less emphatic than was previously the case in IAN 111/08 which stated that ERA “will be provided at frequent and regular intervals”. Under IAN 111/09 the need for frequency is removed as this becomes “ERA need to be provided at appropriate regular intervals”.
◼ Maintenance – IAN 111/09 now includes details on the sizing of maintenance hard- standing for vehicles. Maintenance access requirements now include the use of Chapter 8 traffic management signage, and winter maintenance requirements are now black box text, as is the requirement for Regional Control Centre (RCC) staff to be trained and competent in the necessary procedures.
◼ Operations – The checking of the hard shoulder prior to opening is now black box text, as is the requirement to comply with National Operating procedures.
5.4.4 Section 6 in IAN 111/09 now includes black box text relating to the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 and specifies that risk consideration of schemes must “address the elements required under CDM2007”.
5.4.5 Section 7 of IAN 111/09 provides additional detail in relation to the consultation required to amend the relevant legislation. The amendments include the need to prepare a consultation pack, and the process of obtaining Secretary of State approval to conduct consultation may now take place prior to drafting of the regulations. Where IAN 111/08 specified a consultation period of 14 weeks, this is reduced to 12 weeks in IAN 111/09. The revisions do not include for public consultation or engagement.
5.4.6 There are several key changes in Section 8 of IAN 111/09, superseding information contained in IAN 111/08 with regards to the operations of the DHS scheme. These changes include:
◼ Automatic 3L-VMSL now incorporates 40mph speed limits as well as the 60mph and 50mph specified in IAN111/08. This change is accompanied by modifications to the associated MS4s;
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◼ New black box text identifies that DHS must not be implemented if any part of the managed hard shoulder is flooded or obscured;
◼ Additional approved legends relating to queuing vehicles ahead, or after a junction, are identified for variable messages signs;
◼ Signals associated with the Close Proximity rules are modified to include Red X (lane control) signals on the hard shoulder, and additional Lane Divert signals on the running lane prior to the Red X (STOP) signal on the affected lane;
◼ In relation to ERAs, IAN 111/09 has been updated to note that the National Vehicle Recovery Service has been rolled out, with associated new removal and disposal powers for Traffic Officers. This relates to statutory powers to remove vehicles which are abandoned or which constitute an obstruction15;
◼ Section 8.5 of both documents presents details on the signing, markings and signals required on entry or exit to the DHS scheme. IAN 111/09 provides substantial additional detail, and amends and prescribes particular measures. Notably, it no longer prescribes signs that aid driver interpretation and understanding, thereby removing the following signs from consideration in new DHS schemes:
‘Active Traffic Management Follow overhead instructions’;
‘Variable speed limits ahead’;
‘Traffic enforcement cameras’; and
‘End of Active Traffic Management’.
◼ Additionally, Section 8.5.2 provides new details and black box text relating to the signals required on entry and exit to the DHS scheme.
5.4.7 Given that IAN 111/09 was issued in November 2009, just four months after opening of the three first permanent DHS schemes in July that year, the removal of signs, particularly which are designed to aid interpretation and driver behaviour is somewhat surprising and is in my view inconsistent with the acknowledged requirements to inform drivers.
5.4.8 At the time of this document’s publication in November 2009, there were only six lengths of managed motorways delivered throughout England:
◼ M25 J10 – J15 controlled motorway (1995);
◼ M25 J15 – J16 controlled motorway (2001);
◼ M42 J3A – J7 pilot DHS scheme (2005);
◼ M6 J4 – J5 DHS scheme (2009);
◼ M40 J16 – M42 J3A controlled motorway (2009); and
◼ M42 J3A eastbound and J7 – J9 controlled motorway (2009).
5.4.9 Of these, just two schemes comprised DHS schemes, and both were located close
15 Gov.uk (undated) Information about Highways England Traffic Officer Services and Free Recovery through Roadworks.
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together near Birmingham. Although traffic volumes along these schemes’ lengths will have been substantial, it does not follow that the provision of two schemes is sufficient to ensure that the travelling public across the country as a whole is either aware of the DHS mode of operation, or familiar with its use to an extent which suggests that there is no requirement to prescribe interpretive signage.
5.4.10 There is a well-established use of signage on UK roads, to advise drivers on driving behaviour on uncommon or unfamiliar roads. The use of these signs facilitates compliance with the road layout, and thereby safe driving behaviour in that location. When IAN 111/09 was published, the use of these interpretive signs was codified in the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002 (TSRGD), which came into force on 31 January 2002. The TSRGD 2002 provides for variously:
◼ Diagram 2933 ‘Keep apart 2 chevrons’;
◼ Diagram 2934 ‘Check your distance’;
◼ Diagram 5010 ‘Lane control signals ahead’;
◼ Diagram 5015 ‘End of lane control’; and
16 ◼ Diagram 7014 ‘Permanent change in road layout ahead ’.
5.4.11 Contemporaneously to IAN 111/09, Diagram 5010 is discussed in the Traffic Signs Manual which states that the sign is used to inform drivers and “to explain the meaning of the lane control signals.”
5.4.12 IAN 111/09 acknowledges at 8.11 that for safe operation, “it is essential that motorists comply with the signs, signals or other instructions that are fundamental to successful operation.” Further, at 8.13 it states that “education and publicity for MM-HSR schemes will need to be focused on ensuring that driver compliance is maximised.” Advisory signs, such as diagram 5010 and ‘Active Traffic Management Follow overhead instructions’ are generally used on road schemes to ensure high levels of compliance by assisting drivers’ understanding of a new road layout.
5.4.13 Given the widespread use of this type of signage for schemes on motorways and local roads in 2009, and the fact that only three DHS schemes were implemented at this point in time (incorporating around 100 miles of approximately 1,865 miles of motorway network), it is my opinion that IAN 111/09 prematurely removed the prescription of interpretative signage on entry and exit to DHS schemes in advance of the travelling public having adequate understanding of the requirements of the DHS road layout.
5.4.14 Although requirements codified in IAN 111/09 are now historic, this point is salient to the 2020 decision to continue to implement ALR rather than DHS as I discuss at Section 18.
5.4.15 In addition to these considerations, at Section 10, IAN 111/09 provides additional
16 Statutory Instruments 2002 No. 3113 Road Traffic, The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions (2002).
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information and black box text regarding the DHS infrastructure requirements. With regards ERA and MIDAS loops, there is substantial new information, including prescribed spacings and design criteria for both which I have summarised in Table 5.3.
5.5 Managed Motorways Operational Guidance v.2.0 (2010)
5.5.1 Published in June 2010, this document sets out guidance on the Highways Agency’s policy on the operation of managed motorways to complement IAN 111/09 and IAN 111/08. The document draws on experience from the M42 pilot scheme; operations- related content from IAN 111/09; input from Highways Agency workstream leads, service providers, and stakeholders.
5.5.2 Section 2.3 sets out the overriding operational principles for MM which include:
◼ The hard shoulder should only be opened to live running when justified by actual or forecast daily peak period traffic demand;
◼ The hard shoulder is considered part of normal network capacity and should be treated as such;
◼ ERA is an extension of the hard shoulder and should be maintained in the same way. “Motorists should only use it in case of emergency or breakdown”
5.5.3 Section 4 sets out the operational guidance for the DHS schemes. With respect to ERA, the document presents a black box text requirement that “In an emergency, drivers can stop on either the Hard Shoulder or in the ERA, but drivers should be encouraged to use the ERA as it is a safer place to stop and has an Emergency Roadside Telephone” (4.1.1).
5.5.4 Details are also provided in this section relating to the means by which the hard shoulder should be prepared for opening by: a. “Requesting that all maintenance vehicles leave the Hard Shoulder and ERA bays (this is normally done by contacting the contractor by mobile telephone); b. Requesting that any vehicle whose stop is not an emergency leaves the Hard Shoulder (with assistance from the on-road TOS); c. Where possible, moving any vehicles whose stop is an emergency from the Hard Shoulder to an ERA bay (this normally requires manual intervention from an on-road TOS patrol); d. Attempting to contact vehicles in ERA bays; e. Ensuring that a TOS patrol has driven through the Link in the last 90 minutes (this should ideally be in the last hour).” (4.1.2).
5.5.5 The means by which a hard shoulder link is opened, is also mandated in this section, and may only be opened if:
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a. “the traffic speed has been reduced to the speed defined in the Operating Regime for the scheme by Conditioning the Link; b. There are no obstacles on the Link that pose a danger to traffic; c. A TOS patrol has driven through the Link within at most the last 90 minutes, but ideally within the last hour; d. The Hard Shoulder is clear, (as confirmed by both dedicated CCTV cameras and the TOS patrol); e. Any vehicles in the ERA bays will not attempt to rejoin traffic as the Hard Shoulder is being opened (this will typically require contact with the driver); f. For Junction Links with dynamic Through Junction Running, the Hard Shoulder on the links upstream and downstream of the junction are both open.”
5.5.6 It is also prescribed that the “relevant section of the Hard Shoulder must be opened as soon as the check that the Hard Shoulder is clear is complete” [their emphasis]. This detailed procedure ensures that the hard shoulder is brought into use as a live lane only in the event that there is nothing that could cause an obstruction or hazard to that live traffic and there is nothing that could be impacted by its opening i.e. stopped vehicles.
5.5.7 Section 5 of the document presents details on how incidents are to be dealt with on DHS schemes. The initial response requires:
1. Incidents in LBS1 (hard shoulder) shall be responded to in the same way as incidents in a running lane, regardless of whether it is operating as a hard shoulder or a live lane;
2. Operators in the RCC to attempt to confirm the incident’s existence, location, lanes blocked and characteristics via CCTV. Where appropriate they should dispatch a TOS patrol and alert Core Responders;
3. RCC operators must ensure they are clear about which lanes are affected;
4. Confirmation of which lanes are blocked must state whether LBS1 is blocked;
5. VMS and AMI should be set to protect the incident and back of the queue either through MIDAS or manual adjustment;
6. A lane should be designated as the emergency access route and appropriate signage displayed.
5.5.8 Section 5.7.2 notes that “the implementation of Managed Motorways is expected to reduce both the frequency of incidents (due to the ability of operators to dynamically increase capacity to manage increased demand), and their severity (due to reduced speeds when Managed Motorways are in operation).”
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5.5.9 In terms of facilitating access to an incident, potential routes are identified as the hard shoulder, the offside lane, a path between lanes “in extreme situations”, and the reverse direction down the carriageway once the motorway is closed at the incident location.
5.5.10 In the event that the hard shoulder is open, the preferred access route to the incident location will depend on the lane in which it is located; the length of the access route and rate of traffic build up; the presence of junctions on the route; whether TJR is in place; the density of stacked traffic; and the proportion of HGVs. The RCC assists Core Responders by implementing changes such as closing the hard shoulder and setting VMS and lane divert signs on AMI.
5.5.11 With regards to breakdowns, Section 5.8 states that Traffic Officers have powers under the Removal and Disposal of Vehicles (Traffic Officers) (England) Regulations 2008. These powers enable the removal of vehicles which are broken down or which are causing an obstruction or danger to others. Drivers are given a “reasonable” time to arrange their recovery and if arrangements are not made or are unsuitable, Traffic Officers can arrange a statutory recovery. On standard motorways, drivers of broken down vehicles on the hard shoulder are given two hours to remove their vehicle, given fair conditions. It states that “the Agency is seeking legal advice on the interpretation of obstruction and danger and related considerations regarding the status in law of the hard shoulder…”
5.5.12 Section 6.1 presents compliance issues specific to MM as:
◼ Exceeding variable mandatory speed restrictions;
◼ Driving under Stop indicator (solid Red X) signals;
◼ Driving in hard shoulder when closed;
◼ Non-emergency stops in hard shoulder;
◼ Non-emergency stops in ERA.
5.5.13 General requirements for achieving compliance are set out at Section 6.3 and are mandated as including engineering, education, encouragement and enforcement. Compliance with VMSL is identified as being enforced through HADECS.
5.5.14 In relation to non-emergency stops on the hard shoulder, the Operational Guidance states that the impact is greater on managed motorways than on conventional motorways, “due to both the increased probability of motorists driving on the Hard Shoulder when it is closed, and the effect that such stops have on the Hard Shoulder opening process… where such violations occur frequently, it will generally be necessary to apply both engineering solutions and an increase in education and encouragement activities (such as the use of VMS messages to remind drivers of the correct use of the Hard Shoulder…” (paragraph 6.5.4).
5.5.15 Non-emergency stops in ERA are considered in 6.5.5 which notes that “there is a known problem with drivers using the Emergency Refuge Areas (ERAs) for non-
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emergency stops. Engineering design will have a particular impact on the appropriate use of ERAs, given their potential attractiveness to drivers as a place to stop for comfort breaks. Where the above violation frequently occurs, the engineering design of the ERA should be reviewed to see if it can be made less attractive as a place to stop or whether additional signing could be deployed to reinforce the rules of its use.”
5.6 Managed Motorways – Dynamic Hard Shoulder (MM-DHS) Concept of Operations v.3.0 (2012)
5.6.1 This Concept of Operations was published in 2012 to accompany IAN 111/09 and is a revision to the 2010 document ‘Managed Motorways Operational Guidance’.
5.6.2 The material contained within it is stated to be based on the experience of operating and maintaining DHS schemes as well as consultation with subject matter experts. The document includes black box text which are requirements, and which are intended to demonstrate that a DHS scheme designed to IAN 111/09 can operate safely. It was drafted in parallel to the drafting of ‘Managed Motorways All Lane Running Concept of Operations’ which accompanies IAN 161/13.
5.6.3 In relation to the process of opening the hard shoulder Section 3.1.3 of the Concept of Operations is amended to remove the need for a TOS patrol to physically review the link. Otherwise, in my view, the pre-opening check remains rigorous and it is specified that the section of the hard shoulder “must be opened as soon as the check that the hard shoulder is clear is complete” [their emphasis] with this check being undertaken remotely via CCTV.
5.6.4 Section 4 sets out matters relating to compliance and identifies the same five compliance issues specific to DHS schemes as previously identified in the 2010 operational guidance.
5.6.5 In achieving compliance, the report requires each scheme to produce a Compliance Strategy which highlights exceptions to the VMSL and HADECS implementation guidance. In addition, this strategy is required to make an assessment of the potential for non-compliance with specific rules, taking account of the physical characteristics of the road, the proportion of different vehicle types anticipated to use the scheme; and the levels of motorist familiarity with DHS. The inclusion of motorist familiarity is a new acknowledgement in the body of work relating to smart motorways. The approach to compliance is largely enforcement-led, for example, identifying at point 1 of section 4.4 that VMSL will be enforced through HADECS.
5.6.6 However, the various requirements relating to the five areas of non-compliance do identify other non-enforcement approaches to achieving compliance, with no revisions to the 2010 document in relation to the use of engineering and education to encourage compliant behaviour.
5.6.7 In dealing with incidents, the report is revised to note differences between a DHS
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scheme and a standard motorway environment, including:
◼ Incident Detection – During busy periods a greater proportion of collisions will affect a running lane. Any live lane obstruction will “quickly cause traffic to slow down, with the resultant queues detected by the queue protection system.”
◼ Responder Access – responders may need to access the site of an incident without using the hard shoulder during periods of hard shoulder running.
◼ Incident Management – VMSL will create and maintain a controlled environment, lane control signals can be used to indicate lane availability or close a lane to enable core responders’ access, and the RCC may set signs and signals to enable the recovery of a vehicle from a live lane.
◼ Network Restoration – with the hard shoulder open, a greater proportion of incidents is anticipated to affect live lanes therefore vehicles and debris may need to be recovered to protect the DHS operation. ERAs may be used as a temporary off-network storage location.
5.6.8 Further revisions are also made to Section 5.4 to reflect legal advice obtained. The guidance in relation to broken down vehicles now states that since any vehicle “that is unable to leave the main carriageway (by stopping in a refuge area or continuing to the next exit slip road), will by definition become a live lane breakdown. Since this will inevitably cause an obstruction, the vehicle will therefore be a candidate for an immediate statutory removal.” This statutory power is reinforced in the associated black box text which mandates the statutory removal of the vehicle immediately if it cannot be cleared.
5.6.9 My review of this document leads me to the view that a more enforcement-led approach was in progress in relation to compliance with the DHS schemes. This is reflected not only in the nature of the Compliance Strategy identified, but also in the position in relation to statutory removal of stopped vehicles.
5.7 CHE Memorandum 276/11 Managed Motorway Requirements (2011)
5.7.1 This Memorandum was issued prior to the release of IAN 161/12 (see Section 5.7) and is “applicable to ALL future managed motorway schemes i.e. those commencing construction from late 2012 [their emphasis]”.
5.7.2 The document presents, for the first time, the design criteria for ALR schemes, noting at Section 2 that “further knowledge and experience of operating managed motorways schemes indicates that there is scope to further reduce capital and operating costs, whilst meeting congestion and safety objectives.” I interpret this to mean that ALR designs have been identified and are now promoted rather than DHS, primarily as a means of securing cost savings, rather than because they provide a technical or operational or safety improvement against the DHS scheme design.
5.7.3 This interpretation is supported by Section 4 of CHE 276/11 which notes that the new
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smart motorways requirements will also “contribute to HA business aims by reducing the capital and operating costs associated with managed motorway schemes, whilst maintaining congestion and safety objectives.”
5.7.4 Annex B of the document provides the new guidance and standards in relation to managed motorway design. Paragraph 1.16 of Annex B states that “it is expected that the SMS categorisation exercise will result in a ‘Type B’ categorisation” with regards risk management. This categorisation is somewhat surprising given that no ALR schemes existed at the time of publication, the ALR road environment would have been novel to all users, and the hazard most affect by the permanent closure of the hard shoulder (i.e. live lane breakdowns) was associated with a 216 percent increase in risk (see Section 6.5).
5.7.5 With regards to this hazard and the operational regime associated with this new system, the document states that “with the permanent conversion of the hard shoulder, it must be expected that the proportion of live lane obstructions will increase. Once an RCC operator is made aware of an incident (whether through an automated alert from the queue protection system, a phone call made from an ERT, or by some other means) the CCTV cameras can be used to validate the location and key features of the incident” (2.3.4 and 2.3.5). There is no further discussion in relation to the management of this substantial risk in the memo.
5.7.6 With regards to ERA, paragraph 5.4.1 states that these “will be similar in design to current requirements in IAN 111, but slightly smaller at 100m in length and 4m wide, and provided at up to 2.5km intervals.” I note that this 100m length includes the entry and exit taper lengths and does not therefore correspond with the fully useable length of the ERA for recovery purposes.
5.7.7 Signage relating to VMSL, VMSL Ends, gateway signing and ERA signing is retained as detailed in IAN 111/09 and there is no prescriptive signage to assist driver interpretation.
5.7.8 Annex C of the document provides the requirements for economic assessment of the managed motorways and states at 3.1.2 that “Until long term data on the effect of managed motorways schemes designed to the new requirements introduced in Annex B on accident rates are available, it should be assumed that the introduction of managed motorways leads to a neutral impact on personal injury accident (PIA) rates in comparison to the Do Minimum. If MIDAS has not been installed in the Do-Minimum then a 13% reduction in observed PIA rates can be included for managed motorways.” There is no reference or explanation provided for this 13 percent reduction and it is therefore not possible to ascertain from this document what proportion of this reduction is associated with MIDAS only as opposed to the provision of ALR although I note that the use of MIDAS is referred to elsewhere as offsetting the increase in risk associated with ALR.
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5.8 IAN 161/12 All Lane Running (2012)
5.8.1 IAN 161/12 published in March 2012 gives requirements and advice relating to the design of all lanes running managed motorway schemes. Although termed an interim advice note, the IAN includes black box text which constitutes mandatory requirements which must be complied with. The document only sets out guidance relating to the ALR type of motorway and does not consider DHS requirements as CHE Memorandum 276/11 mandated that DHS schemes were not to be implemented going forward.
5.8.2 With regards road safety, at section 2.1, the report notes that the permanent conversion of the hard shoulder to a running lane, “removes the complex operating procedures related to opening and closing the hard shoulder and brings associated capital and operational cost savings.” I note that this IAN does not consider the adjustment of a DHS motorway to an ALR, therefore the removal of complex operating procedures is not a real-world consideration in terms of the implementation of the IAN, as these procedures are not in place in a standard motorway environment.
5.8.3 In developing the guidance in IAN 161/12, the VMS infrastructure associated with the operational ALR motorway is “rationalised” (paragraph 2.7) compared with the DHS schemes, to “improve value for money”. The use of value engineering to achieve a mathematical balance by compromising safety is presented and discussed at Section 7.6. A summary of these details is provided at Table 5.3.
5.8.4 This comprises increased spacing of information and verge mounted signage and signalling rather than portal gantries. The infrastructure requirements are further reduced compared with DHS as the CCTV associated with hard shoulder monitoring and opening is not required in ALR schemes.
5.8.5 With regards the provision of ERA, Section 2.6 of the IAN sets out black box text which mandates that “refuge areas must be included in the design, providing a place for vehicles to stop in emergency or breakdown.” These refuges must be provided per carriageway where the link between junctions is more than 1.5km in length and must be “viewed by a PTZ camera”.
5.8.6 The over-arching requirement in relation to ERA is set out at 5.24 in that throughout an ALR scheme, “refuge areas must be provided such that a road user never has to drive more than 2.5km from a decision point to a refuge area.” In achieving this, ERA are required to be provided on links between “through junction running” junctions greater than 1.5km, where refuges are defined as:
◼ Motorway service area;
◼ Hard shoulder on an exit slip or link road;
◼ Hard shoulder within a junction; or an
◼ ERA (paragraph 2.6).
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5.8.7 This is a substantial change from the original 500m spacing provided in the M42 pilot and equates to a journey time of some 1.3 minutes at 70mph. In the event of a breakdown resulting in reduced speed, this separation would equate to a travel time of nearly five minutes (4 minutes 40 seconds) at 20mph for example.
5.8.8 While this travel time is short in absolute terms, experientially this time will feel different to drivers who, depending on the weight of traffic on the running lanes at the time, may feel under pressure to continue faster or, due to vehicle failure, may stop entirely. In addition, depending on the vehicle location, it is possible for a driver to have no idea of for how long they would need to continue driving until reaching an ERA, due to the absence of signage as well as the range of locations considered to be ERA. I note that this 2.5km distance is not an absolute maximum as IAN 161/12 notes at paragraph 5.25 that the “2.5km distance may be extended where it can be justified on safety, cost, stakeholder and environmental grounds…”. This issue is further discussed at Section 7.4 and 7.5 with reference to the simulator trials that were conducted in 2010 and 2011.
5.8.9 Unlike the DHS specification, IAN 161/12 places no requirement for a vehicle detection system in an ERA, though notes at 5.45 that there must be comprehensive coverage of the ERA by pan tilt zoom CCTV.
5.8.10 It also states (paragraph 2.9) that the efficient operation of all lane running schemes depends on information being delivered in such a way as “not to cause overload of information, or leave the driver in doubt as to what to do.” Paragraph 2.9 also notes that the efficient operation of ALR schemes is “dependent on compliant driver behaviour in relation to speed limits”. Further, the “infrastructure, technology and procedures put in place enables the network to be managed in a way that delivers a level of driver compliance necessary to support the delivery of performance benefits.”
5.8.11 With regards to road worker safety, the document mandates at section 2.12 that the scheme design must “eliminate hazards and reduce risk exposure to road workers and traffic offers so far as is reasonably practicable.”
5.8.12 The provision for pedestrians in the event of a breakdown is specifically considered at section 5.17 which states that “a pedestrian who has left a broken-down vehicle must be able to reach a refuge without the need to walk on the carriageway. Therefore an assessment must be made of locations where the verge is discontinuous and the refuges located to eliminate the need to walk on the carriageway.” This requirement is alarming and incongruous in an ALR scheme which removes the hard shoulder and is associated with substantially higher live lane breakdowns. Given the absence of a hard shoulder, this requirement to review locations of ERA appears to deem acceptable that people could leave their cars in a live lane breakdown scenario, to walk a significant distance immediately adjacent to live traffic to an ERA to call for help.
5.8.13 Without a hard shoulder, this would place pedestrians immediately adjacent to live traffic for a distance of some 1.25km if they were half way between ERA, equating to between 12 and 15 minutes’ walk time. Given the stated need to minimise the
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implementation of vehicle restraint system to enable drivers to pull onto the verge in the event of a breakdown, there could conceivably be no type of buffer between pedestrian and live traffic in this situation. Regardless of whether the design is rightly taking account of these pedestrian movements, which are in line with the requirements set out in the Highway Code (see Section 10.3), the fact it is mentioned demonstrates an awareness of what could conceivably happen. While it is right for this to be considered, the question of whether the design outcome is appropriate is not addressed. This is salient to the consideration of the continued roll out of ALR.
5.8.14 The consideration of safety in a breakdown is presented in 6.34 in relation to CCTV coverage. IAN 161/12 states that CCTV coverage should be in excess of 95% of the whole scheme and that CCTV blind spots must not include ERA, “ERTs, maintenance hard standings (where provided) or locations where it is not possible for a vehicle to leave the carriageway in the case of a breakdown, for example viaducts”. Given that live lane breakdowns are identified as the single most substantially increased risk associated with ALR, and that pedestrians are associated with these events, it is inconsistent that blind spots are permitted on live lanes in IAN 161/12.
5.8.15 The only detail in the document in relation to safety assessments is at paragraph 6.44 which states that “each section shall be assessed in accordance with the core TA 9/07 principles (of running costs versus predicted accident savings) to identify which sections need to remain lit.” It is notable that this approach reviews the previous five years’ collision data to identify those which “give good reason” to indicate that lighting may be beneficial. Specifically, collisions which involve drink, drugs, vehicle failures, or compound contributory factors (such as following too closely resulting in sudden swerving or braking) are excluded.
5.8.16 The consideration of road safety is detailed in relation to the retention of street lighting only, and on the basis of the previous five years’ data with collisions with various causal factors excluded depending on whether “lighting may potentially be beneficial.” Not only are road safety matters not considered on a like-for-like basis, but in the absence of a hard shoulder, all types of collisions could conceivably benefit from the provision of street lighting in terms of mitigating causal factors, identification and recovery.
5.8.17 In this case, that collisions with compounded contributory factors or vehicle failure are excluded is concerning as a like-for-like consideration cannot be achieved. For example, existence of a hard shoulder for the previous five years means that vehicle breakdowns would have a continuous refuge, removing the majority of breakdowns from the running lanes and thereby potentially reducing collision numbers with live lane breakdowns and pedestrians outside their vehicle as a contributory factor. In addition, in its methodology the IAN excludes the types of collision which cannot be specifically mitigated in the design unlike, say, collisions relating to excessive speed. The latter are also excluded but are mitigated in the design by the use of enforcement technology and implementation of enforcement regimes.
5.8.18 In relation to signage on entry to the scheme, despite ALR being a novel road
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environment, IAN 161/12 provides less interpretive and instruction signage than was originally the case for DHS schemes. As I discuss at Section 5.4, it is my view that this signage was prematurely removed from IAN 111/09, and now with the provision of a new type of smart motorway it is incongruous that signage is not provided for on ALR schemes to advise drivers.
5.8.19 The entry signage for DHS schemes, incorporates three forms of signage which assist drivers in interpreting the scheme: ‘Follow overhead instructions’, ‘Variable speed limits ahead’ and ‘Refuge for emergency use only’. The ALR additional signage now includes ‘No hard shoulder for X’ and ERT advanced signage (paragraph 7.13). Therefore, by contrast with the DHS signage, the gateway signage for ALR schemes as set out in IAN 161/12 includes only ‘Variable speed limit’ gateway signage, and a conditioning VMS. The latter can display legends relating to the situation downstream. For drivers on entering ALR schemes, there is no signage relating to obeying the overhead signs, and none relating to ERA, which as discussed in Section 5.4 is common to enable appropriate driving behaviour outside ALR schemes.
5.8.20 The key differences between DHS design in IAN 111/09 and the ALR design in IAN 161/12 is provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Key Differences between IAN 111/09 and IAN 161/12 Compliant Schemes IAN 111/09 DHS Design IAN 161/12 ALR Design
Dynamic use of the hard shoulder, opening and Permanent conversion of the hard shoulder to a closing of the hard shoulder for congestion running lane management
Signals positioned near the start of each link supporting AMI and MS4s Single VMS at maximum spacing of 1500m capable of Gantries positioned at a nominal spacing of 800m providing the same information but using pictograms supporting AMI and MS4s and wickets Additional above lane specific signalling may be provided on longer links.
ERAs at nominal 800m spacing, usually associated ERAs at maximum 2500m spacing with gantries
Verge mounted signs with overhead direction signs Overhead direction signs mounted on gantries only used to aid clarity in immediate vicinity of junctions or in complex layouts
Provision of entry interpretative signage Requirement for interpretative signage removed (Source: ALR Demonstration of Meeting Safety Objective Report)
5.8.21 It is noted that at paragraph 2.2.9 the IAN relies on the “infrastructure, technology and procedures” to ensure driver compliance to support the “efficient operation” of the ALR schemes. Education and encouragement, which were previously identified as required for DHS schemes are now absent from consideration.
5.9 IAN 161/13 Managed Motorways All Lane Running (2013)
5.9.1 Published 17 months after the publication of IAN 161/12, this document makes a range
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of amendments to the preceding documents. Key amendments relate to:
◼ A new black box section relating to “Through Junction Running” is incorporated at 2.3 – 2.5. This text acknowledges that “operating a 4 lane motorway without a hard shoulder for long distances is a different experience for road users. It is important therefore to minimise, as far as possible, inconsistencies introduced along the route.”
◼ Paragraph 2.6 now reads “refuge areas must be included in the design, providing a place for vehicles to stop during an emergency…”, thereby removing the reference to the use of ERA in breakdowns;
◼ Figure 2-1 at paragraph 2.8 is amended to include a note indicating the inclusion of “ERA signing” in accordance with the IAN;
◼ Paragraph 2.9 has been adjusted to state that the efficient operation of ALR schemes is “dependent on compliant driver behaviour.”
◼ The requirement for designs to eliminate hazards and reduce risk for road workers as far as is reasonably practicable is amended to “reduce risks” only. The maintenance section now refers to the document “Generic Safe Method for Placing TTM on MM-ALR” at 2.14.
◼ The previous need to design out the need for a pedestrian to walk on the carriageway in the event of a breakdown is deleted and not replaced (5.17). As a result, the design of ERA locations no longer specifically takes account of the foreseeable potential for people to walk from their car to raise assistance and there is nothing in the guidance to prompt designers to take account of this foreseeable outcome in the event of a breakdown;
◼ Paragraph 5.24 decreases the frequency of ERA across the scheme so that a use is no more than 2.5km from an ERA “from a decision point.” Paragraph 5.25 amends the viable justifications for this distance to be extended to now include “safety, cost, stakeholder and environmental grounds, and endorsed by the PSCRG.”
◼ Paragraphs 6.31 – 6.34 are amended to incorporate the need for “full” coverage of the mainline running lanes. The wording relating to blind spots is amended so that “CCTV coverage must include refuge areas (except at Motorway Service Areas (MSAs)), ERTs, and maintenance hard standings (where provided).” The specific requirement to cover locations where vehicles cannot leave the carriageway in the event of a breakdown is deleted.
5.9.2 With regards to the signage associated with the VSL, paragraph 7.13 is now amended to provide additional guidance on the need for the ‘No hard shoulder for XX miles’ (TSRGD diagram 820.1) stating, “The sign must be located where it is sufficiently visible that vehicles requiring emergency use of the hard shoulder have adequate time to decide to pull over and still come to a stop before the end taper or decide to carry on. Also there is a need for the sign to be sufficiently visible from the hard shoulder that any driver of a vehicle which does not have enough space to accelerate and merge before the end of the hard shoulder can see this information.”
5.9.3 IAN 161/13 includes amendments which, individually present minor clarifications or
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adjustments. However, it is my opinion that these factors compound to weaken design from a safety point of view. The frequency of ERA is reduced, and statements which assist designers’ understanding are removed.
5.10 IAN 161/15 Smart Motorways (2015)
5.10.1 Published in November 2015, IAN 161/15 supersedes IAN 161/13, and IAN 111/09 and IAN 112/08. It presents design criteria relating to ALR and CM schemes.
5.10.2 IAN 161/15 substantially rewrites IAN 161/13 both in presentation and in content. One key change in IAN 161/15 is the removal of black box text from the document. Instead, ‘shall’ and ‘must’ are used to denote regulatory requirements. There is substantial additional information relating to safety including the provision of a safety baseline and objectives for both ALR and CM schemes.
5.10.3 Section 2.1 now includes, with reference to IAN 139, GD 04, and IAN 69, safety baseline and objectives for both ALR and CM schemes (see Section 6.3 for summary details on GD 04). This draws on validated STATS19 data for the scheme extent to determine the traditional motorway (dualled three lane motorway hereafter referred to as ‘D3M’) baseline which will be used to determine whether the scheme’s safety objectives are met. The safety objectives at 2.1.4 are that the ALR scheme will demonstrate for a period of three years after becoming fully operational that:
“the average number of FWI [fatal and weighted injury] casualties per year is no more than the safety baseline
The rate of FWI casualties per billion vehicle miles per annum is no more than the safety baseline
No population of the customer (for example car drivers, pedestrians, large goods vehicle (LGV) drivers and motorcyclists) is disproportionately adversely affected in terms of safety and risk to each population remains tolerable.”
5.10.4 This section includes the provision for the designer to “determine if additional safety mitigation measures may be justifiably deployed (that are not included in this IAN) that would provide an improved contribution to Highway’s England’s safety targets.” From my reading of the body of work associated with the smart motorway scheme development, I can find no details on the mechanism by which such measures can be identified and am therefore unclear on how the designers are able to contribute to the consideration of safety in this regard.
5.10.5 With regards to road workers, the IAN does not set out a specific safety target or objective. Rather, it makes reference to the Highways England ‘Aiming for Zero’ strategy and notes the legal obligation to manage risk “in accordance with the ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’” principle. Further, the document notes that “Highways England no longer permits live lane crossings on the motorway network and has an overarching ambition of having zero killed or serious injuries on the SRN.” This is reinforced at 2.2.12 which has been expanded to mandate that “the scheme must
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eliminate, reduce or control foreseeable risks that may arise during construction and maintenance and operations so far as is reasonably practicable.”
5.10.6 For CM schemes, the ALR road user safety baseline (i.e. the road in its current format) is used, with the road user safety target identified as, “the achievement of an improvement in safety equivalent to that normally expected from the implementation of MIDAS queue protection (10%) plus CM (expected to be 15%).” I note that “safety” is not defined.
5.10.7 IAN 161/15 appears to use ‘objective’ and ‘target’ synonymously, thus, in the scenario in which a D3M is the baseline, the safety objective for a CM is more challenging regarding an actual improvement (25 percent aggregate improvement in safety) than for ALR which requires only that the situation is no worse three years after opening than the baseline.
5.10.8 Given that the only difference between the two is the removal of the permanent hard shoulder associated with ALR, it can be inferred that there is nothing intrinsic about the removal of the hard shoulder which can derive safety outcomes. Therefore all safety benefits related to ALR schemes are derived from the implementation of MIDAS and VMSL, rather than from ALR’s unique characteristics. The objective for ALR implies that these safety benefits may be offset by the increased risks associated with the removal of the hard shoulder. Indeed, this appears to be supported by the risk assessment methodology relating to ALR which I discuss in Section 6.7.
5.10.9 This is significant as it consolidates the move away from DHS, which had safety improvement as a core objective, to ALR which required a situation no worse than the status quo despite the fact that MIDAS is associated with a 10 percent improvement in safety, and CM schemes with a further 15 percent. It therefore follows that there is an increase in risk intrinsic to ALR which was anticipated to be mathematically offset by MIDAS safety benefits. This approach is confirmed by risk assessment methodology and by the safety objective’s reliance on FWI data. This therefore does not appear to support, or be supported by, the Highways Agency’s stated position that road safety is of paramount importance as identified in their Aiming for Zero strategy.
5.10.10 Turning to the document’s consideration of infrastructure, the content relating to through junction running is reduced to a single paragraph. The user experience is no longer directly described, but is referred to as the “permanent conversion of the hard shoulder on the main line to a running lane also applied intra-junction and is the preferred operational regime as it offers benefits in terms of a consistent customer experience.” There is no evidence or reference provided to support this approach.
5.10.11 The provision of ERA is set out from 2.5.14. The majority of this section’s content is the same as for IAN 161/13 although, the latter’s 5.25 which states that the 2.5km distance between ERA can be extended under certain circumstances is here amended so that “the distance between refuge areas shall not exceed 2.5km” (2.5.25) without qualification.
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5.10.12 The layout of an ERA set out at Figure 2.5.1 presents a change from the equivalent figure in the superseded IAN. This figure now provides dimensions for component parts of the ERA design and includes white taper lining to the entry, collapsible bollards provided to guide to the exit and adjustments to the ‘No stopping except in emergency’ panel so that one faces oncoming vehicles.
5.10.13 Operational considerations for the ERA are also amended to include 2.5.51 which requires designers to “assess the potential time for traffic officers to reach live lane incidents taking into account existing turnaround points and junctions. The findings shall be reported to the PSCRG together with any potential interventions that may be necessary to allow traffic officers to meet their incident response targets.”
5.10.14 IAN 161/15 also sets out new requirements for VMS associated with the ERA at paragraph 2.7.23 stating that “for every ERA, a VMS shall be located upstream of the ERA such that a vehicle exiting the ERA is visible from all lanes at a point adjacent to this VMS. This is referred to as the ERA VMS. This enables the message “Slow vehicle leaving refuge area” to be set where required.” This provides additional protection of a known vehicle manoeuvre from the ERA by alerting oncoming vehicles.
5.10.15 CCTV is considered at 2.6.28 – 2.6.35 inclusive. IAN 161/15 amends the consideration of CCTV to require “comprehensive” coverage on CM schemes, defined as “the ability of operators to see in excess of 95% of the total scheme area and be able to interpret the images correctly” (2.6.28). Given CM schemes retain the hard shoulder, this allowance for incomplete CCTV coverage is understandable.
5.10.16 With regards to ALR schemes however, CCTV is to be provided with “full coverage” of the mainline carriageway running lanes with no blind spots to ensure that “a stranded car anywhere on the main carriageway should be readily viewed by a camera” (2.6.30). Further, “the coverage shall be such that an operator may interpret correctly the nature of each incident within the designed viewing range at all times of day and night, and in all ambient lighting levels whether the carriageway is lit or not… there shall be no blind spots (as defined above) in a refuge area.” This is a distinct change in design standard for ALR schemes, as it mandates full coverage and the quality of that coverage.
5.10.17 Although the description of CCTV in the IAN documents suggests that the whole carriageway is covered full time, this is not the case. I note that although the whole carriageway is covered by CCTV, it is not actively monitored and the verification of incidents requires RCC officers to seek and find the incident using PTZ CCTV cameras.
5.10.18 With regards lighting, IAN 161/15 paragraph 2.6.40 amends the approach so that designers are now required to identify whether any lighting assessments have been carried out on lengths currently unlit, and “whether there has been significant night-time personal injury collisions”. The superseded IAN (6.40) stated that where schemes are brought forward on currently unlit links, “lighting shall not be considered”. Paragraph 2.6.42 refers to IAN 167 to be used in developing the detailed collision analysis to exclude collisions “where it is clear that lighting has had no significant impact on the
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probability or severity of a collision.” These include:
◼ Intoxicated drivers. (drink or drugs)
◼ Suicides and attempted suicides.
◼ Excessive speeding (more than 50% over the speed limit).
5.10.19 As a result IAN 161/15 amends the minimum design criteria for ALR and CM to incorporate more comprehensive CCTV, ERA with an absolute maximum spacing distance, and additional protection for vehicles exiting ERA. These undoubtedly improve the ALR design in terms of safety, but the low level of provision for ERA and the inability to monitor for live lane breakdowns leads me to conclude that there is nothing qualitatively in this IAN which offsets the risk of live lane breakdowns for individuals involved.
5.11 Managed Motorways All Lane Running Concept of Operations v.2.0 (2013)
5.11.1 Published in 2013 to accompany IAN 161/13 this document sets out high level guidance on the operations of a managed motorway scheme and is highly aligned to the 2012 ‘Managed Motorways – Dynamic Hard Shoulder (MM-DHS) Concept of Operations v.3.0’. The Concept of Operations’ intended audience is those responsible for the design or operation of ALR schemes, “including those involved in incident management or maintenance activities, as well as those involved with communicating the details of MM ALR to customers and stakeholders” (section 1.1).
5.11.2 The introduction to the Concept of Operations states at paragraph 2 that the material is based on:
◼ Experience gained by Highways Agency and its stakeholders of operations on parts of the network with “features similar” to those proposed in the ALR design;
◼ Consultation with subject matter experts;
◼ Scheme designers sharing ideas and identifying best practice; and
◼ Feedback from simulation exercises, surveys and trials.
5.11.3 The intent of the Concept of Operations is to “demonstrate that an MM ALR scheme designed to IAN 161/13 can be safely operated and maintained” (paragraph 3).
5.11.4 The use of PTZ CCTV is identified as a key feature of ALR schemes, which will enable RCC operators to “use the CCTV images to remotely confirm incidents”. Further, it notes that “The MM ALR design does not require RCC resource to conduct close monitoring of CCTV images solely for the purposes of incident detection” (footnote 10). Given that enforcement relies in part on highly visible CCTV to give drivers a sense that their behaviour is being monitored, the lack of proactive monitoring for live lane stoppages runs counter to the impression that is implicit in the design.
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5.11.5 With regards to the lack of the hard shoulder, the report notes that “the MM ALR design is not fundamentally different to those sections of the existing motorway and multi lane all-purpose trunk road network that do not have a hard shoulder. However, it has the added advantage of having technology capable of detecting and monitoring events that are happening on the network, coupled with dedicated systems able to communicate appropriate advice or instructions to drivers, such as lane availability or mandatory speed limits. When these are used together, they help to create the necessary controlled, compliant environment” (paragraph 33). It is my view that this is an over- simplification (see Section 6.6).
5.11.6 Compliance issues specific to ALR schemes are identified at paragraph 67 as:
◼ Exceeding variable mandatory speed restrictions;
◼ Driving under a stop indicator (solid Red X) signals displayed above running lanes, or past closures set using lane closure aspects on a message sign;
◼ Non-emergency stops in ERA.
5.11.7 The report notes that DHS schemes have resulted in the routine use of ERA for non- emergency and therefore unlawful stops. In addition, it recognises that on parts of the network with reduced provision for stopping, the location of refuge areas “can influence the frequency of vehicle stops, according to whether they are seen as a desirable place to stop by the public” (paragraph 84). The Concept of Operations goes on to note that “It is anticipated that MM ALR schemes will experience a reduced rate of non- emergency stops compared to the levels observed before the scheme was built.” This is self-evident as the hard shoulder is removed and 100m usable ERA space is to be provided every 2.5km.
5.11.8 The report also states that “Engineering design will have particular impact on the appropriate use of Emergency Refuge Areas, given their potential attractiveness to drivers as a place to make short duration stops. Observed examples of non-emergency (and therefore illegal) use include drivers stopping for phone calls, comfort breaks, map reading, tachograph breaks, etc.” (paragraphs 85 – 86). While there are examples in this text of ERA stops which clearly do not comply with the spirit of the law, it is my view that what constitutes an emergency is open to debate.
5.11.9 Section 5 considers incident management and notes that as ALR schemes remove the hard shoulder, “the number of live lane obstructions is expected to increase, since a proportion of the vehicles that would previously have stopped on the hard shoulder will now be unable to reach the next refuge area or exit slip, and will therefore have no option but to stop in one of the live lanes. Once an RCC operator is made aware of an incident (for example: through an automated alert from the queue protection system, a phone call, or by some other means) the CCTV cameras can be used to validate the location and confirm the key features of the incident” (paragraphs 89 – 90).
5.11.10 The anticipated effect of incidents is set out in 5.1 which notes that in peak periods an
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incident in a running lane would quickly result in congested conditions, enabling slow moving or stationary vehicles to be detected through MIDAS. I note that this assumption is stated and not justified nor tested. As is identified in Section 7.4, this assumption has not been found to hold true. In addition, in considering off-peak conditions the Concept of Operations states that “the majority of vehicles would be able to ‘coast’ to a place of refuge.” The language used in this document gives the impression that breakdowns and incidents are measured, and that infrastructure is adequate as there is no discussion of the anticipated driver response to live lane breakdown i.e. exiting the vehicle into a live lane.
5.11.11 In managing the incident scene the document notes that “the lack of hard shoulder will mean that the RCC may be requested to set signs and signals, for example to protect a lane for police/TOS to stop or escort vehicles, or to assist with the recovery of a live lane obstruction”. This is due to the lack of hard shoulder requiring responders to “attend incidents without relying on a dedicated access route”.
5.11.12 In restoring the network following a collision, it notes that “Refuge areas may be utilised as temporary off-network storage locations. The requirement in IAN 161/13 that refuge areas are provided at intervals not greater than 2.5km will typically result in the provision of at least one refuge area per link” (paragraph 95). It is my interpretation that the use of an ERA for storage as well as the distribution of ERA, could conceivably result in just one 100m long refuge area suitable for HGV recovery being available in a 4.9km stretch.
5.11.13 Section 5.3.3 confirms that Traffic Officers are empowered under the Removal and Disposal of Vehicles (Traffic Officers) (England) Regulations 2008. The content of this section is aligned with the equivalent section of the 2012 Concept of Operations except for an acknowledgement in the 2013 document that suitably trained and equipped Traffic Officers may “regularly” be involved in towing vehicles up to 2.5km “and in instances where the nearest place of safety is occupied or otherwise unavailable, there may be a requirement to tow for even greater distances” (paragraph 109).
5.12 Smart Motorways Concept of Operations v.3.0 (2016)
5.12.1 Published in 2016 to accompany IAN 161/15 this document revises the 2013 Concept of Operations document and updates it to provide specific details relating to CM in addition to the guidance on ALR schemes.
5.12.2 Section 2.4 now acknowledges that “the increased live lane breakdown frequency expected on ALR sections requires a greater presence by on-road traffic officers in the carriageway, which can have implications on resourcing due to the concentration of breakdowns in peak periods” (paragraph 37).
5.12.3 Paragraph 43 of the document is revised to read “In an emergency, drivers within an ALR section can exit the network at the next available downstream junction, or alternatively stop in a refuge area. In addition, to a dedicated (i.e. bespoke) ERA or a
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motorway service area, the hard shoulder adjacent to an exit slip is also considered to provide a suitable location to stop in an emergency; however, these locations will not usually be fitted with an ERT.”
5.12.4 Section 4.4.3 is revised at paragraph 99 to read “The ALR design requires each ERA to be fitted with a pair of fixed ‘No stopping except in emergency’ signs (to TSRGD diagram 642.3); and an additional non-prescribed “Driver must use SOS phone and await advice to re-join main carriageway” sign (NP 2937), to further discourage unlawful use. Near the start of each link, a verge mounted ‘Refuge areas for emergency use only’ (NP 2935) sign shall also be provided.
5.12.5 Section 5.1 is revised to read at paragraph 106, “During off-peak conditions (typically high speed / low flow environments), the majority of vehicles experiencing potential breakdown are expected to be able to reach a place of refuge.” I note that this is a different assumption to that incorporated into the hazard log and risk assessment for ALR which assumes that half of all off-peak breakdowns will be in a live lane.
5.12.6 Later in the same section, the 2013 use of ERA as “temporary off-network storage locations” is deleted in the 2016 version thereby reinforcing that ERAs are to be for purposes related to road users only.
5.13 GD 301 Smart Motorways
5.13.1 In October 2020, IAN 161/15 was withdrawn and superseded by GD 301. GD 301 also replaces ‘Smart Motorways Concept of Operations’ and as such the document substantially rewrites both documents to present in the revised DMRB format.
5.13.2 GD 301 considers operational safety in Section E/2 and establishes a road user safety objective for ALR schemes, that “shall be deemed to have satisfied the minimum road user safety objective where each of the six safety indicators in Table E/2.6 are demonstrated to be better than the safety baseline, for the three years after full scheme opening.” The safety baseline is defined as “the current situation” and includes the six indicators at Table E/2.6 for three years prior to the start of construction of an ALR scheme. Table E/2.6 is replicated in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 GD 301 Table E/2.6 Safety Indicators Number Safety Indicator
1 Number (averaged per annum) of fatal and weighted injury (FWI) casualties
2 FWI casualty rate per hundred million vehicle miles
3 Number (averaged per annum) of personal injury collisions (PICs)
4 PIC rate per hundred million vehicle miles
5 Number (averaged per annum) of killed or seriously injured (KSI) casualties
6 KSI casualty rate per hundred million vehicle miles
5.13.3 The new safety objectives now require an improvement in safety whereas the safety
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objective for the preceding four years has required only that the ALR schemes are at least as safe as the predecessor road. Although the measures of the safety improvement are defined, the quantum of improvement is not. I note that the inclusion of safety indicators 5 and 6 in particular ensures a greater emphasis on addressing the collisions with the most severe outcomes which is more of a Safe Systems approach than has been in place prior.
