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Feature Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, Vol. 71(1) 13–25 ! The Author(s) 2015 Reprints and permissions: American scientists as sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0096340214563679 public citizens: 70 years http://thebulletin.sagepub.com of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

David Kaiser and Benjamin Wilson

Abstract For seven decades, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has served as a discussion forum for urgent issues at the intersection of science, technology, and society. Born in the aftermath of World War II and a roiling debate over the control of the postwar atom, the Bulletin has been a sounding board for major nuclear-age debates, from atomic to missile defense. Since the end of the , the magazine has featured an expanding array of challenges, including the threat posed by global climate change. The BulletinÕs contributors have expressed their public citizenship by helping to bring the political aspects of science into proper focus. They have stood up for the political freedom of science, and sought to harness scientific knowledge to respon- sible ends in the political arena. Such efforts are needed now, as they were in 1945.

Keywords Atomic Scientists of Chicago, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Cold War history, Edward Teller, Eugene Rabinowitch, Federation of American Scientists, Hans Bethe, House Committee on Un-American Activities, Robert Oppenheimer, Ruth Adams

t has been 70 years since a group The goals of their new organization and calling itself the ÒAtomic Scientists of their new journal were, as the first issue of I ChicagoÓ issued its first dispatch. At the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of Chi- the start, the group consisted of a hand- cago put it in December of 1945, twofold: ful of veterans of the , ÒTo explore, clarify and formulate the concentrated at the Metallurgical opinion and responsibilities of scientists Laboratory at the University of Chicago. [concerning] the problems brought Thoroughly engaged with the world about by the release of nuclear energyÓ around them, deeply worried about the and ÒTo educate the public to a full under- implications of their work creating the standing of the scientific, technological first nuclear weapons, horrified by the and social problems arising from the destruction and death the bombs had release of nuclear energy.Ó In October delivered to Japan, they felt an obligation that year, at a meeting between the Chi- to act and to say something. cago scientists and three like-minded

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groups from other Manhattan Project the Federation of Atomic Scientists. In sitesÑLos Alamos, New Mexico; Oak 1946, its name was changed to the Federa- Ridge, Tennessee; and New York tion of American Scientists.1 CityÑthe delegates had agreed to com- Mixing science and politics is risky bine their efforts in a united organization, business, both researchers and

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Monash University on June 17, 2015 Kaiser and Wilson 15 politicians typically think. But, as the such limits were explored at AmericaÕs early atomic scientists knew, to pretend peril, and the worldÕs. that truth and power can live apart is to The magazineÕs title dropped the ref- misunderstand each. The FAS was an erence to its Chicago birthplace and organization of scientists dedicated to became the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- politics, and a political organization tists in March of 1946. In those days, a dedicated to the freedom and openness single copy cost 10 cents. Its founding of science. These scientists were no editors were the Austrian-born physicist fuzzy-minded thinkers and lab-bench Hyman Goldsmith and the Russian-born tinkerers, innocent of the harsh realities chemist Eugene Rabinowitch, each a of power and policy. Far from it. They set veteran of the Chicago Met Lab. The up their shop close to the heart of the BulletinÕs day-to-day operations owed action. At the birth of the FAS, it was much to the Chicago chapterÕs 22-year-old agreed that the central office should be secretary, Ruth Adams, who would work located in Washington, DC and that at her way up through the editorial ranks in least one member from each of the four the years ahead. A specially designed cover member associations should be present first appeared in June 1947. That iconic in the capital at any given time. The FAS quarter-clock,itshandssetataboutseven central office was to function as Òan minutes to midnight, began appearing information and speakersÕ bureauÓ and monthly against a shifting palette of back- would Òhandle contacts with legislative ground colors. A couple of years later the leaders.Ó2 position of the minute hand had become Struggle and controversy lay ahead. sensitive to the state of the nuclear world. Bitter disagreement soon developed It moved ahead a few minutes in October over what should be done with AmericaÕs 1949, following the announcement of the temporary monopoly on the power of first Soviet nuclear test.5 the atom. A new congressional commit- Through endless changes there have tee had recently been formed to weigh been constants. The aim of the atomic precisely this issue. The physicist scientists and their journal had always Edward Teller, writing in the Bulletin in been dual, at once looking out to the early 1946, gave cautious support to his world while focusing inward on develop- colleaguesÕ hope of eliminating atomic ments at home. In 1945, there was the weapons for good.3 But in another article great question of international control: the following year he described his belief whether each nation, separately and Òthat if we should give way to fear and if secretively, would harness the atom, or we should fail to explore the limits of whether nuclear technologies and human power we shall surely be lost.Ó4 materials would rest under the control For him (and for a growing fraction of the of an international organization. And Washington leadership), the limits of there was the recognition (as the Atomic human power were realized in an exp- Scientists of Los Alamos worded it in a anding arsenal of nuclear weapons, the newsletter from 1945) that Òthe preserva- only good insurance policy against the tion of ...secrecy on a purely national rising threat of the . For basis would represent the defeat of any most of TellerÕs fellow contributors to adequate program of international con- the first issues of the Bulletin, however, trol.Ó6 Without responsible domestic

