ISSUE 130
DECEMBER 2008 The most capable warships in the Navy’s history set to join the Fleet Information Operations Management in the RAN The Vernon Parker Oration 2008 The Navy & the White Paper A Cautionary Tale – Failures of Japanese Air Power In WWII and Lessons for Australian Maritime Air Expansion Finding The Lost Submarine: Journal of the The Mystery of AE1 Shipyards: Australia and USA Email: [email protected] Fax +61 8 9410 2564 Tel: +61 8 9410 1111
WWW.AUSTAL.COM Issue 130 3 President’s Message Contents
008 has been an extremely busy the Institute and his active involvement and, in my mind, successful year over the last 30 years at all levels was The most capable warships in the Navy’s for the ANI. We have conducted truly worthy of recognition with the history set to join the Fleet 4 a2 number of very well attended events ANI’s highest honour. including the Vernon Parker Oration, For the second year we hosted the the ANI Warfare Seminar and the Sea ANI Warfare Seminar at HMAS Watson patrol Cast visit to ADFA. which was followed by a reception. It Information Operations Management in We have seen membership rise by its was good to see the support of the the RAN 15 highest annual rate this decade, much event from the Naval Warfare Officers of that due to our focus on engaging Association and the Naval Officers’ younger members through our efforts Club. The sixty guests were given a at ADFA and through the two new essay range of presentations from Senior The Vernon Parker Oration 2008 competitions named after Commodores serving officers on a range of issues that Harry Adams (essay competition for the RAN is grappling with. There is no The Navy & the White Paper 19 Midshipmen and Sub Lieutenants) doubt that the Warfare Seminar has and Alan ‘Rocker’ Robertson (for established itself as a key event in the Lieutenants). These competitions ANI calendar. A Cautionary Tale – Failures of Japanese have lifted the ANI’s profile and have I would like to thank the members re-affirmed that our younger officers of your Council for their efforts this Air Power In WWII and Lessons for have much to contribute to the year. Council has been active in Australian Maritime Air Expansion 25 maritime debate that we strive so hard implementing a work programme to to stimulate. Hopefully you will read a ensure that the key elements of the good cross section of essays from these ANI Strategic Plan are put in place. I competitions over the next 12 months am pleased to see an improved focus Finding The Lost Submarine: The Mystery in Headmark – I would encourage you on governance and the development of of AE1 34 to join the debate through either letters useful set of governance metrics which to the editor or through your own I will expose to you at the next AGM contribution. early next year. I would like to thank There was no doubt that this Ernie Power for his continuing work on Visions from the Vault 43 year’s Vernon Parker Oration was a the website and Tom Lewis for getting real treat for those who were lucky the Journal together each quarter and enough to be there. In this edition we keeping up to the quality we have come have reproduced the address given by to expect. As always I need to mention Book Reviews 45 Professor the Honourable Kim Beazley. our business manager Jean Davitt for Front page: He remains a most thoughtful strategic her unstinting support. HMAS Ballarat in commentator and his words were My aim for next year is to maintain Milford Sound. timely in this a White Paper year. Over the momentum we have built this year Style Notes for Headmark 48 100 people attended this year’s oration through our improved membership and over 65 stayed on for the annual numbers, our busy events calendar and dinner –a very successful evening. I hopefully a vigorous maritime debate. am pleased to report that Rear Admiral I hope that all our members have a ANI Online Guide 49
James Goldrick, AM, CSC, RAN was peaceful and restful Christmas break. Issue Number 130 awarded Honorary Life membership of Printed by Everbest the Institute at the annual dinner. James Yours Aye, Printing Company is of course no stranger to any of us in Davyd Thomas Australian Naval Institute Info 50
ISSN 1833-6531 ATI - AUSTAL - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - BOOZ ALLEN & HAMILTON FRIEND - EDS - KBR - LOPAC ANI Membership Application Form 51 Design & DTP: Diane Bricknell - RAYTHEON AUSTRALIA - SAAB [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 The most capable warships in the Navy’s history set to join the Fleet BLeC y e oRDNER
The most capable warships in the build the number up to 16” with the history of the Royal Australian Navy suggestion that “Anzac derivatives (RAN) will soon be in service. But how could also replace the first four FFGs”.5 can that be with the first of theHobart Prophetically, FSR 91 went on Class Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD) to state: “the ADF has for some more than five years away? Fortunately, time followed a program of mid-life the Navy and the Nation will not have modernisations of the destroyer force to wait that long before four very ... (which) without exception, have capable surface combatants are again been lengthy. Reduced operational operational in the Fleet. The upgraded availability, together with considerable Adelaide Class FFGs are planned to capital expenditure, have been the re-enter service as fully operational consequences of these programs. The front-line warships over the next 12–18 concept of mid-life modernisations HMAS Sydney in homeport months. They will bring what will in is not cost effective, and will not – note the Mk 41 VLS some respects be an advanced level continue.”6 When FSR 91 was of combat capability unprecedented presented the DDG Modernisation in the RAN. This article analyses Defence Policy and the FFG project was still underway, with the Upgraded FFG, the capabilities Upgrade prospects of a limited return on that it brings and the challenges and The FFG Upgrade Project reflects investment for those ships. opportunities it presents for the Navy the outcomes of evolving, indecisive Notably in this context, the Anzac and the Australian Defence Force Australian Defence policy making Class frigates were replacements for (ADF). and relatively low levels of national the River Class destroyer escorts; No analysis of the Upgraded FFG investment in Defence2 that have very much at the low end of the ADF would be complete without first briefly marked the Australian experience over major surface combatant range of reviewing the policy context that several decades.3 This has impacted capabilities. The chosen Meko 200 base resulted in a decision to proceed with negatively on the development of the design would be unlikely to provide an upgrade, and the FFG Upgrade surface combatant force along with the space and weight necessary for the Project experience. Like most major other areas of Defence capability. significant capability enhancements Defence projects the FFG Upgrade Procrastination followed by time required to replace the FFGs (and Project (Project SEA 1390)1 had a and cost overruns has largely been the DDGs). In particular, evolving long gestation period. Although the the characteristics of Defence air warfare (including Aegis phased project is a capability upgrade to an procurement; characteristics that are array radar derivatives and long-range existing platform rather than a new in many respects reflected in the FFG vertical launch air warfare missiles) build, the time taken from concept to Upgrade Project experience. plus helicopter support capabilities and the capability being fully operational In the 1987 Defence white paper potentially unmanned aerial vehicles will be more than 15 years. The FFG the Government announced that (UAVs) in the future (the Anzac has Upgrade Project has drawn attention the Navy would be expanded “…to a only one hanger) would be beyond to many Defence policy and project force operating 16 to 17 major surface that which a Meko 200 platform could management issues that will briefly combatants”.4 The 1991Force Structure reasonably support. be considered here. Whilst project, Review (FSR 91) recognised that the Not withstanding the FSR 91 contractual and audit difficulties surface combatant force was declining pronouncement, due to concerns about have been aired in parliamentary in numbers (it was then down to platform and system supportability, committees and the media, the 10 ships) and indicated a planning the FFG Upgrade Project was initiated capability gains and advantages for intention to replace the DDGs with in 1993. A Surface Combatant Force the total Naval force have not been as “an Anzac derivative” to “maintain the Study during 1993-96 concluded well understood. This article seeks to continuity of Australian shipbuilding, that given evolving anti-ship missile enhance that understanding. to achieve commonality … and to (ASM) and other threats, the FFGs Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 5
FFG and side number Launched Commissioned Original Life Upgraded Life planned life of type schedule. HMAS Adelaide - 01 June 1978 November 1980 2008 Withdrawn from service Jan 08 HMAS Canberra - 02 December 1978 March 1981 2008 Withdrawn from service Nov 05 The FFG Upgrade Project HMAS Sydney - 03 September 1980 January 1983 2010 2015 The FFG Upgrade Project began in HMAS Darwin - 04 March 1982 July 1984 2012 2017 earnest when the RFT was released HMAS Melbourne - 05 May 1989 February 1992 2019 2019 which led to ADI Ltd being selected HMAS Newcastle - 06 February 1992 December 1993 2021 2021 as the prime contractor in 1998. The Royal Australian contract to proceed was signed in Navy - FFG Fleet also required an increase in capability; by “at least three air-defence capable 1999. The initial plan was for all six 14 Schedule Summary particularly improved self defence.7 A ships”. 9 Upgrades to the FFGs plus the FFGs to be upgraded and the Project request for proposal (RFP) was released Anzacs were also identified to occur.10 includes the procurement of six ship to industry in 1994 which led to a In 2007 Government policy recognised sets of equipment plus an FFG Warfare request for tender (RFT) in 1997. that “Our Navy must be able to Systems Support Centre (WSSC), By 1997 defence policy statements establish sea control and operate a Combat Team Trainer and three indicated that 14 major surface freely within our region, while denying Operator Trainers. combatants were considered an such freedoms to an opponent.”11 The FFG Upgrade Project is adequate number and the intention to Given the vast maritime geography more an end of life than a mid-life substantially invest in “ASM defences and dependence upon the maritime modernisation. The prolonged concept and other upgrades for the FFGs and domain for economic, environmental to upgrade timeline with attendant Anzacs” was declared.8 By this time and territorial security for Australia project delays meant that the cost the three DDGs were approaching and its region this bold defence policy effectiveness of upgrading the older their end of life and were to be retired assertion appears entirely justified. ships could not be justified. In late from service without replacement, Concomitantly, this policy statement 2003 the Government determined significantly reducing the Navy’s air raises reasonable expectations that that Canberra and Adelaide would not warfare (AW) capability. Australia would seek to acquire a be upgraded. They have since been The question of surface combatant significant surface combatant fleet withdrawn from service. numbers was left unanswered in the to operate in collaboration with The Project has proven to be 2000 Defence White Paper other than submarines and land-based air challenging and extremely complex.15 Mk 41 VLS being the (six) FFGs were to be replaced forces. While the acquisition of three The FFG Upgrade is one of the embarked AWDs and upgrades to the Anzac most sophisticated and extensive and Adelaide Class frigates were enhancements ever undertaken of a mentioned, no mention was made modern surface combatant. It involves of surface combatant numbers or major weapon, sensor, combat, acquisitions beyond the AWDs.12 and command and control systems The ADF currently has 12 major upgrades along with significant surface combatants (eight Anzac platform supportability work. The Class and four FFGs). TheAnzacs are system integration work is in some shouldering the operational burden respects unique in the world with which includes ongoing commitments the challenge of combining legacy in the Persian Gulf 13 while the FFGs are systems from the original FFG being upgraded. There is some overlap configuration (1970s technology) with between when the AWDs are planned more advanced technologies drawn to enter service during the period from a range of international sources. 2014-2017 and when the remaining In addition to the upgrade specific FFGs are planned to be retired between activities many platform deficiencies 2015 and 2021, noting that there will and deep maintenance issues also had typically be a considerable trials and to be rectified to ensure a planned acceptance period beyond 2014 until 35 year hull life could be achieved. the first AWD will be fully operational. Effectively this required the ships to The table above outlines the FFG undergo major refits concurrent with Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 The most capable warships in the Navy’s history set to join the Fleet
the upgrade. Range Facility (PMRF) off Hawaii in The complexity of the Project and October 2007 the combination of the its implementation was no doubt upgraded air warfare (AW) package of underestimated from the outset. Navy, improved sensors, vertical launched Defence Capability Development Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (DCD), Defence Material Organisation (ESSM) and ADACS successfully (DMO) and the prime contractor, ADI dealt with multiple, simultaneous, Ltd now trading as Thales Australia multi-directional live ASM attack Ltd have been party to what became an (using realistic drone missile targets). ongoing series of schedule slippages to This event included a successful live the extent that the Project is now four ESSM engagement. Incorporation and half years late (i.e. the first of the of the 32 cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch Upgraded FFGs should have been in System (VLS) into the FFG hull is operational service by 2004). Following a considerable naval architectural an extensive negotiation between design feat which helps fulfil one of DMO and the prime contractor a the key requirements for effective Deed of Settlement and Release was ASM defence in the Upgraded FFG. signed in 2006 that presented a revised The ADACS combat system has been Sydney launches an master schedule with Contract Final developed in Australia and is unique to and the improved capabilities the ESSM Acceptance due in December 2009. the Upgraded FFGs. upgrade offers. These internal to Navy The extensive delays had resulted Given the operational environment perceptions will be difficult to rectify in a project climate of frustration and of the Navy’s ongoing Middle East as the challenges are progressively disappointment for all concerned. commitment a fully functioning, addressed and fully operational, high The situation was exacerbated by a integrated ES capability has been performing systems are accepted set to work and trials period plagued identified as the highest priority in to service. Further, the incoming by systems interface and perceived outstanding requirement to support Labor Government has rightly put performance shortcomings, with acceptance and deployment by the Defence on notice about poor project several major systems initially failing Navy. Navy has understandably taken performance.17 No doubt the FFG to meet acceptance criteria. The main a firm stand in demanding that the Upgrade Project stands out as one of problem areas have been underwater Project demonstrate fully functional several troubled projects. The media, warfare (UW), electronic surveillance operational capabilities. In early 2008 both nationally and internationally has (ES) system, and the central Australian DMO, with strong support from and understandably been critical of the Distributed Architecture Combat direct involvement of The Hon. Greg project18 and this in turn impacts on System (ADACS), with Link 16 and Combet, Parliamentary Secretary for morale among people in the FFG Fleet. other significant operational features Defence Procurement,16 established There are parallels here with being progressively incorporated. an FFG ES Stakeholders Group. the situation that obtained when Of late, more collaborative DMO- This group includes representatives the Collins Class submarines were contractor approaches with a from all the major players including encountering problems during sharper end capability focus have Navy, DMO, Thales and Rafael (the introduction to service. The overall shown dividends, with substantial subcontractor for the C-Pearl system). result is that Navy (and Defence) is progress on rectifying problem issues A number of significant people and faced with a crisis of confidence both and demonstration of improved perception casualties have resulted internally and with Government, performance. from the extensive Project delays and and this has significant implications There have also been highly the failure of some systems to achieve for national security. The situation successful and impressive results satisfactory results during initial must be resolved satisfactorily and during the trials and introduction to acceptance trials. Within Navy the FFG expeditiously. service period. For example, during Upgrade Project and the Upgraded Considerable progress is now being ASM defence trials involving HMAS FFG has become known as a “lemon”. made due in no small part to a more Sydney on the United States Navy’s Some FFG officers and sailors appear collaborative approach to solving fully instrumented Pacific Missile to have lost confidence in the ships problems and dealing with challenges Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 7
3. Link 16 3. ES complex project. 2. SRBOC MK 36 Mod 2. AN/SPS-55 Effective communication and 2. AN/SPS-49A(V)1 3. SRBOC Ready Service 2. MK 92 Mod 12 the creation of a cooperative and 2. MK 92 Mod 12 (Mod 2 upgraded to Mod (Mod 2 upgraded to Mod collaborative environment between 1. MK 32 Mod 3. LRCR 2. CIW Torpedo 1. MK 13 GMLS all parties, focussed upon solving 3. Tactica MK41 3. ALBATRO 1. MK 75 Gun problems, are essential from the outset. There must be a clear focus by all parties on the requirement to deliver a functional capability to the customer in a cost effective and timely way. The LEGEND 1. Existing Unmodified Equipment 3. Spherion Sonar MF 3. PETRE 2. Existing Modified Equipment Mine Avoidance customer must be closely engaged 3. New Equipment Sonar throughout. Diagram Courtesy of generated through initiatives like the include: Thales FFG ES Stakeholders Group. There Effective, comprehensive and The Upgraded FFG – is now an atmosphere of cautious detailed project planning is essential. Capability Analysis optimism that the Upgraded FFG Early planning shortfalls can have As indicated in the introductory will “get across the line” and highly disproportionate downstream remarks, the Upgraded FFG presents capable warships will soon be back in consequences. a higher level of combat capability operational service. A brief overview Requirements and specifications than previously available in the RAN. of key Project milestones achieved and must be well defined and agreed This may sound like a grand claim, but planned is presented in the following before contract signature. The lack is backed by tangible evidence. The table. of clearly defined specifications for following analysis will draw together many of the FFG Upgrade Project and assess the key elements of the Date Milestone requirements has meant that assessing FFG systems package that when fully 1 December 2006 Sydney Provisionally Accepted contract compliance and operational operational and combined with a well October 2007 Melbourne Provisionally Accepted performance against that specified has prepared, led and motivated ship’s October 2007 Newcastle Commenced Upgrade proven to be extremely difficult. company, comprises an impressive August 2008 Darwin Provisionally Accepted Lack of expertise to define naval combat capability. This analysis 2 3 November 2008 Sydney Acceptance /Initial Operational Release requirements and manage and will look at the principal naval warfare November 2008 Melbourne Acceptance/Initial Operational implement the project has proven to be areas in turn before drawing the total Release a significant and difficult matter for all assessment together, recognising that November 2008 Darwin Acceptance/Initial Operational Release parties: Navy, Defence, DMO and the the FFG is an integrated, multi-role November 2008 Provisional Acceptance of WSSC prime contractor. weapon system where components November 2008 Acceptance of Upgraded Software Careful consideration must be of the platform, the weapons systems February 2009 Acceptance of Team Trainer given from the outset to the systems and the combat system will contribute June 2009 Newcastle Provisional Acceptance integration implications of combining variously to multiple warfare December 2009 Newcastle Acceptance/Initial Operational Release legacy systems with more recent competencies. December 2009 Contract final acceptance – completion of the contract technologies. Conducting an upgrade of an Air Warfare (AW) existing capability concurrent with A primary aim of the FFG Upgrade Key FFG Upgrade Project maintenance availability is a highly Project was to improve the AW Milestones19 complex activity that requires careful capability generally and particularly Many important lessons about the planning and close cooperation and defences against new generation ASMs, management of complex defence collaboration in execution. including sea skimming missiles. projects have been learnt (or re- The contract and schedule must The Upgraded FFG offers a more learnt) during this extended and often be robust and achievable. There comprehensive and complete AW and frustrating project experience. While must be thorough risk appraisals and ASM capability package than hitherto it is beyond the scope of this paper to risk management processes in place available in the RAN. A classic layered identify or analyse the project lessons particularly where significant technical, defence approach is adopted, involving in any detail, some of the major lessons schedule and financial risks exist with a hard kill and soft kill capabilities. The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 The most capable warships in the Navy’s history set to join the Fleet