5.13.4 For CM with MIDAS implemented, the same road user safety objective applies as previously, with the report noting that “implementation of congestion management is expected to provide a 15% safety improvement” (E/2.11) although I note that it is not set out whether this 15 percent is applicable to some, or all, of the indicators. Where MIDAS is installed as part of a new CM scheme, paragraph E/2.12 notes that “Implementation of MIDAS queue protection is expected to provide a 10% safety improvement in addition to the 15% safety improvement expected to be provided by congestion management.”
5.13.5 Section E/5 details design criteria for vehicle restraint and includes at E/5.10 that “maximising gaps between sections of verge VRS provides road users in an emergency with an opportunity to stop their vehicle in part in whole away from a live lane if they are unable to reach a place of relative safety.”
5.13.6 Section E/8 considers the provision of places of relative safety, including their spacing. Paragraphs E/8/1 and E/8.1.1 establish the maximum distance from entry point on an ALR scheme to a place of relative safety (PRS) as 1.6km with the desirable maximum being 1.2km. I note that this is broadly in line with the outcomes of the 2020 Stocktake report and similarly provides no explanation or rationale for the spacing (see Section 18.1 for my discussion of the Stocktake). This has been included in Table 5.3 which summarises the key components of managed motorway design guidance.
5.13.7 Any proposal for a distance greater than 1.2km is subject to submission to “the SCRG and Overseeing Organisation for acceptance” and the distance can be extended to up to 1.6km if the cost of providing a new place is deemed disproportionate by assessment and this position is accepted by the SCRG and the Overseeing Organisation.
5.13.8 Throughout an ALR scheme, paragraph E/8.4 states that “a place of relative safety shall be provided at a maximum spacing of 1.6km.” Further at E/8.4.1 “Throughout an all lane running section of road, a place of relative safety should be provided at a maximum spacing of 1.2 km.” The minimum spacing of these areas is identified at E/8.6 as 600m.
5.13.9 In relation to ERA layout, Figure E/9.1a in GD 301 revises Figure 2.5.1 in IAN 161/15 so that the layout now includes ‘CCTV in operation’ signage, maintenance hard standing if required, and replaces the ‘Emergency refuge area’ sign previously used with the ‘ERA final’ sign as detailed in Figure E/9.78. These ERA approach signs “shall be located a minimum of 100 metres and a maximum of 400 metres downstream of the entry datum point of the merge or entry datum point of an MSA merge” (E/9.48) A further revision requires the ERA surface to be provided in bright orange where previous documents
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required only standard pavement construction and dressing. The dimensions for an ERA in GD 301 remain as in IAN 161/15.
5.13.10 I consider the provision of orange surfacing to be helpful in some ways as the ERA will be more visible and distinctive. However, colours on the red - orange – yellow spectrum are associated in British traffic systems with prohibition or regulation e.g. prepare but do not advance/ stop if safe signal at traffic lights. While the ERA will be more identifiable, there is potential, unless accompanied by extensive education, for drivers to interpret this colour to mean that they are not permitted to enter.
5.13.11 Appendix E/B of GD 301 presents the Concept of Operations for smart motorway schemes. The operational overview for ALR notes at section E/B2.2.2 that “The permanent removal of the hard shoulder impacts the conventional management of incidents, as it takes away the ability to move broken down vehicles and other debris from a live traffic lane into a dedicated hard shoulder, or to use the hard shoulder as an emergency access route. These impacts are mitigated by smart motorway design components and operational procedures, particularly through the use of technology and place of relative safety provision.” These operational assumptions do not appear to be borne out by recovery operators’ experience as discussed at Section 9.6.
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Table 5.3 Summary Table Identifying Key Components of Managed Motorway Design Guidance Documents Refuges on Links Refuge Separation – Document ERA Technology Overall Detector Siting In-Road Technology Requirements CCTV between Junctions Whole Scheme
Detection (loops or Video PTZ cameras should cover as much of the carriageway as IAN 111/08 (DHS) Not considered Nominally every 800m Imaging Processing) and Nominally 400m MIDAS loop arrangement should be used. possible, with blind spots kept to a minimum. Monitoring (CCTV)
PTZ cameras must typically be installed at alternate gantries at ERA detection and up to 1.6km spacing to provide near blanket coverage of the Between 600m – Average frequency must IAN 111/09 (DHS) monitoring system must be Nominally 400m MIDAS Loop arrangement should be used. carriageway. Blind spots due to structures and bends must be 1000m be no more than 800m implemented kept to a minimum where practical, and must not exceed 5% of camera operational coverage.
CHE Memorandum Not stated Up to 2.5km intervals Not stated Not stated Queue protection system Comprehensive PTZ CCTV coverage. 276/11
PTZ CCTV required on main carriageway, refuge areas and maintenance hard standings or locations where it is not possible Never more than 2.5km Vehicle detection system on all running lanes for: incident detection; for a vehicle to leave the carriageway in the case of a IAN 161/12 (ALR) 1.5km CCTV only 500m +50m / -100m from a refuge area. queue protection; VMSL and congestion management breakdown, for example viaducts. Operators must be able to see in excess of 95% of the total scheme area and be able to interpret the images correctly.
PTZ CCTV required on main carriageway, refuge areas and Never more than 2.5km Vehicle detection system on all running lanes, for: traffic counting, queue maintenance hard standings. CCTV on carriageways must IAN 161/13 (ALR) 1.5km from a decision point17 to a CCTV only 500m +50m / -100m protection, VMSL, and congestion management provide full coverage of running lane carriageways with no blind refuge area. spots.
PTZ CCTV required on main carriageway, refuge areas and maintenance hard standings. CCTV on ALR carriageways must The distance between A vehicle detection system shall be provided, to include all running lanes, provide full coverage of running lane carriageways with no blind IAN 161/15 (ALR) 1.5km refuge areas shall not CCTV only 500m +50m / -100m to support traffic counting, classification, queue protection and congestion spots. On CM schemes, operators must be able to see in excess exceed 2.5km. management (VMSL). of 95% of the total scheme area and be able to interpret the images correctly.
Maximum 1.6km, Maximum 1.6km, desirable MIDAS and stopped vehicle detection In accordance with TD131. PTZ CCTV cameras are positioned to provide full coverage of 500m +50m/ -100m scheme GD 301 desirable maximum maximum 1.2km, minimum CCTV Stationary Vehicle Detection to provide at least 95% coverage of mainline the main carriageway, emergency areas and any maintenance average tolerance 1.2km 600m running lanes and emergency areas. hard standings.
17 Where a decision point is an ERA or the nose of an exit slip.
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5.13.12 Given the restrictions on use of the ERA and the absence of a demarcated hard shoulder, the question of what both constitutes and is perceived to be an emergency is particularly salient in considering the appropriateness of the design and the assumptions relating to behaviour that are embedded into both the design and operational criteria (see Sections 5.5). It is my view that the perception of what constitutes an emergency is not clear, even to the authors of the design guidance and a similar lack of perception is evidenced in the way that people use live ALR roads.
5.13.13 With reference to the events surrounding the deaths of Mr Mercer and Mr Murgeanu on 7 June 2019, I note that neither Mr Mercer nor Mr Murgeanu called the emergency services. Based on the records of the court proceedings18, I interpret this as being due to their concern to ensure that they exchanged details relating to the minor collisions and that this concern was most pressing for both. I also note that in the almost six minutes in which they were stopped some 147 vehicles passed the two men in either Lane 1 or Lane 2 and that some 30 – 40 of these witnesses later “expressed their annoyance at the fact that the vehicles are there” (p.9). Indeed, “despite that they were disconcerted and they were annoyed, clearly annoyed in the witness statements, no members of the public then of course picked up the phone to say what we’ve-- what we’re dealing with here is an-- and is an obstruction” (p.11).
5.13.14 It is notable that ALR risk management (see Section 6.7), design and operations assumes that breakdowns requires members of the public to call in emergency situations. However, it is striking that in the case of Mr Mercer and Mr Murgeanu not only did they not recognise the situation as being an emergency but in the order of 147 witnesses to their predicament failed to both recognise it as being an emergency and then act to call in to the emergency services. To extend the logic of this situation, in order for any of these 147 people who drove passed the incident to have physically called 999 would have required them to either have a hands-free mobile phone set up in their vehicle, or have found a suitable place to stop to make the call. The closest ERA was 0.8 miles away from this incident, but no driver stopped there to make a 999 call thus I am led to conclude it is manifestly not ‘typical’ for people to recognise a vehicle stopped in the live lane as an emergency and, critically, then act on that recognition thereby undermining the assumptions on which ALR risk management and operations have historically been based.
5.13.15 The operations relating to live lane breakdowns is revised in GD 301 to incorporate Stationary Vehicle Detection (SVD) which presents an alert at the RCC for “verification and action”. The document does not detail minimum performance criteria and does not discuss the shortcomings of SVD systems.
5.13.16 PTZ CCTV remain required to “provide full coverage of the main carriageway, emergency areas and any maintenance hard standings.” The operating regime identified at E/B3 notes that “Operations centre operators are able to remotely observe
18 R.v.Szuba, 2020, Proceedings Sheffield Crown Court, (2020)
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network conditions, confirm incidents and stopped vehicle alerts and where they are visible, verify signal settings by utilising the PTZ CCTV coverage. Smart motorways do not require additional close monitoring, although they may be identified as a higher priority in terms of patrolling, given that these scheme tend to be built on the busiest parts of the network.” This confirms that active monitoring of live lanes is not required.
5.13.17 With regards to compliance and driver behaviour, section E/B4 states that “a controlled environment is provided through the effective operation of appropriate infrastructure and technology. It provides the road user with the right information, at the right location at the right time; thereby promoting appropriate and intuitive driver behaviour through situational awareness.” Further, it states, “road users travel through a scheme in an environment where information and the presence of CCTV is highly visible and they perceive that their behaviour is being monitored.” This is a revision to the 2016 Concept of Operations section 4.
5.13.18 In achieving compliance with specific features, GD 301 notes the same three areas of potential non-compliance as the previous versions. However, the means by which compliance is to be achieved is revised for lane closures at E/B4.4.2 to read “where a digital enforcement camera is present, automatic enforcement of a Red X infringement is also provided.” Matters relating to compliance with VMSL and non-emergency stops in ERA remain substantively unchanged.
5.13.19 Section E/B5 relates to incident management, and continues to note that “the number of live lane obstructions is expected to increase, since a proportion of the vehicles that would previously have stopped on the hard shoulder in an emergency are now unable to reach the next place of relative safety, and therefore have no option but to stop in one of the live lanes or pull on to the verge where no road restraint system is present.”
5.13.20 This section of the report has been revised to take account of the changed infrastructure requirements of ALR. The historic reference to drivers making their way to the nearest ERA is removed and replaced with “Live lane breakdowns are detected by the stopped vehicle detection system on an all lane running section and an alert is provided at the operations centre. This is of particular benefit during less busy periods with low traffic flows. In busy periods any obstruction on a smart motorway quickly results in congested conditions, enabling slow moving or stationary vehicles to be detected by the queue protection system. This automatically sets messages and signals designed to help prevent secondary incidents.”
5.13.21 I note that this assertion is not supported by the findings of the SVD Monitoring in 2016 as presented at Section 7.7. Thus the safe operations of ALR schemes going forward, even with SVD systems in place, will remain reliant some of the time, on members of the public calling 999 to report incidents and obstructions. As I discuss at paragraph 5.13.15 there is evidence to suggest that this will not reliably take place in practice.
5.13.22 With regards to broken down vehicles, section E/B5.3.3 is revised to amend paragraph 118 from the 2016 version to reflect the amended maximum distances separating ERA.
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This paragraph now reads, “Suitably trained and equipped traffic officers are able to clear most broken down vehicles to the nearest place of safety, which may be a place of relative safety or a hard shoulder on a controlled motorway section. This can involve moving vehicles for distances of up to 1.6km on an all lane running section, and in instances where the nearest place of relative safety is occupied or otherwise unavailable there may be a requirement to clear for even greater distances.” The guidance therefore acknowledges that the proposition that the closest ERA may not be available in the event of a breakdown is realistic.
5.13.23 I note that the Concept of Operations does not differentiate the operational requirements of new ALR schemes and existing schemes. For example, the reliance on SVD may be applicable for new schemes going forward, but the absence of SVD on existing schemes for the foreseeable future means that assumptions in the Concept of Operations regarding vehicle recovery do not necessarily hold true.
5.14 GD 302 Smart Motorways: Upgrading Hard Shoulder Running to All Lane Running Operation
5.14.1 Published in October 2020, this document sets out design requirements and advice for upgrading DHS and controlled ALR sections to ALR operations. The guidance document notes at page 5, “as a result of the evolution of smart motorways, several variants now exit on Highways England’s network. Providing a consistent approach to hard shoulder use will improve road user understanding of smart motorways. Therefore, hard shoulder running and controlled all lane running sections that are currently operational are expected to be upgraded to all lane running.”
5.14.2 Controlled all lane running is defined at page 7 of the document as “a smart motorway which includes the permanent conversion of a hard shoulder to a running lane but includes technology and emergency area provision aligned to a hard shoulder running scheme”.
5.14.3 The design requirements in GD 302 are largely established in alignment to GD 301 with some differences relating to the provision of places of relative safety:
◼ “The minimum spacing requirements for places of relative safety in GD 301… shall not apply to existing places of relative safety on upgrade schemes” (E/8.2);
◼ “Where an existing emergency area does not meet the minimum stopping sight distance requirements in GD 301… and cannot practicably be improved t support all lane running operation, it shall be assessed for permanent closure” (E/9.2).
5.15 TD 131 Roadside Technology and Communications
5.15.1 Published in 2020, this document incorporates content from IAN 161/15 in relation to roadside technology and communications. Salient to this report are the provisions at:
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1.2 “on motorways incorporating VMSL, where the hard shoulder is used as a running lane or where it is dynamically used as a running lane, CCTV coverage shall enable 1) operators to see in excess of 95% of the total scheme area and be able to interpret the images correctly.
1.3 For motorways incorporating VMSL without a hard shoulder, CCTV coverage shall include the whole carriageway, emergency areas and maintenance hardstanding’s (where provided to enable): operators to see the entire mainline carriageway running lanes and the full extent of emergency areas with no blind spots in all ambient lighting levels.
4.5 For motorways without a hard shoulder or where it is dynamically used as a running lane, ERT shall only be provided at an emergency area and where siting requirements are met;
8.7 For motorways incorporating VMSL without a hard shoulder, SVD shall provide at least 95% coverage of mainline running lanes and emergency areas”
5.15.2 The current guidance and standards therefore continue to allow blind spots in SVD on live lanes. As the SVD system is relied upon for vehicle detection in new ALR schemes, it is of note that the limitations of this system are not discussed in the Concept of Operations.
5.16 Smart Motorways (All Lane Running and Hard Shoulder Running) Initial Incident Response National Operating Agreement (2017)
5.16.1 This document guides the operational partnership between Highways England and the emergency services and applies to ALR and DHS schemes. Incident response for CM is excluded from the Agreement as it is effectively the same as for a conventional motorway. The Agreement was developed from the Memorandum of Understanding for the M1 J28 to J35a and the Regional Operating Agreement for the M25.
5.16.2 Salient to this report paragraph 1.6 notes that “Collisions and other incidents can close carriageway lanes which adversely affects the economy” and paragraph 5.1 states that “Incidents will either be reported to the emergency services from the Highways England RCC, or by other means direct to the emergency services control room operators… During periods of heavy traffic flows, this is often a very short period of time but incidents can go undetected for longer periods when traffic flows are lighter on ALR motorways.”
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Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ I would observe that the design development is characterised by an excessive degree of change in design criteria. I can think of no other body of design guidance or standards which have been revised seven times in twelve years. The discussion relating to smart motorway user confusion, is largely generated by the manner in which design criteria have been quickly iterated and implemented. It is curious that this iteration has been so rapid given its association with increased risk of serious injury or death.
◼ This level of revision could support the concept that the design criteria have been subject to a high degree of testing and improvement. I can find no evidence to support this view. Rather, it appears that the principal changes to the design standards have been motivated by other factors. For example, IAN 161/12 noted only that cost savings could be achieved on smart motorway schemes through the implementation of ALR schemes rather than DHS. Road safety was absent as a motivating factor or key consideration.
◼ In the design development, safety considerations have been gradually weakened. IAN 111/09 was issued just four months after opening of the three first permanent DHS schemes. The removal in that IAN of the mandate to provide interpretative signage is surprising given that only 100 miles of the +1800 miles SRN were smart motorway at that time. This decision is, in my view, inconsistent with the acknowledged and long- established use of signage to facilitate appropriate driving in new road environments.
◼ There were further rapid changes to design criteria relating to the requirement to review locations of ERA to enable people to leave their cars in a live lane breakdown scenario, and walk adjacent to live traffic to an ERA to call for help. This design guidance served to prompt designers to consider foreseeable actions that drivers could take. The deletion of this criterion from the next IAN served to remove this useful aid to safe design.
◼ The comprising of safety is, in my view, clear in IAN 161/15’s safety objectives. Although a CM must achieve a 25 percent improvement in safety, ALR must only be no worse three years after opening than the baseline. As the only difference between the two is ALR’s removal of the hard shoulder, I infer that there is nothing intrinsically safe about the removal of the hard shoulder. All ALR safety benefits are therefore derived from MIDAS and VMSL, rather than from ALR’s unique characteristics. ALR’s safety objective implies that these benefits are cancelled out by the risks associated with hard shoulder removal.
◼ Live lane breakdowns are recognised as one of ALR’s main hazards. The design and concept of operations rely on MIDAS for rapid incident protection during peak periods. As was identified in later trials, this assumption has not been found to hold true. The design also assumes certain user behaviours in these breakdowns yet perception of what constitutes an emergency is evidently not clear to the authors of the design guidance and a similar lack of perception is evidenced in the way that people use live ALR roads.
◼ It follows that there is an increase in risk intrinsic to ALR which was anticipated to be mathematically offset by MIDAS safety benefits. This approach is confirmed by risk assessment methodology and by the safety objective’s reliance on FWI data. This does not support, or is supported by, the HA’s ‘Aiming for Zero' strategy. I conclude that the reduction and removal of design criteria in the successive guidance documents has incrementally compromised smart motorway design from a safety point of view.
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6 Highways England Guidance Relating to the Consideration of Road Safety
6.1.1 This section of the report present an overview of the various documents published by HE that set out the generic approach to road safety risk and hazard management in smart motorway scheme development
6.2 IAN 139/11 Managed Motorways Project Safety Risk Work Instructions (2011)
6.2.1 IAN 139/11 was published to provide the Work Instructions that are used to identify safety management systems (SMS) for MM projects, and then to apply appropriate safety management activities. Due to the date of publication, the report specifically mentions only CM and DHS schemes. The document provides different Work Instructions (002 – 004) depending on the complexity of the scheme. Schemes are identified as Type A, B or C schemes and are defined at 2.3 as:
“Type A Basic safety management needs to be applied. This will be satisfied by the application of existing standards and safety management process, plus a brief Safety Report will be needed.
Type B A moderate level of safety management needs to be applied This will include the application of existing standards and safety management processes, where they exist. However it will also require some additional some risk assessment [sic], plus a more detailed Safety Report.
Type C Rigorous safety management shall be applied. Where they exist, existing standards and safety management processes will still be applied, but by definition, much of the project will fall outside of existing experience. Therefore records shall be kept of all activities undertaken, all decisions and their justifications shall be recorded and extensive risk assessment shall be carried out. A comprehensive Safety Report will be required.”
6.2.2 As the IAN notes at section 1.1, “no MM projects will be classified as Type A”. Work Instruction 100 relates to selecting an appropriate level of SMS for MM projects based on the project features. Guidelines on the features for classification are provided at Table 2-1 in IAN 139/11 as reproduced at
6.2.3 Table 6.1. As noted at page 16, “the default position for all Managed Motorways projects is that they will require a Type B SMS.” Although discrete elements may be subject to a Type C approach to their resolution, the IAN also states that “it is unlikely that any Managed Motorway projects will justify full application of a Type C SMS to the whole project.”
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Table 6.1 Classifying Project Features Feature Type A Type B Type C
1. Stakeholder Interest
- Stakeholders Single or few Several Single or few Many Key Several or or or - Impact Limited Limited Significant Limited Significant Major/ critical
2. Operational Experience
- Extent Widespread Limited Some or None in UK or overseas - Where UK UK Overseas only
3. Technology
Used in - Technology experience (consider degree of Widespread different or Applied in part Not previously applied innovation and criticality of application) application
- Level of safety risk that introduced technology Low Medium High affects
4. Standards and legislation
- Design covered by existing standards All Mostly No New Standard
- Safety-related departures from standards None/ No Significant Some/ few significant Many significant or Some critical departures
- Changes to legislation None Minor changes only Moderate Significant
- HA Guidance Existing/ Not applicable Relevant new guidance available Major development in relevant guidance
5. Impact on Organisation
(consider structure, responsibility, competency, whole No changes Minor changes/ responsibility transfer Significant change or responsibility transfer life impact)
6. Project Scale
- Infrastructure affected Single/ small location Major locations/ implications Widespread/ national implications
- Extent of roll-out None/ minimal Moderate National potential
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6.2.4 I note with reference to CHE Memorandum 276/11 (summarised at Section 5.7) that although no ALR-type schemes were in place and there had been no trial of this new approach, ALR schemes were identified as Type B projects from the outset. This is surprising given the substantial risks associated with new hazards imposed on the carriageway as a result of the permanent removal of the hard shoulder as identified in Section 6.5.
6.2.5 Table 2-2 within Part two provides guidance on characterising six prescribed project features for smart motorway schemes and notes that; “The projects needs [sic] to demonstrate that the risks associated with the operation that will be introduced are sufficiently understood and mitigated.”
6.2.6 Part 5 of IAN 139/11 presents the Work Instruction for Type B projects and identifies at Table 2-1 the risk management activities which are associated with Type B projects. The equivalent Table for Part 7 summarises the risk management activities associated with Type C projects. The two sets of requirements are presented in summary form at Table 6.2.
6.2.7 In relation to both Types of project, the guidance notes “some limited variations” to the application of the project’s safety management process with the main deliverables for both Types of project being the Safety Plan, Hazard Log and Hazard Log Report, and the Safety Report.
6.2.8 At Section 5.2 of Part 5, it is noted that for Type B projects, the risk assessment activities “effectively ‘plugs the gap’ of existing standards and experience and makes sure that the project design and build includes appropriate controls for the safety hazards and risks associated with the project… The risk assessment shall consider safety hazards and risks the road users, construction operatives, Traffic Officers, and 3rd parties separately.”
6.2.9 The comprehensive risk management activities associated with the Type C project are “underpinned by a series of hazard analyses” (Part 7, Section 5.1). At 5.1.1. hazard analysis is defined as “identifying potential hazards and the associated collision sequences for a project. It also involves initial assessment of the risks associated with these hazards… Each [of the Hazard Analysis activities] involved the systematic examination of the project or project elements and its/ their environment, with a view to identifying potential hazards, their causes and appropriate mitigations.”
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Table 6.2 Summary of Type B and Type C Project Safety Risk Management Activities Type B Activity Brief Description Type C Activity Brief Description
Safety Baseline & Defining the current level of safety and the level Safety Baseline & Defining the current level of safety and the level which the project will work to achieve. Objectives which the project will work to achieve. Objectives
Defining the specific safety activities that will be Safety Strategy and Defining an agreed approach for delivering the safety objectives of the project and defining Safety Plan undertaken for the project. Plan all of the safety activities that will be carried out throughout the project lifecycle.
Identifying potential hazards and the associated event sequences that can lead to collisions and estimating the risk that is attributable to each of these hazards. Type C Hazard Analysis may include: Preliminary Hazard Analysis – to identify hazards that will affect the project based on the interaction of the project and its environment. Risk Assessment Identifying potential hazards associated with the System Hazard Analysis – identifying the hazards that can arise from the system design. Activities and Risk Assessment project and conducting appropriate risk Sub-system Hazard Analysis – identifying the hazards that can arise from the detailed Development of Activities assessments design of the system. Hazard Log Interface Hazard Design Analysis – identifying the hazards that can arise at both sub-system boundaries and also organisational interfaces. Operational and Support Hazard Analysis – identifying the hazards that can arise through the execution of the processes and procedures associated with the project. Commonly relates to maintenance and operation.
The processes to demonstrate that the project Verification & Developing a database to record all identified hazards, the associated risk from each hazard meets all of its safety requirements and to determine Hazard Log Validation and progress with mitigation. whether or not it fulfils its original intentions
The processes to demonstrate the project meets all its requirements, including those relevant to safety, determining whether any assumptions made in assessing risks are Documenting the safety work that has been carried Verification and Safety Report consistent with real data and determining whether the project fulfils its original intentions. out on the project Validation Typically a Verification Plan and Validation Plan will be developed with a matching report produced on completion of the activities.
Updating Safety Updates safety documentation to reflect any Documenting the evidence that the project has developed appropriate safety objectives and Documentation changes made once the project has commenced Safety Report that these objectives have been achieved. During Operation operation
Updating Safety Updating all safety related documentation to reflect changes to the project that are made Documentation During once it has commenced operation. Operation
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6.2.10 The principal hazard analysis activities identified at Part 7, paragraph 5.1.1. comprise the Preliminary Hazard Analysis, the Preliminary System Hazard Analysis and the Operational and Support Hazard Analysis the objectives of which are respectively set out below:
◼ Preliminary Hazard Analysis – “identify all reasonably foreseeable hazards that can arise from the project interfacing with its environment”;
◼ System Hazard Analysis – “identify the hazards that can arise from the project design through systematic examination of the design and its potential failure modes”;
◼ Operational and Support Hazard Analysis – “identify and analyse those hazards that are associated with the project processes and procedures carried out by people… it is primarily concerned with the procedural interactions that people have with the project systems rather than the functions of the project.”
6.2.11 Section 5.2.2. notes that the Preliminary Hazard Analysis should review and examine hazards identified at a series of workshops to identify:
◼ The collisions that could arise from these functions and operations;
◼ The hazards, which if they occurred, would give rise to collisions occurring. All hazards will be linked to a collision.
6.2.12 Section 5.2.2. goes on to note that “each hazard will be identified as sufficiently mitigated or in need of further mitigation.”
6.2.13 Section 5.3.2 of Part 7 notes that the System Hazard Analysis will typically be carried out with detailed design having started, as the outcome of the analysis may influence the design. This analysis is required to “identify any new hazards from existing work that may now be applicable to the design” that is, hazards that may have been identified on other HA projects should be reviewed to assess their applicability to the project. From my reading, the practical means by which this is to be consistently achieved is unclear although I note the need for all managed motorway projects to “establish a Project Safety Control Review (PSCRG) at the inception of the project” (Part 1, Section 4). This assessment is extended in the review workshop so that “collisions and hazards from previous projects now identified as relevant shall be reviewed and any project specific features taken into account.”
6.2.14 It is a requirement of all managed motorway schemes to establish a PSCRG which is responsible for reviewing Type B project safety deliverables or issues, and consider or make recommendations regarding Type C project safety issues to the National Safety Control Review Group (NSCRG). In addition, Project Managers are able to request the PSCRG to review specific Type B project safety issues for endorsement or referral to the NSCRG, or to review specific departure applications either prior to submission or following their rejection by technical specialists.
6.2.15 Part 8, paragraph 6.4.2 of the IAN provides guidance to Work Instruction 004 and notes
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that “the outcome of the [Preliminary Hazard Analysis] is essential input for the [System Hazard Analysis]. Other inputs will include… any additional applicable historical data from related projects that is available.”
6.2.16 With regards the Operational and Support Hazard Analysis, the workshops to review hazards identified are specified at 5.6.2 of Part 7 to include key stakeholders and members of the project who have between them “knowledge of user behaviour (this will depend on the project)” and should focus on “identifying hazards associated with the procedures that are examined.” Part 8, paragraph 6.7.1 makes clear that the reports associated with the other primary risk analysis activities are required to inform the Operational and Support Hazard Analysis being conducted. It also requires “relevant human factors engineering data and reports.”
6.2.17 The Risk Management Activities in both Type B and Type C projects contribute to the production of the scheme’s Safety Report which have respective objectives as follows:
◼ Type B – “summarise the evidence demonstrating whether or not the project safety objectives have been met” (Part 5, 8.1) The requirements of the Type B Safety Report include the provision of the Risk Assessment report (where it is deemed necessary), Hazard Log and Hazard Log Report.
◼ Type C – “summarise the evidence demonstrating that the project safety objectives have been met by summarising all of the safety work that has been done in association with the project and in doing so facilitating the safety approval of the project” (Part 7, 8.1). The requirements of the Type C Safety Report include the demonstration “that the overall effects of any changes in approach have not had a cumulative effect on safety performance that cannot be justified” (Part 7, 8.2)
6.2.18 The analyses and associated Hazard Log are used to inform the Risk Assessment for the project. In discussing numeric approaches to risk assessment, the guidance makes clear at page 200 that “despite the use of numbers, the risk score is at best semi- quantitative and does not provide an absolute measure of risk, even approximately. The methodology is designed to place each hazard into one of a number of bands, so that it can be seen clearly which hazards are considered to present the greatest risk.”
6.3 IAN 191/16 Safety Guidance for Highways England (2016)
6.3.1 This document supersedes IAN 139/11 and sets out guidance on the selection and implementation of an appropriate SMS. It is to be read in conjunction with GD04/12 Standard for Safety Risk Assessment on the Strategic Road Network. The IAN sets out the required approach to take in administrative and technical details when designing, constructing, operating and maintaining the strategic road network.
6.3.2 The Advice Note sets out new provisions for Type B and Type C schemes. The former are defined in Section 2.2 as projects which “could have some significant operational impacts” and “those which may lead to an increased level of stakeholder interest (specifically in terms of how safety will be addressed or managed)”. Type C projects are
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defined as “Complex, infrequent projects/ interventions which may have major implications for SRN. This will include the application of existing standards and guidance.” IAN 139/11 Part 1 Table 2-1 (reproduced in this report as Table 6.1) is retained as Table 2-2 in IAN 191/16.
6.3.3 Appendix A of the IAN provides details on the means by which SMS can be selected for projects and notes at A3.0 that as well as the experience of the project team, “Highways England’s corporate experience” should also be considered.
6.3.4 The need for primary hazard analyses including the Preliminary Hazard Analysis, and the System Hazard Analysis are retained for Type C projects (Table 3-1).
6.3.5 With regards to the categorisation of standards and legislation, A3.0 states that “’significant’ departures are likely to include those that, 1. Result in a considerable increase in safety risk to one population, potentially bringing the level of risk for that group close to the intolerable limit 2. Potentially affect a number of different populations, resulting in a material increase in the level of collective safety risk 3. Are based predominantly on judgement and risk assessment (e.g. to predict the impact of the departure on road user behaviour), resulting in a relatively uncertain assessment of the impact on safety risk.”
6.3.6 Appendix A3 also revises the guidance relating to pilots and trials so this becomes “take care to differentiate between pilots and trials that might only affect a relatively localised part of the network and any implementation projects that might follow; only categorise the project for the true extent of the network that it will directly affect.”
6.3.7 Appendix E presents guidance on the means by which the primary hazard analyses are to be undertaken. The guidance relating to Operation and Support Hazard Analysis is revised to include the provision in advance of review workshops of “details of any historical data containing information about collisions or mistakes that have occurred due to human error (this data may be available from projects that are similar and are currently in operation).”
6.4 GD04/12 Standard for Safety Risk Assessment on the Strategic Road Network (2012)
6.4.1 This standard presents the requirements for addressing safety risks in designing, operating and constructing Highways Agency schemes. As noted in the introduction to GD 04/12, until this document was published the Agency took a prescriptive approach to managing risk in projects, based on adherence to detailed standards. “These standards are based on research, pilot activities and many years of experience, capturing the necessary safety risk mitigation properties… The Agency has been successful in improving safety, but this means that future improvements in safety will be much more difficult to realise and thus a more refined approach to safety decision
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making is required…” (1.5).
6.4.2 GD 04/12 introduces the ‘trade off’ concept which it notes has been applied to managed motorways requirements. Black box text at 1.7 mandates that schemes ensure “that the safety risk impacts for different populations… that the Agency has responsibility for, along with their safety risk exposure and safety risk tolerance, are taken into account.”
6.4.3 Sections 3.5 and 3.6 present the Scope of Control for different populations in HA schemes. “Users” are expected to “comply with the law and the Highway Code and that they will take account of all the prevailing conditions (including but not limited to) the weather, road character and condition, traffic level and composition, and any warning signs…” Further, “’Users’ on the SRN can be reasonably expected to:
◼ Balance the safety risks of using the road network against the social and economic benefits of travelling;
◼ Have a general awareness of the safety risks that they are exposed to (through training, driving instruction and driving tests, road safety campaigns, media reporting of collisions, warning signs on the roads of specific hazards etc.);
◼ Have control over the safety risks to which that are exposes, of which they are reasonably aware, e.g. heavy rain, congested route; and
◼ Have a knowledge of their legal obligations whilst using the road and are aware that there is an expectancy that they comply with them.”
6.4.4 The concept of Globally at Least Equivalent (GALE) is defined at paragraph 4.7 as “The Agency will instruct when this principle applies and this will generally be where schemes are not primarily safety related. This situation may arise where the overall scheme is being promoted on the basis of reducing congestion. In this type of scenario the safety risk for ‘Users’ from some composite hazards may be allowed to increase as long as the overall scheme delivers an improved or as an absolute minimum the same global level of safety risk for ‘Users’.”
6.4.5 Black box text at 5.4 requires that “hazard identification must identify all reasonably foreseeable hazards to all populations collectively and individually, and for all modes of operation, using methods appropriate to the level of complexity of the issues… A systematic approach, using previous experience where it exists, should be used as a starting point. This may not always be possible, such as when dealing with a new or novel activity or situation, or when there is insufficient relevant and reliable data available.” It is my view that if the Standard acknowledges that the novelty of a situation or experience is salient in the designer’s consideration of hazards and risk, then it would be rational to extend the same consideration to users as they are experiencing a novel situation. I note that the consideration of uncertainty due to the novel environmental is not included in the risk assessment comments and therefore the designer is not prompted to consider the user experience.
6.4.6 The use of risk assessment processes is set out in Chapter 5. In relation to risk control
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decisions, paragraph 5.19 presents Black Box text which mandates that the use of trade off facilitates “a balance decision through a ‘trade off’ between reducing the target risk (the risk that you are seeking to address) and the increase in other safety risks… Work out the safety risk implications (benefits and disbenefits) for all affected populations, including consideration of how the control may affect human behaviour, (i.e. is there evidence to suggest that a population may behave differently because they feel safer or less safe).” This comment, in my interpretation, goes to the heart of the concern with ALR schemes. The controlled environment gives people the impression that they are safe, even when they are not.
6.4.7 Paragraph 5.31 provides an example of the trade off in action, stating that an extreme trade off example might be that “to spend £1m to prevent five staff suffering bruised knees is likely to be grossly disproportionate; but to spend £1m to prevent a bridge collapse capable of killing five people is likely to be proportionate.” Paragraph 5.33 notes that “the decision about whether or not a control measure is justified will often be based on economic grounds.”
6.5 Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running Demonstration of Meeting Safety Objective Report (2012)
6.5.1 This report aims to show that for ALR schemes the “safety objective is likely to be achieved” based on a qualitative review of the existing and new hazards in ALR schemes and a quantitative assessment of the associated risks. The report assesses the design set out in IAN 161 which establishes refuge areas at 2.5km maximum intervals against the road user safety objective set out at paragraph 1.3.2 which states that the safety objective will be satisfied if, for a period of three years on opening:
◼ “The average number of Fatal and Weighted Injuries (FWI) casualties per year is no more than the safety baseline, and
◼ The rate of FWIs per billion vehicle miles per annum is no more than the safety baseline,
◼ No population (e.g. car drivers, pedestrians, HGV drivers and motorcyclists) is adversely affected in terms of safety.”
6.5.2 The report’s approach relied on the risk hazard log associated with the DHS scheme and removed hazards specific to DHS designs, before adding in new hazards presented by ALR designs. One new hazard identified at Table 3-2 includes “Vehicle Stops in Running Lane” in peak and off-peak situations. This hazard is explicated further noting, “it was concluded that the nature of this hazard is different between peak (congested) conditions and off-peak (uncongested). That is, during congested condition [sic] is [sic] more likely that when the vehicle stops it will be noticed by the drivers [sic] of a following vehicle and queues will forms [sic]. This is less likely to happen off-peak.”
6.5.3 The assertion that a stopped vehicle being noticed is more likely to happen in peak conditions than in off-peak is of interest. Following this logic, if a stopped vehicle is
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spotted by a following vehicle during peak conditions, then by virtue of that following vehicle slowing down, MIDAS should trigger queue protection. There is no consideration of the alternative, i.e. that it is not noticed, and the statement in the report is not supported by the findings of the SVD trial (see Section 7.7).
6.5.4 In developing risk calculations, the report makes a number of assumptions. Salient to this report are:
◼ 50 percent of breakdowns will not reach an ERA, assuming that 50 percent of vehicles can “’coast’ or ‘limp’ a certain distance before stopping”;
◼ One percent of breakdowns stop on the central reserve;
◼ A pessimistic assumption is made that 100 percent of drivers of a broken down vehicle in a live lane “will get out and have a look”; and
◼ One percent of all drivers will drive under a Red X i.e. in a non-live lane.
6.5.5 The report draws on information relating to causes of live lane stoppages on the M4. This data, presented at Figure 3-1 of the report, indicates that the principal causes relate to traffic collisions, debris, breakdown, and animals.
6.5.6 In developing the risk level of the hazard of a vehicle stopped in a live lane, 3.4.3 notes that “this hazard is not always considered to result in a collision. For example, in the case of a vehicle fault, the vehicle does not usually stop suddenly, so drivers immediately behind have time to react. The following vehicle will be warned by observing vehicle brake lights, which may be supplemented by the use of hazard lights… As noted above there are more vehicle parked in carriageway accidents off- peak than peak (1.56 as many).”
6.5.7 I would observe that the reliance on driver(s) of following vehicles responding to brake lights in order to avoid vehicles during breakdown is somewhat at odds with the implementation of MIDAS. The MIDAS technology is used to control speeds and lane use in congested running, in order to reduce the number of collisions which result in these conditions. This implies that drivers are not entirely successful in observing and responding to brake lights associated with heavy queuing traffic, therefore by extension, it is not rational for hazard risk management to rely (even in part) on drivers’ observation and response to the same lights associated with a single isolated vehicle.
6.5.8 I find that the logic embedded in the assumptions set out in the report (as detailed at paragraph 6.5.4) does not take adequate account of the foreseeable driver experience on the road. Thinking through the possible sequence of events associated with a breakdown is illustrative:
◼ A driver notices an issue with their vehicle and has to make a decision about whether or not to continue. If they continue, they are likely to rely on coasting (as is assumed to be the case for half of breakdowns). If they stop, they will use their brake lights.
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◼ Vehicles immediately behind the stopping vehicle are running at speed. Depending on circumstances, some of these will overtake or otherwise manoeuvre around the vehicle, potentially without using their own brakes. Others will manoeuvre using brake lights and potentially hazard lights. At this point there is a significant speed differential between the breakdown vehicle which may not yet be fully stopped, and the vehicles upstream.
◼ Assuming that the two second headway under normal conditions is now reduced due to the speed differential, vehicles following but not immediately behind the breakdown vehicle will have less time to observe and respond to the situation. Brake lights and hazard warning lights may or may not be visible depending on how other drivers are responding to the obstruction. Depending on the speed differential, the headway may not be sufficient to enable the driver of the following vehicle to take avoiding action.
6.5.9 This sequence of events, which is clearly not exhaustive, demonstrates that the ability of upstream drivers to successfully avoid breakdown vehicles is a function not only of their powers of observation but also the behaviour of the drivers of the breakdown vehicle and the vehicles immediately behind it. Due consideration to this combination of foreseeable human behaviours would be appropriate in risk assessment, given the features combined in the ALR scheme design.
6.5.10 Although the report considers the hazard of a live lane breakdown, and acknowledges the increased potential for collisions to result from that scenario, there is no consideration of the hazard of a live lane collision. This is materially different from a breakdown scenario, both in terms of the act of being involved in a collision and in terms of the behaviour expected of drivers immediately following.
6.5.11 As discussed in Section 10.2 there is a legal obligation on drivers to exchange details following a collision. This legal obligation is well-understood and people are, in my experience, keen to do so at an early opportunity. This is borne out by the proceedings of R v Szuba, in the Judge’s noting, “those two gentlemen were doing what people do when there’s a minor shunt?”19 In not considering the similar but significantly different behaviour associated with collisions, I am led to conclude that the risk assessment and management process does not consider the foreseeable hazards which would be presented in an ALR environment as a result.
6.5.12 In analysing the hazards, section 4.2 states that “MM-ALR introduces a number of changes to the layout and technology provision on the motorway. Intuitively, the changes to the physical layout (most notably the permanent conversion of the hard shoulder to a running lane) are likely to lead to a reduction in safety. However, the provision of an extra lane will delay and reduce the length of periods of congestion (which in turn may reduce the conditions that lead to accidents).”
6.5.13 This assumption does not appear to take account of the TRL research regarding live lane breakdowns (see Section 7.4), and does not consider the behaviour of drivers upstream from the vehicles immediately behind the breakdown vehicle, who may not
19 R. v. Szuba 2020, Sheffield Crown Court Proceedings, (2020).
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benefit from having seen the vehicle in the process of stopping which is assumed to provide a warning to the vehicle following. The approach appears to consider breakdowns as short duration events rather than something that could be in place for some time without protection being afforded to the occupants of stopped vehicles.
6.5.14 In any case, the assumption that the extra lane will “reduce the conditions that lead to accidents” is a surprising qualification to find in this report. At the time of its provision, it was already well established that creating new road capacity generates new demand. Indeed traffic statistics have shown for some decades a continuous upward trend in traffic on the strategic road network and traffic on the SRN is forecast to increase between 29 percent and 59 percent by 205020. Any reduction in congestion and its duration will inevitably be temporary in nature and therefore cannot be relied upon as an assumption relating to safety over even a short period of time.
6.5.15 Periods of congestion are by definition associated with slower moving traffic which in turn are associated with collisions resulting in less serious injury than collisions associated with higher speed traffic. It is my interpretation that the potential reduction in absolute numbers of collisions appears to have overruled consideration of the context of collisions of greater severity.
6.5.16 In terms of hazard log scoring, 4.4.2 of the report finds that 15 of the 20 highest scoring existing risks reduce in severity due to the implementation of a controlled environment. Just one new high scoring hazard is introduced as a result of the conversion of the hard shoulder, associated with Vehicle Recovered from Emergency Refuge Area, and three existing high-scoring hazards increase in risk also. The comparison of safety risk between ALR and the D3M baseline is presented in aggregate at Figure 4-1 of the report. This shows that the highest scoring risks include H10 Driver Fatigue – unable to perceive hazards effectively, H136 Vehicle Stops in Running Lane off-peak, and H67 Pedestrian in running lane live traffic. The inference is that, due to the use of aggregated risk scores, the reduction of risk associated with the introduction of MIDAS mathematically enables the introduction of a measure which, intrinsically, substantially increases risk in the environment. This is confirmed in the Transport Select Committee’s report as I discuss at Section 9.3.
6.5.17 Overall, the report identifies that the safety objective “is likely to be achieved” for pedestrians, motorcyclists, HGV drivers, on-road resources, emergency services, recovery organisations, and disabled passengers and drivers. Improvements were identified to be required to achieve the safety objective with respect to maintenance workers.
6.5.18 I note that there is no discussion regarding the results in aggregate and what this means in real terms. In effect, the report states that live lane stoppages are increased and it assumes that all drivers in that situation will get out of their car to look at their vehicle. The report variously relies on MIDAS and following vehicles to mitigate some of
20Department for Transport, (2020). Road Investment Strategy 2: 2020-2025
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the potential risk. Each hazard is considered in isolation and thus there is no discussion on the foreseeable compounding effects of some of these hazards.
6.5.19 For example, there are more live lane stoppages during off-peak periods. During this time, particularly in darkness, it is my view that drivers are more likely to be fatigued and may therefore fail to identify a stopped vehicle. If all stopped vehicles have pedestrians associated with them due to drivers exiting, the resultant scenario is that the people on the carriageway are not afforded protection from MIDAS or other systems as fatigued or otherwise inattentive drivers travel towards them in free flow traffic conditions.
6.5.20 One cause of the absence of these considerations is the use of a traditional risk assessment methodology. As discussed at Section 3 the Safe Systems approach is based on human fallibility and limitations. While I acknowledge that the Safe Systems approach was not formally adopted by Highways England until 2015, its use was known internationally as best practice for at least four years prior to publication of this document. It is my opinion that in developing a new road typology, best practice in considering road safety should have been sought out and taken. As a result of not doing so and rather in taking a traditional approach I would conclude that the ALR scheme has not been designed with fallible human users in mind and has therefore not maximised the level of intrinsic safety.
6.6 Smart Motorways All Lane Running Generic Safety Report (2015)
6.6.1 This document states that its purpose is to “demonstrate that the appropriate level of safety management has been undertaken to assess the expected safety performance for the implementation of ALR”. It also notes that a safety objective has been set for ALR schemes and is “likely to be achieved” (p. 5). This documents inter-relates with the ALR GD04 assessment report.
6.6.2 The road user safety objective modifies that established in the ALR Demonstration of Meeting Safety Objective 2012 report to now become, “An ALR scheme will satisfy the road user safety objective if it is demonstrated for a period of three years after becoming fully operational that:
◼ The average number of FWI casualties per year is no more than the safety baseline;
◼ The rate of FWIs per billion vehicle miles per annum is no more than the safety baseline;
◼ No population (e.g. car drivers, pedestrians, HGV drivers and motorcyclists) is disproportionately adversely affected in terms of safety and risk to each population remains tolerable. (Where different forms of managed motorways are proposed on opposing carriageways, for example, controlled motorways and ALR, then the road user benefits should be considered per link per carriageway)” (p.6).
6.6.3 In terms of the SMS selection, page 7 notes that “ALR has been classified as ‘Type B’. This represents a ‘medium’ level of safety management.”
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6.6.4 With regards to reducing risk, paragraph 1.2.4 states that “it is common practice to review the cost benefit of the different options and select those that show the optimum cost benefit. That said, this cannot be done in isolation as other factors need to be taken into account, such as the tolerable level of risks.” Deciding on a tolerable level of risk is explored at 1.2.7 which notes that this may need to take account of a number of criteria including:
◼ A maximum level of risk that is deemed tolerable for the section of road. This might consist of a percentage of the overall network or regional risk or an absolute criterion in terms of road users fatal and weighted injury (FWI) casualties;
◼ Levels of performance for risk mitigation systems that are deemed to be a minimum for the duty of care to be met; and
◼ The overall effects of the actions taken.
6.6.5 In demonstrating the meeting of the safety objective, section 4.2 details the qualitative and semi-quantitative comparison of ALR with the safety baseline i.e. D3M without implementation of any part of ALR including MIDAS. The numerical calculations are used “as a tool for guiding the construction of a qualitative argument” (4.2.3).
6.6.6 Section 4.2 also discusses hazard management and the risk assessment approach. In developing an evidence-led approach, the results from monitoring of the M42 pilot are used as well as the preliminary results from the first year of monitoring of the ALR scheme implemented on the M25. At 6.1.3, the report notes that initial findings from the M25 monitoring had identified that:
◼ Actual live lane stoppages were comparable to the predicted numbers;
◼ A “considerable amount” of non-emergency stops were made in ERA; and
◼ Driver compliance with Red X signs was poor at times, particularly during periods of high traffic flow.
6.6.7 I note that there is no discussion relating to how these findings should be used to either inform the risk management process, or review the ALR design. This is of particular concern as it implies that MIDAS is not offering the anticipated level of mitigation to peak period live lane breakdowns as was originally assumed due to lack of compliance.
6.6.8 Evidence is provided in this document to compare All Purpose Trunk Roads (APTR) which do not have a hard shoulder, with D3M which do have a hard shoulder. The intention of this work was to “better understand the likely safety implications of the road layout component of ALR” (Section 6.2). This work identified that three-lane APTR have a 9% higher rate of KSI collisions than D3M roads without MIDAS. For KSI casualties, the rate is 5% higher. As a result of this analysis the report concludes that the comparison demonstrates a need “to constrain the possible safety impact of ALR to less than 9% greater than the baseline” in order to maintain pre-existing safety levels on motorways subject to ALR schemes.
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6.6.9 In summary, I note that this report is stating that by comparison with three lane APTR, removing the hard shoulder results in nine percent more collisions resulting in death or a serious injury. The design is therefore reliant on MIDAS to achieve the improvement in these collision rates to ensure that the road schemes meet their safety objective of maintaining the status quo with regards to road safety.