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Monash University on June 17, 2015 16 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71(1) civilian management and the free control over the nuclear weapons com- exchange of nuclear research and infor- plex in the , while another mation, the atomic scientists believed, bill, championed by Sen. Brien McMahon, there was no hope for progress and a Connecticut Democrat, called for civil- peace at the international level. ian control. The question of international Contributors to the Bulletin have control became similarly polarized. expressed their responsibility as scien- The US State Department released the tists not by ignoring or denying the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, written by a political dimensions of science, but by committee chaired by Dean Acheson, sub- comprehending and wrestling with sequently secretary of state, and promin- them. Their struggles have not been easy ent federal administrator David Lilienthal, or uncomplicated. As suggested by care- in March 1946; it aimed to head off an arms ful historical scholarship on scientists in race by establishing a new, international the nuclear age, along with a sampling of Atomic Development Authority which articles published in the Bulletin since the would own and distribute fissile materials. Cold WarÕs dawn, the atomic scientists While negotiating in the United Nations experienced a mix of success and failure, on behalf of the Truman administration, commitment and compromise, advance however, financier and presidential advi- and retreat. But the main thing is that ser Bernard Baruch introduced several they were talking. Some of the most im- important changes, each aimed at punish- portant and urgent conversations about ing other nations (especially the Soviet the science and politics of the nuclear Union) for any efforts toward nuclear pro- age have taken place in these pages. liferation, thereby perpetuating the US ÒSome among the friends of the Bulletin monopoly (Badash, 1995; Hewlett and have counseled it to quit, and to leave Anderson, 1962). mankind to its folly,Ó wrote the longtime On the matter of how to Òcontrol the editor Eugene Rabinowitch in 1952.7 We atom,Ó readers of the Bulletin watched canbegratefulthatheandhisfellowedi- the fledgling atomic scientistsÕ movement tors and writers ignored the advice. pull to a draw. Congress passed the McMahon bill in July 1946, creating a Controlling the atomÑand the new civilian Atomic Energy Commission, scientists but only after significant changes had been made to the original; almost all The earliest issues of the Bulletin were information related to nuclear weapons devotedtothechallengesandopportu- would be Òborn secret,Ó and the civilian nities of converting the wartime Manhat- commissioners would need to work clo- tan Engineer District to a postwar setting. sely with a Military Liaison Committee. Many articles focused on competing bills Meanwhile, BaruchÕs proposals for inter- that had been introduced in Congress national control gained little traction in soon after the end of the war: The May- the United Nations, leaving no clear Johnson bill (named for House Military framework in which to address nuclear Affairs Committee chairman Andrew matters among nations (Badash, 1995; Jackson May, a Kentucky Democrat, and Hewlett and Anderson, 1962; Smith, 1965). Sen. Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, also a Physicist and Manhattan Project vet- Democrat) would have extended military eran Edward Condon had published

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Monash University on June 17, 2015 Kaiser and Wilson 17 spirited appeals on these matters in the nuclear reactions was already widely Bulletin.8 Soon he became the subject of known throughout the scientific commu- the news, not just a commentator. The nity, or could likely be gleaned in any House Committee on Un-American well-stocked laboratory; facets of Activities repeatedly sniped at Condon nature, they argued, rarely stayed secret for alleged disloyalty, even declaring in for long. More important, many empha- a March 1948 report that Condon was sized, bombs were not built from for- Òone of the weakest links in our atomic mulas that could be hastily scribbled or securityÓ (Wang, 1992: 246). Though hidden in the heel of a shoe: The real nuclear scientists and engineers had force behind the Manhattan Project had worked under close scrutiny and surveil- been industrial might rather than esoteric lance since the earliest days of the Man- equations. Thus, early voices like Eugene hattan Project, the public campaign Rabinowitch repeated, any efforts to against Condon galvanized the FAS clamp down too hard on the circulation (Smith, 1965; Wang, 1992). Soon the Bul- of scientific information would only letin was filled with updates and editor- hamper legitimate research.10 ials denouncing the excesses of domestic Theearlyargumentswerevigorous, anticommunism and debating the fast- but concerted hectoring and red-baiting growing federal apparatus of loyalty took their toll. As tensions with the checks and security clearances.9 Soviet Union escalatedÑeven before the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear The specter of atomic secrets bomb in autumn 1949Ñthe Bulletin chronicled American scientistsÕ new rea- The legislative maneuverings around the lities. Access to federal research con- McMahon bill and the wild charges tracts, national laboratories, and even against Condon unfolded amid shocking graduate-student fellowships required revelations about the theft of atomic intrusive background checks and loyalty secrets. In February 1946, a clerk working oaths. Outspoken scientists routinely had in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa defected, their passport applications denied, while leaking information about a wartime spy foreign colleagues failed to secure visas to ring that had included Manhattan Project visit the United States; all of this happened scientist , among others. with dubious protections for due process Four years later, physicist or civil liberties.11 Organizations and not confessed that he, too, had passed infor- just individuals felt the pressure. As his- mation to the Soviets from his own Man- torian Jessica Wang has chronicled, after hattan Project perch. Throughout the years of hounding from congressional postwar decade, the House Committee committees and the FBI, groups like the on Un-American Activities and other FAS abandoned their more energetic pol- congressional committees kept the itical activities, settling instead for a kind threat of further Òatomic espionageÓ in of Òquiet diplomacyÓ (Wang, 1999). the headlines (Kaiser, 2005; Wang, 1999). From the start, outspoken members of Banning nuclear tests the FAS argued that many of what were branded as atomic secrets were no such As the plowed ahead, thing. Important information about scientists were drawn into the political

