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SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Humanitarian Regional COVID-19 Vulnerability Map Needs Assessment 10 November 2020 | Government of Syria Controlled Areas Programme The following factsheet was created by the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme Figures are sourced through the following HNAP products: (HNAP), a joint UN ini� a� ve which monitors humanitarian needs inside Syria. The results Mobility Needs Monitoring: tracks displacement pa� erns, shelter type and priority needs are intended to inform humanitarian partners on COVID-19 risks and regional contagion of residents, returnees and IDPs in the last 30 days; poten� al. It fulfi lls this objec� ve through an inter-sectoral COVID-19 vulnerability scoring matrix that assesses key indicators affi liated with exposure to, and are conducive to, the COVID-19 Rapid Assessment: bi-weekly overview of COVID-19 mi� ga� on eff orts at SD level; spread of COVID-19. The components include: burden of displacement, access to essen� al Transit Point Monitoring: bi-weekly update on status of domes� c and interna� onal transit COVID-19 hygiene items, community awareness of the disease, priority WASH and health points as well as the presence of COVID-19 monitoring eff orts. needs, COVID-19 mi� ga� on eff orts and access to health services. Turkey Disclaimer: The boundaries, areas, names and the designati ons used in this report do not imply offi cial endorsement or acceptance. Detailed methodology available upon request. Total Population 13,615,682 Population at high COVID risk Turkey 9,131,518 Al-Hasakeh Aleppo Most densely-populated locations Community Sub-District Popula� on Mediterranean Ar-Raqqa Al-Hasakeh Jaramana Jaramana 596,392 Sea Aleppo Lattakia Mediterranean Ar-Raqqa At Tall At Tall 212,640 Idleb Sea New Dahiet Qdosiya Lattakia Idleb Elsakina Qudsiya 201,396 Hama TRANSIT POINT LEGEND Hama Deir-ez-Zor Sea Port Border Crossing Point Deir-ez-Zor Airport Transit Point Homs Lebanon POPULATION DENSITY/CONGESTION Homs Scale of 1 (low popula� on density) to 6 (high popula� on density) Rural 1 2 3 4 5 6 Lebanon Damascus Iraq Dar'a Quneitra INTER-SECTORAL COVID-19 RISK SCORE¹ Jordan As-Sweida High risk Moderate risk Low risk The inter-sectoral risk score takes into account rates of health, water and basic services being reported as priority Rural need, supply of COVID-19 hygiene items, community knowledge, IDP presence and rate of COVID-19 Damascus Iraq mi� ga� on measures. Recognizing the central role of popula� on density in spreading COVID-19, sub-district Dar'a vulnerability rates are presented alongside regional Quneitra presence of popula� on. Risk categories, and subsequent popula� on fi gures, are developed using specifi c scoring Jordan methodology and standard devia� on established for As-Sweida each AoC. Figures are es� mates and should be further triangulated with local needs assessments to inform response. Total GoS IDPs Total GoS Returns (2020) Total GoS Residents 3,291,496 65,476 10,258,710 1 GoS controlled areas inside Al-Hasakeh governorate are intrinsically aff ected by local SDF COVID-19 miti gati on eff orts. For this reason, please refer to the SDF report for detailed informati on about these locati ons. SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Humanitarian Regional COVID-19 Vulnerability Map Needs Assessment 10 November 2020 | Government of Syria Controlled Areas Programme