6.6.10 Because the ALR layout shares characteristics with the APTR layout. An analysis of the safety hazards associated with the APTR in comparison with the D3M identified:
◼ “A four to five fold increase in the frequency of vehicle parked in main carriageway accidents
◼ An increase in the frequency of accidents involving vehicles leaving the carriageway
◼ No increase in the frequency of fatigue related accidents
◼ An increase in frequency of pedestrian accident [anticipated due to the different levels of access to the road]
◼ No increase in the frequency of debris related accidents
◼ An increase in the frequency of accidents involving a motorcycle.”
6.6.11 While I agree in part with the comparison between ALR and APTR with regards the removal of the hard shoulder, it is my opinion that these roads are of two distinct and different orders reflecting the weight of traffic and strategic hierarchy of the routes concerned. This is borne out by motorways’ designation, through legislative means, as a Special road. I understand this designation to mean that there is a complete ban on all types of user on the Special Road unless specifically permitted under the relevant Act or Statutory Instrument. As a result, there are strict limits on the types of vehicle that can use them, the absence of at-grade pedestrian crossings and no Public Rights of Way traversing them.
6.6.12 The position with respect to motorways is the polar opposite of all other roads which are considered as ‘all purpose’. For these all purpose roads, all users are permitted to use an all purpose road unless they are specifically prohibited. This prohibition is established via a traffic regulation order and the erection of associated signage. By extension, all purpose trunk roads are a substantively different class of road and it is my view that they are treated as such in design, in regulation, and in use.
6.7 Smart Motorways All Lane Running GD04 Assessment Report (2015)
6.7.1 This 2015 report sets out the approach and outcomes of the safety risk assessment for the ALR concept, in accordance with GD04/12. The purpose of the report is to “demonstrate that for ALR the safety objectives are likely to be achieved.” The document draws on a qualitative review of the “highest risk ‘existing’ motorway hazards and the ‘new’ hazards introduced by ALR” (p.6).
6.7.2 The report identifies one highest scoring new hazard ‘H113 – Vehicle exits emergency
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refuge area’ and notes that two of the high-scoring existing hazards increase in risk, ‘H135 – Vehicle stops in running lane – off peak’ and ‘H149 – Vehicle drifts off carriageway’. This latter hazard is defined as a vehicle leaving the carriageway as a result of road environment. The report concludes that the impact of the new highest scoring hazard and increase to the two existing highest scoring hazards is “expected to be countered by the decrease in risk of existing highest scoring hazards” (p.6)
6.7.3 Section 4.4.1 provides details relating to this hazard of “vehicle parked in running lane” including the outcome of research which is summarised at Tables 4-4 and 4-5. This data shows that the number of accidents and KSI casualties was higher on existing ALR schemes (0.21 and 0.15) than on D3M schemes (0.13 and 0.10 respectively). This shows that more vehicles stopped in a live lane are involved in a collision on an ALR scheme than a conventional three-lane motorway, and more people sustain a serious injury or die as a result.
6.7.4 This is an important finding which provides a perspective on the safety objective for the ALR scheme. By focussing on a mathematical balance of FWI outcomes, the safety objective fails to observe that the positive safety benefits of MIDAS do not offset the negative safety effects of removing the hard shoulder as is assumed in the risk management processes (see Section 6.6). I would contend that, at a fundamental level, a reduction in slight injury collisions cannot be said to equivalently offset an increase in fatal or serious injury collisions on the ALR schemes.
6.7.5 The data also shows that this type of collision is more likely to take place during off- peak periods. However, the collisions are more likely to result in a KSI during peak periods (24%) than off-peak periods (19%). Peak is defined in this report only as “congested conditions” (4.4). Table 4-5 also shows that vehicles stopped in a running late comprised approximately 40% of the total KSI collisions during peak periods compared with 61% during off-peak periods.
6.7.6 Section 4.4.3 discusses the probability of vehicles being stopped in a running lane resulting in a KSI. This uses an analysis of breakdowns in live lanes and resulting PICs to derive an approximate rate of 1 in 1,000 occurrences during the peak period. During the off-peak period there are 156% more occurrences. Non-breakdown causes are not separately identified e.g. minor collisions resulting in stopping in a live lane.
6.7.7 Section 5.1 identifies the assumptions used in developing the hazard log. Salient to this report are:
◼ A37 Percentage of breakdowns that cannot be fixed on site and require towing – 25%
◼ A38 Percentage of breakdowns that fail to reach a refuge – 50% (this report is based on the maximum spacing for ERA of 2,500m).
6.7.8 Section 5.3 provides an overview of the data gathering used to analyse the hazards and notes that “Intuitively, the changes to the physical layout (most notably the permanent conversion of the hard shoulder to a running lane) are likely to lead to a reduction in
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safety… In order for ALR to achieve its safety objective, the increases in safety risk that may be introduced by the change in road layout need to be balanced by the provision of technology providing a safe driving environment.” This section makes reference to the “Provision of adequate guidance review” which suggests that the ALR “is likely to lead to an adequate level of driver compliance (i.e. responding as appropriate to signs and signals).”
6.7.9 Section 5.4 notes that the new hazards resulting from ALR “are expected to add 4%... to the existing risk… Therefore to match or better the safety baseline the risks associated with existing hazards must decrease by more than 4% as a result of implementation of the scheme.” I note that this considers the risk in aggregate and does so potentially to mathematically achieve the safety objective. Further, “The impact of the new highest scoring hazard and increase to one existing highest scoring hazard is expected to be countered by the decrease in risk of existing highest scoring hazards.”
6.7.10 The consideration of the total risk in aggregate is, in my opinion, illogical for two reasons. Firstly, most risks are unrelated and therefore aggregation does not stand to real world experience. Second, by aggregation, the reduction in risk levels associated with some hazards mathematically offset the very substantial (>200 percent) increase in risk associated with others, such as stopping in a live lane. I would challenge the rationale and ethics of failing to address a substantial change in risk in one area, because of a mathematical balance. This is all the more so when it is clear that the travelling public do not immediately perceive a live lane breakdown to be a significantly dangerous situation. This is borne out by the findings of the ‘2017 Smart Motorways Research’ (see Section 9.4) which found that people perceived the risk only when prompted.
6.7.11 The view that consideration of risk in aggregate is inappropriate is shared by the Transport Select Committee which stated in its 2016 report that, “decreasing risk in one area does not justify an increase in risk elsewhere. The concept of ‘overall risk’ becomes arbitrary in a system made up of independent factors, especially where the cause of the reductions and the increases in risk are disconnected.”21 By not specifically addressing KSI collisions, the consideration of risk in aggregate does not align with the Safe Systems approach which was adopted by Highways England in 2015.
6.7.12 Table 5-2 of the report sets out the changes in risk score for high risk hazards. Hazards which may relate to live lane breakdowns are presented in Table 6.3.
21 House of Commons Transport Committee, (2016). All Lane Running Second Report of Session 2016-17. (p.18)
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Table 6.3 Change in risk score for high risk hazards which may relate to live lane breakdowns % Before After Change Hazard Description Type Safety Safety Comments in Safety Risk Risk Risk
Driver fatigued – No change. No unable to benefit from ALS H138 Event E09.00 E09.00 0 perceive especially when signs hazards and signals are off. effectively
Considerable benefit from the controlled Individual environment during H37 vehicle is State S09.00 S08.77 -42 the peak but also driven too fast benefit off-peal (compliance with national speed limit)
Benefit from the controlled Pedestrian in environment. H67 running lane – Event E08.50 E08.00 0 However, more live traffic instances due to increase in live lane breakdowns
An increase in risk is Vehicle stops anticipated reflecting in running a substantial increase H135 Event E07.81 E08.31 216 lane – off- in the frequency of peak (event) vehicles stopping in a running lane
Considerable benefit from the controlled H91 Tail gating State S08.50 S08.50 -49 environment during the peak
More robust and more frequent signalling: controlled environment Driver ignores perception for closed lane(s) motorists; but more H11 signals that Event E08.00 E08.00 0 live lane breakdowns are protecting and monitoring of first an incident ALR schemes shows lack of driver compliance with Red X signals (Source: Table 5-2, ALR GD04 assessment report)
6.7.13 It is unclear why, when the 2015 data shows that there is poor compliance with Red X and that there are more KSI collisions for live lane breakdowns in the peak period, that this risk assessment has not adjusted the level of risk for pedestrians in a live lane.
6.7.14 Section 5.4.1 provides more details on the considerations relating to H135 – Vehicle
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stops in running lane and notes that the increase against the D3M baseline is associated with the absence of a hard shoulder and the assumption that “not all vehicles will be able to reach a refuge area.” Further, “ALR is expected to eliminate illegal stops currently taking place on the hard shoulder.” While this is an obvious statement given the removal of the hard shoulder, I am led to the view that this runs counter to the data provided in the 2015 Generic Risk Report which noted a high level of non-emergency stops in ERA. As a result of drivers using ERA or the verge to stop, the report assumes some 0.35 live lane breakdowns per day per carriageway mile.
6.7.15 With regards to H67 – Pedestrian in running lane – live traffic, the report states that there “will be increased monitoring to detect vehicles stopped in a live lane and MIDAS will be available to protect a stopped vehicle, if a queue develops, which will provide significant benefit during congested periods. In addition, lane signals and VMS signs can be used to protect a vehicle stopped in a running lane and any pedestrians in the vicinity of that vehicle.” I note that no such reference to increased monitoring to detect stopped vehicles is made in the ALR Generic Safety Report and there is no monitoring in the Concept of Operations (see Section 5.11).
6.8 Smart Motorways Controlled Motorways Generic Safety Report (2015)
6.8.1 Published in 2015, this report states that it demonstrates “that the appropriate level of safety management has been undertaken to assess the expected safety performance for the implementation of a generic controlled motorways (CM) scheme and that it should be able to achieve both its safety target and objective” (p.5). A standalone GD04 assessment was not produced for CM schemes.
6.8.2 The safety objective identified for road users of CM schemes is to achieve an improvement “equivalent to that normally expected from the implementation of MIDAS queue protection (10%)… and CM (15%).” With the equivalent road with a retained hard shoulder generating a substantial improvement in road safety, this safety objective reinforces my conclusion that ALR schemes are intrinsically unsafe.
6.8.3 The document applies a Type A SMS with some Type B features, noting that this “represents a ‘basic’ level of safety management, complemented by additional assessment for the type B features” (p.6). As a result of a Type A SMS being selected, the report does not include a hazard log and associated report.
6.8.4 At section 3.2 this document notes that “the work presented in this document has been carried out by the same team that carried out the hazard assessment work on the following Highways England projects:
◼ M42 Active Traffic Management Pilot scheme;
◼ Birmingham Box phases 1, 2 & 3 schemes;
◼ M1 J28 – 35a smart motorway ALR scheme;
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◼ M4 J3 – 12 smart motorway ALR scheme.”
6.9 GG 104 Requirements for Safety Risk Assessment (2018)
6.9.1 Published in 2018, GG 104 superseded GD04/12 and IAN 191/16. Although the Safe Systems approach is not mentioned specifically, this document presents an approach to safety risk assessment which moves towards that methodology. Notably, the content in GD04/12 relating to compliant users in relation to the Highways England Scope of Control has been removed, as has the discussion at Sections 3.5 and 3.6 of GD04/12 relating to HE’s reasonable expectations of users.
6.9.2 GG 104 is also silent on the GALE principal which in GD04/12 had been used to accept that the safety risks for some composite hazards could be allowed to increase if the whole scheme gives an improved global level of safety risk.
6.9.3 With the removal of these elements, the risk assessment process is more aligned with some of the Safe Systems principles. However, the removal of a previous obligation (i.e. to assume a compliant user) is not the same as making plain the requirement to do the inverse. I note that GG 104 is silent on the type of use to be considered in developing a risk assessment.
6.9.4 In considering safety baselines and safety objectives Sections 2.17 to 2.22 does not differentiate severity of outcome, nor does it speak to the relevance of considering severe or fatal outcomes. Indeed, Table D.1 in presenting risk value associated with likelihood and severity, presents categories of severity of outcome which are afforded different weights. The table presents little in the way of differentiating between slight and serious outcomes, and there is insufficient weighting given to serious outcomes so as to trigger the activity prohibited. I interpret this as counter to the Safe Systems approach.
6.9.5 I also note that in identifying risk mitigations, section 3.13.1 of the document states that FWIs can be used as suitable metrics to inform a BCR. Again, given the FWI’s inclusion of slight outcomes, I am led to the view that this approach does not accord with the Safe Systems principles.
6.9.6 While GG 104 does present a move towards Safe Systems, it is my view that it does not fulfil some of the fundamental principles of Safe Systems approach i.e. designing with human capabilities and fallibilities in mind.
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Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ GD 04/12 in 2012 introduced the ‘trade off’ concept which it noted has been applied to managed motorways requirements. This mandates a decision through a ‘trade off’ between reducing the target risk and the increase in other safety risks. This decision is highlighted as including consideration of how the control may affect human behaviour, i.e. people may behave differently because they feel safer or less safe. This, in my view, goes to the heart of the concern with ALR schemes. The controlled environment gives people the impression that they are safe, even when they are not.
◼ GD04/12’s reliance on the additional road space generated by removing the hard shoulder to reduce the conditions that lead to accidents is surprising. In 2012, it was well established that creating new road capacity generates new demand. Any reduction in congestion and its duration on ALR will be temporary in nature and therefore cannot be relied upon as an assumption relating to safety.
◼ One cause of the absence of these considerations is the use of a traditional risk assessment methodology. While I acknowledge that the Safe Systems approach was not formally adopted by Highways England until 2015, its use was known internationally as best practice for at least since 2008. It is my opinion that in developing a new road typology, best practice should have been sought out and taken. As a result of not doing so I conclude that ALR has not been designed with fallible human users in mind and has therefore not maximised the level of intrinsic safety.
◼ The use of APTR in the Generic Safety Report to estimate the likely increase in collisions associated with ALR is an example of this traditional, trade-off approach to road safety. This approach is concerning as, in my view, there are substantive differences in use and in expectation between APTR and a motorway environment and I would maintain that APTR is not a suitable surrogate for an ALR context. The resultant estimate shows nine percent more collisions resulting in death or serious injury due to removing the hard shoulder. The design is therefore reliant on MIDAS to meet the safety objective.
◼ The consideration of the total risk in aggregate is, in my opinion, illogical for two reasons. Firstly, most risks are unrelated and therefore aggregation does not stand up to real world experience. Second, by aggregation, the reduction in risk levels associated with some hazards mathematically offset the very substantial increase in risk associated with others, such as stopping in a live lane. I would challenge the rationale and ethics of failing to address a substantial change in risk in one area, because of a mathematical balance.
◼ More recently, in 2018, GG 104 does not mention the Safe Systems approach specifically, but presents an approach to safety risk assessment which moves towards that methodology. Notably, the previous assumptions that users would be compliant has been removed, as has the GALE principal which had been used to allow some safety risks to increase if the whole scheme gave an improved global level of safety risk.
◼ While GG 104 does present a move towards Safe Systems, it is my view that it does not fulfil some of the most fundamental principles of Safe Systems approach: designing with human capabilities and fallibilities in mind.
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7 Managed Motorways Trials and Studies
7.1.1 The development of smart motorways design has included a number of pilots and trials. A selection of trials and their outcomes are discussed in this section.
7.2 M42 Active Traffic Management Pilot Assessment Strategy (2002)
7.2.1 The M42 Active Traffic Management (ATM) pilot, hereafter referred to as ‘the M42 pilot’, ran between Junction 7 and Junction 3A, a distance of approximately 17 km (10.5 miles) from 1 February 2006 until 30 September 2009. For the first six months VMSL was implemented on the three running lanes of each carriageway with this initial operational regime trial ceasing on 31 July 2006. A further operational regime, testing the use of the hard shoulder as a running lane alongside VMSL, was undertaken for a total of three years from 1 October 2006 to 30 September 2009.
7.2.2 The M42 pilot was carried out on a section of the motorway which carried some 120,000 vehicles daily and provided more than 50 gantries for driver information signage and 41 ERA along the trial length22 equating to one ERA approximately every 500m. The M42 pilot was supported by an Assessment Strategy developed between Highways Agency and TRL. As stated in the Assessment Strategy the purpose of the trial was to “pilot the concept of ATM… [which] aims to make the best use of the existing network without compromising safety and without necessarily building new sections or widening the road.” The objectives of the M42 pilot included to:
◼ Reduce congestion and delay;
◼ Improve Safety;
◼ Reduce the impact of accidents; and to
◼ Develop guidance for the wider use of ATM on the motorway network.
7.2.3 The M42 pilot included the consideration of multiple Candidate Operational Regimes (referred to in the document as COREs) which included integrated incident management, VMSL, and conversion of the hard shoulder. The Assessment Strategy identified the means by which the effectiveness of each CORE was to be tested. In addition to the consideration of traffic and environmental effects of the scheme, the scope of assessment included the effects on road safety including incident detection and clearance rates, though the Assessment also notes that safety benefits for individual COREs could not be derived using the assessment, as insufficient data would result from the pilot to give statistically valid results.
7.2.4 In addition to the quantitative assessment, the Strategy included for the analysis of its operation including how drivers perceive the system. In particular, at Section 5.2, the Assessment notes that “People who may perceive a disbenefit from ATM as a whole could include drivers who are easily confused by additional signing or who object to
22 Highways Agency, (2005). Active Traffic Management M42 Junction 3A to 7 (HA23/05).
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control measures in general. The people who perceive disbenefits are likely to be the people who object to and complain about the OR… Advance publicity should mitigate the effect of the scheme on the people who perceive disbenefits”. It is unclear whether this publicity aimed to educate and inform thereby changing people’s perception through understanding, or whether the publicity was to change by persuasion.
7.2.5 That said, it is telling that prior to the M42 pilot it was foreseeable that driver perception and understanding would be key to the success of the scheme. For this reason driver education was identified as critical to the success of the pilot (this is in contrast to the inclusion of driver education on ALR, in the Highways England Delivery Plan 2019- 2020, some five years after ALR’s first implementation as discussed at Section 13.10).
7.2.6 The whole of Section 6 of the Assessment Strategy presumes that the pilot would result in a positive outcome. There is no discussion of the disbenefits of the scheme, except in the context of being prepared to respond quickly to complainants and having information and data ready to counter those complaints. The possibility that one or more of the trial’s COREs could result in disbenefits that could be perceived by the travelling public but not result in collisions, that is near misses, is not acknowledged or explored. To this end, there is no discussion of capturing data which could highlight such incidents such as near miss data on the running lanes, and there is no strategy for dealing with slight collision numbers rather than fatal or serious personal injury collision data.
7.2.7 The presumption of success is specifically stated at page 11 of the report where it is noted that “the success of the scheme will also need to be conveyed to the public and the media.” It is my view that the level of confidence that this language expresses in relation to the outcome of the pilot is highly unusual and suggestive of confidence bias being present in the development and reporting of the pilot.
7.2.8 The appendices in the Assessment Strategy contain details on the anticipated impacts of the individual COREs, and set out the anticipated impacts and recommended assessment for the respective CORE. In addition, the people who would gain from the CORE (referred to as Gainers) are described as are those who would lose, or perceive themselves as losing, from the CORE (referred to as Losers). The various considerations in relation to road safety are outlined in the following paragraphs.
7.2.9 Integrated Incident Management - The Anticipated Impact includes “increased, efficiency… in response to incidents” which “is expected to deliver savings in terms of reduced response times and a consequent reduction in fatalities.”
7.2.10 With regards Gainers related to this CORE, it is noted that “The emergency services will be able to respond quicker and will be given accurate location information. This will benefit drivers involved in accidents.” This section also notes that “Drivers in Emergency Refuge Areas will be safer than is currently the case” although there is no reference case stated so the comparison being made is unstated.
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7.2.11 Variable Speed Limits - The main stated objectives of VMSL include to reduce the impact of flow breakdown. In particular, the appendix discusses the ability to reduce traffic speeds under poor environmental conditions or under heavy traffic flow conditions, with the aim of reducing accidents. It is also noted that the reduction of variability in speeds between vehicles was anticipated to reduce accident risk on the running lanes and to “increase driver comfort”.
7.2.12 To this end, the Anticipated Impact of VMSL was assessed to be “psychological, reassuring drivers that things are under control, and encouraging them to use lanes in a more even manner.” This is reinforced by the Gainers identified as “Driver stress should be reduced and safety should improve.” There is no discussion in this report relating to system failure when drivers are unlikely to feel that things are under control, however the M42 pilot COREs tested scenarios in which the hard shoulder was always physically present even if temporarily being used as a running lane. I therefore surmise that in the event of a system failure e.g. breakdown or collision, the normal use of the demarcated hard shoulder would be sufficiently clear to drivers to remove the potential for confusion.
7.2.13 However, a salient consideration in relation to road safety relates to what happens, and how people respond, when things are not “under control”. It is my view that in a controlled environment drivers may unconsciously take less responsibility for decision making than for a highway environment operating under normal conditions, resulting in reduced decision making quality and timeliness under controlled conditions. I am not aware of any study which has explored the matter of quality of decision making in smart motorway environments.
7.2.14 It is notable that the results of the M42 pilot identified a substantial and disproportionate increase in side swipe collisions, rising from 16.1 per cent of all collisions prior to the trial, to 31.6% in the 3L-VMSL CORE and 30.9 per cent in the 4L-CORE. I am of the view that this is of particular interest as side swipe collisions commonly relate to failure to check blind spots and may therefore be an indicator of reduced decision making quality. As I discuss at Section 8.2 the increased proportion of side swipe collisions was associated with an increase in absolute terms in this type of collision.
7.2.15 Conversion of the Hard Shoulder - This appendix acknowledges that hard shoulder conversion is already used ‘contingently’ to accommodate traffic in road works, but examines the impact of this as a Candidate Operating Regime.
7.2.16 The use of ERA alongside the hard shoulder during normal operations was identified as a possible benefit as stopped vehicles would be separated from running traffic. However, the Anticipated Impact also identified that “conversion of the hard shoulder at one site might encourage drivers to wrongly drive along the hard shoulder on other sections of the motorway.” There is no consideration of the potential for inconsistency in driver behaviour within the trial and how that data may have been captured to inform a subsequent design approach.
7.2.17 However, the appendix does consider how drivers may be affected by the absence of a
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hard shoulder in this situation, with an acknowledgement that Losers may include drivers who break down and are unable to reach an ERA being “more vulnerable than is currently the case.” Additional Losers are identified as the “emergency and breakdown services” which “may find it more difficult to reach incidents.” I note that the appendix does not make clear what this increased driver vulnerability means in real term. I interpret this to mean that, in the context of a high-speed motorway environment with no escape route and slower times for emergency and breakdown vehicles to reach the driver, there would potentially be an increase in severity of collisions, that is more killed and seriously injured people associated with breakdowns and collisions given an inability to reach a safe harbour.
7.3 Advanced Motorway Signalling and Traffic Management Feasibility Study (2008)
7.3.1 Published in March 2008 by the DfT, this report presented the findings of a study which examined the feasibility of extended advanced signalling and traffic management systems across the motorway network. The considerations included the potential to:
◼ provide additional lanes and capacity where needed within the existing motorway corridors, resolving congestion issues more quickly than is the case in traditional carriageway widening schemes;
◼ information delivery to drivers relating to issues such as changing weather or traffic conditions;
◼ the use of technology to detect and resolve traffic incidents; and
◼ whether a change in enforcement practices would be useful in parallel.
7.3.2 The report directly considers the use of DHS managed motorways and provides a definition of this new technology. It notes at 1.1 that “it is important to keep in mind that this is an ‘early generation’ vision of the managed motorways of the future.” Key points identified in the report relating to the managed motorway environment include:
◼ The use of MIDAS can reduce PICs by “up to 13%” (paragraph 1.5). At the time of the report, MIDAS was in place on some 41% of the English motorway network;
◼ Fixed CCTV cameras provide full coverage of the hard shoulder, and PTZ cameras cover the running lanes and junctions;
◼ A Semi-Automatic Control System is in place to lead RCC operators through the steps required for inspecting the hard shoulder prior to opening. The system is a software based process;
◼ Highway Agency Digital Enforcement Camera System (HADECS) is used to enforce the VMS on the motorway sections. HADECS is linked to the Advanced Motorway Indicators (AMI) which display the VMS;
◼ MS4 message signs can be set automatically or by an operator to display legends, pictures and signals;
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7.3.3 The Feasibility Study identifies three core traffic management systems which combine the CCTV, MIDAS, and HADECS technologies, namely:
◼ Hard shoulder running – permits the use of the hard shoulder as a running lane through the use of message signs and AMI. At the time of the Feasibility Study, a 50mph VMSL was introduced to all running lanes during hard shoulder running and displays on AMI above all running lanes, including the hard shoulder. The use of ERA is identified as a feature of DHS schemes, as is the provision of ERT and “comprehensive CCTV coverage” (1.22).
◼ Controlled Motorway – uses VMSL for 60mph, 50mph or 40mph limits to control traffic flow. These limits are set using MIDAS.
◼ Basic Controlled Motorway (BCM) – this system was acknowledged to be at concept stage at the time of producing the Feasibility Study. It presents a version of CM to be used on two- or three-lane lengths of motorway to control for congestion or incident management. BCM would use VMSL and overhead message signs to control traffic flows or, in incident management mode, warn drivers of incidents. It noted that “if there is an incident, the system would be switched to incident management mode in which the driver information signs would display warnings only (e.g. “Queue ahead”) and not speed limits (although the speed limit signs set on gantries upstream of the incident location would remain in force).”
7.3.4 In addition to these systems, four potential means of managing motorway traffic are identified in the report:
◼ Traffic segregation – would provide the means to identify lanes for use by high occupancy vehicles, buses only, or as HGV-only routes or climbing lanes.
◼ Differential speed limits – gantry signs would set different speed limits (advisory or mandatory) on different running lanes on the same motorway link. These could be used in conjunction with designated lanes for HOVs or HGVs or for incident management.
◼ Digital roadside communication – using infrastructure within the managed motorway environment to enable communication with suitably equipped vehicles.
◼ Monitoring and recording information – using infrastructure within the managed motorway environment to enable images to be captured for monitoring purposes.
7.3.5 In presenting an overview of the M42 pilot, the Feasibility Study confirms that safety was “a key aspect of the design parameters adopted for the pilot” (2.9). Specifically, the report refers to the provision of ERA at 500m intervals, comprehensive CCTV coverage, and the capability to open and close lanes in the event of an incident (albeit the latter had not yet been tested operationally). The report acknowledges that the M42 resulted in measurable benefits relating to traffic flow, journey time variability and noise.
7.3.6 In relation to safety, the study provides a review of the safety outcomes of the M42 pilot, noting that the lack of longer term (three year) collision data means that the findings must be treated with caution. The report however notes a reduction in the number and severity of collisions on the DHS scheme in the pilot’s first six months. It also discusses
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the safety of future DHS schemes and notes at paragraph 3.15 that “experience in Holland and Germany over somewhat longer timescales indicates that hard shoulder running can maintain or even improve safety, provided appropriate technology is installed and operational procedures are followed.” I discuss the international perspective on managed motorways in Section 10.
7.3.7 The Feasibility Study included stakeholder engagement with 22 organisations. Resulting from this engagement, the report notes that concerns were raised regarding the fact that DHS schemes do not address mode shift away from vehicular modes and that by increasing capacity, traffic growth would be encouraged. It concludes that “the need to consider measures to lock in the benefits of schemes should therefore form a key part of scheme design…” (4.13).
7.3.8 Turning to potential priority areas for implementation of DHS schemes on the motorway network, the report notes that the greatest benefits will be derived by implementing on sections where congestion and traffic flows warrant opening the hard shoulder as a running lane. The report identifies some 400km of motorway in which DHS would be beneficial on both carriageways, and a further 17km of carriageway in one direction only. The methodology used to identify links where DHS would be beneficial did not include the consideration of “savings in accidents” (5.11).
7.3.9 Section 7 of the Feasibility Study considered ways in which the infrastructure associated with the DHS schemes could be used to provide better information to users and better traffic management across the SRN. This section of the report identifies that opportunities to improve information and traffic management may result from:
◼ Provision of more VMS on managed motorways;
◼ Greater efficiencies in joining or leaving motorways through early directional or advisory signage;
◼ Segregating fast or slow moving vehicles e.g. HGV-only lanes;
◼ Potential HOV lanes to increase the total people moved through a corridor in a given time;
◼ Priority for tidal peak flows, by changing the directional capacity of a road by changing the direction of flow on one or more lanes i.e. a tidal flow system;
7.3.10 As a conclusion to this section, the results of the stakeholder engagement are noted to have identified an appetite to potentially extend the functionality and benefits of signalling and traffic management in future, as new technology becomes available. There is no mention of the consideration of safety in hard shoulder running aside from matters relating to lighting provision and gantry spacing.
7.3.11 Section 8 of the Study relates to compliance and notes that the systems discussed in the report would be a “new experience for road users”. It is also identified that the aim should be that users “feel reassured about any perceived risks” and that this confidence is sustained over time. A Compliance Vision (as opposed to an enforcement-led
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approach) is set out at 8.2 – 8.4 which includes:
◼ Drivers observe key traffic management instructions because they “believe in the integrity of the system and understand the benefits which it delivers to themselves and to fellow drivers. They also understand and respect the risks of non-compliance, firstly in safety terms and secondly in terms of exposure to sanctions.”
◼ There are very high levels of compliance with safety-critical instructions.
◼ “New signalling systems are observed to promote prudent driver behaviour… Drivers feel more confident about their personal safety, because they witness fewer instances of irresponsible behaviour. There are fewer serious incidents.”
7.3.12 In promoting compliance, the report notes at paragraph 8.8 that “compliance is driven by perceptions. Road users who perceive that positive consequences will flow from compliance, or negative ones from non-compliance, are likely to comply. We believe that the managed motorway environment will of itself promote constructive perceptions, and thus high compliance levels. The evidence from the M42 pilot bears this out. There may be several reasons for this:
◼ Drivers are more likely to comply where they can perceive a clear and short term benefit in doing so – as the system is dynamic drivers may respect the limits because they see them as being appropriate;
◼ Frequent reinforcement of signal messages may have more of an impact on driver behaviour;
◼ A road environment which features proactive (e.g. “use hard shoulder”) variable and changing signal messages may encourage drivers to pay greater attention and remain alert;
◼ Drivers may believe that information conveyed to them is more likely to be up to date and therefore accurate; and
◼ Driver awareness that vehicle movements are being observed may help to discourage reckless or inconsiderate driving.”
7.3.13 I note that this section which addresses the matter of driver behaviour and compliance is silent on both the potential for drivers to be more vulnerable in live lane breakdowns (as identified in 2002), and the anticipated behaviours of drivers in that situation. This omission is somewhat surprising given the observation that the DHS scheme will be a “new experience” for drivers, although this may be as a result of the hard shoulder being retained and thereby a continuous safe harbour provision.
7.3.14 As in Section 8, Section 9 (relating to communication) observes that as the concept of DHS is “unknown to the majority of UK road users”, education and information “will be vital to achieving the full benefits” (9.2). Further, paragraph 9.4 states that “proper education of drivers will help to ensure that drivers realise what they are being asked to do, how and why they should do it. This will help secure a high level of compliance with the system and public support for it, thus helping deliver the full benefits.”
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7.3.15 This section also notes that as more DHS schemes are implemented, the level of media interest will reduce and therefore direct communications with the public may be used more. The communications strategy for the M42 pilot is set out in Section 9 which highlights that a wide range of media and communications methods were used before and during the pilot. These measures included press releases, bulletins to travel presenters, direct communications with the public, and local newspaper advertising. At paragraph 9.18 the report notes that “the success of the communications strategy and the high level of driver education and information are likely to have made a significant contribution to achieving the very high levels of compliance with speed limits and lane directions seen by the scheme (98%). It may also have been a contributing factor to the low number of accidents observed.”
7.3.16 The report goes on to recommend that “wider scale roll out of advanced signalling and traffic management techniques such as hard shoulder running should be accompanied by appropriate measures aimed at ensuring the public are properly informed about how hard shoulder running operates…” (9.19).
7.3.17 Stakeholder engagement also identified that “Stakeholders from across our advisory group have stressed the importance of good driver education” (9.20). “As part of any hard shoulder running scheme on the motorway network it will be important to involve specific stakeholders from an early stage in the plans. The main group where this will be especially important are the emergency services, although road user groups will also be important partners for educating drivers” (9.21).
7.3.18 The conclusions of the report in relation to education and information are notable. The concern that people will not be familiar with the DHS environment and therefore will need to be informed about its use is a characteristic of these early reports which is in contrast to the later reports and guidance discussed in Section 5 which are largely silent in relation to educating road users.
7.4 Future Managed Motorways Concept Development Task 1: Design Comparison Simulator Study
7.4.1 Between October 2010 and July 2012, TRL carried out research on behalf of the HA relating to the emerging ALR design criteria. This report, published in May 2012, set out the outcome of a driving simulator trial which was used to provide insights to the safety and legality (although I do not consider this latter point) of ALR design and concept of operations.
7.4.2 In setting the context for ALR, the report notes that the ALR design has resulted from the HA Roads Programme Steering Group asking for “work to be done where additional savings can be made to the Spending Review 2010 (SR10) programme, whilst continuing to meet the Agency’s safety objective” (p.3). This trial had one key objective, to assess driver behaviour and compliance as a result of verge-mounted MS4 VMS and gantry information. A secondary objective was also in place, to assess driver awareness
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and comprehension of ERA and their signage as well as their use in a breakdown situation.
7.4.3 In assessing the use of ERA, Section 5.3 of the report notes that the instruction of a vehicle fault was given in traffic conditions which allowed participants to choose their preferred speed and lane “1.25km upstream of an ERA and 400m upstream of a sign stating ‘emergency refuge ½ mile ahead’” (p.31).
7.4.4 Of the 45 participants approximately a third failed to stop in an ERA, with some 11 participants stopping before the ERA. I note with reference to Table 6 in the report, that of those 11 participants who stopped before the ERA, all bar one stopped having seen the sign advising that the ERA was ½ mile ahead.
7.4.5 In reviewing the outcome of the ERA trial, the following are noted in the report:
◼ It is not known with certainty why 16 participants did not stop in an ERA;
◼ In total, one participant stopped in lane 4;
◼ One participant stopped in lane 2;
◼ A total of 12 stopped in lane 1;
◼ Two stopped on the grass verge within 200m of the ERA;
◼ Of the five participants who stopped beyond the ERA, four did not successfully manoeuvre to lane 1 in time due to other traffic. It is noted that those who stopped beyond the ERA may have otherwise continued to the next available ERA or junction to stop.
7.4.6 A further questionnaire was used following the main simulator trial which assessed whether understanding of what to do in a breakdown was improved after reading an information leaflet. Of the participants who took part in this element of the study, 100 percent confirmed that their understanding had improved as a result of the leaflet. This outcome leads me to conclude that the trial supports the position that ALR is not intuitive in the event of a breakdown.
7.4.7 Overall, the study concludes that, “these findings help to provide assurance that, in general, the information provided within a scheme designed to the specification in IAN161/12 will be appropriate for road users to understand how they are expected to behave under normal operation in busy traffic conditions” (p.67).
7.4.8 I note that the purpose of the trial was to examine driver behaviour and not to estimate the level of use of ERA in an uncontrolled breakdown event. Therefore the proportions identified in this trial cannot be used with equivalence in this regard.
7.5 Future Managed Motorways Concept Development Task 2: Design Assurance Simulator Study (2012)
7.5.1 The second of the research tasks extended the questions addressed in Task 1 to
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consider drivers’ understanding of ERA at different points in an ALR environment as well as driver response to other matters including speed limits and lanes which are opened or closed to traffic.
7.5.2 Four routes were tested. Route 1 was an ALR and provided refuge areas at no more than 2.5km distances, whether as an ERA or an off-slip. Route 2 represented a standard three-lane motorway and therefore had no ERA. Route 3 ALR equivalent to that in Route 1 followed by DHS which had ERA after every two or three gantries (which were at approximate 800m spacings), and Route 4 ALR followed by three-lane CM which included three junctions and no ERA. All lanes were open on the ALR sections and Lane 1 was open only on ALR sections and not on DHS.
7.5.3 When asked during an ALR route trial ‘where is a safe place to stop in the event of a breakdown’, just under half of participants (49 percent) stated that an ERA was a safe place to stop. Depending on the simulation route being used, between 10 percent and 19 percent of participants responded that Lane 1 was a safe place to stop in a breakdown. In the DHS trial, all participants reported either that the hard shoulder or an ERA was a safe place to stop.
7.5.4 Overall, the study notes that participants in ALR scenarios are “more likely to consider an ERA as the location to stop in the event of a breakdown” and that no participants “understood any lane other than Lane 1 as a place that they would stop in an emergency” (p.32).
7.5.5 A breakdown was also simulated for half the participants, on the approach to a junction at the end of an ALR section in Routes 3 and 4. The presence of an ERT on the slip road was indicated in advanced signage on the approach to the off-slip. Of the 47 participants, 37 stopped having left the main carriageway via the off-slip, or indicated that they intended to do so. Of the remaining ten participants, half stopped in Lane 1 and one stopped in Lane 3, the latter being interpreted by the researchers as the participant misunderstanding the scenario as a technical fault with the simulator. I note that the researchers stated that “only one participant halted their vehicle on the main carriage way [sic]” (p.49) in relation to the Lane 3 stoppage. I infer that this belies a potential misunderstanding of ALR as all Lane 1 stoppages also are main carriageway stoppages in live lanes.
7.5.6 Although this report does not provide much in the way of interpretation of the results, TRL’s later report synthesising the full research does23. Section 2.1.4 of the TRL report for Task 3: Synthesis of Data notes that the findings of the Design Assurance (Task 2) trial suggests that road users’ response to where constitutes a safe place to stop differs depending on their location within an ALR scheme. However, the report also notes that “there may be too much ambiguity in the question asked to conclude much more than this” (p.6).
23 TRL, (2012). Future Managed Motorways Concept Development Task 3: Synthesis of Evidence.
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7.5.7 The report notes that two participants responded to say that they did not know what they would do in an emergency, and that all participants said that their knowledge had improved as a result of reading the information leaflet. As a result, the report concludes that “both of these findings suggest that education could play a role in improving understanding of how to respond”.
7.5.8 This latter report also caveats the findings of the study, noting that the “findings should be considered as indicative only due to the limitations of the simulated scenario” (p.10). Specifically, the report mentions that some participants stopped “almost immediately” on instruction regardless of which lane they happened to be in which is deemed to be “unlikely to be representative of real life behaviour” (p.10). In relation to live lane stoppages in general, the report goes on to note that this may be an “unrealistic willingness to stop in a live lane” possibly due to uncertainty as to whether the simulated vehicle could be driven on the verge.
7.6 Managed Motorways – All Lanes Running Evaluation of the Provision of Refuge Areas (2012)
7.6.1 Following the adoption of ALR as the managed motorways design, the HA produced this report which notes that the ALR design “proposes further ‘stretching’ [refuge area] provision in order to provide an efficient and cost effective solution that remains able to achieve the required level of safety” (p.3). This report considers refuge areas in the round, rather than just ERA provision.
7.6.2 In contextualising the report, Section 2 explains that, “the development of the MM-ALR concept was also precipitated by the need to demonstrate value for money in the current economic climate, an evolving view of the acceptable level of safety risk and tolerability of risk on a MM scheme.” There is no further explanation or definition in relation to this “evolving view” or on the “tolerability of risk” though I note that the short term austerity policy appears to have prevailed over any consideration of the mid- to long-term effects of this approach.
7.6.3 As well as an increase in minimum spacing to 2.5km, based on the maximum spacing for lay-bys and rest areas on multi-lane APTR, the report considers adjusting the design of ERA “as long as the ‘ethos’ associated with their provision remains consistent with current arrangements”, and disassociating ERA provision with gantry locations. The resultant safety analysis in the report is presented as determining whether “a particular combination of design features will be acceptably safe” (p.11) although, again no definition of “acceptably safe” is provided so I understand this to be that a balance of risk was achieved so that the ALR design was no worse than the preceding motorway.
7.6.4 The report concludes that the proposed changes to ERA design and the increased spacings between them are not “expected to have a significant detrimental impact on road users” (p.4). However, with reference to the final row of the table at pages 5 and 6 of the report (replicated at Table 7.1), I note that compared with the safety baseline (i.e.
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three lane motorway without MIDAS) the evolution of the managed motorway design with respect to ERA consistently decreased the level of intrinsic safety in the design, reducing safety benefits from 30 percent in the IAN 111 layout to just 15 percent in ALR.
Table 7.1 Changes in ERA Design Design IAN 111 CALR on Shorter M42 ATM Pilot IAN 111 Design MM-ALR Consideration Stretch Links
ERAs co- ERAs co- ERAs co- located with located with located with gantries, Spacing CALR for short links – ERA Spacing gantries, gantries, nominal spacing up to no ERA nominally at nominally at potentially 2500m 500m spacing 800m spacings greater than 1000m
Hard shoulder incidents eliminated, Safety with Safety Safety benefits Safety benefits Safety benefits however incidents in respect to benefits of 60% approx of 30% of 25% running lanes Baseline of 15% increased calculated safety benefit of 5% (Source: Evaluation of the provision of Refuge Areas)
7.6.5 This reduction in the safety outcomes is borne out in Section 4.2 of the report which summarises the safety record of the M42 trial and notes that the incidence of rear end shunts reduced by some 50 percent. As this form of collision is noted to be associated with vehicles stopped in the carriageway, the report concludes that “the MM concept is very safe and there is considerable scope for a ‘value engineering’ review of MM features”.
7.6.6 In my view, this conclusion is illogical. The reduction in rear-end shunts is associated with the implementation of VMSL which manages traffic speeds and therefore reduces stop-start congested traffic of the type which is characterised by rear end collisions. Therefore, although this type of collision is associated with vehicles stopped in the carriageway, it cannot necessarily be said that this is associated with live lane breakdowns. The implication of the managed motorway environment being “very safe” thereby enabling value engineering, is that it can be designed to be deliberately less safe to secure commercial benefits and cost savings.
7.7 Stationary Vehicle Detection (SVD) Monitoring Study report (2016)
7.7.1 Published in March 2016, this report by IBI Group resulted from a trial of roadside SVD technology. It aimed to determine whether such a system “would provide sufficient additional safety benefit to warrant inclusion either as part of the smart motorways all lane running… design, or on other parts of the network which exhibit similar physical characteristics…” (page 4).
7.7.2 The trial was conducted in two phases. The first was for three months on the M62, and the second for two months on 13km of the M25 between J5 – J6. The SVD trialled is described as “scanning radar approximately every 500m, sending data to a central
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server. An algorithm on the server identifies and locates potential stopped vehicles to 100m blocks in each lane. The system then presents an alert to the RCC via a Control Office Based System (COBS) interface”.
7.7.3 The report notes that a particular hazard for ALR schemes is the potential for a vehicle to stop in a live running lane with no means of exiting the scheme. As I discuss at Section 6.6, this hazard is identified in the ALR generic hazard log (hazard H135) with its associated risk increasing by some 216 percent compared with a D3M scheme, making it one of the highest scoring residual hazards in ALR schemes. During high-flow conditions, the study assumed that queuing which quickly forms behind a stopped vehicle triggers the MIDAS system, which automatically requests changes to the VMSL. In low flow conditions, MIDAS is not triggered, “causing the hazard to remain unmitigated for a longer period of time” (page 8).
7.7.4 In describing the process of incident verification, the report notes that the operator’s manual adjustment of VMSL and other signals, “provides a degree of mitigation until the scene can be attended and the stationary vehicle (and any occupants) protected with emergency traffic management and, ultimately, cleared from the carriageway” (page 8).
7.7.5 The SVD systems generates alerts each time it identifies a stopped vehicle. These alerts are categorised in Table 1 of the report, reproduced at Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 SVD Alert Classification Matrix Classification Description
False Positives
01 – No Source Nothing seen on CCTV footage to indicate a stationary vehicle
02 – Wrong Carriageway – (Maintenance Related) As above, where the alert is related to a maintenance activity
A valid stopped/slow moving vehicle is observed on the 03 – Wrong Carriageway opposite carriageway to the location provided by the SVD alert
Those ‘objects’ that are out of scope but we identified them as 04 – Off Carriageway being stationary e.g. stopped vehicle on overbridge, a cow in a field
True Positives
A valid stopped/slow moving vehicle related to a maintenance 05 – Maintenance Related activity
06 – ERA Stop A valid detection of a stationary vehicle in an ERA
A valid stopped/ slow moving vehicle related to congestion on 07 – Congestion – Main Carriageway the main carriageway
A valid stopped/slow moving vehicle related to congestion on 08 – Congestion – Slip Road one of the exit/entry slip roads
A valid alarm, which can be related to a previously identified 09 – Repeat Alarm SVD event
A valid detection of a stationary vehicle within the Motorway 10 – MSA Hotspot Service Area’s slip roads
11 – Genuine Alarm A valid stopped/slow moving vehicle
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7.7.6 Section 4 also notes that a genuine live lane event may not result in an alert being presented due to the limitations of the technology which results in blind spots as well as an alert being suppressed due to: “Manual suppression: RCC operators can choose to disable alerts, for example to prevent alerts being created which relate to maintenance activities;
Congestion suppression: Alerts are suppressed when the system detects more than four vehicles travelling below 20mph within 100m of each other;
Automatic suppression: The SVD alerts are automatically suppressed whenever signs and signals are set in the vicinity due to incident management or congestion on the network.”
7.7.7 Where suppression is made manually, the trial identified that the SVD system may be suppressed for longer than is required due to operators not re-enabling the system once the TTM is removed. To mitigate this, the second phase of the trial included a Manual Suppression Reminder. It was confirmed that “this helped to remind operators to re- enable the manually suppressed sections” (Section 6.5).
7.7.8 During the two month trial on the M25, some 284 alerts were raised by the SVD which were verified as genuine live lane alerts. Of these, 108 alerts were triggered during low flow conditions. The SVD was identified as having a detection rate of 82.5% - 90.3%, which equates to between 0.6 and 2.2 genuine live lane alert missed events per day on this section of the M25 (Section 5.2).
7.7.9 Section 6.3 provides details on the review of false negatives identified in the study. CCTV was reviewed for the “low flow periods” between 20:00 and 06:00 for a six-day period for the Phase 2 study area. This exercise identified some 294 stationary vehicle events occurred over this period. Table 5 of the report identifies the categories and proportions of each event which included:
◼ SVD System Detected Events 192 (i.e. only 65.3 percent of stopped vehicles were correctly identified by the system);
◼ Allowable missed detection – as a result of suppression 40, or 13.6 percent of stopped vehicles did not trigger an alarm on detection;
◼ Missed detection – blind spots 7 (2.4%) equating to one per day or for “unknown reason” (33 stops, equating to 17.2 percent of all stopped vehicles.
7.7.10 It is notable that the report’s own findings show a low level of success of the SVD system which have recently been identified as incorrect and stated as higher than should have been reported24. Further, this Phase of the trial had a calculated coverage zone of 96.7% i.e. blind spots over 3.3% of the study area. These aspects combined to demonstrate an unreliable level of stationary vehicle detection by this technology.
24 Highways Magazine, (2021). Exclusive: Errors in report cast doubt on smart motorway safety system.
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7.7.11 In reviewing the relationship between SVD genuine live lane alerts and high flow (>4,000 vph per lane) traffic conditions, Section 6.9 notes that “Reviewing a sample of the 15% of alerts created when flows exceeded the 4000vph threshold, the high flow conditions did usually result in congestion being created behind the incident, however this was often only short in both duration and length, and would only have triggered the MIDAS queue protection if the incident happened in close proximity to the MIDAS loop sites, contrary to the initial assumptions of the trial.” This is an important finding, as it not only counters the assumption of the trial, but also the assumptions which have underpinned the basis of design of ALR schemes since 2012 (see paragraph 5.6.7).
7.7.12 In terms of the time taken by RCC operators to investigate and classify SVD alarms, the quickest response time was just six seconds to identify and classify an incident alert. However, the study report’s Figure 10 shows that the 75th percentile time to investigate the alert was 30 seconds. Further, Figure 11 shows that the 90th percentile time to investigate and classify an alert was 117 seconds, in contrast to the 64 seconds 90th percentile in Phase 1. The study notes that this may be related to RCC operators having other tasks to perform thereby being unable to respond as quickly. Compared with existing methods of detection, the SVD trial resulted in detection 16 minutes quicker than the average time using the existing method. Given these results, I am led to conclude that although SVD has some concerning limitations, it does (in the event of a positive detection) provide the benefit of far quicker detection rates than is the case on roads without it installed.
7.7.13 The study also notes at page 30 that “the SVD system can only provide a safety benefit in the event of a genuine incident by enabling operators to set signs and signals to protect the scene earlier in the incident lifecycle than would be possible if the SVD system were not present.” I interpret this to mean that the SVD system is therefore only as safe as the available Traffic Officer resources permit. I note that the provision of sufficient resources was identified as a recommendation to the APPG inquiry as presented at Section 9.6.
