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3 Korea Section The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia Edited by Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto THE ASIA-PACIFIC RESEARCH CENTER (APARC) is a unique Stanford University institution focused on the study of contemporary Asia. APARC’s mission is to produce and publish Asia Pacific–focused interdisciplinary research; to educate students, scholars, and corporate and governmental affiliates about the importance of US-Asian relations; to promote constructive interaction to understand and resolve the region’s challenges; to influence US policy toward the Asia-Pacific; and to guide Asian nations on key foreign relations, government, political economy, technology, and social issues. Asia-Pacific Research Center Stanford Institute for International Studies Stanford University Encina Hall Stanford, CA 94305-6055 tel 650-723-9741 fax 650-723-6530 http://APARC.stanford.edu The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia may be ordered from: Brookings Institution Press Department 029, Washington, DC 20042-0029, USA. Tel. 1-800-275-1447 or 202-797-6258. Fax: 202-797-2960 Attn: Order Dept. Online: bookstore.brookings.edu Asia-Pacific Research Center publications, 2004. Copyright © 2004 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the publisher. First printing, 2004. ISBN 1-931368-06-6 iii CONTENTS Preface / v Daniel I. Okimoto INTRODUCTION The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia / 11 Michael H. Armacost America’s Asia Strategy during the Bush Administration / 25 Kurt M. Campbell JAPAN The Japan-US Alliance in Evolution / 35 Kuriyama Takakazu The Changing American Government Perspectives on the Missions and Strategic Focus of the US-Japan Alliance / 49 Rust M. Deming Japanese Adjustments to the Security Alliance with the United States: Evolution of Policy on the Roles of the Self-Defense Force / 73 Yamaguchi Noboru US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Can Japan Become the Great Britain of Asia? Should It? / 91 Ralph A. Cossa The Japan-US Alliance and Japanese Domestic Politics: Sources of Change, Prospects for the Future / 105 Hiroshi Nakanishi KOREA Shaping Change and Cultivating Ideas in the US-ROK Alliance / 121 Victor D. Cha The United States and South Korea: An Alliance Adrift / 147 Donald P. Gregg Challenges for the ROK-US Alliance in the Twenty-First Century / 157 Won-soo Kim iii US-ROK Defense Cooperation / 177 William M. Drennan Changes in the Combined Operations Arrangement in Korea / 191 Kim Jae-chang Domestic Politics and the Changing Contours of the ROK-US Alliance: The End of the Status Quo / 199 Lee Chung-min CHINA US-China Relations and America’s Pacific Alliances in the Post–-9/11 Era / 221 David M. Lampton China and America’s Northeast Asian Alliances: Approaches, Politics, and Dilemmas / 237 Jing Huang Contributors / 251 iv v Korea SHAPING CHANGE AND CULTIVATING IDEAS IN THE US-ROK ALLIANCE Victor D. Cha fter half a century, the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) stands as one of the most successful Apolitical-military relationships forged out of the Cold War era. What started as a pact of mutual convenience—formed between two parties who knew little about each other and had little in common except a common threat—has emerged as a prosperous and militarily robust relationship between two market democracies. The alliance, from its humble origins to today, represents a model of success. For fifty years, neither the governments nor their constituents on both sides of the Pacific questioned the alliance’s rationale, its substance, or its purpose. However, a chain of events over the past fourteen months has shaken the foundations of the alliance. Growing anti-Americanism among a younger generation in South Korea, disparate perceptions of the threat posed by North Korea, and military transformation initiatives in the United States have created more forces for change in the last year than arguably existed in the previous forty-nine years. The Past The significance of the US-ROK alliance may not have been completely appreciated when it was first concluded. It certainly was not conceptualized as a centerpiece of the US security framework for Asia. It was once described as a “bribe” to persuade then-South Korean president Syngman Rhee to agree to the 1953 armistice ending Korean war hostilities.1 Indeed, prior to the Korean War, the peninsula was not considered within Dean Acheson’s famous “defense perimeter” of US postwar interests in Asia. Even after the Truman administration committed to defend the South after the North’s invasion in June 1950, Korea remained a remote, unknown, and alien place that was strategically important to defend (i.e., keep out of communist hands), but intrinsically meaningless to Americans. Since those inauspicious beginnings, US-ROK relations have run the gamut from the fall of South Korean governments (e.g., Rhee in 1960), to