POPULATION AT LOWER POPULATION AT POPULATION AT HIGH SUFFICIENCY OF COVID-19 SUB-DISTRICT GOVERNORATE RISK TO COVID MODERATE RISK TO COVID RISK TO COVID HEALTH SERVICES2 Daret Azza Aleppo - - 1,576 Insuffi cient As-Safi ra Aleppo - - 39,199 Insuffi cient Banan Aleppo - - 2,155 Insuffi cient Haritan Aleppo - - 2,482 Insuffi cient Hadher Aleppo - - 3,750 Insuffi cient Hajeb Aleppo - - 559 Insuffi cient Tall Ed-daman Aleppo - - 4,334 Insuffi cient Khanaser Aleppo - - 220 Insuffi cient Nabul Aleppo - 48,370 - Insuffi cient Rasm Haram El-Imam Aleppo 700 - 12,350 Insuffi cient Al-Khafsa Aleppo - - 49,835 Insuffi cient Maskana Aleppo - - 23,100 Insuffi cient Eastern Kwaires Aleppo - - 9,430 Insuffi cient Menbij Aleppo 600 - 7,373 Insuffi cient Tadaf Aleppo - - 11,545 Insuffi cient Al Bab Aleppo - - 3,850 Insuffi cient Dayr Hafi r Aleppo - - 10,357 Insuffi cient Zarbah Aleppo - - 1,042 Insuffi cient Jebel Saman Aleppo 9,704 310,557 1,311,991 Insuffi cient Atareb Aleppo - - 395 Insuffi cient Sabka Ar-Raqqa - - 18,111 Insuffi cient Maadan Ar-Raqqa - - 12,463 Insuffi cient Mansura Ar-Raqqa - - 8,524 Insuffi cient Ariqa As-Sweida - - 12,873 Insuffi cient As-Sweida As-Sweida - - 191,894 Suffi cient Gharyeh As-Sweida - - 4,852 Insuffi cient Li� le Sura As-Sweida - - 15,887 Insuffi cient Mashnaf As-Sweida - - 14,499 Suffi cient Mazra'a As-Sweida - 3,593 17,523 Insuffi cient Milh As-Sweida - 13,487 - Insuffi cient Qarayya As-Sweida - - 11,287 Insuffi cient Salkhad As-Sweida - 20,215 7,419 Insuffi cient Shahba As-Sweida - 1,589 37,609 Insuffi cient Shaqa As-Sweida - - 21,216 Insuffi cient Thibeen As-Sweida - 6,552 - Insuffi cient 2 Complete list of the possible health services are available in HNAP’s bi-weekly COVID-19 Rapid Assessment reports and on the fi nal page of this report. SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Humanitarian Regional COVID-19 Vulnerability Map Needs Assessment 10 November 2020 | Government of Syria Controlled Areas Programme POPULATION AT LOWER POPULATION AT POPULATION AT HIGH SUFFICIENCY OF COVID-19 SUB-DISTRICT GOVERNORATE RISK TO COVID MODERATE RISK TO COVID RISK TO COVID HEALTH SERVICES Damascus Damascus 222,198 1,508,467 95,931 Insuffi cient Ash-Shajara Dar'a - - 41,705 Insuffi cient As-Sanamayn Dar'a - - 133,709 Insuffi cient Busra Esh-Sham Dar'a - 4,552 38,365 Insuffi cient Da'el Dar'a - - 41,067 Insuffi cient Dar'a Dar'a - 28,726 167,661 Suffi cient Ghabagheb Dar'a - - 56,066 Insuffi cient Hrak Dar'a - - 46,298 Insuffi cient Izra' Dar'a - - 65,593 Less suffi cient Jasim Dar'a - - 37,975 Insuffi cient Jizeh Dar'a - 20,739 8,433 Insuffi cient Kherbet Ghazala Dar'a - - 47,655 Less suffi cient Masmiyyeh Dar'a - - 11,515 Insuffi cient Mseifra Dar'a - - 40,013 Insuffi cient Mzeireb Dar'a - - 106,774 Insuffi cient Nawa Dar'a - - 60,016 Insuffi cient Sheikh Miskine Dar'a - - 39,589 Insuffi cient Tassil Dar'a - - 25,504 Insuffi cient Tabni Deir-ez-Zor - - 73,619 Insuffi cient Deir-ez-Zor Deir-ez-Zor - - 134,300 Insuffi cient Khasham Deir-ez-Zor - - 8,395 Insuffi cient Al Mayadin Deir-ez-Zor - - 25,709 Insuffi cient Ashara Deir-ez-Zor - - 29,185 Insuffi cient Abu Kamal Deir-ez-Zor - 20,806 31,896 Insuffi cient Jalaa Deir-ez-Zor - 3,136 11,354 Insuffi cient Muhasan Deir-ez-Zor - - 8,994 Insuffi cient Hama Hama - 9,625 745,063 Insuffi cient Ziyara Hama - 1,953 - Insuffi cient As-Suqaylabiyah Hama - 26,492 13,514 Insuffi cient Masyaf Hama - 28,973 37,450 Insuffi cient Wadi El-oyoun Hama - 900 26,086 Insuffi cient