7.7.14 The report makes recommendations for the desirable requirements for the SVD specification and includes at Section 6.13 the recommendation to relax the requirement for SVD notification to be made for vehicles stopped more than 12 seconds, and extend the period stopped prior to notification to 30 seconds. I interpret this to mean that the 90th percentile time to investigate and classify an alert would therefore increase from between 64 – 117 seconds to between 82 and 135 seconds as a result of this recommendation.
7.7.15 In setting out the basis of calculations for the BCR, the report notes at page 46 that the Highways England historic data for breakdowns between J5 to J6 identified some 1,616 live lane breakdowns in 580 days, a rate of 2.8 breakdowns per day. The Phase Two trial however, recorded a rate of 5.0 live lane breakdowns per day. A number of the trial breakdowns identified were short duration stops, and the remaining balance between the two rates may be due to reporting differences.
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7.7.16 Section 6.16 of the report reviews other benefits that may be derived from the implementation of SVD and notes that the system “is likely to also provide improved customer confidence when using smart motorways, arising from the knowledge that they will be rapidly detected if they stop in a live lane, and that assistance will be provided as quickly as possible.”
7.7.17 As a result of reviewing the above details, I interpret the findings of the report to show that the SVD system is imperfect for a number of reasons:
1. It does not cover the entire carriageway. As a result, the Phase 2 study found that an average of one breakdown per day was missed as a result of blind spots;
2. As the system cannot differentiate between legitimately stopped objects such as maintenance vehicles, and other stopped objects, the system can be manually over- ridden for example during maintenance periods. It is also suppressed during periods of congestion and when lane management signals are in place. This means that live lane stoppages are not detected when the system is over-ridden or suppressed as it is effectively switched off for the period. As a result the Phase Two study found that 40 stoppages were missed in the study area;
3. The time taken from the COBS alert being received to investigate and confirm the stoppage is subject to available resource in the RCC. The recommendations of the study would result in potential 90th percentile total response times of between 82 and 135 seconds.
7.7.18 Arguably one of the most important findings is that MIDAS is not reliably triggered by queues in the manner which has been consistently assumed during the ALR design development.
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Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ Various trials have been conducted to inform smart motorway design, with the M42 pilot being used for safety data for a considerable period. The pilot’s presumption of success is clear as the Assessment Strategy presumes that the pilot would result in a positive outcome. There is no discussion of the disbenefits of the scheme, except in the context of being prepared to respond quickly to complainants. The level of confidence that this language expresses is highly unusual for a pilot and suggests confirmation bias.
◼ The 2008 signalling Feasibility Study, which examined the roll out of smart motorways, has notable conclusions. Its concern that people will not be familiar with DHS and therefore will need to be informed about its use is characteristic of these early reports and contrasts with later reports which are largely silent on educating road users.
◼ In 2012, the review of ERA provision is notable in its inviting a further weakening of the position of safety in ALR schemes. This is borne out in the report’s conclusion that the MM concept is very safe and that there is scope for ‘value engineering’ to secure greater cost savings. In my view, this sets an alarming precedent as it enables the road to be designed to be deliberately less safe, to secure commercial benefits and cost savings.
◼ Arguably one of the most important findings in the trials conducted is that MIDAS is not reliably triggered in the manner which has been consistently assumed during the ALR design development. This was identified in the SVD trial which also found SVD technology to be imperfect, correctly detecting only 65 percent of stopped vehicles.
◼ In part, this failure to detect was due to the SVD technology tested in 2016 having blind spots for nearly four percent of the study area. In addition, the system must be suppressed during periods of congestion, maintenance or automatically when signals or signs are set. As a result, the SVD trialled missed 16 percent of all stopped vehicle incidences in the study area.
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8 Smart Motorway Safety Reviews
8.1.1 Over the course of smart motorway design development, implemented schemes have been subject to periodic safety reviews at 12 months, two years and three years after opening. Due to several specific schemes being identified in the various guidance and standards, the safety review documents associated with these key schemes are included in this section.
8.1.2 Until 2016 all Police forces in the UK used the STATS19 method of data collection in which the reporting force’s Office in Charge determined whether an outcome was slight, serious or fatal. In 2016, a standardised reporting system (Collision Recording And Sharing – CRASH) began to replace STATS19 recording in some force areas. CRASH uses a series of rules to automatically allocate severity to collisions, depending on the injury sustained. The use of CRASH has resulted in an increase in reporting of serious injury casualties due to this change and consequently, the two data sets cannot be compared as like for like.
8.2 M42 MM Monitoring and Evaluation Three Year Safety Review
8.2.1 The M42 pilot was implemented in September 2006. In early 2011 this report was provided which reviewed the first three years’ PIC data during the scheme’s four lane VMSL operation and compared such with the six months’ three lane VMSL operations and the period prior to the implementation of the DHS scheme. Overall, the report identified a total of 81 PICs during the 4L-VMSL operation equating to a 55.7% reduction during the scheme’s implementation from a monthly mean of 5.08 collisions without VMSL to 2.25 with 4L-VMSL.
8.2.2 Although at 3.1 the report acknowledges that a fall in the number of collisions would be expected on this stretch of the M42 during the study period regardless of the pilot due to the national falling trend in collisions, no counterfactual calculations are provided within the report.
8.2.3 The collision Severity Index associated with the 4L-VMSL over the 36 month study period was calculated as 0.07 compared with the Severity Index of 0.16 in the 60 month no-VMSL period. This was a reduction not only compared to the no-VMSL scenario but also compared with the national motorway Severity Index in 2009 of 0.12 and indicates that the proportion of serious and fatal collisions to all collisions reduced over the period. Similarly, the casualty Severity Index reduced over the same period, from 0.14 with no VMSL to 0.05 with the 4L-VMSL in place.
8.2.4 The report provides a summary analysis of the collisions by lighting, weather and road surface condition at Table 3.6. This indicates a reduced percentage of collisions in rain on the 4L-VMSL compared with both the no-VMSL and the 3L-VMSL situation. It is interpreted that this reduction in wet weather collisions may indicate that the additional control associated with the DHS system aids in mitigating the additional risk presented
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by wet conditions.
8.2.5 Table 3.9 of the report presents data relating to collision by type. The table shows that the proportion of rear end shunt collisions remained constant in VMSL compared with the proportion in the no-VMSL situation. The report notes that this type of collision is associated with congested operations and because DHS increases the amount of carriageway space, “traffic is dispersed over a greater number of running lanes so congestion should be less”. However, this ignores the fact that DHS is operational during periods of congestion and, although there is more road space as a result, this is not necessarily associated with wholly free flow conditions. It is therefore reasonable to anticipate that rear end shunt collisions would still constitute a substantial proportion of collisions with DHS in place and this is indicated to be the case in the report.
8.2.6 Table 3.9 also indicates that the proportion of side impact collisions increased from 8.2 percent (northbound) and 7.9 percent (southbound) with no-VMSL to 21.0 and 9.9 percent respectively. This increase was also noted in the 3L-VMSL scenario with 15.8 percent of collisions on each carriageway associated with side impact. The report notes that this increase may be associated with vehicles travelling closer together, “something that VMSL is designed to achieve. Furthermore, through the operation of MM it may be expected that there may be an increase in these types of accidents as the addition of a further running lane may increase the number of lane changing manoeuvres therefore resulting in more side impacts.”
8.2.7 I note that while this latter argument is logical for 4L-VMSL, the increase in proportion of side impact collisions was noted in 3L-VMSL operations also which is not associated with DHS operations. In any case, mathematically it could be anticipated for the DHS system to result in a proportionate increase in this type of collision. In this case, going from a situation with two points of side conflict to three through the addition of a fourth lane may be anticipated to result in approximately an increase in proportion of one third (33 percent) rather than the 92 percent increase in the total side impact collisions that is shown to have resulted from the M42 pilot sections.
8.2.8 It is therefore possible that there is something intrinsic about the VMSL operation which results in higher proportions of this type of collision. It is my view that there are two possibilities which warrant exploration:
1. The increase in proportion is purely mathematical and due to the removal of other types of collision in absolute terms as a result of the controlled environment; or 2. Side impact collisions take place due to a range of factors including failure to properly check blind spots, undertaking manoeuvres, and fatigued drivers drifting into an adjacent lane. It is possible that there are psychological effects of driving in a highly controlled environment which compound or indirectly encourage these driving behaviours, respectively a sense of complacency or abdicating responsibility due to the sense of being in a controlled environment; frustration due to slower speeds being imposed by the VMSL, or a feeling of being able to continue driving for longer when fatigued due to the presence of a technological safety net. The report does not present or consider the
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potential for these behavioural to affect road safety in the VMSL system.
8.2.9 The only consideration of the driver’s perception of the DHS system is at 3.2.8 which considers the number of collisions by skidding, jack-knifing and / overturning as “an increase in the number of skidding type accidents may be a result of drivers’ perception of the MM road network”. There is no further explanation of why only this type of collision is associated with driver perception.
8.2.10 Section 3.2.9 of the report considers collisions by vehicle type and notes that the VMSL system is associated with a greater proportion of collisions involving goods vehicles. The increase is particularly notable for HGVs which increased 70 percent from 10 percent of collisions in the no-VMSL situation to 13.7 in 3L-VMSL and finally to 17.0 percent with 4L-VMSL. The report provides a simple summary analysis of these collisions noting that there are no cluster sites and that just over two thirds of goods vehicle collisions were located on the northbound carriageway. Overall, it concludes that there is no “identifiable reason for why there are a higher number of accidents involving this vehicle type during 4L-VMSL as opposed to other operational regimes.”
8.2.11 However, by examining Tables C.1.11 and C.3.11 it can be seen that the average yearly collision rate for HGVs reduced from 26.8 collisions per year in the no-VMSL situation to 17.6 per year with 4L-VMSL. Over the same period, car collisions reduced from an average of 119 per year in no-VMSL to 45 per year with 4L-VMSL. It would therefore appear that the higher proportion of HGV collisions in the 4L-VMSL situation is a mathematical function of a substantial fall in the number of car-related collisions. This does not, however, remove the question as to why the average annual number of collisions for HGVs did not reduce to such a great extent as did the car-related collisions and this question may have warranted additional inquiry.
8.2.12 Examining Table 3.12 of the report provides some further detail on vehicles involved in collisions by type of manoeuvre. This shows that there was a five point increase in the proportion of stop-start collisions in the 4L-VMSL period than in the no-VMSL period. The report notes this increase but does not provide a wider discussion.
8.2.13 It is striking that for other considerations such as rear end shunts, the report notes that the DHS regime provides more road space, therefore “congestion should be less”. However, Table 3.12 shows a substantial increase in the proportion of collisions taking place in congested (stop-start and waiting to go ahead but held up) conditions from 27.9 percent in no-VMSL to 41.2 percent in 3L-VMSL and 35.6 percent in 4L-VMSL and yet this increase is not investigated further.
8.2.14 Table 3.12 shows the proportion of collisions involving a lane change manoeuvre increased from 9.6 percent to 12.4 percent. Although the report does not examine the causal factors in more detail with respect to the increased side impact collisions, examination of the Appendix C of the report shows that for 4L-VMSL (Table C.3.10 and Table C.3.12) all lane changing collisions involved manoeuvres from left to right. There were some 94 vehicles involved in collisions with this manoeuvre, compared with 25
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collisions in 4L-VMSL which were side impact collisions.
8.2.15 Comparing the 3-year 4L-VMSL situation with the 5-year no-VMSL data (Tables C.1.10 and C.1.12) shows that in absolute terms there were fewer vehicles involved in lane changing collisions in the no-VMSL situation (73) compared with the 4L-VMSL (94). In addition, the average number of side impact collisions per year on the pilot scheme decreased from 9.8 per year in no-VMSL to 8.3 per year in 4L-VMSL. This is telling as it indicates that the proportional increase in side impact collisions presented in the main body of the report is a mathematical function of the overall decrease in collisions. However, the absolute increase in number of vehicles involved in lane changing collisions in 4L-VMSL compared with the no-VMSL is a concern as it may indicate a causal factor which is intrinsic to the DHS design as well as a larger overall effect.
8.2.16 Section 3.2.11 notes that of the 81 collisions recorded during the 4L-VMSL period, 22 collisions took place during hard shoulder running. The report’s stated scope is to “determine whether there are any unusual patterns in PIAs following the introduction of 4L-VMSL which were not apparent during other operational regimes” (1.3). However, despite the fact that the 4L-VMSL operation is the same as the no-VMSL operation except for periods of hard shoulder running, the report does not provide a detailed analysis of the causal factors during this period. Instead, the analysis is limited to a summary of the time of day in which the collisions took place and an analysis of the location of the collisions with reference to the no-VMSL closer analysis.
8.2.17 This failure to analysis data associated with the hard shoulder running periods means that while the report provides an overview of the outcome of the pilot, it does not provide any assessment of the actual road safety outcome when 4L-VMSL is in operation. The conclusions note the overall reduction in Severity Indices and accident rates associated with the pilot and concludes that “4L-VMSL has operated successfully and the PIA data suggests that there is a reduction in the number and severity of accidents during this operational regime”.
8.2.18 While this conclusion is correct in overall numbers over the three year 4L-VMSL study period, it is not correct for various collision types. I note that the review is a wholly desktop study and that no site visit or post hoc design review has been undertaken in the light of the data identified to investigate whether there are site specific factors which may explain some of the increase in collision types. By drawing on the data in aggregate to form its conclusions, the report fails to investigate outliers in the data.
8.2.19 Considering the DHS scheme was new technology it is my view that understanding these outliers, which included the increased proportion of HGV collisions and lane changing collisions, was implied in the stated scope of work. By not inquiring as to the cause of these increases, the report does not fulfil its scope of “determining whether there are any unusual patterns” in the road safety record and opportunities were lost to better understand the effects of the DHS design.
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8.3 Smart Motorway All Lane Running M25 J5-7 Monitoring Third Year Report (2018)
8.3.1 The first ALR scheme converted J5 to J6 of the M25 to ALR in 2015, with J6 to J7 upgraded to CM as part of the same scheme therefore retaining a hard shoulder. This report completed the evaluation of the scheme with the scope including to:
◼ “review the safety performance during the initial period of operation;
◼ Continue to monitor and understand the change in risk to road users and to road workers;
◼ Quantify and provide evidence of the benefits of the concept; and
◼ Provide evidence to help improve the concept of operation and the design requirements.”
8.3.2 The report notes at 1.4.1 that in the first and second year of implementation, congestion was significantly relieved by the scheme. In the third year, the benefits were reduced compared with the initial level with the road subject to “slight congestion”. In analysis associated traffic flows, section 1.4.2 states that lane 1 traffic flows are “much lower than the other lanes” although noting that this may be due to the lane drop arrangement which makes the nearside lane less used. The overall level of traffic on the road is noted to increase from peaks of 100 vehicles per minute (vpm) before implementation to 120vpm in year three.
8.3.3 In terms of traffic speeds, section 1.4.4 details recorded vehicle speeds in a single 24 hour period before and after implementation. This snapshot data shows an increase in vehicles travelling at between 61 and 70mph and a substantial reduction in proportion travelling less than 60mph. These results accord with the reduction in congestion noted earlier.
8.3.4 The data also shows a near doubling of the proportion of vehicles travelling between 71 and 80mph from just over 20 percent before implementation to close to 40 percent after. The proportion of vehicles travelling in excess of 81mph reduced by around 20 percent with less than five percent of total traffic travelling at these speeds. The reasons for this level of speeding are not examined.
8.3.5 Section 2 of the report presents detailed analysis of the safety record of the ALR section of the scheme. Overall, the ALR scheme resulted in a 29 percent reduction in collision rate. As detailed in 2.2.1, this is equivalent to a 20 percent reduction against the counterfactual.
8.3.6 The analysis of the serious collisions after implementation shows that eight of the 19 recorded serious collisions involved motorcycles. The report concludes that the “collisions could have happened on any section of motorway and cannot be attributed to ALR.” This is, in my view, a surprisingly broad comment to make in a review on safety for a new form of road environments. Rather, a critical review of the collisions is
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warranted to identify whether any change in pattern has taken place. For example, of the 19 serious collisions, five involved changing lane. In addition, I note that one collision is reported to have involved three vehicles of which two left the scene. There is no exploration at this level of detail in the report.
8.3.7 Section 2.3 shows that the Severity Index for collisions increased from 0.09 before implementation to 0.14 after. The FWI and KSI rates are examined in Section 2.4 of the report which notes that the FWI rate reduced from 6.19 before implementation to 3.95 after. However, the number of serious casualties increased from 14 before to 21 after.
8.3.8 Footnote 4 of the report notes a counterfactual adjustment of 0.95 for collisions in the After period, and section 2.3 also notes that the DfT recognises that CRASH may report the number of serious injuries 10 to 15 percent more than the STATS19 methodology. Running a separate analysis of the actual numbers of collisions presented in Tables 2-3 and 2-4, this results in a calculated counterfactual of 12 serious collisions after implementation. Allowing a 15 percent margin of error would mean that a report of 14 or less serious collisions after implementation could be interpreted as a reduction in absolute terms. With a reported 19 collisions, it is clear that there was an increase in real terms in the incidence of serious collisions after implementation. Undertaking a similar exercise for casualties results in an adjusted counterfactual of 15 casualties. Compared with the reported 21 serious casualties after implementation, there was a clear increase in serious injuries sustained on the ALR section of road.
8.3.9 The report also provides an analysis of compliance with Red X signals at Section 2.6 and reports its findings in terms of vehicles per minute. Noting that a general traffic flow of 30 vehicles per lane per minute constitutes a “high flow”, the report states that “non- compliance in this sample ranges from 0 to 14 vehicles per minute, 0% to 20% of total flow; across all Red X events analysed the minutely average flow of non-compliance vehicles was three per minute. Compliance with Red X as a percentage of total flow was 94%”.
8.3.10 The report further notes that “the subset of drivers who choose not to comply with Red Xs do so regardless of how busy the motorway is or how long the incident duration is.”
8.3.11 Appendix A.4. of the report provides summary data relating to each lane closure reviewed for compliance. Examining this data shows that with the exception of one lane closure which had a duration of one minute, all lane closures resulted in some non- compliant vehicles passing under a Red X. Therefore the 0 percent non-compliance noted in the report should not be interpreted as full compliant, but rather as a result of unstated rounding down the total number of non-compliant vehicles divided by the duration. For example, one closure on page 28 had a duration of 61 minutes during which time 24 vehicles failed to comply with the Red X although it has a recorded percentage non-compliance of 0 percent.
8.3.12 It is salient to describe the dataset provided at Appendix A.4. in more detail with regard to the average per minute flow of non-compliant vehicles. The proportion of vehicles
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failing to comply with the lane closure ranges from full compliance for a lane closure of one minute’s duration and a per lane average flow of 10 vehicles and no incidents of non-compliance, to 20 percent non-compliance for a lane closure of 41 minutes’ duration. This latter example had a per lane average flow of 16 vehicles and 538 incidents of non-compliance with the Red X.
8.3.13 There is a wide range of average minute flow of between zero (noting the information above regarding rounding) and 14 vehicles per minute failing to comply with the Red X. My calculations of all averages find a mean of three vehicles per minute as reported, as well as a mode of one vehicle per minute and a median of two vehicles per minute.
8.4 Smart Motorway All Lane Running Overarching Safety Report 2019
8.4.1 This report presents the safety findings for nine ALR schemes in England, as part of the ALR Monitoring and Evaluation Projects which informed the 2020 Evidence Stocktake and Action Plan (as discussed in Section 18). As such, the report assesses the schemes on the basis of five metrics:
◼ Personal injury collisions (PIC) and collision rate;
◼ Killed and seriously injured (KSI) collisions and collision rate;
◼ Personal injury casualties and casualty rate;
◼ KSI casualties and casualty rate; and
◼ Fatal and weighted injury (FWI) casualties and casualty rate.
8.4.2 The stated purpose of the report is to combine data from all schemes to present a larger sample size, thereby providing a “wider picture” and increasing the evidence on which to base conclusions. This work was carried out in order to review the safety performance, inform Highways England of any changes in safety risk, quantify and evidence the benefits of ALR, and provide evidence to help improve design requirements and the concept of operation.
8.4.3 In undertaking the analysis the Overarching Safety report compares the road before implementation with the situation after. Being based on the safety objective, a three- year safety baseline is established for each of the nine schemes. However, the is necessarily constrained by the time periods over which each of the ALR schemes has been in place. As shown at Figure 2-2 of the report (and confirmed in Table C-1), of the nine schemes only two of the nine schemes had been in place for sufficiently long to generate three years’ safety data. The remaining seven schemes had post implementation data for only one year or less. Thus, the absolute figures for collisions and casualties in the ‘before’ period are not directly comparable with those in the ‘after’ period for seven of the schemes.
8.4.4 However, the report deals with the ‘before’ and ‘after’ data in aggregate to generate a more substantial dataset and as a result there is no detailed analysis by scheme. I note that the absence of detailed analysis of collisions by scheme can result in an absence
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of scrutiny on details which in turn can present information on trend which may not otherwise present themselves when the data is analysed in aggregate form.
8.4.5 The analysis is made with reference to the IAN 161 ALR safety objective for the road “not to worsen when compared to traditional motorways” (p.12). I note that there is no consideration of the safety objective relating to users. The analysis presents absolute data comparisons as well as counterfactual analysis.
8.4.6 Overall, section 3.2.1 of the report notes that there has been an absolute reduction in personal injury collision rate from 9.89 to 7.75 per hmvm. Taking the counterfactual into account, this equates to a statistically significant reduction of 1.01 collisions per hmvm. In detailing this change, the report states that the M1 J28-31 scheme was subject to the greatest level of improvement, although this may be a result of the permanent 60mph limit that was in force.
8.4.7 By contrast, the M1 J39-42 and M5 J4a-6 were subject to worsening performance, although this change was not statistically significant when taking the counterfactual into account therefore suggesting that this worsening may not have been due to the ALR scheme. However, the report notes that the small difference between before and after collision numbers results in this lack of significance.
8.4.8 Section 3.2.2 of the report considers KSI collisions and notes that the KSI collision rate across the data increased from 1.03 to 1.08 collisions per hmvm. This increase is in line with the counterfactual and is not statistically significant. There is a brief overview of the split in schemes with four improving in KSI collision rates and five worsening. However, the report concludes that, “five schemes which worsened each had five or fewer KSI collisions per year in the Before period. Given the very small sample size of KSI collisions and the fact that the overall change is in line with the national average, none of the changes in KSI rate are attributable to the schemes.” This conclusion is surprising given the difference in the ‘before’ and ‘after’ time periods. I would observe that despite the differences in assessment periods, three of the seven schemes with a one-year ‘after’ period had been subject to at least the same number of serious collisions in the first year after opening has had occurred in a full three years prior to implementation.
8.4.9 Section 3.3.1 presents data on casualty rates on ALR schemes which have reduced from 16.76 to 12.08 per hmvm. When the counterfactual is taken into account, this equates to a statistically significant improvement. Of the nine schemes, six had improved casualty rates and three had worse rates after implementation of ALR.
8.4.10 KSI casualties and casualty rates are presented in Section 3.3.2. This shows that the KSI casualty rate increased from 1.19 before to 1.35 per hmvm after implementation. This increase is in line with the national trend and therefore is not statistically significant. The report concludes that, “This means that none of the changes in KSI rate are attributable to the schemes” (p.14).
8.4.11 The use of the counterfactual is somewhat problematic given the national trend for
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increased KSI collisions (largely as a result of adopting the CRASH method of reporting25) as, in my view, the effect on reporting is to imply that an increase in KSI collisions or casualties is acceptable. This is counter to Highways England’s First Imperative (see Section 13.9) and adoption of the Safe Systems approach which requires a focus on reducing serious injuries and fatalities on the SRN (see Section 4.4)
8.4.12 While the outcome of this analysis may not mean these collision rates are statistically attributable, this does not mean they are not practically attributable. I would note that by not presenting or analysing the disaggregated data in detail, the report does not directly consider the context or causal factors of the KSI collisions and therefore no attempt is made to separate out the different factors associated with ALR. For example, the risk assessment processes make clear that an increase in live lane collisions would be expected with the removal of the hard shoulder, raising an important question regarding any change in live lane collision rates after implementation. The only way of considering what collisions (and therefore what rate) may be attributable to the ALR, deeper analysis is required.
8.4.13 Turning to FWI rates, section 3.3.3 notes that the rates have reduced over the dataset from 0.41 to 0.31 per hmvm which is an improvement compared with the national trend. I note that the CRASH effect means that some reporting of KSI outcomes over the after period cannot be compared with the before period thereby making this analysis somewhat unreliable. However, I would conclude that the inability to rely on data from the before and after periods would reinforce the need to consider the disaggregated STATS19 data (or equivalent) in more detail in order to conduct a rigorous analysis and draw robust conclusions.
8.4.14 Section 4 of the report therefore presents a further analysis based on STATS19 data but I note that this analysis continues to use aggregated data. In addressing collisions associated with the change to ALR, Section 4.2.1 of the report filters the STATS19 data to three collision types of interest. It is noted that some of the required data for this exercise was not included in the dataset but for those schemes for which all data was available, all three types of collision have reduced in incidence following implementation: shunt (reduced by 22 percent), side swipe (three percent), and single vehicle run off (40 percent).
8.4.15 Section 4.2.2 presents data on the ten most frequent “contributory factors” which are associated with the recorded collisions before implementation. All of these factors except one (slippery road due to weather) relate to human behaviour, and nine of the factors do not change significantly in ranking after implementation. The one exception relates to “careless, reckless or in a hurry” which increases in incidence taking it from the 10th most frequent factor before implementation, to the third most frequent after.
25 Department for Transport, (2017). Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain: quarterly provisional estimates year ending June 2017.
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8.4.16 Section 4.3 investigates further factors in relation to safety including at 4.3.1 live lane breakdowns and frames this analysis in relation to the Generic Hazard Log that was produced for ALR (see Section 6.7). The report identifies that across the dataset, some eight collisions took place in live lanes before implementation, rising to 27 afterwards. This section also deals with collisions in a PRS to present a “combined effect”. While data on the PRS collisions is provided for the before situation, it is not detailed for the after situation in the body of the report. I note with reference to the report’s Table C-5 that after implementation, there were two collisions reported in PRS, one resulting in a serious injury and the other in a slight injury. The report notes that “as expected; the combined effect is an increase in the rate of collisions due to breakdowns in live lanes and PRS” (p. 24).
8.4.17 In presenting the before and after live lane collision data with reference to the Generic Hazard Log, the report notes that the overall live lane breakdown rate by miles travelled is under the threshold of 0.35 live lane breakdowns per mile per day that was predicted in the Hazard Log. Some 18,675 live lane breakdowns were recorded in the after period across all schemes resulting in 0.18 live lane breakdowns per mile per day after implementation.
8.4.18 It is notable that the body of the report is silent on the severity of outcome of the live lane breakdown collisions recorded in the after period. Although the reader is not directed to it specifically, data relating to severity of outcome is provided in an appendix to the report, and reproduced at Table 8.1.
8.4.19 I note that of the nine ALR schemes, seven resulted in increased numbers of live lane breakdown collisions following implementation. Of these, all without exception have been subject to both greater numbers and more severe outcomes. It is particularly notable that the rates increase not only for serious (from 0.046 to 0.895) and fatal collisions (from nil to 0.358), but also for slight which increases by more than 300 percent from 0.368 before to 1.163 after implementation. By any measure therefore, either a traditional risk assessment based approach, or a Safe Systems approach, this outcome should raise concerns.
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Table 8.1 Summary of Live Lane Breakdown Collisions and Collision Rates
Scheme
27 13
- -
42 31 6 35a 16
7
------
4a
13)
-
-
6)
-
M25 J23 M25 J5 M25 (J5 M6 J10a (J11a M1 J39 M1 J28 M5 J4a M1 J32 M1 J19 M3 J2 Overall
Fatal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Serious 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Number Slight 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 7
Total 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 8
Vehicle distance 3.64 2.09 1.45 1.21 3.79 2.00 1.82 2.91 2.84 21.76
travelled [bvkm] Before Fatal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rate Serious 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.343 0.000 0.046 [/bvkm] Slight 0.275 0.478 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.550 0.343 0.703 0.322
Total 0.275 0.478 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.550 0.687 0.703 0.368
Fatal 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
Serious 0 0 2 1 3 1 0 1 2 10 Number Slight 4 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 13
Total 7 1 3 1 4 4 1 3 3 27
Vehicle distance 3.65 2.31 0.47 0.41 1.25 0.70 0.63 0.80 0.95 11.17
travelled [bvkm] After
Fatal 0.821 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.256 0.000 0.358
Rate Serious 0.000 0.000 4.217 2.444 2.392 1.435 0.000 1.256 2.098 0.895 [/bvkm] Slight 1.095 0.433 2.108 0.000 0.797 4.306 1.598 1.256 1.049 1.163
Total 1.916 0.433 6.325 2.444 3.190 5.741 1.598 3.767 3.147 2.416 Source: Smart Motorway All Lane Running Overarching Safety Report, Highways England, 2019
8.4.20 It is concerning that the analysis in the Overarching Safety Report, on which the Evidence Stocktake was based, did not present this information with clarity. Given that this Overarching Report had as an aim presenting evidence to inform design changes to ALR, it is odd that this data was not dealt with in the body of the report, when it shows beyond doubt that more people are being seriously injured or dying as a result of the ALR’s removal of the hard shoulder. Given Highways England’s First Imperative and the organisation’s adoption of a Safe Systems approach some four years prior to the preparation of this report, the absence of such critical analysis from the body of the report or from its conclusions is inexplicable.
8.4.21 The analysis of impacts on hazards set out in Section 4.4 is also somewhat at incongruous with the wider aims of the report. Again, in contrast with the adopted Safe Systems approach which would require a focus on serious and fatal collision hazards, this section deals with the hazard for all collisions. As a result, by focusing on the
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change in total collision rates, the report is silent on the fact that a fifth of live lane breakdown collisions occurred on the ALR schemes in the peak period as shown in Appendix C of the report.
8.4.22 As highlighted in my discussion in relation to the M42 pilot (see Section 7.2) I interpret the language and presentation of analysis associated with the smart motorways’ outcome as being suggesting of confirmation bias being embedded in the approach at an early stage in the development of the design. This is, in my view, likely to have led to a reduced level of open and critical evaluation of the schemes’ outcomes.
8.4.23 As discussed in Section 7.7, the Generic Safety Report, with reference to the Generic Hazard Log, assumed that MIDAS would offer sufficient benefits to drivers to mitigate the hazard of peak period live lane breakdowns, therefore only off-peak live lane breakdowns were identified as a high risk hazard in the Generic Hazard Log. However, this assumption was identified not to be the case in 2016. It is surprising that, given the improved knowledge in relation to MIDAS as well as the aim of the report and this report’s own conclusion that “variable speed limits are applied for queue protection and congestion management and are proven to improve safety” (p.30) no meaningful analysis was presented in this report in relation to peak period live lane break down collisions. I also note that the version of the Generic Hazard Log referenced in Section 4.4 (Generic Hazard Log v 0.23xlsm) is not publicly available and as a result, I am unclear on why only eight of the 18 high risk hazards identified in the GD04 Assessment report are considered in this report.
8.4.24 With reference to the hazard of live lane breakdowns, it is salient to consider the effects of non-compliance with Red X signals. Section 5.1 presents a light analysis of Red X compliance, noting only that for 75 percent of all Red X events across all the schemes, compliance was greater than 92 percent.
8.4.25 What I interpret to be, in this report, a tacit acceptance that 92 percent compliance of a Red X is acceptable is at distinct odds with the findings of other parties and reports, including the APPG. It is my view that eight percent non-compliance with a signal which is functionally the same as a red traffic light, is not adequate to ensure occupants of vehicles in a live lane are adequately protected. I note that the report is silent on the inverse implication i.e. that for a quarter of Red X incidence, the level of compliance is worse than this already low level.
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Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ In my view, there are substantive issues with the ways in which safety has been considered in smart motorway schemes.
◼ The confidence which was present in the M42 pilot reports, and which appeared to limit the considerations in those reports persists into to the safety reports considered in this section. The M25 Monitoring Third Year Report presented data relating to Red X compliance in a way which can be readily interpreted overly optimistically. The 0 percent non-compliance noted in the report should not be interpreted as full compliant, but rather as a result of unstated rounding down the total number of non-compliant vehicles divided by the duration.
◼ So too, the Overarching Safety Report published in 2019 presents some concerns. of the nine schemes only two had been in place for sufficiently long to generate three years’ safety data. Seven schemes had post implementation data for only one year or less, so the absolute figures for ‘before’ period are not directly comparable with those in the ‘after’ period for seven of the schemes.
◼ The report deals with the ‘before’ and ‘after’ data in aggregate to generate a more substantial dataset and as a result there is no detailed analysis by scheme. There is a brief overview of the split in schemes with four improving in KSI collision rates and five worsening and the report concludes that, none of the changes in KSI rate are attributable to the schemes. I would observe that three of the seven schemes with a one-year ‘after’ period had been subject to at least the same number of serious collisions in the first year after opening has had occurred in a full three years prior to implementation. The report’s conclusion is somewhat surprising given the difference in the assessment time periods.
◼ While the outcome of this analysis may not mean these collision rates are statistically attributable, this does not mean they are not practically attributable. By not presenting or analysing the disaggregated data in detail, the report does not directly consider the context or causal factors of the KSI collisions and therefore no attempt is made to separate out the different factors associated with ALR. The only way of considering what collisions (and therefore what rate) may be attributable to the ALR, deeper analysis is required.
◼ It is notable that the body of the report is silent on the severity of outcome of the live lane breakdown collisions recorded in the after period. I note that of the nine ALR schemes, seven resulted in increased numbers of live lane breakdown collisions following implementation. Of these, all without exception have been subject to both greater numbers and more severe outcomes, with the rates increased not only for serious and fatal collisions, but also for slight. By any measure this outcome should raise concerns.
◼ It is concerning that the analysis in the Overarching Safety Report, on which the 2020 Evidence Stocktake was based, did not present this information in the body of the report, when it shows beyond doubt that more people are being seriously injured or dying as a result of the ALR’s removal of the hard shoulder. Given Highways England’s First Imperative and the organisation’s adoption of a Safe Systems approach some four years prior to the preparation of this report, the absence of such critical analysis from the body of the report or from its conclusions is inexplicable.
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9 Perception of Smart Motorways
9.1.1 To this point, my report has been concerned with technical considerations relating to smart motorways. However, the consideration of the perceptions of drivers, the public and other non-technical specialists is relevant. This section therefore draws on a range of sources to provide an overview of the range of perceptions.
9.2 SM-ALR Monitoring M25 J23-27 Twelve Month Evaluation Report (2016)
9.2.1 In summer 2015, interviews were conducted with road users as part of the 12 month evaluation for the M25 J23-27 ALR scheme. This involved 603 household interviews to obtain views of local road users (LRU) and 677 interviews at MSAs to obtain views of non-local road users (NLRU)26. Key findings of these interviews included: Q. “Sections of the motorway network are being upgraded to smart motorways. In some areas the hard shoulder is permanently converted into an additional traffic lane. Are you aware of this change on the M25?”
53% of LRU and 75% of NLRU who had not used the scheme were not aware of this;
29% of LRU and 26% of NLRU who had used the scheme were not aware of this;
Less than half of LRU and 59% of NLRU who had used the scheme knew it was ALR;
The results indicate a substantial proportion of drivers using the scheme each day were not aware it was smart motorway.
9.2.2 Oddly, although the M25 J23-27 scheme is ALR, the interview included questions relating to DHS schemes. Some ten percent of LRU did not know that a “Solid white line between Lanes A and B indicates the presence of a hard shoulder which should not be used unless a speed limit is displayed above it.” Further, up to ten percent of LRU were not aware that “Drivers should not stop in the hard shoulder when speed limits are displayed above the lane”.
9.2.3 I note that respondents were asked “How familiar would you say you are with the signage and regulations associated with the use of smart motorways”. Statements or cards of the features and their regulation or use were presented and “know” or “would have guessed” were options for possible responses. This methodology lacks rigour as it invites participants to confirm awareness, rather than testing that awareness. That the research methodology did not address the matter of participant bias is concerning as there was therefore no attempt to mitigate the effect methodologically for example by asking open questions regarding features of the ALR scheme. It is my view that the findings regarding “Awareness of scheme signage and regulations” can therefore not be
26 Highways England, (2016). SM-ALR Monitoring M25 J23-27 Twelve Month Evaluation Report.
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considered reliable and the insights provided are brought into doubt.
9.2.4 The effect of participant bias could explain the very high positive response rate (93 percent of all respondents) expressing knowledge of DHS features which were unrelated to the scheme in question. It also provides an alternative perspective on the Overall Compliance Trend shown in Figure 4-6 of the report which shows very low levels of compliance (<20 percent) when VMSL is showing speed limits of 40 or 50mph. This reinforces the concept that compliance depends on knowledge, an ability to comply, and a factor which compels compliance (either through encouragement or enforcement).
9.2.5 Given the absence of smart motorways in the Highway Code and the very small amount of the SRN provided as any form of smart motorway in 2015, these high positive response rates seem unrealistic and unreliable given the wider context.
9.2.6 With regards ERA, 15 percent of NLRU who had used the scheme were not aware that “Emergency refuge are provided where there is no hard shoulder.” The research also found a variance in the rate of agreement with statements regarding the use of ERA. While some respondents had almost complete agreement that it is not “permissible to use ERA to get something out of the boot”, 22 percent of NLRU who had used the scheme considered it appropriate to use the ERA to “attend to a child’s needs.”
9.2.7 As the report notes “awareness of ERA and their permitted usage was lowest amongst those NLRU who use the scheme, which as these are the most intensive users of the scheme could result in inappropriate usage of ERA.”
9.2.8 With regards driver behaviour, the surveys found that the proportion using LBS2 was higher than using LBS1. This was the case for drivers of large vehicles although these users were more likely than car drivers to use LBS1. A total of 11 percent of respondents said it was “not at all likely” that they would use LBS1 in typical traffic conditions. The report notes that “there is a reluctance amongst drivers to use the inside lane (old hard shoulder), but it is likely that this behaviour adjusts with increased usage.”
9.2.9 The report notes that when asked their reasons for not using the inside lane, the majority of comments related to it being blocked by HGVs. However, there were also indications of lack of comprehension (“That is a slow lane or for emergency”), uncertainty (“I don’t think it is a lane”). Quantitative data on these responses is not provided.
9.2.10 The survey also found that around half of drivers (54 percent) said that they felt more safe on the ALR scheme although 42 percent of disabled drivers said they felt less safe. Bearing in mind that only 42 percent of all respondents said that they knew about the change to the section of the motorway, as well as the lack of consideration relating to participant bias in the methodology, it is my view that these responses cannot be viewed as reliable.
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9.3 Transport Select Committee
9.3.1 In 2016 the Transport Select Committee held an Inquiry on ALR schemes27. Evidence was provided from a range of witnesses and the Committee published their report on 13 June 2016.
9.3.2 The report summary states that “We do not support All Lane Running as the attendant safety risks have not been fully addressed. While the case for increasing motorway capacity is clear, the earlier forms of smart motorway have by Highways England’s own analysis, a lower risk profile than All Lane Running. The type of scheme used on the M42 has a track record of safety and performance, and it is perverse for the DfT to continually lower the standard of the smart motorway specification, while presenting such changes as a logical next step… If traditional motorway widening has been rejected as too expensive, then it is the model of the M42 pilot that should be considered the basis of future schemes”.
9.3.3 At paragraph 11 the report cites the DfT as stating that ALR “evolved from successful earlier forms of smart motorway and was the logical next step in a process of incremental improvement”. The report disagrees with this position and asserts that “the permanent removal of the hard shoulder, is a major, fundamental and not incremental change.” Further, at paragraph 12, “the Department is wrong to present this as merely an uncontroversial, incremental step or the logical extension of what has gone before. The permanent loss of the hard shoulder is a radical change and the Department should present it as such.”
9.3.4 The benefits of the ALR operation with respect to journey time reliability benefits and reduced congestion is discussed and at paragraph 22 the report states that “our concern is that the risks arising from converting the hard shoulder into a running lane are an unacceptable price to pay for such improvements.”
9.3.5 Section 2 of the report considers the management of risk. Acknowledging that the hard shoulder is not a safe environment, the report states that “it is, however, a much safer environment than a live lane, even if such a lane is closed with a Red X signal. There is very little chance that a driver will be mistakenly using a traditional hard shoulder as a running lane, whereas this is a relatively common event on a lane closed with a Red X” (paragraph 23).
9.3.6 This section of the report is damning regarding stakeholder consultation processes relating to the ALR schemes, and the reliance on one year’s worth of road safety data for the schemes on the M25 to support the further roll out of the ALR schemes. With reference to the ALR safety objective, the report notes that “we believe that a group of road users (recovery personnel) are significantly, disproportionately adversely affected” (paragraph 26) therefore it is my opinion that the ALR systems do not demonstrably fulfil their safety objective.
27 Transport Committee, (undated). All lane running inquiry – publications.
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9.3.7 In considering the placement of ERA, the report cites the trade union Prospect that “the reality is that whilst many vehicles are capable of [reaching an ERA], motorists tend to simply halt the vehicle in lane.” Further, Edmund King of the AA is cited as stating that “he thought that if people could not see an ERA, they would not continue driving until they found one, even if their vehicle was capable of doing so” (paragraph 31).
9.3.8 In considering the implications for the travelling public, the RAC and AA will not recover in a live lane without a physical barrier being in place (see Section 9.6 for further discussion on matters relating to vehicle recovery). This may lead to the vehicle being removed under statutory powers, at the driver’s expense. The DfT reported some 592 recovery incidents on ALR schemes in 2015. At paragraph 33 the report concludes that “the level of emergency refuge area misuse is unacceptable. When combined with the scarcity of such areas, this can lead to a driver being forced to stop in a live lane in the event of a breakdown”. Further, at paragraph 35, “Police forces, motoring organisations, and vehicle recovery operators are in agreement. Emergency refuge areas in All Lane Running are placed too scarcely… The Department should revert to emergency refuge areas spaced at 500-800m, as in the M42 Active Traffic Management pilot”.
9.3.9 I note that the findings of an All-Party inquiry for ALR in 2020, reported that Highways England “told the [Transport Select] committee that the agency were open to change on this aspect of the design”28 (see Section 9.6).
9.3.10 With regards to Red X compliance, the report notes a 92 percent compliance with Red X signals. While this compares favourably with compliance with speed limits, it is noted that “it was ‘very low’ compared with driving through a red light” (paragraph 40). The report notes that this compliance rate is “unacceptable” and that smart motorway schemes in general “need to show significant improvement in this area”.
9.3.11 While the report acknowledges the safety benefits and risk reduction gained from MIDAS and VMSL, there are substantial concerns regarding the use of the risk reductions generated by the controlled environment to offset and therefore justify the risks associated with the permanent closure of the hard shoulder. At paragraph 59, the report notes that, “the loss of the hard shoulder is responsible for a net increase in risk in existing hazards and a net increase in newly introduced hazards, and the installation of the controlled environment is responsible for a net decrease. We find that the way that the Department has presented the risks of All Lane Running is disingenuous. The increase in risk caused by the loss of the hard shoulder is not an unfortunate, necessary cost of installing the controlled environment. The two acts are not intrinsically connected.”
9.3.12 With reference to Highways Agency’s ‘Managed Motorways Factsheet 1’, the report notes that the DfT’s risk assessment of carriageway types identified that the M42 pilot scheme had “a significantly smaller risk profile than any other configuration, including a normal D3M motorway… By choosing to disregard the design, and only aiming for a
28 All-Party Parliamentary Group for Roadside Rescue and Recovery, (2020). All Lane Running Inquiry. (p.18)
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safety baseline of a standard D3M motorway, the Department is actively choosing a less safe option” (paragraph 61).
9.3.13 The Select Committee made a number of recommendations, to which the Government responded on 26 August 2016. In summary, this response29 does not accept that the hazards associated with the removal of the hard shoulder are too high, and points to the APTR and balance of risks to support their position. The response does confirm that further effective public engagement is required to increase knowledge, awareness and compliance with ALR.
9.3.14 With regards to SVD, the Government response notes that, “as Highways England advised the Committee at the hearing, it is committed to implementing measures to further improve the performance of All Lane Running, which includes the introduction of stationary vehicle detection to all All Lane Running sections.”
9.3.15 The response commits to reviewing ERA spacing and associated signage and measures to make them more conspicuous, with these measures to be identified by the end of 2016. With respect to the risk assessment methodology, the Government response supports the use of the GALE approach (see Section 6.4)
9.3.16 Finally, the Government response does not accept that the roll out of ALR should stop, or that a pause is warranted until such a time as the road safety evidence has been collected from the existing ALR schemes. It notes that “All Lane Running provides four lanes of capacity at the national speed limit unlike Hard Shoulder Running (60 mph maximum operating speed) and avoids the labour intensive operation of opening and closing the hard shoulder which needs to exactly coincide with the traffic demand for it to be effective.” The response also states that, “simpler, more intuitive driving environment that is quicker to deliver and maintains high levels of safety performance.”
9.3.17 The Transport Select Committee’s final report presenting its commentary on the Government response30 notes that,
“We stand by our call for a halt in the rollout of all lane running. It seems that the Government is determined to press ahead with a move to the latest design of all lane running notwithstanding the concerns that we and others have expressed. We believe that it is therefore obliged to set out, more clearly than it has so far,
◼ how the findings of the review into ERA spacing will be acted on and whether existing schemes will be reworked if spacing is reduced;
◼ whether gantry spacing will be adjusted for existing schemes if the specification is tightened for new schemes;
◼ when and how stationary vehicle detection systems will be retro-fitted to existing schemes; and
29House of Commons Transport Committee, (2016). All Lane Running: Government Response Fifth Report of Session 2016-17. 30 UK Parliament, (2016). All Lane Running.
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◼ what plans it has for the dynamic hard shoulder pilot given that the Government does not consider it represents a typical design or performance for hard shoulder running.”
9.3.18 I note that several of these ‘obligations’ were not fully addressed until the publication of the ‘Smart Motorways Evidence Stocktake and Action Plan’ in 2020 (see Section 18)
9.4 Smart Motorways Research (2017)
9.4.1.1 This research was carried out on behalf of Transport Focus, the independent watchdog for transport users with a stated vision to “ensure that operators, funders and regulators of transport systems put transport users first.”31
9.4.2 The research was commissioned due to the “ongoing debate around the effectiveness of the smart motorway network” to gain “a firm understanding of road users’ experiences of – and views about – smart motorways”. To achieve this, the research considered:
◼ Awareness of knowledge of the concept of smart motorways, and understanding of their key features;
◼ Experience of using smart motorways including each of the key features, and any concerns relating to breakdowns; and
◼ Understanding opinions on the future of smart motorways.
9.4.3 The research was based on a phased qualitative approach, involving interviews of individuals and organisations, focus groups and interviews which included pre-tasks to sensitise the participants. The report notes variously how prompted versus unprompted responses differed, suggesting that the methodological approach was cognisant of participant bias, even if not mentioned specifically. Findings relating to understanding and awareness of smart motorways are identified at page 11 as including:
◼ “It is assumed that the changes have been implemented to improve traffic flow and it is similarly assumed (hoped) that safety has been a primary consideration;
◼ But understanding of smart motorways is developed passively/ experientially
◼ As such many drivers’ views on smart motorways are not ‘joined up’ and this leads to challenges that exist at four levels:
Understanding the purpose of individual features of smart motorways and how these fit together, leading to a lack of understanding of the rationale behind smart motorways
Apparent inconsistency between road conditions and road instructions, undermining trust in the smart motorway concept
For some drivers confusion about key signals and instructions and for many drivers, uncertainty about the role and use of ERAs
Some subconscious concerns about safety.”
31Transport Focus, (undated). About our goals.
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9.4.4 In relation to awareness of the component parts of a smart motorway, the research found that few participants were aware of the use of in-road sensors and “most drivers can also point to situations where message boards appear to be relaying ‘incorrect’ information or where variable speeds do not reflect road conditions”. This includes where “there is no congestion or other reason given”. This comment particularly demonstrates a lack of awareness of the use of the technology to avoid congestion. The significance of the active management of signage was questioned and the report states that “there are doubts about how closely signs are being activated to incidents, whether they are activated at all, or whether they are kept up to date. Some also begin to question what might happen in the event of an accident” (page 13).
9.4.5 The report identified confusion relating to ERA, their role and use as well as uncertainty on the hard shoulder and need to comply with the VSML. The report details that when prompted people raise concerns about safety of smart motorways and that “the general consensus is that all lane running smart motorways are less safe than conventional motorways” (page 15). Participants acknowledge a trade-off between the perceived level of risk and probability of occurrence and the benefits of improved journey time reliability. The report notes that “respondents tend to then either prioritise quicker and more reliable journey times or simply put it out of their mind.”
