Classics in Game Theory Edited by Harold W. Kuhn PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY CONTENTS Permissions vii H. W. KUHN Foreword ix DAVID KREPS AND ARIEL RUBINSTEIN An Appreciation xi 1. JOHN F. NASH, JR. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. 3 2. JOHN F. NASH, JR. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. 5 3. JOHN NASH Non-Cooperative Games. Annais of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295. 14 4. JULIA ROBINSON An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annah of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301. 27 5. F. B. THOMPSON Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952). 36 6. H. W. KUHN Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216. 46 7. L. S. SHAPLEY A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. 69 8. L. S. SHAPLEY Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100. 80 VI CONTENTS 9. H. EVERETT Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. 87 10. R. J. AUMANN AND B. PELEG Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. 119 11. GERARD DEBREU AND HERBERT SCARF A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. 127 12. ROBERT J. AUMANN AND MICHAEL MASCHLER The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477. 140 13. ROBERT J. AUMANN Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17. 170 14. HERBERT E. SCARF The Core of an n-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69. 192 15. JOHN C. HARSANYI Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model. Man. Sei. 14 (1967) 159-182 216 Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points. Man. Sei. 14 (1968) 320-334 247 Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game. Man. Sei. 14 (1968) 486-502. 268 16. DAVID BLACKWELL AND T. S. FERGUSON The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. 289 17. LLOYD S. SHAPLEY AND MARTIN SHUBIK On Market Games. J.E. T. 1 (1969) 9-25. 296 18. R. SELTEN Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. 317 List of Contributors 355 Index 357 .