military coups (by Park in 1961 and Chun in 1979), troop withdrawal plans (Nixon in 1969 and Carter in 1977), trade friction, radical anti-Americanism (1980s), democratization crises (1987), and financial crises (1997).2 The alliance held despite these events, drawing its strength and cohesion from a clear combined mission and a commonly perceived threat. Asia-Pacific Research Center Victor D. Cha The Present For the United States today, a range of indicators determines the success of a military alliance. It (1) deters aggression; (2) facilitates US power accretion and projection; (3) shares risks and costs among the parties; (4) enables common tactics and doctrine through joint training; (5) promotes a division of security roles; (6) serves US security objectives in the broader regional context; (7) facilitates cooperation in production and development of military equipment; (8) facilitates a reasonable quality of life and hospitable environment for US forces stationed abroad; (9) reflects shared political values; and (10) elicits political support among domestic constituencies.3 The alliance with Korea has generally met these expectations, despite a number of significant bumps in the road along the way. No relationship is without its problems. For nearly fifty years since the formation of the alliance, the United States’ role in inter-Korean relations was relatively uncontroversial. The animosity in Seoul-Pyongyang relations and the Cold War structure of regional security dictated one basic algorithm. The United States guaranteed successful deterrence against a North Korean attack on the South; moreover, US-ROK unity on a policy of diplomatic isolation and non-dialogue toward the North was indisputable. In recent years, this algorithm has been called into question. Despite arguments to the contrary by policy elites, the US role in inter-Korean relations is being contested, with the spectrum of views ranging from supporters of the Cold War template to dissenters who see the United States as a fundamental obstacle to improvement in inter-Korean relations. The controversial nature of the US role became increasingly evident in the aftermath of the June 2000 North–South Korea summit, when South Koreans perceived a relaxation in peninsular tensions. The Bush administration’s designation of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” did not help matters. Moreover, as the South Korean presidential elections of 2002 showed, for the general public, the distinction between the United States as security guarantor and ally against the North and as a spoiler of inter-Korean reconciliation has become at best muddled, and at worst destroyed.4 The Future The events of the past two years provide a window on the emergence of a historically unique collection of forces around the peninsula that compel inevitable, if not imminent, changes to the alliance. • US strategy: The US troop presence has been tailored successfully to deter North Korean aggression. However, because they are single-mindedly focused on the deterrence mission, these forces are currently positioned, trained, and equipped in a manner that does not fully contribute to overall American strategy in East Asia. 122 123 Asia-Pacific Research Center Victor D. Cha • South Korean capabilities: While US forces on the peninsula remain inflexibly tied to one mission, the ROK military has grown more robust and capable of bearing a larger defense burden, a far cry from the feeble force trained by the United States fifty years ago. • Demography and democracy: As noted above, civil-military tensions over the US military footprint have grown immeasurably in the past year. This is not the radical anti-Americanism of the 1980s, but the showcasing of a younger, affluent, and educated generation of Koreans, bred on democracy, who see the United States less favorably than their elders. • Sunshine policy: The Sunshine or engagement policy toward North Korea had the unintended consequence of worsening perceptions of US troops among the body politic. On the one hand, the policy’s (exaggerated) success caused the public to be less welcoming to the US presence. On the other, the policy’s failure led to the search for scapegoats, in which the US presence was a ready target. • Military transformation: Larger trends in US security thinking also presage change. The Pentagon’s 100,000 personnel benchmark in Asia is viewed by experts and the Department of Defense (DoD) as hindering transformational changes in regional military capabilities. The focus, they observe, should be on military capability and not a mere number. As the US military continues to transform itself into a more expeditionary (i.e., mobile) force increasingly equipped with precise weapons, fully networked command, information, and surveillance systems, and long-range striking ability, the US forces stationed in East Asia will of necessity be part of this transformation.
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