Rome, June 01 2019 Volume 3 World Food Programme Cross-Border Operations

World Food Programme Cross-Border Operations Personal Experiences of Alumni

The World Food Programme Alumni Network Published by: The World Food Programme Alumni Network https://wpfalumni.wfp.org Joseph Kaifala, Editor

World Food Programme Cross-Border Operations

Personal Experiences of Alumni

The World Food Programme Alumni Network

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed are those of the individual authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Food Programme (WFP) or the WFP Alumni Network. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this book rests solely with the authors. Publication of this book does not imply WFP or WFP Alumni Network endorsement of the opinions expressed.

Copyright © 2019 WFP Alumni Network

All rights reserved.

Book and cover design, Joseph Kaifala Front cover image: Iraq food recipient, WFP/Abeer Atefa

Dedication

To those who devote their lives to humanitarian service with the World Food Programme; to the resilience, courage and determination of those in the places they serve; to the mothers and children who are recipients of their nutritious food; and to the 68.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide.

Foreword

Once again, our committed World Food Programme (WFP) Alumni have taken the time to share their life stories in this latest Oral History publication, “World Food Programme Cross-Border Operations: Personal Experiences of Alumni.” Providing food assistance in a single country is a challenging and complex process. The complexity multiplies significantly when WFP is called upon to assist across borders. Often, those crossing borders do so at great personal risk. In addition, the capacity of recipient countries may be stretched beyond the capacity to provide adequate support.

This book provides insight to such challenges through anecdotes ranging from cross-border food assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina to getting food into Afghanistan from Pakistan. There are stories from South and Southeast Asia. Other examples include transboundary support between Cyprus and Iraq, and between Namibia and Angola.

When I first met the WFP Alumni Network, I was impressed with their accumulated experience and knowledge in every sphere of our work. I felt their passion for their work and indeed the compassion in their hearts. The Oral History publications are an indispensable record of the spirit of the WFP family and reflect WFP Alumni’s continued contribution to the organization.

In this regard, I am thankful for the enduring support of WFP Alumni colleagues towards achieving Zero Hunger.

Best wishes,

David Beasley, Executive Director

I I

Preface

n , the World Food Programme Alumni etor A started to ublish its ral istor series based on the ersonal eeriences of alumni, ith toics selected through a sure of A members. he series started ith the outhern African rought mergencies , folloed b nnoations at WFP . his third olume is based on the eeriences of alumni ho ere inoled in crossborder oerations.

he current olume contains contributions from alumni and is focused on the folloing regions AfghanistanPaistan, osniaerzegoina, rusra, amibiaAngola, ri ana, and hailandambodia. Persecties on cross border oerations hae also been etracted from Bread and Stone: Leadership and the Struggle to Reform the United Nations World Food Programme (2006), a boo ritten b former WFP ecutie irector, ames ngram, coering his tenure at WFP, eseciall a age on the nited ations order elief eration, and Une Vie en Bleu (2018), a boo ritten b eanacues raisse, a former WFP eut ecutie irector.

t ould not hae been ossible to roduce this olume ithout contributions from the alumni ho cared to share their resectie stories. hoe that these eeriences and ersecties ill be useful to the management and staff of WFP ho hae come after these alumni.

ould lie to than our editor, oseh aifala, and m colleagues on the ditorial Panel. oseh has once again oen together a comendium of ersonal stories ith areciation from the ditorial Panel.

uresh . harma

President, WFP Alumni etor teering ommittee

II II

Introduction

As a historian, when I heard that this year’s volume was going to be about rossborder oerations, I was immediately eited ven though these are stories o orld ood rogramme Alumni who were involved in humanitarian servies, roviding ood to hungry eole in omliated border situations, I new they would inlude irsthand historial inormation—narratives not usually available in history boos uided by humanitarian riniles o neutrality and imartiality, these ontributors oten had to negotiate with multile onliting arties and survive under treaherous natural onditions to reah those in need o relie

hese stories show that rossborder oerations oten our in violent onlit ones where humanitarian worers themselves an be targets o violent attas he end o olonialism led to identity rises and national seldeinition in many regions aross the world, ithing raial, religious, ethni or other revolutionary grous against eah other In these situations, as the iberian warlord harles aylor oten said, when elehants ight, the grass suers—ordinary eole leeing as Internally islaed ersons I and reugees ometimes even eeding vulnerable eole is olitiied by those resonsible or their suering and these humanitarians are usually the only hoe or ood and shelter

he stories in this volume are not only about the intriaies o these oerations, but also about the lives o these selless servants themselves, who have had to relive the ain o losing olleagues and riends in these oerations As a strong suorter o the wor o nited ations agenies, I still remember the ain I elt ater the bombing o the anal otel in aghdad and the humanitarian worers the world lost that day ore than eole were illed ut even when other aid worers were evauated ater the bombing, the ast Inormation ehnology and eleommuniations mergeny and uort eam I stayed behind to maintain ommuniation lines A maor art o this volume is ontributions rom orben ue, Anette risen, arlos eloso and others who were involved in the Ira erations

nortunately, humanitarian worers ontinue to wor under dangerous onditions, many still dying in the line o duty aross the world Aording to the Aid orer eurity eort, in there were maor inidents o violene against humanitarian oerations in ountries, aeting aid worers this total, were illed, wounded, and idnaed hese inidents onstitute a erent inrease rom I hoe those who read these touhing stories o ourage and servie to humanity would aly more eorts towards inreasing rotetion or humanitarian worers

As with revious volumes o these series, I have learned a lot rom these imatul ersonal aounts As a ormer reugee, I am indebted to and all

III III those who leave their own amilies at home to serve humanity in araway laes or these series, I am grateul to ein ullerud, who has oten gone out o his way to hel us ind the best images, and Arianna earotti It is always a delight to wor with the ditorial anel, eseially those who assisted with this volume r uresh harma, rethen loom, Angela an ynbah and eggy elson

oseh aiala

ditor

IVV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

oreword I

reae II

Introdution III

able o ontents

Asia nited ations order elie eration ames Ingram hailand ambodia avid orton hailand ambodia ulian eevre ambodia erner hleier ambodia Adelina antos ania yrvang aistan Aghanistan iero erranera ri ana uresh harma

Aria enya udan eanaues raisse amibia Angola ouglas asson outts

uroe osniaeregovina artin hlsen he alans harles inent

iddle ast Ira Ira orben ue Ira eanaues raisse yrus Ira ane eare nited Arab mirates Ira eter asier Ira Anette risen Ira arlos eloso Ira arlos eloso

onlusion

ditorial anel

1 1

Asia

2 2 United Nations Border Relief Operation – A Difficult Decision

James Ingram

ert rom his boo Bread and Stones: Leadership and the Struggle to Reform the United Nations World Food Programme

In we were still managing the nited ations order elie eration , but I was beoming more and more uneasy about our role and deided that year to relinuish it, though ontinuing to manage the suly o ood to the amuheans I made several visits to the border ams and attended several donor meetings in ew or I ame to see that the orld ood Programme’s (WFP) soalled leadageny role had little substane e had no say in relation to oliy or even oerations, other than resonsibility or aounting or the resoures rovided by the donors oliy was in the hands o the nited ations eial eresentative or oordinating amuhean umanitarian Assistane and his reresentative in ango As with every ountry oeration the nited ations eveloment rogramme eresentative was the titular head o , although the sta on the ground was sta onsistent with my oliy o ritial review o our erormane, begun during the great Arian drought and used to enasulate lessons to imrove uture emergeny management, in I ommissioned ord niversity’s Refugee tudies entre to evaluate our wor An issue that had been bothering me was the unwillingness o the hais to agree to higher eduation o the hmer hildren onined to the border ams his denial o eduation omounded the denial o the ormal status o reugee and the rights, however slender, onerred by that status nortunately, the nited ations igh ommissioner or eugees , under ressure rom hailand, had been omliit in this situation, so undermining its redibility as an aolitial humanitarian institution

he evaluation revealed a shoing abuse o human rights I new it would be imossible or me to submit suh a olitially harged doument to the A on my own authority in view o the at that resonsibility rested with the eretary General’s Special Representative, not WFP. I therefore sought clarification from

read and tones eadershi and the truggle to eorm the nited ations orld ood rogramme , , oourge , orth harleston, outh arolina, A 3 3 the Secretary General of WFP’s responsibilities as “leadagency.” I was told that ew or had neither the tie the inclination nor the intellectal capability to wor throgh the isses. he reality was that copared with the Foreign ffice of a edisied power lie stralia the Secretary General ade do with st a handfl of staff and little foral capacity to analye isses. Policy was ade on the rn. his sited aor goernents who preferred a wea Secretary General lacing the resorces to challenge their appraisals. ccordingly I passed decisionaing to the Special epresentatie and soght perission to withdraw WFP fro its noinal lead role. hat was a difficlt decision to ae. I new it was liely to be isinterpreted and it was with e being said to hae created a crisis oer the ealation in order to obtain fll control of . he syste is highly copetitie and all proposals for rationaliation of responsibilities between agencies are thoght to be abot personal and instittional power. hat was a thoght far fro y ind. WFP laced the staff with the eperience to flfil sch a political role.

4 4

aid orton and atherine ertini WFP ectie irector WFPo asell

ear ero in abodia was the her oge taeoer of Phno Penh in pril following the ietna war and the start of the abodian genocide. In ietnaese forces entered abodia and droe the her oge to the western forests and ontains of abodia bordering hailand. here was ery little harest that year and the interior of abodia was in troil owing to the war. any abodians and soe her oge fled to the ile frontier with hailand. Soe crossed oer to hailand. ost of those people were starving, making press reports of “walking skeletons” common.

Initially those people were accoodated in refgee caps adinistered by the nited ations igh oissioner for efgees near the hai border. oweer as the flow of people increased hai athorities started to hold the in caps along the border technically still inside abodia. hey were described by hai athorities as displaced persons not refgees becase they had not entered hailand.

hailand established as Force staffed by ilitary officers as the agency responsible for aid and interacting with the nited ations and ongoernental rganiations G along the border.

5 5 n , a oint orer operation was estalise te nite ations Children’s Fn an te nternational ommittee of te e ross on te ai sie to provie assistance to isplace people. e orl oo rogramme provie asic foo rations for an to istrite, an also provie rice see ner a oo an gricltre rganiation of te nite ations programme, wic was collecte amoians at te orer an taken into amoia o cart, in an effort to restart rice proction.

oo ai was also provie in amoia a operation rn erner cleiffer in nom en. at foo was sippe irectl to te amoian port of ompong om.

was te senior officer for te operation from to te en of . Initially, WFP’s role was to provide food for approximately 260, isplace amoians living in camps along te aiamoian orer. e istrition was organized by UNICEF/ICRC. From 1982, with a month’s notice, WFP was reeste to take over te responsiilit of proviing all assistance to isplace amoians from . is incle not onl foo, t water, selter, sanitation, ealtcare, aternal an il eat services, ecation, an a raioase secrit sstem for nite ations an staff.

ecame fll operational in its new role, sing its staff to istrite foo, water, an selteriling materials irectl to eneficiaries, an coorinating an fning aot s to provie services sc as ealtcare, sanitation, an moter an cil ealtcare. a tree fiel offices to cover activities along te mile orer. part from me, te onl oter reglar professional staff memer was lian efevre, m ept, wo eae te main fiel office near te orer at ranapratet.

is operation ma ave een te first time tat ecame fll operational, sing its own staff to istrite foo an oter ai irectl to eneficiaries, rater tan following te previos traitional approac of proviing foo for governments to istrite.

ere was ongoing trmoil in amoia an foo was ver scarce. an amoians fle to te orer wit ailan to seek safet an to fin foo. oo ai was onl provie to nonmilitar persons wo were actall present at te orer—no ai was provie to e taken ack into amoia. ose insie amoia were assiste wit ai elivere irectl to te atorities in nom en.

e approimatel , isplace amoians in camps along te mile orer were eiter locate in a noman’s land or in Cambodia. In many areas te actal orer was not clearl efine, an orer markers were inclined to “move.” The camps were established and organized by Cambodians

6 6 themselves, and were open on the Cambodian side, bt the inhabitants were not permitted to cross over to Thailand.

The camps were also politicized. ome camps, mainly in the montainos and heavily forested parts of the border, were nder the control of hmer Roge others were nder the control of the hmer erei or Free hmer movement, an antiCommnist and antionarchist grop that eventally became the basis of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under Son Sann. One camp was rn by proihano spporters.

The border was heavily militarized on the Thai side. n the Cambodian side, the border areas were more or less nder the control of armed elements of the hmer Roge, hmer erei and ihano spporters, and conflict among them was common. lso, increasingly, ietnamese forces began to approach the border.

The camps were organized and managed by Cambodians, bt Thai irreglar armed gards were posted to provide a semblance of secrity. Thai athorities tried to discorage smggling and blac maret activities.

s with the UNICEF/ICRC oint operation, WFP drew heavily on the spport of abot 22 Thai and international Ns. WFP coordinated and largely fnded their activities. The division of labor was that WFP provided and distribted food, water and shelter materials, sch as bamboo and tools, while Ns provided healthcare, C services and spplementary food for yong children, sanitation and special care for abandoned babies. ne N set p worshops for the manfactre of prosthetic limbs for amptees, of whom there were many becase of the prevalence of landmines. WFP ran a border pharmacy that provided most of the medical spplies to health agencies, which reslted in economies of scale. WFP also provided Ns with forwheeldrive picp trcs prchased nder a bl order from apan. Each picp was eipped with a F radio set. nd handheld radios were issed to N field staff, essential for secrity and commnication. WFP and N staff only entered the camps dring daylight hors.

WFP provided a radiobased secrity system to all United Nations and N staff woring in the camps. secrity coordinator was identified for each camp—who was either from WFP or an N. The role of the secrity coordinator was to open the camp to WFP and N staff in the morning, if it was safe to do so, and to close the camp in the evening. The secrity coordinator monitored the secrity sitation in the camp and srronding contryside. e or she set secrity levels for the camp dring the day, according to the following levels 0 calm 1 be alert 2 prepare to evacate evacate the camp and see shelter. The radio base at the WFP field office ensred that lowlevel radio signals from handsets were repeated at high power and adible to all in the area.

7 7 iiulties ere both “strutural” (beause o the uniue oraniational arranement) and “operational” at the beneiiar leel. Struturall this operation too plae beore FP obtained autonom rom FO. Personnel series or proessional sta ere proided b FO in ome. t FP ield oies throuhout the orld inanial series and personnel series or loall reruited sta ere proided b the nited Nations eelopment Proramme (NP). he NP esident epresentatie as deemed as the FP epresentatie.

In those days, WFP’s provision of food aid was in the form of aid supplied to oernment aenies hih arraned or its distribution. FP ield oie tpiall onsisted o onl one to or three proessional oiers ith loall reruited seretaries administratie assistants and driers.

n anuar aed ith the need to tae oer the oint NF border operation and to beome ull operational FP suddenl needed to massiel inrease its sta and support strutures.

WFP’s mandate was the proision o ood aid onl not ater shelter or health series. he solution to the mandate problem as that m oie undertoo the nonood aspets o the operation under the nominal authorit o the NP esident epresentatie ho had no mandate restrition. he title nited Nations order elie Operation (NO) as ien to the operation. NO (then) had no leal status. he name FPNO as used in the earl ears to reflect WFP’s provision of the main support for the operation.

drated a position paper that set out the parameters o the operation emphasiin that the leel o aid proided to the border areas should not at as a manet to attrat ambodians to the border. id as to be proided at a leel ommensurate ith onditions ithin ambodia itsel.

Sir obert Jackson was the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Kampuhea liaisin losel ith authorities in Phnom Penh anoi ano oso ashinton and other apitals. part rom dealin ith the politial aspets o the situation Sir obert oranied donor onerenes in Ne or to raise unds or the humanitarian operations both rom hailand and ithin ambodia hih ere held in the Kampuhea rust Fund.

here as no FP proet or the operation and no FP resoures ere used. ll unds ere raised b oluntar donations throuh a series o donor onerenes oranied b Sir obert. his inluded unds or operations to proide assistane in ambodia itsel oranied rom Phnom Penh. onor unds ere held in a Kampuhea rust Fund administered by Sir Robert’s office. Most of the food aid as proided b loalreional prourement.

8 8 oordination between nited ations aencies present alon the border, includin WFP, IF, R, and IR, was achieved throuh weekly interaency meetins chaired by Sir Robert or his deputy.

oordination at the operational level was facilitated by the oordination ommittee for Services to isplaced Persons in hailand SP, chaired by Gs, which met weekly. WFPR worked very closely with Gs and coordinated nonfood services at the border throuh sector committees dealin with health, sanitation, and supplementary feedin. hese were chaired by WFP R, in the case of health, or by an G chairperson selected by the committee. eneral principle was established that only one G would provide services say health or supplementary feedin in any one camp. WFPR recruited a medical coordinator, a respected and eperienced doctor, who initially worked for an G there, for the whole border.

notable feature of the border operation was that, in the main, donors chose to provide funds for Gs throuh the ampuchea rust Fund rather than directly to Gs. his facilitated coordination by WFPR, which neotiated fundin areements for services with Gs.

oordination with hai authorities was throuh ask Force , with whom reular meetins took place both at the border and in ankok, with weekly meetings at the Royal Thai Army’s Supreme Command Headquarters.

Since the aid was seen by WFP eaduarters, at least initially, as a resource mobiliation eercise, it did not fall under the sia ureau, but was administered by a small unit within the Resources and ransport ivision. WFP maintained an office in Phnom Penh, led by Werner Schleiffer, reportin directly to Rome, which provided food aid in ambodia.