key elements of the layers are reviewed below. The outer layer of hard kill comprises fighter aircraft, whether operated by the ADF or coalition partners, land-based or carrier borne, and combined with Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) when available, plus the surface to air missile capabilities of other RAN and allied warships that may be operating together. The Diagram Courtesy of FFG’s ability to effectively integrate of an updated air surveillance radar, SPS 55 surface search radar) plus the Thales with US and NATO forces for example, the AN/SPS 49A(V)1, which provides two Mk 92 system fire control radars. and to direct fighters is greatly a much improved ability to detect The outcome is the automatic detection enhanced with the inclusion for the low altitude and small radar cross of targets, automatic correlation of first time in the RAN of Tactical Digital section targets, and includes automatic multiple radar detections and accurate Information Link (TADIL) J Link target detection, improved reliability prediction of target movement to the 16, added to TADIL B Link 11 and and other features. The operational Command team and weapons systems. using the Joint Tactical Information performance of this radar has proven to The range of the Mk 92 CAS fire Distribution System (JTIDS) for data be considerably better than the variant control channel is more than double link communication. This capability it replaced and gives high confidence that of the earlier variants being now effectively enables the FFG to direct the in the early detection of aircraft and more in line with that offered by the prosecution of hostile aircraft, whether missile targets. Mk 92 STIR fire control channel. This missile carriers, fighter bombers The AW fire control system has vastly improved and automated sensor or surveillance aircraft hundreds been greatly enhanced with inclusion combination means that the reaction of kilometres away. An enemy’s of the Mk 92 Mod 12 system, which time for detect, track, decision, fire surveillance, target selection and is a further enhancement of the Mod control radar acquisition, to firing a identification problem becomes vastly 6 system in service with US, Spanish weapon at a target is greatly reduced. complicated by imposing an extended and Taiwanese FFGs. The Mod 12 This enables the engagement of stand-off range; and hostile aircraft can system includes the same coherent multiple, multi-directional and quickly be engaged before they can launch anti- receiver and transmitter (CORT) of the manoeuvring air and missile targets at a ship weapons. It also presents a much Mod 6 variant plus improved signal much greater range from the FFG than improved capacity for RAN integration processing, solid state electronics was previously possible. The capability with US-led coalitions. and improved reliability over the was practically demonstrated during The subsequent layers of AW Mod 6. Mk 92 system performance is the PMRF ESSM firings bySydney capability rely primarily on ship borne enhanced by inclusion of a new Radar mentioned earlier. The performance of sensors and weapons although these Sensor Data Fusion System (SDFS), the upgraded Mk 92 system is reported can also be cued with information from which provides a Radar Integrated to be “excellent”.20 other sources like AWACS or other Automatic Detection and Tracking The improved radar and weapon ships via Link 16. The air surveillance (RAIDT) capability that combines data system performance is supported by a capability of the FFG has been from all the ships search radars (AN/ vastly improved surface to air missile considerably enhanced by inclusion SPS 49A(V)1, Mk 92 CAS search, AN/ capability. The GMLS 13 missile Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 9
launcher system has been retained authorised intervention in East Timor important for cuing hard kill weapons with its potential to carry and launch in 1999, where a USN Aegis cruiser had and soft kill measures like Nulka as well up to 40 missiles. The system will to be relied upon to provide effective as for target identification. The AN/ be upgraded so that SM 2 Medium air defence cover for the landing force, SLQ 32 ASM warner has been replaced Range surface to air missiles can be will not be necessary in the future with the current generation Rafael accommodated along with the older when an RAN FFG is available.22 C-Pearl digital combined electronic SM 1 missiles and the latest variants ESSM missiles deployed from a surveillance and ASM warner system. of the Harpoon surface to surface 32 cell Mk 41 VLS provide a highly The system covers the 0.5 – 18 GHz missile. SM 2 missiles are reported to effective third layer of hard kill ASM frequency spectrum and is fully be entering the ADF inventory in late defence. The performance of this integrated with the combat system. 2009.21 system, when combined with the The system has high sensitivity and Inclusion of the SM 2 option Upgraded FFG radar and fire control a high data rate. Significant system represents a major enhancement to the package, is reported to be excellent.23 integration, perceived performance Navy’s AW capability with significant The ESSM capability offers ASM and human machine interface (HMI) force multiplier implications. The SM defence redundancy not previously problems have been encountered 2 missile has a maximum range of available in the FFG because the GMLS during trials, which have resulted in more than 80 nautical miles (nm) (150 13 launcher was potentially a single low confidence in the ES system among km) compared with the SM 1 missile point of failure. some FFG personnel. As a result maximum range of 25 nm (46 km) and In addition to the missile of the concerted and collaborative the ESSM maximum range of around capabilities, a fourth layer of hard kill efforts of the FFG ES Stakeholders 10 nm (18 km). SM 2 and ESSM air defence is provided by the 76 mm Group numerous technical issues missiles are also reported to have rapid firing gun. The gun effectiveness have been identified and resolved. The much improved fusing arrangements has been significantly enhanced by Stakeholders are working to present an and therefore effectiveness when integrating the existing Electro Optical operational ES system that will meet engaging very low targets. This means Tracking System (EOTS) 2500 with the Navy’s requirements consistent with that the surveillance, identification Mk 92 system. This capability includes the Acceptance timetable. and targeting problem for hostile a laser range finder and enables an aircraft seeking to attack or direct additional three dimensional gun Surface Warfare (SW) an attack on a force at sea protected fire control channel to be integrated Many of the capabilities enhancements by an Australian FFG has become a with the two radar directed channels touched upon in the AW analysis are whole lot harder. Previously, when of fire. The fifth, last resort defensive also relevant to SW. The Harpoon friendly fighter cover was not available, layer is the Phalanx 20 mm close in system has been upgraded so that a hostile aircraft could loiter with weapon system (CIWS), which is now the latest variants of the missile can impunity, conducting surveillance and integrated with the ADACS combat be deployed from the GMLS 13 launching weapons or directing attacks system providing a remote designation launcher. The SWG 1(A) Harpoon from outside the FFG SM 1 missile capability. control panel has been installed in the engagement zone (MEZ) of 25 nm or The inner layers of AW capability Operations Room. Harpoon remains the Anzac MEZ of 10 nm. include the Australian designed and a very potent SW weapon with its 80 For the first time the RAN has developed Nulka offboard, active ASM nm (150 km) range, way points, anti- a genuine ship borne surface to air decoy. Two additional Mk 137 Mod counter measures and terminal attack missile-based area defence AW 1 decoy launchers able to deploy new features. A significant aspect of the capability. This means that an FFG Seagnat RF decoys and Pirate IR and SW package is the ability to employ the can offer effective cover for ships it acoustic decoys along with long range embarked Seahawk helicopter’s surface is escorting as well as for itself; it can chaff rockets (for confusion) complete surveillance, targeting and data link provide AW force protection over a the soft kill ASM (and anti-torpedo) capabilities to provide over the horizon significant and moving geographic suite. targeting (OTHT) for Harpoon area. With this capability entering An upgraded ES system is a major engagements. Other upgraded features, the ADF inventory the circumstance component of the enhanced AW including the fully integrated EOTS that obtained during the early stages capability; critical to sending an FFG in with laser range finding for the 76 mm of the Australian-led, United Nations harms way. An effective ES capability is gun, add to a potent SW capability. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 The most capable warships in the Navy’s history set to join the Fleet
A concerning aspect of Navy’s UW capability. The Seahawk employs reports from recent UW trials indicate overall SW capability not directly a range of UW surveillance and that the combination of the HMS applicable to the FFG Upgrade but localisation sensors including for and towed array passive and active relevant to SW capability options that example passive and active sonobuoys capabilities are giving impressive could be available for employment and high definition search radar, and submarine detection results.24 Also like from the FFG and other RAN surface can deploy anti-submarine torpedoes. the ES system, significant HMI issues combatants is the failure of the Super The Upgraded FFG integrates have been identified. The passive and Seasprite Helicopter Program. This information via a discrete Seahawk active data from the HMS and towed helicopter was originally procured to data link into the FFG combat system, array are presented in a single Sonar be deployed from Anzac Class frigates which enables effective coordination Operator Console (SOC) which is and Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and control of force UW efforts. The highly operator intensive. This entails (the OPVs never came to fruition). ability to embark two helicopters a complex and high workload for ASM armed helicopters deployed remains a significant asset provided the single operator; consideration is from surface combatants remain a by the FFG. TheAnzac Class frigates being given to addressing HMI and most effective weapon option against and the new Hobart Class AWD can specifically the workload associated missile armed patrol boats and larger embark only one helicopter which with concurrency tasking. surface combatants optimised to impacts on the numbers of helicopters Another UW feature is the addition operate in the littoral and archipelagic available in an RAN surface force of the Petrel Mine and Obstacle areas in Australia’s region. While there to support operational rotation and Avoidance Sonar (MOAS). The MOAS are well founded concerns about the redundancy. This shortcoming will provides three dimensional imaging emergence of submarine capabilities be felt in the future as the FFGs retire and automatic detection and tracking in the region the missile armed patrol from service. out to around 700 metres. The MOAS boat remains a considerable threat and The onboard UW package in the is controlled and monitored from the the ADF continues to have a significant Upgraded FFG comprises several bridge. It performs extremely well in capability gap in effectively dealing with significant capability enhancements. its designed role and provides a very this threat. The AN/SQS 56 and Mulloka hull useful aid to navigation in confined mounted sonar’s (HMS) have been waters.25 The FFG Petrel MOAS is Underwater Warfare (UW) replaced with the second generation the same as that fitted in theAnzac The Upgraded FFG offers the most Spherion medium frequency HMS that frigates, thus offering training and advanced and comprehensive surface provides active and passive submarine supportability benefits. combatant based UW capability now detection capabilities. The Albatross available in the RAN. Somewhat Torpedo Detection System (TDS) The Combat System similar to AW, effective UW protection towed passive array has been added. The FFG Operations Room (Combat of surface vessels and geographic When combined with the Lescut Information Centre - CIC) layout areas like approaches to ports and acoustic decoys, this system offers a remains virtually unchanged from straits used by international shipping greatly enhanced self defence capability the original configuration. However, requires a layered defence or defence in against torpedo attack. Information changes soon become apparent depth approach that is asset intensive. from the HMS and the towed array is with new flat screen colour displays, The outer layer may include forward fused and integrated automatically into although functionality is very similar deployed submarines like the Collins the combat system. to the former arrays with the NCDS Class and land-based maritime patrol Like the ES system experience, functions retained. ADACS Baseline aircraft (MPA) like the P3C Orion. The initial results from the onboard UW Build 3 software package is currently FFG retains the capability to integrate sensor package were disappointing. undergoing trials in HMAS Darwin. with MPA via data link and voice Trials conducted at the Canadian This brings Link 16 capability plus a communications and to coordinate, Nanoose Bay fully instrumented number of fixes to address software control and direct wide area UW underwater range facility have integration problems identified surveillance activities. confirmed that the sensors are during trials. The incorporation of The FFGs capacity to embark and performing satisfactorily and system advanced command and control (C2) operate two S70B Seahawk helicopters interface problems have been identified and decision support features like presents a significant force protection that are being resolved. Anecdotal automatic detection and tracking of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 11
many hundreds of targets, dissimilar increasing the limiting displacement schedule slippages, initial equipment sensor data fusion, improved from 4100 tons to 4200 tons. application courses soon fell out of step tracking in clutter, automatic threat Modifications have included reduced with posting cycles. This has meant grading, interfaces with weapons electromagnetic and acoustic that some personnel have experienced and sensor systems and the multi- signatures. Improved resilient the frustration of not being adequately tier weapons scheduler in the Mk 92 mountings for machinery have been trained for the systems they are to system significantly improve the C2 incorporated to reduce self noise operate. Combined with systems performance of the FFG and reduce which contributes to enhanced sonar performance teething problems it is operator workloads. A new Combat performance. not surprising that there has been a Data Link Management System The Upgraded FFGs are in many “crisis of confidence” among some (CDLMS) has been incorporated respects now Australian “orphans” FFG personnel. Now that systems to enable Link 11 and Link 16 to be which means that Defence must integration and performance problems managed. take responsibility for configuration are being resolved perception and The upgraded C2 package includes management and through life support. attitude issues may soon ease. Certainly an On Board Training System (OBTS) This offers challenges and advantages, the Upgraded FFGs are fine ships with that provides sensor stimulation (the like full control over software excellent capabilities and hopefully all facility to inject false targets through management and maintenance. FFG personnel will soon become justly the sensors) and effector (weapons) Inclusion of the WSSC is an important proud of being involved. simulation to avoid safety issues. The feature. A windfall logistics outcome There may however be a more OBTS is reported to be an excellent from project delays and the decision complex and demanding people training aid that provides realistic not to proceed with upgrades to issue that needs to be addressed. presentations for operator training.26 Adelaide and Canberra is that six ship The Upgraded FFG in many respects sets of new equipments were procured. represents a quantum leap in capability. Supportability This means that further options for For example, the new ES system is far A major feature of the Upgraded spare parts are available to support the more sensitive and capable than its FFG and one of the main reasons upgraded equipments and the retired predecessor and indeed any ES system for initiating the upgrade is greatly FFGs have been comprehensively in the RAN inventory. Similarly, the improved supportability. In addition cannibalised for spares to support UW package with the active/passive to the weapons and sensor upgrades legacy equipments. HMS integrated with a TDS towed already outlined several obsolete and array that also offers a passive detection obsolescent equipments have been Human Capability capability, provides a far greater replaced. The combat and weapons Human capability is an essential level of capability and accompanying systems are now supported by AN/ component of combat capability; complexity than the RAN surface UYK 43 computers, which have indeed it is the most important community has previously replaced the AN/UYK 7 computers. capability factor. Clearly the FFG encountered. Former FFG sailors will be pleased to Upgrade Project has been a long and Configuring smart systems learn that the often problematic ship’s frustrating experience for many of the for optimum performance and service diesel generators (SSDGs) and FFG personnel involved. For example, understanding the results generated 400 Hz static frequency converters as the lead ship to be upgraded, the requires equally smart and experienced (SFCs), essential to the provision of Sydney team have borne the brunt operators who know much more power for the ship’s systems, have of much of the initial trials programs than simply how to operate the been replaced. The former SSDGs enduring the vague and dynamic equipment. They need to have a have been replaced with Caterpillar nature of contractor driven schedules. deep understanding of the operating diesel generators that are painted in HMI has been identified as an issue environment, whether, for example stylish white and the SFCs are now with both the ES and UW systems and it is the electromagnetic spectrum solid state. Chilled water systems have there may be shortcomings in other for electronic warfare or the acoustic been upgraded however the original areas. Lack of familiarity with the environment for undersea warfare. signal data converters (SDC) have been new systems has been exacerbated by The generic combat system operator retained. reduced access while the systems have concept supported by application Platform upgrades have included been in contractors’ hands. Also, given courses may no longer be sufficient. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Welcome to the future of naval maintenance
Photos courtesy KBR's capabilities include ILS planning at of Defence the conceptual stage of a project
Applying commercial best practice to sustain complex maritime platforms and systems
Jointly providing integrated materiel services to the RAN’s amphibious and afloat support ships
