Sovereign Energy Independence Properly Understood and Effectively Achieved in the 21St Century Spencer Abraham & Mark P

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The Future of Energy

Sovereign Energy Independence Properly Understood and Effectively Achieved in the 21st Century Spencer Abraham & Mark P. Mills

Spencer Abraham is Energy, like food, is a foundational requirement for civiliza- Chairman & CEO of tion. The World Economic Forum’s 2012 Energy Vision Update The Abraham Group. He previously served as begins with the observation: “Energy is the lifeblood of the the tenth United States global economy – a crucial input to nearly all of the goods Secretary of Energy and 1 before that as a United and services of the modern world.” We disagree with the States Senator from Forum in one respect. Energy is crucial not to “nearly all” Michigan. but in fact to all goods and services. Mark P. Mills is a Ensuring the availability of an economically sustainable Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute and secure energy supply is one of the primary responsi- and CEO of the Digital bilities of sovereign governments. Energy independence, Power Group. properly understood, is a central component in achieving both supply and economic security. The policy options for pursuing “independence” depend on the realities of the day. In this paper we will argue that a clear understanding of the landscape is more important than clever policies, and that, in any case, there are precious few options in regards to the latter. We begin by noting that two central features of the global energy landscape are the same now as they have been for decades, even centuries. These are the underlying character of both geopolitics and geophysics. The animating forces in geopolitics have been the same

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for as long as there have been nation and social fallout from such a radical states. National goals, political sys- price hike may be muted, if not for- tems, and social objectives vary wide- gotten. Were prices to double today ly, and always have. Differences can the fallout would be almost inconceiv- lead to both unintentional and inten- able. However, such a possibility is far tional conflicts. Conflicts are ulti- from unimaginable and cannot even mately resolved using the same three be termed a “black swan” given how tools since time immemorial: business little progress has been achieved in the arrangements of mutual convenience, underlying issue of Middle East stabil- diplomacy, or war. Put simply, people ity. have not changed. Energy “independence” policies are Similarly, underlying geophysical no less vital today than they were at the realities of the planet remain constant. dawn of the modern era of energy pol- The asymmetric distribution of eas- icy in providing some measure of insu- ily accessible high-grade resources is lation against the possibility of events incontestably a fact that creates oppor- similar to those of 1973 and 1979. tunities for economic or geopolitical In fact, given the current geopolitical advantage, or conflict. environment we would argue “inde- On the other hand, some things pendence” should remain the first pri- today are quite different. Indeed, we ority of sovereign governments when

The geopolitical objective of “independence” is really about preventing one or a few players from being in a position to undermine or manipulate the marketplace, or from using energy as a political tool.

will argue that the energy landscape has forging energy policies, against which undergone tectonic shifts in the para- all other goals should be secondary. digms of supply and demand since the The question for nations on how to dawn of the modern energy era, an era achieve energy independence requires that arguably began in the fall of 1973. first a definition, itself inherently a The modern lexicon of energy policy-centered consideration. For “independence” and policies attending most nations, the concept of indepen- thereto began with the one-two punch dence rarely means seeking closed-bor- of the 1973 OPEC embargo and the der self-sufficiency. For many nations 1979 Iranian revolution. With the first individually and, in particular, col- event, world oil prices roughly doubled lectively through regional or mutual nearly overnight. Prices doubled again alliances, the geopolitical objective of a few short years later.2 With the pas- “independence” is really about pre- sage of time, the political, economic, venting one or a few players (Iran and

[66] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ABRAHAM AND MILLS The Future of Energy