When WFP took over from the Joint ency, it had to rapidly recruit a lare number of professional and local staff. Many of these were people already in the country, workin for R, IF and Gs. In those days, workin with F Personnel Services in Rome to hire professional staff initially proved an insurmountable challene. n arranement was thus made where staff were recruited on P contracts. Similarly, recruitin local staff on normal contracts proved impossible, and those recruited were iven P Special Service reements SS, which were unsatisfactory in terms of normal staff benefits such as leave and medical care. nited ations Field Service contracts were used to recruit professional technical staff such as radio technicians and vehicle workshop manaers. WFP had about professional level staff and about personnel on national level contracts.

9 9 The order as heaily militaried and ull o landmines. The Royal Thai Army had a regular presene on the Thai side. ietnamese ores ere neer ar aay on the Camodian side and there ere oten artillery ehanges eteen the to and sometimes one ould hear shells histling oerhead in the order amps. n suh oasions the seurity system issued radio instrutions or sta to eauate the amp.

The amps ere or iilians ut their openness to the Camodian side meant that small arms and Camodian militias ere neer ar aay. To try to ensure that aid as proided to iilians only sureys o the amps ere undertaen and it as estalished that the aerage amily sie as . persons to eery oman oer the age o using a height minimum o . meters. or the purposes o issuing ood ration ards only emales oer . meters tall ould qualiy. Regular unannouned headounts ere undertaen in the amps y and sta at hih ood ration ards ere issued to all emales ho it the height requirement using measuring stis o . meters.

or most amps in the more easily aessile areas o the order ood rations ere issued one a ee to omen in possession o ration ards. A ood paaging entre as set up in a HCR reugee amp at hao ang run y CAR ith reugee orers and unded y R. ul agsontainers o rie eans anned ish and egetale oil ere roen don and repaaged into plastic bags containing a week’s supply for 2.5 people. These were loaded onto a leet o ommerially hired argo trus and deliered diretly to the amps. ater as also deliered to amps in the dry order areas y a leet o ommerially hired ater taners and disharged into galanied ater tans proided y .

A priniple as estalished that aid ould only e proided i the hmer ooperated in regular head ounts at all amps. n some ases there as relutane to do this leading to suspiions that atual populations ere less than reported. n these instanes aid as ut o until head ounts ere alloed.

R estalished a general priniple that the leel o aid at the order should e ommensurate ith liing onditions inside Camodia so as not to attrat people to the order. The proision o donor unds or s ia R meant that oordination as made easier and eetie. Competition eteen s or eneiiaries as restrained.

n and ietnamese ores inreasingly approahed order areas in order to atta hmer military elements there. nitially areas ontrolled y hmer Rouge ores ere attaed ut this later etended to the hmer Serei and Sihanouist areas. The intention as apparently to lear the Camodian side o the order o militias and drie displaed people into Thailand. At irst these attas sometimes ourred during daylight hours hen international sta ere 10 10 in the caps. ortunately the security syste cope an staff ebers were not hare but her ciilians were freuently kille or woune. ater on the attacks occurre at night so that when ai personnel arrie in the orning they foun the cap clearly close an conflict ongoing.

This eterioration in the security situation along the borer le Task orce to restrict the presence of ai staff in the caps to those in possession of a ientification car. This actually facilitate coorination by .

was suenly face with tens of thousans of her fleeing to farlans in Thailan as entire caps were isplace by shelling. egotiations took place with arious oyal Thai ry coaners along the borer an it was agree that we coul prepare eacuation sites in Thailan where the her coul be accooate. This was an etreely sensitie issue. brought in heay euipent to layout a gri of cap roas in agree areas within Thailan an pit latrines were ug with ecaators. f there were inications that any of these eacuation sites woul be iinently neee then stockpiles of baboo an shelter aterials incluing plastic sheeting woul be brought in together with tools to enable the her to construct their own shelters. ater tanks were also set up. n soe areas firewoo ha to be proie. entually all the planne eacuation sites were neee. oo ai was also proie to Thai farers who were affecte by these operations.

n the en the choice ost onors ae that is to channel their funing for s through facilitate coorination an the efficiency of the operation.

11 11

The establishent of the nite ations orer elief peration starte in anuary 2 uner orl oo rograe anageent. The full Thai aboian operation laste fro i to . anage until the en of when it was hane oer to the nite ations eelopent rograe which hane it oer to the nite ations igh oissioner for efugees prior to the repatriation of the her isplace people in .

The central office was in angkok with a ain fiel office in the Thai borer town of ranyaprathet along the central Thaiaboian borer an two suboffices in urin northeast Thailan an Trat southeast Thailan.

ro ctober to epteber was in the angkok ffice as one of two international professional staff inole in the operation which anage soe 25 illion of resources uring this tie perio both for use in Thailan an for shipent to aboia. was a roect fficer sering as eputy to the irector of perations. ll other heas of agencies were at the or 2 leel.

uring the perio fro epteber to eceber was the iel oorinator at our ain logistics base in attana akhon near the Thai aboian borer. ro anuary 2 to une sere as the first iel oorinator base in ranyaprathet. oersaw the establishent of uring its first onths.

i y secon tour of uty in Thailan fro ebruary to eceber as the irector of perations an eputy irector. The esient epresentatie was the irector of uner institutional arrangeents in place at the fiel leel for ffices at that tie. t the en of oersaw the hanoer of to .

12 12 uring the initial perio assue its ore traitional role providing food aid to other agencies, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund nternational oittee of the e ross oint operation for the central borer area refugee caps an the oyal Thai oernentry saller isplace persons caps in the ore reote southern an northern Thaiaboian borer areas an the affecte Thai illage prograe. also purchase consierable uantities of foo in Thailan for shipent by sea an air to aboia for the operation in that country run separately fro an office in hno enh.

hen pulle out of the borer operation at the en of the nite ations ecretary eneral aske to take oer irect responsibility for the whole Thaiaboian borer area fro the aotian borer own to the ulf of Thailan. This le to the establishent of uner anageent. To y knowlege this was the first tie that anage a relief operation that coere the whole gaut of huanitarian assistance—not ust foo ai but also health sanitation aternal an hil ealth serices eucation ocational training shelter security etc.

n the initial perio the serious lack of eperience international professional staff was a aor proble. s note earlier there were two professional staff running the operation in the angkok office at a relatiely unior leel an as copare to other agencies. or the fiel offices epene on a weish isaster esponse tea of arying eperiences an copetence. hen they withrew towars the en of nite ations olunteers worke in the fiel offices with help fro locally recruite national staff all of who ha to be traine fro scratch. This le to heay workloas for the two angkok international staff an a subseuent lack of capacity to conuct any serious enuse onitoring of the foo ai proie particularly through the oyal Thai oernentry in the ore reote but saller borer caps where there was a strong suspicion that soe of the foo was passe to nonciilians. There was less proble with a aor part of the foo channelle to large borer caps uner the oint ission as they ha their own onitoring teas an proceures as i for its refugee caps in Thailan.

ith the establishent of an the recruitent of eperience staff fro other agencies an other ongoernental rganiations was able to run a ore coherent an efficient operation with better enuse onitoring an control.

oe of the lessons of this operation that ight be useful to in future operations are

● ake sure that operations of this agnitue are aeuately staffe with eperience staff at the appropriate grae leel fro the start of the operation. ● ake sure that staff are not oerburene as they ay start to suffer from physical and mental “burnout,” sometimes without realizing it. ● nsure that proper enuse onitoring systes are in place fro the start of the operation. t ties there is a tenency een toay to place a lot 13 13 of emphasis on logistics and the volume of food deliveries without paying sufficient attention to the allimportant monitoring of the use of the relief supplies, including food aid ● nsure that radio and security protocols are in place and understood by all relief worers in a war environment, as was freuently the case along the haiCambodian border e were fortunate to not lose any relief worer to hostile incidents during the operation, although there were some close calls, with shells and mortars landing near staff as evacuations too place I felt some of the “shock waves” on several occasions. ● Create a level of delegation, for operational decisionmaing, to the field e were fortunate to wor in an era before the incessant flow of emails as well as telephone calls and conference calls, which seem to tae so much of staff time these days

UN closed in , when the displaced hmer people repatriated to Cambodia, following a political settlement he focus switched to Cambodia and the rebuilding of that country

14 14

erner chleiffer

ril at the eak of the hot season was an etremel hmi a. I landed at Phnom Penh’s totally deserted airport to take up my World Food roramme assinment. In ractice this imlie the settin an rnnin of WFP’s newest Country Office for three months, or “not to exceed five months” according to my marching orders, because of the rather exceptional livin conitions in the wartorn contr at the time. ost of the contr was still ner ferocios fihtin when I ot there. I knew little aot man asects of this assinment to a contr that ha een scrlosl close off to most foreiners since an I certainl i not anticiate that I was oin to sta there on m sseent sestions for nearl three ears.

15 15 nother glance at this new, baffling environment no other planes in sight except a few wrecks on the horion, no travellers, no aircraft servicing crews he plane took from angkok was a ransall of the elgian ir Force, chartered on behalf of what was called in those days the “Joint Mission” of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross CC, carrying mostly humanitarian relief supplies for programmes of the nited ations agencies and CC hat flight was actually the only direct connection by air between Phnom Penh and Bangkok, Southeast Asia’s nearest hub, with passenger use essentially restricted to the staff of humanitarian assistance agencies and their donor agency representatives

he few people evidently employed at the airport seemed to be ietnamese military personnel those coming down from the tower after the aircraft landed, those checking my baggage and my nited ations aisse Passer, and those guarding the airport’s access road. I did not notice a single Cambodian among these officials

While waiting for that lonely eep to pick me up driven by the first Cambodian saw after my arrival and take me to a nearly empty ghost townlike Phnom Penh its population had reportedly been reduced by some percent during the hmer ouge regime under its leader, Pol Pot, kept thinking about these flight arrangements Why were these humanitarian flights not run in the name of WFP, at a time when WFP had already made its name as the key logistics actor of the nited ations system worldwide and, in particular, in the context of the Cambodian relief operations

aking the ourney by road from angkok was obviously out of the uestion intensive bombings throughout the s left innumerable craters and blownup bridges along “Highway #5” (as I saw during subsequent field trips), making long segments totally unusable oreover, units of hmer ouge military forces, which still controlled some three uarters of Cambodian territory, obviously had plenty of experts to plant mines at strategic points on roads and around maor towns was told that, every month, those mines killed several doen Cambodians who had survived years of nightmare during the previous regime hey also created havoc and fear among those who tried to make a living, albeit a very scant one, by trading mainly between provincial capitals

My next surprise came at the “hotel” renamed “Hotel Samaki” (Solidarity) – which years ago was “Hotel Le Royal”, and then renamed “Hotel Le Phnom”. It used to be one of the finest of its kind in Cambodia t had subseuently been the place of last refuge for panicstricken foreigners when hmer ouge forces entered Phnom Penh in pril t was again made famous in by the movie “Killing Fields.” The hotel was run by a Vietnamese management with the help of Cambodian waiters and cleaners

found out that being a citien of a country that had not recognied the government operating in Phnom Penh and, on top of that, a nited ations 16 16 official, I was not allowed to live in one of the innumerable empty apartments. nly governments of the arsaw Pact and their allies, and later India, had recognied the overnment of (what was called at that time) the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. The maority of governments of United Nations member states however and the United Nations per se continued to recognie the credentials of the overnment of emocratic Kampuchea and maintained diplomatic relations with Cambodia through the Khmer Rouge regime (and its small groups of political allies) that operated essentially out of its headquarters in ungle camps along the ThaiCambodian border. Thus, a maority of United Nations member states also agreed that the Khmer Rouge Representative to the United Nations could retain his position and continue to exercise his diplomatic functions.

As a consequence of that diplomatic imbroglio, and an acute scarcity of somewhat habitable rooms at Hotel Samaki, most United Nations staff received accommodations that became their offices and, at the same time, their living rooms, bedrooms and kitchens (with camping gas cookers). The ensuing weeks gradually provided more clarifications and helped me understand this terra incognita and its ramifications for my work.

Although there had obviously been primarily military and political considerations, the Vietnamese army also had to compensate for a severe labour shortage that threatened Cambodia’s survival as a nation. The Khmer Rouge regime, through one of its first acts after taking over Phnom Penh, pushed almost all of the city’s survivors out into concentration camplike accommodations in faraway provinces. Estimates of those killed or who died from disease or famine during these four years of terror range from one and a half to three million, out of a total population of some nine million—up to a third of the population. The regime had thus committed crimes the proportion of which the international community had hardly experienced anywhere since orld ar II. It was estimated that about 5 percent of the victims were men, about 5 percent were people who had gone through more than basic education e.g., people who spoke foreign languages, whose palms were smooth (hence no manual labourers), and people who wore glasses.

Representatives of Nongovernmental rganiations (Ns) told me that, at the end of the Khmer Rouge regime, medical doctors and one architect had survived and remained in the country—according to their surveys. In other words, during this genocidal regime, most Cambodians previously employed in the industrial and service sectors, requiring some technical expertise, met a terrible fate or managed to leave the country in time.

It became clear why vacant posts that could not be filled by local expertise were occupied, at least temporarily, by large dispatches of foreign workers. In the highpriority medical sector, these were mainly foreign experts assigned

17 17 primarily by governments that recognied the ne authorities and also by C and CC staff.

The mandates of C and CC are uniue in the sense that they are alloed to operate in any country ith any government authority irrespective of hether the governments are recognied or not by the nited ations. oth of these agencies had longstanding epertise in the provision of humanitarian assistance. P on the other hand had its hands tied in those days by the issue of nonrecognition by the nited ations of the Phnom Penhbased People’s Republic of Kampuchea. t could therefore officially operate out of its Phnom Penh office only under the roof of C and CC under the socalled oint ission. oreover P as not alloed to provide any assistance that could be considered support for socioeconomic development.

This state of affairs led to some aard situations especially in the case of P because in the early s some percent of the total value of nited ations system assistance as in fact supplied by P. The remaining percent as essentially provided by the other three nited ations agencies having offices in Phnom Penh i.e. the ood and griculture rganiation of the nited ations ) C and a little later the nited ations igh Commissioner for efugees (UNHCR). Because of WFP’s key role, the dialogue and cooperation beteen the local P office and its counterpart authorities needed to be direct ithout a roundabout routing through other agencies) and given WFP’s de facto lead role in port and domestic transport logistics eceptionally timely and unbureaucratic.

nitially establishing a productive and responsive dialogue and cooperation ith the authorities as a complicated and dranout eercise. everal aid agencies had to share one interpreter cum liaison officer called “guide” in the government’s jargon, who was to transmit our messages to the government agencies concerned and mae us aare of their vies and decisions. oever maing this arrangement or effectively too a lot of time effort and patience.

ur certainly most illing guide indicated that he had been a former teacher assigned to a high school located far aay from Phnom Penh close to the aotian border. is noledge of the nited ations system as not surprisingly etremely limited. uite some time had to be set aside to eplain the setup and functions of the nited ations system and the types of assistance P as in the process of providing to his country—and hat it ould not provide. similar familiariation had to be subseuently carried out ith officials in other government offices e.g. the inistries of Transport and griculture the Port uthority and K—the government’s shipping agency.

During my first meeting with our guide’s supervisor in the inistry of oreign ffairs the irector of the nited ations ffairs epartment had to focus on the core mandate of the nited ations and ho it as different from government agencies of member states—the latter freuently raising suspicion 18 18 among my Cambodian counterparts. But, over time, the three of us overcame a certain distance and actually managed to establish a rather cordial, “personalized” working relationship. This evolution was strongly encouraged by our Cambodian driver (on the Ministry’s payroll)—a spontaneous, agile go getter, who proudly told me that, in the old days, he had driven huge merican ack trucks all over the country.

his initial distance, however, and the absence of formal written agreements with our counterpart government offices as a result of the nonrecognition had, at first, repercussions and, sometimes entailed contradictions.

() he approval of each new position in the WFP office (not under UNCF or CRC supervision) reuired lengthy negotiations. he approval of the post for our first secretary to be assigned to Phnom Penh took, for eample, nearly si months. nly the second year of my posting brought a certain breakthrough in the form of shorter approval time.

() WFP staff like all other United Nations staff were not allowed to drive their agency vehicles – in the case of WFP a simple oyota jeep. nly a Cambodian driver assigned by the inistry of Foreign ffairs was authoried to do so. s a result, our mobility was etremely restricted. Fortunately, as a kind of personal favour after discussions stretching over si months, was allowed to import two bicycles for WFP staff—thus enabling us to go on scouting tours in the Phnom Penh area.

() ll trips to and out of Phnom Penh had to be approved on an ad hoc basis. rips taking United Nations staff to Bangkok reuired eit and entry visas (renewals were not automatic, thus creating uncertainties with regard to the continuation of assignments). he approval of travel within Cambodia, to the ocean port of ompong om and to provinces receiving WFP food aid, reuired simultaneous green lights from various government agencies that also had other considerations on their minds. oreover, all incountry trips reuired the presence of our guide and, uite often, also guides from other ministries or provincial authorities—guides who usually did not know one another beforehand. n other words, the absence of an agreement opened the door for ad hoc arrangements that could be easily cancelled or postponed.

() s a WFP officer had to handle the somewhat contradictory task of transferring the title of ownership of imported goods such as WFP’s food aid to the authorities of a government that the United Nations did not recognie. Hence, any kind of followup could not be based on a reference to mutually binding contractual obligations that, normally, would have been agreed to earlier by the two parties. herefore, such followup was only possible with the goodwill of the counterpart authorities, and on uite a number of occasions as a result of sustained efforts of persuasion. o be fair, should also point out that, during

19 19 my entire stay never encountered any difficulty importing office euipment or personal items such as my own food supplies.