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K0709 09/07
Welcome to the future of naval maintenance
Photos courtesy KBR's capabilities include ILS planning at of Defence the conceptual stage of a project
Applying commercial best practice to sustain complex maritime platforms and systems
Jointly providing integrated materiel services to the RAN’s amphibious and afloat support ships
Contact Email: [email protected] Phone: 1800 194 866
K0709 09/07 Issue 130 13 The most capable warships in the Navy’s history set to join the Fleet
Conclusions first time the RAN has a genuine The FFG Upgrade Project grew ship borne area air defence capability. from an evolving Australian Air defence comprises several layers defence policy context of utilising enhanced systems and sensors indecisiveness, procrastination combined with comprehensive hard and lack of commitment to and soft kill capabilities. The AW and defence expenditure. The Project anti-ship missile defence capabilities commenced in 1993 following are impressive. The FFG SW a policy statement in 1991 capabilities have also been enhanced. that mid-life modernisations The UW package is the most capable A potent air defence package The advent of relatively advanced, for surface combatants were for a surface combatant in the RAN very capable and complex systems considered not to be cost effective with the capacity to embark two in the Upgraded FFG may serve as a and would not continue. Concerns Seahawk helicopters and improved useful precursor to the introduction with supportability and survivability onboard active and passive detection of the even more capable and complex of the FFGs in a contemporary threat capabilities. These enhanced naval AWDs. There may be a requirement environment were the key drivers that warfare capabilities are fully integrated for the Navy to revisit the issue of deep led to the decision to proceed with an with a unique Australian combat specialisation for systems operators in upgrade. system. The combination of systems the surface community. The contract for upgrading the and weapons improvements provides FFGs was signed with ADI Ltd, now a considerable naval warfighting Tactical Development trading as Thales Australia Ltd, in capability in a compact package. During the preparation of this 1999. The upgrade is one of the most One of the key objectives of article the extent to which tactical sophisticated and extensive capability the Upgraded FFG was to improve employment of the Upgraded FFG enhancements of a surface combatant supportability and this appears to have has been the subject of thoughtful ever undertaken. The parties to the been achieved. Concerns remain with and experienced consideration was Project underestimated the challenge performance, integration and therefore not able to be ascertained. Clearly the and the Project has suffered schedule acceptance of the ES and UW systems. FFG presents a significant capability slippages to the extent that it is Technical and other issues have been enhancement and its effective now some four and a half years late. identified and are being progressively employment requires considerable Delays and relationship difficulties resolved. There is now confidence tactical development effort, including have contributed to frustration and that the FFGs will soon be back in experimentation and fleet trials to disappointment for all concerned. operational service. ensure that it is employed to the This has impacted on confidence in Issues like HMI, human capability optimum effect in a range of diverse the Upgraded FFG within the Navy development and tactical development and demanding scenarios. The simple and between the Navy, Defence and may require further priority attention. fact that the RAN has for the first time Government. Significant project The Upgraded FFG provides a valuable a genuine area AW defence capability management related lessons have been growth path toward introduction of at its disposal means that new learnt and re-learnt in what has been a the AWDs and the lessons learned thinking about tactical employment difficult project for all parties. After an should be helpful when introducing of the FFG should be a priority. When extensive contract renegotiation and that advanced warship in to service. combined with the enhanced FFG the adoption of a more collaborative The FFGs and AWDs will be in service UW capability, in a regional security approach, the Upgraded FFG Project together for several years, and along context that includes rapid qualitative now appears to be on track to achieve with the Anzac FFH, will provide the and quantitative improvements to delivery of ships to the Navy during Navy and Australia with a small but maritime capabilities, including the late 2008 and during 2009 to meet the potent surface combatant capability. proliferation of submarines, the need revised schedule. The Upgraded FFG is a highly for concerted tactical development The Upgraded FFG presents a capable warship that is well constituted efforts is compelling. higher level of surface combatant to make a major contribution to capability than previously available Australia’s maritime security over in the history of the RAN. For the the next decade. FFG personnel will Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 14 The most capable warships in the Navy’s history set to join the Fleet
or upgraded facility or Upgraded Software Sight: The RAN in the North Arabian Gulf, continue to serve with pride and conform to the requirements of the Semaphore Issue 06, June 2008,
Operations develops an IO Annex in support of a the development of the knowledge Joint CONOPS along with supporting edge.’ It states that ‘A knowledge edge Management in the elemental appendices as appropriate. will exist when there is a comparative HQJOC disseminates the approved advantage in those factors that RAN CONOPS to the tactical level via the influence decision making and its BD y oNALD eAKIN-Bell component commanders in the form of effective execution.’4 . IO is a major an Operational Instruction (OPINST) means that enables a force to have such containing the IO Annex. The IO a knowledge edge over adversaries. e live in the Information implementation is chiefly carried out The RAN is increasingly operating Age, where the ability to use by tactical level units. in the littoral environment, with a informationW is the mark of a country’s The RAN is involved in the focus on such activities as operations economic and social superiority. implementation of these IO Annexes other than war including peacekeeping Superior Information Technology instructions using its tactical level and constabulary operations and is also and analysis is the key to an advanced units and capabilities, yet generally has significantly improving its amphibious nation’s competitive advantage. This not been involved in the development operations capability. This is a major is also true for a nation’s military of the instructions that it has to change from the mid ocean blue water competitive advantage. implement as it has few people trained focus of the Cold War. In order for Information superiority in the as IO Staff officers and no personnel the RAN to create a knowledge edge military environment is created by the Blue water allocated to HQJOC IO planning. to meet the challenges of Littoral Hard Art of Soft War1 the conduct of engagements The RAN has capabilities and Operations, the integrated capability Information Operations (IO). ADDP will become interests in many of the areas of IO, offered by IO is needed. IO is a classic 3.13, Information Operations states that increasingly especially Electronic Warfare (EW), asymmetric force multiplier, which IO ‘is not a capability in its own right, Computer Network Operations can either be used by our opponents rare… just prior but a collection of capabilities brought (CNO)/Information Assurance (IA), or by us. together and focused for a specific to the Battle of Military Deception, Operational The important thing for the RAN effect’2 . Leyte Gulf. Security (OPSEC) and Protective to realise is that as CAPT Wayne P. Ships are, Security. The RAN does not co- Hughes states in his seminal book IO is from left to ordinate these capabilities when it on Fleet Tactics, ‘It is relatively rare The integrated employment of the conducts operations, rather each for two fleets to meet simply and right: Musashi, core capabilities of electronic warfare, capability operates as a separate entity. specifically to gain control of the sea. computer network operations, Yamato, a cruiser In most cases one side or the other psychological operations, military and Nagato. Why IO is important has to deal directly and immediately deception and operations security, (Courtesy of Mr. So why is IO important to RAN? RAN with an object on land’5. The object of in concert with specified supporting Kazutoshi Hando, Doctrine 1, Australian Maritime the threat or use of military power is and related capabilities to influence, Doctrine talks about the ‘Revolution to persuade an opponent to do your 1970.US Naval disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial in Military Affairs being drive by the bidding. If this can be done without human and automated decision Historical Center information revolution..’ and the ‘high force, so much the better. making while protecting our own3. Photograph) priority being placed by the ADF on This paper proposes a means of IO is an integral part of Effects managing Information Operations Based Operations (EBO), thus a major within the RAN. departure from the platform based Military Forces are used by the mindset that pervades the RAN. Australian Government to pursue Information Operations are a National Policy in the international “Whole-of-Government” development, arena as a means of projecting beginning with Shaping and National Power and persuading other Influencing (S&I) conducted at the nations and non state players to agree strategic-level and communicated to Australian goals. The spectrum of to the operational-level, HQJOC, in use of the military ranges from co- the form of a Strategic Shaping and operative regional engagement with Influencing Plan (SSIP). HQJOC other nations, through constabulary Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 Information Operations Management in the RAN
25 Ibid. operations,26 Ibid. disaster assistance, joint planning stages of operations, over Australian forces. peacekeeping, peacemaking to conflict especially in the planning of their IO The reasons for this lack of IO 6. In the majority of these situations, components. For, while ADFP 3.13.1 capability are varied. Lack of interest in overt force is not used, rather national states that ‘IO is applicable across all IO capability starts at the higher level will and goals are obtained by other levels of command and IO requires due to the platform based career focus means. Means, such as IO. guidance from commanders at all that has moulded the mindset of many IO is a way of conducting levels and the input of specialist IO senior officers. This lack of interest operations that relies on co-ordination staff to accurately and effectively flows to the lower levels, with the of activities, both at the single service target the intended audience’, most prime warfare focus of the RAN being and joint levels. RAN operations are RAN commanders have limited, if any on platform based kinetic capabilities, frequently carried out at the single understanding of IO and the RAN has not the effect based capabilities that platform or small task group level. This very few personnel trained as IO Staff include IO. This is a consequence of has created the current mindset among Officers8. the Junior Warfare Officer Application middle level officers of focusing on The consequence is that when Course (JWAC) and Principal Warfare technical ship and weapon handling IO plans are developed at higher Officer (PWO) training continuum that and tactical level issues. Yet, the headquarters, RAN input is limited or emphasises platform based warfare, RAN had a long history of IO type non existent and the plans developed with limited focus on areas such as EW, activities. The use of early warning by Army or Air Force staff officers IA, CNO and Military Deception. This information provided by Australian Thus IO plans do not benefit from an lack of interest leads to a lack of trained Coast Watchers, commanded by LCDR understanding of RAN capabilities or staff. The low priority of IO leads to Feldt, and Signal Interception and limitations. RAN units then are tasked few RAN officers able to be released Analysis, pioneered by LCDR Neve, to undertake tasks for which they are to undertake IO Staff Officers training were key navy activities that disrupted not suitable for and even worse are due to high operational tempo and the Japanese Information cycle during misused or underused for IO tasks. the many critical staff shortages in the WWII. Yet IO is vital to the RAN. In the officer ranks. area of PsyOps the RAN is often The consequence of this lack of Should the RAN be involved the only Aust forces to engage with capability is that not only are RAN in IO Planning persons in the maritime environment operations less able to use IO as a Where does this focus on single service and can project positive or negative tool, they are vulnerable to enemy kinetic operations leave the RAN? images and messages that can make IO operations. Examples include the Sadly, frequently missing or providing The Span of Maritime or break an operation. Electronic deception operations used by the input as a very junior partner in the Tasks 7 Warfare is a major navy capability, a life Serbian Forces in Bosnia, the “Turning or death requirement. around your high-powered, fully Information Systems wired expeditionary force in Somalia are critical to Military with a single, 30-second video clip”9, Operations, they are the the Internet based Psy Ops campaign basis of Network Centric of al Qaeda, and poor OPSEC that Warfare and modern contributed to the bombing of the USS platforms are useless Cole. It should be noted that nations without computer such as China are increasing the systems. It is possible focus on IO as a means of developing for a small dedicated military competitive advantage. C2 cell in an otherwise unsophisticated Involving the RAN in IO organization to create a Involving the RAN in IO needs to start temporary knowledge- with the basics. Raising awareness is based advantage over a essential, not just about IO, but about militarily superior force, component elements that contribute which can be translated to IO such as Intelligence, EW, into a military advantage Crypto Analysis, Military Deception, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 17
RAN capabilities or limitations to the IO staff officers who are developing the plans. A targeted mini IO module for these courses needs to be developed for these groups, focusing on what the RAN can do for IO and what IO can do for the RAN. Again, this is a Kri Sutanto in a Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), deception pattern (TAMW) which would take the lead supplemental to the joint, operational- OPSEC and especially Counter IO. IO often used by navies in IO training in the RAN. The PWO level IO course. needs to be included into revised RAN inshore Faculty at HMAS WATSON would be IO Staff Officers at single or joint Doctrine publications. tasked to work with the ADF Warfare headquarters develop the IO plans that Briefing of senior officers is a Centre (ADFWC) to develop modules the RAN implements, yet the RAN primary requirement, followed by the at the appropriate level. These single has consistently not filled its quota need to foster awareness of IO among service modules are to be a supplement of students on the ADFWC IO Staff the Naval Warfare community and to not a substitute for the joint ADF IO Officers course for many years. This general naval community, especially in course. is partially because high Op Tempo the officer and senior sailor ranks. But At the Application Course level (i.e. makes releasing personnel difficult, but before any of this can occur, IO in the Junior Warfare Officer Application also because attendance is generally RAN needs a sponsor. Course, Supply Officer Application a self-selection and unit-funded, not IO is a cross discipline joint activity. Course, etc), a basic overview module DNOP-funded process. It should be a The best IO planners are people with about IO, its elements and effects is all requirement that a number of officers, a flexible mindset whose background that is required. Such a module would especially those who have completed could be Supply, Engineering, be similar to the IO module presented the FWO course and also officers Communications, as much as a PWO. on the ADFWC Introduction to from other branches that have or are However, it is still a warfare activity Joint Warfare Course. Following this likely to have joint experience attend and the best sponsor is the Head of the at the intermediate level such as the the course, to develop a pool of RAN Naval Warfare Community. PWO course, a module going into officers able to plan IO. The Directorate greater depth especially about Naval of Naval Officer Postings (DNOP) Organising & training for IO IO elements such as EW, Military should be involved in the selection of The actual work would be done by Deception and counter IO. these officers as part of the career and the Directorate of Naval Intelligence, The Force Warfare Officer (FWO) workforce management process. Surveillance, Reconnaissance and and CO/XO designate course The Navy’s operational environment Electronic Warfare (DNISREW) level is where a greater level of IO is changing, with a shift away from the within the Navy Communications understanding is needed. FWO’s are mid ocean blue water focus to a littoral and Intelligence Branch, preferable required to advise and plan at both focus. Navy capabilities need to change by allocating a dedicated Staff Officer the Task Group and Joint levels and to meet the new demands placed upon to RAN IO development. DNISREW need to develop their tactical plans in it by the many operations other than already deals with many of the conjunction with Operational Orders war it is now involved in. Non kinetic elements that make up IO. DNISREW which will include IO plans. CO’s and means are needed for this environment would also chair a Navy IO working XO’s are required to implement IO and Information Operations need to be group to co-ordinate the raise train and plans. The training requirement at this part of Navy’s tool box. sustain aspects of Navy IO. level is high, with personnel needing to While IO is important, the RAN DNISREW would work with the understand their place in an IO plan as has not done enough to develop an IO Training Authority Maritime Warfare well as be able to provide advice about capability. It needs to raise, train and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 Information Operations Management in the RAN sustain such a capability in order to involving the use of electromagnetic contribute to national policy in the 21st and directed energy to control the century. electromagnetic spectrum and to attack the enemy. Also know as EW. EW includes electronic attack (EA), protection (P), and electronic support (ES).
ENDNOTES 1 , Although IO can be very “hard,” employing kinetic weapons in support of OPSEC, Deception, PSYOPS. 2 ADDP 3.13, Information Operations, ADFWC, April 2003 3 Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations; United States Department of Defence; February 2006. Australian doctrine Donald Deakin-Bell, BA, Grad Cert refers to 11 elements: OPSEC, Deception (HRM), psac and Counter Deception, PSYOPS and Counter PSYOPS, EW, CNO, Targeting Don Deakin-Bell is the Liaison and Public (Physical Destruction), Counterintelligence, Affairs Officer at HMAS Watson. He was Protective Security and Military Networking a Peace Monitor with Operation Bel Isi in and 3 supporting elements: Civil Affairs Bougainville, where he was involved in (CIMIC), Public Affairs and INT 4 “Australian Maritime Doctrine (RAN IO implementation. He is a former Army Doctrine 1); RAN Sea Power Centre, 2000 Reserve Officer and served in regimental 5 Fleet Tactics, Theory and Practice; postings with infantry and armour. Capt Wayne P. Hughes Jnr, USN Rtd; Naval Institute Press, Annapolis; 1986; p10 He has a BA in Political Studies and 6 Australian Maritime Doctrine (RAN International Relations, a Graduate Doctrine 1); RAN Sea Power Centre, 2000, Certificate in HRM and graduated from p 19 describes the Spectrum of Conflict in the RAN Staff Acquaint Course at the ACSC. detail 7 Navy Contribution to Australian Gl oSSARy Maritime Operations, RAN DOCTRINE 2 Defensive information operations – Sea Power Centre 2005, Introduction (IO) are processes, synergised with 8 ADDP 3.13.1, Information wider activities and plans, designed Operations Procedures, ADFWC, to ensure friendly information, November 2006, p 1-1 information processes and information 9 Weaponry by CNN, The Inquire systems are protected from attack or an adversary’s use of offensive IO, or from accidental or naturally occurring acts.