Venezuela come to mind for many, consumption an amount equal to the or Russia, or OPEC) from being in a adding of two United States’ worth of position to undermine or manipulate energy demand.5 the marketplace, or from using energy This shift in the epicenter of demand as a political tool. means that policies intended to reduce In order to develop a framework to the use of oil in the United States (e.g., understand how best to pursue energy improving fuel efficiency of light vehi- independence, we start with the fea- cles) that would once have had a major tures that have in fact changed, the facts impact on global oil demand, no longer relating to how the two most important do so and increasingly have de minimis forces – technology and demographics impact on the geopolitics of oil. Argu- -- have altered the equation of sup- ments can still be made for efficiency ply and demand. As we earlier not- on the basis of domestic economic ed, human behavior (geopolitics) and benefits, but geopolitics motivated gov- nature (geophysics) remain unchanged. ernment intervention in this case of But human ingenuity (technology) and energy demand and security (and many populations (demographics) have sig- others similar). The modern and now nificantly changed since President Nix- firmly embedded Corporate Average on first used the phrase “energy inde- Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards were pendence” in the epoch-setting speech enacted in 1975 in direct response to of 7 November, 1973.3 the 1973 embargo.6 But today, even radical reductions in total U.S. light Supply and Demand in a New vehicle fuel use – whether from the Era. Throughout the 20th century, recently enacted expansions in CAFE the United States in particular and standards or a political goal of a mil- the West in general were the globe’s lion electric cars – would moot only a largest users and fastest growing major small percentage of future global oil consumers of energy. In the 21st cen- demand. The United States in particu- tury demographics, combined with the lar, and the West in general, no longer maturation of emerging economies, have a political foot on the accelerator have permanently shifted the center of or brake that determines the growth in gravity. energy demand. Western nation poli- The Asia-Pacific and emerging cies rooted in the 1970s demand para- regions, with the Asia-Pacific domi- digm are, if no longer valid, certainly nating, are now responsible for not emasculated in impact. only the fastest growth in large-energy Just as we see a shift in the 21st centu- demand, but also essentially all net ry metrics on the demand side of energy growth in demand. Within a few years, driven by demographics, so too has there the emerging economies will have com- been a shift on the supply side metrics, pleted their transitions and will con- in this case driven by technology. The sume in aggregate more total energy world is not in imminent danger of than the entire “West.”4 Indeed, over running out of hydrocarbons broadly, the coming two decades, the growth in nor oil in particular. The central issues emerging economies will add to global for the future will continue to be the

Winter/Spring 2013 [67] SOVEREIGN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE same as those in the past, largely ones of progressive recognition of the underly- costs and access—the former is mainly ing engineering and economic reali- determined by technology and the latter ties rather than aspirational policies. by government policies which control They represent a consensus recognition or own about 80 percent of land where (some would say, capitulation) of the oil resources reside.7 And, in the face of practical nature of energy resources and today’s North American glut of natural technologies. gas, many have forgotten the passage in Dozens of nations, including for 1978 of the Powerplant and Industrial example the United States, Germany, Fuel Use Act (finally repealed in 1986), Spain, Britain, and China have over inspired by a fear of imminent limits the past several decades invested enor- to gas resources. The North American mous financial and policy resources in glut has already impacted world mar- attempting to create significant, eco- kets, and the technologies that created nomically viable capabilities to replace the glut are expected to spread around conventional fuels.10 While many influ- the world as well.8 ential policymakers believed otherwise Nonetheless, there continues today in recent decades, there is now a wide- an ‘industry’ if not an intellectual spread recognition that there is no framework that flowered in the post- realistic prospect of seeing technologies embargo era, anchored in the the- emerge in useful time-frames, and at sis of limits, epitomized by the iconic costs that are acceptable, that can fun- and politically prescient 1972 Club of damentally displace the central role Rome’s “Limits to Growth,” and fol- of hydrocarbons—coal, oil and natu- lowed in more recent years by the thesis ral gas—particularly in the context of of “peak oil.” For policy makers, the the magnitudes of projected demand existential debate about long-term geo- growth. physical resources limits or population Some would argue that the failure expansions are not, or should not, be to see an even larger non-hydrocar- relevant. The issues that animate poli- bon contribution than is now forecast cies emerge from practical near-term reflects a failure in the world’s nations realities measured in years (though, as to establish global treaties, policies, and an aside, in politics we frequently see mechanisms to “de-carbonize” energy even shorter time frames) or at most in production. For our purposes here, a decade or two. without regard to the merits of such Without regard to historic policy, efforts, it is sufficient to note that they social, or political objectives, the con- have not succeeded. The enormous sensus forecasts from international and direct and immediate economic (and national organizations (e.g, the IEA social) costs of the vast majority of de- and the DOE/EIA) see the overwhelm- carbonization proposals held against ing share of future energy supply com- the state of world economies, make it ing from the same three hydrocarbons highly improbable that anything along that today provide 85 percent of global those lines will happen in time-frames needs: oil, coal and natural gas.9 These meaningful to policymakers. forecasts are doubtless anchored in It bears noting that this observation