Working out agreements between nited ations agencies and the CC on the management of our oint emergency relief programmes was a relatively uncomplicated task. t was evident that all of us working under one roof in rather small teams (because of the staffing restrictions imposed by our counterparts and under difficult conditions wanted to facilitate and enhance our internal cooperation as much as possible. s a result our periodic reporting on our work to the ampuchea donor meetings tended to be a rather straightforward assignment.

ut in these reports we obviously also had to refer to that public entity that hosted us with which we were working every day and to which we handed assistance worth during the first year some million. bviously the term “government” was a nonstarter as that entity was not recognized by our ultimate bosses the maority of nited ations member states. fter lengthy debates, we finally settled on “Phnom Penh Authorities”— not an ideal description of our counterparts but at least respecting the fact that (a a public entity was located in the country’s capital; and (b) its authority had to be acknowledged if we wanted to make our oint operations reasonably successful an ultimately farsighted eample of pragmatism in the freuently comple and complicated world of humanitarianism.

n summary the Phnom Penh assignment was probably one of the most difficult but also most rewarding of the eight assignments had with WFP. The daily eposure to death and survival by a narrow margin in the midst of a hairraising political situation made me believe more than ever in the irreplaceability of the nited ations system.

20 20

Adelina, or and ars in Paistan

y life changed dramatically when oined the orld ood Programme (P) on ovember , , on a temporary basis, as an accountant for the ampuchean order peration was seconded from the nternational und for Agricultural evelopment (A) as an accountant for the operation for a period of three months, but my contract was eventually etended for another si months, as resources were being pledged by some donors, during the annual ecember conference at the nited ations in ew or y contract was then etended for a year and later etended under a fiedterm contract of five years as inance fficer subseuently received a continuing contract and retired at the end of as anager of the isbursements and Payroll ranch

he accounting eercise of the ampuchea order perations was eventually mainstreamed into the Accounts unit of P, under the esources ivision, and the unit became the Accounts ranch five years later, under a new anagement ervices ivision ()

oring from the P eaduarters in ome changed many elements in my life married an eA colleague, or yrvang, whom had met on my first day at A on une , , and we had our son, ars became a Professional fficer of the nited ations system had been granted the opportunity to

21 21 eercise decisionmaing to some etent, demonstrating creativity and resourcefulness in handling and managing issues—sills and talent that triggered measures that permitted me to become a successful manager at P

n my first day, due to the irregularity of recruitment of a dedicated person to handle accounts, found a few pages of written notes and procedures on the analysis of accounts, and about a two feet high stac of accounting documents that had to be reviewed and analyed for correctness and compliance with the inancial egulations and ules of P n fact, was called for a meeting with the Assistant ecutive irector, alahuddin Ahmed, together with the then onsultant, r iuseppe uonaiuti, who had been temporarily hired before my appointment to review the ampuchea order peration, not on a continuing basis because he was hired to oversee some other accounts he meeting went well and the agenda was highlighted by an assurance of a continuous accounts analysis, management, and updated reporting for the operation, including the certainty of reviewing and analying incoming documents from ountry ffice operations lined to the ampuchean order peration

espite my short contract, humbly accepted the challenge and wored many long hours, including weeends, which helped me comprehend enough, not only about the daily administrative pattern of ependitures, but also the food purchasing system of P, because millions of dollars were involved in the operation his eercise assisted me in finaliing all pending accounting documents for review for compliance, recording, management and reporting

eiing during the iananmen uare protest

ne of the more significant events that remember dearly was when was ased to undertae duty travel on the accounts system in Paistan (since the 22 22 receptionist informed us that Beijing was engaged in a “civil war,” specifically at

— ssued at the Philippine Airlines’

reports and data up to the current month’s accounts.

23 23 was made dysfunctional and a new P integrated software was put in place— the P ntegrated etwor loal system s.

Another major difficulty encountered related to communication, since the eginning of my appointment, had a des telephone for internal use, as there were a few numers allocated y A to P when we shared Building at the A ome eaduarters. found it cumersome to call colleagues in ountry ffices and other locations. owever, this situation was alleviated when a restructuring of the organiation was pushed through and the Accounts Branch ecame part of anagement ervices ivision.

he rapid separation of P from A, especially in terms of the computeried system, comprises an important lesson, since these various elements interplayed to mae P one of the most respected nited ations agencies. hans to P leaders for paving the way towards remarale eras of success. saw this happen as part of the staff at Building “F” until 1995 when the Italian overnment relocated us to the P eaduarters in Parco dei edici, ome—a move that oosted the morale and character of each staff memer.

learned that each P operation is not selfcontained, especially the high profile ampuchean Border peration. t was mandatory to comprehend the nuances and elements involved in the operation eyond food purchases. nfortunately, did not have the opportunity to visit the actual refugee camps and operation. At that time Accounts was seen almost as an end of the line process and anagement did not see the merit of their involvement at the start of any project or operation. owever, usiness and industry have dictated that almost a degree integration of all areas is the norm.

he order operation ceased in . was ale to otain a longer contract with P, and in the ampuchean Border peration accounting eercise was merged with all the accounts groups, specifically a unit called Bilateral and nternational mergency ood eserve Accounts nit under the Accounts Branch, headed y s. aria raia uri, who was one of the P stalwarts.

24 24 Programme’s Regional Office in Pakistan

fghan Food elier FFran etrella

his is an aount of a regional rossorder operation during tie as Regional Head of Logistics at the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Regional Office in Islaaad aistan where I had transferred fro eing a des offier at WFP’s Rome headquarters in ugust 1 ust a few das efore the epteer 11 1 atta on the orld rade enter in ew or

he nited ations iediatel eauated its areer staff woring in fghanistan leaing loal staff to do what the ould to deal with the fghan eergen reated the alian

Fortunatel I anaged to eep the fghan operation going eause the food dispath offies of ehran urenaat arahi ia uetta eshawar ere and sh eing out of fghan territor were still funtioning and food aid supplies still arried at the arious tended elier oints

he logistis inoled in the oeent of food aid inluded

• ia essel arahi then tru to eshawaruetta and onto fghanistan aulandahar regions and eond

25 25 • ia essel to Iran’s Bandar Abbas, then by truck to Tehran where it was consolidated and onto ashad and into fghanistan truc to the Herat region • ia arge from uroe to Riga then train to ermeeistan ushaneaiistan Oshrgstan urmenaaturmenistan and Heratfghanistan • From erme truc to a sath of territor in northern fghanistan • From ushane truc to the northern art of fghanistan around undu • From Osh by truck along the world’s second highest road to supply adahshan • From urmenaat to ndho and an territor that the fietonners from aul could not reach (see elo food to amian region from Peshaar) and • From inside fghan territor Herat (a former Russianuilt siteridgerail truc to the aareharif region

he onl ig rolem as to someho ensure that food aid could e transorted to the right P in the right quantit ithout the resence of the resonsile managers ho ould hae normall ensured that this crucial tas as erformed

On Octoer the commenced its hea oming raids in fghanistan hitting alian slamic mirate Forces and other militias

midOctoer in site of the fear generated attacs (one WFP arehouse had een omed) realied that our local staff ere full ale to carr on according to instructions their ecellent or of receiing and distriuting food sent truc maor rolem as crossing conflict lines ecause under the ressure of omings the inasion of fghanistan as degenerating into a guerrilla ar eteen arious fghan militants eginning etemer hen a coert agenc assassination too lace against hmed hah assoud leader of the strong orthern lliance He as illed at his aar headquarters to lgerian freelancers osing as ournalistscameramen

n order to ensure that food aid reached areas inaccessile due to the conflict it as decided for instance that to reach the amian area food aid ould e transorted across disuted lines local fietonner trucs herefore the WFP Peshaar Office ould disatch a numer of mt trucs ia the her Pass to alalaad and onto aul here the trucs ould unload onto seen small trucs ith local driers familiar ith the est route to amian hese trucs ould find their indiidual a to the amian region unload their cargo at destination get the aills signed the local WFP staff and return to aul ith the signed aills for more loads

uring this eriod although aills eentuall reached m des rought trucers returning from andahar or aul or couriers from at least fie 26 26 countries, I still had no way to actually eriy that all o the ood had been deliered correctly to those in need, because the superisory structure had been impaired by the eacuation o F senior sta O course, I talked to eery ongoernmental Organiation O sta member returning to abul or Islamabad or meetings not a ery reuent eent because o unsae roads

In October , amiro opes da ila and Amer aoudi rom F ome headuarters arried in Islamabad The main component o the mission was or Amer Daoudi to take over the regional logistics post because of Rome’s perceied diiculty o mastering an operation plagued by the absence o career officers in the field, serious war activity, and the new US Coalition’s sustained bombing o Aghan targets

By then, I had managed to make it begin to run like clockwork noisy clockwork despite the daily horrors that heik Omar and his band o Talibani constantly dreamed up in Aghanistan, torn between allowing local people to be ed and their contrary intent to obstruct nited ations work, possibly out o enophobic ideology I took the change without linching, especially since I was asked to remain in the region and take oer a new aspect o the operation hie o the nited ations oint ogistics oordination , in order to coordinate the operation o ciilians and military in the region

I did not mind the substitution It had taken me the month o eptember to modiy the operation so it would work well enough to support, remotely, F aid to millions o Aghans in need ow I was asked to realie the irst ormal embodiment o and had the opportunity to make it a stunning success in a really comple emergency oreoer, I had receied a promotion o some sort, no matter how lateral it might hae been intended, as I was now de acto ead o Agency or the

I did not understand it at irst but it was conirmed to me by the F Aghan ountry irector who, when I traelled to abul, had insisted I stay at o F uest ouse, which had only our rooms intended or the ountry irector and Agency heads. The conversations at dinner weren’t altogether pleasurable because they were always about eents and neer about ideas, but the place was comortable and the ood uite edible oreoer, Amer had wisely asked me to keep running the egional ogistics Oice on his behal until he understood the iner aspects o it well enough to take oer o, I had the best o both worlds create a badly needed coordination entity or the Aghan operation and keep control and hold together a ragile logistics operation

Finding the right calibre o sta was the greatest diiculty eople, in general, hae a aried understanding o what coordination is I needed people who had a wellounded eperience o general humanitarian work to be able to coordinate rather than direct—a common mistake a comple emergency situation y irst moe was to ask entities like the orld ealth Organiation O, the nited ations igh ommissioner or eugees , the 27 27 nternational rganiation for igration , the United ations ffice for the Coordination of umanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Children’s Fund UC, and the United ations Development rogramme UD to provide suitable members of their staff to become part of UC.

or some reason, was offered mostly people who were unprepared for most things, let alone delicate field coordination. managed to retain one person from UC slamabad one from whom posted to ashad first to oversee erat, and then in erat itself and an emilitary Spaniard whom gave the responsibility of overseeing the aareSharif areas, from across the border initially, and whom later replaced with someone proposed by eneva, and who is now a manager at decins Sans rontires S.

The coordination was also at oC level with the military who, in Afghan operations contet, was the US military. After September , , it took over a month to put together the Coalition that started their devastating bombing of Taliban and Alaeda targets on ctober . And days later, they managed to land a sieable invasion force in the country.

recall that towards the end of ctober, the local US commander was calling me daily, wanting to know what time the trucks left eshawar, what time they crossed the hyber ass, what time they reached alalabad, and when they would be in abul. This information was necessary in order for them not to attackbomb our truck contractors on their way to abul. hile understood this to be a necessary act of selfserving concern and kindness towards , still could only reply that the transports used were contract trucks, and even when we loaded trucks a day, those that were loaded first would go first or go back to eshawar to get fuel our warehouseoffice was at the border with the tribal lands or go home and stay with their families before leaving at night, trying to avoid illadvised US bomber planes. Therefore, could not advise them on the times of the convoys, because the convoy concept just wasn’t in the contractors’ DNA, and because they left at anytime they liked, or decided to visit a cousin on the way, or even travelled together.

y ovember , , the Taliban had been kicked out of aar by forces loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Ubek military leader. ver the net week Taliban strongholds crumbled after US Coalition and orthern Alliance offensives on Taloan ovember , amiyan ovember , erat ovember , abul ovember and alalabad ovember .

After the Taliban crumbled, the orthern Alliance went after Alaeda and managed to trap in aden with a sieable force in the caves of Tora ora, not far from alalabad. Two weeks of ferocious fighting killed a few hundred Al aeda fighters, but in aden got away.

y December , had some suspicions over the uantities of grain bagged in Turkmenabat they arrived in bulk via railway. saw from waybills that 28 28 urmenabat was trucin uantities of , mt of rain to Afhanistan (Andhoy) hen first too over my post as eional oistician, visited all the Ds could access and urmenabat was one of them

remember clearly that they usually sent some , to , mt into Afhanistan, and my discussion with staff members revealed that they could not even manage 3,000 mt. The problem wasn’t so much one of poor labour or poor loadin activity, but mostly one of there bein very few trucers who wanted to o into the chaotic Afhan territory How was it possible, then, that the local Head of Office, Anton ( believe he was from ussia), had suddenly manaed to obtain eiht times more trucs that accepted to load for the Andhoy reion At the end of my tenure as temporary standin eional oistician, went to urmenabat to investiate the matter, as part of a wider tour includin ajiistan and ran hen ot there, found that amiro and Amer had, coincidentally, just otten there and that Anton was in bed at home, suddenly taen ill with apparently massive blood pressure problems, and barely coherent

ithout bein able to tal to Anton, spoe to his staff and they assured me that the trucs were loaded and left for Andhoy was still not convinced because they could not satisfactorily eplain how they could now et eiht times more trucks than before, when the Afghan situation hadn’t worsened At the first opportunity, I asked an official from the WFP Inspector General’s Office to investiate the matter, and the response later received was that there was no proof of any underhand activity nterestinly, Anton left his job after my visit and returned home

29 29 orer itin a ation – ri anka

res arma

ackgron I arrived in ri anka as the first World Food Programme WFP epresentative in ay . At that time, WFP had a relatively moderate level programme in ri anka with four proects—an Irrigation ystem ehabilitation Proect, an Assistance to ahaweli esettlement Proect3, a bilaterally funded eforestation Proect and a Protracted elief Operation PO for Internally isplaced Persons IP.

The first three proects, considered development proects, were fairly normal foodassistance proects. PO, however, was a sensitive proect, as it entailed feeding a population displaced by the “war” between the Government with a Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority.

I was shocked when I first heard the term “war” from government officials. Gradually, I realied that it was actually a war situation. The ri ankan Army had recently “cleared” Jaffna peninsula from LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil elam, the rebel Tamil group, but Wanni was still under the control of TT. There was a significant displacement of population first when TT had taken control of Wanni and affna, and later when the ri ankan Army took affna back from TT. The displaced populations were living in camps in several areas – Puttalam, Anuradhapura, atticaloa, Polonnaruwa, and affna. WFP was responsible for providing food rations to IPs, who numbered about 0,000 at that time. In addition, WFP was also given the role of monitoring the availability of food in the “uncleared” Wanni area.

eriences I am going to share three eperiences I had during my tenure in ri anka. These stories relate to the emotional, tactical and logistical challenges of maintaining access in order to assists beneficiaries amid security challenges in areas that are not easily accessible.

2 arlier, the head of WFP in ountry Offices used to be called the Assistant epresentative to P esident epresentative. This was changed to irector of Operations in . WFP egulations were changed in ecember to allow for the appointment of a WFP epresentative by the ecutive irector, I ust happened to be the first one to present my credentials to the Government. 3 The current President of ri anka, aitripala irasena, was the inister of ahaweli inistry at the time. 30 30 W had started giving assistance in Jaffna when the Sri Lankan Army “cleared” the peninsula. The assistance consisted of providing food to marginal farmers who were working in the rehabilitation of irrigation tanks (ponds. The road from olombo to Jaffna eisted but it was not usable because a part of Wanni (avuniya to Elephant Pass) was still “not cleared.” Humanitarian supplies were transported from Trincomalee to Jaffna on a boat operated by the International ommittee of the ed ross (I for humanitarian purposes. umanitarian personnel used the same boat—sleeping overnight in a container on the boat. There was also an air service between olombo and Jaffna operated by Lion ir. The flights were scheduled but they operated only when clearance was received from both the Sri Lankan rmy and LTTE. I (together with ohamed mey a W colleague who spoke both Sinhalese and Tamil took one of those flights soon after I arrived in Sri Lanka. It was a small plane so there were only a small number of passengers. When the crew – especially the pilot and the hostess – learned about my affiliation with W they came to talk and I eplained what W was doing in Jaffna after it was liberated by the Sri Lankan rmy. They were appreciative of WFP’s work of providing assistance to the internally displaced population. I also epressed my appreciation of their work—flying across the war one.

W eputy Eecutive irector r. amanga gongi with monitors of the incomegeneration activities WSri Lanka

We arrived in Jaffna visited project sites participated in a communal lunch at the municipal office in Jaffna and returned to olombo the following day. week later the Lion ir plane on the same route was shot down (allegedly by 31 31 E) over Wanni. t was uite an emotional shock for me those kind and innocent faces of the pilot and the young hostess on the flight had taken a week efore would vividly come ack to me. he conflict took the lives of some other people had come in contact with or worked with.

As mentioned earlier one of the responsiilities of WFP in ri anka at that time was to monitor the availaility of food supply in the Wanni region which was “uncleared” or under the control of LTTE. WFP was doing this on behalf of the international humanitarian community in the country. he ri ankan overnment itself supplied food to the Wanni region. WFP received reports from the relevant ministry triangulated them with reports from other sources and issued a monthly status report of the availaility of food in Wanni.

A week after arrived in ri anka when had not even paid courtesy calls to all relevant government officials ilateral and multilateral missions received a call from an amassador from a donor country asking for my view on the reduction in shipment of food y the ri ankan overnment. Frankly at first didn’t even understand what WFP had to do with the situation. told him would speak to the concerned government official and get ack to him.

useuently found out that the government had reduced the volume of food sent to the Wanni region that month y percent ased on a report that there were not enough people in the “uncleared” Wanni area, and that a majority of the population had already left the area.

The “uncleared” area was under the control of LTTE. There was no access to the area. ome humanitarian personnel visited the area from time to time on humanitarian missions after getting permission from oth the ri ankan Army and E. However no survey was conducted during those years to confirm the sie of population.

