CHAPTER 3

THE IMPERIAL SCOURGES

Cholera, Malaria, Plague and Sanitary Housing

Water is intimately connected with diseases. Inadequacy and impure supplies can lead to diseases like cholera, while excess and stagnant water can lead to others like malaria. Further, it is also the principle weapon against insanitation. The insanitation and diseases of Bombay, apart from being a social concern, also threatened the imperial image and the commercial prospects of the city. This subject, therefore, aroused much discussion and debates from time to time. While the city was host to several diseases, only Cholera, Malaria and Plague have been taken for study as these, apart from their impact on the city's image, also help to understand 'social attitudes" and the "living conditions" of the common natives, especially in the context of the manner in which they received their water supply.

Measures adopted to combat the above mentioned diseases, included the institution of the hydraulic supply system, which assured the sanitary redemption of the city through its apparently copius and pure water supply, and a scientific system of drainage. This sanitary apparatus, it has often been contended, effectively controlled morbidity in the city. However, the other side of the coin is largely ignored; i.e. the efficiency and management of the new water technology in fighting these diseases.

Further, while Cholera was greatly impacted by the distribution and mode of delivery of water, the latter, along with Malaria and Plague, also influenced the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the new as well as the traditional water management systems of the city; an area which has been mostly overlooked. This chapter therefore examines the complex interaction between these diseases and the new water supply technology, along with the impact of this relationship on the city and its water management.

David Arnold. Cholera and Colonialism in British India. Past and Present. No. 113 (Nov. 1986). pi 18. Hereafter. Arnold Cholera.

131 WATER SUPPLY AND CHOLERA IN BOMBAY

British attempts to deal with Cholera, in the city, have been studied by scholars like David Arnold, Ira Klein and Mridula Ramanna. All of them agree that Cholera mortality declined at the beginning of the 20"^ century. Arnold has attributed this to the drop in famines and Ramanna, to the new water supply system. The following discussion therefore tries to understand the role of the new water supply system in the mitigation of this disease.

The occurrence of Cholera, at this time, was ascribed to the defective air, water, overcrowding and improper food or clothing. In fact bad conservancy and all defects of sanitation were related to the causation of this disease. No less importance was attached to local conditions such as the existence of defective physical and social environs in the form of swamps and the habits of the natives. Leith"s report "Deaths in Bombay" for example, indicted the low and humid locales of the city and demanded, "A system of drainage which will embrace even the lowest levels of the island", reclamation of marshes, improvement of the sewerage and widening of the streets, as measures of first importance in the control of diseases.^ Miasmas, or impure noxious air, arising out of insanitation were held to be equally responsible for diseases. The International Congress at Constantinople, in 1866, had reached the conclusion that the human body was the chief medium of reproduction and dissemination of the poison. It was also a belief, at this time, that warm and damp atmospheric conditions were favourable for the spread of the disease. Similarly, credence was also given to the idea that decomposition around the wells, tanks, drains and sewers aided in the reproduction and dissemination of the poison. Cholera epidemics, it was understood, were found particularly intense in areas which were devoid of trees and when Cholera camps were moved into 'topes of trees' it was found that there was a marked reduction in the disease. At the same time the dry earth system, for the disposal of night soil, and evacuation or removal, from conditions of overcrowding, and the most careful supervision of water, to prevent its contamination by the Cholera poison, were perceived as remedies.'

- BTJC. op. cit. 17"^ October 1859, pi 964 John Murray. Report on the Treatment of Epidemic Cholera, From Information collected by the Governments of Bengal. Madras. Bombay, N. West Provinces.

132 Claims vs. Reality

With the onset of Vihar water, in 1860. an exultant Government claimed, that Bombay had embarked on modern times. The new technology, they assumed, had made the city of Bombay highly advanced as far as water supply was concerned and that people were certainly enjoying an inestimable blessing. Russel Aitkin further asserted that both sanitary and monetary benefits had accrued from the new supply system. He strongly believed that "the health of the community has been much benefitted by the introduction of the Vihar water". Bombay, the Government chorused, had become free of cholera, except in its densely packed parts, such as Chowpatty where only well water was available. Fever, another cause of mortality, had disappeared and guinea worm was on the verge of disappearing. Elephantiasis had become rare. Thus, without the Vihar water "the present population could not be maintained on the island, nor could the city as at present constituted exist."^

Seven years later, Crawford declared that cholera had been stamped out of the city.' The Sanitary Blue Book for 1869-70 even maintained that, the death rates per 1000 in India, as a result of such sanitary improvements were the lowest in Bombay at 19.2 while those in London were 23.3. It was contended, that in four years (1864-8), the death rate in Bombay had fallen from 31.3 to 19.2. The Blue Book further stated that "in three years the masses have begun to learn that such scourges as Cholera, fever and the like can be prevented by the ordinary processes of sanitation."^ An elated Nightingale, therefore, congratulated Bartle Frere. the Governor of Bombay, for being instrumental in making Bombay city on par with London, the healthiest city in Europe. According to Nightingale, the death rate in Bombay was lower than