Effects-based Operations.The planning and conduct of operations in such a way to achieve a desired effect on the target
Electronic warfare. Military action Sea Hawk Tiger 79 on the flight deck of HMAS Melbourne HMAS of deck flight the on 79 Tiger Hawk Sea Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 19 The Vernon Parker Oration 2008 The Navy & the White Paper byP K rOFESSOR im Beazley1*
y now the skeleton and a lot of partners face a spectrum of challenges, has gripped the imagination of Defence the sinew of this government’s including violent transnational planners. Throw natural disasters and Bfirst White Paper on defence should extremist networks, hostile states pandemic threats into the mix and you be completed. What remains would armed with weapons of mass have a witch’s brew that would tax the be the task of establishing the blood destruction, rising regional powers, lifetime of most defence planners. A bit flow – timetables on the acquisition emerging space and cyber threats, of thought, however, would walk such and replacement of capabilities and, natural and pandemic disasters, and a a planner back to Gates’ position. Here above all, the long term funding. growing competition for resources’. defence helps out but its force structure The writers of it have a decade Plan a force structure around that! must be determined by other factors. of background behind them of The answer of course is you don’t The last couple of years have started coping with appalling government have to. What you have to do is to to draw us back to the problem that has indiscipline. Featured heavily have peel the threat away to arrive at core always been the primary commitment been mammoth budget busting elements that permit rational planning of defence forces – employment in acquisitions with no properly for defence forces. Discern what is interstate conflict with capacities thought through military/strategic primarily a problem for diplomats, drawn down for these broader justifications nor consideration given governance experts, civilian specialists, purposes from a force structure built to their place in the queue alongside law enforcement authorities and around national defence against a programmes to deal with glaring intelligence agencies. Establish what structured enemy. inadequacies in our force structure. the defence force is uniquely equipped George W. Bush, as he sought to On the testimony of Hugh White, to respond to and separate that refocus the still shocked American the author of the last White Paper, out from where it can lend a hand. people after the 9/11 atrocity, spoke his competent effort was ruined by Lending a hand is not a force structure of a Western Cold War triumph a Prime Ministerial directive that no determinant. in his 2002 US National Security capabilities were to be dropped or Again, Robert Gates is helpful: Strategy. The West’s victory provided diminished, rendering impossible the ‘in the long run the Department of ‘a single sustainable model for national timely incorporation into the Defence Defense is neither the best source success: freedom, democracy and free Capability Plan of new capabilities of resources and capabilities nor the enterprise.’ Paul Kelly drew attention to to address new circumstances. The appropriate authority to shoulder these this quote in an excellent short article White Paper was followed by a series tasks. The comparative advantage, and recently which pointed out there was a of Defence Updates which until the applicable authorities for action reside more authoritarian model on the rise last, completely undermined the elsewhere in the US Government, in Russia and China. We may thank our strategic rationale for the long term at other levels of government, in the lucky stars that neither has an interest planning of our defence forces. Only private sector and with partner nations. in transnational Islamic fundamentalist last year’s paper attempted to rein DoD should expect and plan to play a terror or in the spread of WMD. in the horses. What a tragedy in an key supporting role in an interagency But the rise of this alternative model era of relative defence plenty. What a effort to combat these threats and does refocus us on state structures. danger in a region where slowly but to help develop new capacities and Whatever internal weaknesses exist, surely the drift in the distribution of capabilities, while protecting its own it is the nation state which is likely power is against Australia. vulnerabilities.’ to sustain capable defence forces In some ways the confusion is In recent times the immediate with power projection capabilities understandable. We face a complex challenge of transnational terrorist and nationalism which is likely to be world. As US Secretary for Defense, threats and criminality, particularly used to enforce state cohesion. Two Robert Gates, said in the National when intersecting with the problems characteristics may be discerned Defense Strategy he released in June: or strategies of failed and rogue states among the states of our region of ‘The United States, our allies and our and the spectre of WMD proliferation, strategic interest. One is that they,
* 1 Professor Kim Beazley is Professorial Fellow in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Western Australia, and former Defence Minister 1984 -1990. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 The Vernon Parker Oration 2008 The Navy & the White Paper along with the Africans, are the last Their efforts may from time to capabilities mean that in geographic bastions of the Treaty of Westphalia. time fail, and here the question of the terms, regional capabilities have to They take their neighbours, the borders region’s military capabilities come be measured even further out for our and their internal right against external into play. To avoid provocation our identification of the area in which interference very seriously. The ally now defines its force structure we need to be able to assert strategic second is that we inhabit a religious around threatening capabilities, not dominance or at least denial. Usefully environment in which Islamic belief threatening states. We pioneered diplomatically we could stop short is very strong either as a majority or a this approach in the 1987 White of the archipelago: I am not sure we large minority component of the state Paper. What gave it discipline was could do that now. One thing we can populations. the close interrelationship between be certain of is that a properly devised This should be pause for thought, general strategy – self-reliance within force structure will again give us plenty not nervous atrophy. Be they enticed the framework of alliances; threat of scope to collaborate both with our by an authoritarian model, nationalist measured by regional capabilities; main ally and those in our region. It in outlook or the locus of religious military strategy, defence in depth will also give us plenty of options in fervour, they want to be peaceful and focussed first on our approaches; dealing with the defence component of wealthy, whether or not their claims force structure; affordability – realistic that multiplicity of threats I described on each other might contradict this guidance. earlier in the supportive manner that interest. They are energy hungry and as Those who write this White Paper Secretary Gates describes for the role the Minister for Resources has pointed must come back to our maritime of American forces. out, we are an energy superpower and capabilities and the new field of cyber The yawning gap in our maritime a resources bank. There is much ice to warfare. The key difference now capabilities is anti-submarine warfare. skate on for our politicians, diplomats, as opposed to 1987 is that regional This will be critical when new businesses and our internationally capabilities are improving at a faster submarines are considered, helicopters oriented service providers, in a way rate than ours, making careful for our surface vessels, networked whichColour would Ad guarantee25/5/06 our 10:14 security. AM Pageselection 1 more important. New battle space and our Orion P-3
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 21
replacements. I will deal with some of being displayed. We are looking at a years of commitment alongside the this later in the lecture. We will have system of multiple centres of power US in the Gulf and its hinterland. In the capacity to embark half the Army’s not dissimilar, except for its scale the speech, I did foreshadow the types combat capability on the new LHDs and geographic character, from the of independent commitment we have but with the underwater environment European State system of the early 19th made in the South Pacific and South developing in the region, a government century.’ East Asia for crisis stabilisation and would be foolhardy to put them to sea I identified those states as capacity building. in anything other than the softest of India, China and Japan. But also Ironically for an alliance built circumstances. ‘Regional force structures, which around troubles in the Pacific, for the The critics of our 1987 White Paper have traditionally given priority last 20 years our engagement with pondered whether it left us sufficiently to ground forces, are changing our ally has focussed on the Persian engaged with our allies. This was not a emphasis. Among the ASEAN nations, Gulf. In that time, we have seen the question that troubled our American Indonesia has recently acquired four Navy deploy DDGs, FFGs, ANZACs, ally in the aftermath of the White Harpoon-firing frigates and two mine amphibious ships, supply ships and Paper’s presentation (it did before). counter measures vessels. Malaysia clearance diving teams. The Army has Secretaries Schultz and Weinberger is purchasing more than $2.5 billion committed SAS, commandos, infantry in Sydney in June 1987 ticked off of defence equipment from Britain, elements, engineers, communicators, on a force structure which provided including an Oberon class submarine elements of mechanised forces, plenty of options for the independent for crew familiarisation and ASW transport capabilities, rapier air defence advancing of Western interests in the training, WASP helicopters and batteries, and even some artillerists, eastern Indian Ocean and South East maritime strike aircraft. Thailand but without their guns. RAAF has Asian littoral and collaboration with took delivery in 1987 of two US- committed FA-18s, in-flight refuellers, the US further afield. built Harpoon equipped frigates, C-130s, P3Cs, airfield defence guards In the second Vernon Parker mine counter measures vessels and and air traffic controllers. All three oration I reported these facts to you ASW Corvettes. Regional air defence services have committed personnel all on 6 September 1989, in a speech capabilities are similarly being to command arrangements and entitled Key Concepts in Australia’s upgraded.’ logisticians. They have been in wars, Strategy. I said then: ‘It is evident we Not bad for 1989. Everyone talks blockading arrangements and peace- are coming to terms with the fact that of a multipolar system now. This was keeping forces. They have filled niches our maritime strategy has two distinct before the end of the Soviet Union. In in the rear and the front-end. While but completely interrelated aspects: fact the paper contained something not necessarily providing all our allied the self-reliant defence of our maritime of an underestimate of the role of armed forces might have liked, the approaches, and the cooperative expanding Chinese capability and commitment has been completely to promotion of our maritime interests’. a slight overestimate of the pace of the satisfaction of the leadership of our Far from assuming a benign change in South East Asia, but the ally. environment in our region, I pointed world described is with us now. I recollect with great enjoyment a out that it would be subject to great I did not mention one development day and night on board HMAS Arunta change: ‘there has been strong which predated the speech. That was and HMAS Melbourne during the economic growth among a number the proposed (it did not eventuate) blockade phase of the sanctions on of medium sized powers bordering commitment to the Persian Gulf of a Iraq. One of the highlights was a visit to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It has clearance diving team, though I had the USS Hopper, an Arleigh Burke class been accompanied by the emergence plenty to say about collaboration with destroyer from whence an Australian of greater confidence in their national the US. That had occurred at the end captain commanded the allied strength and, in some cases a concern of 1987. It was made during the later operation at the head of the Gulf. This to exert more comprehensive influence phases of the ‘tanker war’ component situation still exists, though now the beyond their immediate borders. of the Iran/Iraq War, in support of task is protecting Iraq’s oil terminals. If Importantly from the point of view British efforts to escort Australian ever I needed an education in the value of Australia and our neighbours, merchant ships operating in the Gulf. It of AWDs, I got it then. Their broad it is in the maritime environment was a commitment informally sought area surveillance capabilities provided that this new found confidence is by the US. It foreshadowed twenty an effective centre for a networked Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 The Vernon Parker Oration 2008 The Navy & the White Paper operation. the DDGs, not as has happened, the some of the areas we identify. It was good to see first hand the DDGs and FFGs. We expected the Like the US, we see the region effectiveness of the ANZACs in ANZACs to be ASW work horses. We as friendly with a determination the close waters of the Gulf. I was tried to sell four to the New Zealanders diplomatically to keep it that way. not surprised to read later of their on the same basis. Like the US, however, we have to substantial role in the Iraq war. The The 1987 White Paper structure for plan on the basis of the capabilities waters are ideal for mining. Counter the Navy was carefully planned. As I being developed in the area against a mining measures are another Western said in the 1989 Vernon Parker oration: day when things are not so politically navy weakness. Though not in 1987 The importance of maintaining benign. This is a very difficult task but subsequently, our clearance divers our superiority together with the politically. played a significant role. possession of significant maritime We should note that our region is I worry about one thing. That is and some strategic strike capabilities shot through with maritime and land the situation of our ships, should the is clearly acknowledged. So too is the border disagreements. Almost every current dispute with Iran over the priority accorded to the protection of state has some point of difference development of their nuclear systems maritime focal areas and choke points. with its neighbour. By and large, the turn to war. As they did in the 1980s, It is there that an adversary would have nations of the region contain these the Iranians would attempt to shut the the greatest opportunity and capability points of disagreement and long may Gulf down. They have been preparing to threaten our trade and to strike at that continue. However, there are flash submarines, land-based missiles, strategically significant targets in the points now on the Thai border and legions of small rocket craft and much adjacent littoral area. endemic disagreement in the South upgraded mines for a reprise of their Given the vastness of our China Sea, not to mention issues in the littoral guerrilla warfare of the 1980s. maritime approaches and the range Taiwan Strait. The Americans would eliminate the of interests we may need to protect, One example close to home is threat but there would be some nasty the implementation of an effective interesting. In its annual report to days before that happened. I don’t think maritime strategy imposes great Congress on the Military Power of the our ships would necessarily cope too demands on the ADF. The absolutely PRC, the Pentagon reported: readily in the environment so I hope prime requirement is the ability of In December 2007, China serious contingency plans have been the navy and the airforce to operate announced the elevation of Hainan developed. together in a completely integrated Province’s Xisha Islands office to a All this has been done with the way, reflecting the fact that the county-level office named ‘Sansha force structure planned for the defence sea and the air constitute a single City’ which would hold administrative of Australia’s approaches in 1987, operating environment in the sorts of jurisdiction over the Paracel and augmented slightly by the amphibious contingencies which we might credibly Spratly island groups, and Macclesfield component incorporated in the 1994 face.’ Bank – claims disputed by Brunei, White Paper. The type of ‘out of That requirement remains as valid the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan area’ collaboration was completely today as it was then. If anything, and Vietnam. A PRC spokesperson anticipated in the White Paper, if not recent shifts in US strategy have asserted that China has ‘indisputable the intensity in its ultimate location. made it even more relevant. The sovereignty’ and effective jurisdiction Having said that, when the services 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review over the islands of the South China are examined, the Navy looks least redefined the task for USN in modern Sea and ‘the adjacent waterways’. like the one anticipated in 1987. warfare from a blue water strategy In reaction to China’s declaration, Then we expected the surface fleet to a green water one. Action on the hundreds of Vietnamese protestors to exist in three tiers. The top tier littoral where weaker nations could demonstrated outside the Chinese was to be the DDGs and the FFGs, build a local asymmetrical challenge to embassy in Hanoi. the second tier the ANZACs, and US dominance was perceived as a key Most nations in the region are the third patrol boats and MCMs. force structure determinant. The main upgrading capabilities for surveillance, The submarines were the main strike littoral to be contested was a line from air and sea, to pursue at least denial if element. Combining the top tiers, we the Bay of Bengal through the South not control capacities over substantial expected 17 ships. We hoped for eight East Asian archipelago to north of the maritime areas. Most interesting are submarines. The AWDs were to replace Japanese seas, highly coincident with submarines. Bangladesh, China, India, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 23
