From the Editor's Desk *****

15 May 2013 | Vol. 4, № 16. From the Editor’s Desk Dear FDI supporters, Welcome to the Strategic Weekly to counter the threat from over the Analysis. This week’s issue starts in border. Bangledesh with an analysis of the recent unrest, where clashes between Islamist Finally, we look at Africa, where hardliners and security forces have continuing ethnic tension in Kenya raises increased with the war crimes tribunal questions over the recent March election, handing down further verdicts. and whether President Kenyatta may be institutionalising ethnic violence. Next, FDI Senior Visiting Fellow Dr Sandy Escalating social tensions in Uganda Gordon provides us with a timely look at continue to threaten the countries oil the prospects for Pakistan under the industry; and in Djibouti a pro-Western incoming government of Nawaz Sharif. outlook has been bolstered by recent significant investment from the United We then move to an examination of the Kingdom towards social and economic evolving relationship between China and reform. Nepal, and the consequences for the subcontinent’s stability in light of the I trust that you will enjoy this edition of recent border stand-off in Ladakh. India the Strategic Weekly Analysis. faces a similar problem with its Chinese relationship, with the on-going border Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) disputes continuing simmer in the Institute Director and CEO background we examine the possibility of Future Directions International India forming or joining a security alliance ***** Bloodshed in Bangladesh as Islamist Hardliners Clash with Security Forces With the war crimes tribunal handing down further verdicts and hardliners proposing controversial Islamic laws, further unrest and violence is likely in Bangladesh. Background Violence erupted in Bangladesh last week as Islamist hardliners clashed with security forces, killing at least 37 people. The clash on 6 May was the latest act in the violence that has been ongoing since late February, when a leader of Bangladesh’s biggest Islamic party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, was sentenced to death for his actions in the 1971 war of independence from Pakistan. Now, however, many hardliners are demanding a controversial anti-blasphemy law, calling into question Bangladesh’s secular political tradition and raising fears of further violence. Comment The clash on 6 May followed days of unrest in which tens of thousands of demonstrators staged marches in Dhaka, the country’s capital. The demonstrations involved both members of Jamaat and Hefazat-e-Islam, a radical Islamic group, who had been protesting the death penalty given to Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, the deputy President of Jamaat. In all, almost 40 people were killed across Bangladesh, in the bloodiest day of conflict since Sayeedi’s verdict was read out on 28 February. So far this year, over 150 people have died in clashes between hard-line extremists and the police. The ruling Awami League, perhaps worried about further backlashes, tried to justify its heavy-handed response. The information minister, Hasanul Haq Inu, claimed that Hefezat had come to Dhaka to topple the government. Further violence has been averted, thanks largely to a curfew banning public protests in Dhaka. But new clashes are expected as the war-crimes tribunal continues to prosecute Islamist hardliners over their roles in the liberation war of 1971. Almost all those being prosecuted are leaders of Jamaat, who claim that the charges are politically motivated. On 9 May, Muhammad Kammaruzzaman, the senior assistant secretary general of Jamaat, was sentenced to death for his part in the war of independence. Only three days later, A.K.M. Yusef, the leader of Jamaat, was arrested in Dhaka for similar offences. In response, Jamaat called for another protest on 14 May; Bangladesh is now bracing for more fighting between protestors and security forces and the resultant bloodshed. Meanwhile, the recent clashes have thrown the Hefezat group into the spotlight. Previously unknown to many, the newly formed Islamic group is loosely linked to Jamaat, the standard- bearer for Saudi Arabia’s strand of Islam in Bangladesh, though seemingly it has no political aspirations. It draws support from private madrassas in Chittagong, in the country’s south. As well as being involved in the recent clashes, the group has issued a series of demands, which have called into question Bangladesh’s secular political tradition. In April, the group Page 2 of 14 listed 13 demands in total, including an anti-blasphemy law that would include a provision for the death penalty. It has also called for other Taliban-style laws, including: the cancellation of Bangladesh’s pro-women development policy; a ban on the mixing of men and women in public; and mandatory dress codes. Such demands go against Bangladesh’s secular tradition and against the moderate version of Islam practiced by the majority of Bangladeshis. Indeed, secularism is even enshrined in Bangladesh’s constitution. The group, therefore, has