Punjab. Oudh and Central India. Office of Superintendant Press. Calcutta. 1869. pp 3-6 ^ PWD General 1868-1889. Vol. 423. Letter no. 1873 of 1868 from Russel Aitkin. Executive Engineer, to Arthur Crawford, Municipal Commissioner for the city of Bombay, 15"'July 1868, pp 7-8 ' Mariam Dossal. EPW. September 3. 2005, A Master Plan For The City Looking At The Past, p 3899. Hereafter, Dossal EPW. Sir Edward Cook. The Life Of Florence Nightingale In Two Volumes. Vol. 11 Macmillan And Co.. Limited. London 1913. p 174

133 that in London. "If we do not take care, Bombay will outstrip us in the sanitary race. People will be ordered for the benefit of their heath to Bombay,"• • 7 she stated.

These claims, however, need to be reviewed and understood in the background of the supply and distribution system adopted for the masses in the city. Though blessed with a modern water supply system, the poorer class of people, as seen in the previous chapter, were to be provided with water, only via public sources like fountains, dipping wells and standpipes. G.7: Wells Supplied And Not Supplied By Vihar Water in 1869. BDWS, p 428 Even here there was • supplied with lack of consensus x^ Vihar water among the e 4000 1 • Not supplied 2000 administrators and the 1 with Vihar water medical fraternity. s 0 N S Total Crawford favoured Wards ^o" fountains while Dr. Blaney did not.^

Standpipes sent out from England, as per the earlier plan, and fixed at different stations in the street, apart from being defective, proved to be insufficient for public supply of water. Therefore, the Municipality was driven by the convenient logic that dipping wells, from which a number of persons at a time could till their vessels for domestic use, were much better suited to the local habits and requirements of the people. As a result, these along with private wells, continued to be the mainstay of supply for a long time.

However, most dipping wells were faced with a frequent problem of contamination due to percolation of sewage water, since they had been constructed in a faulty manner with their bottoms fixed below the surface of the surrounding grounds. This kind of contaminated water increased the spread of xymotic diseases, a danger that was not realized when the wells were built. Critical of this mode of supply, both

Philip Mason. The Men Who Ruled India. Rupa and Co. Delhi. Third Impression. 1997.pl9l ^ BDWS 1869. op. cit.. pp 62-63

134 Leith and Hewlitt. Health Officer to the Municipality, maintained that the use of dipping wells made this water a means of disseminating—not health, but disease. Leith especially mooted for their discontinuation.

On account of this faulty supply cholera was rampant in the city. Cholera affected Girgaum and Chaopatee of the Native Town more often. Here, there were only 774 connections of Vihar water and the majority of the people drank water from dipping wells, dug out of the porous calcareous sand which formed the locality. This district had extensive Oarts. covered with coconut trees, among which poorer classes lived in cadjan huts, which were densely packed and poorly drained. Most of the dirty water therefore, found its way into the nearest wells. Girgaum and Chaopatee had earned the dubious distinction of being the "Cholera gardens" of the city. G.8: Cholera Deaths In Bombay City 1860-1865. Though condemned as insanitary, L Michael, p 171 dipping wells and private wells 6000 1 j 1 continued to supply water to the natives. 1 4000 58^ In fact, new dipping wells were 2000 "deaths constructed on the proposal of Sir Bartle 0 1 ' i U ' 1—1 o i-i CM m ^ in Frere. and sometimes for native use by U? U3 ^ 1.0 VD kO 00 00 00 CX) 00 00 private subscription as well.

Not surprisingly, almost a decade later in 1868. the Health Officer remarked that the danger of cholera was ever present in the city, since the remedy, that is pure water supply and adequate drainage, was never thought of. "Of the latter there is none and of the former the supply is far too scanty." An additional disincentive to the use of Vihar water was the fear that people would have to pay for it. Nothing however was done to address the water supply issues of the natives.