9.4.6 The research found that professional drivers (i.e. people who drive for a living but not HGV drivers) had a lack of knowledge about ERA and emergency procedures, but have a high level of use of smart motorways. This results in a “heightened concern around the absence of a hard shoulder” (page 23). I interpret this to be due to these drivers’ increased awareness of the lack of a demarcated hard shoulder, combined with the lack of awareness of the existence or use of ERA. Thus they are more concerned of the ramifications of the lack of hard shoulder. With regards stakeholders rather than members of the public, the research found their primary concerns to be with safety and education of the public. Some stakeholders view the removal of the hard shoulder in ALR as problematic from a safety point of view, but that education can help mitigate any issues with the operation of the smart motorways. I note that this is similar in thinking to that within Highways England which was found to be problematic in the 2020 report discussed at Section 4.5.
9.4.7 With regards to the specific features of smart motorways, the research notes that people are generally aware of hard shoulder running, but not necessarily of the difference between DHS and ALR operations. With regard to ALR, the research identified the permanent removal of the hard shoulder to be contentious noting that “users are particularly anxious about breakdown.”
9.4.8 For ERA also, there is incomplete understanding of their use with some participants “completely oblivious to their existence” (page 40). Although most respondents understood that they are for use in a “genuine emergency only” there is “little knowledge about the ‘proper’ use of ERAs, many have not even considered this.” As a result, the report notes that there are several concerns regarding ERA including:
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◼ “ERAs spaced too far apart… although underlying assumption is that they have been spaced with safety in mind;
◼ As such, prevailing fear of being unable to locate ERA in breakdown scenario;
◼ Fear of ERA being occupied when needed;
◼ Concerns about how closely ERA are monitored – or even whether they are monitored at all.” (page 41.)
9.4.9 The smart motorways research identifies a number of areas which require improvement to affect users’ understanding of ALR: education, information, monitoring and safety concerns.
9.5 Transport Focus
9.5.1 In their role, Transport Focus have commissioned research such as the 2017 ‘Smart Motorways Research, Getting to the Heart of Smart’, and have corresponded with the Secretary of State on matters relating to smart motorways. In their letter dated 4 November 2019, the Chief Executive noted that “We know from research that road users put a high degree of trust in ‘the authorities’ to look after them, I suspect many would be surprised that automatic stopped vehicle detection isn’t already on every all- lane running section… One part of Highways England’s recent letter to the Transport Select Committee stood out for me. Namely that the safety objective of any all-lane running scheme is to be at least as safe as the traditional motorway it replaces. Is that actually good enough?”
9.5.2 Due to purdah prior to the General Election, this was responded to by the Secretary of State’s Principal Private Secretary in a letter dated 11 November 2019 who noted that,
“Highways England’s road user safety objective for all lane running is that schemes must demonstrate for a period of three years after becoming fully operational that:
◼ The average number of fatal weighted injury (FWI) casualties per year is at or below the number in the ‘before’ period
◼ The rate of FWI casualties per hundred million vehicle miles per annum is no more than the number than the rate [sic] in the ‘before’ period.”
9.5.3 I note that the response is incomplete as it does not include the safety objective relating to ‘no population of the customer’ being adversely affected.
9.5.4 Following the General Election, Transport Focus again issued the letter to the Secretary of State for Transport, accompanied by their research Getting to the Heart of Smart. In his foreword to this document, the Chair of Transport Focus notes that, “the voice of the road user has often been absent in recent headlines, debates and inquiries mostly around safety on smart motorways with no hard shoulder”.
9.5.5 The document reports the findings of the ‘Smart Motorways Research 2017’ and
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highlights the desire for more information about their operation, including what to do in the event of a live lane breakdown. The reports makes a number of recommendations including that Highways England: 1. Increase road user knowledge and understanding about smart motorways and their use; 2. Ensure that VMSL are regarded as appropriate to the traffic conditions; 3. Make clearer when the hard shoulder should and should not be used with consideration given to a green arrow as well as a Red X; 4. Reassure users that ALR are safe even in the event of a breakdown and that risks associated with not having a hard shoulder will continue to be mitigated; and 5. Implement the orange surface and new signage to ERA as quickly as possible.
9.6 All Lane Running Inquiry (2020)
9.6.1 In January 2020, the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Roadside Rescue and Recovery published its findings from its inquiry to ALR motorways. The inquiry was conducted “on the basis that ALR is a fundamental change to the nature of a major road, and hence has changed the nature of the work of recovery operators” (p.6). The inquiry’s aim was to examine the way that ALR impacts recovery operators, but the report also considers the wider issues for ALR users as well as HE’s responsibilities with respect to all road users’ safety. The inquiry examined the incidence of live lane breakdowns on ALR compared with D3M roads. As a result, it reported that “The 38% live lane breakdown rate amongst road users is completely unacceptable. Though live lane breakdowns do occur on traditional motorways 20.43% of the time, [they] should be minimised at all costs. That a system is being rolled-out across the country that nearly doubles the frequency of such incidents is a public policy failure” (p. 14).
9.6.2 With regards to the spacings of ERA, the inquiry report reflects on the outcome of the 2016 Transport Select Committee and notes that in 2016 Highways England were “open” to changing spacings of ERA on existing ALR schemes and details various correspondence which took place between Highways England and the Select Committee in 2017 and 2019. As a result of the correspondence and evidence provided at the inquiry, the report concludes that, ”If increasing the number of ERAs can be seen to be replicating the effects of having a hard shoulder – i.e. somewhere in road users’ field of vision that they know will be safer than stopping in a live lane – then this would surely reduce the number of live lane breakdowns. However, given Highways England were unable or unwilling to produce the evidence behind their claims, the APPG has been unable to make a fair and balanced assessment of them” (p.19).
9.6.3 Turning to the provision of SVD, the report is scathing regarding the Highways England response to retrofitting this technology onto existing ALR schemes. Noting that a commitment was made in 2016 to the Select Committee to include SVD is all future ALR schemes, the inquiry report states that “Highways England’s record on this front has been incredibly poor… As with the issue of ERA spacing, the mis-match between the commitments made to the Transport Committee in 2016 and what has taken place since is breath-taking. Despite committing to adding Stopped Vehicle Detection to all
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ALR schemes both future, and existing ones via retrofitting, at the time of their response in September 2019, Highways England had only implemented Stopped Vehicle Detection on 25 miles of the ALR network that now spans more than 400 miles of road, having rolled out new ALR schemes in that period without Stopped Vehicle Detection” (p.21).
9.6.4 The inquiry report notes a Transport Select Committee session from 2019 at which Highways England Chief Executive was asked how many deaths would have been prevented if SVD had been implemented. His response was noted to be “an honest but damning answer… had Highways England met a commitment that the agency he leads made to a House of Commons Select Committee, then some of those who have tragically lost their lives would still be with us today” (p.21).
9.6.5 In considering Red X compliance, the inquiry report notes that in 2019 legislation was put in place to enable non-compliant drivers to be fined and that Highways England have committed to education campaigns to improve awareness of what Red X means. However, the low levels of compliance were noted to be of particular concern for recovery operators with both the AA and RAC raising concerns at the inquiry.
9.6.6 Overall, the report concludes that “All Lane Running, which has been presented by Highways England and the Department for Transport as the natural extension of earlier ‘smart motorways’ but is in fact a fundamental alteration to the nature of a road, has been conducted with a shocking degree of carelessness. The necessary steps have not been taken in advance to ensure the safety of motorists and recovery operators. Many of the measures now being taken should have been in place before the roll-out of these roads commenced. This would have also cost the taxpayer less, given the high cost of retrofitting in comparison with installing the safety features during construction – and, more importantly, it would have saved lives” (p.11).
9.6.7 As a result of the inquiry, the APPG recommended that the implementation of ALR be halted until there is at least three years of safety data for each ALR link which shows an improvement in safety on each scheme compared with a D3M and a “marked reduction” in live lane breakdown rates and:
◼ The rate of live lane breakdowns is at or below the rate for D3M;
◼ HE traffic officer resources increase and there is a “marked improvement” in response times to live lane breakdowns;
◼ All existing ALR schemes have SVD retrofitted and ERA retrofitted to no less than 800m spacings;
◼ Red X compliance should be improved to be at least 98 percent.
9.7 Green Flag & Brake Reports on Safe Driving: Motorway Driving
9.7.1 The brief research conducted by Brake in 2020 surveyed some 2,010 about their experience of motorway driving. While the sampling methodology is not stated, a large
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dataset was obtained for the research.
9.7.2 The study found that 75 percent of drivers reported knowing what a smart motorway is but only 48 percent said they knew the rules for driving on one. A quarter of all respondents did not know what a smart motorway is, nor the relevant rules. In a similar vein to the 2015 surveys carried out as part of the M25 J23-27 evaluation, the report provides no evidence relating to participant bias and therefore the responses may not be viewed as reliable. However, the responses to this survey in my professional opinion appear to be more realistic than for the M25 J23-27 surveys, as there is a greater variation in response rate in this study, with for example 53 percent of men reporting that they had driven on a smart motorway compared to 34 percent of women. Further, there was a high regional variation, with 49 percent of respondents from London reporting that they had driven on a smart motorway, but just 26 percent of drivers in Wales and 17 percent in Scotland.
9.7.3 A significant minority of respondents, ranging from 14 percent in England to 24 percent in Northern Ireland were not sure if they had ever driven on a smart motorway. The variance in responses reflects the density of smart motorway provision in the UK which suggests that the research may be a reasonable indication of levels of knowledge. Overall, although there is a question on the sampling, the research corroborates the view that the travelling public are not adequately familiar with ALR.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ The Transport Select Committee’s damning 2016 report regarding ALR made a number of recommendations, to which the Government responded, rejecting that the hazards
associated with the removal of the hard shoulder are too high, and pointing to the comparison with APTR and balance of risks to support their position.
◼ Following this response, the Transport Committee made further recommendations, regarding ERA and gantry spacing, retro-fitting of SVD and the future of the M42 pilot. I note that several of these ‘obligations’ were not fully addressed until the publication of the ‘Smart Motorways Evidence Stocktake and Action Plan’ in 2020
◼ Research in 2017 for Transport Focus identified confusion relating to ERA and their use as well as uncertainty on the hard shoulder and VSML. The report details that when prompted people raise concerns about safety and that “the general consensus is that all lane running smart motorways are less safe than conventional motorways”.
◼ A further inquiry by the Transport Select Committee in 2020 concluded that a system being implemented across the country that nearly doubles the frequency of live lane incidents is a “public policy failure”. Overall, the highly critical report concludes that ALR “has been conducted with a shocking degree of carelessness” without the necessary steps to ensure the safety of motorists and recovery operators.
◼ Overall public awareness of ALR is demonstrated in Brake’s 2020 survey which found that 75 percent of drivers reported knowing what a smart motorway is but only 48 percent said they knew the rules for driving on one. I note public education appears to be as crucial in 2020 as it was considered to be in 2008 and the early stages of design development.
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10 Regulations and Guidance to Drivers
10.1.1 Advice to drivers in the event of a breakdown is dealt with in several documents. This section sets out the principal areas of consideration in terms of advice or rules relating to driver behaviour under normal driving conditions as well as for breakdowns or collisions on motorways as well as on smart motorways.
10.2 The Road Traffic Act 1988
10.2.1 The Road Traffic Act 1988 sets out the various duties of users and operatives on roads under normal and extraordinary conditions.
10.2.2 Section 22 of the Act states that any person in charge of a vehicle who causes, or permits, that vehicle to “remain at rest” on a road in a manner as to “involve a danger of injury” to other road users is guilty of an offence. I note that Section 22 does not present any qualification relating to the context in which a vehicle may be caused to remain at rest.
10.2.3 Section 38 of the Act identifies The Highway Code as the means by which the “guidance of persons using roads” is set out. As such The Highway Code is required to be observed by all road users and I therefore consider the Code later in this Section.
10.2.4 Section 70 of the Act sets out the duties in case of an accident where a “mechanically propelled vehicle” is involved in a collision which results in a personal injury being caused to someone other than the driver of that vehicle, or damage is caused to another vehicle or trailer; an animal other than that which is being transported by that vehicle; or the property associated with the road on which the collision took place, or land adjoining the road. The duties as identified in the Act include:
◼ Subsection 2 – the driver of the vehicle must stop and give their details and those of the vehicle owner to any person reasonably requiring them;
◼ Subsection 3 – should the driver not provide his name and address as required in Subsection 2, they must report the accident;
◼ Subsection 4 – anyone who fails to comply with either Subsection 2 or 3 is identified as guilty of an offence.
10.2.5 The Act does not set out any qualification relating to the context within which the driver must stop for example, “at the nearest safe place to stop”.
10.3 The Highway Code for England, Scotland and Wales
10.3.1 The latest version of the Highway Code32 sets out the rules relating to user behaviour on all elements of the highway.
32 Department for Transport, (2019). The Highway Code.
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10.3.2 The Highway Code does not reference smart motorways specifically and does not provide guidance on their use, instead referring to the component parts i.e. lining and signage. The use of the hard shoulder as a running lane is referred to as “Active Traffic Management” in only one Rule (269) which is replicated here for ease of reference:
“Rule 269: Hard shoulder. You MUST NOT use the hard shoulder for overtaking. In areas where an Active Traffic Management (ATM) Scheme is in force, the hard shoulder may be used as a running lane. You will know when you can use this because a speed limit sign will be shown above all open lanes, including the hard shoulder. A red cross or blank sign above the hard shoulder means that you MUST NOT drive on the hard shoulder except in an emergency or breakdown. Emergency refuge areas have also been built into these areas for use in cases of emergency or breakdown.”
10.3.3 Details relating to required behaviour on motorways are set out in Rules 253 to 273. In relation to the prescribed signing and lining on smart motorways, the following Rules apply:
◼ Mandatory Speed Limits – Rule 261 which requires compliance beyond the roundel sign (though I note that there is no mention of the variability of these speed limits);
◼ Lane Closure signals – Rule 258 which requires drivers to not use the specified lane beyond the signal; and
◼ Emergency Refuge Areas – Rule 269 which acknowledges the existence of the Emergency Refuge Areas and their availability for use.
10.3.4 Aside from these rules, The Highway Code is silent on the manner in which smart motorways are to be used. The use of ERA is not explained, nor is the manner in which vehicles are expected to re-join the motorway from an ERA.
10.3.5 With regards the actions required in the event of a breakdown or incident, Rules 274 to 287 of the Code set out driver requirements. Rule 275 sets out the requirements in the event of a vehicle failure on the motorway and is replicated here for ease of reference:
◼ “Rule 275: If your vehicle develops a problem, leave the motorway at the next exit or pull into a service area. If you cannot do so, you should:
◼ pull on to the hard shoulder and stop as far to the left as possible, with your wheels turned to the left
◼ try to stop near an emergency telephone (situated at approximately one-mile intervals along the hard shoulder)
◼ leave the vehicle by the left-hand door and ensure your passengers do the same. You MUST leave any animals in the vehicle or, in an emergency, keep them under proper control on the verge. Never attempt to place a warning triangle on a motorway
◼ do not put yourself in danger by attempting even simple repairs
◼ ensure that passengers keep away from the carriageway and hard shoulder, and that children are kept under control
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◼ walk to an emergency telephone on your side of the carriageway (follow the arrows on the posts at the back of the hard shoulder) – the telephone is free of charge and connects directly to an operator. Use these in preference to a mobile phone (see Rule 283). Always face the traffic when you speak on the phone
◼ give full details to the operator; also inform them if you are a vulnerable motorist such as disabled, older or travelling alone
◼ return and wait near your vehicle (well away from the carriageway and hard shoulder)
◼ if you feel at risk from another person, return to your vehicle by a left-hand door and lock all doors. Leave your vehicle again as soon as you feel this danger has passed.”
10.3.6 Rule 275 is qualified by Rule 277 which states “Rule 277: If you cannot get your vehicle onto the hard shoulder do not attempt to place any warning device on the carriageway switch on your hazard warning lights leave your vehicle only when you can safely get clear of the carriageway.”
10.3.7 I note that the Highway Code does not differentiate the need to leave a vehicle in the event of breakdown depending on the road environment, and does not incorporate the ERA into the advice. There is no mention of only leaving the vehicle in the event that there is a safe place to wait e.g. on a verge removed from the carriageway.
10.3.8 It is noteworthy that Rule 269, which is the only point in the Code which discusses the ERA, is located in the section of The Highway Code relating to “Overtaking”. The part of the Code which relates to driver behaviour in non-standard operations, such as a breakdown or collision, does not present a coherent overview of the expected outcome in any type of Smart Motorway environment.
10.3.9 Overall, I am led to conclude that The Highway Code does not set out the component parts of smart motorways, or the behaviour expected by drivers using them, sufficiently to ensure safe and appropriate user behaviour. During the time that smart motorways, in their various formats, have been implemented on English roads The Highway Code has been revised multiple times. Having reviewed the former editions available to me, I find it incongruous that there has been a persistent silence in the Code on the use of a road which was acknowledged in 2002 to require driver education. As a result, I am led to conclude that the principal means on which driver theory education has been based has not adequately prepared or informed new drivers in the use of smart motorway environments.
10.3.10 Overall, the absence of clear and unambiguous messaging to drivers and road users creates a situation in which, in my judgement, drivers are not informed sufficiently to be consistently and reliably compliant with the Road Traffic Act or The Highway Code. This position is exacerbated by the advice provided by third parties such as the AA and RAC, which provides sound information but by necessity contradicts The Highway Code.
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11 Smart Motorways Beyond the UK
11.1.1 In understanding the deployment of smart motorway technology in other countries, I have conducted a high level review of the road types and associated design parameters in place outside the UK. As the UK has one of the lowest incidence rates of road fatalities globally, this Note considers the ways in which smart motorway technology has been implemented in countries with similarly low fatality rates. The International Transport Forum33 provides data on the number of road fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants based on the latest reported data (p.17). This data shows that the UK has a fatality rate of less than five per 100,000 inhabitants.
11.1.2 On the assumption that countries with similar fatality rates will have similarly organised protocols of hazard and risk management and would similarly prioritise road safety considerations in design, this Note considers smart motorway technology which has been implemented in countries with an annual road fatality rate within the same range as the UK i.e. at no more than five road fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants or less.
11.1.3 On this basis, in this Section I consider design in The Netherlands, Germany, and Australia. Due to the limited material available in English and the prohibitive costs of translation, this review is naturally constrained in relation to the German and Dutch principles, and more expansive in relation to the Australian approach.
11.2 The Netherlands
11.2.1 Hard shoulder running smart motorways have operated in The Netherlands since 200434. In addition to DHS the Dutch motorways implement a ‘Plus Lane’, a narrow lane (2.75m – 3.05m wide compared with the standard 3.5m wide lane) constructed by adjusting the median strip35, when traffic levels are approaching congested working. In- road queue detection loops are provided at 400m – 600m spacings and gantry signals at 600m – 900m spacings. Emergency refuge areas (ERA) are provided at maximum 1km intervals36 and are permitted to be used only when the hard shoulder is being used as a running lane.
11.2.2 CCTV is provided every 200 – 250m on average and Dutch ERA are fitted with detection loops which link to the control centre. On opening the hard shoulder as a running lane, the operational standards mandate that the operator has a maximum inspection time of 60 seconds per link of hard shoulder followed by a maximum of 15 seconds to enable the Red X signals closing the hard shoulder. The hard shoulder is opened only with speed harmonisation in place on all running lanes.
11.2.3 The ERA is fitted with communications technology to enable the control centre to speak
33International Transport Forum, (2020). Road Safety Annual Report 2020 34 ITS International, (2013). Traffic monitoring and hard shoulder running. 35 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration Office of Operations (HOP), (2010). Efficient Use of Highway Capacity Summary. 36 Rijkswaterstaat Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, (2017). Ontwerp en Inrichting Spitsstroken
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with the driver via loud speaker. Road Inspectors are provided on patrol to assist drivers in the event of a breakdown or other emergency. These Road Inspectors are permitted to fine people using the hard shoulder illegally, such as HGV drivers on rest stops or drivers not enabling emergency response access.
11.2.4 In Dutch law, the hard shoulder and ERA can be used only in an emergency. What constitutes an emergency has been subject to debate in The Netherlands with, for example, comfort breaks for children being deemed acceptable but not for adults.
11.3 Germany
11.3.1 Hard shoulder running smart motorways have operated in Germany since its implementation in Cologne in 1996 and has historically been embedded in the Federal Government’s infrastructure plan as a means of relieving recurrent congestion37 in locations where traditional upgrading is not commercially or technically feasible. In more recent years, the national Road Safety Programme has identified that, temporary hard shoulder running is specifically supported by the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure to improve traffic flow and reduce the risk of collisions38.
11.3.2 It continues to be used as a “temporary solution” in advance of a regular upgrade as is established in the 2030 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan39 and in ancillary documents including the ITS Action Plan for the Roads40. I note that this latter document confirms that, “Intelligent Transport Systems will definitely not be a substitute for upgrading transport infrastructure as a whole” (p.23).
11.3.3 Criteria for the use of HSR include:
◼ Speeds during HSR use are harmonised and must be no more than 100kph equivalent to 62mph (note, unusually, German motorways do not have a speed limit in place during standard operations);
◼ ERA must be provided at no more than 1,000m spacings and at spacings less than this if possible;
◼ Verge mounted signage is mandatory on both sides of the carriageway;
◼ During HSR the hard shoulder is continuously monitored by RCC officers;
◼ Running lane speeds are controlled and reduced; and
◼ PTZ CCTV is provided at 500m spacings.
11.3.4 The implementation of HSR includes “Junction Control” which is used at on-slips or merges where there are fewer downstream lanes than upstream. This method enables HSR to operate between and through junctions.
37 Easyway, (undated). Temporary Hard Shoulder Running A 63 in Germany.. 38 Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, (2015). Road safety programme 2011. 39 Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, (2016). The 2030 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan, 40 Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development, (2012). ITS Action Plan for the Roads.
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11.3.5 For enforcement, mobile Police have been used rather than static enforcement cameras41. Enforcement has been something of a concern with temporary HSR in locations such as the A63 at Mainz, which has been subject to some drivers using the hard shoulder as a running lane outside of its operational period. However, Easyway notes that this is likely due to the road having been subject to permanent HSR (i.e. ALR) for the preceding two years therefore some drivers have become accustomed to using the nearside lane as a running lane.
11.3.6 Following discussions with colleagues and the author of the Easyway note in January 2021, I understand that the A63 scheme was implemented initially as a temporary ALR scheme, with the intention always being that it would be superseded by a longer-term DHS scheme within two years. That the DHS scheme itself is also viewed as a temporary measure is underscored by the current proposals to widen the A63 to six lanes, to improve traffic quality and traffic safety42.
11.4 Australia
11.4.1 Australian freeways are built and managed by states and territories rather than being under federal jurisdiction. Referred to as managed motorways or smart motorways, this technology has been implemented in several states. Victoria led with the first Australian Managed Motorway in 2007 with the M1 project in Melbourne43 and since then joint bids have been successfully submitted for federal funding for national smart motorway provision44.
11.4.2 Although motorways are a state or territory matter, Austroads has published the ‘Guide to Smart Motorways’ which relates to their design and implementation. Austroads is an organisation of Australasian road transport and traffic agencies which includes representation by all Australian states and territories, as well as New Zealand’s Transport Agency.
11.4.3 According to the Austroads smart motorways are motorways that “have information, communications and control systems incorporated in and alongside the road45” (p.1). These systems are used to improve road capacity and safety and include:
◼ Ramp metering;
◼ Lane use management system (known as LUMS) allocates and manages lane use across the roadway during incidents and roadworks. LUMS incorporates;
◼ VMS and VMSL with lane status and speed limit signs on gantries;
◼ Vehicle detection (similar to MIDAS);
41 U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, (2011). Freeway Geometric Design for Active Traffic Management in Europe. 42 Project Information System (PRINS). (undated). On the Federal Transport Route Plan 2030 (A 63 AS Klein-Winternheim – AS Saulheim. 43 Transport Futures Institute, (2010). Smart motorway management: what is happening with traffic in Australia? 44 Infrastructure Australia, (2011). 2010-2011 Project Assessment Brief 45 Austroads, (2016). Guide to Smart Motorways.
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◼ PTZ CCTV;
◼ Incident detection;
◼ Emergency stopping bays (e.g. ERA) on DHS and ALR type roads; and
◼ Vehicle detection technology.
11.4.4 The ‘Guide to Smart Motorways’ notes that the objectives for smart motorway systems are to “provide a safe and reliable level of service that maximises productivity of the motorway” (p.18). These objectives cannot be achieved by implementing the ITS components on an existing motorway without considering the geometric design and traffic demands. For this reason, the Austroads guide notes that an in-depth analysis of the motorways and its adjoining roads must take place to identify any bottlenecks. Only once these are resolved should the ITS elements be promoted.
11.4.5 Both DHS and ALR systems are used in Australia, with DHS warranted when peak traffic flows exceed the managed capacity of the motorway, and ALR warranted when peak traffic exceeds the motorway’s capacity beyond the daily peak periods. DHS is recognised as a means of increasing capacity without costly widening treatments, and ALR is identified as a possible approach for new build motorways. ‘The Guide to Smart Motorways’ recognises that additional infrastructure is required on ALR to manage road safety and identifies that in DHS schemes, the solid white line delineating the hard shoulder should be replaced by another form of demarcation. The Austroads Guide refers to the UK IAN 161/15, IAN 112/08 and IAN 111/09 for further guidance on design considerations.
11.4.6 The provision of ERA is governed by a risk assessment approach and are provided in all forms of Australian smart motorway. The use of the ERA may be encouraged instead of the hard shoulder, due to the enhanced safety by virtue of the increased separation from the running lanes. For motorways without a hard shoulder for more than 1km in length (regardless of the use of DHS), ERA “should be provided at a typical spacing of 500 m, up to a maximum spacing of 1 km” (p.60). ERA have a minimum required width of 4m and should have sufficient entry and exit tapers to enable appropriate manoeuvring to access or exit. Depending on the outcome of the risk assessment, ERA may be equipped with ERT and associated signage, location signage, vehicle detection and CCTV.
11.4.7 Vehicle detection is provided at up to 500m spacings, depending on anticipated traffic flows. Depending on the sensitivity of locations, PTZ CCTV may be used to provide up to 200 percent coverage across the motorway environment to enable monitoring and giving a high level of designed redundancy to ensure continuity of provision. This overlapping CCTV coverage “may also be considered for motorway sections where there are additional safety considerations, such as sections with ALR, part-time ELR [DHS] or reversible lanes in operation as well as for bridge and tunnel environments.”
11.4.8 Automatic incident detection technology must be cover 100 percent of the motorway
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including hard shoulder and ERA, and must be able to detect stopped vehicles, vehicles travelling the wrong direction, queuing vehicles, pedestrian or animal on the road, and fallen objects or debris.
11.4.9 Turning to operational considerations, section 13.4 of the ‘Guide to Smart Motorways’ presents the operational considerations which apply to DHS and ALR systems including:
◼ Prior to opening the hard shoulder for DHS, a safety assessment must be undertaken either by physical drive through or by CCTV inspection;
◼ Typical Victorian response times include attending 80 percent of incidents within 10 minutes of notification and clearing 50 percent of incidents within 10 minutes of notification;
◼ Continuous monitoring of traffic conditions is required;
◼ Incident management strategies include incident response times and driver education regarding breakdown in the absence of a hard shoulder;
11.4.10 The Austroads Guide also refers to the Highways Agency 2013 ALR Concept of Operations and to the MM-DHS Concept of Operations v.3.0 for additional guidance.
11.4.11 With regards to compliance, the ‘Guide to Smart Motorways’ makes reference to the UK experience and notes that there can be higher levels of non-compliance with lane closure and speed limit instructions. As a result, the Guide states that the ‘five Es’ should be used to improve compliance being; education and encouragement, engineering, enforcement and evaluation. Again, the Guide makes reference to the Highways Agency MM-DHS Concept of Operations v.3.0 document as guidance, though I note with reference to section 5.6 of this report that the Austroads Guide includes “evaluation” as applicable to compliance which is absent from the Highways Agency consideration.
11.4.12 The wider implementation of this technology in Australia was identified in 2016 as subject to the maturation of the technology and benefits of broader adoption explored46. As a result a 2018 study reviewed the use of a range of traffic management technologies including the managed motorways technology47. The literature review in the 2018 report noted that no studies were available relating to safety or efficiency outcome in relation to LUMS as simulations only were available. Safety information was available only for the VMS and VMSL component of managed motorways in this review and the managed motorway system as a whole was not reviewed.
11.4.13 From my review of the documents associated with the international perspective, the Australian overriding focus on safety is notable and in contrast to the content available within the UK. The managed motorways framework for both VicRoads and Austroads is predicated on the Safe Systems principles which are set out in Austroad’s Safe System
46Transport and Infrastructure Council, (2016). National Transport Technology Action Plan (2016-2019). 47 Austroads, (2018). Research Report AP-R570-18 Benefits of Safety and Traffic Management Technologies.
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Assessment Framework48 and which is discussed at Section 3 of this report.
11.5 Road Safety Outcomes in International Smart Motorways
11.5.1 To examine whether there are any core similarities or differences in application between countries’ smart motorways and subsequent safety outcomes, I have sought to obtain data on their operation before implementation compared with following implementation. As noted by the Road Safety Observatory in 201749, the impact of smart motorway technology on road safety in early schemes in The Netherlands and the UK suggested a decrease in collisions and fatalities as a result, “this work was early on in the development of this technology and further evidence relating to the safety implications of Smart Motorways is needed” (p.4).
11.5.2 I have sought this further evidence through various means including:
◼ Internet search for relevant documents and data in English using relevant search terms;
◼ Internet searches for relevant documents and data in German, carried out by technical colleagues with German as a first language;
◼ Discussions with Dutch colleagues, employed as highways engineers by Royal HaskoningDHV in the Netherlands and who work on framework contracts with Dutch roads authorities to design road infrastructure; and
◼ Correspondence with the Department for Transport in Victoria, Australia.
11.5.3 Although governmental reports in Germany, the Netherlands and Australia speak of or imply road safety benefits resultant from the implementation of the smart motorway technology, I can find no hard data which records recent collision data in these countries.
11.5.4 A factsheet for the CEDR Working Group Traffic and Network Management in 2018 stated that collisions reduced in Germany and The Netherlands as a result of implementing smart motorway technology. In the order of 25 – 85 percent reduction in collisions was identified on “several sections” in the Netherlands, with up to a 20 percent reduction possible in Germany50. This factsheet also notes that “Because of the reduced probability of congestion related incidents, the impact to road safety is rather positive and not negative when HSR is operated in an appropriate way” (p.1).
11.5.5 Within Australia, there is inconsistency in collision and road safety reporting between states and territories51 which limits federal data collection and reporting. Through my correspondence with the CrashStats team in Victoria’s Department for Transport, I understand that there is no data collected specifically to compare the Victorian smart motorway collision record with the predecessor road, and they were unaware of who
48 Austroads, (2016). Safe System Assessment Framework. 49 Road Safety Observatory, (2017). Motorways Research Synthesis. 50 CEDR Working Group Traffic and Network Management, (2018). Hard Shoulder Running Fact Sheet. 51 Infrastructure Australia, (2009). Australian Infrastructure Audit 2009.
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might manage other Australian datasets52.
11.5.6 In the Netherlands, SWOV provides publicly available data in English relating to collision types by road types (e.g. urban and rural) and by speed limit, but does not differentiate between motorways with or without a Plus Lane53 therefore this cannot be used to draw conclusions on their road safety outcomes. However, Dutch colleagues have provided a copy of ‘Hoofdrapport Differentiatie Verkeersveiligheid Spitsstroken’ (approximately translated as ‘Main Report Differentiation of Road Safety Rush-Hour Lanes54’) published by Grontmij, SWOV, and Rijkswaterstaat in 2015. Although not particularly recent, this report does set out example safety data for Rush Hour lanes in the Netherlands.
11.5.7 This Rijkswaterstaat report examines road collisions with respect to:
◼ Traffic density;
◼ Prohibition of overtaking for freight traffic;
◼ Breakdown density on hard shoulder running schemes;
◼ Links or junctions; and
◼ Percentage of freight traffic
11.5.8 Section 6.1.1 of the report sets out the overarching conclusions and “possible explanations” and identifies that in medium to heavy traffic flows the crash rate for DHS schemes was not “significantly higher” than for standard motorway sections with a hard shoulder. Although the report notes that measures can be taken to compensate for the lack of hard shoulder during these periods, during times of low traffic flow “these compensatory measures are not sufficient to completely contain the extra insecurity: in these traffic situations, the crash risk for rush-hour lane routes on the right is significantly higher than for regular routes with an escape lane.”
11.5.9 In relation to the low traffic flow situation, the report notes that few cars use the hard shoulder as a running lane, and that this is due to the lane being subject to slower traffic than the main running lanes. It should be noted that in the Netherlands, DHS is used with speed limits in place on that lane, making sense of the report’s conclusion that, “motorists indicate that they do not find the speed limit on open rush-hour lane sections credible in quiet traffic situations, which is also evident in their behaviour”.
11.5.10 With respect to breakdowns, the report notes that with the hard shoulder closed to running traffic, the safety level is improved on these roads when compared with the traditional format motorway which does not use DHS. I note that this is a similar finding to the UK situation which has consistently found MIDAS to result in improved safety outcomes. In a similar vein to the UK situation, the report notes that the MIDAS- equivalent technology “detects traffic jams, but not an individual vehicle that has come
52 CrashStats Support, Department for Transport (Victoria) (2021). Email to Simpson S. 2 February 2021. 53 SWOV, (undated). Road Deaths in the Netherlands. 54 Royal HaskoningDHV, (2021). Approximate Translation of Differentiation of Road Safety Rush-Hour Lanes.
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to a standstill” which may explain some of the higher collision rate in off peak conditions;
11.5.11 The Rijkswaterstaat report found crash rates on hard shoulder running sections to be “significantly higher” (section 6.1.1) at DHS scheme junctions than at traditional layout motorway junctions. This higher collision rate was identified both when the hard shoulder was open as a live lane, and when it was closed. The report identified the carriageway alignment, and VMS signal positioning as factors which may affect this collision rate.
11.5.12 Finally, the report discusses the effect of peak spreading on the operation of the DHS schemes, stating that, “the total average opening time that rush-hour lane routes in the Netherlands are opened per day has increased sharply in recent years”. While it acknowledges that this is due, in part, to the creation of more DHS schemes, it also states that, “the average opening duration per rush-hour lane section per day has also increased over the years: from an average of about three hours a day in 2006 to about six hours a day in 2013” (Section 6.1.3).
11.5.13 Reflecting on the ramifications of this extended opening on control centre resources, the report discusses the additional pressure that this imposes on traffic officers and resource management in undertaking their necessary checks prior to opening. As a result, “rush-hour lanes are opened unnecessarily long, as a result of which the emergency lane is unnecessarily removed from traffic and the credibility of the road user with regard to the desired behaviour (use of the rush-hour lane and speed) is lost, which in particular reduces road safety”.
11.5.14 The overarching recommendations set out in Section 6.2 of the report include:
◼ “Keep the opening times of rush hour lanes to a minimum in quiet traffic situations” which will require applying a “stricter opening regime… which must be monitored frequently”; and
◼ “The opening times of rush-hour lanes in busy traffic situations will probably increase.” For DHS routes, “where there is a structural traffic jam, additional measures can be taken or priority can be given to adaptation to regular road expansion”
11.5.15 I note that the application of DHS on Dutch motorways, created only short- to mid-term increases in capacity as is demonstrated by the increasing length of hard shoulder running periods on these roads. In addition, and despite considering the resourcing issues and pressures generated by the hard shoulder opening and closing checks, the report recommended additional measures or “adaption to regular road expansion” i.e. traditional road building to remedy this due to the safety benefits of retaining a hard shoulder.
11.5.16 This decision is in direct contrast with the UK’s decision to remove the hard shoulder by implementing ALR smart motorways thereby removing the resourcing issue. Further, the length of time that DHS has been implemented in the Netherlands is salient as
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many of these roads are now subject to extensive congestion. In my view, this can be seen as an indicator of the possible outcome on UK smart motorways in future.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ DHS has been used in the Netherlands and Germany for at least the past 15 years, with Germany’s first scheme implemented in 1996. In both countries, DHS is used as temporary measure in advance of a regular upgrade to increase capacity.
◼ The Dutch and German DHS systems are similar in having ERA at no more than 1,000m (0.6 mile) spacings, and CCTV located between 250m – 500m spacings. Both systems impose speed limits in order to harmonise speeds, in Germany speed is limited to 100kph (62mph)
◼ Managed motorways have been used in Australia since 2007. Both DHS and ALR systems are used in Australia, with DHS warranted when peak traffic flows exceed the managed capacity of the motorway, and ALR warranted when peak traffic exceeds the motorway’s capacity beyond the daily peak periods. DHS is recognised as a means of increasing capacity without costly widening treatments, and ALR is identified as a possible approach for new build motorways. In both forms, ERA are provided with a typical spacing of 500m and at no more than 1,000m spacings.
◼ From my review, the Australian overriding focus on safety is notable and in contrast to the content available within the UK. The managed motorways framework for both VicRoads and Austroads is predicated on the Safe Systems principles which is codified in the Austroad’s Safe System Assessment Framework.
◼ In considering the road safety outcomes of smart motorways beyond the UK, although governmental reports in Germany, the Netherlands and Australia speak of or imply road safety benefits resultant from the implementation of the smart motorway technology, I can find no hard data which records recent collision data in these countries.
◼ A 2018 factsheet for the CEDR stated that collisions reduced in Germany and the Netherlands as a result of implementing smart motorway technology. In the order of 25 – 85 percent reduction in collisions was identified in the Netherlands, with up to a 20 percent reduction possible in Germany. The factsheet is silent on KSI collisions.
◼ Within Australia, there is inconsistency in collision and road safety reporting between states and territories which limits federal data collection. Through my correspondence with the CrashStats team in Victoria’s Department for Transport, I understand that there is no data collected specifically to compare the Victorian smart motorway collision record with the predecessor road and they were not aware of federal comparison data.
◼ The only detailed analysis obtained for any of the countries reviewed was for the Netherlands in 2015. This identified a series of issues with the operation of DHS schemes, but it is notable that despite considering the resourcing issues and pressures generated by the hard shoulder checks, the report recommended additional measures or regular road expansion to remedy this due to the safety benefits of retaining a hard shoulder. This is in direct contrast to the UK’s decision making.
◼
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12 Interpretation on the Intrinsic Level of Safety in All Lane Running
12.1.1 Traditionally, road safety aims were to address the worst collision sites (black spots) first, thereby creating a reactive approach to addressing road safety. This has gradually evolved into proactive programme and treatments based on identified collision risks. Since Sweden’s publication of Vision Zero and the Netherlands’ Sustainable Safety in the mid-1990s, a Safe Systems approach has been increasingly accepted as best practice which diverges from this traditional approach.
12.1.2 The Safe System approach seeks to prevent road deaths, serious road injuries and permanent injury by systematically reducing the underlying risks of the entire traffic system. Road designs therefore take account of human physical vulnerability as well as our cognitive limitations. This means that designs take account of unintentional errors, and people’s intentional violation of rules is taken into account through enforcement. By designing with the fallible human user in mind, the aim is to create a road system which is intrinsically safe.
12.1.3 In so doing, intrinsically Safe Systems prevent latent errors as far as possible, and generate an environment in which road safety depends as little as possible on individual road user decisions. As such, an underlying principle of the Safe Systems approach, is that road users should not bear the full responsibility for safe road use, but that this is a responsibility shared by those who design, manage and maintain the systems.
12.1.4 A safe system is based on five essential principles for a sustainably safe transport system:
1. Functionality – roads have a single hierarchical function;
2. Homogeneity of mass or speed and direction – there should be equality in mass, speed and direction at medium and high speeds. In high speed locations, different users and directions of travel should be separated to reduce conflicts;
3. Predictability – the road environment and user behaviour supports user experience through consistency and continuity in design;
4. Forgiving – Injury is limited by a forgiving road environment and anticipation of road user behaviour. This also particularly includes the concept of forgiving hard shoulders relating to infrastructure within those areas;
5. Awareness – users are able to assess their own ability.
12.1.5 In review of the history of smart motorway design development, there is a clear relationship between the outcomes and findings of the 2006 M42 pilot and today’s ALR guidance. Because the M42 pilot’s legacy is embedded in the design guidance, my considerations on the matter of road safety extend back to include the M42 pilot and
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subsequent design guidance for the DHS and then ALR systems.
12.1.6 This section presents my interpretation and opinion regarding the management of hazards and risks, and the design development of ALR.
12.2 The M42 Pilot
12.2.1 The M42 pilot had, as one of its objectives, an aim to improve safety. The need to assess road safety using a statistically relevant, longitudinal dataset was acknowledged prior to the M42 pilot taking place, as the assessment methodology noted that road safety benefits for individual COREs to be tested i.e. VMSL or conversion of the hard shoulder, could not be assessed as a result of the pilot. This therefore means that while the M42 pilot study was suitable for assessing outcomes relating to driver behaviour and traffic flow for example, it was not suitable for identifying road safety effects of individual measures.
12.2.2 The M42 pilot’s intrinsic changes to the road environment in the conversion of the hard shoulder scenario were understood to present new hazards to drivers. In particular the Assessment Strategy noted that drivers who break down and are unable to reach an ERA would be more vulnerable than on the pre-trial road. It acknowledged that there may be increased difficulty for emergency and breakdown services to reach incidents.
12.2.3 As my investigation of the available data has shown, although the M42 pilot resulted in an increase in certain types of collision, there was an overall reduction in collision numbers and the associated Severity Index was also substantially reduced. It is of interest that (as identified in Section 7.3.8) in 2008, potential future DHS scheme locations were identified in relation to congestion only and that a required improved safety was not a criteria for site selection.
12.3 ALR Design Development
12.3.1 There is no doubt that the development of the ALR design has taken account of some safety considerations in the design development. As the Government response to the Select Committee in 2016 sets out, the approach to road safety is publicly available and as such is transparent (see Section 9.3). That consideration has been made is borne out by the reduction in total collision numbers on smart motorway schemes and the work in the public domain relating to hazard management and risk assessment. There is also no doubt that in developing the ALR, there has been a trade off with road safety benefits being reduced in order to achieve greater costs savings (see Section 7.6).
12.3.2 However, it is my interpretation that the development of the design is characterised by an absence of critical inquiry. Further, there is inconsistent thinking across the body of documents associated with ALR schemes, with assumptions in one report contradicted by assumptions in another. For example, the hazard log assumes that half of
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breakdowns will not reach an ERA55, but a more optimistic assumption is promoted in the 2012 Concept of Operations which notes that the majority of drivers are anticipated to reach an ERA.
12.3.3 While different assumptions may be used for different purposes, the fact that assumptions are used suggests that in the absence of a trial or pilot, a best guess was used based on the outcome of the M42 pilot which, being a DHS scheme is not comparable to ALR. This view is supported by the use of the M42 pilot data in various documents, from informing the Generic risk report56 to details in the A1(M) ALR consultation57.
12.3.4 The reason why ALR systems appear to be ‘intuitively’ unsafe is that they design out the mechanism on which we rely to provide some form of safe harbour. By contrast, the DHS system has continuous availability of a hard shoulder in the event that it is required, so there is continuous provision of a clear place for drivers to go to in the event of a collision or breakdown.
12.3.5 I note that DHS hard shoulders and ERA are subject to comprehensive technological coverage which is not present on ALR’s ERA. It can be seen that drivers on DHS schemes have, in effect, three safety nets: the ERA; the hard shoulder; and the monitoring technology. In ALR schemes this reduces to just one, the ERA, of which there is a minimum of less than 100m usable provision per 2.5km link.
12.3.6 The design guidance established in the IAN documents do not explicitly consider the inter-relationships between component parts of the layout e.g. MIDAS, the ERA and the VMS. There is also no consideration of the ALR being a system involving people whose experiences and decisions are unique. Where there is a consideration about the people navigating the system, these references are overwhelmingly related to drivers feeling confident due to the environment being highly controlled, or commenting on non- compliance with the system for example, “illegal” use of the ERA.
12.3.7 In my review I am led to surmise that lack of consideration of the novel environment is explained by the 2015 comparison of ALR with APTR. While I agree in part with the comparison between ALR and APTR with regards the removal of the hard shoulder, it is my opinion that these roads are of two distinct and different orders reflecting the weight of traffic and strategic hierarchy of the routes concerned. This is borne out by motorways’ designation as a Special road, with limits on the types of vehicle that can use them, the absence of at-grade pedestrian crossings and no Public Rights of Way traversing them. I note that this position was not shared by Highways England witness for the 2016 Transport Select Committee inquiry58.
12.3.8 That these types of roads are distinct is implied in the design criteria for 3 lane dualled
55 Highways Agency, (2012). MM-ALR Demonstration of Meeting Safety Objective Report. 56 Highways England, (2012). Smart Motorways all lane running Generic safety report. 57 Highways England, (2019). Smart Motorways Programme A1(M) Junctions 6 to 8 Smart Motorway Statutory Instrument Consultation The introduction of variable mandatory speed limits. 58 House of Commons Transport Committee, (2016). All Lane Running Second Report of Session 2016-17.
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all-purpose roads (D3AP) and dual 3 lane motorway (D3M) as set out in DMRB Road Investment Strategy for 2015/16 59, and summarised in Table 12.1.
Table 12.1 Comparison of CD 109 Compliant D3AP and D3M Design Criteria D3AP D3M
Carriageway width (excluding hard Dual 11 metres Dual 11 metres + hard shoulder strips and hard shoulders)
Frequency of commercial accesses, Low, equal to less than or equal to 5 Low, equal to less than or equal to 5 lay-bys and junctions per km per km
Standard verge width 6 metres 0
Stopping Sight Distance permitted relaxations:
Band A where momentary 2 steps below 1 step below obstructions are present in the road
environment 3 steps below 2 steps below Band B following long grades >3% and >1.5km
Nearside – hard strip Nearside – hard shoulder Edge Treatment Offside – hard strip Offside – hard strip
Not permitted – motorway Direct Access Treatment Not permitted - Clearway regulations
Junction Treatment at Minor Road Not permitted Not permitted Intersection
Junction Treatment at Major Road Full grade separation – motorway Full grade separation Intersection standard
12.3.9 As identified in Table 12.1, there are points of difference in design considerations which demonstrate the heightened strategic importance of D3M over D3AP roads, largely relating to the permitted relaxations. This leads me to conclude that the two road types are not directly comparable. Therefore, although it is reasonable to take APTR as a starting point in understanding ALR operations the two are not directly comparable not least because the ALR motorway is a Special road whereas APTR can be used by cyclists and other users who are otherwise prohibited from using motorways. Therefore I would assert that outcomes on one are not fully generalisable onto the other.
12.3.10 By direct comparison with APTR, the 2015 Generic Safety Report identified a potential for nine percent increase in collisions for ALR. However, with reference to the higher volumes of traffic, the strategic nature of the roads and the typically higher proportion of HGV traffic, it is my view that there was a case for increasing the required adjustment due to MIDAS to mitigate the removal of the hard shoulder.
12.3.11 A more fundamental consideration, however, is whether our infrastructure should be required to be intrinsically safe. One of the reasons smart motorways elsewhere in the globe use DHS rather than ALR, is that the DHS system is more readily fail-safe. In the
59 Highways England, (2020). CD 109 Highway Link Design, Design Manual for Roads and Bridges.
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event of a system failure, the hard shoulder is physically still there, and the default is that it cannot be used as a running lane. By contrast the ALR has a distinctly reduced level of intrinsic safety compared with both conventional motorways and DHS due to the absence of a permanently present, continuous place of relative safety along the carriageway’s length. There is therefore a heavy reliance on technology to mitigate these risks, as is the case in Australia (see Section 11.4).
12.3.12 As a result, Highways England is looking to technology to remedy the shortfall in intrinsic safety of the scheme, and specifically to SVD. However, as discussed in Section 7.4, the 2016 Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD) study shows, SVD is also imperfect for a number of reasons:
1. It does not cover the entire carriageway. As a result, the Phase 2 study found that an average of one live lane breakdown per day was missed in the 13km long study area;
2. The system cannot differentiate between legitimately stopped objects such as maintenance vehicles, and other stopped objects. Therefore, to prevent constant triggers, the system can be manually over-ridden for example during maintenance periods. As a result live lane stoppages cannot be detected during this period and the Phase 2 study found that an average of 3.5 stoppages per day were missed in the study area as a result;
3. The time taken from the alert being received to investigate and confirm the stoppage is subject to available resource in the Regional Control Centre (RCC).
12.3.13 Critically, this same study found that the expected utility of MIDAS, in terms of queue detection, which had been embedded in the ALR design process, were not borne out in reality. The study observed that, in peak periods congestion did indeed form quickly upstream of live lane breakdowns, but this congestion only triggered the MIDAS queue protection if the incident happened in close proximity to the MIDAS loop sites. Thus the consistent protection that is envisaged to be provided by MIDAS, and which has been embedded in the ALR design since 2012, is not the case. I am led to conclude that this has substantial implications for the ALR design.