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, North LHDs and AWDs in which they are this study, EY’s work in this area reveals Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, active participants themselves. He lays common threads, that may be worthy South Korea and Vietnam all have or down requirements for hull-mounted of consideration equally by Navy and are acquiring submarine capabilities. sonar I hope are being incorporated its Defence industry providers. Generally speaking, acquisition in the new ships. We can say with First, it is evident that many policies, of submarines upgrades a nation’s certainty however that the helicopter processes and procedures in large intelligence gathering and the component and its equipment is a long enterprises work against retention. preparation of battle zones containing way down the track in the Defence These are often cumbersome, not only a torpedo and missile threat Capability Plan. This is unsustainable. discriminatory and often based on ‘one but also capacities for clandestine We are entitled to be worried now. By size fits all’. mining. Submarines, even in peace the time the AWDs and LHDs come Secondly, adopting a life-stages time, are used very aggressively. into service, we will be frozen with approach can dramatically improve As the Cold War demonstrated, fright. the situation. By life-stages approach, their operations are replete with I want to conclude with a discussion I mean having policies that recognise opportunities for clashes with of our best ASW platform – obviously the different stages that people go submarines and other nations’ surface the submarine. But before I do, I want through during their working life. The vessels. There seems to be a licence for to discuss one other matter which if lesson in the above two points is that submarine operations not dissimilar to not addressed, will collapse the best many things that can improve retention that extended to intelligence services. outcome we might envisage in all these performance are in our control and When combined with more effective areas. It is a matter that would have ability to change. Currently, half the aviation in maritime contexts, a very been close to Vernon Parker’s heart. defence force shifts every year. Apart different picture emerges from the That is the question of recruitment from the disruption to life, each move benign one of waters plied by massive and retention. It is appalling to think costs Defence $30,000. numbers of merchant ships, fishing we cannot man all our submarines. Thirdly, data is important. All of us fleets and coastal boats. The USN can double crew some of have theories about why people might As has been pointed out by Andrew theirs. The position in the surface fleet leave or stay and which levers to pull or Davies of ASPI, Australia’s ASW is not much better. We are paying off push to improve retention. However, capability has not advanced in the ships before we need to because of unless data-driven, discussions last decade or so, if anything it has crewing difficulties. Part of the reason about changing career management retreated. The Seahawk helicopters for acquiring the LHDs, which I think practices, pay or conditions may not have not been given dunking sonar. are too big for our requirements and effectively achieve retention outcomes. Towed array has not been put on don’t give us enough amphibious A good example can be found in the ANZACs though it is on their platforms, was that it would reduce relation to the UK MoD Armed New Zealand version. Hull-mounted Navy’s crewing requirements against Forces Personnel Agency. This agency sonars, essential though not sufficient that wider capability. I’ll lay London reported that taking an holistic view of in themselves, are not up to date. to a brick we will start thinking about pay and conditions across the Armed Thankfully, the Sea Sprite has been AUSTAL’s littoral ships to fill that gap if Forces enabled lower total employment abandoned. It was not optimised for we solve the crewing issue. costs and at the same time, targeted ASW. A replacement that is, is essential Navy experiences similar retention levels were achieved. for the ANZACs, the new AWDs, recruitment and retention challenges Admiral Peter Briggs for the and the LHDs. To which you could to industry but the stakes are higher. Submarine Institute has been working add the P3Cs are doing magnificent Navy is often competing with the hard on the Collins replacement. surveillance in the Gulf, but it is not demanding mining sector. The lustre The decision by Joel Fitzgibbon to ASW. of the life-long career that the military bring forward the project makes We have reached a critical point. offers is dimming. Recently Ernst and possible Peter Brigg’s view that it Andrew Davies’ paper of last year, Young, in which I chair its Defence should be in sea trials no later than ‘The Enemy Below: Anti-Submarine practice, completed a study into the 2022. His paper bears close reading Warfare,’ will have been read by most drivers of retention performance in not only on the capability required in people here. He lays out a convincing Navy, using the technique of ‘choice the new submarine but also on the scenario for layered defence of our modelling’. While I won’t comment on acquisition process. In this short time Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 The Vernon Parker Oration 2008 The Navy & the White Paper
I want to comment on three issues. notice contingencies demand high take on a European partner. The first is the size of the submarine levels of mobility and endurance. If ASC is not sold with a clear path and the second two are related to Tropical littoral oceans enforce to the submarine programme, a proper the acquisition strategy and the demands on the life support/ sharing of risk with the government on privatisation of ASC. habitability systems and require high the Air Warfare Destroyer and either Firstly on the size. Evidently we agility and prolonged covert operations the common user facility in Adelaide are to have a debate about whether or on the approaches to and in operating or guaranteed access to it, it won’t be not we need a small submarine and areas. In this environment, the worth a great deal. lots of them or fewer large ones. This submarine will require low signature We are at a very risky point in all debate should not have resurfaced. in all spectrums and at high speed, this. Along with the F111 replacement, Our submarine must be capable of imposing new demands on submarine this will be Australia’s most difficult long distance, clandestine operation design. Current European designs do defence decision. On it rests in large in waters with which Australians are not offer the range, endurance, high measure our capacity to meet all familiar but European small boat speed transits or payload capacity and contingencies an era of diminishing designers are not. flexibility Australia requires. Australian relative power is likely to Small submarines will not be able ASC now contains the only design throw up. to compete with the types of boats team in Western navies capable We are attempting to defend being brought into service in the Indian of designing a large conventional ourselves, devoting a percentage of and Chinese navies, at least always submarine. Whatever happens our GDP to defence no greater than assuming they can be got in clandestine with privatisation and subsequent most European states and less than fashion into the relevant waters. Must acquisition of the submarine, its some, despite the fact that our threat we trash our design capability, so hard destruction or decimation would be environment is more complex. If we won in the Collins programme? folly. were spending the same percentage of Briggs lays down six roles for the Our problem is this. For the our GDP on defence as we did when new submarine beyond that of surface submarine’s capability to be optimised, I was Defence Minister, we would strike: surveillance and intelligence collaboration with the USN is essential be spending $3 billion a year more gathering; anti-submarine warfare; in new technologies. They simply will on defence. Yet in budget terms our land strike; battle space preparation not pass critical knowledge across defence expenditure is not ungenerous. (effectively preparing areas for to the Europeans or maybe even a Australia has much lower public taskforce operations); an expanded private all-Australian owner. The latter, sector/GDP ratios than the Europeans range of special forces operations; and however, might be capable of being so ours involves greater effort. a clandestine mining capability. To managed, particularly if Electric Boat Therefore we can expect no more. The which I would add anti-air capability was involved, but that would require challenge is there for our White Paper in part for its protection but maybe work before the sale of ASC. We would writers – not one wasted dollar. some other uses. We cannot put want to be sure. The Australian Naval Institute does optimal sensors, weapons systems ASC must deliver the new this country great service, composed and deployment space associated submarine. Competition is fine as it is of people who personally with all these tasks in a small hull in theory but no other builder of contributed greatly. I appreciate the with maximum survivability against submarines other than the US operates chance you have given an old Defence what may be sent against it. These on that basis and it knows only Minister to speak his mind. My ex- studies were done ad-absurdum two competitors. Cost controls are colleagues now in government want to before the Collins acquisition and the established by effective negotiation do the right thing by the country. I am environment was more benign then, with the provider. There are enough glad you want to help them. and a submarine was perceived of as equivalent operations elsewhere to having less capability. That is not to say establish effective cost controls. To small submarines are not useful, but we move away from this model means are not Singapore. reinventing a very hard won wheel, Briggs points to the following with all the problems associated with as special features of the Australian the Collins re-emerging, and the US environment. Long transits and short out of the picture. They will be loath to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 25 A Cautionary Tale – Failures of Japanese Air Power In WWII and Lessons for Australian Maritime Air Expansion1 B y LCDR MaTHEW Bradley
I cannot but recognise the remarkable power of airplanes, seeing the results of last night. These battleships [HM hS ips Prince Of Wales and Repulse] that had participated in the sinking of the Bismarck proved to be poorly equipped for a defensive battle, though they were the newest and most powerful ones. - Admiral Matome Ugaki. 2 Photo opposite: A Zero fighter from the Pacific Aviation The Fleet Air Arm will provide preponderance for a continental of communication – all contributing Museum. Used Navy with the inherent defence outlook that relied on the factors to defeat in 1945. widely in WWII, the advantages of airpower in northern sea/air gap as a natural, naval variant was a a graduated response that cost effective defence. In recent Failures of Japanese Air premier fighter in the early years of the war enhances the inherent naval years however, Australia has shifted Power characteristics of deterrence, emphasis from the geo-strategic Beyond stating that air superiority persistence, lethality and reach. towards a more expeditionary outlook was a component of the Japanese - Naval Aviation Force - Guidance. 3 that encompasses a willingness to subjugation of Manchuria and that militarily intervene in regional affairs. the limitations of Japanese Army hese two statements highlight the With the impending integration of direct support air operations against historical and future necessity maritime expeditionary assets into the Soviet Union precipitated defeat Tof air power to augment and protect the ADF, the projection of maritime in 1939, a comprehensive assessment modern maritime forces. The first forces must be fundamentally linked of the role of air power in Japanese quote illustrates the vulnerability to the ability to achieve air superiority continental ambitions is beyond the of maritime forces exposed to air to ensure that land forces are safely scope of this discussion. What can be superiority, while the latter expresses deployed. ascertained is that during the three the desirability for the burgeoning In more strategic terms, the month period after Pearl Harbor, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) integration of air power fundamentals ‘mobile concentrated air power’4 of the maritime expeditionary potential to be within maritime strategy will help Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) proved augmented by a deployable air power ensure that we never suffer from that localised command of the air was capability. an economic stranglehold from an a decisive component of successful In light of these two statements aggressor state. Japan recognised attacks against naval forces (the sinking Japanese air power development in the importance of naval aviation in of HM Ships Prince Of Wales and WWII has some important military military strategy prior to 1941, but Repulse), land forces (Malaya and and strategic lessons for the ADF preoccupation with the less critical Singapore) and strategic bombing through consideration of certain continental military threat resulted (Darwin). failures of maritime air power. in a division of resources between These examples are impressive but Prior to 1941 Japan was a maritime the army and navy that eventuated are fundamentally undermined by nation that was politically and in the failure of Japan to adequately the fact that no attack was conducted militarily focussed on a continental train personnel, sustain an air power against any air force that enjoyed parity conflict, a set of circumstances that based military posture and defend with Japan until the commencement of parallel Australia’s post Vietnam territorial possessions and sea lines carrier based warfare with the United Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 A Cautionary Tale – Failures of Japanese Air Power In WWII and Lessons for Australian Maritime Air Expansion
fleet engagement) and Mitchell (the vulnerability of capital ships to air attack) existed as a command force to promote an air power based approach to contemporary maritime warfare (and was demonstrated in the Yamamoto led IJN victories prior to Midway). This however was not translated into widespread doctrine, with surface warfare Royal Navy officers dominating the lower amphibious landing States Navy (USN). Once faced with huge losses, their air operations had command ranks of the IJN who never platform dock HMS a comparable adversary, the failure to become almost totally ineffective,’5 and fully appreciated the revolution of naval Bulwark shown visiting Hamburg in maintain this air superiority was due to failure to maintain a deployed carrier warfare that Pearl Harbor represented. Germany-photo by a critical inability to sustain offensive strike force resulted in an over reliance For army aviation, no comparable Michael Nitz air projection that was a direct result on army pilots who were inadequately leader existed to formulated strategic of force preparation; namely the trained to conduct fleet support air power usage, nor was there a development and sustainment of reconnaissance and strike activities, cadre of air experienced personnel to training systems, doctrine, technology, reflecting a critical loss of focus on the champion an independent air force. tactics and command and control. concerted maritime offensive strategy Hence, army aviation and later ground of 1941.6 based IJN air forces, were rendered Aircrew Training subservient to ground forces and Although sufficient Japanese pilots Command Appreciation of subsumed in direct tactical direct were recruited to serve during WWII, Air Power support dogma. 9 the reconstitution of IJN assets and In the years prior to Pearl Harbor, personnel lost at the Battle of Midway Admiral Yamamoto was cognisant Technological and (June 1942) was severely restricted due of the risks of going to war with Doctrinal Development to fuel shortages and priority allocation America. After a decade of continental The development until 1941 of of resources to the land campaign military strategy against China, the maritime aviation extended to the in China. Without replacement, prospect of simultaneously attacking building of an extensive carrier force, experienced aircrew remained Western interests in Asia and the development of aviation technologies deployed, further compounding the Pacific indicated to him that victory and training of aviation personnel. limitations of providing adequate could not be achieved through ‘any Even though this mantra of air power training staff forab-initio pilots and ordinary strategy’, but rather through appeared ascendant in Japan’s overall increasing the risk of losing the most a joint maritime/air offensive.7 A long military strategy, it was fundamentally experienced aviators in battle. time advocate of naval aviation, he undercut by command elements within Training of a carrier pilot was was often at odds with traditional IJN the IJN that still believed in the primacy thorough and routinely took six Mahanian doctrine of defeat of the of the battleship. This preponderance Isoroku Yamamoto months; therefore the loss enemy through decisive capital ship with traditional naval warfare allowed of aircraft and personnel battle. Given that he spent the majority vital material resources to be diverted without replacement was a of the 1920s in America it is feasible from carrier and aircraft production ‘considerable blow’ to IJN that he would have studied General to build capital warships that fatally tactics, and resulted, by William Mitchell’s air power theories undermined the ability of the IJN to mid 1942, in the decline of as a precursor to his own advocacy project air power beyond the inevitable the average skill base of the and training of carrier based offensive attrition of war against the USA. Japanese aircrew to the point operations.8 This preponderance also extended where Allied pilots could It is interesting therefore to to the IJN leadership which, with claim professional superiority. hypothesise that in one individual an the death of Yamamoto, ignored ‘Despite great sacrifice and appreciation of Mahan (the decisive fundamental appreciation and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
28 A Cautionary Tale – Failures of Japanese Air Power In WWII and Lessons for Australian Maritime Air Expansion
significant repercussions for IJN aviation by removing the inherent flexibility of a mobile concentration of aviation force, the placement of naval aviation forces at the behest of a separate command structure incorporating the Japanese Army had further significant impact on operations. US Navy, Dock Landing Ship USS application of air power doctrine that of the air power strategy that had Command and Control Whidbey Island by is inherent to an air power specialist to facilitated Japanese military successes.12 Command integrity between the Michael Nitz take advantage of and develop Japan’s This willingness to sacrifice lives was a Japanese armed forces was very poor, extant aviation industry. In the words trait of the Japanese Bushido military and during the course of WWII, Army of Yamamoto, the decision to attack culture, and ignored greater strategic and Navy Chiefs of Staff would only America was a total risk that accepted advantage in maintaining a Fleet in meet on an ad hoc basis to discuss the possibility of total annihilation of Being and organic air capability.13 issues of mutual interest.16 This Japan’s military,10 but the willingness Specifically; whilst the IJN maintained arrangement reflects the disparate to accept this risk was testament to a blue water aviation capability it still continental versus maritime strategies the lack of strategic appreciation that posed a threat to the USN Pacific of 1941, but the requirement for allowed doctrinal and technological advance, but in the absence of this the IJN to provide direct support development (the capability edge) to capability the USN was afforded total to Japanese Army forces stationed cease. freedom of action. in the Pacific defensive perimeter mandated a theatre joint command Maintaining a Capability L oss of Organic Air Support to ensure adequate utilisation of Edge Japan’s defensive perimeter would aviation assets. This arrangement While the success of the initial IJN have required at least three times was never established and resulted campaign rested on its capacity the number of aircraft available in in a fundamentally different ‘trend to project air power, the failure of 1944 to adequately defend itself.14 of thought’ between Army and Navy doctrinal development affected the In the absence of this aviation force commands, even when assets were co technological and training expansion and carrier groups the IJN made a located on land.17 For example, the required to sustain war beyond 1943. strategic decision in mid 1944 to Philippines Combined Base Air Force Although naval conflict between the remove aviation forces from sea based Commander (Vice Admiral Fukudome) IJN and USN was sporadic following platforms to achieve localised support attempted to coordinate aviation the Battle of Midway, IJN defeats at in defending critical island bases.15 operations beyond the army centric Guadalcanal in November 1942, the The result of this was twofold: in one tasking to ‘drive back any attempt Marianas in June 1944 and the Taiwan/ instance the amalgamation of aviation at landing by the enemy’ in order to Philippine defence of October 1944 assets, such as occurred in Taiwan support IJN forces. reflected a growing technological at the beginning of October 1944, Unable to satisfactorily control army gap between the opposing forces and allowed USN Carrier strike groups the units, Fukudome was forced to turn ‘a facilitated American strategic bombing discretion of concentration of force to deaf ear to those requests [for maritime objectives to undermine Japanese destroy the ground based aircraft in reconnaissance and strike] and decided industrial infrastructure.11 these locations. that the best way protection [sic] I The Philippine engagement was of Secondly, ground based aircraft could give… would be to concentrate particular importance as IJN strategy became subject to the vagaries of my entire air force in attacking [the involved drawing the USN into decisive tropical and island meteorological USN] Task Force…’.18 Thus when fleet engagement through the sacrifice conditions resulting in a state of these search assets were required by of remaining carrier assets, thus tactical impotence in poor weather. the IJN, inadequate command and representing the final abandonment Although both these aspects had control led to a critical breakdown in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 29