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Monash University on June 17, 2015 18 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71(1) arena once again over the issue of nuclear had seized an opportunity to bring him testing. In March 1954, the Castle Bravo down (Bird and Sherwin, 2005; McMil- thermonuclear testÑthe largest US lan, 2005; Thorpe, 2006).13 nuclear detonation everÑrained radio- In the wake of the Oppenheimer affair, active fallout on several Pacific atolls, scientists increasingly confined the emer- along with the Japanese fishing boat ging test ban debate to ÒtechnicalÓ Lucky Dragon. As details of the test and issuesÑthe means of verifying compli- its aftermath came to light (nearly two ance with a possible treaty, the threshold dozen fishermen suffered symptoms of yield above which underground explo- radiation sickness, and one eventually sions could be unambiguously detected, died), the event sparked international and so on (Divine, 1978; Greene, 2007; outrage over the hazards of nuclear test- Rubinson, 2011). David Inglis, a physicist ing (Creager, 2013; Hamblin, 2008; Moore, at the Argonne National Laboratory, opti- 2008). The BulletinÕs pages quickly fea- mistically told Bulletin readers in 1954 tured articles explaining the effects of that a test ban could be verified by an fallout on the human body; an entire spe- international agency Òso as to guarantee cial issue of the magazine in November that any violation would be unequivo- 1955 was dedicated to the genetic effects cally announced to the world.Ó A technic- of radiation. The voices of anti-testing ally verified test ban seemed the most alarmists like the chemist Linus Pauling plausible first step in the much longer could be heard above the din of reassur- and more difficult process of disarma- ing government statements.12 ment. At the same time, concerned scien- Yet the same pressures that had inten- tists acclimated themselves to the sified government suspicions of scien- orthodoxy of nuclear deterrence. By tists and their ÒsecretsÓ had also drawn 1957, Inglis could express his displeasure increasingly rigid limits around what that during the 1956 presidential election could be argued in public about US campaign (when the Democratic candi- nuclear policy. The Atomic Energy Com- date, Adlai Stevenson, ran, and lost, on a mission investigation of Robert Oppen- platform that included a call for a test heimer, the ÒfatherÓ of the bomb himself, ban), more attention had been given to counseled caution to would-be commen- the radiological hazards of testing than tators on the issue of nuclear testing. For to what he saw as the more serious dan- recommending against a crash program gerÑthe threat posed to deterrence by in pursuit of thermonuclear weapons in continued testing. As the physicist Hans 1949, Oppenheimer was punished in Bethe recommended, ambivalently, ÒWe 1954 with a humiliating loyalty-security should test those designs which fit into hearing, culminating in the loss of his our strategic plans in order to be sure clearance to access classified nuclear that we can rely on our designs and thus information. A fully declassified tran- on our invulnerable deterrent.Ó Mean- script of the hearing, recently released while, influential pro-testing experts, by the Department of Energy, confirms especially Edward Teller, argued force- the judgment of several historians that fully that a test ban was sure to give the Oppenheimer had hardly been ÒdisloyalÓ Soviets a decisive nuclear advantage (and to the United States. In a climate of anx- they were sure to cheat, in any case, Teller iety and suspicion, powerful enemies seemed certain).14