[68] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ABRAHAM AND MILLS The Future of Energy neither obviates nor denigrates signifi- were brought about by the constella- cant contributions to national strategies tion of deep-water technologies that from non-conventional energy sourc- gave rise to increasing production in es, or from the cost-effective pursuit the North Sea roughly after the 1979 of conservation measures and energy global oil shock. That transformation efficiency. However, we know now that continues in regions like Brazil’s Cam- at prices and scales commensurate with pos Basin, on-going surprises in the expected demand, non-hydrocarbon Gulf of Mexico, and, perhaps, West alternatives, even where regionally sub- Africa. And, setting aside the challeng- stantial, cannot come close to meeting ing policy issues, we now see potentially the scale of global economic require- game-changing access to resources in At prices and scales commensurate with expected demand, non-hydrocarbon alternatives… cannot come close to meeting the scale of global economic requirements. ments. Thus for policymakers seek- deep-water expansion in Arctic waters ing as a primary objective means to from Russia’s Pechora Sea to Canada’s ensure the benefits from energy inde- Baffin Island region, to the persis- pendence, a preoccupation with non- tent politically challenging Alaskan off- hydrocarbons, while it may have other shore fields. merits, cannot be considered central to On shore, the steady march of tech- achieving the goals sought in “indepen- nology has substantially improved dence.” the efficiency in extracting oil from the hundreds of billions of barrels of Disruptive Technologies in a potential reserves in Canada’s vast oil Shifting Landscape. It is not sands.11 The geopolitical issues associ- just that non-hydrocarbon technol- ated with expanding the utilization of ogy options have not matured at the those resources were illuminated in rate that some hoped or forecast would the high-profile political tussle over bring practical economic capabilities, the Keystone Pipeline, which as of this but also that the world has seen substan- writing continues (and may ultimately tial progress—in some cases unexpected take more time than actual construction acceleration—in the technologies asso- period for such a pipeline). ciated with hydrocarbon exploration, The single largest shift in the hydro- production, and efficacy of utilization. carbon landscape has been the unex- The inexorable and remarkable pected and remarkable rise in U.S. advances in ultra-deep-water oil pro- natural gas and oil production in recent duction hold enormous potential years. New technologies have unleashed for numerous regions. Significant so much new natural gas production resource and policy transformations that the flow-direction of major pipe-

Winter/Spring 2013 [69] SOVEREIGN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE lines has been reversed. Moreover, hydrocarbons makes them appealing there has been an associated growth for conversion to liquid transporta- in energy-related construction (e.g., tion fuels, either directly or indirect- fertilizer, steel, and chemical plants) ly. Indeed, a number of technology including a rise in foreign direct invest- options are at or approaching econom- ment inflows into the United States. ic parity with some regional costs of oil, And, of course, applications are backed where coal or natural gas can be used as up for reversing LNG terminals to re- primary feedstocks to yield viable liquid orient around exports. substitutes for conventional crude.12 Meanwhile, on the United States’ For policymakers, such options can- crude production side, output has not be ignored when seeking economi- reversed a forty year decline and in cally viable options for sustaining global some regions the growth has been so growth in transportation that is essen- rapid that oil is being carried to mar- tial for commerce and a vital feature of ket by rail and even truck in significant social progress in emerging economies. quantities. By now, this change has In short, the recent and prospective been widely reported and while typi- advances in hydrocarbon-related tech- cally it has been attributed to advances nologies promises a continued expan- Energy policy in the early 21st century is, despite earlier expectations and great investments, still fundamentally dependent on hydrocarbon realities. in hydraulic fracturing, the reality is sion in hydrocarbon supply capability. that the result is also attributable to a It is of course clearly the case that for broad and deep advance in the array both alternatives to hydrocarbons as of enabling technologies, from basic well as for new hydrocarbon technolo- materials science, to sensors and com- gies/sources, it is the current and the putational tools, to the maturation of expected near-term price of oil in par- tertiary recovery including CO2 flood- ticular that serves as a primary gating ing. The combination of low-cost gas factor. The consensus of a new ‘nor- for process heat and low-cost crude has mal’ range (i.e., excluding temporary opened up the possibility of expanding event-driven spikes) for oil appears to U.S. refining. In fact, the United States be in the $50 to $110 a barrel range.13 is now a net exporter of refined hydro- By historical standards, it seems likely carbons for the first time since 1949. that prices will remain in this relatively The other emerging technology- high range because of the aforemen- centric feature of hydrocarbons is tioned demand features and the pace at the potential for greater convergence which new production can be brought amongst the three hydrocarbons. The on line at the scales the world needs. low cost and abundance of non-oil But this has been the oil price range the