aviation asset tasking and the promised ADF has limited capability to rapidly complement this, the ADF sponsors concentration of aviation forces was expand material capability and asserts a highly selective aircrew training never achieved due to inclement the assumption ‘of support from program that emphasises technical tropical weather.19 allies and coalition partners in major mastery as a core component of the conflicts.’21 Can the ADF always rely mandate of professional mastery. Australian Maritime on coalition partners to provide and While this system is deemed sufficient Air Power Expansion – augment capabilities in a time of in regional non warlike and niche Lessons from the Japanese conflict? If not, is the ADF materially coalition operations, it ignores the Experience and doctrinally prepared to conduct critical vulnerability of maintaining While the Japanese experience expeditionary operations within a small professional workforce to the could be ignored by the ADF as range of an aggressive air power? threat of attrition. lessons applicable only to a historical Perhaps within this consideration is After Midway, the IJN capability footnote of total war and national the pertinent lesson of the IJN and edge of superior training and survival, it behoves air professionals Yamamoto; that no one theory or experience was subsumed by the to appreciate these factors as relevant military service is pre-eminent and inability to draw on professional when ADF material purchases that the judicious application and reserves or an expanded training such as the Landing Helicopter integration of joint doctrine and pipeline to provide workforce depth Dock (LHD) provide a capability to technologies (as follows) may be a to sustain a cycle of operationally project battalion size army units and formula for future military success. experienced aviators providing ab- associated air assets, command and initio training. To counter this, the support staff beyond geo-strategic Training Systems ADF could consider sponsoring cadet reach.20 Even at the lowest level of Current ADF policy as indicated by style ab-initio training programs that the whole-of-government approach, the whole-of-government approach would provide a pool basically trained Australian expeditionary doctrine dictates the utilisation of all aspects of reserve personnel that could be drawn must be developed as basis for regional Australian national power to counter upon to train to military requirement USS Essex conducts engagement with a credible, protected state and non-state threats. Within to increase the potential uniformed a beach landing force as a centrepiece for strategic this policy is the requirement to workforce available to the ADF at a rehearsal during options. maintain a highly professional aviation time of crisis. Within this system would Exercise Talisman Like the Japanese in WWII, the force as part of a capability edge.22 To be a core of specialised aircrew who Saber could be retained outside of the military construct of promotion, posting and deployment cycles to augment instructors who have more recent operational experience. Alternatively, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) that bypass the extensive pilot training syllabus but still provide capability edge Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities could also mitigate the risk to ADF air power in a conflict of attrition.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 A Cautionary Tale – Failures of Japanese Air Power In WWII and Lessons for Australian Maritime Air Expansion
Developing Joint Air Power be expected to be conducted outside Recognition of the critical Professionals of the effective operating range of interdependence of sea control An important component of training land based strike assets. Use of this and offensive air power to facilitate systems is the ongoing development capability in this manner invokes land operations is fundamental to of post graduate professional high risk considerations that cannot successful expeditionary operations, knowledge.23 Development of be mitigated by current embarked so ideally Service integration should aircrew beyond operational flight aviation capabilities. If operations be established prior to operational training ensures that a comprehensive were countenanced against a credible requirements within an expeditionary understanding of air power’s air power, in order to avoid the doctrine that confronts a broad characteristics, advantages and defeat suffered by the IJN, doctrine spectrum of threats and non warlike vulnerabilities permeates the ADF must be developed to facilitate situations. The ideal of a seamless force command chain at mid level and higher initial expeditionary operations to would recommend the establishment management. By removing a systemic secure forward operating bases, of a permanent expeditionary frailty that is reliant on the personality or alternatively, a manned Short command element at sea that would and drive of the individual (such as Takeoff Vertical Landing (STOVL) or incorporate land, sea and air power Yamamoto), widespread understanding reconnaissance/strike UAS must be professionals to avoid IJN related of doctrine and capabilities will ensure procured to exploit the LHD ‘ski ramp’ ignorance of air power tenets, that ‘the unique qualities of air power configuration that can support a fixed establish an expeditionary professional are effectively integrated into joint wing capability.25 experience cadre, and facilitate an operations.’ A fixed wing strike aircraft would immediate deployable capability for At the level of capability provide a credible capability for afloat theatre air campaign planning.29 development, professional masters persistent effect through physical and can provide the advice required by virtual pressure that would augment a Conclusion government officials to make educated whole-of-government intent to meet The root cause of the Japanese defeat decisions regarding technology the ‘complex security challenges of in the Pacific theatre extends to acquisitions and force development the 21st Century.’26 If these options are systemic failures that undermined and employment. At the tactical level, not countenanced, then the utilisation any capacity to sustain a maritime developing an experienced cadre of of the contemporary strike force war of attrition. The IJN air power aviation mission commanders who of Hornets and Super Hornets, in failures of inadequate training can apply their experience and status flight fuelling and (eventually) AEW regimes, professional/doctrinal as warfare officers to integrate within Wedgetails will limit the national development, technological capability, a Joint Operations Command (JOC) strategy to low-end expeditionary joint command and control and the and/or an afloat Air Operations Centre deployment until embarked air power resultant abandonment of embarked (AOC) will ensure that expeditionary strike technologies are secured.27 aviation capabilities damaged activities command structures are fully within a maritime theatre reliant on cognisant of aviation capabilities.24 Centralised Command and joint operations for successful defence. With the advent of the LHD and Control For the ADF, the imminent proposal to utilise bespoke army and The limitations demonstrated by technological and material expansion navy capabilities, the presence of the Japanese WWII experience mirrors the development of the IJN experienced and articulate air power of disparate commands failing to experience and an appreciation of professionals can only facilitate ease of adequately coordinate maritime air history can help avoid repetition operations. operations is a possible factor in future of these errors. To achieve this, ADF operations. It is envisaged that expeditionary air power must be Organic Air and Task Group within the LHD a deployable theatre wielded as part of a coherent national Survivability command will be incorporated to strategy that exploits the relative merits Despite promoting a technological provide ‘an unprecedented level of of ground and sea based maritime capability edge such as Early Warning command and control… through the aviation. This will require recognition (AEW) and ISR as a means of providing onboard joint headquarters,’28 but this that, if the ADF assumes a mandate soft protection to ADF maritime will not be a permanently embarked of expeditionary operations, air forces, expeditionary operations can capability. professionals must be integrated within Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 31
(Endnotes) p. 503. Citing differences in culture the development of this capability. 1 Originally submitted as part of the and terminologies with Army aviation, Defence of expeditionary units Advanced Air Power Course. Fukudome notes the pinnacle of joint 2 M, Ugaki, Fading Victory: The Diary aviation operations in the Philippines as in hostile waters will challenge the of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945, coordination of different takeoff times. ADF to develop systems that can (Pittsburgh, 1991), pp. 49-50. 19 USSBS, (Vice Admiral Ozawa), 3 Royal Australian Navy, The Navy 222-225. ‘Lack of air power, I feel, was the provide sufficient aviation support Strategy: Charting the Course to 2025, weakest point. I knew in advance that lack required to fight in maritime warfare (Canberra, 2007), p. 19. of air power was the main drawback to the 4 Air Power Studies Centre, Japanese operation.’ See also USSBS, op. cit., (Captain environment. In a region of escalating Air Power 1919-1945: A Study in military Ohmae), p. 160. military technologies and capabilities, Dysfunction, (digital resource, date accessed: 20 K. Gillis, ‘Landing Helicopter Dock 03 April 2008), p. 18. Project – Canberra Class’, Defence Today, it behoves the ADF to ensure that 5 O. Tagaya, ‘The Imperial Japanese Air (Strike Publications, November/December vulnerable expeditionary units are Forces’, (Air Power Development Centre 2007), p. 28. ‘It will transform how the digital resource, date accessed: 03 April Australian Army deploys, how Army deployed within a technologically 2008), p. 193. Aviation operates in the field, and how advanced, well trained and integrated 6 United States Strategic Bombing the Commonwealth Government thinks Survey (Pacific), ‘Interrogations of Japanese about deploying into our closer area of air power doctrine. Officials’, (Naval Analysis Division, 1945, responsibility.’ http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/ 21 Air Power Development Centre – USSBS/IJO/index.html, date accessed: Australia, The Air Power Manual AAP 1000- 13 September 2007) (Vice Admiral D, (Tuggeranong, 2007), p. 30. Fukudome), p. 519. Inadequately trained 22 APDC, pp. 96-101. to the extent that during the period 23 Organisations such as the School of Fukudome’s tenure as Commander of Air Warfare are particularly committed Second Air Fleet ashore in the Philippines, to the development of post graduate approximately 3000 aircraft were lost, the professional development for tri-service majority through misadventure directly aviation personnel through courses such attributable to poor training, ‘the greater as targeting and weaponeering that will part of the total loss was traceable to other augment a mandate to develop mission than air combat.’ command excellence. 7 S. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl 24 APDC, pp. 30-33. Harbor, The Imperial Japanese Navy and the 25 Gillis, ‘The fact is that we now have United States, (Annapolis, 2006), p. 281. a platform that has a ski ramp and there is 8 Asada, p. 184. interoperability. It can be certified, it may 9 Tagaya, p. 181. happen [fixed wing capability] but it is not in 10 Asada, p. 282, also p. 289. Including the project task or contemplated at present.’ warnings from IJN air staff commanders 26 APDC, pp. 54-56 and 72-76. (the air power professionals) that they were 27 A. Davies, Issues for the Australian ‘not confident about war with the United Air Combat Review, (Australian Strategic States.’ Policy Institute, January 2008) 11 D.C. James, ‘American and Japanese 28 Gillis,. An interesting division of Strategies in the Pacific War’, in P. Paret tasking for one unit that raises the question (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, from as to the desirability to dual employ a C2 Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton, platform as the primary Amphibious Task 1986), pp. 713-717. Group asset. 12 USSBS, op. cit., (Rear Admiral 29 APDC, p. 24. Takata) p. 265-266. Specifically they were to ‘draw off Halsey’s Task Force to the north even though defenceless under attack so that our own land-based planes could attack Halsey.’ 13 Sea Power Centre – Australia, Australian Maritime Doctrine, (Canberra, 2000), p. 149. ‘The use of options provided by the continued existence of one’s own fleet LCDR Bradley joined the RAN in 1993. to constrain the enemy’s options in the use of his.’ Initially qualified as a Seaman Officer, 14 USSBS, (Vice Admiral Fukudome), he completed Observer training in p. 523. 15 USSBS, (Rear Admiral Matsuda), p. 1999 and has operated in a number 278. See also USSBS, op. cit., (Vice Admiral Fukudome) p. 507. of theatres including Bougainville, 16 USSBS, (Vice Admiral Weneker (Kriegsmarine)), p. 285. Solomon Islands, Iraq, Sumatra and 17 USSBS, (Vice Admiral Ozawa), p. Timor Leste. He is currently serving at 225. See also USSBS, op. cit., (Rear Admiral Takata) p. 264, ‘Army and Navy forces were the School of Air Warfare as the Senior to cooperate as closely as possible; the air forces and the surface forces were to Naval Officer RAAF East Sale and will cooperate. No single control was erected, but close cooperation was made.’ undertake ACSC in 2009. 18 USSBS, (Vice Admiral Fukudome),
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32
RA LIBERTAD is a tall ship which serves as a school ship in the Argentine Navy. She was built in the 1950s at the Rio ASantiago shipyards near Buenos Aires, Argentina. Her maiden voyage was in 1962, and she continues to be a school ship with yearly instruction voyages for the graduating naval cadets.
The Argentine Ship ARA LIBERTAD (Armada de la República Argentina) pulls into the port at Garden Island, Sydney.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 33
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 Finding The Lost Submarine: The Mystery of AE1 byG S rAHAM eAL
…Wrapped in the ocean boundless, Where the tides are scarcely stirred, In deeps that are still and boundless, They perished unseen, unheard …
From ‘Missing’ by Will Lawson, 1914
he oldest mystery of Australian naval history revolves around Tthe fate of submarine AE1. Together with AE2 she was the first submarine to be purchased by the fledgling Commonwealth government and undertook a record- AE1 leaving the making voyage to Australia in 1914. Minister Deakin became convinced navigational bridge built over the docks in Barrow, UK. After arranging to return to port of their value and ignored the conning tower made them ideal for Photo courtesy HMAS at Kokopo (then Herbertshohe) in negative advice of Australian Naval patrol and reconnaissance work, the Stirling New Britain on September 14, AE1’s Commandant Captain WR Creswell, role in which AE1 was engaged when thirty-five officers and crew sailed who recommended the purchase of she disappeared. into a sea mist and were never seen destroyers rather than submarines. At just over 54 meters, E boats again. Since then there have been The Commonwealth government were lengthier than most of their many speculations about her fate paid just over £105,000 for each boat, predecessors. They were also heavier and a number of attempts to locate taking delivery from the builders but faster, able to achieve speeds the wreckage. Forgotten though AE1 in Barrow-in-Furness in January of 15 knots on the surface and was in the ensuing events of the war, 1914. Six weeks later AE1 and AE2 nine knots dived. Their propulsion her brief life and the unexplained were commissioned into the Royal depended on two six-cylinder diesels circumstances of her loss made Australian Navy, their 35-man crews and two electric motors. They were an extraordinary impact on the having joined the boats early the armed with four torpedo tubes, one Australian public and still have the same month.1 at the bow, one at the stern and two power to move us today. The E class submarines had on the beam, providing the facility to In December 1910 an Australian been developed from earlier British fire at right angles as well as from the nation less than one-decade old, designs, themselves based on the bow and stern.2 Later E boats were ordered two submarines from the American Holland boats of the fitted with deck guns, but AE1 and Vickers Maxim shipyards at Barrow- 1890s. After much technical and AE2 had none. in-Furness. These were to be boats engineering experimentation, trial For the first time ever, these of the British E class, their national and error and some notable disasters, submarines were also fitted with designation heralded in the prefix ‘A’. the submarine was just beginning gyroscopes and primitive Marconi There had been a strong debate in to become a serviceable weapon of wireless equipment, the aerial Australian and British defence circles war, even though few people had mounted on a wooden frame that was about the value of submarines and any idea how they might best be folded down when diving. Wireless even a report recommending against deployed. The general seaworthiness had not been included in the original their use. But after representing and observational values of the Australian specifications for the Australia at the 1907 Colonial two periscopes carried by the E submarines. As a communications Conference in London, Prime class submarines, together with the technology for submarines it was at Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 35
the experimental stage, unreliable underwater experience through a Submarine Squadron but had a and dependent on a cumbersome rigorous training regime and need for reputation as a capable and cautious and fragile wooden aerial mast high physical attributes. officer, suggesting he would have that required lowering and raising Besant had joined the Royal Navy taken no unnecessary risks with his whenever the craft submerged or as a midshipman in 1898 at the age command. Like his First Lieutenant surfaced. of 15. He saw action in China during The Honourable Leopold Scarlett and The inside of these narrow the Boxer Rebellion and later became ‘Third Hand’ Lieutenant Charles L machines was around seven meters deeply interested in the development Moore, Besant was a single man. wide and crammed with pipes, of submarines.4 A Freemason, he was The sister submarines began their levers and torpedos. Officers and interested in horses, fishing and golf. pioneering voyage from England to crews necessarily lived in close He was redundantly described by the Australia on the morning of March quarters in the cramped conditions, newspapers in Sydney as ‘a clean- 7, 1914, escorted by the masted reading, playing cards and, on AE1, shaven young officer of youthful cruiser HMAS Eclipse built in 1894. occasionally making music on a appearance’. If his other utterances They were still largely top-secret couple of concertinas.3 Even with were accurately reported, he was also experimental craft, with the need the necessary no smoking rule, the an enthusiastic spokesman for the for constant attention to defects and limited air quickly becoming polluted submariner’s occupation: non-performing machinery. AE1 had while underwater. been subjected to balancing tests In these circumstances, leadership ‘… it’s not all beer and skittles and before leaving England, the results of and morale were even more perhaps it is a harder life than which suggested that there may have important considerations than usual in other branches of the service been problems.6 and the commanding officers and but it’s the life I’ve chosen. Oh, AE2 had many mishaps. Only crews were carefully chosen. English- yes, it’s dangerous if you want to three days from Portsmouth a blade born Lieutenant Thomas Fleming look at it like that but it’s got to fell off her port propeller and the Besant, RN, became the commander be done – and every man in the starboard propeller suffered the same AE1 with HMAS of AE1, and Irishman Lieutenant Navy, no matter in what branch problem three weeks later. Even Australia and Henry Hugh Gordon Dacre Stoker, he is in, has to be prepared to the spare propeller was found to be HMAS Yarra in the background, in RN, commanded AE2. Their meet danger when it comes.’5 faulty, with a large crack appearing, September 1914 a few crews were Royal Navy and Royal it was mostly thought, from days before her loss- 7 Australian Navy men, the senior Besant was very young to be made poor manufacturing techniques . photo courtesy HMAS sailors in particular selected for their Commander of the Australian Officers and crew dealt with these Stirling naval base
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36
Finding The Lost Submarine: The Mystery of AE1