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The scientistsÕ discussions in the Bulle- Defense Department scientists, how- tin tracked agonizing negotiations in ever, clung tenaciously to the idea that Geneva, which began in 1959. A morator- missiles might be defended against. By ium on nuclear testing had commenced in the mid-1960s, a spirited debate had 1958 but ended dispiritingly in 1961 when started to take shape in the Bulletin. the Soviets began a series of high-yield The physicist Freeman Dyson argued nuclear tests, including the largest-ever in 1964 that development of missile thermonuclear explosion. The United defense systems had Òreached the point States resumed its own testing just days at which serious decisions have to be later. This major setback spurred made. It is not enough to repeat the renewed interest in the test ban, and slogan Ôthere is no defenseÕ and leave it new efforts at the negotiating table. Bulle- at that.Ó16 As Dyson would argue fre- tin editorial staffer Ruth Adams wrote to quently in the years ahead, a nuclear the MIT physicist Bernard Feld in the world dominated by defense (by missiles days following the broken moratorium: designed to destroy other missiles, rather ÒOur mail has tripled from readers seek- than cities) was surely the lesser of two ing advice and what they call nonpartisan evils. The mathematician and strategic factsÓ concerning the test ban. The jour- analyst Jeremy J. Stone put forward a nalÕs writersÑincluding Feld himselfÑ very different view later in 1964. In his were ready to provide them.15 Still, with eyes, an antiballistic missile deployment such intense focus on the technical would amount to Òa new round in the aspects of verification, in the end the sci- arms race.Ó17 Stone and many of his entists and the negotiators would not stop fellow arms controllers argued that the arms race, but drive it underground. because buying more offensive missiles In August 1963, the Limited Test Ban was a cost-effective way of offsetting an Treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the adversaryÕs defenses, ABM did not atmosphere, the oceans, and outer space dampen the arms race but inflamed it. was signed in . A comprehensive The lines of dispute had been drawn, test ban agreement would wait for and over the next several years contribu- another three decades, as the super- tors debated the compatibility of deter- powers continued to build their arsenals rence and defense in the missile age.18 with the aid of belowground tests During the 1960s, scientists increas- (Badash, 1995). ingly attacked ABMÕs technical limita- tions, framing their arguments with the The dream of missile defense tools of their disciplinary expertise (Slayton, 2013). In September 1967, Since 1945, the atomic scientists had said Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that there was no effective defense announced the administrationÕs plan to against nuclear weapons. The arrival of deploy a ÒthinÓ ABM system (to shield the missile age in the late 1950s put a against a ÒlightÓ ICBM attack by point on this venerable claim. Missiles ).19 Soon, highly placed physicists magnified the speed of nuclear delivery, were arguing on basic physical grounds shrinking the time-span between warn- that missile defense could easily be ing and arrival of a nuclear strike from defeated. The physicists Hans Bethe hours to minutes. Some officials and and Richard Garwin went public with a

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Monash University on June 17, 2015 20 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71(1) blockbuster critique of ABM in a 1968 never keep in a real nuclear war. SDI Scientific American article, explaining in ultimately died a slow death. Missile impressive technical detail the various defense, however, would long outlive ways an attacker could deceive and over- the end of the Cold WarÑthe George whelm a missile defense system (Garwin W. Bush administration withdrew the and Bethe, 1968). United States from the ABM Treaty in By the late 1960s, arms controllers like 2002Ñand it remains a live issue for Bethe were ferrying information and nuclear security analysts today.21 arguments from classified contextsÑin which many scientists worked as con- Climate change and other sultants and advisers to the govern- emerging threats mentÑout into a growing public debate about nuclear policy. Scientists had ear- The polarizing Cold WarÑwhich had lier chafed against the restraints of come to define so many facets of daily government secrecy, but the arms con- life for American scientists and policy trollers relied heavily on their insider makersÑended with an abruptness that status and their access to secret informa- caught most experts by surprise (Gus- tion in fashioning critiques of govern- terson, 2004). The dissolution of the ment programs (Wilson, 2014). In fact, Soviet Union did not, of course, solve the as early as 1962 Bethe offered in the Bul- dilemmas of nuclear weapons: Securing letin his judgment that effective missile fissile materials and weapons know-how defense was technically Òimpossible.Ó continues to demand urgent attention, But at that early date, the case was not amid concerns about proliferation to un- easily made in public, Òlargely because friendly nations and non-state actors much of the argument is classified,Ó he alike.22 Meanwhile, charges against Los wrote. Thanks to his and othersÕ efforts, Alamos scientist in 1999 for vigorous discussion of missile defense mishandling nuclear secretsÑwhich re- would become far more open by the sulted in Lee spending nine months in soli- end of the decade.20 tary confinement before ultimately being The destabilizing potential of missile exonerated of nearly all chargesÑseemed defense was recognized in the landmark to echo earlier patterns of overreach and US-Soviet ABM Treaty in 1972, which fear-mongering in the service of protecting put firm limits on allowed ABM deploy- the US nuclear stockpile.23 ments. But in the 1980s, the Reagan Nuclear concerns also served as a administrationÕs ambitious Strategic bridge to a new topic that began to fill Defense Initiative (SDI) threatened the the BulletinÕs pages more often in the arms control orthodoxy. Government 1990s: climate change. The Bulletin had officials and their scientific backers run a cover story on climate change as revived the dream of perfect missile early as February 1978.24 In the post- defense with promises of space-based Cold War era, proponents and critics of Òdirected energy weaponsÓ and other civilian nuclear power recast their super-high-tech platforms. Opponents debate amid new apprehension about attacked SDI with equal vigor, arguing greenhouse gas emissions and implica- (in the spirit of Bethe and Garwin) that tions for global warming.25 Soon the SDI made technical promises it could topic commanded significant space in