12.3.14 If vehicles stopped in a live lane have pedestrians associated with them due to drivers exiting their vehicle (as they are required to do under The Highway Code – see Section 10.3), the resultant scenario is that the people on the carriageway are not afforded protection by means of MIDAS. The fall-back situation of SVD identifying these stopped vehicles has been shown to be imperfect also due to blind spots and manual overrides. Neither of these technologies provide a maximally safe means of mitigating the removal of hard shoulder, and in any case SVD does not yet exist on most of the ALR network.
12.3.15 Even in the situation whereby MIDAS is triggered and queue protection is in place, the ALR design means that the gantries and signage is provided less frequently compared with DHS systems or, due to being verge mounted, in ways which can sometimes be
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missed due to obstruction by passing vehicles. Further, ERA are more remote than in DHS schemes, which not only provide ERA at more frequent spacings but also have the fallback position of a hard shoulder which can brought back online for use as a refuge.
12.4 Risk Assessment Methodologies
12.4.1 The development of risk management processes is discussed in Section 6. I note that the method for managing risk was established in the M42 pilot and used for the ALR design development in combination with safety reviews for implemented schemes.
12.4.2 The safety reviews that have been carried out appear partial or uncurious. For example the M42 Three Year Safety Review clearly shows that VMSL is associated with an increase in proportion of side swipe collisions, and that the removal of the hard shoulder in DHS operations is associated with a higher increase in proportion of collisions involving HGVs than with the hard shoulder in place. Yet neither of these outcomes were investigated in the reporting. As a result it is not possible for me to fully determine exactly what information has informed the hazard identification and risk management process.
12.4.3 However, the process of risk management is clear. The risk assessment process aggregates all risk scores associated with the hazards identified in the scheme, dealing with the risks in aggregate. As a result, not only are the results discussed in aggregate but the risks also. The process appears to only consider overall mathematical outcome and I can find no information on how attention may have been paid to mitigating specific hazards which relate to serious or fatal collisions.
12.4.4 For example, the generic safety report and hazard log for ALR acknowledges that the risk to drivers of vehicles breaking down in a live lane is increased by some 216 percent compared with a dualled 3-lane motorway (D3M).
12.4.5 As noted in the 2016 SVD Monitoring report, the hazard log assumes that at peak periods, MIDAS will be triggered as a result of queuing traffic upstream from the breakdown mitigating the risk. The larger risk score in ALR documents relating to live lane breakdowns has therefore been in off-peak conditions when MIDAS was envisaged not to be triggered, “causing the hazard to remain unmitigated for a longer period of time”. This is problematic. In peak conditions, congested running is associated with rear end collisions and without an effective and reliable queue detection system, people are left to make decisions on how to respond in an environment which does not facilitate reliably safe navigation of breakdowns.
12.4.6 For off-peak periods, the risk assessment is predicated on the mathematical balance created by the increased risk score for the less mitigated off-peak periods being offset by the reduced risk score for completely different hazards. This is a procedural benefit of considering risks in aggregate as the designers have focussed on the reduction of total risk levels with the ALR scheme in place, due to the removal of slight collisions resulting from the controlled environment. This is in line with the compulsion for ALR to
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be a Value Engineered solution to secure cost savings (see paragraph 7.6.6) I can find no evidence of off-peak live lane breakdowns receiving any specific consideration for mitigation.
12.4.7 The 2015 generic safety report also presented data comparing ALR with 3 lane APTR roads. This report shows that, by comparison with 3 lane APTR, removing the hard shoulder was anticipated to result in nine percent more collisions resulting in death or a serious injury. The design is therefore reliant on MIDAS to achieve the improvement in these collision rates to ensure that the road schemes meet their safety objective of maintaining the status quo.
12.4.8 Subsequently, in 2015, it was identified that the number of accidents and KSI casualties was higher on existing ALR schemes (0.21 and 0.15) than on D3M schemes (0.13 and 0.10 respectively)60. This shows that more vehicles stopped in a live lane were involved in a collision on an ALR scheme than a conventional three-lane motorway, and more people sustained a serious injury or die as a result. This result is corroborated by the more recent Overarching Safety Report for ALR schemes (see Section 8.4)
12.4.9 The data also showed that this type of collision was more likely to take place during off- peak periods but that the collisions are more likely to result in a KSI during peak periods (24%) than off-peak periods (19%). This is an important finding which runs counter to the assumptions used in the design development in relation to MIDAS. Despite the importance of these findings, I can find no evidence that the results have been either incorporated into new guidance or resulted in amended design guidance.
12.4.10 The ALR Generic Safety Report considers risk on ALR in terms of the undefined “tolerable” level of risks. I would assert that tolerance of risk is not only a quantitative matter for a design hazard log and risk assessment, but also a matter for the public to determine.
12.5 Public Perception
12.5.1 As is discussed in Sections 9.2 and 9.4, research conducted in 2016 and 2017 found a poor level of understanding of ALR by people in areas close to ALR schemes. This lack of understanding related not only to the term smart motorway but, more importantly, to their operation and the infrastructure associated with it, including ERA.
12.5.2 This lack of understanding is evidenced by the existence of Highways England’s driver training on smart motorways (see Section 13.9) which is run in partnership with LogisticsUK. It is notable that smart motorways are therefore the only road environment which has a specific Driver CPC training course devoted to it. It is my view that if professional drivers, who are some of the most familiar with interpreting lining, signing and signals benefit from this specific training, it is not reasonable to assume that any given member of the public will be conversant with ALR and its requirements given the
60 Highways England, (2015). Smart Motorways All lane running GD04 Assessment report.
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absence of driver training or details in the Highway Code. This is borne out by the identified need for enforcement and education campaigns identified by Highways England.
12.5.3 It is telling that prior to the M42 pilot it was foreseeable that driver perception and understanding would be key to the success of the scheme. As was acknowledged in the reporting relating to the pilot at Section 7.3, DHS schemes were a “new experience to road users” as it was “unknown to the majority of road users”. For this reason driver education and information was identified as critical to the success of the pilot and then “vital” to ensure compliance and therefore the success of the scheme.
12.5.4 It was also identified at the time that as more DHS schemes are implemented, the level of media interest in each new scheme would reduce and therefore more direct communications with the public may be needed. This statement is of particular interest as it suggests not only that compliance is predicated on drivers’ understanding of the road environment, but it also implies direct engagement prior to implementation if not actual consultation. That direct engagement was identified in 2008 as a foreseeable need to ensure compliance of the future schemes is notable and it contrasts with the inclusion of driver education on ALR for the first time in the Highways England Delivery Plan 2019-2020, some five years after ALR’s first implementation in 2014.
12.6 Driver Behaviour
12.6.1 Following on directly from the M42 pilot, the need for designers and decision makers to take account of driver perception was identified in IAN 111/08, the first design guidance relating to smart motorways. This noted that consistency in road environment is an important factor in enabling drivers to successfully comply with DHS schemes. Although IAN 111/08 appeared to be referring to decisions on the locations for new DHS schemes, I would posit that this consideration is salient to the wider consideration of smart motorways.
12.6.2 IAN 111/08 did however prescribe signage to aid driver interpretation, although just one year later with the publication of IAN 111/09 these signs were no longer prescribed for new DHS schemes.
12.6.3 By 2009, just two DHS schemes had been implemented; both in the Birmingham area. Although traffic volumes along these schemes’ lengths will have been substantial, it does not stand that the provision of two schemes is sufficient to ensure that the travelling public across the country as a whole is either aware of the DHS mode of operation, or familiar with its use to an extent which suggests that there is no requirement to prescribe interpretive signage.
12.6.4 As I discuss in Section 5.4, there is a well-established use of signage on UK roads to advise drivers on driving behaviour on uncommon or unfamiliar roads. Advisory signs, such as diagram 5010 and ‘Active Traffic Management Follow overhead instructions’ are generally used on road schemes to ensure high levels of compliance by assisting
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drivers’ understanding of a new road layout. Given the widespread use of this type of signage for schemes on motorways and local roads in 2009, and the fact that only two DHS schemes were implemented at this point in time, it is my opinion that IAN 111/09 prematurely removed the prescription of interpretative signage on entry and exit to DHS schemes in advance of the travelling public having adequate understanding of the requirements of the DHS road layout.
12.6.5 A recurring theme in the research and in the Transport Select Committee’s 2016 report, is the presumption that ALR has been designed with safety in mind and with an overarching objective to create a safer road environment. As 2017 research identified (see Section 9.4) , the public trust the authorities to “look after them”. This perspective is supported by the statements in Highways England’s strategic documents which, since 2015, have identified with increasing weight, the First Imperative to make the number of people killed or seriously injured on the SRN approach zero. Comments within those documents have identified long-term performance areas to make the network safer and to increase user satisfaction.
12.6.6 Notably, GD 04/12 obliges designers to “work out the safety risk implications (benefits and disbenefits) for all affected populations, including consideration of how the control may affect human behaviour, (i.e. is there evidence to suggest that a population may behave differently because they feel safer or less safe).”
12.6.7 In my view, this comment goes to the heart of the concern with ALR schemes. The controlled environment gives people the impression that they are safe, even when they are not. Therefore behaviour is not adjusted to reflect the hazards inherent to the situation as is borne out by the rates of KSI collisions on ALR schemes involving lane stoppages. This issue is compounded by the public-facing materials relating to ALR being emphatic that there is “always somewhere to go in the event of a breakdown61”.
12.6.8 For users of the ALR, the controlled environment was designed to create a compliant environment, that is, it “provides the road user with the right information, at the right location at the right time; thereby promoting appropriate and intuitive driver behaviour through situational awareness”.62 Except for learner drivers, for most people driving in normal conditions is intuitive most of the time as it is instinctive and does not require conscious reasoning. If drivers do not perceive a road environment to be cognitively challenging i.e. requiring active attention, there will be a tendency to not perceive or consider risk.
12.6.9 This has been understood since the mid-1970s with the publication of Kahneman’s Attention and Effort63 which identified that attention is distinct from exposure. This would mean for example that two people could be exposed to the same hazard for the same length of time, but only an individual intending to attend to the hazard may actually
61 Highways England, (2015). Road Investment Strategy for 2015/16 – 2019/20 Road Period. 62 Highways England (2020). GD301 Smart Motorways. (p.63) 63 Kahneman, (1973). Attention and Effort
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perceive it.
12.6.10 On this basis, it is conceivable drivers not expecting to see live lane breakdowns may not perceive the hazard. This human fallibility reinforces the need for a maximally safe approach which takes account of these natural limitations to our powers of perception.
12.7 Compliance
12.7.1 At various points in the design development for smart motorways, the guidance has acknowledged the need to enable and ensure driver compliance with the ALR signs and signals. I note that this has only been considered with regard to the standard operation regimes. The only consideration of compliance during non-standard operations has been with regard to the use of ERA. There are many instances throughout the body of guidance and operational documents, that ensuring only “legal” stops, or emergency- related stops are made in ERA, this is borne out by the signage relating to ERA which frames their use in terms of emergencies only. However, it is my opinion that what constitutes an emergency is open to interpretation.
12.7.2 This is demonstrated not least by the language that is employed in the guidance documents which identifies emergencies as something distinct from vehicle breakdown. For example, Managed Motorway Operational Guidance v.2.0 and IAN 161/12 state that motorists should only use an ERA, “in case of emergency or breakdown”64.
12.7.3 It is notable that the risk assessments and hazard logs include no discussion of the new environment in which drivers will find themselves. In August 2019 the UK had a population of approximately 66.4 million people65 and some 40.9 million people held a driving licence66. In year ending June 2019 some 157,630 casualties of all severity were recorded in the UK67 equating to less than half of one percent (0.38%) of all drivers and 0.23 percent of all the UK population.
12.7.4 The fact that a very small proportion of the UK driving population is involved in road collisions each year means that a collision, and particularly one involving a casualty, is an unusual and novel situation for most people in any road environment. This means that should a collision take place in a highly familiar street environment for example, the fact that they were involved in a collision would in itself present a new and unfamiliar situation to be navigated. In the event that the road environment was unfamiliar: no hard shoulder, no obvious place to seek refuge, then behaviour may be more unpredictable as they attempt to navigate an unfamiliar situation in a setting which does not provide an obvious means of doing so.
12.7.5 GD 04/12, which has been in place for the design of most ALR schemes, states that users are expected to comply with the law and the Highway Code and that they will take
64 Highways England, (2010). Managed Motorway Operational Guidance v.2.0, 65 Office of National Statistics (2019). Overview of the UK Population: August 2019. 66 Department for Transport (2019). August 2019 GB Driving Licence Data. 67 Department for Transport (2019). Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain: provisional estimates year ending June 2019..
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account of all the prevailing conditions and warning signs. Further, they will balance the safety risks of using the road network against the social and economic benefits of travelling and have a knowledge of their legal obligations when using the road.
12.7.6 This is an important consideration. Based on my review of the smart motorways material, I am led to conclude that it is not possible for people travelling on the smart motorway network to take an informed view of the balance of safety risks against the socio-economic benefits. It is clear that people have a limited understanding of smart motorways and their operation.
12.7.7 Despite the need for driver education for smart motorways being identified in 2008 and again in 2011, it is impossible for the travelling public and most professional drivers to have a general awareness of the safety risks associated with ALR. The Highway Code provides only cursory information on this type of road, so no new drivers are being educated in the way to use ALR. Interpretative signage which was initially prescribed for DHS schemes in IAN 111/08 was removed as a requirement just one year later, thereby removing the opportunity to support drivers on the smart motorway network. Until the publication of Highways England’s 2018 Delivery Plan, the DfT and Highways England were silent on the provision of campaigns and training associated with smart motorways.
12.7.8 Turning to the driver’s knowledge and application of their legal obligations, it is my view that this constitutes a substantial issue for drivers in incidents on ALR schemes. Drivers do not only have legal obligations as drivers, but also as parties in collisions or breakdowns. As the typical driver is involved in few collisions over their driving career, it is my experience that the way we respond to these situations is not uninformed. We revert to what we have been told which is, consistently, to pull over and get out of our car.
12.7.9 Behaviour in the event of a collision on an ALR scheme may not be reliably predicted. While some people will pull over to the nearside and exit their vehicles to exchange details, others do not. I note that the M25 three year monitoring noted one collision reported to have involved three vehicles of which two left the scene68. While the report did not provide details on that collision, neither did any research take place to explore the potential for different behaviours in the event of a collision. This would seem to be an important understanding if only to inform road safety campaigns.
12.8 Conclusion
12.8.1 The question established in Section 1.3 with regard road safety asks:
What is the intrinsic level of safety associated with ALR?
12.8.2 In my view it is beyond doubt that the removal of the hard shoulder in a motorway
68 Highways England, (2018). Smart Motorways All lane running M25 J5-7 Monitoring report.
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environment is intrinsically less safe than any other form of smart motorway. There is sound evidence to show that this has been understood since at least 2015 and this has been demonstrated most recently in the 2020 Stocktake.
12.8.3 Throughout the design development and risk management processes for ALR, I have consistently found that peak period live lane breakdowns have not received attention due to the assumption that MIDAS will provide queue protection. I have been unable to find an instance of the inverse condition being considered. Due to the use of aggregated risk scores, the reduction of risk associated with MIDAS mathematically enables the introduction of a measure (removal of the hard shoulder) which is openly acknowledged to intrinsically and substantially increases risk in the environment.
12.8.4 My review presented in this report shows that MIDAS does not provide consistent automatic protection for live lane collisions in peak times. The fallback position of using SVD to resolve this issue is also imperfect and in any case SVD is not installed on most ALR. However, even in the event that MIDAS is triggered in peak periods, either automatically or through SVD, non-compliance with Red X has been found to be poor especially at peak times.
12.8.5 Thus ALR relies on technology to mitigate the risks inherent in that system. Yet the MIDAS technology does not provide the required mitigation and even when it does, this mitigation is negated by human behaviour for which reactive enforcement has only recently been legislated. As a result the 2015 data showed ALR to have a higher level of KSI collisions than its predecessor road (a trend which has continued and is identified in the 2020 Evidence Stocktake as discussed at Section 18). It is also telling that more people are killed or seriously injured on ALR in peak period, congested conditions when most controls are in place, than in off-peak conditions which are typically associated with higher speeds.
12.8.6 In terms of public perception and thereby driver behaviour, my review leads me to conclude that the public’s perception of ALR is largely uninformed. The research presented, and the lack of detail in The Highway Code and other public-facing campaigns, means that members of the travelling public cannot take an informed view of the balance of risk. This is corroborated by the existence of a training course for professional drivers which covers smart motorways. If professional drivers benefit from such training in order to understand how to safely use these types of roads, I would contend that it follows that it is not rational to assume that a member of the general public can do so.
12.8.7 It is clear to me that there is no understanding in the public at large of the risks inherent to ALR smart motorways, and specifically those relating to the removal of the hard shoulder and live lane breakdowns. Fundamentally, from the KSI data for ALR I infer that designers do not necessarily have this understanding, so I would suggest that it cannot be rational to assume that a member of the public can.
12.8.8 With regard to driver behaviour, Section 12.3 notes that there is an issue with
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compliance with critical signals such as the Red X. In collisions, the matter of compliance is complex. On the rare occasions drivers are involved in a collision, our duties as an insured party and, potentially, as a blame-worthy party are present. In my own experience I have seen drivers on M25 on-slips exchanging details just as they would if they were in a local street. The majority of people want to comply with their duties and obligations, but ALR makes this task life-threatening.
12.8.9 It is my view that not taking a Safe Systems approach to the design, implementation and review of the ALR smart motorway, to challenge and test the assumptions on which design is predicated, has arguably resulted in more collisions than may have otherwise been the case. This is corroborated by the Highways England’s Chief Executive’s comments cited in the 2020 APPG report which noted that had SVD been implemented, “undoubtedly one or two [fatalities] might have been avoided” (p.21).
12.8.10 I am led to conclude that ALR has the lowest level of intrinsic safety of all SM designs, that it is not a maximally safe road system, and that the risk management and assessment methodologies have not resulted in effective mitigation of the hazards resulting from ALR.
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Part 2 – Considering the Appropriateness of Consultation
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13 Managed Motorways in Policy
13.1.1 The implementation of managed motorways has been a feature of national transport planning policy, strategy and reviews in England since the 1998 White Paper, a New Deal for Transport. This section presents matters salient to this report from various policy and strategy documents.
13.2 New Deal for Transport (1998)
13.2.1 This document presented the Government’s White Paper for transport and made the first explicit connection between technology, improved in-journey information, and asset management. In particular, the report made the first policy mention of the “controlled motorway experiment on the western sector of the M25”.
13.2.2 It is relevant to reflect on the transport context of this document. At this time, the Highways Agency existed as a road builder rather than a roads operator, emergency vehicles were not permitted to use the hard shoulder to reach incidents on motorways, and regional control centres (RCC) did not exist. This White Paper sought to change these conditions, and with regards to RCCs the White Paper noted that they could help tackle “the effects of traffic congestion by facilitating modern management techniques, including:
◼ “traffic monitoring and modelling;
◼ Strategic traffic control;
◼ Traffic and travel information;
◼ Assistance to the emergency services;
◼ Network performance monitoring and management information.”
13.2.3 With reference to the CM on the M25, the document committed to “pilot an innovative and imaginative mix of techniques on the M25 that can have wider application elsewhere.” In these commitments, the New Deal for Transport thereby put in place the foundation for the implementation of smart motorways,
13.3 Transport Ten Year Plan 2000
13.3.1 The Ten Year Plan for transport aimed to implement the Government’s priorities as set out in the White Paper with an overarching ambition to reduce congestion and better integrate all modes of transport
13.3.2 The need to modernise the transport system was identified in the Plan, specifically with regard to trunk roads for which “smarter management of the trunk road network, giving drivers better information on traffic conditions” were identified (p.5). Further, the “motorways of the future” were discussed at page 37 which clearly set out identifiable elements of the managed motorway in new systems which “will provide more reliable journey times, improve safety and control traffic flows, for example by:
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◼ Linking speed limits to traffic levels to improve the evenness of flows…;
◼ Using lane control systems to make best use of available road space;
◼ Faster response to incidents and quicker clearance of blocked lanes…
These will be significant steps towards the ‘smart’ roads of the future.”
13.3.3 It is notable that the component parts of the “smart roads of the future” are identified as the means by which safety will be improved, traffic flows controlled and journey times made more reliable and that these matters are presented with equivalence.
13.4 The Eddington Transport Study: The Case for Action (2006)
13.4.1 Sir Rod Eddington undertook a review of the long-term links between transport and the UK’s economic productivity. This report sets out his advice to Government with regards to transport in the long-term.
13.4.2 The Eddington report was wide ranging in scope and presented evidence across all aspects of transport. Salient to this report is paragraph 1.74 which addresses the role of technology in the future, stating that, “new and existing technologies have the potential to transform transport services more widely. Technology developments have the potential to help manage demand and improve the supply of transport… In the near- term, the other most relevant technology development are likely to be… some increased automation of vehicle control, with potential safety and reliability benefits.”
13.4.3 At 1.75 Eddington notes that, “However, some of the most exciting prospective technologies are undeveloped or untested and carry significant uncertainties and risks around cost, deliverability, public acceptability and the scale of benefits…” I note that during the period in which this report was being researched and authored, the M42 pilot scheme was implemented and the first CM scheme on the M25 had been in place for a short period therefore it would not have been reasonable for firmer commitments or recommendations to have been made in the Eddington report.
13.4.4 In his recommendations, Eddington includes at paragraph 1.144 “policies that raise the performance of the current transport networks – particularly road pricing – stand out above the other interventions in offering the potential to deliver for economic growth and minimise environmental and social impacts, but the challenges and risks must be well managed.”
13.4.5 Overall, although the Eddington report did not discuss managed motorway schemes specifically, it did confirm the importance of technology in supporting greater efficiencies in the existing network, and established the preference for maximising use of existing assets rather than creating new roads.
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13.5 National Infrastructure Plan (2011)
13.5.1 The National Infrastructure Plan, published 2011, set out the UK Government’s strategy for infrastructure to meet the needs of the UK economy. The introduction to the document states that the Plan “brings together the first ever comprehensive cross- sectoral analysis of the UK’s infrastructure networks and sets out a clear pipeline of over 500 infrastructure projects.”
13.5.2 Table 1C of the Plan notes the “Major Roads” challenges to be those related to “constrained motorway capacity, increasing network congestion over time” and “ambition to reduce carbon intensity”. “Strengths” in this sector relate to “road safety” and “improved asset condition.”
13.5.3 The Plan’s ambitions include at paragraph 3.36 to improve “the capacity, performance and resilience of roads, railways and international gateways, making smarter use of existing infrastructure and tackling performance problems.” Further, the Plan commits at Figure 3.B to introducing MM on the M62, M60, M6, M4, M5, M1 and M3. Paragraph 3.43 states that “Alongside this targeted programme of action, the Government will,
◼ Implement a new specification for managed motorways which will reduce the costs of implementation by up to a quarter. This specification will be applied up to eight schemes in the Department for Transport/ Highways Agency investment programme which are due to get underway between now and 2015”.
13.5.4 This “new specification” relates to the change from DHS to ALR schemes. I note that this change is highlighted in relation to cost savings only and there is no explanation provided or discussion of the new specification. The specific consideration of safety is absent from the Plan and it is not identified as an outcome for interventions with the exception of “Road pinch point schemes”.
13.6 National Policy Statement for National Networks (2014)
13.6.1 This document, referred to as the NPS, sets out the “need for, and Government’s policies to deliver, development of nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs) on the national road and rail networks in England.”
13.6.2 The Government’s vision and strategic objectives for the national networks are identified at Section 2 as “The Government will deliver national networks that meet the country’s long-term needs; supporting a prosperous and competitive economy and improving overall quality of life, as part of a wider transport system. This means:
◼ Networks with the capacity and connectivity and resilience to support national and local economic activity and facilitate growth and create jobs.
◼ Networks which support and improve journey quality, reliability and safety.
◼ Networks which support the delivery of environmental goals and the move to a low carbon economy.
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◼ Networks which join up our communities and link effectively to each other.
13.6.3 The NPS notes that approximately 16 percent of all travel time on roads in 2016 was spent delayed in traffic (2.3) and that under central forecasts, traffic is expected to grow by 30 percent by 2030 (2.4). The time spent delayed in traffic is also anticipated to rise to 25 percent of travel time by 2040 (2.18). In response, paragraph 2.5 notes that “we expect technology, both from better information and data, and in vehicles… to have a significant effect on how the network performs.”
13.6.4 In addressing the need for development of the national road network, paragraph 2.14 notes that “although only making up 2% of roads in England, [the SRN] carries a third of all road traffic and two thirds of freight traffic. Some 85% of the public use the network as drivers or passengers in any 12-month period.”
13.6.5 Paragraph 2.23 states that, “The Government’s wider policy is to bring forward improvements and enhancements to the existing Strategic Road Network to address the needs set out earlier. Enhancements to the existing road network will include:
◼ Junction improvements, new slip roads and upgraded technology to address congestion and improve performance and resilience at junctions, which are a major source of congestion;
◼ Implementing ‘smart motorways’ (also known as ‘managed motorways’ ) to increase capacity and improve performance…”
13.6.6 I note that the implementation of smart motorways is committed to with reference to economic growth and efficiency of the SRN network, although the NPS strategic objectives include the improvement of “journey quality, reliability and safety” without any noted exception.
13.7 Road Investment Strategy for the 2015/16 - 2019/20 Road Period (2015)
13.7.1 Referred to as the RIS, Part 1 of the Strategy presents the DfT’s Strategic Vision to “revolutionise our strategic roads to create a modern SRN that supports a modern Britain” (p.10). To achieve this vision, the document sets out an ambition for 2040 for the SRN to be “Smarter – a world leader in road building and traffic management technology” and for “the number of people killed or seriously injured on the SRN” to be “approaching zero” (p.11).
13.7.2 The report notes at page 36 that road traffic forecasts suggest that by 2040 around 32 percent of the motorway network will be subject to “severe congestion” at peak times and would “suffer poor conditions at other times of the day.”
13.7.3 In response, the RIS presents long-term plans which include implementing smart motorways between Leeds and Sheffield and linking Manchester and Leeds to support the Northern Powerhouse (p.38). Further, “Building a smarter network” is identified as
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one of five “long term challenges for the SRN”, so that “smarter infrastructure can unlock the potential of our roads, as we are already seeing through the deployment of smart motorways.” The RIS goes on to state that a “key challenge for government and [Highways England] will be to drive forward these changes and developments so we can maximise their potential and make the most of the network of the future” (p. 43).
13.7.4 The “Story of Smart Motorways” (p. 47) provides an overview of the ALR design, stating that “CCTV cameras and variable message signs are used to regulate speed and close lanes in the event of an incident or congestion, and regularly-spaced emergency refuges mean that there is always somewhere to go in the event of a breakdown.” I have explored these elements in more detail in Section 5.9.
13.7.5 Smart motorways are identified in Section 6 of the RIS as being “at the cutting edge of technology” and a need for more schemes is identified in the RIS obligation for Highways England to “set out its approach to innovation, technology and research during the early part of this Road Period” (p. 46). This requirement is supported by the figure at page 49 which shows smart motorways to be delivered across substantial parts of the SRN to the north and towards the west of England.
13.7.6 Section 7 presents eight long-term performance areas, which include:
◼ Making the network safer – “we will never stop striving to ensure the safety and welfare of all those who use, work on, or are indirectly impacted by the road network, with the ultimate aspiration of eliminating fatalities and serious injuries on the network”. This area has a KPI of achieving a 40 percent reduction in KSI collisions on the SRN by 2020.
◼ Improving user satisfaction – “satisfaction levels are also a reflection of expectations. In the long term we want to radically change what all road users expect of the network, making them more demanding of improved performance”.
◼ Supporting the smooth flow of traffic – “We want to improve journeys and allow users to drive at consistent speeds and enjoy predictable travel on our roads”.
◼ Achieving real efficiency – Highways England has “the chance to build on recent progress, extract maximum value from every pound spent and, in the long term, deliver schemes and maintenance faster and 30% - 50% cheaper than today”.
13.7.7 Part 2 of the RIS presents the investment plan. A number of commitments are made to the roll out of smart motorways in this section, not only in relation to the Northern Powerhouse as identified above, but more broadly, “the Smart Motorway roll-out will continue, supporting our biggest cities and increasingly linking them to our biggest cities and increasingly linking them to one another. By the end of the second Road Period, there will be continuous Smart Motorway corridors linking London, Leeds, Manchester, and Birmingham, offering a reliable and consistent level of service to motorist” (p.7).
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13.8 Highways England Strategic Business Plan 2015 – 2020
13.8.1 Published in 2015, this Plan was the first Highways England document to be published in response to the RIS. The Plan states that investment in the SRN identified in that document “will deliver substantial benefits for road users, communities and the nation as a whole” with the key outcomes being identified as including:
◼ “Safe and serviceable network where no one should be harmed when travelling or working on the network;
◼ More free flowing network, where routine delays are more infrequent, and where journeys are safer and more reliable…” (p.9)
13.8.2 With regards smart motorways, Section 3 states that “In recent years our Smart Motorways programme has made use of the hard shoulder, utilised advanced technology to add extra capacity and used our Traffic Officer Service to manage traffic effectively across some of the busiest sections of the motorway network. We will build on this by significantly expanding the roll out of Smart Motorways across the country.
By adding more than 400 miles of extra capacity without the need to widen the road, we will create a spine of Smart Motorways which will relieve congestion and reduce delays across the network. Importantly we expect the road to be at least as safe as it was before the changes were made.”
13.8.3 An ‘Expressway’ road type is introduced and explained and illustrated in Section 3 as using similar technology as for ALR schemes.
13.8.4 Section 4 includes details on the “customer value proposition” which includes:
◼ “Modernise, maintain and operate the network for the benefit of the country;
◼ Build stronger relationships with customers and communities;
◼ Give customers the information to take control of their journeys;
◼ Reduce delays and improve the customer experience;
◼ Ensure our customers feel safe.”
13.8.5 The inclusion of the feeling of safety on the SRN is a new addition to the Highways England documents and provides the first distinction between the quantitative and qualitative interpretation of the use of the SRN.
13.9 Highways England Delivery Plan 2018 – 2019
13.9.1 The Delivery Plan 2018 – 2019 details the work to be implemented in the period to make Highways England’s “roads safer, improving [HE] service to road users, and delivering the RIS”. The Executive Summary notes that increasing safety “remains our first imperative and underpins everything we do”. This section also notes that the implementation of smart motorways has been part of the “drive to improve safety… [to]
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help facilitate safer roads, drivers and working practices.”
13.9.2 Section 2 of the Plan relates to safety on the network and notes at page 12 that “we are also looking for continuous improvement of compliance through awareness and enforcement initiatives for hard shoulder and Red X.” I note that smart motorways and their use are not specifically mentioned, and that they are mentioned only by implication with regards to Red X enforcement and a training package related to smart motorways (see paragraph 13.9.4).
13.9.3 Page 15 includes a statement relating to road safety, noting that “safety remains our first imperative. We have set ourselves the challenging long-term vision that no-one should be harmed whilst travelling or working on our network. We are taking forward a broad range of initiatives to improve road safety and will continue to engage with our customers.”
13.9.4 Section 9 details the “smart motorways training package” developed in partnership with the Freight Transport Association. At page 46, the Plan describes this course as “a training package for the haulage industry, creating a Driver Certificate of Competence accreditation, the equivalent of National Vocational Qualification Level 2. The aim is to improve the understanding of smart motorways amongst professional drivers, shape driver behaviour and support compliance, increasing safety overall.”
13.9.5 An NVQ Level 2 is equivalent to a GCSE grade A* - C, or 9 – 469 in today’s grading system, and content provided to this level is defined as “Competence which involves the application of knowledge and skills in a significant range of varied work activities, performed in a variety of contexts. Some of the activities are complex or non-routine, and there is some individual responsibility and autonomy. Collaboration with others, perhaps through membership of a work group or team, may often be a requirement.”
13.9.6 It is a requirement of the CPC syllabus that training courses should have a “specific emphasis” on health and safety70 and the FTA (now Logistics UK) / Highways England CPC course provides a seven-hour Level 2 course. The course aims to “review and improve driving behaviour using defensive driving principles and compliance with motorway signs, signals, speed limits, Red X markings and use of the hard shoulder71.” The stated benefits of attending the course include:
◼ “Increased driver awareness of UK Smart motorway systems and how they operate.
◼ Engage with drivers to increase compliance in the use of smart motorways.”
13.9.7 The course content includes the design features and signs and signals used on smart motorways.
69 Gov.uk (undated). What different qualifications mean. 70 Gov.uk, (2020) Run a Driver CPC training course. 71 Logistics UK, (undated) Driver CPC – Smart Motorways
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13.10 Highways England Delivery Plan 2019 – 2020
13.10.1 The Delivery Plan for 2019 – 2020 identifies the schemes to be implemented in the period to meet the three imperatives of “making our roads safer, improving our service to road users, and delivering the Road Investment Strategy” (p.8).
13.10.2 In addition to specific improvement schemes to be delivered, the Executive Summary notes that “improving safety remains central to all we do. During the year we will build on our successful campaigns to inform motorists about the potential risks on the network and help tackle inappropriate driver behaviour. This will include… increasing awareness and understanding of how to use smart motorways.”
13.10.3 This campaign is detailed at page 12 of the Plan which details a “new campaign” to be launched in summer 2019 to cover “Red X, breakdowns, emergency areas and highlight the benefits of all lane running. In addition, we will carry out further education and enforcement to encourage compliance on smart motorways, for example issuing warning letters for drivers who break the law and drive in lanes with a Red X or on the hard shoulder illegally.”
13.10.4 Page 15 provides details of a further initiative to improve “our understanding and approach to managing unplanned incidents (such as breakdowns, collisions, medical situations), as well as the advice and guidance we give to motorists to reduce their risk. Our casualty analysis indicates that drivers are being struck while getting out of their vehicles following these unplanned incidents, so in 2019-20 we will publish better guidance on the correct behaviour to adopt in these situations.”
13.10.5 There is no context provided for the locations of this type of breakdown-related collision in terms of the SRN network. However, given the preceding details regarding drivers’ lack of understanding of what to do in the event of an “unplanned incident” on a smart motorway, I believe it can be reasonably assumed that this commitment for “better guidance” here, also relates to smart motorways.
13.10.6 As I discuss in Section 6.5, the potential for there to be a substantial increase in pedestrian KSI resulting from ALR schemes was identified as early as 2012 when it was assumed that half of all ALR vehicle breakdowns would be in a live lane and that all drivers involved in those live lane breakdowns would “get out and have a look” at their vehicle. It is of interest that the 2019-20 Delivery Plan identifies driver education as the means to remedy this highways safety issue rather than work to review the schemes’ design.
13.10.7 The Plan’s focus on safety is reinforced at page 17 which develops the equivalent statement in the 2018 – 2019 Plan so it now states that “safety remains our first imperative and our long-term ambition is that no one should be harmed whilst travelling or working on our network. To achieve this, we will continue to focus on action to improve safety through driver education, enforcement and by refining our understanding of the causes of accidents.” Section 4 of the Plan relates to customer service and
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includes at page 27, “to address road user concerns about safety, we will carry out further work to develop our understanding of the factors that affect how safe they feel and the relationship between the numbers of casualties and perceptions of safety. That information will then be used to develop a plan to address these issues.”
13.10.8 I note that the SRN context to the “factors that affect how safe” users feel is unstated. However, given the increased mention of smart motorways, it is not unreasonable to conclude that smart motorways are included within this consideration. It is curious that the approach to be taken with regard to safety and driver perception is predicated only on the “numbers of casualties” and not on the severity of collision as would be the case if aligned to a Safe Systems approach which seeks a maximally safe outcome. Nor does it consider the user groups involved, or the nature and context of the collisions, albeit these elements may well be incorporated into the research on perception.
13.10.9 Finally, the Driver CPC smart motorways training which was identified in the 2018-19 Delivery Plan is again identified in this Plan at page 50. The Plan aims for a total of 130 organisations to have participated in the training by the end of 2020, but does not provide an estimate of the proportion of the UK’s professional drivers this is envisaged to cover.
13.11 Road Investment Strategy 2: 2020 – 2025
13.11.1 The Ministerial Foreword to the second RIS notes that “a central principle in the development of this strategy was to create a road network that is safe, reliable and efficient for everyone – whether they are cyclists or drivers, passengers or pedestrians.”
13.11.2 The Introduction to RIS2 states that it has been developed taking account of public engagement, consultation and research. The associated consultation document ‘Shaping the Future of England’s Strategic Roads’ details the four-stage approach of developing the RIS2, which began with research in 2016 to 2018 and included the consultation in 2017. The research element included feedback from the HE online mapping tool, and research conducted by Transport Focus (namely the “Measuring performance of England’s strategic roads: what users want” and “Road Users’ Priorities”), as well as input from the ORR and other bodies (section 2.5).
13.11.3 The Summary of Consultation Responses (Department for Transport, 2018) notes that of the 3,153 responses some 90 percent were from members of the public. Of these, 2,000 responses were associated with the Campaign for Better Transport campaign. The campaign’s response expressed concerns regarding the Expressway proposals, and also focused on the need to make the SRN safer. The Campaign for Better Transport’s associated campaign document was silent on smart motorways aside from acknowledging the benefit of lower speed limits to reduce air pollution72.
13.11.4 In terms of feedback on individual questions, 80 percent of respondents stated that they
72 Campaign for Better Transport, (2017). Rising to the Challenge, A shared green vision for RIS2.
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agreed with the four categories of road (smart motorways, motorways, expressways and APTR), although the primary concern for the fifth of respondents who disagreed with the categories was that “too many categories would cause confusion for drivers” (p.11). I note that the Connecting the Country consultation document did not provide details on the smart motorway design and associated hazards. I would therefore question how informed the consultation responses could be deemed to be in the absence of this information.
13.11.5 RIS2 forecasts between 29 and 59 percent traffic growth on the SRN and therefore sets out plans to implement the findings of the Smart Motorways Evidence Stocktake, and implement both smart motorways and Expressways (similar to ALR but on all-purpose roads) on the SRN. It also commits to increased roll out of active traffic management and continued investment in smart roads and identifies multiple smart motorway schemes to be implemented during the RIS2 period.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ It is notable that, based on my review of the policy and strategy documents, between the New Deal for Transport in 1998 and the RIS in 2015, no consultation was carried out to
inform these strategies. As a result, the policy basis for implementation was development incrementally over the course of 17 years, without having been publicly debated.
◼ As a result, decisions including the roll out of ALR, established in the National Infrastructure Plan 2011, were made without taking account of the views of the public or wider stakeholders. The 2011 National Infrastructure Plan therefore included to “improve the capacity, performance and resilience of roads” by introducing MM on seven motorways. It also committed to implementing a new specification for managed motorways on the basis of it reducing the costs of implementation by up to a quarter.
◼ RIS in 2015, predicted that a substantial part of the motorway network would be subject to “severe congestion” at peak times and would “suffer poor conditions at other times of the day.” In response, it presented plans to implement smart motorways in the north of England and these plans were committed to in the 2015 Business Plan.
◼ The Highways England Delivery Plan 2018 – 2019 marked a departure from the Plans and Strategies to this point. It includes a statement relating to road safety, noting that “safety remains our first imperative and set out the long-term vision that no-one should be harmed whilst travelling or working on our network.” This Plan identified several driver education and information campaigns to be implemented with respect to ALR use.
◼ This approach continued in the 2019 – 2020 Delivery Plan, which now includes a focus on reducing the impact of live lane breakdowns. The Plan also aims to address road user concerns about safety by carrying out further work to develop our understanding of the factors that affect how safe they feel and the relationship between the numbers of casualties and perceptions of safety. Given HE’s adoption of Safe Systems, it is curious that the approach to be taken is based on the “numbers of casualties” and not on severity.
◼ RIS2 in 2020 was the first Plan to incorporate consultation, receiving 3,153 responses of which 90 percent were from members of the public. Given the quality of consultation, I would question how much impact the consultation process had on the final strategy.
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14 All Lane Running Scheme Consultation Processes
14.1.1 In this section I provide an overview of the legislative context and an analysis of the adequacy of the consultation to date for the ALR schemes.
14.2 Legislative Context
14.2.1 It is my understanding that the rights to execute the physical works associated with the implementation of Smart Motorway schemes are established in powers given to the Secretary of State for Transport in existing legislation and regulations:
◼ The Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, hereafter referred to as ‘the 1984 Act’ and the associated Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions govern signing and lining implemented as part of the smart motorways schemes;
◼ The Highways Act 1980 governs the implementation or removal of street lighting, provision of safety measures such as induction loops and CCTV, and concrete barrier or other safety barrier on the carriageway median; and since 2015;
◼ The Motorways Traffic (England and Wales) Regulations 1982, hereafter referred to as the 1982 Regulations, have been amended to enable the provision of Emergency Refuge Areas.
14.2.2 These Acts and Regulations therefore govern the majority of works that are associated with the implementation of smart motorways, with the exception of variable mandatory speed limits (VMSL) and, for schemes prior to The Motorways Traffic (England and Wales) Regulations 1982 (S.I. 2015/392), Emergency Refuge Areas (ERA).
14.2.3 The power to implement VMSL on the motorway, is subject to the making of Regulations, in accordance with sections 17(2) and (3) of The 1984 Act. In turn, the making of such Regulations is subject to Section 134(2) of The 1984 Act which requires the Secretary of State to consult with “such representative organisations as he thinks fit” prior to making any Regulations under the Act.
14.2.4 On the basis of the above, it is my understanding that the only Statutory consultation that must be carried out in relation to the implementation of smart motorways, relates to the Statutory Instrument(s) required to enable the provision of VMSL and, for schemes prior to 2015, the provision of ERA. This is supported by the inclusion in IAN 111/08 of advice relating to consultation on relating to the Statutory Instrument, as identified in Section 5.2.
14.2.5 In assessing whether the consultation process associated with the smart motorways schemes could be considered adequate, I have considered the following:
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1. The UK Government’s guidelines on consultation. Guidance on consultation has been available since 2000; first as a Code of Practice then, since 2012, as a simplified short guide. Consultation Principles sets out the overarching criteria by which all Government consultations should be carried out. 2. A review of three Smart Motorway consultation processes; from 2004, 2012/ 2013 and 2019 to identify points of difference and commonality.
14.3 Consultation Principles
14.3.1 The UK Government has, since publication of its Code of Practice on Consultation in 2000 (and revisions to it in 2004 and 2008), set out Consultation Principles which are to inform how consultation is carried out. Although none of these documents have any legal force, they do demonstrate the long-established open democracy approach to decision making and recognise that consultation therefore has an important role.
14.3.2 These criteria have been regularly reviewed over the intervening years, being superseded and entirely re-written in 2012 by the new Government in a new document entitled Consultation Principles. This document has since been revised in 2013, 2016 and in 2018. Given that the design development of smart motorways extends throughout this period, this section of the report contextualises the history of consultation and demonstrates how key considerations have changed over that period.
14.3.3 Table 14.1 sets out the component parts of each Code of Practice in the order in which they were presented in each Document. Table 14.2 presents the criteria established in Consultation Principles documents. Note, that the order in which each component part is presented in the table follows the structure of the 2018 document and is used for ease of comparison.
Table 14.1 Criteria for Consultation Established in UK Government Code of Practice on Consultation Documents Code of Practice on Written Code of Practice on Consultation Code of Practice on Consultation
Consultation 2000 2004 2008
Timing of consultation should be built into the planning process for a policy Consult widely throughout the (including legislation) or service from process, allowing a minimum of 12 Formal consultation should take place 1 the start, so that it has the best weeks for written consultation at least at a stage when there is scope to prospect of improving the proposals once during the development of the influence the policy outcome. concerned, and so that sufficient time policy. is left for it at each stage.
Be clear about what your proposals Consultations should normally last for It should be clear who is being are, who may be affected, what at least 12 weeks with consideration 2 consulted, about what questions, in questions are being asked and the given to longer timescales where what timescale and for what purpose. timescale for responses. feasible and sensible.
A consultation document should be as simple and concise as possible. It Consultation documents should be should include a summary, in two clear about the consultation process, Ensure that your consultation is clear, 3 pages at most, of the main questions it what is being proposed, the scope to concise and widely accessible. seeks views on. It should make it as influence and the expected costs and easy as possible for readers to benefits of the proposals. respond, make contact or complain.
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Code of Practice on Written Code of Practice on Consultation Code of Practice on Consultation
Consultation 2000 2004 2008
Documents should be made widely available, with the fullest use of Give feedback regarding the Consultation exercises should be electronic means (though not to the responses received and how the designed to be accessible to, and 4 exclusion of others), and effectively consultation process influenced the clearly targeted at, those people the drawn to the attention of all interested policy. exercise is intended to reach. groups and individuals.
Sufficient time should be allowed for Monitor your department’s Keeping the burden of consultation to considered responses from all groups effectiveness at consultation, including a minimum is essential if consultations 5 with an interest. Twelve weeks should through the use of a designated are to be effective and if consultees’ be the standard minimum period for a consultation co-ordinator. buy-in to the process is to be obtained. consultation.
Responses should be carefully and Ensure your consultation follows better Consultation responses should be open-mindedly analysed, and the regulation best practice, including analysed carefully and clear feedback 6 results made widely available, with an carrying out a Regulatory Impact should be provided to participants account of the views expressed, and Assessment if appropriate. following the consultation. reasons for decisions finally taken.
Officials running consultations should Departments should monitor and seek guidance in how to run an evaluate consultations, designating a 7 N/A effective consultation exercise and consultation co-ordinator who will share what they have learned from the ensure the lessons are disseminated. experience.
14.3.4 The original 2000 Code of Practice and its revisions focus on matters of process. It assumes that consultations will take place and takes an inward view of consultation processes; setting out the criteria for consultation to satisfy governance requirements on a principle of open democracy.
14.3.5 The Code of Practice established minimum consultation timescales of 12 weeks, to enable full consultation responses, and also acknowledged the existence of consultation fatigue, which could result in some consultees failing to engage with consultation exercises. The Code sets out the means by which the “burden of consultation” was to be avoided.
14.3.6 None of these criteria specifically relate to the expectations of consultees, for example in the methods of consultation, or the media which can be used to engage, or the schemes upon which consultation exercises are to be carried out. However, in his foreword to the 2008 version, John Hutton MP states that the Code of Practice sets out “how consultation exercises are best run and what people can expect from the Government when it has decided to run a formal consultation exercise” (p.3) which I interpret to indicate that the principle of anticipating and responding to people’s reasonable expectations was an emerging factor informing the criteria set out in the final Code of Practice.
14.3.7 The Code of Practice was superseded by the Consultation Principles document which was established by the Coalition Government in 2012. Its publication marks an evolution from the inward-looking, governance focussed Code, to one which
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acknowledges the need for meaningful engagement and scrutiny as is demonstrated in the summary provided at Table 14.2.
14.3.8 Collectively, these documents demonstrate that the various UK Governments since 2000 have been aware of and promoted the need and benefit of consultation. That the means by which governmental consultation should be carried out has been codified for the past 20 years, also suggests to me that the respective Governments have been aware of, and interested to avoid, the inverse i.e. superficial or bureaucracy-fulfilling consultation processes. Overall, throughout the documents from 2008 onwards, there are several common themes:
1. Consultation documents should be easy to understand; 2. The full range of stakeholders required should be targeted; 3. The objectives of the consultation should be clear; 4. Information provided should be useful and sufficient for people to make informed comments; 5. Consultation should be proportionate to the proposal; 6. Consultation exercises should be part of a wider process; and 7. A form of evidence or assessment should be available early in the process.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ It is my understanding that the rights to execute the majority of physical works associated with the implementation of Smart Motorway schemes are established in powers given to the Secretary of State for Transport in existing legislation and regulations. The exception to this relates to the implementation VMSL which is subject to the making of Regulations, in accordance with The 1984 Act.
◼ The only Statutory consultation that must be carried out in relation to the implementation of smart motorways, relates to the Statutory Instrument(s) required to enable the provision of VMSL.
◼ The principles of public consultation to inform decision making and scheme design is long- and well-established, having been codified since 2000.
◼ The principle of anticipating and responding to people’s reasonable expectations in consultation was an emerging factor informing the criteria set out in the 2008 Code of Practice.
◼ That the means by which governmental consultation should be carried out has been codified for the past 20 years, suggests to me that the respective Governments have been aware of, and interested to avoid superficial or bureaucracy-fulfilling consultation processes.