After discussing the situation with my WFP colleagues and taking into account the sensitivities of the government as well as the humanitarian community we followed a threepronged approach

● o the government we challenged them privately noting that they were likely to lose the goodwill they had in the international community y eing the supplier of food for the population in an area outside their control. hey could not seek credit for such action if they were to unilaterally reduce the volume of food ased on an aritrary assumption of a lower population sie. We also assured them that WFP would undertake a survey to determine the population sie as well as their nutritional status. viously the government did not withdraw their decision ut we noticed that they modified their methodology which increased the food provided aout halfway etween the earlier volume and the new volume.

32 32 ● We informed the humanitarian community that while WFP was negotiating with the government not to reduce the food supply, we also needed to be cogniant of the fact that the nutritional status of the population in some other parts of the country Estate rea and outhern ry one was worse than those of Wanni as seen a few years before that as humanitarians, we could not concentrate only on the population in the area controlled by LTTE. There was some sympathy to this logic, and other humanitarian agencies offered their support for a nutrition survey of the Wanni region.

● We approached LTTE with a proposal that WFP needed access to conduct a nutritional survey to determine the actual food and nutrition status of the population in the area under their control in order to be able to influence the government to maintain or adjust the food supply. LTTE agreed to the proposal.

While Wanni was not accessible officially, humanitarian worers were allowed to go across the border. The usual point of border crossing was avuniya. eads of some other nited ations agencies had been to avuniya and met LTTE senior leaders. When LTTE indicated that they would be open to a nutrition survey by WFP, wanted to visit Wanni and meet their senior leaders. We approached the government and obtained their consent. Then we approached LTTE with the message that WFP epresentative would lie to visit the Wanni area and discuss the nutritional survey. ccordingly, a programme was created.

nfortunately, could not mae a single trip to Wanni, despite three attempts in about months. The first time, we received a message in olombo the night before we were supposed to travel, warning us not to come. We did not now why, but there was no point in going if they were not available. Later we heard news of a major offensive the net day.

The second time, a colleague and had already travelled to nuradhapura, the capital of orth West Province, and were visiting the hief inister of the Province, who was formerly a inister of ocial ervice, a WFP counterpart. y colleague received a call to inform us that the meeting would not be possible. We learned later that there was a major fight in another part of the “uncleared” area around that time.

The third time, had reached avuniya, and again we received a message that the meeting was postponed. Later, we learned of a major battle at Elephant Pass around that time. ot only was my visit cancelled, the nutrition survey could not tae place while was there. We had eternal eperts ready for the survey mission, but we had to cancel two times. The mission of humanitarian agencies to Wanni used to be considered a normal matter, but the war situation affected my scheduled visit three times.

33 33 contacted ohamed mey to review the facts. e confirmed the events and wanted to contribute the following from his eperience

fter the plane was shot down, we had to undertae a monitoring visit to the north by using an ship. We had to travel to Trincomalee by road to board the ship that too rations and doctors to the north. The ship used to leave in the evening from Trincomalee and sail overnight through the ndian cean to reach affna the following morning. We were piced up after a security chec to visit welfare centres that were assisted by WFP.

onitoring was a very tiresome and challenging job. We had to eep our balance with both LTTE and the government in assisting beneficiaries who were displaced in Wanni and the north as well as Puttalam and the East. WFP conducted the operations for ten years . mey was the Programme fficer. Later, WFP introduced foodforwor FFW as an eit strategy leading to resettlement. bout , internally displaced beneficiaries were targeted for resettlement, and some were relocated to new areas. t that point we developed soft FFW norms in order to help with the resettling of beneficiaries. The wor included the construction of access roads, the rehabilitation of minor irrigation tans and water ponds, and other small infrastructure projects for speedy settlement. t wored very well. We wored with the ocial ervice epartment. This was well appreciated by visiting headuarters officials and the ountry irector.

mey feels proud that he was able to introduce soft FFW as a tool prior to going to regular FFW with the guidance and support of the ountry irector and Project fficer. t was a good tool for beneficiaries who participated in this activity to construct assets for speedy settlement.

34 34

35 35

Ecerpt from Une Vie en Bleu Translated by retchen loom

n , war was raging in the south of udan between the Sudan People’s Liberation rmy PL, an armed branch of the ovement for the Liberation of outh udan, and the hartoum rmy. We had no access to the populations of ahr El haal, a region of udan located south of arfur, for many months. The overnment had forbidden flights of our airplanes based in Loichoggio in the north of enya. hartoum pretended that the World Food Programme WFP and other ongovernmental Organizations’ (NGO) planes were being utilied to transport arms belonging to the Liberation rmy, and not food rations.

The poor region of ahr del haal was being deprived of eternal aid during the civil war and was suffering from severe famine. n the summer of , after months of negotiations with the overnment in hartoum, President mar alashir decided to authorie flights by a WFP plane from Loi. iven the severe famine in the outh, this was clearly insufficient. We needed to use smaller planes to drop our teams on the ground, and several planes to drop sacs of maie and pulses from the sy. maller planes were also needed to deliver vegetable oil to landing strips in numerous locations in the province. Finally, President ashir authoried us to mount a huge air operation because there were insufficient safe land routes for us to use trucs.

t the beginning of eptember, flew from airobi to Loi where we had an impressive fleet of small planes and s to supply the outh. Loi was a village in the north of enya where an important base housed the planes, WFP food and personnel, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and international s. any staff members were living in maeshift houses or tents. The little airport was very animated. fter a night in Loi, a single engine plane dropped me and three other passengers at a base that we had just established in ahr el haal. There were a doen tents set up for our staff and visitors on this little runway.

ne ie en leu, , omre Editions, mes, France. 36 36 Our Information Offier in Nairobi, taing advantage of m visit and our logistis, arranged for a team of C ournalists and reporters to aompan me he were thrilled hese orrespondents were in South Sudan for the first time uring our first evening in the amp, we had the hane to renew ties that I had established with the media during m previous stas in Nairobi when I was woring for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and later as esident Coordinator of the United Nations e spent a long evening hatting about Sudan and also about m ears in Nairobi

It wasn’t until the following day that we returned in three little planes to a camp where two ourageous FP personnel wored with several international NGOs deins Sans Frontires otors without orders (SF), tion ontre la Faim (tion against unger), CE and orld ision, to nourish and are for the thousands of seletallooing human beings who had survived months of a terrible famine his was the first time that I enountered a famine of this magnitude he babies and infants seemed to mae it, but the old women and men would without doubt not make it. I was shocked, but I didn’t want to show it too muh to m olleagues and staff of NGOs who epeted a lot from FP and its logistis team

umour had spread that FP had deided to ut its aid presene reassured them that we were not leaving Our two olleagues had prepared the ground for dropping food rations he population had been evauated from the field the were in radio ommuniation with the two planes that were going to drop their argo he ournalists aompaning me wanted to film two drops It was prett impressive to see tons of sas weighing ilos eah rash on the ground Onl a few got ripped Our teams staed these preious sas arefull in a big tent that was impeabl lean s soon as a signal indiating the end of drops was given, groups of ids immediatel threw themselves at grains that had fallen out of some sas

uring the ear when deliveries were massive – some , tons per month – onl one small bo was illed b a sa that rushed him he ground had been leared, and our teams did not notie him, beause he hid in a bush e had four big Ilushins based in Nairobi and hartoum at the time and ten Cs in oihoggio and El Obeid in Sudan he too off loaded in the morning and afternoon undreds of thousands of sas of food were transported on long semitrailers, from Port Sudan to El Obeid, passing b hartoum, and from ombasa via Nairobi to oihoggio Eah sa was then put into two other empt sas to ushion the drop and thus avoid losses uring the rain season these were limited to two laers beause the soft ground lessened the impat of the fall e had proved that with big logistial efforts we ould prevent famine as long as governments and armed groups let us operate

aving saved millions of South Sudanese, FP faed a possible new famine in South Sudan (independent sine ) in his time it was not as a result

37 37 of a war with udan, but because the two big ethnic groups, uer and inka, had engaged in a terrible war in their own country. WFP’s donors ended up, alas, getting tired of saing millions of people who would readily agree with each other if their leaders, in their thirst for power, did not succeed in pitting them against each other.

In the nineties we had constructed the only routes in the country, had epanded landing strips, and een tolerated the whining of the utch inistry of eelopment that reproached us for doing what they belieed was the work of the World Bank. But why hadn’t the World Bank, the African Development Bank or the uropean nion constructed routes that were so indispensable to transporting hundreds of thousands tons of food rations by truck rather than by plane

38 38

ancusso, Angola reviewing border crossing and security procedures with olonel ahulo A,

received a call from ome in the early part of . he World Food Programme WFP enior anagement in ome wanted to know whether the ountry ffice in Windhoek, amibia, could help the WFP team in Angola access the south of that country through Namibia. My first reaction was, “Of course.” And then I thought, “Oh my, the new Namibian Government and the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) are not going to like this.”

A civil war had been raging for years between the central overnment in Luanda, led by the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the ational nion for the otal ndependence of Angola A rebel force led by onas avimbi. he Angolaamibia border area was a war one until the year before. In what was one of the most vicious examples of a “proxy war” during the old War, outh Africa fought a long and bitter war along the border of outh West Africa WA – later amibia, a former erman colony, and Angola. he eague of ations gave WA to the British in trusteeship after World War , and the British in turn authoried outh Africa, their colony at the time, to manage it on their behalf. he problem developed after World War when

39 39 South Africa essentially annexed SWA and imposed an apartheid system that was stricter than the version in South Africa.

South West Africa Government Office (South African olonial Office), Windhoek (with the three official languages of the territory, Afrikaans, nglish and German)

Similar to the liberation struggle between the South African Government and the African National ongress (AN), SWAPO fought the SWA colonial government that was imposed by South Africa and considered an illegal occupation by the nited Nations. A guerrilla war raged in the northern border area for years, with SWAPO insurgents based in Angola fighting the South African efence orce (SA) and the SWA erritorial Army. uban troops fought alongside the Angolan Army (MPLA) and SWAPO against South Africans who were fighting in alliance with NIA who controlled most of southeastern Angola at the time. here were also a number of irregular SA battalions made up of antiSWAPO Namibians, disaffected Angolans, and mercenaries plus “Bushmen” or San soldiers who were excellent trackers and the bane of SWAPO troops (known as PLAN – People’s Liberation Army of Namibia). Their former border base, known as the uffalo ase, was ideally situated to become our WP Operations entre for crossborder operations.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Namibian refugees had been living in exile since the s, in nited Nations igh ommissioner for efugees (N) camps in Angola and ambia, sponsored by SWAPO with food rations provided by WP. y the s, the border proxy war was at a stalemate and South Africa finally accepted nited Nations esolution , which was to lead to a nited Nations mandated transition of SWA to independence as Namibia and the withdrawal of 40 40 SA. The peacekeeping mission was known as the nited Nations Transitional Assistance roup NTA). N and P were included as key parts of NTA as we organied the repatriation, rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees from our camps back to Namibia to ensure that they would be able to participate in the first “free and fair” elections in the autumn of 1989 that led to the election of a SAPled oernment at independence in arch .

nce it became clear that nited Nations esolution was actually to be implemented after many years of false starts, and the last colony in Africa was finally on the road to independence, N, P and the nited Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) scrambled to pull together a repatriation plan for SWAPO refugees. Charlie Rutledge from WFP’s Emergency Service walked into my office at P eaduarters in ome early in and asked me to oin the mission on behalf of P. The relationships and goodwill established with SAP leadership during that Angola mission later helped tremendously to conince the newly elected independent oernment of Namibia to allow us to run our conoys to Angola.

I was later asked to join UNTAG as “Chargé de Mission” (a title that didn’t exist at P). Tesema Negash, ountry irector in ambia, went on temporary detail to NTA oer the summer of , and took oer in September. Loredana raternalionati, Senior Secretary with ack itchie, who was the Asia Bureau head at WFP Headquarters, volunteered to join me as “International Secretary” for our NTA ission ffice. n addition, P was also approached by the nited Nations Personnel ffice in New ork to contribute staff to NTA. P assigned four international secretaries and administratie staff to NTA.

Loredana raternalionati with ouglas outts – with a map of the new Namibia, indhoek, 41 41 When the call came from WFP Headquarters on the Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA) support, Namibia had just become independent and UNTAG was withdrawing. The United Nations evelopment Programme (UNP) was not yet on the scene and WFP and UNICEF were in the process of designing a Country Programme with the expectation that we would open a longerterm office and establish an incountry presence, requested by the new SWAPO Government.

The WFP ogistics Office in Rome sent avid aatrud to help us come up with a logistics plan for the SRPA support. ohn Prout came over from Moambique where he had been working with CARE on a WFP project. Hiroyuki Matsumura, oredana and I were in the process of hiring local staff from the departing UNTAG to establish a regular WFP Country Office.

Ramiro opes da Silva was head of the WFP Angola Office (WFP irector of Operations in those days since we were technically under UNP). Ramiro and his team, including our NGO partners, e.g., CARE, World ision, utheran World Federation (WF) and International Medical Corps (IMC), needed us to transport food rations and medical supplies overland to vast areas on the southern border areas of Angola as part of the SRPA. We also had to work through UNITA who controlled these areas and was at war with the central government of Angola. We only had a few sandy tracks to work with and no proper roads.

avid aatrud (WFP), Ulrich Olesen (WF), ohn Prout (WFP), ouglas Coutts (WFP) – in front of one of the convoy vehicles, former uffalo ase, nd attalion (SAF), agani, Namibia, 1991

42 42 soldiers/trackers (known as “Bushmen”) who had fought with SADF and UNITA in the border war. This “Bushmen” battalion was disbanded at independence and our newly created “antipoaching squads” in what would become Namibia’s first

—

–

43 43 figure out a workable operational plan. As he was a master logistics planner een in those earlier days I learned much from Daid aatrud.

e purchased food in South Africa or shipped it through the South African port of alis Bay. The food and medical supplies from our N partners in Namibia were stored at the Buffalo base. For transportation we found ten heay duty wellused sibysi allwheeldrie trucks in ape Town and a team of driers and mechanics who were eSADF soldiers who had fought in the border war and knew the back routes and difficult road conditions in the border region. They were all white Afrikaners (who held a ery dim iew of the role of the United Nations in their region) which further complicated our lies with SA and the Namibian Army. hile their epertise and back country knowledge was critical to our success in naigating the bush there were tense moments in the personal and working relationships among this disparate group that we had to manage—it felt like the “Wild West” at times.

Interiews with the skeptical Namibian press were useful to building awareness and appreciation for the cross border operation – here with NB (Namibian Broadcasting orporation T) at Buffalo Base Bagani on the border arch

Then we had to assure staff and convoy safety with a “security umbrella” on both sides of the border which had been a noman’s land during the war and sealed as a “nogo area” after independence. There were no border posts anywhere on the border at that time because the new Namibian SA oernment essentially wanted nothing to do with the central oernment of 44 44 ngola. The amibian ilitary and olice supported us locally but would not approach the border as they did not want to risk any encounters with T who controlled the entire ngolan border in that area. t took uite some time to negotiate operating procedures logistics protocols and understandings on the border especially with T.

order – ancusso ngola and agani amibia – safe passage discussion for st W relief convoy

ormer uffalo base agani – inspection of st W convoy by amibian military police mbassy of ngola diplomats from Windhoek arch

45 45 —

–

—

46 46

47 47

48 48

49 49

Tun Myat, who was Director of WFP’s Transport Division, must have anticipated gave me clear directions before I left: “With the upcoming transfer, and within ”

50 50 “internal” lines are also relecte in a threememer resienc comose o a memer rom each maor rou.

he ar in osnia encomasse all three rous ihtin each other over territories enclaves an reions as ell as alon ethnic an aith ase lines. he ar ene in ecemer ith a neotiate settlement non as the aton reement. he economic an olitical ivision o the countr an the three mentione rous remain until toa.

With the collase o the uoslav Feeral tate an the estalishment o ne orers the nite ations ih ommissioner or euees ha een involve in the unolin crisis since . t ecame the leaaenc or all nite ations relie eorts. an nternall islace Persons P ha actuall ecome reuees. onseuentl s traitional manate as automaticall etene to all islace ersons in the countries o the Former uoslavia. t is interestin to note that the etene manate as ormall conirme or reuees an Ps in rica uner the so calle amala reement eteen an the rican nion ith ie oerational conseuences or WFPs oeration on the continent.

Within the relie eort oerate since several ears a commercial trucin leet out o elrae an an international trucin leet o trucs out o etovic in roatia. he international trucin leet in roatia consiste o a numer o convos ith aout caro trucs. he convos ere either irectl secone to lie the oreianoreian euee ouncil convo or une overnments lie the enmar an erman. ach convo team oerate ith international rivers.

he leet out o elrae as a eicate commerciall contracte hite ainte erian trucin leet eclusivel eliverin assistance to estinations in the eulica rsa the erian art o osniaereovina.

WFP’s First Europe WFPs initial reticence to et involve in a ullscale oo assistance roramme as ase on a cororate unerstanin not to enae in a mileincome uroean countr ell outsie WFPs usual ocus area—intervenin onl in crises involvin loincome countries. WFP’s intervention in the Former uoslavia as thereore its irst larescale emerenc relie oeration ase in uroe.