Downloaded from bos.sagepub.com at Monash University on June 17, 2015 Kaiser and Wilson 21 the Bulletin, sometimes even beyond the point to a broader lesson about scien- nuclear question. Detailed descriptions tistsÕ shifting political and cultural for- of scientistsÕ developing understanding tunes. After all, the flip side of red- of the risks of climate change ran side baiting during the early Cold War was a by side with heated denials that global widely held assumptionÑwhether mer- warming posed any threat at allÑearly ited or notÑthat scientists did deserve exchanges, lobbed more than 20 years special attention. The scrutiny and sur- ago, that presaged todayÕs bitter, grind- veillance came as a by-product of the ing stalemate on climate change.26 belief, shared by political officials, jour- Since that time, most scientists and nalists, and the voting public alike, that readers of the Bulletin have come to scientistsÕ opinions and advice should agree that global climate change poses carry extra weight in the nuclear age. an existential threat to humankind just Since the end of the Cold War, scientistsÕ as potent as a runaway nuclear arms place in the polity seems to have race. Yet that very real concern has settled into a new reality: just another failed to drive effective political action. interest group jockeying for attention in Despite a welter of reports by groups like a media-saturated world. the Federation of American Scientists Knowledge and power, science and and the Union of Concerned Scientists, politics: We are no closer to solving the and longstanding communication eff- riddle of their entwining today than were orts by individual climate scientistsÑ those weary, earnest veterans of the including James Hansen, a former dir- Manhattan Project 70 years ago when ector of the NASA Goddard Institute they launched the Bulletin of the Atomic for Space Studies, and Stanford Univer- Scientists. From the continuing threat of sity climate scientist Stephen Schneider, nuclear weapons and climate change to both Bulletin Science and Security Board newly emerging technological threats membersÑno new ÒscientistsÕ move- (such as the rise of synthetic biology), mentÓ has coalesced with the same barn- the journal continues to keep a watchful storming zeal that had marked the early eye on pressing issues. The earthly chal- post-war quest to control the atom. lenges remain real; the stakes are still Perhaps scientists find it more diffi- high. Amid todayÕs haze of Facebook cult to rally public opinion today given ÒlikesÓ and blog-addled misdirection, the incremental nature of climate change. may the Bulletin long continue to serve Even the most dramatic, photo-ready as a vital forum for informed and impas- effects of global warmingÑtitanic ice sioned ideas. shelves cleaving off of glaciers in Antarc- ticaÑseem to lack the iconic force of a Funding mushroom cloud hovering above a smol- This research received no specific grant from any dering city. Meanwhile, decades of con- funding agency in the public, commercial, or not- tentious struggle over topics like arms for-profit sectors. control may well have dampened younger scientistsÕ enthusiasm for the rough-and- Notes tumble of direct political action. 1. ÒThe Atomic Scientists of Chicago,Ó Bulletin Or perhaps the stubborn challenges of of the Atomic Scientists [BAS] 1, no. 1 (10 addressing climate change ultimately December 1945): 1. All Bulletin articles