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Table 14.2 Summary of UK Government’s Consultation Principles Documents Consultation Consultation Principles (2012) Consultation Principles (2013) Consultation Principles (2016) Consultation Principles (2018) Principle
Information provided to stakeholders should be easy to Information provided to stakeholders should be easy to Use plain English and avoid acronyms. Be clear what Use plain English and avoid acronyms. Be clear what comprehend – it should be in an easily understandable comprehend – it should be in an easily understandable questions you are asking and limit the number of questions questions you are asking and limit the number of questions Clear and Concise format, use plain language and clarify the key issues, format, use plain language and clarify the key issues, to those that are necessary. Make them easy to understand to those that are necessary. Make them easy to understand particularly where the consultation deals with complex particularly where the consultation deals with complex and easy to answer. Avoid lengthy documents when and easy to answer. Avoid lengthy documents when subject matter. subject matter. possible and consider merging those on related topics. possible and consider merging those on related topics.
The objectives of any consultation should be clear, and will The objectives of any consultation should be clear, and will depend to a great extent on the type of issue and the stage depend to a great extent on the type of issue and the stage in the policy-making process – from gathering new ideas to Do not consult for the sake of it. Ask departmental lawyers Do not consult for the sake of it. Ask departmental lawyers in the policy-making process – from gathering new ideas to testing options. whether you have a legal duty to consult. Take consultation whether you have a legal duty to consult. Take consultation testing options. The purpose of the consultation process should be clearly responses into account when taking policy forward. Consult responses into account when taking policy forward. Consult The objectives of the consultation process should be clear. stated as should the stage of the development that the Purpose about policies or implementation plans when the about policies or implementation plans when the To avoid creating unrealistic expectations, any aspects of policy has reached. Also, to avoid creating unrealistic development of the policies or plans is at a formative stage. development of the policies or plans is at a formative stage. the proposal that have already been finalised and will not be expectations, it should be apparent what aspects of the Do not ask questions about issues on which you already Do not ask questions about issues on which you already subject to change should be clearly stated. Being clear policy being consulted on are open to change and what have a final view. have a final view. about the areas of policy on which views are sought will also decisions have already been taken. Being clear about the increase the usefulness of responses. areas of policy on which views are sought will increase the usefulness of responses.
Information should be disseminated and presented in a way Information should be disseminated and presented in a way likely to be accessible and useful to the stakeholders with a likely to be accessible and useful to the stakeholders with a Give enough information to ensure that those consulted Give enough information to ensure that those consulted Informative substantial interest in the subject matter. substantial interest in the subject matter. understand the issues and can give informed responses. understand the issues and can give informed responses. Sufficient information should be made available to Sufficient information should be made available to stakeholders to enable them to make informed comments. stakeholders to enable them to make informed comments.
The governing principle is proportionality of the type and The governing principle is proportionality of the type and scale of consultation to the potential impacts of the proposal scale of consultation to the potential impacts of the proposal Consider whether informal iterative consultation is Consider whether informal iterative consultation is or decision being taken, and thought should be given to or decision being taken, and thought should be given to Part of Engagement appropriate, using new digital tools and open, collaborative appropriate, using new digital tools and open, collaborative achieving real engagement rather than following achieving real engagement rather than merely following Process approaches. Consultation is not just about formal approaches. Consultation is not just about formal documents bureaucratic process. Consultation is part of wider bureaucratic process. Consultation forms part of wider documents and responses. It is an on-going process. and responses. It is an on-going process. engagement and whether and how to consult will in part engagement and decisions on whether and how to consult depend on the wider scheme of engagement. should in part depend on the wider scheme of engagement.
Timeframes for consultation should be proportionate and realistic to allow stakeholders sufficient time to provide a considered response and where the consultation spans all Timeframes for consultation should be proportionate and or part of a holiday period policy makers should consider realistic to allow stakeholders sufficient time to provide a what if any impact there may be and take appropriate considered response. The amount of time required will Judge the length of the consultation on the basis of legal Judge the length of the consultation on the basis of legal mitigating action. The amount of time required will depend depend on the nature and impact of the proposal (for advice and taking into account the nature and impact of the advice and taking into account the nature and impact of the on the nature and impact of the proposal (for example, the Proportionate example, the diversity of interested parties or the complexity proposal. Consulting for too long will unnecessarily delay proposal. Consulting for too long will unnecessarily delay diversity of interested parties or the complexity of the issue, Duration of the issue, or even external events), and might typically policy development. Consulting too quickly will not give policy development. Consulting too quickly will not give or even external events), and might typically vary between vary between two and 12 weeks. In some cases there will enough time for consideration and will reduce the quality of enough time for consideration and will reduce the quality of two and 12 weeks. The timing and length of a consultation be no requirement for consultation at all and that may responses. responses. should be decided on a case-by-case basis; there is no set depend on the issue and whether interested groups have formula for establishing the right length. In some cases there already been engaged in the policy making process will be no requirement for consultation, depending on the issue and whether interested groups have already been engaged in the policy making process.
Policy makers should be able to demonstrate that they have Policy makers should think carefully about who needs to be considered who needs to be consulted and ensure that the Consider the full range of people affected by the policy, and Consider the full range of people affected by the policy, and consulted and ensure the consultation captures the full consultation captures the full range of stakeholders affected. whether representative groups exist. Consider targeting whether representative groups exist. Consider targeting Targeted range of stakeholders affected. In particular, if the policy will affect hard to reach or specific groups if appropriate. Ensure they are aware of the specific groups if appropriate. Ensure they are aware of the vulnerable groups, policy makers should take the necessary consultation and can access it. consultation and can access it. actions to engage effectively with these groups.
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Consultation Consultation Principles (2012) Consultation Principles (2013) Consultation Principles (2016) Consultation Principles (2018) Principle
The medium should be appropriate for the subject and those [“The medium should be appropriate for the subject and Groups Consulted Consult stakeholders in a way that suits them. Consult stakeholders in a way that suits them. being consulted. those being consulted.” Deleted]
The consultation process is also linked to the need for Departments should seek collective ministerial agreement Seek collective agreement before publishing a written Seek collective agreement before publishing a written Agreement Prior to collective agreement in policy making at an early stage before any public engagement that might be seen as consultation, particularly when consulting on new policy consultation, particularly when consulting on new policy Publication before any public engagement that might be seen as committing the Government to a particular approach. proposals proposals committing the Government to a particular approach.
Include validated impact assessments of the costs and Include validated impact assessments of the costs and benefits of the options being considered when possible; this benefits of the options being considered when possible; this Every effort should be made to make available the Every effort should be made to make available the might be required where proposals have an impact on might be required where proposals have an impact on Facilitate Scrutiny Government’s evidence base at an early stage to enable Government’s evidence base at an early stage to enable business or the voluntary sector. business or the voluntary sector. contestability and challenge. contestability and challenge. Explain the responses that have been received from Explain the responses that have been received from consultees and how these have informed the policy. State consultees and how these have informed the policy. State how many responses have been received. how many responses have been received.
To encourage active participation, policy makers should explain what responses they have received and how these Publish responses within 12 weeks of the consultation or Publish responses within 12 weeks of the consultation or have been used in formulating the policy. The number of provide an explanation why this is not possible. Where provide an explanation why this is not possible. Where responses received should also be indicated. Consultation consultation concerns a statutory instrument publish consultation concerns a statutory instrument publish Timely Publication responses should usually be published within 12 weeks of responses before or at the same time as the instrument is NA responses before or at the same time as the instrument is of Responses the consultation closing. Where Departments do not publish laid, except in very exceptional circumstances (and even laid, except in exceptional circumstances. Allow appropriate a response within 12 weeks, they should provide a brief then publish responses as soon as possible). Allow time between closing the consultation and implementing statement on why they have not done so. Departments appropriate time between closing the consultation and policy or legislation should make clear at least in broad terms what future plans implementing policy or legislation. (if any) they have for engagement.
Avoidance of Consultation exercises should not generally be launched Consultation exercises should not generally be launched Consultation exercises should not generally be launched Consultation exercises should not generally be launched Elections during local or national election periods. during local or national election periods. during local or national election periods. during local or national election periods.
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15 ALR Managed Motorway Consultation Case Study
15.1.1 This section of the report provides a detailed review of the consultation processes that took place, associated with the implementation of the ALR system on sections of the M1, Junctions 28 – 35. This consultation was undertaken in 2012/13.
15.1.2 The work to transform the M1 between Junctions 28 and 35 to a smart motorway was preceded by a consultation process comprising the work identified in Table 15.1.
Table 15.1 Summary of M1 J28 – 35a Consultation Process Number of Stated Date Consultation Title Duration Consultees
17 December 2012 – 11 M1 J32 to 35a smart motorway scheme73 8 weeks 76 February 2013
6 March 2013 – 10 April M1 J28 to 31 smart motorway scheme74 4 weeks 91 2013
28 October 2013 – 9 M1 J31 to 32 variable speed limits75 6 weeks 27 December 2013
15.1.3 The findings of the consultation responses were consolidated into a single summary report in January 201576 and the works to implement the smart motorway scheme were completed in March 2016.
15.1.4 In this section I set out the key points contained in the consultation documents and the response summary.
15.2 M1 J28 – J35a Consultation Documents
15.2.1 For each section of the M1 J28 – J35a consultation, the Consultation Document was made available online, and organisations were directly consulted, including local government bodies and authorities, emergency services providers, environmental organisations, road safety organisations, vehicle recovery operators, and business organisations.
15.2.2 The Executive Summary of each Consultation Document states that the consultation presents “the proposal to introduce variable mandatory speed limits for the M1 motorway J[x] to J[y] managed motorway scheme”, with the second paragraph adding that “Once in force, the relevant Regulations will restrict driving at a speed exceeding that displayed on the signs.”
15.2.3 Section 1 of each Consultation Document sets out the reasons for the consultation and justification for the scheme, and in so doing acknowledges that this section of the M1
73 Highways Agency, (2012). M1 J32 to J35a Managed Motorway Consultation Document. 74 Highways Agency, (2013). M1 J28 to J31 Managed Motorway Consultation Document. 75 Highways Agency, (2013). M1 J31 to J32 Variable Mandatory Speed Limits Pinch Point Scheme. 76 Highways Agency, (2015). M1 Junctions 28 to 31 Smart Motorway M1 Junctions 31 to 32 Variable Mandatory Speed Limits M1 Junctions 32 to 35a Smart Motorway Summary of Consultation Responses.
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was subject to high typical daily traffic flows “with a trend of increasing accidents and casualties.” The Documents then explain that the schemes are expected to:
◼ “Increase motorway capacity and reduce congestion;
◼ Smooth traffic flows;
◼ Provide more reliable journey times;
◼ Increase and improve the quality of information for the driver.”
15.2.4 I note that the expectations set out in the Consultation Document do not speak to the impacts on road safety, indicate a safety objective, or speak to any associated improvements in the trend of accidents. The stated aim of introducing the VMSL was to “make best use of the existing road space.”
15.2.5 All three Consultation Documents confirmed that the consultation was being carried out in accordance with the UK Government’s Consultation Principles, as replicated at Figure 15.1 for ease of reference.
Figure 15.1 M1 J28 – J35a Stated Consultation Principles
1) Subjects of Consultation – The objectives of any consultation should be clear and will depend to a great extent on the type of issue and the stage in the policy-making process – from gathering new ideas to testing options. 2) Timing of Consultation – Engagement should begin early in policy development when the policy is still under consideration and views can genuinely be taken into account. 3) Making information useful and accessible – Policy makers should think carefully about who needs to be consulted and ensure the consultation captures the full range of stakeholders affected. Information should be disseminated and presented in a way likely to be accessible and useful to the stakeholders with a substantial interest in the subject matter. 4) Transparency and Feedback – The objectives of the consultation process should be clear. To avoid creating unrealistic expectations, any aspects of the proposals that have clearly been finalised and will not be subject to change should be clearly stated. 5) Practical Considerations – Consultation exercises should not generally be launched during local or national election periods.
15.2.6 I note that the M1 J28 to J35a Consultation Documents present only partial excerpts from the Consultation Principles and that the majority of the contemporaneous Consultation Principles were omitted, including the need for information provided to stakeholders to be easy to comprehend, in an easily understandable format, using plain language and clarifying the key issues, particularly where the consultation deals with complex subject matter.
15.2.7 Section 2 of each report sets out the legislative changes that would result from the consultation exercises, to enable the respective schemes. These legislative changes
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comprise:
◼ Creation of Regulations under Section 17(2) and (3) of the 1984 Act to enable the implementation of VMSL signs; and
◼ The permanent amendment to the Motorways Traffic (England and Wales) Regulations 1982 (S.I 192/1163) to enable a definition of ‘Emergency Refuge Area’ to be inserted to those Regulations, thereby extending the restrictions of use of Hard Shoulders, to those areas.
15.2.8 Significantly, the permanent amendment to the 1982 Regulations was only set out in Section 2 of the M1 J32 to J35a Managed Motorway Consultation Document, with the other two Consultation Documents referring to only the new Regulations in relation to the 1984 Act.
15.2.9 Section 3 of each report provides “General Information” regarding the schemes. Although there are points of difference relating to the geographical locations of the respective schemes, the “Key Features” section of each identify the same benefits derived by similar schemes elsewhere of:
◼ “Improved journey time reliability through reduced congestion;
◼ A scheme at lower cost and with less environmental impact than conventional widening programmes.”
15.2.10 I note that there is no mention of road safety considerations or benefits, or of capacity enhancements as a result of the schemes already implemented elsewhere. This is in line with the absence of safety considerations in the relevant IAN, as discussed in Section 5.8.
15.2.11 Section 3.2 “Key Features” of the J28 to J31 and J32 to J35a documents identify the same design features for the schemes which include:
◼ VMSL;
◼ Driver information “generally provided at intervals not exceeding 1500m”;
◼ Queue protection and congestion management system;
◼ Comprehensive CCTV coverage;
◼ Refuge areas “generally provided at maximum intervals of 2500m” to include motorway services areas, a hard shoulder on an exit slip or link road, or an ERA;
◼ Provision of emergency roadside telephones at all ERA and the removal of existing emergency roadside telephones apart from where the hard shoulder is retained.
15.2.12 I note that although only the J31 to J35a Consultation Document indicates that the responses would be used to affect legislative changes relating to the ERA, there is no difference in the information relating to these areas provided in these two documents.
15.2.13 With regards to enforcement, Section 3.3 of all the Consultation Documents recognises
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the need to obtain an “acceptable level of compliance with the variable mandatory speed limits” to ensure the successful and safe operation of the scheme.
15.2.14 Section 4 of the Consultation Documents introduce the operational regimes to be implemented within the scheme as:
◼ Normal operation i.e. without variable message signs;
◼ VMSL; and
◼ Incident Management.
15.2.15 One page of information is provided for each of the operational regimes with the information relating only to the use of VMSL.
15.3 M1 J28 – J35a Scope of Consultation
15.3.1 Each Consultation Document provides an initial Summary of the Consultation section which identifies, amongst other things, the scope of the consultation.
15.3.2 All three Consultation Documents identify the scope as to consider the “implementation of variable mandatory speed limits (VMSL)” within the respective section of the M1 motorway.
15.3.3 The consultations for the M1 J28 to J31 and J32 to J35a managed motorway schemes also identified that each respective scheme included the introduction of ERA, albeit that only the latter Consultation has reference to the potential permanent change to the 1982 Regulations.
15.3.4 I note that the “Scope of Consultation” section in both Consultation Documents specifically omit the invitation of any comment on the implementation of any other component part of the scheme. Rather, the documents stress that views were not sought on the policy of using the component parts i.e. VMSL, ERA, or removal of hard shoulder, as these constituted established UK Government policy. With reference to the details set out in Section 13, by excluding the component parts from the consultation, the documents continue to exclude the public and stakeholders from commenting on, and therefore influencing, the design and implementation of the ALR scheme.
15.4 M1 J28 – J35a Consultation Response Pro Forma
15.4.1 Each Consultation Document provides the same Consultation Response form which sets three questions in the “Your Comments” section. The questions from the Managed Motorway consultations (J28 to J31 and J32 to J35a) comprise:
1. Do you consider that the proposal to introduce the managed motorway scheme on the M1 between Junctions [x] and [y] will lead to an improvement in travelling condition on this section of motorway?
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2. Are there any aspects of the proposal to introduce the managed motorway scheme on the M1 between Junctions [x] and [y] which give you concerns?
3. Are there any additional comments you would like to make about the proposal to introduce the managed motorway scheme on the M1 between Junctions [x] and [y]?
15.4.2 The questions set out in the Pinch Point scheme (J31 to J32) Consultation Document are the same, but substitute “variable mandatory speed limits” for “the managed motorway scheme”.
15.4.3 Given that the scope of the consultation excludes the consideration of the component parts of the scheme, it is incongruous that the pro forma invites open field responses in relation to the managed motorway concept (which is excluded from the consultation) and does not ask about VMSL which is the only element in the ALR scheme documents to be under formal consultation. There is no indication in the consultation documents of the possible reasons for this strange approach to securing comments in the consultation, but I would note that it is my view that this approach is fundamentally not in accordance the criteria established in the Consultation Principles (see Section 14.3).
15.5 M1 J28 – J35a Summary of Consultation Responses
15.5.1 Subsequent to the M1 J28 to J35a consultation exercises, the Highways Agency published a summary of the consultation responses on 28 January 201577 hereafter referred to as the Summary of Responses.
15.5.2 Unlike the original Consultation Documents, the Summary of Responses introduces the proposal to introduce ALR between Junctions 28 and 31 and 32 and 35a of the M1. In addition, new information is provided in the Summary of Responses relating to the implemented ALR scheme on Junction 5 to 7 of the M25 as well as previously unseen details on the proposed design of the M1 Junction 28 to 35a. I note that none of this information is presented as specifically new details, thereby giving a reader unfamiliar with the Consultation exercise no indication that this information was not included in that exercise. In my experience this is a highly unusual approach to presenting consultation responses.
15.5.3 As the Summary of Responses also states, “at the time of the consultations there were no schemes in operation to this design and the schemes on the M1 were, along with the schemes on the M25, the first to publish consultations.” Given that this consultation related to one of the earliest schemes, it is surprising that the consultation did not seek and take account of feedback relating to the ALR format as a whole. Overall, the approach to presenting and taking account of the Summary of Responses is, in my view, unorthodox at best.
77 Highways Agency, (2015). M1 Junctions 28 to 31 Smart Motorway M1 Junctions 31 to 32 Variable Mandatory Speed Limits M1 Junctions 32 to 35a Smart Motorway Summary of Consultation Responses.
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15.5.4 Given the absence of any details on the design of the scheme or the design development within the Consultation Documents, and consultees’ inability to look elsewhere in the strategic network to see an operational example, it is to my view particularly notable that most positive responses in support of the principle of reducing congestion also noted that this should not be at the expense of safety.
15.5.5 To this end, I note that of the 20 organisations who responded to the consultation, eight raised specific concerns relating to the increased risk of vehicles stopping in a live lane in both peak and off-peak time periods. Specifically the Summary of Responses notes that, “there was a particular focus on the increased risk off peak which traffic levels will be lower, traffic speeds may be higher and automatic detection systems are less likely to detect a stopped vehicle.” It is telling that so many stakeholders raised pertinent road safety concerns despite this level of pertaining to road safety being absent from, not only the consultation documents, but also the wider body of documents presenting policy, strategy and information relating to ALR schemes.
15.5.6 I note that the Summary of Responses mentions an “expected” improvement in overall safety compared with the existing situation thereby achieving the scheme’s safety objective. However, the document contains no consideration of the increased severity of outcome that could be foreseeable in collisions with a vehicle in a live lane and which had been identified in the risk assessment (see Section 6.7).
15.5.7 The Summary of Responses notes that in addition to the 20 responses received from organisations, 14 were received from members of the public. Given that consultation was run for a total of 18 weeks, and with some 96 separate organisations consulted, (most of which being consulted for the full 18 weeks) it is my view that this is a very low level of response for a scheme that could reasonably be considered one of the most important road corridors in England. The quality of the consultation, and the means by which it was delivered leads me to the view that the low number of responses from members of the public in particular indicates that this consultation was not meaningfully targeted to the public, rather than that members of the public were not moved to respond to a consultation of which they were aware.
15.6 Interpretation of the M1 Junctions 28 – 35: Managed Motorways Consultation
15.6.1 On review of the three Consultation Documents, I observe that the purpose of the Consultation is not clear. It is not expressly and consistently identified that the documents are seeking consultees’ responses on the implementation of the VMSL and at no point do any of the three documents state that the Consultation is in relation to a Statutory Instrument only and not a general consultation on the merits of the overall proposed smart motorway scheme.
15.6.2 At no point in the J32 to J35a Consultation Document is there a clear explanation of the ERA, their layout, use and enforcement. Indeed, ERA are mentioned just twice in this
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document: first in relation to the permanent amendment to the 1982 Regulations that may be implemented as a result of that particular consultation; and secondly in relation to the provision of “refuge areas” at maximum intervals of 2,500m and where the ERA are referred to simply as a “bespoke facility”. There are no questions specifically relating to ERA in the Consultation Response Form. It is therefore difficult to ascertain how respondents were able to provide informed feedback to this consultation.
15.6.3 However, the Summary of Responses states that this consultation “also covered the introduction of emergency refuge areas (ERAs) on a national basis.” It is my opinion that the content of the J32 – J35a consultation was not adequate in relation to the permanent change to the 1982 Regulations and, given the paucity of information provided, I am unsurprised that the Summary of Responses notes that “On the issue of extending the 1982 Regulations to cover ERAs on a national basis, no comments were received.”
15.6.4 The lack of clarity in the Documents is compounded by the questions asked of consultees, particularly given the questions relation to the “proposal to introduce the managed motorway scheme”. The Documents provide only superficial levels of information regarding the Managed Motorway scheme such as the provision of CCTV; provision of speed limit and driver information signage; refuge areas; and queue protection system. Section 3.2 Key Features of each report does not mention that the hard shoulder would be replaced by a running lane and that ERA would be the only location away from the running lane sections of the motorway as a result of the scheme. The consultation is also silent on hazards and increased levels of risk.
15.6.5 Given all of the considerations above, it is my view that there was no clarity in what the consultation was actually seeking feedback on, and there was insufficient information in the Consultation Documents for a consultee to make an informed response. This is particularly the case for a member of the public or other non-technical consultee as there was insufficient detail contained in the Consultation Documents to provide an appropriate level of explanation of the overarching scheme and component parts.
15.6.6 That the objective and purpose of the consultation exercise was not clear is borne out by the responses received by the Highways Agency. This lack of clarity is perpetuated by the content of the Summary of Responses in which assertions are set out in relation to work that has been carried out in design development, traffic modelling, specification of CCTV, and consultation with emergency services. However, there are no design drawings and no signposting to the evidence referred to in the Summary of Response. By contrast, the Summary of Responses also notes that only limited responses were made in relation to the principle of VMSL and that no responses related to the proposed Regulations. This leads me to conclude that for most stakeholders there was sufficient concern and interest in the wider proposals to take the time to provide a response, and that VMSL were seen as an ancillary element of the proposals with other elements demanding greater attention.
15.6.7 In any case, with reference to the Statutory Instruments and Section 3.2
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“Recommendations” of the Summary of Responses, it is my view that the Consultation Exercise for the M1 was only intended to satisfy the basic requirements for consultation set out in the 1984 Act. It is my interpretation of these consultation documents that the Highways Agency’s views (and therefore presumably the Secretary of State’s view) was that all other component parts of the Smart Motorway scheme would be implemented using established highway authority powers and that there was therefore no requirement to consult. This would accord with the position with respect to DHS schemes set out in IAN 111/08 (see Section 5.2).
15.6.8 The inconsistent and unclear language established in the Consultation Documents leads me to the opinion that this Consultation Exercise was mis-leading in content and therefore inadequate for the general development of a scheme design.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ In reviewing the content of the M1 smart motorway consultation documents, I note that the “Scope of Consultation” section in both Consultation Documents stress that views were not sought on the policy of using the component parts i.e. VMSL, ERA, or removal of hard shoulder, as these constituted established UK Government policy. This exclusion from the consultation thereby limit the public and stakeholders from commenting on, and therefore influencing, the design and implementation of the ALR scheme.
◼ Given that the scope of the consultation excludes the consideration of the component parts of the scheme, it is incongruous that the pro forma invites open field responses in relation to the managed motorway concept (which is excluded from the consultation) and does not ask about VMSL which is the only element in the ALR scheme documents to be under formal consultation. It is my view that this approach is fundamentally not in accordance the criteria established in the Consultation Principles.
◼ Of the 20 organisations who responded to the consultation, eight raised specific concerns relating to the increased risk of vehicles stopping in a live lane in both peak and off-peak time periods. It is telling that so many stakeholders raised pertinent road safety concerns despite this level of pertaining to road safety being absent from, not only the consultation documents, but also the wider body of documents presenting policy, strategy and information relating to ALR schemes.
◼ It is my view that there was no clarity in what the M1 consultations were actually seeking feedback on. In a similar vein to the approach in the RIS2 consultation, there was insufficient information in the Consultation Documents for a consultee to make an informed response. This is particularly the case given the insufficient detail in the documents to provide an appropriate level of explanation of the overarching scheme and component parts.
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16 Comparison of Consultation Processes
16.1.1 The M1 Junctions 28 to 35a consultations considered in the previous section were carried out some nine years ago, since which time the Government’s Consultation Principles have changed. Given that consultations relating to Smart Motorway schemes have continued, and with a view to ascertaining the differences between previous and current consultation processes, I have undertaken a review for comparative purposes of the Consultation Document associated with a more recent Highways England consultation for A1(M) Junctions 6 to 878 which closed on 9 March 2020.
16.2 A1(M) Junctions 6 to 8 Consultation Document
16.2.1 In providing a comparison and analysis, each section of the Consultation Document is considered in turn.
16.2.2 The Summary of the Consultation presents the same summary details as in the M1 Consultation Document. The majority of the text is an exact match between the two documents, aside from the names of the respective schemes, and the scheme context as set out in “Getting to this stage”. The Scope of Consultation is identical. I note that the A1(M) consultation lasted for four weeks, the same length of time as for part of the M1 consultation.
16.2.3 The Executive Summary in the A1(M) Consultation Document has the same initial paragraphs, although there is a new mention of the proposal to introduce “by way of Regulations” the variable mandatory speed limits. The Executive Summary of this later document also identifies new benefits of the VMSL. Whereas the benefits identified in the M1 Consultation Document focused on operational considerations (increased capacity; reduced congestion; smoother traffic flows; journey time reliability; and improved driver information), the A1(M) document speaks specifically of road safety with benefits including:
◼ “Signal [through VMSL] to users what the optimum safe speed is in any given section of a smart motorway
◼ Help to control the speed of traffic, leading to fewer collisions. This helps to smooth the flow of traffic and improve travel times
◼ Facilitate the provision of extra capacity on the motorway by controlling the speed of traffic safely and helping to reduce collisions and delay
◼ Are one of the measures which enable the proven delivery of a high level of safety performance
◼ Support the successful implementation of smart motorways, which minimise the environmental impact of increasing capacity – as additional land is generally not required for the construction of smart motorways.”
78 Highways England, (2019). Smart Motorways Programme A1(M) Junctions 6 to 8 Smart Motorway Statutory Instrument Consultation Document The introduction of variable mandatory speed limits.
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16.2.4 I note that the A1(M) report presents the traffic control element as relevant to road safety. In addition, it speaks of a “proven delivery of high level of safety performance” and that ALR is one of unspecified “measures which enable the proven delivery of a high level of safety performance” without providing a reference to, or details of, supporting evidence. On review of further Consultation Documents, it appears that these new benefits were first used in 201879. Prior to this, the original benefits text was used, without the references to road safety.
16.2.5 Aside from scheme-specific information, Section 1.2 of the A1(M) Consultation Document presents a verbatim justification for the scheme as for the M1 scheme. Section 1 in each Consultation Document differs only in the description of treatment of personal data in relation to Freedom of Information Act or the General Data Protection Regulation.
16.2.6 Section 2, relating to Legislative Changes, presents the same information in the two Consultation Documents in relation to the amendments to the 1984 Act although there are some minor presentational differences.
16.2.7 Section 3 presents the General Information relating to the smart motorway scheme. I note that the structure of the section is the same between the two Consultation Documents, although Section 3.1 of the A1(M) document includes a new “Benefits of a smart motorway scheme in this area” sub-section. This sub-section refers to the M42 Active Traffic Management project as demonstrating the “clear benefits” of the smart motorway “without compromising overall safety”. This is an incongruous addition as the M42 pilot was a DHS scheme rather than ALR and therefore not directly comparable.
16.2.8 Section 3.2 Key Features of the A1(M) report, includes the mention of the “permanent conversion of the hard shoulder to a running lane… providing all-lane running throughout this section”. This detail was not included in the M1 Consultation Document, though I note that mention of the conversion of the hard shoulder has been included in Consultation Documents since 201580. I also note that the penultimate bullet point in the A1(M) Key Features section refers to “places of relative safety” and “emergency area[s] marked with SOS signage” rather than to the refuge areas and ERA terms that are detailed in the M1 Consultation Document. This reflects the change in terminology in IAN 161/15.
16.2.9 Aside from the M1 Consultation Document’s reference to the regional control centre and minor differences in Figure captions, Section 4 in both consultation documents is identical with the same text and images throughout.
16.2.10 The content of the Appendices comprises the same component parts in both documents: Frequently Asked Questions; Consultation Response Form; and List of
79 Highways England, (2018). Smart Motorways Programme M62 Junction 10-12 Smart Motorway Statutory Instrument Consultation Document The introduction of variable mandatory speed limits. 80 Highways England, (2015). M6 Junction 16 to 19 Smart Motorway All Lane Running Scheme Consultation document for statutory instrument.
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Consultees.
16.2.11 The Frequently Asked Questions contained in the A1(M) Consultation Document differs from the M1 document by the inclusion of “What is meant by smart motorway”. Unlike the M1 scheme, the A1(M) document details the different types of smart motorways and states that on All Lane Running sections “there is no hard shoulder and road users are required to obey variable speed limits and must not stop on the motorway. In the event of an emergency road users are required to use an emergency area…”. There is no detail provided regarding the increase in live lane breakdowns and therefore no discussion of the increase in risk for users.
16.2.12 The A1(M) Consultation Document also provides additional information in relation to the effectiveness of the VMSL. The report provides a brief technical description of evidence gathered from four ALR schemes which “indicates that smart motorways are meeting their safety objective and maintaining the very high standards of safety compared to traditional motorways”. This section also states that data shows a “reduction in overall collision rate of 12%.”
16.2.13 With regard to the Consultation Response Form, the questions asked in the A1(M) Consultation Document are identical to those asked in the M1 J31 to J32 Pinch Point Consultation Document.
16.2.14 In terms of consultees, aside from the addition of the local Members of Parliament in the A1(M) document (one of whom is also the Secretary of State for Transport) the types and numbers of consultees are aligned between the M1 and A1(M) Consultation Documents.
16.3 Interpretation of the A1(M) Junctions 6 to 8 Smart Motorway Consultation
16.3.1 On review of the Consultation Document, I note that there is a high degree of consistency between the two processes, with much of the content of the documents being identical or with only minor differences in presentation or language. This high degree of alignment is most noticeable in:
◼ Summary of the Consultation;
◼ Section 1: relating to the consultation process;
◼ Section 2: relating to the legislative changes;
◼ Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 relating to the operational regimes; and
◼ Consultation Response Form.
16.3.2 This high degree of alignment relates to the process of consultation, the legislative changes that would result from it, and the operational regimes under which the VMSL would operate. It is inferred that the high degree of alignment in these areas is due to these sections being salient to the Statutory Instrument.
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16.3.3 Where there is a difference between the Consultation Documents, I note that this relates to the:
◼ Executive Summary which includes perceived road safety considerations in smart motorway schemes;
◼ Section 3 which mentions the M42 trial, specifies that hard shoulder will be converted to a running lane, and substitutes “places of relative safety” for ERA;
◼ Frequently Asked Questions which describes the three types of smart motorway, and specifies which “will” be provided within the A1(M) scheme.
16.3.4 As for the M1 consultation process, it is my view that the A1(M) Consultation Document is unclear as to its objective and purpose as it does not adequately set out the specific elements which are under consideration.
16.3.5 Unlike the consultations for the early smart motorway schemes, the more recent consultation provided information relating to the component parts of the overarching scheme i.e. the specification of smart motorway to be implemented, and repeatedly presents the smart motorway as a road safety scheme. However, there is no evidence presented to support the assertions, and in describing the research carried out uses dense technical language in relation to the road safety outcomes of smart motorway schemes again with no references or supporting information to enable scrutiny.
16.4 The Variable Mandatory Speed Limits Regulations
16.4.1 The Statutory Instruments resulting from the consultations, hereafter referred to as ‘the Regulations’ provide for the VMSL to be implemented on specified lengths of motorways as set out in the associated Schedules. The Regulations establish that:
◼ Vehicles must not be driven at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit within that limit’s demise;
◼ Where a speed limit changes to a reduced limit less than ten seconds before a vehicle passes, the driver is permitted to proceed at the previously displayed limit; and
◼ Contravention of the Regulations is an offence under the 1984 Act.
16.4.2 By virtue of the Regulations relating to VMSL, they are silent on matters relating to the use of any other form of sign or message and do not speak to the hard infrastructure that would be associated with the use of variable speed limits or the means by which the variable speed limits would be implemented other than to specify the lengths of the associated roads.
16.5 Considerations Relating to Public Expectations of Consultation
16.5.1 Whilst there are statutory requirements relating to consultation in relation to the 1984 Act, the quality and quantity of consultation required is not specified. Further, the Highway Act 1980 does not specify a statutory requirement for consultation for works
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such as those which comprise the component parts of a smart motorway scheme. As a result, the use of non-statutory consultation for highways works is well-established and is specifically referred to by Highways England in consultation processes as disparate as that for the A66 Trans-Pennine project consultation which ended on 11 July 201981, the A303 Stonehenge consultation82, and the M271 Redbridge Roundabout in Southampton consultation which ended 16 December 201683.
16.5.2 In addition to the non-statutory consultations carried out by the strategic highway network, the use of non-statutory consultation processes to establish the public’s views on proposals is well established across all manner of local highway authority. For example, Norfolk County Council carries out non-statutory consultation on major highways projects84, Bristol City Council conducts non-statutory consultation on road corridor improvements85, and Transport for London routinely consults on a wide range of schemes including:
◼ “New guidance, policy updates and amendments;
◼ Changes to bus services;
◼ Relocation of bus stops and shelters;
◼ Design and management of London roads;
86 ◼ Major transport projects and developments. ”
16.5.3 Non-statutory consultation is conducted by strategic and local highway authorities across England and across a wide range of small and large scale projects. Combined with the long history of codified guidance on how consultation is conducted, it is my opinion that the public has a sound basis for expecting to be consulted on the design and operational implementation of smart motorways. I consider the implementation of this level of change to the motorway network without meaningful consultation to be inappropriate and runs counter to the public’s and other stakeholders’ expectation of consultation.
16.5.4 This is corroborated by the evidence cited in the Transport Select Committee’s All Lane Running report, which discusses the consultation processes used with regards the implementation of ALR schemes. It reports that “only 56% of respondents to the consultation were supporting of the scheme, but those against were dismissed by the then-Highways Agency, as ‘the majority of the consultation responses expressed concerns on the workings of the Managed Motorway system rather than the introduction of the [VMSL]… The lack of consultation was mentioned by a number of witnesses. The AA called it ‘surprising’ that ‘such a far reaching change’ was pursued without formal consultation at any stage, and that ‘whilst the agency was open to discussion its policy
81 Highways England, (2020). A66 Northern Trans-Pennine project 82 Highways England, (2019). A303 Stonehenge – non-statutory consultation. 83 Highways England, (2017). M271 Redbridge Roundabout Public Consultation Report. 84 Norfolk County Council, (undated). About Consultation, 85 Bristol City Council. (undated). A4018 consultation: report on the results. 86 Transport for London, (undated). Consultations & Surveys.
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decision had been made’.”87
16.6 Consideration of Adequacy of Consultation
16.6.1 On the basis of my review of the M1 Junctions 28 to 35a and the A1(M) Junction 6 to 8 smart motorway consultations, it is my view that the content of the consultation satisfies the requirement to establish the need for and use of the VMSL for the purposes of promoting the Statutory Instrument.
16.6.2 However, having reviewed the content of the M1 J27 – J35a consultation and compared with the more recent consultation, I am led to the view that the Consultation Documents, although not offering a rounded view, present sufficient information relating to the wider scheme for the consultation to be interpreted by consultees as consulting about the wider scheme and not just the VMSL as is indicated by the Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation’s response to the consultation. My opinion is consolidated by the latter scheme which presents a greater level of detail on the design of the smart motorway, while not providing any greater level of detail relating to the actual element on which the consultation is being carried out; the variable speed limit signs.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ On comparing the M1 Consultation Documents with more recent consultation
documentation, I note that there is a high degree of consistency between the two
processes, with much of the content of the documents being identical or with only minor differences in presentation or language. ◼ Unlike the consultations for the early smart motorway schemes, the more recent
consultation provided information relating to the component parts of the overarching scheme i.e. the specification of smart motorway to be implemented, and repeatedly presents the smart motorway as a road safety scheme. However, there is no evidence presented to support the assertions, and in describing the research carried out uses dense technical language in relation to the road safety outcomes of smart motorway schemes again with no references or supporting information to enable scrutiny.
◼ The use of non-statutory consultation for highways works is well-established and is widely used by Highways England for major schemes. In addition, the use of non-statutory consultation processes to establish the public’s views on proposals is well established across all manner of local highway authority.
◼ Given the well-established guidance on consultation and the use of non-statutory consultation by all highway authorities for all scales of project, it is my opinion that the public has a sound basis for expecting to be consulted on the design and operational implementation of smart motorways. I consider the implementation of this level of change to the motorway network without meaningful consultation to therefore be inappropriate.
87 House of Commons Transport Committee, (2016). All lane running Second Report of Session 2016-17. (p.27)
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17 Interpretation on the Appropriateness of Consultation
17.1.1 It is typically the case that consultation occurs at two stages of scheme development. The first takes place in developing the policies or associated strategies which will enable schemes to be brought forward, and the second occurs in the design development for the specific scheme. Based on my review of the available literature, it is my opinion that a meaningful consultation has never taken place with the public or stakeholders in relation to smart motorways.
17.1.2 Based on my review of available documents, it would appear that the DfT relies on the fact that the majority of the component parts of smart motorways, except for VMSL, are incorporated in the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions, as well as other legislation and regulations, and as such no specific consultation was required. This is supported by the incremental incorporation of smart motorways into national roads policies and strategies.
17.1.3 The policy review shows that since 1998’s White Paper, the use of technology has been incrementally incorporated into the SRN, with each policy or strategy building on the previous. The New Deal for Transport established the foundations for roll out of managed motorways, and the Transport Ten Year Plan 2000 identified smart motorways as a new entity. The National Infrastructure Strategy identified the need for congestion management and therefore the implementation of smart motorways, and RIS and RIS2 included their provision as part of the identified programme of improvement works.
17.1.4 The 2011 National Infrastructure Plan was the first strategic document to identify specific sections of the SRN to be converted to smart motorway. To the best of my knowledge the Infrastructure Plan was not preceded by consultation which engaged with people in relation to these schemes.
17.1.5 Where strategic documents did involve consultation, or included details of smart motorway, this has consistently been presented at a high level and without consideration of hazards or risks. It is my opinion that the level of information provided was too low for readers to these documents to have been considered informed.
17.1.6 At a scheme level, as I detail in Section 16.6 although ALR schemes have been subject to consultation processes, these relate to the requirement to establish the need for and use of the VMSL for the purposes of promoting the Statutory Instrument and they have not sought responses in relation to the design development.
17.1.7 However, it is my opinion that the Consultation Documents associated with the VMSL present sufficient depth of information relating to the infrastructure proposed in the scheme, for the consultation to be reasonably interpreted as consulting about the whole scheme and not just the VMSL. This opinion is supported by the Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation’s responses to the M1 scheme consultation which responds in relation to road infrastructure and not just the VMSL. For later schemes a
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greater level of detail is presented on the design of the smart motorway, while not providing any greater level of detail relating to the actual element on which the consultation is being carried out; the variable speed limit signs.
17.1.8 The blending of information, the lack of clarity on the consultation objective, and the absence of supporting evidence, means that it is not possible for the smart motorway consultation to be adequately scrutinised. As a result, there is a high degree of confusion and misinterpretation of the consultation process evident in the stakeholder responses.
17.1.9 This uncertainty is exemplified by the Consultation Institute which states “They receive very few responses – hardly surprising because they cannot easily be located on the Highways England website (one of the few public bodies without a dedicated ‘consultations’ page) and consultees would probably be unaware if the proposed distances between SOS sites are longer or shorter than elsewhere.88” I interpret this to show that there is a view held that there has been consultation in relation to the design of the smart motorway scheme. That a public authority undertakes consultation which is associated with a lack of consensus over what is actually being consulted upon I find to be a cause for concern.
17.1.10 Despite the number of statutory consultations that have been undertaken in relation to smart motorways, it is my opinion that none that I have reviewed have been carried out to seek meaningful engagement and feedback with a view to informing to the design and implementation of the whole scheme.
17.1.11 In addition, although consultation has taken place in relation to higher level decision making, such as to inform RIS2, those consultations include smart motorways as one of many points under consideration and cannot therefore be viewed as a consultation on specifically on their implementation. I would contend that the absence of detailed information regarding the ALR design, its operation, the existence of MIDAS, and the presentation of details regarding hazards and risk means that even in the event that this were promoted as a consultation on ALR, the paucity of information provided means that it is not possible for stakeholders or members of the public to make an informed response.
17.1.12 To obtain a degree of insight into what types of comments an informed consultation regarding design decisions may have resulted in, I turn to the comments set out in ‘Smart Motorways Research 2017’ carried out for Transport Focus. When people attending the focus groups had the technology associated with ALR explained to them, the report notes that “the general consensus is that all lane running Smart Motorways are less safe than conventional motorways” and that “drivers rationalise these concerns away (assuming that the system has been designed with safety in mind)”.
17.1.13 While I would agree that the system has been designed with some elements of safety in
88The Consultation Institute, (2019). Smart Motorways – has there been enough consultation?
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mind, I do not agree that there is sufficient evidence (as set out in this report) to rationalise these reasonable concerns away. As I discuss at paragraph 18.1.35, the recent decision to replace all DHS schemes with ALR schemes is despite the evidence that the DHS schemes are associated with the lowest levels of fatal or serious injury collisions. This decision casts doubt over the research participants’ assumption, and throws doubt on Highways England’s First Imperative to remove all KSIs from the SRN and its adoption of a Safe Systems approach.
17.1.14 As a result, cumulatively over the past 14 years there has been no formal consultation on the implementation of ALR infrastructure incorporating the removal of the hard shoulder and the reduced use of ERA compared with the level of their provision in the M42 pilot. This is confirmed by the findings of the Transport Select Committee which noted that evidence provided at its 2016-17 inquiry stated that consultation was inadequate (see Section 9.3). Given the extent to which the public is consulted by highway authorities, and the long history of codified guidance on how consultation is conducted (see Section 14), it is my opinion that the lack of public consultation in relation to ALR infrastructure, ignores both the reasonable expectations of the public in relation to consultation, and the Government’s stated principles on consultation.
17.1.15 Non-statutory consultation is conducted by strategic and local highway authorities across England for a wide range of small and large scale projects. As such, I consider it to be reasonable for a member of the public to expect that they should be provided the opportunity to express an opinion in relation to a major project to change the structural layout and operational system of sections of England’s most important and highly used roads.
17.1.16 This is corroborated by the evidence cited in the Transport Select Committee’s 2016 report, which discusses the consultation processes used with regards the implementation of ALR schemes. It reports that “only 56% of respondents to the consultation were supporting of the scheme, but those against were dismissed by the then-Highways Agency, as ‘the majority of the consultation responses expressed concerns on the workings of the Managed Motorway system rather than the introduction of the [VMSL]… The lack of consultation was mentioned by a number of witnesses. The AA called it ‘surprising’ that ‘such a far reaching change’ was pursued without formal consultation at any stage, and that ‘whilst the agency was open to discussion its policy decision had been made’.89”
17.1.17 The question established in Section 1.3 regarding consultation asks: How appropriate has consultation been in the implementation of ALR?
17.1.18 My review of the smart motorways consultation documents leads me to conclude that Highways England’s position has been and continues to be that no statutory consultation is required for the smart motorways, therefore no meaningful engagement will be carried out. However, to take this position ignores the reasonable expectations of
89 House of Commons Transport Committee, (2016). All lane running Second Report of Session 2016-17.( p.27)
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the public in relation to consultation and the Government’s stated principles governing consultation.
17.1.19 Meaningful consultations have been promoted for the past 20 years as a major channel for listening to stakeholders and citizens and for open democracy with respect to decision making in transport policy and infrastructure provision.
17.1.20 There is sufficient evidence to lead me to conclude that the consultation processes are targeted at achieving the overarching aim of implementing VMSL and are not targeted at public engagement, education, or improving the proposed scheme. This evidence includes the guidance on statutory consultation contained in IAN 111/08 and its subsequent withdrawal; the inconsistent understanding among stakeholders as to whether or not they had been consulted with regard to the concept of ALR; and the lack of responses relating to the statutory component of the consultation.
17.1.21 Based on my review, I conclude that the consultation in relation to smart motorways has been, and continues to be, inadequate and that the public and stakeholders have not been afforded a meaningful opportunity to engage with the ALR proposals as a concept. It is my view that the change in travel patterns which may result from the Covid-19 pandemic may create the conditions to undertake consultation, as the public’s consideration of travel is forecast to change significantly over the short and mid term.
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Part 3 – The Decision to Continue ALR Implementation
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18 Smart Motorway Safety, Evidence Stocktake and Action Plan (2020)
18.1 Stocktake Review
18.1.1 Published in 2020, the Stocktake was carried out to derive conclusions on the operation of the smart motorways in England. The data provided in the report draws on that set out in the 2019 Overarching Safety Report (see Section 8.4), but is extended to cover all motorway typologies. ‘Part A Evidence Stocktake’ identifies that average incidence rates of slight and serious casualties on DHS and ALR schemes were higher between 2015 and 2018 than on conventional motorways. Fatality rates over the same period were lower than on conventional motorways.
18.1.2 With regards to fatality rates, ALR schemes were subject to the greatest proportion of fatalities compared with CM and DHS schemes. Given the data I discuss at Section 6.7, this finding is not surprising. Rates for seriously injured causalities were also higher for ALR schemes than for CM or DHS schemes. A summary of the findings is presented at Table 18.1 which draws on data provided at paragraph 1.14.
Table 18.1 Comparison of Casualty and Fatality Rates 2015 – 2018 by Motorway Type Slight Casualty Serious Casualty Motorway Type Fatality Rate FWI Rate Rate Rate
Conventional 10 per hmvm 1.1 per hmvm 0.16 per hmvm 0.38 per hmvm
CM 14 per hmvm 1.2 per hmvm 0.07 per hmvm 0.33 per hmvm
DHS 15 per hmvm 1.2 per hmvm 0.07 per hmvm 0.33 per hmvm
ALR 11 per hmvm 1.3 per hmvm 0.11 per hmvm 0.35 per hmvm
18.1.3 Paragraphs 1.24 and 1.25 present data for the ALR motorways comparing the before situation with that after implementation. Compared with the counterfactual, there has been a greater reduction in the “all casualty” rate from 16.8 per hmvm to 12.1 per hmvm. The fatal and serious casualty rates have been subject to a greater increase in rate than may have otherwise been anticipated compared with the counterfactual.
18.1.4 Paragraph 2.10 notes that “smart motorways make up a relatively small proportion of the SRN, comprising 7% of its road length in 2018.” Of this, one percent is comprised DHS schemes, and three percent each for CM and ALR schemes which carry some 16 percent of all SRN traffic.
18.1.5 In comparing ‘before’ and ‘after’ hazard assessments for ALR schemes, Figure 23 in the Stocktake shows that while overall hazard levels have reduced, those related to ‘Vehicle stops in running lane’ and ‘Unsafe lane changing’ increase on implementation of the schemes. This is as noted in the respective hazard logs and safety reports.
18.1.6 Paragraph 4.29 notes that for the first nine ALR schemes, “there has been a reduction in the average annual number of personal injury collisions involving vehicles in places of
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relative safety, following conversion to ALR.” Given the schemes vastly reduce the provision of these locations by permanently removing the hard shoulder, it could be reasonably anticipated that a reduction in the number of collisions would follow. This is not consistently the case in terms of severity however, as summarised in Table 18.2 which shows an increase in serious collisions in these locations. However, the very low numbers of collisions which take place in these locations on ALR means that the analysis of this data serves no useful purpose and , in my view, implies a false equivalence with the analysis of more high risk hazards associated with both ALR and D3M.
18.1.7 The Stocktake does not note whether this data considers only ERA, or if MSAs are also included on a like for like comparison basis.
Table 18.2 Comparing Before and After Average Collision Rates for Places of Relative Safety Before After
Slight 2.0 0.7
Serious 0.3 0.7
Fatal 0.3 0.0
18.1.8 I note that at the Transport Committee on 3 February 2021, the Secretary of State for Transport mentioned that “No fatalities have taken place in emergency areas because they are set back from the road, they’re monitored automatically by CCTV90”. While it is the case that there have been no fatalities, this statement ignores the increase in serious collision rates in places of relative safety.
