Classics in Game Theory

Edited by Harold W. Kuhn

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY CONTENTS

Permissions vii

H. W. KUHN Foreword ix

DAVID KREPS AND ARIEL RUBINSTEIN An Appreciation xi

1. JOHN F. NASH, JR. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. 3

2. JOHN F. NASH, JR. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. 5

3. JOHN NASH Non-Cooperative Games. Annais of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295. 14

4. JULIA ROBINSON An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annah of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301. 27

5. F. B. THOMPSON Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952). 36

6. H. W. KUHN Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216. 46

7. L. S. SHAPLEY A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. 69

8. L. S. SHAPLEY Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100. 80 VI CONTENTS

9. H. EVERETT Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. 87

10. R. J. AUMANN AND B. PELEG Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. 119

11. GERARD DEBREU AND HERBERT SCARF A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. 127

12. ROBERT J. AUMANN AND MICHAEL MASCHLER The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477. 140

13. ROBERT J. AUMANN Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17. 170

14. HERBERT E. SCARF The Core of an n-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69. 192

15. JOHN C. HARSANYI Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model. Man. Sei. 14 (1967) 159-182 216 Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points. Man. Sei. 14 (1968) 320-334 247 Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game. Man. Sei. 14 (1968) 486-502. 268

16. DAVID BLACKWELL AND T. S. FERGUSON The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. 289

17. LLOYD S. SHAPLEY AND MARTIN SHUBIK On Market Games. J.E. T. 1 (1969) 9-25. 296

18. R. SELTEN Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. 317

List of Contributors 355

Index 357