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published prior to 1999 are available at: 1949): 95; Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒAtomic http://books.google.ca/books?id¼-wsAAA Spy Trials: Heretical Afterthoughts,Ó BAS AAMBAJ; more recent articles can be found 7 (May 1951): 139”140; Henry Wallace, ÒThe at: http://bos.sagepub.com/. Maginot Line of Secrecy,Ó BAS 8 (February 2. ÒThe Federation of Atomic Scientists,Ó BAS 1952): 36”37; Ralph E. Lapp, ÒAtomic 1, no. 1 (10 December 1945): 2. See also Barn- Candor,Ó BAS 10 (October 1954): 312”314, hart Sethi (2012). 226; Lloyd Berkner, ÒIs Secrecy Effective?Ó 3. Edward Teller, ÒScientists in War and BAS 11 (February 1955): 62”63. See also Well- Peace,Ó BAS 1, no. 6 (1 March 1946): 10”11. erstein (2010). 4. Edward Teller, ÒAtomic Scientists Have 11. Byron Miller and Harrison Brown, ÒLoyalty Two Responsibilities,Ó BAS 3 (December Procedures of the A.E.C.: A Report and 1947): 355”356. Recommendations,Ó BAS 4 (February 1948): 5. Bernard Feld, ÒTribute to Ruth Adams,Ó 45”48; FAS Committee on Secrecy and BAS 40 (November 1984): 2; Mike Moore, Clearance, ÒLoyalty Clearance Procedures ÒMidnight Never Came,Ó BAS 51 (Novem- in Research Laboratories,Ó BAS 4 (April ber/December 1995): 16”27; Alexander 1948): 111”114; FAS Committee on Secrecy Rabinowitch, ÒFounder and Father,Ó BAS and Clearance, ÒSome Individual Cases of 61 (January/February 2005): 30”37. Clearance Procedures,Ó BAS 4 (September 6. ÒThe Policy of the A.L.A.S.,Ó BAS 1, no. 1 (10 1948): 281”285; ÒAEC Criteria for Security December 1945): 1. Clearance,Ó BAS 5 (February 1949): 62”63; 7. Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒTen Years After,Ó Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒThe ÔCleansingÕ of BAS 8 (December 1952): 294”295, 314. AEC Fellowships,Ó BAS 5 (June/July 1949): 8. E. U. Condon, ÒAn Appeal to Reason,Ó BAS 1, 161”162; Victor F. Weisskopf, ÒReport on no. 7 (15 March 1946): 6”7; E. U. Condon, the Visa Situation,Ó BAS 5 (June/July 1949): ÒScience and International Cooperation,Ó 221”222; ÒCivil Liberties of Scientists: Report BAS 1 (May 1946): 8”11. of AAAS Committee,Ó BAS 5 (November 9. ÒIn Defense of Science and FreedomÑ- 1949): 298”299; ÒJoint CommitteeÕs Reports Speeches at the Condon Dinner,Ó BAS 4 on AEC Investigations,Ó BAS 5 (December (June 1948): 173”175; ÒLoyalty InvestigationsÑ 1949): 330”336; Eugene Rabinowitch, A Poll of the Atomic Scientists,Ó BAS 4(July ÒEditorial: Scientists and Loyalty,Ó BAS 7 1948): 218; ÒCondon Is Cleared by Atomic (December 1951): 354”355; Leonard White, Energy Commission,Ó BAS 4 (August 1948): ÒThe Loyalty Program of the United States 226, 255; ÒSome Individual Cases of Clearance Government,Ó BAS 7 (December 1951): Procedures,Ó BAS 4 (September 1948): 363”366, 382; E. U. Condon, ÒScientists and 281”285; ÒEight Scientists Protest Thomas the Federal Government,Ó BAS 8 (August CommitteeÕs Methods,Ó BAS 4 (October 1952): 179”182; ÒScientists Defend Them- 1948): 290, 320; ÒThe Committee on Un-Amer- selves on Loyalty Charges,Ó BAS 9 (February ican Activities Feels the Effect of November 1953): 2; Edward Shils, ÒConspiratorial 2,Ó BAS 4 (December 1948): 376; E.U. Condon, Hallucinations,Ó BAS 10 (February 1954): ÒReflections on Government,Ó BAS 5 (June/ 51”54; ÒScientists Defend Themselves on July 1949): 179”181. Loyalty Charges,Ó BAS 9 (February 1955): 10. Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒEditorial: Freedom 2”3; Geoffrey Chew, ÒPassport Problems,Ó of Scientific Publication,Ó BAS 2 (December BAS 12 (January 1956): 26”28. See also 1946): 1, 32; Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒEditorial: Wang (1999). The Atomic Secrets,Ó BAS 3 (February 1947): 12. In fact, worries about the hazards of fallout 33, 68; Brien McMahon, ÒShould We Reveal produced by nuclear testing predated the the Size of Our Atomic Stockpile?Ó BAS 5 Castle Bravo episode, and were anchored (March 1949): 66”68; Robert Cushman, much closer to home, in the US nuclear test- ÒFreedom versus Security,Ó BAS 5 (March ing program at the Nevada Test Site. See, for 1949): 69”72; ÒSecrecy Debated in Joint example, Lyle B. Borst, ÒNevada Weapons Congressional Committee,Ó BAS 5 (March Test,Ó BAS 9 (April 1953): 73”75. On the