[70] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ABRAHAM AND MILLS The Future of Energy world has lived with now for a number fired electric generation,14 as well as of years, and it is one in which new the increased potential for imports of hydrocarbon sources have flourished, Russian natural gas. Similarly, we now while new non-hydrocarbon produc- see a proposed $13 billion Vladivo- tion (especially for transportation) have stok, Russia, terminal to ship LNG to not, at least at the dimension the world Niigata, Japan.15 There is as well dis- needs. cussion of a daunting ultra-deep gas Energy policy in the early 21st cen- pipeline between those two ports. The tury is thus, despite earlier expecta- geopolitical alignments associated with tions and great investments, still fun- such projects, and more surely to come, damentally dependent on hydrocarbon should have relevance to U.S. decisions, realities, the features of which are now for example, where the relatively recent shifted only in terms of the epicenters glut of natural gas has opened up the of demand and supply. unprecedented possibility of massive natural gas (LNG) exports. Numerous On Politics and Policy. Sover- analysts have framed the astounding eign energy policies necessarily and shift in natural gas resource potential ultimately react to all these fundamen- in terms of the U.S. as a new “Middle tal resource and technology realities East” – a phrase that has obvious geo- outlined above. However, while broad political implications.16 macro factors in supply and demand There are many more examples of create a framework in which energy major offshore and on-shore projects, policies are formed, it is inevitably the of pipelines, refineries, LNG projects case that specific policies are catalyzed (e.g., the colossal Shell bet offshore by impactful events. We will doubtless Australia17) and coal port expansions in see how this plays out now, both in North America and around the world. reacting to the persistent tensions in We would argue that all this activity the Middle East that have changed little emerges from every sovereign nation’s in character, as well as what is happen- first order responsibility to obtain ade- ing in other parts of the world. Some of quate energy supplies. There are always the shifts in the geography and features a variety of social and environmental of energy geopolitics are now coming issues that enter into policy consider- into view, all with implications that ations, but the primary consideration ripple out beyond their locus. of sovereign nations will necessarily While political fallout from Fuku- stay anchored in the inextricable link- shima, for example, may have minimal age between the economic growth and impact on nuclear energy programs energy growth – a linkage that has globally, beyond Japan and Europe, existed since the dawn of time. the derivative activities in both regions Any inability to provide adequate have far-reaching implications. Ironi- and affordable energy places a nation cally, it may be Europe and not Japan at risk of such severe economic dis- where a retreat from nuclear energy advantage that one sees repeatedly a will be more long-lasting where we willingness to trade cost and availability already see a resurgent use of coal- for political, supply-chain and physical

Winter/Spring 2013 [71] SOVEREIGN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE risks. We have seen the consequences manipulations, sufficient to be reason- of these decisions many times, not just ably called “independence.” with the iconic October 1973 OPEC embargo, but also more recently with Securing Energy Indepen- Russian tinkering with natural gas sup- dence. The underlying thesis here is plies to Georgia and the Ukraine.18 thus one of realism based on recogniz- Thus the question for nations on ing how technology has changed and how to achieve energy independence more importantly how global econo- requires first recognizing and then mies have changed. As we began, poli- embracing the implications of a policy cies must embrace the utter centrality definition for “independence.” As we of sovereign nations ensuring an eco- earlier noted, this rarely means isola- nomically viable energy supply for its tionistic self-sufficiency. Independence business and citizens. comes from recognizing, first, the real- At a basic level, there are essential- ity of what energy sources (hydrocar- ly only two mechanisms for achieving bons) are required by society in time- energy independence: produce enough periods that matter to citizens, and on your own to have de minimis import then how to ensure supplies that insu- dependence (or become an exporter), late a country from economic disrup- or import what’s needed from reliable tion, political manipulation of foreign sources using low-risk supply chains. There is no escaping the interconnectedness of global markets, trade, and the pervasive role of energy in all aspects of domestic economies. supplies, and thus affordably achieve Of the two, the former is often pre- the central goals of “independence,” to ferred over the latter, but the former wit, resilience, reliability and security. is not always possible, or possible at a And, regardless of the ability of some price that is tolerable. Of course poli- nations to achieve resource self-suffi- cies should pursue both in combina- ciency (by definition, net exporters are tion. For sovereign nations then, there self-sufficient), there is no escaping the are four principals that comprise the interconnectedness of global markets, core tools available to achieve practical trade, and the pervasive role of energy energy independence. in all aspects of domestic economies. One could say then, in some sense, the Promote hydrocarbons simple idea of energy independence is There are few nations who are not a myth. However nations can achieve undergoing some type debate regarding adequate levels of insulation, insur- the environmental issues association ance, or resilience against reasonably with the use of hydrocarbons. In some anticipatable disruptions or malicious cases countries have moved past debating