Shat-ha Hama - 14,759 640 Insuffi cient Suran Hama - - 28,104 Insuffi cient As-Salamiyeh Hama - 1,098 138,445 Insuffi cient SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Humanitarian Regional COVID-19 Vulnerability Map Needs Assessment 10 November 2020 | Government of Syria Controlled Areas Programme POPULATION AT LOWER POPULATION AT POPULATION AT HIGH SUFFICIENCY OF COVID-19 SUB-DISTRICT GOVERNORATE RISK TO COVID MODERATE RISK TO COVID RISK TO COVID HEALTH SERVICES Hamra Hama - - 10,870 Insuffi cient As-Saan Hama - 2,925 3,618 Insuffi cient Jeb Ramleh Hama - 38,922 1,101 Insuffi cient Madiq Castle Hama - - 5,825 Insuffi cient Harbanifse Hama - 445 49,595 Insuffi cient Oj Hama - - 47,456 Insuffi cient Oqeirbat Hama - - 1,289 Insuffi cient Tell Salhib Hama - - 17,135 Insuffi cient Ein Halaqim Hama - - 21,492 Insuffi cient Saboura Hama - - 8,310 Insuffi cient Eastern Bari Hama - - 5,299 Insuffi cient Muhradah Hama - - 34,443 Insuffi cient Karnaz Hama - - 7,216 Insuffi cient Al-Qusayr Homs - 15,375 45,467 Insuffi cient Nasra Homs - 57,386 - Insuffi cient Qaryatein Homs - - 13,259 Insuffi cient Hawash Homs 7,836 36,926 - Insuffi cient Hadideh Homs - 44,044 - Insuffi cient Jeb Ej-Jarrah Homs - 21,971 - Insuffi cient Qabu Homs - 40,405 - Insuffi cient Mahin Homs - 1,930 - Insuffi cient Hasyaa Homs - 31,362 - Insuffi cient Al Makhrim Homs - 45,155 - Insuffi cient Farqalas Homs - 18,925 6,786 Insuffi cient Tall Kalakh Homs - 32,994 4,905 Insuffi cient Kherbet Tin Noor Homs - 8,878 68,005 Insuffi cient Ein Elniser Homs - 34,252 - Insuffi cient Shin Homs 23,638 9,865 - Insuffi cient Taldu Homs - 4,867 60,405 Insuffi cient Ar-Rastan Homs - 62,581 - Insuffi cient Sadad Homs - - 7,061 Insuffi cient Raqama Homs - - 28,761 Insuffi cient Talbiseh Homs - 5,581 87,499 Insuffi cient Homs Homs 3,010 268,599 361,563 Insuffi cient Tadmor Homs - - 2,962 Insuffi cient Sokhneh Homs - - 4,066 Insuffi cient SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Humanitarian Regional COVID-19 Vulnerability Map Needs Assessment 10 November 2020 | Government of Syria Controlled Areas Programme POPULATION AT LOWER POPULATION AT POPULATION AT HIGH SUFFICIENCY OF COVID-19 SUB-DISTRICT GOVERNORATE RISK TO COVID MODERATE RISK TO COVID RISK TO COVID HEALTH SERVICES Sanjar Idleb - 1,154 9,214 Insuffi cient Tamanaah Idleb - - 4,460 Insuffi cient Abul Thohur Idleb - 420 2,230 Insuffi cient Al-Qardaha La� akia 6,820 35,968 - Insuffi cient Fakhura La� akia 12,817 4,871 - Insuffi cient Harf Elmseitra La� akia 4,026 2,314 - Insuffi cient Jobet Berghal La� akia 3,854 2,732 - Insuffi cient Ein Shaqaq La� akia 8,581 3,640 - Insuffi cient Qastal Maaf La� akia 6,960 6,978 - Insuffi cient Salanfa La� akia 6,080 1,205 - Insuffi cient Hanadi La� akia 16,609 - - Insuffi cient Jablah La� akia 12,265 28,038 41,055 Insuffi cient Bahlolieh La� akia 6,061 2,900 - Insuffi cient Ein Et-teeneh La� akia 4,736 - - Insuffi cient Kansaba La� akia 1,313 - - Insuffi cient La� akia La� akia - 34,519 865,106 Insuffi cient Mzair'a La� akia 8,757 1,555 - Insuffi cient Al-Haff a La� akia 1,853 12,604 - Insuffi