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aftermath of the Bravo test, see James R. 18. George W. Rathjens, Jr., ÒDeterrence and Arnold, ÒEffects of the Recent Bomb Tests Defense,Ó BAS 14 (June 1958): 225”228; on Human Beings,Ó BAS 10 (November 1954): Robert Gomer, ÒThe ABM Debate: A 347”348; Bentley H. Glass, ÒThe Hazards of Soviet View,Ó BAS 21 (February 1965): Atomic Radiation to Man: British and 25”26; N. Talensky, ÒAntimissile Systems American Reports,Ó BAS 12 (October 1956): and Disarmament,Ó BAS 21 (February 1965): 312”317; Linus Pauling, ÒAn Appeal by 26”29; Betty Goetz Lall, ÒGaps in the ABM American Scientists to the Governments Debate,Ó BAS 23 (April 1967): 45”46; Oran R. and People of the World,Ó BAS 13 (Septem- Young, ÒActive Defense and International ber 1957): 264. From the special issue on the Order,Ó BAS 23 (May 1967): 35”41; Laurence genetic effects of fallout, see, for example, W. Martin, ÒBallistic Missile Defense and Ralph E. Lapp, ÒGlobal Fall-out,Ó BAS 11 Europe,Ó BAS 23 (May 1967): 42”45; David (November 1955): 339”343. R. Inglis, ÒMissile Defense, Nuclear 13. ÒEditorial: The Oppenheimer Case,Ó BAS 10 Spread, and Vietnam,Ó BAS 23 (May 1967): (May 1954): 173; Harry Kalven, Jr., ÒThe Case 49”52; D. G. Brennan, ÒNew Thoughts on of J. Robert Oppenheimer before the Atomic Missile Defense,Ó BAS 23 (June 1967): 10”15; Energy Commission,Ó BAS 10 (September Leonard S. Rodberg, ÒABMÑSome Arms 1954): 259”269. On the recent release of the Control Issues,Ó BAS 23 (June 1967): 16”20. full Oppenheimer hearing report, see http:// 19. B. T. Feld, ÒTo Deploy: An Editorial fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/10/oppenhei- Opinion,Ó BAS 23 (December 1967): 19; mer-declass/ and http://www.osti.gov/ Jeremy J. Stone, ÒBeginning of the Next opennet/hearing.jsp. Round,Ó BAS 23 (December 1967): 20”21; 14. David R. Inglis, ÒBan H-Bomb Tests and Franklin A. Long, ÒStrategic Balance and the Favor the Defense,Ó BAS 10 (November ABM,Ó BAS 24 (December 1968): 2”5; J. W. 1954): 353”356; David Inglis, ÒNational Fulbright, ÒForeign Policy Implications of Security with the Arms Race Limited,Ó BAS the ABM Debate,Ó BAS 25 (June 1969): 12 (June 1956): 196”201; David Inglis, 20”22; George W. Rathjens, ÒIs Safeguard ÒProspects for Stopping Nuclear Tests,Ó Worth the Risk?Ó BAS 25 (June 1969): 23”24; BAS 12 (January 1957): 19”20. See also Hans A. Bethe, ÒHard Point vs. City Defense,Ó Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒScience and the BAS 25 (June 1969): 25”26; Herbert F. York, Affairs of Man,Ó BAS 12 (June 1956): ÒThe Arms Race and the Fallacy of the Last 186”188; Ralph Lapp, ÒThe Humanitarian Move,Ó BAS 25 (June 1969): 27”28. H-bomb,Ó BAS 12 (September 1956): 264; 20. Hans Bethe, ÒDisarmament and Strategy,Ó Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒThe Bomb Test Con- BAS 18 (September 1962): 14”22. troversy,Ó BAS 12 (November 1956): 322; 21. William M. Arkin, ÒSDIÑPie in the Sky?Ó Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒThe Nuclear BAS 40 (April 1984): 9” 10; Sidney D. Drell, Weapon Test Ban,Ó BAS 13 (June 1957): 201; ÒABM Revisited,Ó BAS 40 (June 1984): 7”8; Jay Orear, ÒDetection of Nuclear Weapons Bernard T. Feld, ÒEnd Space Race Now,Ó Testing,Ó BAS 14 (March 1958): 98”101; BAS 40 (October 1984): 2; Gerard C. Smith, Eugene Rabinowitch, ÒNuclear Bomb ÒNo Dead End for Arms Control,Ó BAS 41 Tests,Ó BAS 14 (October 1958): 282”287. (January 1985): 3”4; Frank von Hippel, 15. Feld quoted in Rubinson (2011: 306). See also ÒAttack on Star Wars Critics a Diversion,Ó Lawrence Ruby and Bernard Feld, BAS 41 (April 1985): 8”10; Hans A. Bethe, ÒAtmospheric Testing,Ó BAS 28 (January ÒThe Technological Imperative,Ó BAS 41 1962): 31”33. (August 1985): 34”36; Thomas K. Longstreth, 16. Freeman Dyson, ÒDefense against Ballistic ÒLatest ABM PloyÑOld Is New,Ó BAS 43 Missiles,Ó BAS 20 (June 1964): 12”18. (December 1987): 3”4; George N. Lewis 17. Jeremy J. Stone, ÒArms Race or Dis- and Theodore A. Postol, ÒThe European armament?Ó BAS 20 (September 1964): Missile Defense Folly,Ó BAS 64 (May/June 20”24. 2008): 32”61.