problems with stoic inventiveness: ‘Through a long list of mechanical difficulties and mishaps overcome by hook and crook, the miles were pushed astern, the weariness of it but lightly relieved by a few days in ports of call…’, wrote Stoker Charles Suckling in his diary.8 These incidents caused a great deal of practical difficulty, much paperwork and considerable repairing when the submarines reached Gibraltar late on 6 March. AE2 with AE1 inboard They sailed for Malta on 9 March. cracked.9 The ships then made a they left for Jakarta (then still called at Garden Island AE1 broke down during the voyage good passage to Colombo where Batavia). Here they were entertained (RAN photo) and had to be towed due to one of Eclipse was relieved by the Town- by the Dutch authorities until their many malfunctions of the exhaust class light cruiser HMS Yarmouth. departure for Darwin on April 28. and intake valve springs, engine Partly under tow, AE1 and AE2 sailed While travelling through the clutches, toggle bolts and overheating to Singapore, meeting with their treacherous currents of the Lombok of the motor shaft and bearings that Australian escort HMAS Sydney on Strait, Sydney and the submarines plagued the vessel. Three days later April 21. Conditions had improved almost collided while AE1 was both submarines left Malta for a little for the crew, as Engine Room under tow. An electrical problem rough passage to Port Said. As the Artificer John Marsland, later lost in aboard AE1 jammed the rudder. The small convoy passed through the Suez AE1, wrote in his diary of the voyage: submarine began to yaw and her Canal and the Red Sea, temperatures ‘The heat in the submarine is now towrope parted, hampering Sydney’s inside the submarines sometimes almost unbearable.’10 steering. AE2 had luckily dropped reached 100 degrees Fahrenheit Unfortunately, the Royal astern of AE1 and narrowly avoided (almost 38 degrees Celsius). AE1 was Australian Navy had been ill prepared collision with her sister submarine painted white in an effort to reduce to host the novelty of submarines as AE1 swung out of control. AE2’s the heat. and there was no accommodation steering then jammed, almost forcing An improvised but effective aboard Sydney for the submarine her aground. After restoring the refitting of AE2’s starboard propeller crews while in port, the men having helm, AE2 moved ahead of Sydney, in Aden involved placing the to remain aboard their cramped only to be almost run down by the anchor chains of Eclipse across the and torrid craft. To make matters escort as she struggled to remove submarine’s bow then the flooding worse, Sydney coaled with poor AE1’s broken tow-wire from her the forward ballast tanks. This forced quality fuel, her cinders and sparks rudder the stern to rise high enough for blowing back onto the submarines With a triple disaster averted divers from the submarines’ crews to under tow, causing discomfort and through astute seamanship aboard fit the spare propeller, itself already navigational difficulties. On April 25 the submarines, they arrived safely Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 37
at Darwin on May 5. After two days was still the stuff of science fiction for were still being refitted from their that included ‘a very large number the general public. record-breaking journey when taking advantage of the opportunity As senior officer, Lieutenant war between Britain and Germany of landing on Australian soil for Commander Besant was interviewed was declared on August 5 1914. the first time’11, they left for Cairns by the newspapers and seems to have Australian ships were tasked to attack where they spent five days, heading become something of a minor media Germany’s East Asiatic Cruiser for Sydney on May 18. Following celebrity. Reporter for the Sydney Squadron under the command delays caused by bad weather and Morning Herald wrote: of Vice-Admiral Count von Spee. ‘angry waves’, as Marsland described The repaired submarines, with them, AE1 and AE2 sailed through The submarines stood barely their parent ship Upolo, joined an Sydney Heads at 6 in the morning of five feet above the waterline Australian flotilla near Rabaul, New Empire Day – May 24 – docking at (save for the bridge and conning Britain (then the main island of what Garden Island. The two vessels had tower, rising some ten feet was German New Guinea) as part accomplished the longest submarine higher), and only a naval officer of the hunt for the enemy ships and voyage ever undertaken. Even though who has made a submarine his the capture of Rabaul and the Bita under tow for around a third of the home and loves every bit of her, Paka radio station. On 14 September distance, they and their crews had would contend that she’s a lady, AE1 and Parramatta were patrolling covered almost 21 000 kilometres, like ‘the liner’. There are such together near Cape Gazelle in case ‘a significant feat of seamanship and men. You have only to talk to von Spee’s cruisers appeared. The engineering’12, even acknowledged by Lieutenant-Commander Besant, ship and submarine – called a ‘devil the mighty London Times. Marsland who has charge of AE1, for a few fish’ by the indigenous Wirian people wrote in his diary with a justifiable moments, and you discover it. It – were exchanging visual signals note of satisfaction that they had is nine years since he joined the until shortly before AE1 was last seen ‘completed a most wonderful journey submarine service, and he has just before 3.30pm.17 Parramatta of endurance, both for men and lived a fair proportion of that returned to AE1’s last known position engines.’13 time under water.15 but did not sight the submarine. Although the arrival of AE1 and Assuming that AE1 was returning AE2 in Sydney had been muted due The citizens of Sydney were greatly to harbour as planned, Parramatta to the delay and the fact that most impressed by the arrival of these made for Herbertshohe, anchoring residents were celebrating Empire intriguing new craft in their harbour at 7pm. Day, it was not long before the press and provided their officers with a An hour later AE1 had still and public became fascinated by civic reception. There was patriotic not returned and Australian Fleet these bizarre machines of the deep. applause when Besant stated that Commander Rear Admiral Patey No one was allowed aboard, as the 30 of the submariners of AE1 and ordered a search for the missing submarines were still top-secret AE2 were Australian and that the submarine. Encounter, Parramatta, weapons. This simply made people submarines were important elements Warego and Yarra spent the next inquisitive and the crowds came of Australia’s naval defences. Officers two days combing the area. Yarra and stared anyway, their interest and crew then enjoyed their first damaged her propellers on a shoal stimulated by the press reports, extended periods of shore leave, in the poorly charted waters west which played on the secretive aspects including beaches, clubs, sporting of the primary Duke of York Island, of the boats, as well as their unusual events and general socialising. Stoker, further reducing the effectiveness appearance and operation, with who liked to present himself as a of Patey’s squadron. AE1 was not phrases and sub-headings such as ‘philanderer’, moved in more exalted found, nor was any wreckage and it ‘strange looking craft and ‘the Home social circles than did the submarine was determined to convene a Board of Secrets’.14 Jules Verne’s famous crews, or even Besant. He provides of Inquiry. For unknown reasons, fantasy, 20 00 Leagues Under the Sea, a vignette of the experience in his though perhaps due to the urgency of had only appeared in English for the autobiography, Straws in the Wind, the war situation, this was never held. first time in 1873, so the concept declaring Sydney ‘the most attractive Instead Lieutenant Stoker of AE2 of living and travelling in a self- city to live in I have ever seen.’16 was asked for his expert opinions as contained capsule beneath the sea Two months later, AE1 and AE2 to what might have happened. His Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38
Finding The Lost Submarine: The Mystery of AE1 speculations were contained in a prefaces his diary reads, in part: only clues we possess report he made from Suva a month to the manner in which later. The possibility of enemy attack ‘To the memory of our sister the AE1 came to her was dismissed, as was a breakdown ship AE1, and her crew, Lost end, and they are by no leading to her being swept away. September 14th, 1914 in St. means conclusive. Stoker considered that the most likely Georges Channel, between causes of her disappearance were that German New Guinea and New Whether she was she had either suffered a catastrophic Ireland. We took the first patrol actually sunk by a mechanical failure while dived or had on the 13th, they took the second shot from the enemy, been wrecked on one of the many next day. We came back, they whether an unseen treacherous reefs in the area. In the didn’t. The path of our duty pinnacle of coral ripped absence of any further solid evidence, became the high-way of mystery open her plates, or the the speculations began and have for they never came back. They lie pumps refused to do continued ever since.18 coffined in the deep, keeping their their work in bringing In his diary, AB Wheat aboard silent watch at Australia’s North the vessel again to the AE2 recorded that ‘The cause of her Passage, heroes all.’22 surface after a dive, will disappearance is still a mystery’ and probably remain forever also speculated along the same lines Similar speculations appeared in the unknown.23 as Stoker’s official report. Wheat, and Australian press. The Sydney Morning probably his fellow crewmen, thought Herald published a not very accurate Other press reports reveal the impact that AE1 might have been sunk by an account from a ‘special corespondent’ that the loss of AE1 produced. The old tug armed with a five-barrelled in Rabaul: Sydney Morning Herald of September Nordenfeldt gun. When the burnt- 21 contained a lengthy account, out and beached wreckage of this The tragedy of the AE1 together with the official statement vessel was discovered it was thought is the first loss that on the incident and the Minister’s that she might have surprised the Australian Navy Tribute. The Prime Minister’s AE1, which had no deck gun. The has sustained, and the sympathies were extended and possibility of a mine was discounted magnitude seems all there were sections on the crew and due to diligent sweeping of the area. the grimmer for the officers, including Artificer Lowe Wheat included the suggestion that atmosphere of mystery and Commander (as he was styled) AE1 may have overtrimmed due to which surrounds it. Besant. The section of the report having one of her motors disabled detailing the history of the ill-fated – ‘that is had not buoyancy enough On the afternoon of submarine once again focussed on with her one remaining motor to 15th September the her top-secret nature.24 give complete control and finally submarine was sighted Far away in Western Australia she had become unmanageable and off Gazelle Point, the loss was hardly less muted. The sank.’19 Given the troubled trimming south of Herbertshohe, Western Mail carried a photograph procedures of AE1 in England and heading in the direction of AE1 titled ‘The Lost Australian AE2’s later stability problems in the of Rabaul. She was Submarine’25 and reprinted the Dardanelles, this is perhaps the most never seen again. expressions of sympathy and likely explanation for the loss of condolence from near and far, Australia’s first submarine.20 A strange patch of oil including those from New Zealand The failure of the search to reveal floating on the quiet and from the Commanders in Chief anything of AE1’s fate hit the officers surface of the water, of the East Indies and China. Also and men of AE2 especially hard. a nameless schooner, included was the official statement Wheat wrote that it ‘cast a great with a gun mounting from the Navy Board, noting that gloom over us as we all had friends from which the gun was ‘ … although our men did not fall who had gone and we were the missing, discovered on by the hand of the enemy, they fell only two submarines in Southern the coast in flames and on active service, and in defence of Waters‘.21 The Dedication that sinking - these are the their Empire, and their names will be Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 39
enshrined with those of heroes.’26 leaping The ship without a name, the luckless As well as a strong popular Afar o’er the seas she sped’ AE-1. reaction to Australia’s first casualties Patrolling the long swells sweeping Yet were her sailor’s lives no less for of the war, there was considerable With the sunlit clouds o’erhead. Empire lost, dismay in official circles. AE1 and One touch of the hand that steered And mothers, sweethearts, wives her sister submarine had arrived her, must pay the bitter cost. in Sydney to some fanfare in the She answered swift to her helm; Australia’s warships sweep the broad press and a great deal of community Yet the scattered spray that cleaned Pacific main, interest. Not only were they the her But one from out the deep will never country’s first submarines, they Could smother her and o’erwhelm. rise again. were also tantalisingly top secret And, into the depths that bind her, Yet we shall not forget, through all and, at the time, novel fighting She plunged with a swirling run. the years that run, machines. AE1’s disappearance We may seek, but we shall not find The fate that she has met - Goodbye caused an outpouring of public her, to AE-1. grief and commemorative activity. Or the crew of the AE1. There were messages of sympathy Pent in their iron cell, they sank from the King and Queen and from The cruisers were dimly creping beneath the wave, Winston Churchill in his role of First Like ghosts ‘neath a dawnlit sky, Untouched by shot or shell, they Lord of the Admiralty. The Royal Seeking, searching and sweeping; drifted to the grave. Australian Navy produced a black- But the deeps made no reply, Until their painful breath at last edged memorial booklet and special Hour after hour they waited began to fail; payments and arrangements were For the lift of a conning tower, Upon their way to death let pity draw made for the wives and families of the And a periscope that vibrated the veil. officers and crew.27 To her engines eager power, They could not strike one blow, but It was a pre-radio and television Or gleam of a white wake hissing out of sound and sight age in which poetry was still an In the rose of the rising sun. Of comrade or of foe they passed to important form of public as well They have posted them sadly endless night; as private expression. A number ‘Missing’ – Deep down on Ocean’s floor, far from of poems were composed in The crew of the AE1. the wind and sun, commemoration of the tragedy. They rest for evermore - Goodbye to Will Lawson (no relation to Henry When Australia’s brave sea story AE-1 Lawson) penned one simply titled Is written and told, we know ‘Missing’, published in the Victorian Their names will be lit with glory; A harder fate was their’s than men’s Education Department’s The School And, wherever the six stars go, who fight and die, Paper: Wherever, with bugles blowing But still Australia cares, and will not Australian flag shall wave, pass them by; They heard no clamour of battle, It will tell of a dark tide flowing When Honour’s lists are read, their No charging squadron’s cheers; O’er a lonely ocean grave. names will surely be No murderous Maxim’s rattle And the sound of women weeping Among the gallant dead who fought Was dinned in their dying ears; For husband, lover and son, to keep us free. For wrapped in the ocean boundless Shall stir them not in their sleeping – Their winding-sheet is steel, their Where the tides are scarcely stirred The crew of the AE1.28 sepulchre is wide; In deeps that are still and soundless, Theirs is a Monument of History, They perished unseen, unheard. Another poem on a similar theme, begun O! brave are the heroes, dying titled ‘To the Men of AE1 Entombed When down to death they went - ‘Mid thunder of the charge and gun; But Not Forgotten’ by Del M’Cay Goodbye to AE-1. But our half-mast flags are flying appeared in the Sydney Sun.29 For the crew of the AE1. These expressions of grief and She faced no battle flame, she heard remembrance echoed the public Lean hull through the light waves no German gun, shock at the loss of AE1, along with Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40
Finding The Lost Submarine: The Mystery of AE1 the concern in official circles. But Memorial Chapel, is the only tangible sharks prevented a thorough survey the fate of the submarine and her acknowledgement in the southern of another promising feature. The crew would soon be forgotten by hemisphere of the sacrifice made following year, Foster tried once more most as the even greater tragedies by the men of AE1.30 Unfortunately, but was again frustrated. of the war unfolded. The lost the plaque was evidently prepared He and the documentary makers submarine quickly faded from in haste, or perhaps from inaccurate then managed to convince the the pages of the newspapers and information as it contains at least Australian Broadcasting Corporation AE1’s sister submarine sailed to the four and possibly more errors, to fund an investigation of the Mediterranean. AE2 became the first including misspelling the surnames most likely area for finding AE1. to ‘force the Dardanelles’, penetrating of crewmen Smail, Marsland and This expedition included marine the Narrows section of the Hodgkin31. archaeologist Jeremy Green of Dardanelles and entering the Sea of A few years later John Foster, the Western Australian Maritime Marmara. Here she engaged Turkish a RAN Commander, now retired, Museum whose experience with warships and was eventually scuttled began a serious search for the lost the high technology of modern after being forced to surface due to submarine. Working in Papua New wreck searches was invaluable. But unexplained trimming problems. Her Guinea as a naval officer in the yet again, the hopes of Foster and officers and crew spent the rest of the 1970s, Foster first heard that a local his collaborators were dashed as war as prisoners of the Turks, four of crayfish diver thought that he had this expedition failed to locate the them never to emerge from captivity. seen a submarine on the sea floor. submarine. AE2 first engaged the enemy at the He obtained the official RAN files Foster held further consultation same moment as the original Anzacs on AE2 and was astounded to find with the Wirian people, which were landing at what has since that most of them had not been included his being initiated as an become known as Gallipoli on the opened since 1919, and then only to honorary clan member. The Wirian other western side of the Dardanelles make administrative corrections.32 told him that they thought he was peninsula. The Gallipoli campaign He managed to convince the Navy looking in the wrong place. Oral was a failure, but culminated in a to allow him to make a side-scan tradition and the experience of local triumphant withdrawal in December, sonar search from HMAS Flinders in fishermen dragging their weighted 1915. The following year the horrors 1976. A promising contact was made nets across a metal object on the of trench warfare were taken to but was unable to be investigated. bottom suggested that there was their worst level on the Somme and Subsequent publicity about the a wreck a little outside the area in subsequent actions involving search resulted in a number of that Foster and his expeditions had Australian troops. In the mounting descendants of AE1’s crew contacting already searched. Foster provided body count of World War I, the Foster and continuing to play a role in a GPS position in deeper waters relatively minor disaster of AE1 his quest. off Mioko Island that he felt should in a colonial sideshow to the main In 1990 the famous undersea be the datum for a further search theatres of war was quickly forgotten explorer, Jacques Cousteau, which, as recommended by Jeremy by the public and by the government. conducted another search for Green, should be initially conducted But not by the families and friends AE1. Once again, this provided by an aircraft fitted with a Magnetic of the men of AE1 nor by the Royal a tantalising contact but nothing Anomaly Detector, followed by an Australian Navy. In 1968, at the conclusive was found due to faulty ROV or diver investigation.33 It was instigation of the then commander of equipment. Foster was not able also felt that an extended sonar and the Australian Submarine Squadron, to put another search expedition magnetometer search might also be Commander W L ‘Bill’ Owen, RAN, together until 2002. Having been fruitful. a memorial plaque to the crew firmly rejected by the Australian In February 2007 HMAS Benalla, of AE1 was presented to the War Government, he sought financial with Foster aboard, made a likely Graves Commission and located support from a documentary film sonar identification of AE1’s last in Bita Paka War Cemetery, near company. Following up information resting place. A man-made object Rabaul. This, together with a stained gleaned from local divers, Foster and of approximately the right size and glass window commemorating AE1 a party investigated a likely site near shape was discovered at 65 metres in and AE2 in HMAS Watson’s Naval Milia Mission, Rabaul. Unfortunately, an undisclosed location.34 There was Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 41