[72] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs ABRAHAM AND MILLS The Future of Energy policy and initiated actions to curb the nizing the same linkage between refin- use or development of hydrocarbons, eries and transportation fuels. Iran but in many the discussions rage. In has historic weakness in this regard, most cases those advocating the reduc- but so increasingly does Europe and tion—and in more extreme instances North America.19 To state the obvious; the near elimination of hydrocarbon increasing supply of primary resources use—contend that replacing oil, coal, (whether through domestic production and natural gas with alternatives is con- or imports) cannot supply the refined sistent with energy independence goals products, kilowatt-hours and gallons, since most renewable-centric alterna- absent significant infrastructure. And, tives are theoretically consistent with it bears noting, promoting anti-hydro- freedom from energy imports. The carbon policies generally translates into reality is that at this time and for the inadequate investment in key energy foreseeable future the goal of a carbon- infrastructure across the hydrocarbon free energy policy is untenable for the supply chain, which places a nation at reasons outlined above, and the pur- greater, not less risk to energy disrup- suit of a carbon-minimization policy is tions. economically infeasible. While it might be politically attractive to advocate such Increase domestic production policies, doing so is incompatible with While there are some nations where economic growth as well as the attain- this observation has little relevance, ment of anything approaching energy in general most major nations have independence in the reasonably fore- significant geophysical resources. New seeable future. Even though nations can technologies have increased the pros- and should seek to diversify their ener- pects for finding and economically gy mix, and to pursue basic research extracting hydrocarbons across many to expand practical energy options, it geophysical regions. While strategies is essential for security purposes that intended to encourage domestic explo- nations promote hydrocarbons as an ration and production mean differ- integral part of their energy policies ent things in different places, it must and as a key ingredient in the pursuit of include streamlining regulations and energy security. other impediments to discovery and development. It also means rejecting Commit to infrastructure the notion of placing unreasonable For a country, and often necessarily areas of domestic territory off limits to for a region, a modern energy infra- exploration and production or to pre- structure is pivotal, from extraction, venting the deployment of capital from to transportation, to processing. This foreign sources to develop resources. means pipelines, rail, ports, refineries, power plants and transmission systems. Develop energy alliances It bears noting that most countries Given the “unfair” geographic dis- understand that power plants are need- tribution of high-quality resources, ed to convert fuel into electricity. There regional alliances in particular but has been a puzzling resistance to recog- equally importantly alliances of com-

Winter/Spring 2013 [73] SOVEREIGN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE mon political interests, are arguably any case unachievable. And there is no the single most important policy tool bright line that defines when a nation for nations to achieve energy indepen- has achieved sufficient insulation from dence. The energy domain is not dif- energy geopolitics to be considered ferent than others, and arguably more “independent.” However, it is often critical, in terms of capturing the ben- clear—sometimes alarmingly so when efits of mutual free trade and similar geopolitical events turn ugly as they did policies. The North American Free in 1973 and 1979, and regrettably could Trade Act serves as one such model, again —when sovereign nations have and is particularly relevant in remov- failed to make sufficient progress. ing unproductive, even artificial inef- The abundance of primary hydrocar- ficiencies that not only harm all three bon resources does not of course guar- collaborating nations, but are inher- antee low-cost energy, nor the absence ently “unfair.” of either supply disruptions or of sovereign conflicts. But robust policies can Conclusion. Policies that embrace significantly reduce both geopolitical the above outlined four principles can risks and economic shocks. Nations that bring essentially every nation close to fail to embrace the goal of energy inde- the goal of energy independence. As pendence, properly understood, put we have noted, this is not in the literal both their own citizens at risk, as well as sense of energy isolation, which is in others in the world.