WFP oo shiments ha starte in ovemer hen the aovementione international trucin leets manae ha alrea een oerational or some time. t this time urin the onoin ar an until mi WFP unertoo a limite resonsiilit or moiliin oo an eliverin it to arehouse locations outsie osniaereovina. From there oul 51 51 tae over an istriute the oo assistance. WFP oices ha een oene in are an elrae an a Port atain as assine to Ploce on the riatic coast o roatia. ther shiments ere mae throuh the ort o onstana omania.

ta meetin in araevo ith ountr irector eanarie oucher

With WFP’s move to araevo in anuar an nearl a ear eore the aton reement as sine in ecemer WFP also estalishe a ie netor o arehouses rea to start manain all o the oo sul. en 1995 the rather “tedious” operational transer as nearl comlete an WFP ha assume ull resonsiilit or the entire oo assistance roramme in osniaereovina. he roramme scale as to eliver an averae o mt o various oo items to some eliver oints in the countr monthl.

hallenges and Dangers of Delivery Beyond “Enemy lines” Our first objective was to “reak through” the our erian checoints that ere still active at the entr o esiee araevo comin rom the outh. ince the checoints ere use to control convos reuestin assae into esiee araevo. t all times some eole ere livin in araevo. here ha not een an commercial transort enterin araevo ut tunnels ha een u to sul the ton rom outsie. ue to the siee a ver lare art o the oulation eene on assistance rom the outsie mainl on rea rouce an istriute in ton ail ith heat lour rovie throuh WFP.

ur secon oective as to ensure a reular sul to some o the isolate overnmenthel uslim enclaves in eastern osnia the territor o eulica 52 52 rpska like rebrenica and orade oth enclaves had been under siege and shelling for ears he horrible assacre of soe en in rebrenica in ul 1995 was on everybody’s mind, and it brought significant changes of attitude in the international counit visvis the erbian ilitar forces O forces launched iportant air strikes destroing large parts of the infrastructure in the hinterland forcing the erbian overnent to conclude the aton greeent this tie orade which is onl 5 k awa fro arajevo with a population of had reained soehow isolated badl daaged with people ehausted b ears of siege and continuous erbian ilitar ilitia presence on the outskirts of the town

onvoy eraion ino araevo and Easern Bosnia efore and even after the aton greeent was signed at the end of 1995 it was uite noral for an relief convo nited ations or coercial to be blocked “en route” and held back for no reason ilitar authorities levied “taxes” on people vehicles and cargo and stones were thrown at vehicles particularl b children and oungsters here was alwas an atosphere of insecurit on the roads and high pressure at checkpoints egotiation with authorities had becoe a part of the realit of war and post war operations onvo leaders were ver eposed in the leadvehicle and during negotiations he held iportant responsibilit for the securit of national drivers vehicles and cargo

ivil iliary iaison and onvoy learane

ischarging wheat flour in arajevo 1995

Fro anuar 1995 Peter cottowden WFP Prograe Officer and ale koric the later assigned arajevo based ilitar iaison Officer both with

53 53 exerience in military and crossbordercross enemy line oerations, used their exertise and contacts to arrange clearance of commercial truck movements through various territories and into isolated locations in eastern osnia and to araevo lthough each convoy as ell reared and monitored, e ere not alays able to ensure that all trucks ere unloaded at the right arehouse in araevo or in the enclave usual occurrence as a diversion of the last or several trucks at the end of the convoy hile entering a ton y the time it as noticed, the truck ould have already been unloaded and returned to the convoy his haened also occasionally ith trucks entering araevo

e had no other means but to reort the incident to our office and the nited ations Military Police, or as in the case of “Serb Sarajevo,” to follow up with authorities on our beneficiaries and distribution lists, hich as a tedious and to some extent dangerous undertaking, because it forced staff to cross over the “Snipers Alley” into the heavily damaged “Serb Sarajevo.” Serb Sarajevo authorities regularly asked us to divert ercent or three truckloads out of ten to their side did not exerience any direct, ersonal threats from these authorities, but there ere hostilities toards the nited ations and other relief organiations exerienced this tice hile accomanying a convoy to orade hen confronted the erb authorities ho had diverted a truck on the outskirts of ton, it as made clear, ith a alashnikov ointed at me, that should move on with my “own business”

First Trial Run into Sarajevo and Gradual “Takeover” After the summer of 1995, we decided to start the “transfer” from ith a regular number of small commercial food convoys to araevo he first seven trucks ith roatian lates ere loaded by loce ith heat flour for unloading at the famous bakery in the center of araevo ontractors had rovided ith an accetable rice er mt and selected exerienced drivers ens aekholm, the ort atain in loce and his assistant, nena had done a great deal of rearation and accomanied the trucks u to the first erb checkoint before araevo e had informed , the nited ations rotection orce, but they urosefully had not made other direct re arrangements ith erbian checkoints at the entry of araevo rucks ere suosed to arrive in convoy fashion, enter araevo for discharge and dearture on the same day o our surrise, all trucks drove straight ast the checkoints, arrived at the mill and ere safely discharged fter that, ogistics taff accomanied the emty trucks back to the checkoints to facilitate their assage ater, became convinced that the commercial oerators ere making their on arrangements along the routes and the checkoints to guarantee smooth delivery hey had understood from the very beginning that a shift to commercial transort ould rovide an imortant boost to the local transort economy

54 54 e were encouraged by this eperience and increased the deliveries to Sarajevo. e also started deliveries to Mostar, very close to Ploce and to enica and ula, in central osnia. had not anticipated the fast pace of our implementation. eanMarie had to hear and reply to a lot of criticism during interagency meetings relating to “breaking up the good routine and practice,” and our logistics team was openly criticied, even internally. umours were spread about our incapacity to eep the delivery path during the winter without the deployment of specialied trucs later in the year. e ept insisting, and eanMarie supported us in his typical, diplomatic way. uring the spring of 199, the erman epresentative in Sarajevo called me to as whether ermany should etend its funding of the erman convoy for si more months. told him, P was capable of doubling deliveries using commercial trucs with the same funding and ermany should allocate the funds directly to P. As a conseuence, the erman convoy was not etended and we were no longer “welcomed” in the UNHCR Croatianbased trucconvoy base.

F eliveries to te osnian nlave A new challenge arose when we were ased to provide regular transport services to the osnian enclave in orade. he enclave was in the territory of the epublia Srpsa, only 5 m from Sarajevo. or political reasons, food deliveries to these nearby enclaves were not part of PBelgrade’s operation. or the nited ations umanitarian oordinator, deliveries to orade from Sarajevo presented a test of the agreed free passage and actual implementation of the ayton Agreement. hroughout the osnian ivil ar, Serb rebel and military forces had freuently stopped and prevented nited ations convoys from reaching the enclaves. A regular convoy of commercial trucs was new and a practical test.

e decided to organie and plan for a weely convoy of up to si commercial trucs with osnian plates and drivers. he convoy was led by a P vehicle. he uantities to be delivered were paced on palettes and planned in such a way that we were able to guarantee uic discharge and return to Sarajevo during the day. he preparation went well and was ased to lead the first convoy, followed by many others. learances were obtained. ery early in the morning we set off with the convoy through the tunnel separating osnian Sarajevo from Serb Sarajevo. Shortly after crossing the tunnel, we came across a checpoint and were ased to stop. was called into the guard post. A discussion ensued, translated by the driver of the lead vehicle. e were offered coffee and Slivovit and all looed at the driver, a Muslim, to see whether he would drink. He apologized, “I am the driver,” and had to swallow two Slivovits on an empty stomach around a. m. e were released, but had to promise to bring some “souvenirs” from Sarajevo net time. After that, we made it to orade without any incident, passing through an talian P controlled road intersection and without any ids throwing stones. t is on one such transfers that a truc loaded with vegetable oil was diverted from the convoy entering orade. continued leading convoys into orade, each time 55 55 carrying “souvenirs” in the form of cigarettes coffee brandy and football or car magaines for distribution to erbian soldiers ver time ’s weely deliveries by convoy to orade had become a normal operation and the soldiers had withdrawn

Te reaktrou y spring our office had nearly achieved the “mission objectives” formulated by un yat when one afternoon on short notice ome offered us a harter essel with mt of bul wheat grain Jeanarie was ecited and gave the logistics team until the net day to provide him with an operations concept e had never received loose grain in roatia had no milling arrangements with any of the local mills in place and were not sure whether we would be able to identify and contract sufficient trucs to carry the grain in bul to the mills

he following day a logistics mission was sent to the ort of plit where the reuired discharge euipment was available he port management agreed immediately to receive the shipment and we gave our “goahead” to Jeanarie e also wored day and night to set up milling agreements with four osnian mills in ula ostar ugojno and arajevo utch milling epert identified by Joop enveld rocurement fficer based in ome came as a volunteer to osnia and helped us with the negotiations and agreements one of the mills had actually operated during the last four years and the owners were very een on collaborating with e had however not yet decided whether we were going to bag the grain upon discharge or deliver the loose grain directly to the mills

n plit we heard about a large transport company in ugojno efore the war the company freuently performed bul transportation services to the mills in osnia owever ugojno town and its surroundings were where osnian roats and osnias fought bitterly during their war and ethnic relations in ugojno remained strained

he town was still divided between the two groups when we arrived there for freight negotiations he truc fleet was dispersed on both sides of the town and individual drivers offered transport services ur team literally had to cross the main street several times going from one coffee shop to the other until both parties finally agreed to sit together in the meeting room at the nearby grain mill to discuss nce the two groups understood that we were proposing a commercial transport agreement under the condition that they were able to reinstate the company and agree to provide the necessary number of trucs for the direct discharge of some mt daily we signed a transport agreement within two wees just in time for the arrival of the vessel ll grain was transported in bul directly to the mills he operation was a success

56 56 essons earned and ersonal inion out te Situation became increasingly nown in the country e were offering a number of service contracts in transport storage distribution and milling thus providing a large number of business opportunities to the local economy his substantially facilitated access to all locations and areas in osnia for contractors irrespective of truc registration or origin of the driver

rom there on we were no longer tracing every vehicle nor did we provide any support in the form of preclearance and information to the nited ations eaceeeping orce had become a recognied business partner to the etent that sometimes when we were travelling through osnia with the logistics team and stopped for a brea random customers offered us free coffee

has freuently applied crossborder deliveries through enemy lines in many countries favouring commercial solutions before establishing trucing fleets o a certain etent even viation which started chartering cargo aircraft in the s became during the years the nited ations umanitarian ir ervice was able to build a strong and professional reputation in the transportation of passenger and relief cargo by air worldwide he nited ations reform and establishment of the lobal ogistics Cluster enforced WFP’s ransport and ogistics role in all nited ations relief operations ith the decentraliation of many ogistics fficer positions to the field the ransport ivision in ome and ountry Offices were able to offer “allin” logistic services to the humanitarian community whether by air sea river or land following the simple slogan, “we deliver!”

57 57 eliverin Food in a oliated Reion – Te alkans

arles inent

Carles incent

n was ead of te World Food Programme WFP elgrade, erbia office, in carge of erbia, ontenegro, Former ugoslav epublic of acedonia, and astern osnia, including uslim enclaves being tigtly besieged by osnian erbs reported to avid orton, wo was irector of te ugoslavia operation based in agreb Francesco trippoli was te eaduarters coordinator for ugoslavia

astern osniaeregovina, mostly osnianerb territory, ad a substantial number of displaced people, and uslim enclaves believe totalling about , people, but it could ave been fewer, could not be reaced from Croatia terefore, umanitarian cargo ad to go troug erbia

lmost all WFP umanitarian relief for tis corridor was offloaded in urgas, ulgaria, and transported by trucs to elgrade, offloaded into nited ations ig Commissioner for efugees C wareouses until WFP started operation, and later into a WFPleased wareouse in Pancevo on te outsirts of elgrade y getting its own wareouse and repacaging operation, WFP was able to drastically cut down on te cost of logistics

From Pancevo, convoys were organied by C troug a fleet of commercial operators for erbcontrolled territories, togeter wit a dedicated fleet of trucs managed by C, to reac uslim enclaves inside osniaeregovina WFP 58 58 was later able to do direct deliveries rigt into erbcontrolled territories, speeding up deliveries and reducing costs no offloadingreloading

emember, te winter is brutal in that region, and “Yugoslav” and "Bosnian" erb autorities were not always elpful wit getting cargo to uslim enclaves ey argued tat tere were a lot of poor, displaced erbs wo needed elp true enoug, but te situation in te enclaves was really dire Permits to go in and out were often given, but yet trucs were bloced at te border for a lot of bad reasons

osovo displaced people, WFPom asell

WFP convoy, ugoslavia, WFPom asell

59 59 t one oint, reeived a all ro raneso trioli ho inored e that ater onsulting avid orton, e Belgrade ie ould reeive, through the ort o Burgas, Bulgaria, aout , t o heat lour—a git ro the But there as a ath

he donor anted all o the argo to go to Bosnia he lours validit or onsution ould soon oe to an end and e had to ees to oload and transort it to Bosniaeregovina

ote this eant engaging aout , trus in inter onditions

hen the shi arrived, a ort ier as sent to Burgas to oordinate he tender had resulted in an aaingl lo rie o around t ro Burgas to Belgrade and a it ore or diret deliver to various Bosnian tons as tended eliver oints

ne aor diiult as getting a transorter ho had suiient trus to do the rotations at a ae o trus o t eah da, and illing to go into Bosnia e ere ale to get reasonale ries eause eriaontenegro and erian Bosnia were under strict economic sanctions…ie, no uel he truers had to ount huge ell tans under the trailers and ill the u ith hea Bulgarian gasoline and diesel, reselling the uel ater rossing the order at a huge roit his is h reeived hea rates or transorting ood argo But e did not no it at the tie

nother diiult as getting into eria and driving all the a to Bosnia t the outset o the oeration, er ustos uthorities loed trus ro entering eria through the Bulgarian order olitiians in Belgrade ere uset that none o the , t o lour as going to eria and ontenegro roer ter three das, e had nearl trus aiting at the order, inurring deurrage alled headuarters and advised to sto all shients to dislaed ers in eria and Bosnia ot ore than inutes later, the order agiall reoened ould it have een that our hones ere onitored You an et on it he trus ere alloed to roeed, soe to arehouses or transhient on the designated leet, and soe diretl to the Bosnian order into erontrolled territories here no issues ere raised

e had an issue ith the oor ualit o the heat lour on deliver ter sending ees on the editerranean sea, and in light o the roiit o its eir date, soe o the lour as deinitel not in good shae e had our ogisti iers revie and advise authorities to ut the ad stu aside, have loal health oiials anale it, and sell it or attle eed as needed, and er regulations

ould eneiiaries aet the lour Yes indeed, eause the situation as dire or hundreds o thousands o eole in Bosniaeregovina and heat lour as needed to ae read t ight not have een the highest ualit read the

60 60 eer made neerteess te new was trin its er est rememer an od woman near oo crin wit o wen te our was anded to er

ere is anoter stor aout te Baans and te mied erusim riade stationed in oo a town wit a ewis maor e maor was oin to sta to te itter end te town was asica destroed ecause ers ad rotected ewis amiies in oo durin ord ar ou cannot inent tis stu t is te Baans

e ast trucs entered Bosnia on te er ast da eore te our was due to eireand ou can et tat te autorities woud ae oced an truc wit eired ood

n te end it was anoter amain o tans to a team o dedicated and reat coeaues wo crossed orders in conict ones to et incredie amounts o ood to eoe wo needed itand te did it wit ride and tota dedication e aso ad some ood moments around raia wit eneiciaries wo on ad raia to sare

were to suest ideas or success rom our eerience woud sa

irst and oremost recruit te est eoe ossie and create a rea team weter ou are distriutin ood or cas econd it is imortant to ae a stron networ wit transorters oernment autorities etc ird it is crucia to te eneiciaries te trut aout wat wen ow esecia in emerenc situations and were tins can et ad er uic tins do not o rit e uront tis can itera sae our ie ased on simiar ersona eeriences in anistan aiti emocratic euic o ono and Burundi two ears ao ure eoe do not ie to ear ad news ut i ou ae estaised trust it wi or te most art e arit ina do not romise wat ou are not sure ou can deier nd i ossie ae resence wen tins o rit or not is aies aain or ood nonood or cas

sta ae awas done a reat o eedin unr eoe around te word ne e issue rom te mids onward was securit restrictions imosed on and articuar securit oicers wic reented us rom doin more wen we coud ae es we did some cra stu ac in te s and 90s, which, looking back, were really overboard in terms of risk. But the “cover your back” approach of the years 2000 and increased bureaucracy brought aout te internet and sreadseets were not a ositie deeoment or ein eoe in need t is a rea conundrum understand tat te word is deinite not te wa it was u into te s umanitarianism is deinite more diicut toda tan it was at east tat is m eein

61 61

62

62

orben ue

ra invaded and occupied uwait in ugust 990 with the purpose of anneing it. his was immediately condemned by the nited ations ecurity ouncil, calling for a withdrawal of rai forces from uwait. owever, the overnment of ra did not respond, and within a week the ecurity ouncil approved esolution , which included very comprehensive sanctions against ra. ll imports, eports, financial services, flight connections and other echanges between ra and other nited ations member states and their nationals were prohibited under esolution . verview of compliance was done by the anctions ommittee, which was also established under esolution .

umanitarian supplies such as food and medicine were not part of the sanctions, but they were still under the supervision of the esolution anctions 62 ommittee.

n anuaryebruary 99, rai forces were driven out of uwait by a broad coalition led by the US in a military operation code named “Desert Storm.” egime change was not part of the agenda and oalition forces soon left ra. idespread uprisings in the then hia dominated south and urdish north 63 63 olloed bt the reime manaed to reain control o the soth hile the rdish north retained a de acto atonomy and the central oernment had no presence in the rdish areas the oernorates Doh rbil and Slaimaniyah.

he sanctions remained in orce as the rai oernment did not collaborate or lly comply ith nmeros other Secrity oncil esoltions that olloed. n addition sbsidiary orans ere established sch as the order Demarcation ommission the raait bseration ission U the United ations Special ommission US and the United ations onitorin eriication and nspection ommission U or isses related to eapons o ass Destrction D incldin chemical bioloical and nclear isses. ther special commissions ere set p to deal ith damaes cased by rai orces in ait or property missin persons etc. he isses dealt ith by these commissions ensred that ra as ery hih on the international aenda or many years to come.