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22. Kosta Tsipis, ÒAfter the Cold War: New Creager ANH (2013) Life Atomic: A History of Radio- Tasks for Arms Controllers,Ó BAS 45 (July isotopes in Science and Medicine. Chicago, IL: Uni- 1989): 7”8; Theodore B. Taylor and Sidney versity of Chicago Press. Drell, ÒWhy Not Now? Debating a Nuclear- Divine RA (1978) Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954”1960. New York: Oxford Free Millennium,Ó BAS 45 (July 1989): 25”31; University Press. Tom A. Zamora, ÒNew Jobs for Old Labs?,Ó Garwin RL and Bethe HA (1968) Anti-ballistic-missile BAS 48 (November 1992): 14”21; Frans systems. Scientific American 218(3): 21”31. Avail- Berkhout, Anatoli Diakov, Harold Feiveson, able at: http://fas.org/rlg/03%2000%201968% Marvin Miller, and Frank von Hippel, 20Bethe-Garwin%20ABM%20Systems.pdf. ÒPlutonium: True Separation Anxiety,Ó Greene BP (2007) Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the BAS 48 (November 1992): 28”34; Roald Sag- Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, 1945”1963. Stanford, CA: deev, ÒRussian Scientists Save American Stanford University Press. Secrets,Ó BAS 49 (May 1993): 32”36. Gusterson H (2004) Missing the end of the Cold War 23. Stephen Schwartz, ÒA Very Convenient in security studies. In: Gusterson H People of the Bomb: Portraits of AmericaÕs Nuclear Complex. Scandal,Ó BAS 55 (May/June 1999): 34”39; Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Stephen Schwartz, ÒScientist, Fisherman, Press, 100”120. Gardener... Spy?,Ó BAS 56 (November/ Hamblin JD (2008) Poison in the Well: Radioactive December 2000): 31”38; William Arkin, Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear ÒThe Silver Lining,Ó BAS 57 (January/Febru- Age. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University ary 2001): 76. See also Stober and Hoffman Press. (2002). Hewlett RG and Anderson OE Jr (1962) The New 24. William W. Kellogg, ÒIs Mankind Warming World, 1939”1946: A History of the United States the Earth?Ó BAS 34 (February 1978): 10”19. Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. I. University 25. W. Lanouette, ÒGreenhouse Scare Reheats Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Kaiser D (2005) The atomic secret in red hands? Nuclear Debate,Ó BAS 46 (April 1990): American suspicions of theoretical physicists 34”37; Robert H. Williams and Harold A. during the early Cold War. Representations Feiveson, ÒHow to Expand Nuclear Power 90(Spring): 28”60. Available at: http://web.mit. without Proliferation,Ó BAS 46 (April edu/dikaiser/www/Kaiser.RedTheorists.pdf. 1990): 40”45; I. Mintzer and A. Miller, McMillan PJ (2005) The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer ÒGlobal Warming: No Nuclear Quick Fix,Ó and the Birth of the Modern Arms Race. New York: BAS 46 (June 1990): 30”33. Viking. 26. See, for example, Spencer Weart, ÒFrom the Moore K (2008) Disrupting Science: Social Move- Nuclear Frying Pan into the Global Fire,Ó ments, American Scientists, and the Politics of the ” BAS 48 (June 1992): 18”27; S. Fred Singer, Military, 1945 1975. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni- versity Press. ÒWarming Theories Need Warning Label,Ó Oreskes N and Conway EM (2010) Merchants of BAS 48 (June 1992): 34”39. Cf. Weart (2003); Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Oreskes and Conway (2010). Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. New York: Bloomsbury. Rubinson P (2011) ÒCrucified on a cross of atomsÓ: References Scientists, politics, and the Test Ban Treaty. Dip- Badash L (1995) Scientists and the Development of lomatic History 35(2): 283”319. Available at: http:// Nuclear Weapons: From Fission to the Limited onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7709. Test Ban Treaty, 1939”1963. Atlantic Highlands, 2010.00950.x/abstract. NJ: Humanities Press. Slayton R (2013) Arguments That Count: Physics, Com- Barnhart Sethi M (2012) Information, education, and puting, and Missile Defense, 1949”2012. Cambridge, indoctrination: The Federation of American MA: MIT Press. Scientists and public communication strategies Smith AK (1965) A Peril and a Hope: The ScientistsÕ in the atomic age. Historical Studies in the Natural Movement in America, 1945”47. Chicago, IL: Uni- Sciences 42(1): 1”29. versity of Chicago Press. Bird K and Sherwin MJ (2005) American Prometheus: Stober D and Hoffman I (2002) A Convenient Spy: Wen The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppen- Ho Lee and the Politics of Nuclear Espionage. New heimer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. York: Simon and Schuster.

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Thorpe C (2006) Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect. education. His physics research focuses on Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. early-universe cosmology, working at the inter- Wang J (1992) Science, security, and the Cold War: face of particle physics and gravitation. Kaiser The case of E. U. Condon. Isis 83(2): 238”269. is author of the award-winning book Drawing Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/234506. Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Dia- Wang J (1999) American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War. grams in Postwar Physics (University of Chi- Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press. cago Press, 2005), which traces how Richard Weart SR (2003) The Discovery of Global Warming. FeynmanÕs idiosyncratic approach to quantum Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. physics entered the mainstream. His latest Wellerstein A (2010) Knowledge and the Bomb: book, How the Hippies Saved Physics: Science, Nuclear Secrecy in the United States. PhD disserta- Counterculture, and the Quantum Revival (W. tion, Harvard University, USA. W. Norton, 2011), charts the early history of Wilson B (2014) Insiders and Outsiders: Nuclear Arms BellÕs theorem and quantum entanglement and Control Experts in Cold War America. PhD disser- was named book of the year by Physics World tation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, magazine. USA.

Benjamin Wilson is a postdoctoral fellow at Author biographies Stanford UniversityÕs Center for International Security and Cooperation. In 2014, he received David Kaiser is Germeshausen Professor of his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of the History of Science and department head of Technology in the Program in History, Anthro- MITÕs Program in Science, Technology, and pology, and Science, Technology, and Society. Society, and a member of MITÕs Department His research focuses on the history of nuclear of Physics. He completed an AB in physics at arms control expertise in the United States. His Dartmouth College and PhDs in physics and dissertation, Insiders and Outsiders: Nuclear the history of science at Harvard University. Arms Control Experts in Cold War America, KaiserÕs historical research focuses on the explores arms controlÕs emergence and development of physics in the United States growth as a field of interdisciplinary research during the Cold War, looking at how the discip- and policy. line has evolved at the intersection of politics, culture, and the changing shape of higher

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