18.1.9 It is also incorrect to say that the reason there have been fewer collisions is due to them being off-line and monitored automatically by CCTV, which suggests that there is a warning system in place. As shown in Table 5.3 this is not the case. I would observe that the ERA cover less than ten percent of the ALR link length and therefore are of a very limited utility for most people using the roads. In my opinion, this is a more salient cause of reduced fatality rates.
18.1.10 The hard shoulder is repeatedly identified in the guidance as unsafe, with some eight percent of collisions taking place in that area. However, I have not been able to find the source of this stated eight percent, and this is in any case to ignore that a highway can never be a completely safe environment and the hard shoulder serves as a refuge for many more people than are subject to a collision and it is clearly a safer environment than a live lane.
18.1.11 This position is borne out by the low number of hard shoulder collisions (eight) identified on the hard shoulder in the Overarching Safety Report91 before ALR implementation, compared with the total number of collisions in the study area over the same period
90 Royal HaskoningDHV, (2021). Verbatim Transcript – Parliament Live Transport Committee – Responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Transport 3 February 2021. 91 Highways England, (2019). Smart Motorway All Lane Running Overarching Safety Report 2019.
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(1,337). This equates to less than one percent total personal injury collisions taking place on the hard shoulder on a D3M environment which is a very low level of incidence.
18.1.12 The guidance acknowledges that the hard shoulder is subject to misuse by people who stop there in non-emergency situations. It would follow that if a hard shoulder is subject to mis-use and mis-interpretation of use, then it is conceivable that ERA would also be subject to mis-use or mis-interpretation and again, this is borne out by the same 2019 research which found a high level of non-emergency stoppage in ERA.
18.1.13 Whilst Highways England’s design guidance has until recently been predicated on the use of the smart motorways by compliant drivers, to ignore common human behaviour as it relates to the singular part of the design which provides a safer location in an emergency situation is to ignore a foreseeable health and safety risk to the users of the smart motorways. If in the event of an emergency a driver cannot bring their car to rest in an already-occupied ERA, then a new hazard of being at rest in a live running lane is imposed on that driver. Indeed, the Stocktake and information from other sources makes clear that there is a degree of mis-use of ERA with them commonly being used as lay-bys.
18.1.14 With regards to live lane breakdowns, paragraph 4.30 notes that “when compared to the volume of traffic, breaking down and stopping in a live lane is an infrequent experience for road users.” In the first nine ALR schemes, the total live lane collisions increased from an average of three per year to an average of 19 per year following implementation. A summary of the breakdown of these collisions is provided at Table 18.3.
Table 18.3 Summary of Annual Average Live Lane Collisions in First Nine ALR Schemes Collision Severity Before Implementation After Implementation
Slight 2.3 9.1
Serious 0.3 7.0
Fatal 0.0 2.8
18.1.15 I note that paragraph 4.32 points to the infrequency of these live lane collisions on ALR schemes to qualify the increased annual average collisions on the schemes. This is a curious qualification given that the rate and frequency would be substantially less under any other sort of motorway environment. That a type of collision occurs infrequently in absolute terms does not, in my view, moderate the unacceptable position that the ALR scheme generates a higher frequency of these collisions overall with a subsequent higher level of risk. Further, this approach is not supported by the Safe Systems approach which is concerned with the reduction of serious and fatal collisions and as such it is odd that the Stocktake does not set out the severity of these collisions.
18.1.16 As paragraph 4.33 states “a vehicle which breaks down is more likely to stop in a live lane on ALR than on conventional motorways, which is reflected in the increased likelihood of personal injury collisions involving a vehicle stopped in a live lane” and my
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analysis set out in Section 8.4 shows that there is an increase in fatal or serious injury outcome in live lane breakdown collisions on ALR than on the predecessor roads.
18.1.17 The Stocktake does not provide details on the live lane breakdowns resulting in collisions on DHS schemes. However, the report’s Table 3 does provide details on the numbers and proportions of live lane breakdowns across all SRN roads. The data relating to all types of motorway is replicated in Table 18.4.
Table 18.4 Average Annual Number and Percentage of Breakdown Incidents on all Motorways Types 2017 – 2018 Conventional Controlled Dynamic Hard Breakdown Type All Lane Running Motorway Motorway Shoulder Running
25,663 2,361 3,873 9,206 In a Live Lane (20%) (14%) (27%) (40%)
96,097 14,118 9,012 12,112 Not in Live Lane (74%) (81%) (63%) (53%)
8,250 930 1,367 1,536 Not Specified (6%) (5%) (10%) (7%)
12,9991 17,409 14,215 22,963 Total (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
18.1.18 Table 18.4 shows that the proportion of live lane breakdowns in DHS schemes is seven points greater than in conventional motorways, and there is a 20 point increase in the proportion associated with ALR schemes. As noted in Royal HaskoningDHV’s 2020 report which considered the M1 J25 – J31 and J32 – J35a ALR schemes, “the RHDHV study supports the DfT’s conclusion with an emerging trend of fatal collisions related to vehicles stopping in Lane 1, (which would have previously been the hard shoulder) due to vehicle/ mechanical failure or ‘reasons yet to be established’.”92
18.1.19 With regards the weight that could be given to this Stocktake, paragraph 4.35 states that “Before and after studies, with a ‘counterfactual’ scenario to estimate what might have happened in the absence of the road scheme, is the strongest standard of evidence considered in this stocktake. Combined with statistical significance testing, it is the most reliable basis for forming conclusions on the relative safety of smart motorways on a like for like basis, and in in line with best practice and HMT guidance on policy evaluation”. Summary details from this section of the Stocktake are presented in Table 18.5 which demonstrates that a third of ALR schemes had an increase in casualties After implementation. I find this to be particularly concerning.
18.1.20 Given the risk management process for ALR relies on the aggregation of all risk scores together with the operation of MIDAS to mitigate the increased risk associated with the ALR design, it is clear that the outcome for one third of the schemes does not align with the outcome anticipated in the risk management process. I am led to the opinion that this was a foreseeable outcome given the data identified in 2015 and 2016 as
92 Royal HaskoningDHV, (2020). Review of All Lane Running Smart Motorway: M1 Junction 28 to Junction 31 and Junction 32 to Junction 35a,.
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discussed in Sections 7.4 and 6.6.
Table 18.5 Summary from All Lane Running Stocktake Review Reduction/ Increase in Rates Compared with Counterfactual
ALR
POPE and Safety Reports (Collision Rates)
M25 J5 - 7 Reduction (statistically significant93).
M25 J23 - 27 Reduction
M1 J39 - 42 Increase
M6 J10a - 13 Reduction (statistically significant)
Smart Motorway All Lane Running Overarching Safety Report (Casualty Rates)
M1 J28 - 31 Reduction
M3 J2 – 4a Reduction
M25 J5 - 6 Reduction
M1 J32 – 35a Reduction
M6 J11a - 13 Reduction
M1 J19 - 16 Reduction
M25 J23 - 27 Increase
M5 J4a - 6 Increase
M2 J39 - 42 Increase (statistically significant)
18.1.21 Paragraph 4.46 notes that (in relation to the All Lane Running Overarching Safety Report) “for the M1 J39 – 42, although the number of casualties per annum in the after period was comparable to the other schemes evaluated, the number of casualties in the before period was the lowest among all the schemes.”
18.1.22 I would note that although this scheme was the second lowest of all the data presented prior to the scheme’s implementation, the ‘After’ casualty rates were the second highest of all the schemes, thereby presenting a substantial change in outcome. Thus an alternative conclusion can be drawn, that the ALR scheme has been implemented on a road with a good safety record and made it substantially less safe. As noted in Royal HaskoningDHV’s 2020 document, “the focus upon overall rates by the DfT potentially conceals local issues, notably along sections of the M1, M5 and M25.94” Given the Stocktake was authored following the adoption of the Safe Systems approach by Highways England, its conclusion is not supported by the health and safety position of the organisation.
18.1.23 Of the nine schemes identified in Figure 25 of the Stocktake, four resulted in a reduction in KSI casualties after ALR implementation compared with the counterfactual, and five
93 Note, Statistical tests used and associated Confidence Intervals are not stated. 94 Royal HaskoningDHV, (2020). Review of All Lane Running Smart Motorway: M1 Junction 28 to Junction 31 and Junction 32 to Junction 35a..
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had an identifiable increase in KSI casualties.
18.1.24 Figure 26 shows that when considering FWI rather than only KSI collisions, all schemes except two resulted in a reduction in injuries. This shows the dampening effect of considering slight collisions. The two schemes which had higher FWI after implementation were the M1 J32 – 35a and the M1 J39 – 42. It can be said that these schemes did not meet the FWI element of the scheme objectives i.e. they were not “at least as safe” as the pre-existing road.
18.1.25 In summarising the review of ALR schemes, paragraphs 4.49 and 4.50 note that:
◼ “The casualty rate has fallen for the majority of schemes, and as a group, following the introduction of All Lane Running. This indicates a fall of 18% from 14.7 per hmvm to 12.1 per hmvm when compared to the counterfactual…
◼ The fatal and serious casualty rate has increased across the group of schemes by 2% from 1.32 per hmvm to 1.35 per hmvm when compared to the counterfactual…;
◼ The Fatal and Weighted Injuries… rate fell following introduction of ALR for all but two of the schemes, and fell as a group from 0.4 per hmvm to 0.31 per hmvm compared to the counterfactual informed by background trends (by 23%)… The set of ALR schemes considered had a statistically significant reduction in casualty rates, with an increase in serious and fatal casualties in line with the counterfactual and a fall in the FWI.”
18.1.26 Given that this report presents a Stocktake of evidence, the absence of equivalent data for the DHS schemes is notable and as a result a like-for-like comparison cannot be made. In the absence of an equivalent report to the Overarching Safety Report for ALR having been produced also for DHS schemes, paragraphs 4.53 and 4.54 provide a basic analysis of Before and After data for “a selection of roads that have been converted” to DHS. This analysis presents only annual average collision numbers for each road for before and after scheme implementation. There is no comparison to the counterfactual and no FWI data. Each of Figures 27 to 29 shows that there was a reduction in slight and serious collisions across eight DHS schemes, aside from an increase in slight collisions in the M6 J5-8 scheme and an increase in serious collisions on the M1 J10 – 13a and M62 J29 – 30.
18.1.27 With regards fatal collisions, seven of the eight schemes reported a reduction in fatal collisions, with three reporting zero fatalities. Only one scheme, on the M5 J15 – 17 was subject to an increase in fatal collisions after scheme implementation.
18.1.28 The original safety objectives for smart motorways (to be as safe, or safer than the pre- existing road) are not referenced at the Conclusions to Part A of the Stocktake, noting that “the evidence shows that in most ways, smart motorways are as safe as, or safer than, conventional motorways, but not in every way.” It is my view that this statement is disingenuous as it appears to draw equivalence between slight collisions and those which result in fatalities. I would contend that it does not matter if it is safer in most
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ways, if the ways in which they are less safe are associated with greater levels of more serious casualties or fatalities. This is both in terms of the substantially higher economic costs of fatal collisions compared with slight injury collisions, but more importantly the human and societal cost as encoded in the Safe Systems approach. Again, the stated position in the Stocktake runs counter to Highways England’s adopted position.
18.1.29 However, a third of the ALR schemes identified do not satisfy the objective identified in the paragraph above as they are not “as safe” as the pre-existing road when taking account of all casualty types. The equivalent information is not provided for DHS schemes although of the seven schemes identified at 4.51, just over half (four) were noted to have a decrease in overall casualty collision rates.
18.1.30 With regards the objective that no user population be disproportionately adversely affected, the Stocktake is silent and offers no evidence. It does however note that the incidence of live lane breakdowns has increased across all smart motorways compared with conventional motorways, and particularly for ALR schemes. The absence of equivalent or comprehensive data makes a like for like comparison between the two types of smart motorway scheme impossible.
18.1.31 Part B of the report presents the Action Plan which includes a range of measures:
◼ Ending the use of dynamic hard shoulders;
◼ Faster rollout of SVD;
◼ Faster attendance by more TOs;
◼ Reduced maximum spacing for ERAs to 1 mile;
◼ Make ERA more visible;
◼ More signs to the nearest ERA;
◼ £5 million for communications and driver education campaigns; and
◼ Update to the Highway Code.
18.1.32 Paragraph 1.1 states that “the statistics suggest that fatal casualty rates are lower while injury rates may be slightly higher. Within this overall picture, the specific risk related to live lane breakdowns has increased and there is confusion over the different types of smart motorways.” The Stocktake presents no evidence of this confusion or details on how that confusion is manifest i.e. whether it relates to just one or multiple forms of smart motorway. I would observe that in the absence of driver education and training, the removal of interpretative signage on SM schemes (see Section 5.4), as well as the lack of detail regarding the use of SM in The Highway Code (see Section 10.3), confusion on the use of the SM was inevitable. Indeed, it was identified as a requirement for mitigation in the M42 pilot and in IAN 111/08 along with measures to avoid generating this confusion.
18.1.33 At section 1.3, the report notes that DHS “has the potential to cause confusion for motorists because the hard shoulder is sometimes in use for traffic and sometimes not.
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Also, as time goes on and the motorway becomes busier, the hard shoulder is in use for longer periods of time. The simple solution to end this potential for confusion is to convert the hard shoulder permanently into a traffic lane… We are announcing that we will convert all existing… [DHS into ALR] by the end of March 2025 so there will be only one type without a permanent hard shoulder. This will provide a more consistent experience for motorists.”
18.1.34 The simple solution does not necessarily, in my view, denote the correct, or most judicious, solution. I note that were all ALR schemes to be converted to DHS schemes, the result would be similarly a “more consistent experience for motorists.” The provision of ALR in preference to DHS schemes, may relate more to the provision of a permanent increase in capacity without the political burden of specifically promoting road building schemes. The potential for DHS to be used for longer periods of the day is in line with the Dutch approach demonstrating this can be achieved (see Section 11.2).
18.1.35 The announcement that all DHS schemes will be converted to ALR is made with no justification as the basis of decision making. Given that all the evidence, including the DfT and Highways England’s own data, demonstrates that DHS has consistently lower collision and casualty rates than ALR, I am led to conclude that the conversion of the DHS schemes to ALR could result in an increase in serious and fatal collisions.
18.1.36 The Action Plan’s reduced time in attendance by TOs from 17 minutes to 10 minutes is not supported by details on how that would be achieved on a wholly ALR network. At present, the DHS schemes have a retained hard shoulder that may be closed to enable TO access to an incident. This is not the case in ALR schemes which instead rely on RCC operators plotting a course for the TOs to the incident through the manual adjustment of lane signals. The Action Plan does not provide an explanation why these increased patrols are only committed to locations where places of relative safety are provided with in excess of one mile spacings.
18.1.37 The reduction in maximum spacing for ERA and the additional signage for them will increase the availability of a place of relative safety for users of ALR schemes. However, the new standard of 1 mile (or desirable maximum of ¾ mile) remains a significantly longer spacings than the ERA spacing on DHS schemes which are shown in the Stocktake evidence to be consistently safer.
18.1.38 Although the Stocktake itself provides no evidence to support, or explain the decision to provide ERA at one mile intervals, I note that this outcome is aligned with the Highways England 2019 response to a letter from the APPG Chair (quoted in the APPG All Lane Running Inquiry report) which states that, “To increase customer confidence of reaching a place to stop in an emergency, we took the decision to reduce the maximum spacing to 1 mile on future schemes to be constructed from 2020 onwards. It should be noted that whilst 1.5 miles (2.5km) is the maximum spacing, the average spacing on all ALR schemes to date is approximately 1.2 miles (2km).” As the APPG report notes, this proposes the reduced spacing of ERA in new schemes for the purposes of customer confidence rather than improved safety, and “is in tension to their already reneged upon
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commitment to retrofit existing stretches” (APPG, p.18).
18.1.39 The APPG also noted that with respect to the safety effects of different ERA spacings, “This confusion could have been avoided if Highways England had provided the evidence that supported these claims. It was also notable that they did not, despite it being requested. Following up this request, the APPG repeatedly requested the evidence from Highways England; no response was forthcoming” (APPG, p.18). It is my interpretation that the absence of data or evidence to support the decision established in the Stocktake to reduce ERA spacings to 1 mile, is a continuance of the same absence in evidence over the lifetime of the ALR design and over the duration of two all-party inquiries.
18.1.40 The Action Plan also commits to making the ERA more visible and identifiable to drivers through the use of orange surfacing. However, amber or red-spectrum colours in traffic signs is consistently used to indicate a form of warning. It is my view that there is therefore potential for the orange surfacing to be interpreted as ‘no entry’ or ‘authorised vehicles only’ by uninformed drivers. If there is evidence from trials and pilots to justify the use of this colour surfacing, this information should be provided.
18.1.41 Despite the conclusions of Part A stating that the Action Plan includes “continuing to monitor the evidence as it evolves” in actuality the Action Plan makes no such commitment. Paragraph 2.3 of the Action Plan notes only that “we will pay particularly close attention to the [smart motorways] post-implementation performance.”
18.1.42 Overall, the Evidence Stocktake provides little in the way of balanced evidence. The report appears partial, with more evidence provided relating to ALR schemes than DHS schemes and no substantive evidence provided regarding CM schemes. While ALR designs have been the single standard for some time, it is a matter of fact that more miles are driven individually on CM and DHS than on ALR schemes (see Figure 9 of the Stocktake), with DHS schemes providing additional capacity over and above that provided by CM. It would therefore have been reasonably expected that commitments and decisions made on the future provision of smart motorways, took account of the outcomes for all types.
18.2 Royal HaskoningDHV Safety Review of ALR Smart Motorway
18.2.1 The DfT’s Stocktake presents evidence relating to the post-implementation operations of smart motorways. However, this data is presented in aggregate, with no exploration of the operational impacts on different user groups. The 2020 Royal HaskoningDHV document presents a road safety review of the M1 J28 – 31 and J32 – 35a which includes the consideration of different user groups.
18.2.2 Table 3.1 of the document presents collision numbers by severity Before and After the scheme implementation. The overall reduction in the average number of collisions is identified as statistically significant. In addition, it is observed at paragraph 3.2.3 that there was a doubling of fatal collisions and no significant change in the number of
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serious collisions in the After scenario.
18.2.3 Paragraphs 3.2.6 to 3.2.10 notes the circumstances of the fatal collisions after implementation. Of the eight collisions, five were reasoned to be unrelated to the implementation of the ALR scheme and three could be attributed to the implementation of ALR.
18.2.4 Paragraph 3.2.12 states that “it is reasoned that the three fatal collisions described above could potentially be attributed to the implementation of the M1 Smart ALR motorway scheme. This conclusion is based upon the assumption that, had a hard shoulder been available, the drivers could have pulled off the active carriageway before stopping and exiting their vehicles.”
18.2.5 Turning to the consideration of serious injury collisions, the report states at 3.2.17 that three “may not have happened prior to the implementation of the M1 Smart ALR motorway scheme. This conclusion is based upon the assumption that, had a hard shoulder been available, the drivers could have pulled off the active carriageway before stopping and exiting their vehicles.”
18.2.6 On the basis that a Safe Systems approach maintains that serious collisions are of interest as well as fatalities, I have reviewed the STATS19 documentation included in Appendix A of the Royal HaskoningDHV report to produce Table 18.6. This data considers the collisions which occurred in the three years following implementation of the ALR scheme.
18.2.7 Of the 50 serious or fatal collisions recorded in the study area over the three year period, I have identified the ALR’s permanent removal of the hard shoulder as a contributory factor in seven (14 percent) of the collisions as identified in Table 18.6. Although the majority of these collisions occurred during off-peak conditions, two people died and two people sustained serious injuries as a result of collisions which took place during weekday peak periods. In total, of these attributable collisions, three resulted in fatalities.
18.2.8 It is notable that to date, two of these fatal collisions have received coroner verdicts setting out a need for further action. One advised a review of smart motorways and returned a verdict of unlawful killing95. A second has referred the death to the Crown Prosecution Service96.
18.2.9 In examining the outcome of collisions, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 detail the calculated severity index (fatal and serious collisions divided by total collisions by link) for each scheme. The severity index on J28 – J31 increased from 0.08 Before to 0.29 After implementation. Severity Index for J32 to J35a increased from 0.10 Before to 0.21 After. This is due to the reduction in the number of slight collisions for the former scheme, and for the latter scheme, the reduction in the number of slight collisions combined with an
95 Coroner Area of South Yorkshire West, (2021). Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths 96 New Civil Engineer (2021), Highways England may face manslaughter charges over smart motorway death
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increase in serious and fatal collisions.
18.2.10 Comparisons of the FWI for the two schemes illustrate the differences in collision patterns. As detailed at Table 3.5 of the document, the FWI for J28 – J31 reduced from 0.417 Before to 0.332 After (a slight reduction against the counterfactual of 0.353). For the J32 – J35a scheme the inverse occurred, with the FWI increasing from 0.257 Before to 0.455 After (compared with a counterfactual of 2.18).
18.2.11 With regards to the scheme objective of not disproportionately adversely affecting a population of customers, Section 3.6 provides details on the number and proportion of collisions which occurred in post-implementation. As shown in the report’s Table 3.7, there was an increase in pedestrian, motorcyclist, HGV occupants and minibus casualties After opening. Of these, the minibus, HGV and motorcyclist proportional increase was as a result of the overall increase in fatal or serious collisions within the scheme extents. However, there was an increase in absolute numbers of pedestrian casualties, equating to a 1.9 percent increase in pedestrian casualties.
18.2.12 As a result of the increased pedestrian casualties, as well as the increase in FWI on the J32 – J35a section, the report states at Section 4 that, “the average number of FWI casualties per year and FWI casualties per billion vehicle miles during the After period is lower that during the Before period between Junction 28 and 31 but higher between Junction 32 and Junction 35A. As such, overall, the M1 ALR Smart motorway scheme has not met the FWI casualties aspect of its safety objectives.”
18.2.13 In addition, “analysis of the types of casualties (user groups) indicates that pedestrians have been disproportionately adversely affected in terms of safety, with five pedestrian fatalities recorded during the After period. This is compared to a total of three during the Before scenario.” As a result, the report concludes that “M1 Smart ALR motorway scheme does not meet any of the three road user safety objectives”.
Summary Findings and Opinion
◼ In comparing ‘before’ and ‘after’ hazard assessments for ALR schemes the Stocktake shows that while overall hazard levels have reduced, those related to ‘Vehicle stops in running lane’ and ‘Unsafe lane changing’ increase on implementation of the schemes.
◼ In the light of this safety outcome, it is my view that the absence of data or evidence to support the decision to continue with ALR and to reduce ERA spacings to 1 mile, is a continuance of the same absence in evidence over the lifetime of the ALR design.
◼ The conversion of DHS schemes to ALR not justified. Given that all the evidence demonstrates that DHS has lower collision and casualty rates than ALR, I am led to conclude that this conversion could result in an increase in serious and fatal collisions.
◼ This decision is all the more surprising given the findings of the Royal HaskoningDHV review that the M1 Smart ALR motorway scheme does not meet any of the already compromised safety objectives. This is particularly the case as this is not the only ALR scheme which has been subject to excessive KSI casualties since implementation.
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Table 18.6 Summary of M1 Collision Data 1st March 2017 to 28 February 2020 ALR Collision No. No. Date Time Surface Lighting Severity Description Contributory Ref. Vehicles Casualties Factor?
Travelling southbound. Veh 1 (HGV) in L1 due to tyre blow out, 17241347 02/11/2017 0450 Dry Darkness Serious 3 2 veh 2 (car) stops L1 due to debris. Veh 3 (HGV) collides with veh Yes 2 which in turn strikes veh 1.
Travelling northbound. Veh 1 in L1 travelling at reduced speed 18293232 06/05/2018 0205 Dry Darkness Serious 2 3 due to tyre blow out. Veh 2 approaches at speed and collides to Yes rear of veh 1. Driver veh 2, 20 years old.
Travelling northbound. Veh 2 stopped in L1. Veh 1 (HGV) strikes 18295361 15/05/2018 1820 Dry Daylight Serious 2 2 Yes veh 2.
Travelling northbound. Veh 1 stopped due to breakdown. 18330350 09/09/2018 2141 Dry Darkness Fatal 4 3 Occupant exited vehicle. Veh and pedestrian hit by three further Yes vehicles.
Travelling northbound. Veh 1 and veh 2 stopped in L1. Veh 3 19846089 07/06/2019 0808 Dry Daylight Fatal 3 2 Yes (HGV) stuck veh 2 forcing into veh 1. Two fatalities.
Travelling northbound. Veh 1 stops in L1 following tyre blow out. Driver exits vehicle and stands on the carriageway between 1900340 22/03/2019 1230 Dry Daylight Fatal 3 3 vehicle and barrier. Veh 2 collides with veh 1 causing its driver Yes fatal injuries. The front seat passenger of veh 2 sustained serious injuries.
Travelling southbound. Veh 3 stopped in L1. Veh 2 slows to 1901440 14/10/2019 1405 Wet/damp Daylight Serious 3 2 change lane and veh 1 collides with rear of veh 2. Two people Yes sustained serious injuries.
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19 Conclusions on the Decision to Continue ALR Implementation
19.1.1 The roll out of the smart motorways typology in England has undeniably resulted in a reduction in the number of collisions on these motorways compared with their operational safety record as a conventional motorway. For CM schemes, this is supported by the objective to secure a 10 percent reduction in collisions due to the implementation of MIDAS, and a further 15 percent reduction due to the implementation of CM design.
19.1.2 For ALR schemes however, there has been no such objective to specifically improve road safety until the publication of GD 301 in 2020. Although the M42 pilot had the stated objective to reduce casualties, the safety objective for ALR has consistently been to ensure that the new roads are no worse than the respective road prior to ALR implementation, i.e. the D3M road, which is presented as a baseline situation.
19.1.3 As recently as the Highways England 2019 – 2020 Delivery Plan, smart motorways have been identified as a means to “modernise and maintain our network and make it safer”97 with the tacit implication through their inclusion in the Delivery Plan, that smart motorways intrinsically support Highways England’s “First Imperative” to work towards no one being killed or serious injured on the SRN in the long-term.
19.1.4 There is a different principle in play for DHS schemes than for ALR schemes with DHS schemes providing a more intrinsically safe road environment in the case of signals failure than the ALR system. In a DHS scheme, the default scenario is that the hard shoulder is closed to traffic and it is available for use in emergencies only. In the event of a signals failure, I understand that this would be the resultant position.
19.1.5 For ALR schemes, the default scenario is that all lanes are live and the national speed limit of 70 mph applies. In the event of a signals failure, no signals would display to modify driver behaviour and the scheme is therefore reliant on drivers being attentive to unexpected hazards which cannot clear the running lanes. Even with SVD in place, the default scenario does not change, and the road’s safe operation remains reliant on technology.
19.1.6 As Highways England acknowledge, the smart motorway is an “innovative product”98 which is heavily relied upon to deliver the economic benefits required under the current and preceding Delivery Plans. As such, it is imperative that the safety of all users of the smart motorways is assured.
19.1.7 The question salient to my overall conclusion is: How sound is the decision by Highways England to implement and continue to operate the ALR system?
97 Highways England, (2019). Highways England Delivery Plan 2019 – 2020. (p.13) 98 Highways England, (2015). Highways England Delivery Plan 2015 – 2020. (p.15)
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19.1.8 As discussed in Section 18, the announcement that all DHS schemes will be converted to ALR is made with no justification as the basis of decision making aside from reducing confusion. I can find no evidence that one type of smart motorway is any more confusing than the other. Indeed, DHS motorways carry more traffic and result in fewer collisions than ALR which would suggest more certainty in their use.
19.1.9 Given that all the evidence, including the DfT and Highways England’s own data, demonstrates that DHS has consistently lower collision and casualty rates than ALR, it can be concluded that the conversion of the DHS schemes to ALR will result in an environment which is less intrinsically safe and an increase in serious and fatal collisions. It is not stated in the Stocktake how this is reconciled with the Highways England ambition to have no one killed or seriously injured on the SRN.
19.1.10 Alternative options are not considered in the Stocktake report, such as implementing the safest version of smart motorway, perhaps with modifications to the design, and to educate the public. As the Highway Code has not incorporated smart motorways drivers have not been educated in their use as part of the licencing system. Added to this the fact that there have been seven iterations of design guidance in the past 12 years, it would be reasonable to believe that drivers may not be entirely confident in using smart motorways in general.
19.1.11 Rather than change all smart motorways to ALR, improving driver comprehension of smart motorway environments could also be achieve through a review of the signage used. For example, using green arrow ‘lane open to vehicular traffic’ (TSRGD diagram 5001.1/ 5001.2) signs in LBS1 to indicate the lanes in use (in the same way as used on Dutch managed motorways) could reduce ambiguity in the road environment. In addition, a comprehensive change to driver training, public engagement, the Highway Code, and education through public advertising campaigns and its inclusion in speed awareness training courses, may well achieve the same outcome i.e. increased clarity on the road’s use.
19.1.12 The Stocktake notes that the rollout of SVD is noted as “not essential for achieving the safety objective for smart motorways to be as safe as, or safer than, the road they replace.” However, this statement is presented with no evidence to support it, and it is counter to the evidence presented in the Stocktake which shows that live lanes incidents increase for smart motorway schemes, and particularly for ALR. I am led to the conclusion, based on the details of managed motorways internationally (see Section 10), that if a Safe Systems approach had been taken to the review, and a decision made on the basis of a maximally safe design ALR would not have been chosen to be taken forward.
19.1.13 I note that the Secretary of State presents a new objective in the Foreword to the Stocktake that “I want smart motorways to be safer than the conventional kind”. As it is the Secretary of State for Transport who is the Roads Authority (and that this position appears to have informed GD 103 and the new safety objectives relating to serious and fatal collision rates), this objective should have been afforded weight and the decision
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made on this basis. Yet it is not clear to me that this is what has been done.
19.1.14 As the evidence stocktake notes, the United Kingdom has some of the safest roads in the world. It is therefore all the more striking that of all the smart motorway typologies, the one with the trend of increase KSI collisions has been identified for implementation in the future. Based on this, it is my view that the decision to discontinue the DHS schemes, and to implement only ALR in the future is unsound.
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20 The New Context for Smart Motorways
20.1.1 Smart motorways have, in some form, been implemented on the English motorway network since 1995, with DHS being first trialled in 2006 and the first permanent ALR scheme implemented in 2014. Since 2014 the implementation of ALR has increased with RIS and RIS2 identifying multiple schemes for implementation.
20.1.2 There have been concerns raised regarding the safety of smart motorways, particularly ALR schemes, at least since 2016 and the Transport Select Committee’s report that year. Since January 2020 there have been a number of reports and decisions in relation to this consideration including:
◼ January 2020 – APPG All Lane Running Inquiry report identifying concerns relating to ALR motorways.
◼ March 2020 – Smart Motorways Evidence Stocktake and Action Plan confirming a decision to implement only ALR and to convert existing DHS schemes.
◼ July 2020 – ORR published ‘How Highways England Prioritises Investments to Improve Safety Outcomes’
◼ October 2020 – Guidance (GD 301) for smart motorway design revised to reflect the outcomes of the Stocktake and incorporating new safety objectives for ALR.
◼ January 2021 – Coroner records verdict of unlawful death in the case of Mr Mercer and Mr Murgeanu.
◼ February 2021 – Coroner refers the death of Mrs Begum on the M1 ALR to the Crown Prosecution Service.
◼ February 2021 – Transport Select Committee confirms investigation into smart motorways.
20.1.3 Over this same period, the country has changed as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. This pandemic has catalysed significant societal responses, not least in the way that transport is forecast to change for the foreseeable future. Research carried out by YouGov found that some 39 percent of workers wanted to work from home “some of the time” after the Covid pandemic99.
20.1.4 More recently, research by Marsden et al published in March 2021100 has examined travel patterns during the pandemic and considers the future for transport as the UK emerges from it. This new research, which draws on national data and a panel of more than 6,000 participants, identifies that between lockdown periods, there was no indication that the “switch away from public transport would mean everyone turned to the car” (p.6) with car traffic averaging 70 percent of levels before the pandemic.
20.1.5 The research also notes that the pandemic has accelerated pre-existing trends, with
99 YouGov, (2020). Most Workers Want to Work from Home after Covid-19. 100 Marsden, G., Anable, J., Docherty, I. and Brown, L. (2021). At a crossroads: Travel adaptations during Covid-19 restrictions and where next? Centre for Research into Energy Demand Solutions.
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levels of online shopping and home working between lockdowns far exceeding levels preceding the pandemic, and with respondents anticipating that this would continue as we emerge from Covid-19. Further, the research identifies that, “it is not inevitable that car traffic will return to pre-pandemic levels” (p.6) with an associated 14 percent reduction in car commuting trips forecast as a result.
20.1.6 In terms of the transport response to the ‘green recovery’, Marsden et al cast doubt on the maintenance of a “£27bn major roads programme when we have seen clearly that much of the business and commuting travel on which it is predicated could be done virtually” (p.8).
20.1.7 Based on the body of research into travel patterns, I am led to conclude that the pandemic has accelerated and consolidated social changes and attitudes to working from home and commuting. If only a modest proportion of the workforce work from home some of the time as the UK emerges from the pandemic, and the propensity to shop online persists, this will have substantial changes on commuting patterns across the UK’s motorway network. As a result, capacity issues which were present pre-Covid may be substantially relieved by these new travel habits on the SRN for several years thereby reducing the immediate urgency of the imperative to address the lack of capacity.
20.1.8 In addition to the Covid-19 pandemic, 2020 also saw the publication of the DfT’s ‘Decarbonising Transport: Setting the Challenge’. This report marked the beginning of the process to secure net zero greenhouse gas emissions transport system by 2050 to meet its legal commitments established in the Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019.
20.1.9 The Decarbonising Transport report identifies six strategic priorities to deliver the net zero transport system, including “accelerating modal shift to public and active transport”, decarbonising road vehicles and “how we get our goods” (p.7). These priorities are required in combination to decarbonise UK transport which, “became the largest emitting sector of [greenhouse gas] emissions in 2016” and reduce the 451 million tonnes of carbon dioxide emitted by the sector annually (p.11). The DfT’s transport decarbonisation plan is due to be published in Spring 2021.
20.1.10 The development of smart motorways was in response to a perceived need to increase road capacity on the SRN using a ‘predict and provide’ model which remains evident as recently as RIS2. By contrast, there has been a long-established understanding in the transport planning profession that building new roads can induce traffic and that, at some point, a shift to a ‘decide and provide’ model will be more appropriate101.
20.1.11 I note that the Government’s decision to stop the sale of combustion engine cars and vans has given rise to concerns regarding the ability to resource the quantities of minerals that would be required in the UK to support this increase in battery fuel cells102.
101 TRICS, (2021). Guidance Note on the Practical Implementation of the Decide and Provide Approach. 102 Auto Express, (2019). UK electric cars will require twice the world’s supply of cobalt.
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This doubt on whether transferring the annual new vehicle supply from combustion to electric is practicable suggests that the need to address modal shift as well as how and why we travel more fundamentally is a matter which requires urgent attention. Taking a ‘decide and provide’ approach would enable and entail having a clear vision for the UK’s fleet as well as the SRN in future, and establish policies to achieve such.
20.1.12 In practical terms, this could foreseeably entail making a decision on the limits on road capacity to be provided in the long term, and delimiting any new road capacity, including that established through smart motorways rather than traditional new build schemes. Existing capacity provided in smart motorway environments can therefore be provided for in other means, through some of the very mechanisms that are identified in the Decarbonising Transport report i.e. through modal shift, changing the way we access goods, or changing our travel behaviour. Any change to the motorway environment, including adjusting or removing smart motorways in full or in part, would not therefore necessarily require “equivalent land of 700 Wembley Stadiums sized football pitches to somehow undo all of this”103.
20.1.13 English roads policy is silent on what would happen once the capacity of existing ALR schemes is fully exhausted, and once congested working again results in long peak periods and extended periods of VMSL use. As discussed in Section 11, in Germany and the Netherlands, managed motorways are viewed as a temporary means of increasing capacity until such a time as standard road building and improvements can be implemented. This is not the adopted position in England. In the absence of a stated policy position, I am left to assume that the obligations to decarbonise transport will delimit the creating of new road capacity by any means, instead requiring new approaches to reduce traffic in future rather than predict and provide for ever increasing traffic.
20.1.14 Given the current safety levels of the existing smart motorways, as well as the limits on efficacy of the technology they rely on, I would submit that a ‘decide and provide’ approach is warranted now and that the changes in commuting travel patterns on the SRN that are forecast over the coming years, will provide the capacity and opportunity to do so.
20.1.15 Overall, with respect to the existing context, I conclude that the development of smart motorway design standards and guidance was carried out over a period in which there were fewer obligations in relation to Climate Change, the Safe Systems approach to road safety was not embedded in Highways England, there were no coroner verdicts relating to smart motorways, and the world was untouched by Covid. Given the wider context in which the SRN now operates it is my view that a fresh approach on the continued implementation of smart motorways would be timely.
103 Royal HaskoningDHV, (2021). Verbatim Transcript – Parliament Live Transport Committee – Responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Transport 3 February 2021.
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21 Conclusion to the Report
21.1.1 This report has been produced to analyse the decision by Highways England to implement and continue to operate the All Lane Running smart motorway system. In so doing, I have consolidated the areas of interest into three main questions: 1. What is the intrinsic level of safety associated with the All Lane Running system including the relevant design standards? 2. How appropriate has consultation been in the implementation of All Lane Running motorways? 3. How sound is the decision by Highways England to implement and continue to operate All Lane Running?
21.2 Intrinsic Safety
21.2.1 There is no doubt that the development of the ALR design has taken account of some safety considerations in the design development but not all. As the Government response to the Select Committee in 2016 sets out, the approach to road safety is publicly available and as such is transparent. That consideration has been made is borne out by the reduction in total collision numbers on smart motorway schemes and the work in the public domain relating to hazard management and risk assessment. There is also no doubt that in developing the ALR, there has been a trade off with road safety benefits being reduced in order to achieve greater costs savings.
21.2.2 However, it is my interpretation that the development of the design is characterised by an absence of critical inquiry. There is inconsistent thinking across the body of documents associated with ALR schemes, with assumptions in one report contradicted by assumptions in another. For example, the hazard log assumes that half of breakdowns will not reach an ERA, but a more optimistic assumption is promoted in the 2012 Concept of Operations which notes that the majority of drivers are anticipated to reach an ERA.
21.2.3 The reason why ALR systems appear to be ‘intuitively’ unsafe is that they design out the mechanism on which we rely to provide some form of safe harbour. By contrast, the DHS system has continuous availability of a hard shoulder in the event that it is required, so there is continuous provision of a clear place for drivers to go to in the event of a collision or breakdown. I have no doubt that it is for this reason that DHS is used in the Netherlands and Germany in preference to ALR systems.
21.2.4 In my review I am led to surmise that lack of consideration of the safety of the ALR environment is explained by the 2015 comparison of ALR with APTR. While I agree in part with the comparison between ALR and APTR with regards the removal of the hard shoulder, it is my opinion that these roads are of two distinct and different orders reflecting the weight of traffic and strategic hierarchy of the routes concerned. This is borne out by motorways’ designation as a Special road, with limits on the types of
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vehicle that can use them, the absence of at-grade pedestrian crossings and no Public Rights of Way traversing them. Thus these road types are not directly comparable. Not least because ALR motorway is a Special road whereas APTR can be used by cyclists and other users who are otherwise prohibited from using motorways. I would assert that outcomes on one are not fully generalisable onto the other.
21.2.5 A more fundamental consideration, however, is whether our road infrastructure should be required to be intrinsically safe. One of the reasons smart motorways elsewhere in the globe use DHS rather than ALR, is that the DHS system is more readily fail-safe. In the event of a system failure, the hard shoulder is physically still there, and the default is that it cannot be used as a running lane. By contrast the UK ALR has a distinctly reduced level of intrinsic safety compared with both conventional motorways and DHS due to the absence of a permanently present, continuous place of relative safety along the carriageway’s length. There is therefore a heavy reliance on imperfect technology to mitigate these risks, but even once these are implemented, there will continue to be less mitigation than is used on Australian ALR schemes.
21.2.6 The question established in Section 1.3 with regard road safety asks:
What is the intrinsic level of safety associated with ALR?
21.2.7 Throughout the design development and risk management processes for ALR, I have consistently found that peak period live lane breakdowns have not received attention due to the faulty assumption that MIDAS will provide queue protection. MIDAS technology does not provide the required mitigation and even when it does, this mitigation is negated by human behaviour for which reactive enforcement has only recently been legislated. As a result data shows ALR to have a higher level of KSI collisions than predecessor roads. It is also telling that more people are killed or seriously injured on ALR in peak period, congested conditions when most controls are in place, than in off-peak conditions which are typically associated with higher speeds.
21.2.8 It is clear to me that there is little understanding in the public at large of the risks inherent to ALR smart motorways, and specifically those relating to the removal of the hard shoulder and live lane breakdowns. Fundamentally, from the KSI data for ALR I infer that designers do not necessarily have this understanding, so I would suggest that it cannot be rational to assume that a member of the public can.
21.2.9 It is my view that not taking a Safe Systems approach to the design, implementation and review of the ALR smart motorway, to challenge and test the assumptions on which design is predicated, has arguably resulted in more collisions than may have otherwise been the case. This is corroborated by the Highways England’s Chief Executive’s comments cited in the 2020 APPG report which noted that had SVD been implemented, some fatalities could have been avoided.
21.2.10 It is my opinion that it is beyond doubt that the removal of the hard shoulder in a motorway environment is intrinsically less safe than any other form of smart motorway.
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There is sound evidence to show that this has been understood since at least 2015 and this has been demonstrated most recently in the evidence associated with the 2020 Stocktake. ALR is not a maximally safe road system, and risk management and assessment methodologies have not resulted in effective mitigation of the hazards resulting from the removal of the hard shoulder.
21.3 Consultation
21.3.1 It is typically the case that consultation occurs at two stages of scheme development. The first takes place in developing the policies or associated strategies which will enable schemes to be brought forward, and the second occurs in the design development for the specific scheme. Based on my review of the available literature, it is my opinion that a meaningful consultation has never taken place with the public or stakeholders in relation to smart motorways.
21.3.2 Where strategic documents did involve consultation, or included details of smart motorway, this has consistently been presented at a high level and without consideration of hazards or risks. It is my opinion that the level of information provided was too low for readers to these documents to have been considered informed.
21.3.3 The DfT and Highways England rely on the fact that the majority of the component parts of smart motorways, except for VMSL, are incorporated in the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions, as well as other legislation and regulations, and as such no specific consultation has been required. Although ALR schemes have been subject to consultation processes, these relate to the requirement to establish the need for and use of the VMSL for the purposes of promoting the Statutory Instrument and they have not sought responses in relation to the design development.
21.3.4 However, it is my opinion that the Consultation Documents associated with the VMSL present sufficient depth of information relating to the infrastructure proposed in the scheme, for the consultation to be reasonably interpreted as consulting about the whole scheme and not just the VMSL. This opinion is supported by the Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation’s responses to the M1 scheme consultation which responds in relation to road infrastructure and not just the VMSL. That a public authority undertakes consultation which is associated with a lack of consensus over what is actually being consulted upon I find to be a cause for concern.
21.3.5 Despite the number of statutory consultations that have been undertaken in relation to smart motorways, it is my opinion that none that I have reviewed have been carried out to seek meaningful engagement and feedback with a view to informing to the design and implementation of the whole scheme.
21.3.6 As a result, cumulatively over the past 14 years there has been no formal consultation on the implementation of ALR infrastructure incorporating the removal of the hard shoulder and the reduced use of ERA compared with the level of their provision in the M42 pilot. This is confirmed by the findings of the Transport Select Committee which
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noted that evidence provided at its 2016-17 inquiry stated that consultation was inadequate. Given the extent to which the public is consulted by highway authorities, and the long history of codified guidance on how consultation is conducted, it is my opinion that the lack of public consultation in relation to ALR infrastructure, ignores both the reasonable expectations of the public in relation to consultation, and the Government’s stated principles on consultation.
21.3.7 The question established in Section 1.3 regarding consultation asks: How appropriate has consultation been in the implementation of ALR?
21.3.8 My review of the smart motorways consultation documents leads me to conclude that Highways England’s position has been and continues to be that no statutory consultation is required for the smart motorways, therefore no meaningful engagement will be carried out. However, to take this position ignores the reasonable expectations of the public in relation to consultation and the Government’s stated principles governing consultation. Meaningful consultations have been promoted for the past 20 years as a major channel for listening to stakeholders and citizens and for open democracy with respect to decision making in transport policy and infrastructure provision.
21.3.9 There is sufficient evidence to lead me to conclude that the consultation processes are targeted at achieving the overarching aim of implementing VMSL and are not targeted at public engagement, education, or improving the proposed scheme. This evidence includes the guidance on statutory consultation contained in IAN 111/08 and its subsequent withdrawal; the inconsistent understanding among stakeholders as to whether or not they had been consulted with regard to the concept of ALR; and the lack of responses relating to the statutory component of the consultation.
21.3.10 Based on my review, I conclude that the consultation in relation to smart motorways has been, and continues to be, inadequate and that the public and stakeholders have not been afforded a meaningful opportunity to engage with the ALR proposals as a concept. It is my view that the change in travel patterns which may result from the Covid-19 pandemic may create the conditions to undertake consultation, as the public’s consideration of travel is forecast to change significantly over the short and mid term.
21.4 On Continued Implementation of ALR
21.4.1 The roll out of the smart motorways typology in England has undeniably resulted in a reduction in the number of collisions on these motorways compared with their operational safety record as a conventional motorway. However, as a result of the extensive review presented in this report, I am led to conclude that there has been insufficient critical evaluation in the design and implementation of smart motorways taking a Safe Systems approach.
21.4.2 The question salient to my overall conclusion is:
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How sound is the decision by Highways England to implement and continue to operate the ALR system?
21.4.3 The announcement that ALR will continue to be implemented and all DHS schemes will be converted to ALR is made with no justification as the basis of decision making. Given that all the evidence, including the DfT and Highways England’s own data, demonstrates that DHS has consistently lower collision and casualty rates than ALR, it can be concluded that the conversion of the DHS schemes to ALR could result in an increase in serious and fatal collisions. I cannot determine how this is reconciled with the Highways England ambition to have no one killed or seriously injured on the SRN.
21.4.4 Alternative options are not considered in the Stocktake report. It is good transport planning practice to examine and consider a range of varied options, but such an approach does not appear to have been taken with respect to this decision. This results in inconsistency in the decision to covert DHS to ALR on the basis of providing a consistent driver experience.
21.4.5 As the Highway Code has not fully incorporated smart motorways drivers have never educated in their use as part of the licencing system. Added to this the fact that there have been seven iterations of design guidance in the past 12 years, it would be reasonable to believe that drivers may not be entirely confident in using smart motorways in general. I can find no evidence that one type of smart motorway is any more confusing than the other. Indeed, DHS motorways carry more traffic and result in fewer collisions than ALR which would suggest more certainty in their use.
21.4.6 Indeed, a review of the signage used on DHS, for example using green arrow ‘lane open to vehicular traffic’ signs to indicate the hard shoulder is in use as a running lane in the same way as used on Dutch managed motorways. A comprehensive change to driver training, public engagement and education through public advertising campaigns and its inclusion in speed awareness training courses, may well achieve the same outcome i.e. increased clarity on the road’s use. I can find no evidence that this option has been considered.
21.4.7 As the evidence stocktake notes, the United Kingdom has some of the safest roads in the world. It is therefore all the more striking that of all the smart motorway typologies, the one with the trend of increase KSI collisions has been identified for implementation in the future. I would therefore conclude that it is my view that the decision to discontinue the DHS schemes, and to implement only ALR in the future is unsound
21.5 The New Context
21.5.1 The development of smart motorways was in response to a perceived need to increase road capacity on the SRN using a ‘predict and provide’ model which remains evident as recently as RIS2. By contrast, there has been a long-established understanding in the transport planning profession that building new roads can induce traffic and that, at some point, a shift to a ‘decide and provide’ model will be more appropriate.
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21.5.2 Given the current safety levels of the existing smart motorways, as well as the limits on efficacy of the technology they rely on, I would submit that a ‘decide and provide’ approach is warranted now and that the changes in commuting travel patterns on the SRN that are forecast over the coming years, will provide the capacity and opportunity to do so.
21.5.3 Overall, with respect to the existing context, I conclude that the development of smart motorway design standards and guidance was carried out over a period in which there were fewer obligations in relation to Climate Change, the Safe Systems approach to road safety was not embedded in Highways England, there were no coroner verdicts relating to smart motorways, and the world was untouched by Covid. Given the wider context in which the SRN now operates it is my view that a fresh approach on the continued implementation of smart motorways would be timely and, given the evidence, necessary to reduce avoidable deaths.
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