he sanctions had a serios neatie impact on the economy that as eacerbated by damaes to inrastrctre sch as roads brides and transport eipment cased by the ar. he rai economy as based on oil eport and the import o almost anythin else incldin ood. onseently the economy collapsed as nothin cold be eported or imported. mport o medicines and ood or hmanitarian prposes ere the only eceptions. eertheless idespread hman serin olloed cased by lac o medicine and ood and araated by a lac o spare parts or electricity plants eipment or hospitals transport eipment etc. he hmanitarian crisis prompted the international commnity to proide ndin or emerency prorammes addressin this sitation. he US as the larest donor bt all traditional donors contribted ith sbstantial spport to alleiate the hmanitarian crisis.

he orld ood roramme as the larest player implementin hmanitarian assistance on the rond becase ood secrity as the most critical isse. n order to deal ith this challene a lare oice as established in ahdad toether ith sboices in the oernorates. prorammes ere traditional emerency responses to proide assistance to lare parts o the poplation ith special eedin prorammes or lnerable rops lie inants small children and prenant omen.

manitarian assistance as deliered eectiely bt it did not sole the problem it as spposed to address. here ere to main problems the assistance as too small in scale compared to the manitde o the problems hich meant the hmanitarian crisis as not soled and the cost o assistance as ery hih and een hiher i the hmanitarian isses ere addressed in a comprehensie manner. t the same time larescale hmanitarian crises in est rica the reat aes reion in ast rica and

64 64 other parts o the orld reired sbstantial ndin. Donor attention and ndin shited to some etent to those areas. here ere also some dobts abot hether the hmanitarian assistance to ra as deliered lly in accordance ith hmanitarian principles or to be more speciic i the oernment o ra aored speciic rops oer others hen deinin those ho needed assistance.

n important part o the considerations as that ra had ery lare oil reseres that cold easily be sed to inance the hmanitarian assistance needed. hese considerations led to the approal o Secrity oncil esoltion or the il or ood roramme in . he se o the rai oil reseres had already been considered or sericin rai orein debt ar reparations to ait and other prposes that old mae it possible or ra to meet its international obliations.

he proramme as based on the sale o rai oil and the proceeds ere sed or ndin the import o alloed hmanitarian items i.e. medicine ood health items and other spplies and materials or essential ciilian needs. here as a oods eie ist o items alloed. ore oods ere radally inclded oer time as a reslt o the rndon o essential ciilian acilities.

ontries interested in importin oil rom ra ere reired to sbmit a reest ith all releant details sch as antity price eport rote and timin endorsed by the oernment o ra beore orardin the reest to the esoltion Sanctions ommittee or approal. nce approed the byer deposited the areed amont into an escro accont established by the United ations Secretary eneral. he oernment o ra had no control oer proceeds rom the sale o oil. ndependent inspection aents ere deployed to ra to eriy that the eports too place in accordance ith the contract. port only too place ia the ir pipeline to rey or rom the oil terminal o ina alara in sothern ra.

he Secrity oncil approed oil eports p to one billion dollars or a day period and reports ere sbmitted to the Secrity oncil ater days. he amont as increased oer the years as more items ere alloed. he proramme as etended by the Secrity oncil eery days ntil it decided to phase it ot ater the second l ar. roceeds rom the sale o oil coered all costs incldin the cost to the United ations or administerin the proramme. ports to ra o ood medicine and other essential items or ciilian se as in accordance ith procedres already deined in esoltions and . he oernment o ra reested import o commodities to ra based on the oods eie ist o alloed items. he Sanctions ommittee approed the reest ater a reie. ra aranteed the eitable distribtion o items based on a plan sbmitted and approed by the Secretary eneral. Description o the oods to be prchased as also inclded. he spplier as

65 65 paid directly by the United ations ith oil eport proceeds held in an escro accont. he deliery o oods as monitored by a team o inspectors at the border crossin points and the port o Umm asr. he end se o imported items as eriied by a team o obserers.

’s role as limited to obserin the end se o imported oods. t as o corse mainly ood bt eipmentspare parts or hospitals the transport sector heat mills etc. ere also inclded. he ood component as the larest o the il or ood roramme. he oernment o ra had established a pblic distribtion system coerin the hole poplation ith all basic ood items heat lor beans oil sar tea and mil poder or inants. Soap and ashin poder ere also proided. he monthly ration as almost per person.

he il or ood roramme had a special proision and bdet allocations or the three rdish oernorates here the rai oernment had no presence. he monthly allocation as mt and arraned transport and manaed arehoses hich meant perormin nctions taen care o by the rai oernment in the rest o the contry.

he obseration tas as to eriy i ood items ere distribted eally to the hole poplation on time. his reired tracin the ood imports rom the bordercrossin points to central arehoses in ahdad and rther to arehoses in the oernorates. he inal distribtion too place rom some small shops. ach amily had a ration card indicatin members o their hosehold by ae and ender. t also inoled reent isits to arehoses and shops to eriy i the amilies listed receied their allocated ood rations. ore importantly a ery lare nmber o hosehold isits ere also carried ot. n arch hen the second l ar started more than a million isits had been carried ot oer the years and it shoed that ood spplied nder the il or ood roramme reached the intended poplation. only perormed the obseration nction bt there ere attempts by the oernment to inole in the politics srrondin the sanctions.

had a meetin ith the inister o ealth in ne . e had a constrctie conersation abot the ntrition problems in ra. hen e ere inishin the meetin a cre entered the room and the minister sddenly ased, “What do you think of the sanctions affecting Iraq?” He clearly tried to get a condemnation o the sanctions bt he ot a bland anser instead. he echane as on the same eenin.

nternational tensions ith ra contined ater the irst l ar. he main isse as the Ds that ere to be destroyed accordin to Secrity oncil esoltion . he irst e years ater the ar lare antities o missiles and other ar materials ere destroyed and others ere acconted or. oeer 66 66 there ere frequent roles reenting insectors fro gaining unhindered access to all sites here eaons could hae een hidden hese issues continued and ne allegations ere ade that Iraq still ossessed W, and, furtherore, it had the caaility to roduce the he tensions ere high and occasional airstrikes ere carried out against Iraqi targets he eteer terrorist attacks on the and susequent ilitary interention in fghanistan also increased aareness or susicion of otential threats fro Iraq It as clear that olicy shifted in toards regie change in Iraq, y ilitary eans if necessary

he issue as discussed at ecurity ouncil eetings here the ecretary of tate claied to hae roof of Iraq ossessing Ws t the sae tie, the nited ations insection tea declared that there as no roof of the eistence of W in Iraq Hoeer, a coalition led y the gae adda Hussein an ultiatu to leae Iraq or face ilitary action nder these circustances, Iraq as declared to e in hase ive of the Secretary General’s Security plan – eaning eacuation – and all staff left Iraq on arch ,

he ar started on arch ith heay oardents, and the Iraqi regie collased ithin a fe eeks his created a ne reality as the regie as relaced y the oalition roisional uthority , hich took oer all goernent functions in accordance ith the enea onention for occuied countries his eans, aong other things, that the occuying oer is resonsile for the suly of food, edicine and other articles as needed for the oulation he inistry of rade, in charge of the ulic food distriution system and WFP’s main counterpart, was now headed by Robin Raphel, a US diloat

lso, as the olitical situation had changed, there as no longer a need for the il for ood rograe as designed under esolution ecurity ouncil esolution of arch , introduced iortant changes to the oerating odality of the il for ood rograe It authoried the nited ations ecretary eneral to take oer the rograe in order to ensure that the huanitarian needs of the Iraqi eole ere et he nited ations ecretary eneral through the il for ood rograe ecretariat and together ith the releant nited ations agencies no decided on deliery oints for contracts already eing shied and redirected shients hen needed hey also reieed the list of aroed funded and nonfunded contracts, and rioritied deliery ased on the needs of the oulation hey accelerated or delayed shients if necessary and negotiatedagreed ith suliers on necessary adustents in the ters and conditions of the contracts eing odified he resolution also alloed the ecretary eneral fleiility in using the escro account to eet the huanitarian needs of the oulation he resolution gae W a ery different role fro eing an oserer of deliery, distriution, and use of the goods deliered under the il for ood rograe to

67 67 manain the pipeline of the food supply as well as a lare number of other non food supplies for the whole population

Resolution of ay nd started the phaseout and handover of the il for Food Proramme to the P and the interim rai administration t ranted days to close onoin operations and transfer remainin responsibilities to the P he evelopment Fund for ra F had already been established for humanitarian and development reconstruction activities and remainin money from the escrow account and other rai rust Funds were transferred to the F n addition, further proceeds from the sale of rai oil were also deposited with the F isbursement of funds was decided by the P in consultation with the rai interim administration

he resolution also mandated the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative to coordinate all United ations activities in ra While humanitarian needs were still hih on the list of priorities, the scope of activities was broader than before, because it included promotin economic reconstruction, support to civil administration, promote leal and udicial reforms, facilitate reconstruction of infrastructure, and support the establishment of an internationally reconied and representative overnment of ra he intentions and hope were that ra would return to normality throuh economic and social development, with a representative overnment supported by the United ations, and in collaboration with the international community his, however, proved to be more difficult than anticipated

n the net section we will loo more closely at the role and activities of WFP from late to the end of

he second Gulf War started in arch , but WFP preparations for it were initiated in here were already speculations about an eventual US military intervention in early Political tensions were risin and a military conflict was considered a possibility by most observers t was evidenced by statements of the US Government and replies from the Government of ra ra was also a freuent item on the aenda of the United ations Security ouncil t was clear that an eventual military conflict would interrupt food supply to ra with dramatic humanitarian conseuences t that time there was no private sector involvement in the import of basic foods due to the sanctions and the il for Food Proramme that supplied all basic food items to ra

We had several basic uestions ow many people should WFP assist From where would we et the food ow to deliver the food to the country ow to distribute it to the population ra had a population of around million at the time, meanin a caseload substantially hiher than any other emerency operation in the history of WFP here were two schools of thouhts 68 68 reardin the caseload the first was a traditional merency peration P coverin the most vulnerable people estimated to be around five million based on scenario plannin, or the second was to accept that the whole country would become food insecure within two months after the outbrea of war—meanin provide food supply for the whole population t was decided that WFP should aim at assistin the whole population t was also areed that WFP should mae an attempt to tae over the il for Food Proramme because it was considered unrealistic that donors would provide sufficient fundin for such a lare operation lso, iven the leadtime for procurement, shipment and overland transport, donorfunded food miht not have arrived in time t was, however, decided that WFP should appeal to donors, in case the il for Food Proramme option did not materialie

oistic ountry ssessment was carried out in ra and neihbourin countries, which included roads, transport euipmentcapacity, capacity of the ports and conestion times, etc Settin up a distribution system for million people was considered unrealistic and also not needed he public distribution system was in place, coverin the whole population with central and reional warehouses, plus around , small shops that distributed food he only concern was what to do if the physical infrastructure was destroyed or if the staff were to leave

t was also clear that WFP would need another structure in ra efore the war, WFP had a very small loistics capacity, very little presence outside ahdad and the urdish areas, a lare team of national and international observers, but limited proramme sills We therefore desined an overall oraniram of WFP ahdad, and the Reional ffices in asra, osul and rbil ranirams were also developed for the suboffices in the overnorates ll functions were included, ie, oistics, nformation echnoloy, Security, Proramme and Financedmin, Reportin, onor Relations, and Public nformation he structure or oraniram was created so that we could cope with the worload we epected he staff we already had in ra turned out to be too few for the tas facin us

We did not have the sills in the ra ffice for such an undertain, and therefore we embared on a massive trainin proramme rainin sessions were held in mman for local staff around proramme and monitorin issues rainin on how to operate in the absence of the international staff was also conducted nternational staff were sent to Sweden for emerency trainin ast, but not least, a number of meetins were held in ahdad with ey staff where scenarios and challenes were discussed and solutions identified bi plannin meetin was held in ypt with the participation of the heads of functional areas in ra, ountry irectors from neihbourin countries, Reional irectors, and other staff from Reional ffices, as well as staff from headuarters and other places who were epected to play important roles in a crisis his meetin was

69 69

—

70 70

a “food train”

71 71 for t ar t aftr or fi an it a ddn oon rai oation for t firt ti in an ar no ad a to nnord intrnationa n nitd ation offi at t ana ot ad n ootd and dtrod tr a no r a tat od d a iin artr on otion a trfor to arran torar aoodation at t ana ot r ord ad or a and t firt ta a to a t offi fntiona aain it oniation int otr t t a r ai and t food a aa t a in and ri or ri and in ti a da or oon t di ri t a tnt it nt to t ana ot ao t an rfa to d a iin artr and tra offi a an or taff od no aoodatd and a f taffd in adad t nd of a

n t innin r on a f taff and t fo a on oordinatin it t oration ntr in arnaa and taiin ontat it t initr of rad nrin tat t i itrition t a rad to ri and ditrit t food to t a o troot t ontr rin t ont of n o t of food r dird to ra n ara on troad of food a diatd r int da and nit for or tan da food a ditritd tro t in a ti and ordr annr i i o a food rii a artd i a a aor aint tat od tat t trat on a orrt r t fooin ont a tad fo of food a dird and t t fntiond r

ra aro ani r

72 72 an an ritd t anad to on t riona in ara ai and o ri a arad fntionin offi r rada ond in ot ornorat dndin on t rit itation ta ood of rit nforation noo and oiti rifid ondition at oation for t rn it a in to on an offi oon ro drin ti firt riod a idrad ootin of aro and ornnt idin n ra fn aon t ia r diantd and od to ootr i ad for rottion of t aro ad a nr of tin it t and t iitar and initia rottion a roidd or tr r too f troo to rott infratrtr and nr rit in nra or intan t ain aro in ara ad the “food basket,” was under the protection of the British iitar to otr rioriti it a annond tat t rottion for od d ot oo ti a non to t oation and a rod atrd otid t at rad to o in and oot a oon a t riti iitar od ot anad to rad t oandin offir to t troo at t aro and t food a rd

oi and aon iddn in t aro a anotr ro fond arond i fro a fortr on ii to a ar anition and tr o on t roof of aro t a a diod of a i dinin ro n anition dot a diord o tr fro t art of t ana ot iitar didd to a a “safe” explosion, but there was an even bigger depot next to the one discovered. t indo of t idin fain t to oion r on ot ood a rt t it a ar itin to ont ao taid fntionin oniation and intrnt onntion in a ara and offi nforation noo taff did a fantati o in nrin f onntiit for a taff in a offi i a ritia for a f intation of t oration

ation it t and t initr of rad r r ood in artiar it t rian d fato ad and r riti adior or ration it rai taff o ad n anain t for ar r or o oio ft it a iiatin tat t dirtion and ora anant r no in t and of forinr antd to intrat t and t ind rondd to initation to attnd oordination tin t trnd ot tat ot nior o did not a ni and ndd tranation rai offiia r ar n on tain a ontro and oitia and orationa irtan ad ti aition ioi ontrod fnd for rornt and tranort o tr a no o for ara iiit atiiti ornnt offiia anr and frtration of nior rai offiia r ar rd at a tin in an inoin nior offiia an a rai and r aodi

73 73 he xecutive irector, i orris, was the first head of an agenc to visit Baghdad in a. t was a oneda visit that proved ver useful, because he left ra with a clear understanding of the issues and challenges facing . e alwas provided percent support to the ra office, which was critical in an aspects. he purchase of harvested wheat was another adventure. ra was and is a fooddeficit countr, but with a substantial production of wheat and soe other grains. B pril it was alread clear that a solution had to be found for the procureent of the harvest. t was agreed between the and the nited ations that would bu the wheat harvest and would bu the barle harvest. he rationale was that the wheat could be channelled to the , while the barle was used for anial feed. he operation was copleted successfull and the ore than one illion tons of locall produced wheat was iportant for the food pipeline. t was also a useful inection of one into the rai econo – illion dollars in total.

he nited ations coordination of operational and securit issues included dail eetings at the anal otel with donors as well as internal coordination eetings. here was updating of operational aspects as well as securit issues. he environent becae ore and ore tense fro une onwards. he ecurit ouncil asked the ecretar eneral to appoint a nited ations pecial epresentative in a esolution with a broad andate to coordinate the huanitarian and reconstruction assistance provided b the nited ations and s, work with the to restore public institutions, proote econoic reconstruction, facilitate reconstruction of ke infrastructure, and, last but not least, support the foration of an interi rai adinistration until an internationall recognied representative was established b the people of ra. his arked a aor political shift for the nited ations, fro priaril providing huanitarian assistance to becoing an active plaer in shaping the future of ra at the econoic and political level.

he unnis, who had been the doinant group in ra for generations, saw these efforts as a threat to their power and there was increasing backlash against oalition forces in unni doinated areas, and also attacks on hia uslis in Baghdad and elsewhere. his situation escalated fro une onwards. rocketpropelled grenade was fired at the office in osul, but luckil it did not explode. During a Country Director’s visit to Mosul shortly after, a shootout took place in front of the gate to the office, leaving two dead and one wounded. Based on these incidents and guided b a securit risk assessent, we started scaling staff nubers down to a iniu. he bass of ordan and the ed ross ffice in Baghdad were targeted with bobings and the atosphere was nerveracking. n ugust , the nited ations offices at the anal otel were the next target of a terrorist attack, ust five das after the creation of the nited ations ssistance ission to ra . his was probabl not a coincidence.