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    Research Paper David Butter Middle East and North Africa Programme | March 2016 Salvaging Syria’s Economy Contents Summary 2 Introduction 3 Institutional Survival 6 Government Reach 11 Resource Depletion 14 Property Rights and Finance 22 Prospects: Dependency and Decentralization 24 About the Author 27 Acknowledgments 27 1 | Chatham House Salvaging Syria’s Economy Summary • Economic activity under the continuing conflict conditions in Syria has been reduced to the imperatives of survival. The central government remains the most important state-like actor, paying salaries and pensions to an estimated 2 million people, but most Syrians depend in some measure on aid and the war economy. • In the continued absence of a political solution to the conflict, ensuring that refugees and people in need within Syria are given adequate humanitarian support, including education, training and possibilities of employment, should be the priority for the international community. • The majority of Syrians still living in the country reside in areas under the control of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which means that a significant portion of donor assistance goes through Damascus channels. • Similarly, any meaningful post-conflict reconstruction programme will need to involve considerable external financial support to the Syrian government. Some of this could be forthcoming from Iran, Russia, the UN and, perhaps, China; but, for a genuine economic recovery to take hold, Western and Arab aid will be essential. While this provides leverage, the military intervention of Russia and the reluctance of Western powers to challenge Assad mean that his regime remains in a strong position to dictate terms for any reconstruction programme.
  • Syria SITREP Map 07

    Syria SITREP Map 07

    Syria Situation Report: February 7 - 21, 2018 1a-b February 10: Israel and Iran Initiate Largest Confrontation Over Syria Since 6 February 9 - 15: Turkey Creates Two Additional Observation Points in Idlib Start of the Syrian Civil War: Israel intercepted and destroyed an Iranian drone that violated Province: The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) established two new observation points near its airspace over the Golan Heights. Israel later conducted airstrikes targeting the drone’s control the towns of Tal Tuqan and Surman in Eastern Idlib Province on February 9 and February vehicle at the T4 Airbase in Eastern Homs Province. Syrian Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (SAMS) 15, respectively. The TSK also reportedly scouted the Taftanaz Airbase north of Idlib City as engaged the returning aircraft and successfully shot down an Israeli F-16 over Northern Israel. The well as the Wadi Deif Military Base near Khan Sheikhoun in Southern Idlib Province. Turkey incident marked the first such combat loss for the Israeli Air Force since the 1982 Lebanon War. established a similar observation post at Al-Eis in Southern Aleppo Province on February 5. Israel in response conducted airstrikes targeting at least a dozen targets near Damascus including The Russian Armed Forces later deployed a contingent of military police to the regime-held at least four military positions operated by Iran in Syria. town of Hadher opposite Al-Eis in Southern Aleppo Province on February 14. 2 February 17 - 20: Pro-Regime Forces Set Qamishli 7 February 18: Ahrar Conditions for Major Offensive in Eastern a-Sham Merges with Key Ghouta: Pro-regime forces intensified a campaign 9 Islamist Group in Northern of airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting the 8 Syria: Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar opposition-held Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Al-Hasakah a-Sham merged with Islamist group Damascus, killing at least 250 civilians.