Wheat, J. typescript Diary AWM PRM a flurry of renewed interest in AE1 as and her crew remains a mystery. But F0026+3DRL/2965 newspapers and magazines around when AE1 is finally found, it seems White, M., Australian Submarines: A History, AGPS, Canberra, 1992. the world, as well as the Internet, likely that her rediscovery will have as reported the event. Foster and the great an impact on the public as did APPENDIX 1 - Technical specifications Royal Australian Navy were confident her arrival in 1914. of E class submarines that they had found a man-made Type: E Class Submarine Displacement: 660 tons (surfaced), 800 tons object at a depth and location that (submerged) fits with the known facts of AE1’s Length: 181 feet Beam: 22 feet 6 inches disappearance. A few months later, Draught: 12 feet 6 inches another attempt was made to identify Builder: Vickers Ltd, Barrow-in-Furness, England the feature as the AE1. As the official Laid Down: 14 November 1911 press release from the Minister Launched: 22 May 1913 Machinery: Assisting the Minister for Defence 2 sets of 8 cylinder diesel engines, battery put it: driven electric motors Horsepower: 1,750 (surfaced), 550 (submerged) The Coastal Mine Hunter HMAS Speed: 15 knots (surfaced), 10 knots (submerged) Yarra conducted a four day search Professor Graham Seal AM researches Armament: 4 x 18-inch torpedo tubes using her mine hunting sonar, divers the social and cultural aspects of Complement: 35 and the ship’s camera fitted Remotely Australian submarine history. He is APPENDIX 2 - The Crew of AE1 Operated Vehicle (ROV) to search a the author of award-winning books, The pioneer submariners of this period 50 sq km area around the position of were drawn from Australian and British numerous articles and is Director of backgrounds – and, in once case, New the object identified by Benalla. Zealand. Many had been in the Royal the Centre for Advanced Studies in Navy, transferring to, or on loan to, the Royal Australian Navy, when joining the Unfortunately, once again the Australia, Asia and the Pacific at Curtin submarine crews. Others were Royal search was unsuccessful: Australian Navy men. The exact proportion University. of British to Australian crew is unclear from official documents. According to the The object detected by Benalla’s Director of Navy Accounts writing to the Select References Director of the Australian War Memorial, sonar was confirmed by the ROV of the 35 ill-fated crew of AE1, 10 were camera to be a submarine shaped Brenchley F & E. Stoker’s Submarine, born in Australia, one in New Zealand HarperCollins, Sydney, 2001. and the remainder in England, Ireland or rock formation. 36 Foster, J., AE1: Entombed But Not Scotland. Other lists claim up to 14 were Forgotten, Australian Military History Australian-born. Besant was reported in the The crew of Yarra concluded the Publications, Loftus, 2006. Daily Telegraph to have claimed that there Foster, J.D. ‘Tom Besant where are you?’ were 30 Australian submariners among his search with a memorial service for The Mystery of HMA Submarine AE’. men. the men of AE1. In the press release Defence Force Journal, No. 5, July/August The confusion seems to have come about 1977, pp. 19-23. because some crew were British-born the Minister Assisting reaffirmed the Frame, T., The Shores of Gallipoli, Hale & but serving (by transfer or on loan) in the government’s commitment to the Iremonger, Sydney, 2000. Royal Australian Navy, see documents Green, J., The search for the AE1: in Australian Archives (AAV - MP 472, search: magnetometer and side scan sonar survey DoN, cf, asns, 1911 - 1921, file number Duke of York Islands, East New Britain, 16/14/4771, docket number 13/11747, 22–28 November 2003, Report No. 174 37 ‘The Government will continue Department of Maritime Archaeology, 21.11.13). At this period, most Australians to support the search for AE1 if Western Australian Maritime Museum, considered themselves essentially members 2003. of the British Empire. The ‘crimson thread credible information about its Jose, A. W., The Royal Australian Navy of kinship’, as Henry Parkes colourfully likely location comes to hand. (The Official History of Australia in the War described the links between Britain and of 1914-18, vol. 9), Angus & Robertson, Australia in his 1890 speech in support of It is important to provide some Sydney, 1928. federation, were at least as important as comfort to the descendants of the Marsland, J., Diary, extracts reproduced nationality; for many they were even more in Naval Historical Review, December 1974. important. However, while nationality was brave crew of the AE1, who gave Meade, K., ‘Steel Tomb on the Ocean then, as now, an emotive issue, it was not their lives in the service of their Floor’, Weekend Australian March 10-11, an issue in the designation of AE1 as an ‘Australian’ warship, even though some 35 2007, p.29. nation.’ Richardson, Peter at http://www. doubt was apparently expressed, presumably ae1submarine.com/authors_notes.html by the British, in the late 1920s. Stoker, H., Straws in the Wind, Herbert Following are the ranks, names, places The search goes on. In the meantime, Jenkins, London, 1925. of birth and designations of the officers and the fate of Australia’s lost submarine Suckling, C., Diary, p. 4 AWM 3DRL6226. crew of AE1: Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 42
Finding The Lost Submarine: The Mystery of AE1
Lieutenant-Commander Thomas Fleming Stoker James GUILD Scotland Royal at http://www.ae1submarine.com/authors_notes.html, accessed BESANT England Royal Navy Navy March 2007. Lieutenant Charles Lewis MOORE Stoker Henry Joseph GOUGH England 18 See White, pp. 34ff and, chpts 8 and 9 and Foster, J., Ireland Royal Navy Royal Australian Navy (ex RN) AE1: Entombed But Not Forgotten, Australian Military History Lieutenant The Honorable Leopold Publications, Loftus, 2006, chpts 8 and 9. Peter Smith, Honorary Florence SCARLETT England Royal Navy SOURCES: Curator of the Spectacle Island Submarine Archives points out, AE1 Petty Officer Robert SMAIL Scotland Director of Navy Accounts to Director was carrying several more engine room crew than usually required Royal Australian Navy Australian War Memorial, Feb 22 1927, at the time of her disappearance, suggesting some serious problems Petty Officer Henry HODGE England (6411), AA: MP 124/6 File No. 507/201/237 in this area. Personal communication January 2007. Even Stoker Royal Navy Defence (Navy) Series 1923-1938; White, was still undecided about the fate of AE1 when he published his Petty officer William TRIBE England pp. 225-226; Foster, pp. 105-112; Roll of autobiography, Straws in The Wind, a decade later, pp. 64-67. Royal Navy Honour, Lenham (Kent) War Memorial 19 Wheat, J., typescript Diary AWM PRM F0026+3DRL/2965, Petty Officer Thomas Martin GUILBERT at http://www.roll-of-honour.com/Kent/ p. 5. England Royal Navy Lenham.html 20 E class submarines were very much works in progress and CERA1 Thomas Frederick LOWE developed rapidly throughout the war with over fifty being built at a England Royal Navy variety of British dockyards. It is possible that the first two suffered CERA1 James Alexander FETTES New more design, construction and operational problems than the South Wales Royal Australian Navy (Endnotes) remainder, most of which seem to have been considered as reliable CERA2 John Albert MARSLAND 1 Six extra crew were taken aboard each and effective as the technology of the time could provide. Only a few England Royal Navy submarine to allow four instead of three E boats were lost in undetermined circumstances. CERA Joseph William WILSON England watches, White, M., Australian Submarines: 21 Wheat p. 5. (original caps). Royal Australian Navy A History, AGPS, Canberra, 1992, p. 16. 22 Wheat, Dedication. ERA3 John MESSENGER Victoria Royal 2 See Appendix 1. 23 Sydney Morning Herald, September 27, 1914. Australian Navy 3 A possibly trying experience for other 24 Sydney Morning Herald, September 21, 1914, p. 8. Leading Seaman Gordon COURBOLD crew members; information from Daily 25 Western Mail September 25, 1914, p. 28. New South Wales Royal Australian Navy Telegraph interview with Besant quoted 26 Western Mail, September 25, 1914, p. 45. Able Seaman John REARDON New in Brenchley F & E. Stoker’s Submarine, 27 Australian Archives MP472/1, 3/14/8389, 1914-1914. Zealand Royal Australian Navy HarperCollins, Sydney, 2001, p. 22. 28 The School Paper, No 181, Nov. 2, 1914. Able Seaman Jack JARMAN Victoria 4 Besant family history, quoted by Peter 29 Sydney Sun Sept 23, 1914. Also found in diary in possession Royal Australian Navy Richardson at http://www.ae1submarine. of H. Willis, 54 Denman Avenue, Lakemba, NSW, Australia with Able Seaman Frederick William com/authors_notes.html, accessed March transcription by Peter Richardson at http://www.ae1submarine. WOODLAND England Royal Australian 2007. com/authors_notes.html, accessed March 2007. Navy (ex RN) 5 Sydney Morning Herald September 21, 30 It seems not to be widely-known that they are also Able Seaman James Benjamin THOMAS 1914, p. 8. commemorated in the Royal Naval Memorial at Portsmouth, England Royal Australian Navy (Ex-RN) 6 See research notes on AE1’s trimming dedicated to all those World War 1 and 2 sailors who rest in Able Seaman Frederick George DENNIS and inclining experiments in December unknown graves beneath the waters of the world. England Royal Australian Navy (ex RN) 1913, prepared by Peter Smith and drawn 31 J A Marsland appears as ‘Mareland’, R Smail appears as ‘Snail’, Able Seaman George HODGKEN from Submarine Sketch Book No 4 by J J Maloney appears as ‘J F’, (his surname may also be misspelled, see (should be HODGKIN, see Roll of Honour, Mitchell, O J., Shipdraughtsman, Submarine Director of Navy Accounts to Director Australian War Memorial, Lenham (Kent) War Memorial at http:// Design Office, Admiralty, London, dated Feb 22 1927, (6411), AA: MP 124/6 File No. 507/201/237 Defence www.roll-of-honour.com/Kent/Lenham. to 1918, Submarine Historical Collection, (Navy) Series 1923-1938) and G Hodgkin appears as ‘Hodgskin’, html, accessed April 2007) England Royal Spectacle Island. These tests showed though it appears that there may have been an attempt to remedy Navy problems with the ‘Y’ internal main ballast this. These observations have been made from photographs of the Able Seaman Arthur FISHER England that may or may not have been subsequently plaque and there may be other discrepancies. A thorough check Royal Australian Navy (Ex-RN) corrected. of the relevant primary source records may ascertain the correct Signalman George DANCE England 7 See Eken, J., ‘Technical Detail of the details. See also mention of repair work to the memorial in Royal Australian Navy (ex RN) E Class Submarine’, Appendix 1 of White, DVA—Annual Reports 2003-2004 — Annual Report of the Telegraphist Cyril Lefroy BAKER p. 222. Department of Veterans’ Affairs Output 3. War Graves at http:// Tasmania Royal Australian Navy 8 Suckling, C., Diary, p. 4 AWM www.dva.gov.au/media/aboutus/annrep04/ar_dva/outcomes/ Chief Stoker Harry STRETCH England 3DRL6226. outcome03_02.htm Royal Navy 9 White pp. 21-22. 32 Foster, p. 52. Peter Richardson, brought up in Rabaul, also A/Leading Stoker Sydney Charles 10 Marsland, J., Diary, extracts made efforts to locateAE1 in the 1990s, but was hampered by BARTON England Royal Australian Navy reproduced in Naval Historical Review, volcanic activity in the area. Peter Richardson at http://www. A/Leading Stoker John William MEEK December 1974. Marsland was on board ae1submarine.com/authors_notes.html, accessed March 2007. England Royal Navy AE2 at this time, though was later lost with 33 See Green, J., The search for the AE1: magnetometer and Leading Stoker William Elliott GUY the AE1. side scan sonar survey Duke of York Islands, East New Britain, England Royal Navy 11 Marsland Diary 22–28 November 2003, Report No. 174 Department of Maritime Stoker Petty Officer John Joseph 12 White, p. 25 Archaeology, Western Australian Maritime Museum, 2003. MOLONEY (Spelled Maloney by White and 13 Marsland diary quoted in Naval 34 Report by J Foster to Commodore RJ Griggs RAN Deputy Foster) Queensland Royal Australian Navy Historical Review, December 1974, p. 59. Fleet Commander Maritime Headquarters, March 8, 2007. See also Stoker Petty Officer Charles Frederick 14 Sydney Morning Herald May 25, ABC TV ‘Foreign Correspondent’ segment ‘The Hunt for the AE1’ WRIGHT England Royal Australian Navy 1914, p. 8. March 27, 2007. (ex RN) 15 Sydney Morning Herald May 25, 35 024/2007 Wednesday, 30 May 2007, media release from Stoker Petty Officer William 1914, p. 8. Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence ‘LOCATION OF WADDILOVE Victoria Royal Australian 16 Stoker, H., Straws in the Wind, AUSTRALIAN WWI SUBMARINE STILL A MYSTERY’. Navy Herbert Jenkins, London, 1925, p. 60. 36 Director of Navy Accounts to Director Australian War Stoker Percy WILSON New South Wales 17 There were suggestions of poor Memorial, Feb 22 1927, (6411). This document was produced Royal Australian Navy communication between ship and to refute apparently extraordinary claims that there were no Stoker John James (Jack) BRAY Victoria submarine due to strained personal and Australians aboard AE1 and AE2. Royal Australian Navy professional relationships and rivalries 37 Peter Richardson at http://www.ae1submarine.com/authors_ Stoker Ernest Fleming BLAKE between the Royal Navy and the Royal notes.html, accessed March 2007. Queensland Royal Australian Navy Australian Navy, see copy of personal letter Stoker Richard Bains HOLT England from Engineer-Lieutenant Alec B Doyle Royal Navy written aboard Parramatta on Sept 17, 1914
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 43
HMAS Stuart arrives home to Garden Island, Fleet Base East, Sydney, after a six-month deployment to the North Arabian Gulf.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
Issue 130 45 Visions from the Vault VisionsVisions from from the the Vault Vault
HMAS Pioneer’s wartime career was Konigsberg continued until July when armament ammunition than any other one of the more interesting in the early the arrival of two shallow-draught but RAN warship during the course of the RAN. heavily-armed river monitors allowed war. As this photograph shows, Pioneer Deployed from Australia at the the British to destroy the German evidently employed some local labour Admiralty’s request the small cruiser vessel at extreme range. during her time on patrol, but the arrived at Mombassa on 3 February Pioneer remained on station specific nature of the tasks they were 1915. There she joined with British enforcing the general blockade of the expected to perform remains unclear. forces maintaining a close blockade of German colony, and in 1916 took part The original caption reads ‘Seechi German East Africa. These patrols not in several shore bombardments in boys. HMAS Pioneer’ and from the only aimed to prevent supplies from support of the Allied advance ashore. smart fit of their uniforms one might reaching the German forces ashore, Her last action was in July, by which surmise that these were personal issue but also served to neutralise the enemy time the Germans were being driven items and not simply donned for the cruiser, Konigsberg, which had taken inland, and the unlikelihood of their occasion. The black sash worn around refuge up the Rufiji River beyond the receiving support from the sea allowed the waist appears to be a feature unique range of effective fire from the sea. a reduction in the coastal patrol. to this group. Pioneer intercepted and sank a Pioneer returned to Australia in few dhows, but the stand-off with October 1916 having fired more main Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 Book Reviews
Otago during the ship’s deployment to Mururoa, has written this book based upon personal reflection and access to declassified Defence documents. The deployment of both New Zealand frigates was supported by the RAN who stationed the tanker HMAS Supply near Rarotonga which enabled the frigates to remain poised off Mururoa for many weeks. The unsung supply of Furnace Fuel Oil, provisions, stores and mail enabled the New Zealand plan to oppose the testing to become a reality. Mururoa Protest - The Interestingly the US, Russian, Carrier Battles — story of the voyages by Chinese and British Governments also Command Decisions in stationed ships in the area to observe HMNZ ships Otago and the tests and in the case of the British Harm’s Way Canterbury to protest to be also ready to evacuate British against the French subjects from Pitcairn Island in case of By Douglas V. Smith fallout reaching the island. Additionally atmospheric nuclear tests the embarking of civilian media Hardcover; 352 pages, includes 44 at Mururoa Atoll in 1973 representatives and a New Zealand Line Art Drawings: 44 cabinet minister in the RNZN ships to Total Number of Illustrations: 44 ISBN 978-0-473-13178-4 provide direct communication with the By Gerry Wright New Zealand media and Government Published by the United States was perhaps the first time this type of Naval Institute: $34.95US event had occurred. Reviewed by CMDR Greg Swinden The 248 page, paperback book is reasonably well illustrated with black Reviewed by LCDR Bradley Smith As the old saying goes ‘Don’t judge and white photographs (although a book by its cover’. This history of some are of very poor quality) and the New Zealand Navy deployments despite its somewhat rambling style at Carrier Battles is a book that has been to Mururoa Atoll to ‘protest’ against times it is still a good read. Strongly written for those who have an interest the French nuclear testing that took recommended for those interested in in both US Naval history during WWII, place in July/August 1973 looks, on RAN/RNZN history or staff officers, and the art of decision making and face value, to be a somewhat ‘scruffy’ as it is a good example of ‘if you want a influence of officer training on those paperback written by a retired naval new idea then read an old book’, or in decisions. The author has attempted officer. Not until you have finished the this case a new book about old ideas. to analyse the key carrier battles last page do you realise that the author Mururoa Protest is available from during this period to demonstrate that has provided one of the very few public the author [email protected] superior training produced by the US views of a virtually unknown period for $25.00 (NZD) and $10 postage to Naval War College enabled the US in New Zealand, and Australian, naval Australia. Gerry is also the author of to overcome a Japanese naval force history. He also provides some candid two other books on New Zealand naval initially greater in both number and views on the command and control, history being A Kiwi on our Funnel technological capability. planning, training and media aspects (the story of two RNZN ships during The book is a good read for those of the deployments as well as an insight Confrontation in 1965-66) and We were who simply wish to gain a greater into life at sea in a now bygone era. There (the story of RNZN involvement understanding of the scale of the Gerry Wright, a former naval in British nuclear testing off Christmas numerical advantage that the Japanese officer and Operations Officer in Island in 1957). had at the beginning of this period, and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 47
the success of the US in battles against these forces. Detailed descriptions of the events and outcomes of each battle, including detailed tactical charts, and statistical tables of each force, are included. As the title suggests the book describes the major carrier battles of the Pacific (Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Santa Cruz, and the Philippine Sea). Whilst this is interesting in itself the focus is on the method and thought process of each commander’s decision making to shape and ultimately win these battles. The book does not develop the individual characters or stories of heroism that are encountered in many other titles written about the largest naval campaign seen to that date and after. It also provides only limited insight into the decision making process of the Japanese officers during these battles. This is a book focused on analytical assessment of the US Naval commanders who achieved extraordinary success, and on how that success was derived from their officer training. Carrier Battles provides great insight into the performance of commanders in battle and how their training shaped their decision making and tactical thinking. A recommended read for those wanting to gain a greater understanding of the importance of making sound military decisions under pressure, and of the value which a professional military education can provide.
HMAS Collins launches a flare as it moves past Singaporean Victory Class Missile Corvette, RSS Vengeance
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark
In general, please present your work edition. or Jack Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At the end of the with the minimum of formatting. So: article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant Commander Paragraphs: Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would prefer not to Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Leo Cooper, 1992. use them. Then please supply a paragraph on yourself, to Separate paragraphs by one line. Single Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. a maximum of 50 words, including any qualifications you spacing only. Use one space only after New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. would like listed, and any interesting biographical aspects. stops and colons. Articles use quotation marks around If possible please supply a colour or greyscale head and Conventions: their title, which is not in italics. shoulders e-photo of yourself for use alongside the article Use numbers for 10 and above, If citing web sites please use the title. words below. Ship names use italics in convention: Illustrations: title case; prefixes such asHMAS in Australian Associated Press. “Army Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without capitals and italics. Book and Journal admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use titles use italics. 17 February, 2004.
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 130 49 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 Australian Naval Institute
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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Sea Hawk Tiger 79 approaching to land on the flight deck of HMAS Melbourne