74 74

fterath of the Canal otel oing

truc loaded ith explosives tried to enter the Canal otel copound late in the afternoon of ugust , ut as not alloed to enter, so it drove to the estern side of the copound here the explosion too place, close to the office of the nited ations pecial epresentative, ergio iera de Mello. e died together ith other nited ations staff visitors.

everal security easures had een put in place, including a o shelter, alls around the copound, a heavily fortified entrance, procedures for ho could enter the copound, using unared cars, to cars alays travelling together, freuent reporting ac to the radio roo on location, and situation hen travelling. he ilitary also had a presence to protect the nited ations. oever, the all to the est of the copound as not last proof and part of the uilding collapsed.

he explosion too place around and the scene that folloed as one of confusion. Many ere ounded and trauatied oviously needing help, hile others spontaneously started rescuing those trapped inside the uilding. t as horrile and proaly the orst experience in our lives. ucily, elicopters arrived uicly and the ounded ere transported to a Military ospital for treatent. ll staff ere accounted for, ut e could not locate Darlene isson. he as airlifted to the Military ospital and fro there to another hospital in uait, and finally to a ilitary hospital in erany. ater, e all

75 75 returned to our respective living uarters and stayed there for a fe days until e ere authoried to return to or.

elping the ounded after the Canal otel oing

he folloing day, the nforation echnology tea anaged to restore counication lins to oe and elsehere. ur offices ere destroyed, ut e anaged to convert soe prefas into offices, and ithin a fe days e ere fully operational again. Conseuently, the supply of food as not interrupted y the incident. t as, hoever, not considered safe to eep operating fro inside ra, and ost and other nited ations staff ere gradually evacuated ithin the folloing ees. his proved to e a ise decision ecause there as a second attac on epteer rd, after hich all nited ations staff ere evacuated.

t as, hoever, also clear that and the nited ations ere not prepared for such an attac. t as the first of its ind in the history of the nited ations. he perception at efore the oing as that e ere less exposed ecause e ere providing huanitarian assistance. he nited ations as clearly considered an eney y l aeda and other radical slaic groups. he experience therefore had a profound ipact on ho security issues ere anaged thereafter.

o other aspects also ecae very clear. irst, there as no a need to have capacity ithin the nited ations to handle a situation involving evacuation and provide support to affected staff and their failies nited ations as not prepared for the tas. usiness continuity under such circustances as also an issue. econd, there as no lan in case the nited ations offices had een ore affected than it as. here is no need to go into details on these

76 76 issues, ut the oing of the Canal otel changed the indset of the nited ations forever.

Torben’s office at the Canal otel after the oing

he ra ffice relocated to an, ordan, here an office as set up in record tie. he or to deliver food in accordance ith ecurity Council esolution continued uninterrupted. his as the first challenge e faced. he second and ore serious one as ho e could avoid another terrorist attac and at the sae tie continue to deliver the food reuired for the D. he solution as to operate ith no visiility and ith a seleton staff only. his eant not using offices, not using anything that could e lined to , such as nited ations vehicles, ag arings and signs on trucs, etc. t proved to e effective ecause e did not have any ore incidents. lso, in the very tense political situation in ra, ith increased violence eteen unni and hia groups, the easure protected national staff fro ecoing a target for attacs.

day tie liit as given in esolution to provide uch needed assistance to the rai people and hand over the prograe to Crai authorities y the end of oveer. e had een discussing this issue ith the C and highlevel eetings ere held in an, including eetings ith proposed counterparts ho ould tae over fro . t soon ecae clear

77 77 none o e rooss ere be s e roose ne rnersonrors no see o e e reen eerene or o e on s s n e oer se e r os e nsr o Tre ere rn or e rern o onro n neen o e o e Te er reerre n oon o rnee e o o oo o r o no be nerre n ere no onne e nsr o Tre o o e ob e ere one on seer osons n oeber or sor Te senor neen o e r oe ssse e sse n ree e o o e ob enes rsse e s e or o neoe rer e Te een oo e e oe n e or orrs ee reor o s n e or sse b n e s sor o n reeen e Tere s on ssson o e oeron sses beore e e o e sse o one e se o one be n e nser s on ors e en roose n reeen or on ors eore snn n reeen e onse enes rsse or reen e ree n sese we copy the Auditor’s Office, which objected on the ground that we were not ore o sn s n reeen oeer e ere Tere s non n res o e onrr

e ere en n e s o onnn e re oeron n e o n nr or eens e n e nsr o Tre o rrne or eenon ner s reeen eere oo o reon bs n e onorn non o er eer en e r os ere er n e rrneen sne roreen n rnsor ere ne b so ne onrn n en Tere s orron e nsr o Tre b ner e reeen ere s e ossb or orr es oeer es ere e s e soere oo n Tre been eere o r b oe r os s sre eorn oo o e one

e so ee o reoe n reorne e oe s oe o oe Te ose oornon beeen roreen sn n oss re esbse ner e reos se s no onsoe no sne neen n Ts roe o be er eee ro n oeron on o e n so oseee en ore o n ener orse n on ors es roo or eono o se roo e s n

e en o n er ere s e s n s been on T or os o ers b e ob s one n s no o e ne r oernen o sse resonsb or s e o se on n sne s er re srre e e o e oeron e ere ron s n b er e ere on o soe nernon n non s

78 78 here were any aegations of corruption in the Oi for ood rograe and the ecretary enera appointed an ndependent nuiry oittee, better nown as the ocer oittee, after the chair au ocer, forer edera esere hairan he coittee uncoered corruption within the Oi for ood rograe, ainy in the for of icbac to the rai regie fro suppiers here was aso corruption within the nited ations, ainy in ew or where contracts were approed was aso inestigated, but staff were not inoed in corruption or isuse of funds here were ony ery positie references to in a few footnotes his ared the end of a period

he ra office did an afteraction reiew with a arge nuber of recoendations, of which any were specific and technica t was posted on go and is probaby aaiabe in the archies oweer, ooing bac it is osty the ain features that stand out, ie, what made WFP’s role and response to the ra crisis specia

he confict itsef was specia because it was initiay a confict between two states, both ebers of the nited ations t was no doubt one of the ost iportant conficts since ord ar , and it gae the nited ations an iportant roe in accordance with the nited ations harter ost other conficts had been cii wars or iberation wars in the contet of decooniation, often with superpower countries supporting different sides of the confict

had a uniue roe in ra first as a proider of eergency assistance in the eary s, foowed by the Oi for ood rograe, and ater as a proider of a basic foods to the whoe popuation for a twoyear period foowing the second uf ar ocusing on the period , ra woud hae faced a serious food crisis in id if had not proided assistance he prospect of a huanitarian crisis was often used in the edia to raise awareness about how serious it woud hae been if food suppy to ra were interrupted. In late 2003, we were sometimes criticized for having “cried wolf” and the crisis did not ateriaie oweer, our critics did not understand that the wor of was a ery successfu preentie operation without which there woud hae been a argescae huanitarian crisis in ra

Our successes cae fro the fact that, when panning for the operation, we carefuy anayed a aaiabe afteraction reports fro preious operations he one fro the osoo crisis was by far the best and was used etensiey in our panning e had, unie in the osoo crisis, the benefit of haing tie to anaye, thin and pan hat ade a big difference he panning was based on the assuption that we had to secure food suppy for the whoe popuation, which proed to be correct

A aspects of the operation were conseuenty anayed and soutions appied systeaticay e estabished an oera operationa pan with defined suppy corridors based on the findings of the ogistics country assessent, port 79 79 capacities in the region, as well as securing the final distriution of food to the population. We instituted an integrated operational planning, including donor forecasts, resource programming, il for Food Programme food, procurement, shipping and overland transport. his was the first eample of integrated suppl chain management at WFP and it was critical to the timel deliver of food to all parts of Ira.

here was a close coordination etween ogistics, ecurit and Information echnolog to minimize the riss of operating in an insecuredangerous environment. uman esources, dministrative and Financial ervices were also calirated to deal with the size of the operation. preaudit was conducted in prila 2003 to ensure that the setup complied with rules and regulations. ffices were setup in uwait, ordan, ria, eanon, ure, prus and Iran in time. upport from the WFP Fast Information echnolog and elecommunications mergenc and upport eam FI in uai was also ver important as it made communication possile for staff in all offices.

Initiall, WFP did not have the staff reuired. he staffing strateg was therefore ased on having a mi of eperienced WFP staff in senior positions together with consultants and stand partners. ustinime training programme was developed for all nonWFP staff, including information on their role, structure of the operation, and securit issues.

he support from headuarters, spearheaded eanacues raisse and the egional ureau headed haled dl, was critical to achieving the operational goals, coordinating WFP gloall as well as dealing successfull with the political and humanitarian aspects of the Ira crisis at the nited ations in ew or. he WFP response was, thans to these efforts, a trul corporate one.

he aove can e summarized as comprehensive analsis, rigorous planning, and forceful implementation. ome of the Ira lessons were applied to the review of the emergenc response capacit in 200200, when the concept of evel 3 emergencies was introduced together with standard procedures for activating a corporate emergenc. Integrated uppl hain anagement was also mainstreamed ears later.

Finall, the oming of the anal otel in ugust 2003 changed perceptions aout securit issues and usiness continuit forever at WFP and the rest of the nited ations. ll these aspects made the Ira crisis uniue and hopefull a source of inspiration for current and future WFP staff.

80 80

eanacues raisse left during his visit to Ira

uring m une 2003 mission to Ira, oren ue and amiro opes a ilva suggested that a visit to ril and osul would e most useful ecause man other visitors from headuarters had focused on aghdad and asra.

ur local office manager in osul gave me a comprehensive tour of the office, depots, mills, etc., and arranged a visit to the office of eneral avid Petraeus of the 0st irorne ivision who was in charge of the osul region. I was intrigued and impressed with the detailed PowerPoint presentation he gave us in front of his senior officers, eplaining his counterinsurgenc methods, pulic wors and reconstruction proects. e was full of praise for World Food Programme WFP operations in his region and offered his full support to guarantee our safet.

ater that evening I had the pleasure of attending a nice dinner on the river with eneral Petraeus and a few of his aides together with our small team. I was sitting net to him on a long tale facing the river. I rememered the advice I had received a few das earlier at a securit riefing on m arrival at the anal otel in aghdad where I was told to mae sure never to e in the wrong place at the wrong time. he eautiful restaurant was on the outsirts of osul, facing the river, with high vegetation on all sides. hen it crossed m mind that, if anod had organized an amush to ill the eneral and his people, I would have een precisel in the wrong place at the wrong time. e arrived in two 81 81 umvees with five or si officers carring handguns. o heav securit was visile.

visit to ril gave me the opportunit to meet with our ecellent staff and see the impressive WFP operations, and also to have cordial meetings with urdish authorities. I had an appointment at the ommand post, which was located in a large deserted tourist hotel on the outsirts of town. ecurit looed ver relaed, with a few Peshmergas apparentl in control. retired wo tar eneral received me and m small team for reafast. e wore civilian clothes – sports shirt and eans – avoiding an of the strict militar impressions of osul. he room had ver large windows, with a eautiful view of the surrounding mountains. he eneral, with his hands on m shoulder, told me of an incredile sight on a right morning when he looed out of the window and saw, for the first time, an endless convo of large trucs, fling WFP flags, winding down the road to the valle. e told me he had worried, da after da, aout how the would meet its oligations to feed the entire population. he da he saw our trucks arriving from Turkey was the day he could finally say, “ We have won the war.”

82 82

ane earce front center, Toren ue right and others in aghdad

started working on the ra war oeration well efore the invasion. started in as a ecial ssistant to haled dly, the egional irector, during the lanning hase of the oeration. any of us had een art of the team that was deloyed to akistan in the wake of the etemer , terrorist attacks in the , so we knew each other and worked well together. The understanding was that once the operation “really began” I would move to the office of the Iraq ountry irector as egional eorts fficer.

A couple of days after the “Shock and Awe,” the small Rome team joined the ountry ffice staff who had een evacuated from aghdad to yrus to set in motion everything we had een lanning. Two hotels were rented and converted into offices for the ra resonse. The offices faced the lue editerranean sea. A lasting image that remains with me is that of being in full “emergency mode,” with long days, full of adrenalin, and a sense that it was all going to egin very soon, and then looking out the window and seeing holiday makers calmly sunathing on the each.

What awaited us in ra was unknown, and so in order to e reared for any eventuality, those of us who were expected to deploy to Iraq were “NBCtrained” 83 83 by the Swedish Rescue Services hey taught us how to quickly don clothing and masks that would protect us from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons Fortunately, we didn’t need this equipment, but my navy backpack with its gas mask and boiler suit still sit in my attic—a reminder of how unsettled that period really was

he reporting system we had devised during the planning phase, using lessons from the Afghan response, was quickly put in place ach day the Reports team attended meetings, listened to plans being made, talked to key staff members, read reports coming from Iraq and neighbouring countries, and synthesied them into daily reports to keep our colleagues in Rome, the Regional Bureau and neighbouring countries informed A shorter version was sent to the donor community and other partners

he amount of information and activity during this period was overwhelming, and it seemed the world was fixated on the situation in Iraq Nongovernmental rganiations N and hink anks were doing studies, S forces were releasing information and the media was rife with speculations on what would happen next, what the state of the population was, which Iraqi exile would return as part of the transition team, how long the war would last, etc

herefore, in order to get all of this information into a digestible format for our busy bosses, we pioneered a second daily report that we called the ain aily evelopments his synthesied everything happening outside orld ood rogramme operations that was relevant or of interest to us, from political developments to information coming from other agencies and Ns, and discussions at the nited Nations Security Council It started off just as an internal report for arnaca staff, but soon enough we started receiving requests from others who wanted to be added to the mailing list ventually, we attached the to the daily operational report on activities used for teleconferences with Rome It was a lot of work, and as it often happens, the reporting staff were often the first to arrive at the office in the morning and the last to leave at night

84 84 ”M.” –

“The horror…The horror…” From the movie oe o

Peter Casier (right) on “TV Hill” in Kabul

ll our orld Food rogramme F ubai sta are standing in the reception o our office in silence. We put up the plaque our headquarters gave us: “WFP F team – ubai ward or erit For their outstanding global achievement and particularly or the critical support o the humanitarian effort in Iraq.” Each of us is deep in thought. It seems weird how in a split second zillions of thoughts and images can flash through one’s mind.

Robert Kasca was a bit angry with me that week. He rightfully said, “this plaque is something to be proud o, how come we still have not put it up e received the plaque several months ago.” I did not really have an answer or him n my deence, though, there was a spelling mistake on the plaque, so they had to re do it hen we had a problem inding a suitable spot, etc maor issue was that it brought back a lot o painul memories or me did not want to remember that period. I didn’t want to remember the pain. But that is not the right way. obert was right the team had done well he team he had coordinated did well 85 85 in the Iraq Emergency peration and the people involved had to be remembered for their ecellent work. We also had to remember how we stuck together as a team despite the pressure and challenges.

e re ro o he e h o er e er mind’s eye. I hear her laugh. Did she feel pain? Fear? Regrets? Or did it all go in h e h

If you live through a number of humanitarian emergencies, work long enough in relief operations, you start to develop a sith sense. It was this sith sense that helped us decide to move our intervention team from Kosovo to Islamabad a few years ago. We sensed that at any moment the might retaliate against the Taliban. ur speculation was that basing our team in the middle of Central sia would allow us to prepare the region for a possible humanitarian emergency if the were to take military action in fghanistan.

I told Tine just before I left home, “I do not have a good feeling. The stars are not right. Something is up.” That feeling was in sharp contrast to the one month holiday we had ust had off the beaten track in Hawaii. But the sith sense was there, with huge warning signs.

We were working in our office in Islamabad when alal, one of our staff, said “Hey, a plane just flew into the New York World Trade Center!” And a few minutes later, we heard a second plane had crashed into the Towers. We stopped all work. I knew it was not an accident. This was an act of terrorism. In a flash, I saw what would happen. The world was going to fundamentally change. I foresaw the attacking fghanistan. I foresaw the polarization of the world into uslim and nonuslim. I also foresaw the invasion of Iraq. I ust knew we were entering a very rough period, with a lot of human suffering to go with it. I felt very sad. When I returned to my guesthouse, very late that night (), I could not stop looking at the video replay on TV, showing what happened in ew ork. It was so violent so many people were lost at one go. But above all, I felt it was all coming our way. “Within here and a few weeks, the world’s attention is going to be focused on our region,” I thought.

It took less than a week for us to start seeing international camera crews, with their equipment loaded onto rental cars, arriving at hotels in Islamabad. They began to set up shop on the roofs of hotels. Wellknown anchors from renowned broadcast stations started reporting from Islamabad. The media is often one step ahead of the military.

everal months later, the Taliban was defeated, Bin aden was on the run, and Afghanistan was “liberated.” I knew Iraq was going to be next. No matter what

86 86 the world’s opinions were on the subject, I felt the US was going to attack Iraq too.

ichard Egwangu and I spent a nice evening in one of the openair restaurants in aghdad. Even though it was close to midnight and pretty cold outside, there were plenty of people still walking around. I loved the people there and the feeling the setting gave me. They were friendly, helpful, hospitable, and many of them were well educated. s we were walking the streets that night, people smiled at us, often saying, “Hey, Habibi, how are you? Where do you come from? What do you do?” When we talked to them, the subject of children and family always came up. o matter where people come from, love for their close ones always seems to be the main thing on their minds. We felt safe, almost at home, without the slightest sense of fear or insecurity. We were among good people.

The first United ations Weapons Inspectors had arrived earlier that day. We saw them dragging boes carrying their equipment into the anal Hotel, the United ations Headquarters in aghdad. Somehow I felt it was all going to be in vain. The US had already made up its mind: “Saddam had to go.” Even if the Weapons Inspectors did not find any Weapons of ass estruction W. However, I could see all the human misery a US invasion of Iraq would cause, and the anarchy and violence that would follow. I imagined those peaceful streets of aghdad in flames.

M s I closed the door to my apartment, on my way to work, I stopped for a moment. Something was not right. Something was different that morning. I could hear my neighbours’ TVs. There were different languages and the reporters sounded agitated. y heart started to beat really fast. I went back into my apartment, switched on the TV, and sat down. There were images of helicopters, tanks, and military convoys crossing the border from uwait to Iraq. I picked up the phone and called Gianluca runi at our ome Headquarters. It was still early in Europe, so he was asleep when I called. I said “Gianluca, switch on your TV. It has begun. The invasion has begun.”