been dismissed by the Awami League, but it is gaining traction. Worryingly, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the country’s main political opposition, has backed Hefezat’s demonstrations and has threatened to boycott general elections scheduled for January 2014. Despite moderation being preferred by most Bangladeshis, religion still plays a large part in the country’s politics. Even the Awami League, a supposedly secular group, talks up its religious credentials before elections and the relationship between the judiciary and Islamic law is often blurred. The Awami League still lets some religious leaders issue fatwas that supersede judicial law. At the same time, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that 82 per cent of Bangladeshi Muslims were in favour of making Islamic law official. Muslims constitute almost 90 per cent of the country’s 160 million people. With an election scheduled for January 2014, it appears the government will have to make some concessions to the Islamic right, whose support it needs to win elections. In the meantime, as the war-crimes tribunal prepares to release more verdicts and with groups such as Hefezat gaining prominence, further violence and unrest can be expected. For most, the election cannot come soon enough. Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected] ***** Pakistan’s New Government: A Harbinger of Hope? While Pakistan’s economy and its relations with India and the US may improve under incoming Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, it remains unclear whether he will able to exert sufficient control over the military and extremist groups. Background Pakistan has just experienced the first democratic change of government in its history. It did so despite a violent campaign by religious extremists to derail the election. This violence targeted secular-oriented parties such as the ousted Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). However, the victory is still a genuine one by Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Party Page 3 of 14 (PML-N). The 60 per cent voter turnout is excellent for Pakistan and indicates that Pakistanis defied the religious extremists. Comment Voters were clearly fed up with the PPP’s corruption and poor economic management. The country has suffered from serious electricity cuts and an anaemic economy. It is burdened by a rapid population growth rate, fuelled by poor levels of general and, especially, female literacy. Environmental problems in the heavily irrigation-dependent economy are growing. At the time of writing, Imran Khan has won about 30 seats, which roughly equals that won by the PPP. It is likely Sharif will be able to reach the necessary 137 seats to govern in his own right by attracting independent support. He may nevertheless seek a deal with Khan in order to provide additional stability. Although the electoral base of the new Sharif Government is mostly confined to Punjab, it will have the benefit of being far more stable that the wobbly coalition it replaces. Sharif, who is a billionaire in the steel industry, will be more market-oriented than Zardari. Pakistan will have a less regulated economy. Economic growth will likely pick up given a reasonable international environment. But, judging by Sharif’s previous stint in power, do not expect a marked diminution in corruption or “money politics”. Pakistan’s regional and security relationships are also challenging. Sharif campaigned on the basis of lessening the Pakistani dependence on the United States. Even though Washington is winding down the US military commitment in Afghanistan, it needs Pakistan to achieve an ordered withdrawal from Afghanistan. This is a massive logistical exercise. It would be greatly complicated should the US be forced to use the alternative route through the Central Asian republics and Russia. Washington also needs Pakistan to ensure that a post-NATO Afghanistan is not unduly destabilised from across the Pakistani border. Sharif may well temper his supposed antagonism to the US. He will likely be encouraged to do so by the Pakistani military. He has no love for the military and was ousted in 1999 by then-Chief of Staff Pervez Musharraf and sent in to exile. But he will have little choice but to work with them given their importance. Despite hiccups in the relationship between the US and the Pakistani military, such as the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, the two countries still have an important working relationship, including in the provision of aid. Sharif will no doubt give the impression of distancing Pakistan from the US, but will probably allow himself to be convinced on crucial issues like continuing supply and exit through Karachi. Even though drone attacks now originate from Afghanistan rather than Pakistan, Sharif may force the US to curb such attacks on Pakistani soil because it is an especially high-profile issue in Pakistan. If the US route through Pakistan is cut, it may be a temporary measure as a negotiation tool.

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