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NOTES 1 World Economic Forum, Energy for Economic Growth 2011); International Energy Agency, “IEA Sets out the Energy Vision Update 2012, (Geneva: 2012). “Energy is ‘Golden Rules’ needed to Usher in a Golden Age of the lifeblood of the global economy – a crucial input Gas,” Internet, http://www.iea.org/newsroomande- to nearly all of the goods and services of the modern vents/pressreleases/2012/may/name,27266,en.html world. Stable, reasonably priced energy supplies are (date accessed: 15 January 2013). central to maintaining and improving the living stan- 10 United Nations Environmental Programme, dards of billions of people.” Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2012 (Nairobi, 2 Energy Information Administration, Annual June 2012). Energy Review 1997, DOE/EIA-0384(97). (Washing- 11 American Petroleum Institute, Canadian Oil Sands: ton, DC, July 1998), Table 5.19. Enhancing America’s Energy Security (Washington, D.C., Jan- 3 Richard Nixon, “Presidential Address uary 2011). to the Nation,” (7 November 1973). Can 12 “Liquid Transportation Fuels from Coal and be found at: http://www.cvce.eu/content/ Biomass: Technological Status, Costs, and Envi- publication/2003/7/3/1158015d-8cf9-4fae- ronmental Impacts,” National Academy of Sciences, 8128-0f1ee8a8d292/publishable_en.pdf. (2009). 4 Where, of course, South American economies 13 U.S Energy Information Administration, Annual properly belong in the maturing economies category, Energy Outlook 2013 (Washington, D.C., 5 December despite the nomenclature weakness of the label “the 2012). West.” 14 See for example: Tino Anresen, “EON Loses 5 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Inter- as RWE’s Coal Plants Win Germany’s Green Shift: national Energy Outlook 2011, (Washington, D.C., Sep- Energy,” Bloomberg News, 7 December 2012. tember 2011); British Petroleum, BP Energy Outlook 15 See for example: Center for Environment, 2030, (London, January 2013); ExxonMobil, The Commerce & Energy, “Japan Turns To Russia For Outlook for Energy: A View for 2030, (Irving, Texas, 27 LNG,” Internet, http://cenvironment.blogspot. January 2011). com/2012/09/japan-turns-to-russia-for-lng.html 6 Allan R. Hoffman, “The Origins of CAFE,” (date accessed: September 2012). Forum on Physics and Society by the American Physical Society 36, 16 “ENERGY 2020: North America, the New no. 4 (October 2007). Middle East?” Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solu- 7 Valerie Marcel, “States of Play: National Oil tions, 20 March 20 2012. Companies Control 80 Percent of the World’s Oil,” 17 Stanley Reed, “Shell Bets on a Colossal Floating Foreign Policy, (September/October 2009). Liquefied Natural Gas Factory Off Australia,” New York 8 See for example an overview that one of us has Times, 12 November 2012. written see: Mark P. Mills, “Unleashing the North 18 See for example: Bernard Gelb, Russian Natu- American Energy Colossus: Hydrocarbons Can Fuel ral Gas: Regional Dependence, Congressional Research Growth and Prosperity,” Manhattan Institute (July Service (5 January 2007); Richard B. Andres and 2012); Another, by the International Energy Agency Michael Kofman, European Energy Security: Reducing Volatility can be found at: http://www.iea.org/aboutus/faqs/gas/. of Ukraine-Russia Natural Gas Disputes, Institute for National 9 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Inter- Strategic Studies, (February 2011). national Energy Outlook 2011, (Washington, D.C., Septem- 19 Iraq Energy Outlook, IEA (Paris, 2012); Refining ber 2011); British Petroleum, BP Energy Outlook 2030, Capacity, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufactur- (London, January 2013); ExxonMobil, The Outlook ers, U.S. Refining and Storage Capacity Report, (1 for Energy: A View for 2030, (Irving, Texas, 27 January January 2012).

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