I met . in yprus several times. She was working for another United ations agency. y coincidence, we had the same travel itinerary, so we spent several days on the road together—flying from yprus to ordan, then driving to Erbil in orth Iraq, and flying to aghdad a few days later. We talked a lot about work, people we had met, our hobbies, adventure travelling, what appealed to us in the world, and in people. The last time I saw her was one evening in the anal Hotel, aghdad. or security reasons, the movement of our staff in town was restricted, and we all lived in the large office compound. couple of guys had put together a barbeque in the parking lot, which by then was filled with

87 87 sleeping and storage tents. s I was walking back to my room, . was walking toward the barbeque area. She had a strange look in her eyes. She hesitated for a moment as we were passing each other. I stood still for a moment, wondering what her look was about. I told her I was leaving for ubai the net day. I cannot remember if she said anything, as we echanged three kisses on the cheeks. aybe we said a pleasantry like “See you whenever I see you again.”

few weeks later, I received a message from her. Some stuff about work. She had decided the Iraq mission was going to be her last. She wanted to quit in September and do something different. She had had enough of that type of work. It was a good road, but that road had come to an end.

I had a long chat with obert, our roject oordinator in aghdad. He ran the large W ast Information Technology and Telecommunications Emergency and Support Team ITTEST, installing the technical infrastructure for most of the United ations relief agencies. ost of the conversation was about his main worry: security. He felt something was going to happen. The “tension in the air” was just too much. He felt some of our staff or some of our offices were going to be attacked. “Something bad is about to happen,” he said. I shared his feeling. I did not sleep much that night. I had a lot of “my” staff in Iraq and I felt responsible for them.

ITTEST at work in Iraq, Whotolibrary

This was one of the saddest days of my life. ats ersson called to inform me, “our headquarters in aghdad was bombed a few minutes ago. truck full of 88 88 eplosives flattened most of the building.” Mats and I spoke with Robert in a conference call later that day. It was bad. obert said most of our staff members were accounted for, but several of them were badly inured by debris, shrapnel or glass. A window frame hit Ghis Penny’s head. Michael Dirksen’s face was badly cut by glass. iya l sadi was evacuated with severe cuts in his arm and hands. oens of people had died. The pictures on T looked horrific. I was shocked, and I felt an endless guilt. These were people I had recruited. I had sent them in harm’s way. I felt guilty because no matter how good the security precautions we had taken, no matter how many times we had stressed that they be careful, they got hurt. It cut deep inside me. I also felt guilty because I was not there to help. I should have been there with them.

ITTST was able to restore communication within hours after the bombing

s more details of the bombing arrived, a provisional list was circulated—names of those not accounted for and those confirmed dead. I could not believe my eyes when I saw M.’s name on the list. M. was no more.

These thoughts and images fly no, they scream through my head as we stand in front of our plaque. It takes a few seconds for it to come through. ll of the hurt, the immense sadness and senselessness, the guilt of not having done enough, the guilt of not having said things that should have been said. So often

89 89 we forget that when we say “goodbye,” it might really mean “goodbye.” We might never see that person again in this life. I see M.’s face in front of me as we taled for a brief moment in time, passing each other in the anal otel that evening of the barbee.

I shold have taen the time to sit and tal with her. I shold have nown that might have been the last time ever that we had the chance to tal. I did not. I was tired and wanted to go to sleep, becase I had an early start the net day.

In eter asier headed FI and the F upport Offie in Duai hih eame one of the main prourement and supply ases during the Ira risis. During FI as mandated to prepare the tehnial infrastruture in Ira and all neighouring ountries. During the ar FI had already gone into Ira together ith OORD the nited ations eurity Department to prepare the teleoms eletriity and I infrastruture for all nited ations offies efore the rest of the nited ations staff as alloed in. ith a large team of oer staff in Ira FI oordinated the interageny seurity ommuniations and ommon Ieletriity infrastruture proiding series to nited ations agenies and Os. fter the anal otel as omed on ugust OORD and ore FI staff remained onsite hile all other staff ere eauated from the ompound.

90 90

W food for school children in Ira, Waniel epper

International food monitors visited all Irai dministrative istricts on a weely basis, and were responsible for verifying the monitoring of food commodities prchased nder the nited ations ood for il rogramme.

aily monitoring of food spplies, evalated by antity and ality at the hosehold level, was carried ot by a national team of World ood rogramme W food monitors.

he obectives of food monitoring were

. o collect and analye data on food imports nder the il for ood rogramme, related to specific food items oil, mil, flor, chicpeas, lentils, soap, washing powder, infant mil, rice, etc..

. o verify that the agreed antity and ality of food items reached each member of a family—endsers defined as an Irai hosehold.

. o sample and analye irreglarities in the food distribtion system to the nited ations ecrity oncil on a weely basis.

he entire setp consisted of an agreed set of estions that the monitors cold as the head of a hosehold. In order to ensre that International ood Monitors only ased agreed estions, each International ood Monitor was accompanied 91 91

around “blindfolded.”

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Red Cross reported incidents of

92 92

Carlos eloso Farco Frattini

I first isited the Raila eaduarters in ahdad in earl arch . It is a ritish colonial buildin that as ell ept ith sins here and there indicatin onoin aintenance. I ent ith Ibrahi an enineer ho had ored on railas in the past and had been inoled in the construction of railroads ith forein copanies. he first eetin ith the perations irector of the national railways and other officials was for a common “study” and to define the modus operandi for the future. he irector of rocureent nar as appointed as focal point. e as a echanical enineer—a raduate of (est) eran ith a sense of huour.

I had authorit to isit an raila installation in ahdad ithout bein escorted b anbod fro the Railas. s a atter of respect and courtes I ased Ibrahi to infor the authorities of our plans at least four das in adance. hen our isit as outside ahdad I alas ased to be accopanied b soebod fro the Raila eaduarters. ost of the ties it as nar ho ent ith us.

on hours in the car alloed us to et to no each other better—talin about failies the ar ith Iran football his eperience of studin in eran and sharin an oes. It as interestin for e to learn that ost of his Irai oes ere in certain cases er siilar to ortuuese ones.

93 93 e deeloed confidence and trust in each other to a oint that my rai counterart was asin me for technical adice on railway issues ne day we were oserin an euiment that had arried some months earlier and was used in rehailitatin the railway lines when he ased for my oinion on the euiment told him that the euiment was too eensie for a secondhand “You could have gotten a new and good brand for that price.” he surrise on his face was evident. “But this equipment is brand new,” he replied. I smiled and ased him to watch some asects of it closely esecially areas under the latform e was surrised not ecause of the rice ut ecause it was indeed a reconditioned euiment

n mid went with nwar and rahim to osere some ery sohisticated euiment at a uarry roducin allast for the railways t was the first time that a nited ations serer isited that location on the yrian order—one of the unofficial order crossins he euiment was to uality and new ut the wor oraniation was a mess fter an hour on location nwar ased what thouht ased him to come with me to the to of a meter hih ile of allast e could see the whole uarry from u there offered him some suestions elainin the reasons and imact it would hae on outut nwar looked at me and said, “why have we not thought about it before?” I smiled, and he immediately started to ie instructions ased on my oserations

ur o was difficult ut one of the thins reconfirmed was that ein resectful and trustful can mae the hardest wor easier

94 94

arlos eloso right and ommission resident, os Barroso, imon rittle

It was the second half of anuary when orben told me to go to mman for a meeting on logistics planning, following a meeting in an gyptian ed ea resort in ovember . hen I arrived at the hotel in mman, I saw mer aoudi who pulled me aside after checkin and told me, “I just had a call from orben ue and amiro opes da ilva. Your son has been admitted to hospital. Barbara is driving tonight from Bagdad.” My son had had leukemia for the last three years and this information meant he had a relapse. I walked to my room listening, faraway in my mind, to the last words of mer, inviting me (admonishing, not “ordering”) to go out for a drink. At this time I had met Amer only once, during the ed ea retreat, and we drove for two hours only the two of us from Cairo to the Red Sea resort without talking too much, not to say “at all.”

he following day, Barbara took care of the flights while I participated in the meeting all day. he group was composed, as far as I remember, of mer and myself, acques ollignon egional ogistics fficer, ohn atsaros ogistics fficer for Iraq, Brain ray ogistics fficer for urdistan, and eter cott 95 95 Bowden from headuarters. he brainstorming was mainly to have all of us in line with the concet, determine the challenges, and be ready to start at any moment. It was also decided that a headuarters team would start to make reliminary contacts in all neighbouring countries to determine orts and road transort caacity, and establish contracts. hat day I received a call from Adrian an der na, who worked at the time with avid aatrud at the nited ations oint ogistics Coordination (C), informing me that I would be aointed as ead of C when the Ira oeration started. I thanked Adrian for the consideration and informed him that they should first inform orben and have his consent. I immediately informed Amer about the offer. At the end of the meeting, and before going to the airort, Amer told me that he wanted me to be his deuty of oerations and orben was in agreement with that. I thanked Amer and told him that I would do what the organiation thought was better, and of course, with the consent of my Country irector.

I left Baghdad in March, some two to three days before the comlete withdrawal of nited ations staff. I saw Amer and aura urner when checkingin at my hotel in Amman. wo days later we were all in Cyrus, meeting in a hotel by the sea in arnaca that was transformed into offices. very day new eole arrived from all over the world. The third floor was “declared” Operations Floor and Amer took the only room with a sea view. ohn Aylieff and Matthew ollingsworth were on the other side of the corridor dealing with all secialied staff (demining) and suort euiment that would be needed. aura urner and alid Ibrahim were writing the sitres and later collecting all disatches from different corridors. ohn atsaros and I dealt with readiness inside the country and arrangements in all corridors. et to our room were idier risch and aniel Stolke who dealt with shiing. In other rooms were Iane Suvanto with the ieline team, and Michelle Barrett, eanierre de Margerie and raveen Agrawal dealt with resources and budget revisions. Calum ardner later joined this group. At the end of the corridor were Bekin and Salamawitt “cracking” andside ransort Shiing and andling numbers.

reena uang was in Rome leading a team to renegotiate all the food contracts under the il for ood rogramme that were aroved andor in transit. he main corridors already had the basic staff to start oerations. very morning there was a meeting in Amer’s office, sometimes cramped with as many as 20 eole. It was during those meetings that we learned about the theraeutic roerties of chilli eer when administered through unconventional means, the vast abilities of Amer’s mother, especially driving trucks, and how smart his daughter was.

he concet of the oeration was straightforward suly all the mills and warehouses of the ublic istribution System (S) in the governorate caitals. he Ministry of rade under the ransitional overnment was resonsible for what haened between these laces and shos. he lan was designed with redundancies to allow for fleibility. he South Corridor included the uwait, 96 96 mm asr in ra and ranian ports. The entral orridor included Aaba in ordan, Tartus and atakia in Syria, and eventually the ebanese and ranian ports. The orth orridor included the Turkish and Syrian ports.

At the beginning there was an almost daily meeting between idier, Treena and me to decide where to send the ships that were already on their way and also start making plans about where to send ships arriving in four to eight weeks. There were many disagreements on various options. n those cases the decision was often scaled up to Amer. Based on F eperience of ports in the region, there was a fair idea of their capacities in the beginning. e also had some ideas about road transport capacities, but those were not very consistent. There was a good knowledge of administrative procedures and forwarding agents for some countries. The biggest unknown was the aftereffect of the invasion in terms of banditry, destruction, and capacity at receiving end.

The first shipment arrived in Aaba at the beginning of April. ommunication with Ayad annan ogistic Officer and the most senior national officer in Baghdad, was at first impossible and thereafter irregular. e decided to send the first trucks from Aaba to an agreed mill in Baghdad. The operation started slowly and we immediately started to see where challenges could arise. The most reliable entry point in the South orridor, considering the security situation, was mm asr. The ranian option was very bureaucratic—every step had to be authoried by a higher authority in Teheran. Aaba, Syria and Turkey were responding to those needs. uahannad in Syria and avid Schaad in Turkey informed us that they could do more than what was planned for their corridors. had daily conversations with the head of each corridor. e had a “positive” challenge with Turkey because we could only call via satellite phone there is no phone connection between yprus and Turkey. used to climb to the terrace of the hoteloffice from where could see the sea. t was my daily relaation. e were working almost 2 hours a day, seven days a week.

By end of April Torben told me that after his reentry should go immediately to Baghdad to manage the ra side of the operation. n ay F started receiving staff to fill positions in nine established suboffices. knew most of the Operations colleagues from other operations and had heard of the others did not know. onditions were hard, but we were a strong team. There was a pushpull where ports started to increase delivery, which obliged the receiving end to increase their capacity, sometimes employing unconventional solutions. The political obective was to deliver . million mt to ra between April and September 200.

There was a conference call between Baghdad with the team in arnaca three times a week to plan the weeks ahead, analye the performance of different corridors, and adust when necessary.

97 97 n pril around t were dispatched by all corridors n ay that volue was around t and they received the highest one o t in une

There was a conerence call with the arnaca tea and eads o orridors in early une when brieed everyone about reception conditions inside the country and the lack o capacity eperienced at soe ills and warehouses due to sabotages or local tribes ighting or power asked the to slow down a little at least or a week in order to give tie to clear a backlog o trucks and keep low at a lower rate There was a brie silence ollowed by a typical er shout: “nobody slows down; increase the delivery. If you guys are not able to handle it will send y other with a bunch o chilli peppers.”

n uly we started to eperience soe probles in the aba corridor due to the underperorance o a transporter t was necessary to iediately use the additional road capacity on oer ro yria and Turkey at very copetitive prices round t were dispatched to ra which eant that in our onths o the target was reached The reaining t took up to eceber to be copletely delivered due to the deterioration o security in ra and the incapacity o soe o the suppliers o anuactured products soap vegetable oil and ilk to deliver under the conditions o our contracts

The ra oice oved to an in epteber and the arnaca oice was discontinued t was necessary to reduce the anpower in dierent corridors close the books but keep a response capacity in case new support was reuested by the Transitional overnent

n epteber started a tour to the reaining corridors in operation ordan where was based yria and Turkey to discuss the way ahead

n ctober st I was at Dragica Pajevic’s apartent in nkara or a dinner with colleagues who had worked or the ra operation in Turkey e were about to start eating when y phone rang t was arbara calling ro an to inor e that y son died that day

Thanks to the support o the Turkey ice landed in isbon the ollowing day at in the orning eeting arbara at chiphol irport ust in tie to attend the creation

98 98

Delivering food to hungry eole around the world is already a colicated undertaing but as we have learned fro the stories in this volue cross border oerations resent even greater difficulties and riss both for beneficiaries and the huanitarian worers involved. any of the contributors in this volue had to serve as orld ood Prograe P eloyees cu diloats in order to reach vulnerable eole across eney lines needing to use both their rofessional and ersonal relationshis to succeed in reaching the hungry.

P staff fought hunger in dangerous laces such as osniaeregovina where artin hlsen and harles incent eloyed silful actions to deliver food to various ethnic territories and enclaves or ngola where Douglas asson outts and others used both their rofessional and ersonal relationshis to garner suort fro aibia in order to serve their revious adversary ngola navigating through dangerous guerrilla territories at the tie. eanacues raisse recalls a siilar situation using lanes to airdro food for vulnerable eole in the south of udan. oeties huanitarian worers are caught in the iddle of an uneected conflict such as when delina antos ania yrvang and her faily arrived at the airort in eijing hina years ago as the iananen uare rotest was unfolding.

– ertain oerations reuire the creation of new institutions to facilitate innovative aroaches to new situations for efficiency or sily to circuvent hurdles. David orton offers an insight into the creation of the nited ations order elief eration to serve abodians along a ile frontier with hailand. ne of the greatest achieveents of was the establishent of a central fund for all s and agencies involved in the oeration leading to an effective anageent of the oeration. P anaged until the end of when it was handed over to the nited ations Develoent Prograe DP which handed it over to the nited ations igh oissioner for efugees before the reatriation of the dislaced her eole. Ingra believed it was tie for P to relinuish what he considered a noinal leadrole and ass decisionaing to the nited ations ecial eresentative.

– Political situations soeties reuire woring with disagreeable governents in order to serve hungry eole. nited ations agencies are often caught in situations that reuire woring with regies not recognied by the nited ations in order to rovide assistance to

99 99 People’s Republic of Kampuchea, when the United Nations and a majority of

– ress in Peter Casier’s emotional piece about “M.” who died in ’ –

M –

M –

100 100 usin reenue from the sale of rai oil to proide food for ulnerable people. hen the U inaded ra in , creatin a new humanitarian situation, United Nations Resolution authoried the United Nations to tae oer contracts of the ra il for ood Proramme in order to feed hunry rais, reducin dependence on conentional donor fundin. he multiplicity of lobal emerencies and disasters has made it difficult to attract humanitarian fundin. he il for ood Proramme was one way of usin rai resources to sere its ulnerable people.

inally, what all these contributions sum up to are the resilience of those inoled and the need for more protection for humanitarian worers enaed in operations around the world. houh it is fair to state that security mechanisms hae improed in oraniations such as P subseuent to many of these eperiences, international humanitarian laws concernin protection for humanitarian relief personnel and objects must be upheld and enforced in order to create deterrence and sae aid worers. Parties in conflicts must be encouraed to respect international humanitarian principles and norms protectin humanitarian personnel and emblems. Moreoer, many scenarios in this olume indicate that humanitarian oraniations must also inest in more security for personnel serin in iolent conflict reions.

incerely,

oseph Kaifala

101 101

oseph Kaifala, ditor

r. uresh harma, Chair nela an Rynbach, Member

102

retchen loom, Member Pey Nelson, Member

102

103 103 Printed by Typography STAMPA 3 S.N.C.

finished printing June 2019

Via del Colle della Strega, 49/51 00143 Rome Italy

104 103 Rome, June 01 2019 Volume 3 World Food Programme Cross-Border Operations

World Food Programme Cross-Border Operations Personal Experiences of Alumni

The World Food Programme Alumni Network Published by: The World Food Programme Alumni Network https://wpfalumni.wfp.org Joseph Kaifala, Editor