'^ T. G. Hewlett. A Paper On The Sanitary State Of Bombay, Read Before The Public Medicine Section Of The British Medical Association, At Leeds, On The 30"^ July, 1869,pl2

'"MCR. op. cit. 1866. pp 11-12 " Report on Sanitary Measures adopted in India from 1869-.lune 1870. Together With Abstracts Of Sanitary Reports For 1868 Forwarded From Bengal Madras And

135 Even the assumption that the completion of the Tuisi and the Bhandarwada Reservoir, commissioned precisely to deal with the problem of cholera, the dipping wells could either be done away with or altered by placing spring taps in it, the pipes of which could be connected directly with the mains, proved wrong. The imposition of stiffer rules, after the introduction of TuIsi waters, made these wells even more indispensible and they continued to be constructed, altered or repaired. Such was their need that, villagers of the "poorest description", at Matunga who found it difficult to obtain water from the standpipe provided to them, constructed one, at their own expense, and handed it over to the Municipality. When their abolition was urged upon, in 1878. by the Army Sanitary Commission, the Municipality only repaired them. At Lower Colaba and Wadala for example, the bottoms of these wells were raised as a ,- preventive measure 70 G.9: Public Water Supplies 1877-1891. MCRs 1877&1891 a Dipping against pollution. 60 Wells The total number of 50 Drinking dipping wells, at this 40 Fountains time, stood at 53 in 30 Stand Pipes all the 6 wards.'" In 20 the late eighties they 10 u Large were abolished, on 0 Ornamental Fountains paper, and work 1877 1891 began, to substitute these, by taps and fountains: the latter once again supplied by charitable individuals. For instance, fountains were created in 1889 at Wadala. and Matunga by Mr. Anandrao Raoji. at Naigaum by Mr. HL Batliwala and a cattle trough at Kala Chowkie Road by Bai Hirabai Jamshetji Tata.'^

Yet another risk rose from intermittent supply. Between 1866 and 1875 there was a 40 % rise in the number of connections (from 6750 in 1866 to 11. 109 in 1875). The intermittent supply not only affected the quantity but also quality of water. Service

Bombay. Printed By George Eyre and William Spottiswoode. London, Abstract Annual Report of the Health Officer for 1868. p 190. Hereafter, RSMl 12 MCR. op. ciL 1878. pp 270-72 '-'MCRop. cit. 1889-90. p 209

136 pipes corroded very frequently as a result of the alternate exposure to moisture and air. Incrusted pipes obstructed the flow of water and therefore required frequent cleaning. People, however, expected the Municipality to undertake the task of

I J. cleaning the pipes since they were not inclined to do it at personal expense.

Risks increased further from the state of the subsoil water, through which the water mains passed. According to the Health Officer a large number of mains ran through the sewers and were 'bathed in ordure" day and night, which caused accidental pollution. Despite enhancement of engineering techniques; lack of tightness in the pipe joints or holes or cracks, resulted in the entry of sewage or sub soil water into the pipes.'"^ The practice of damaging hydrants too, as noted in the previous chapter, to get water, was an equal threat to public health.

Response to Cholera

Since there was no reliable explanation for diseases, the colonial prejudices about race and culture were reinforced. Measures to deal with cholera, which was considered contagious at this time, included the exclusion, isolation or destruction of the source from which the poison emanated. Therefore, in order to check the spread of infectious diseases, dangerous to life in the city of Bombay, and especially with reference to the vessels arriving at or within the limits of the Port of Bombay, Bombay Act IV of 1867 mandated that "sanitaria" be established. A Health Officer of the Port was appointed. Further, the Health Officer of the city or in his absence the Health Officer of the Port, were empowered to remove people, suspected of carrying infectious diseases from the Dhrmashalas, temples etc. to these sanitaria. Those who refused to do so had to face penalties. The Army Sanitary Commission also cautioned the Municipality against the unguarded growth of the city.

'^MCRop. cit. 1876. pl08 15 MCRopcit.. 1878. p 273 16 Bombay Act No. VI of 1867. The Bombay City Sanitary Regulation Act 1867 as modified up to 1937. Government Central Press, Bombay 1938. pp 1-2

137 Far from diminishing, cholera deaths in Bombay continued to record a rise, from .41 % in 1871 to 1.31 in 1875.'^ The only section of the community that enjoyed immunity from cholera, in this period, was European and native troops."* Since a popular connection was established between overcrowding and cholera, increased migration to the city was frowned upon as it was firmly believed that this floating population brought diseases to the city.

Therefore, the point to be laboured is that even though the role of polluted water supply, as a conveyor of cholera, had been known since 1848. no attempt was made to improve the method of distribution or filter the water, as the disease was considered a native one. Not only this, the disease was conveniently attributed to the sudden influx of population due to the cotton boom, the shortage of housing and food supply. Even wells which did not get water supply were condemned and the closure of such wells was desired.

The Technology Of Filtration

The above reasons apart, all these years there had been no motivation to filter the Vihar water as the latter was assumed to be exceedingly pure. Even at the time of its formation, filtration had been considered altogether superfluous as the gathering grounds were of basalt. Evergreen vegetation and lack of human habitation, throughout the area of the gathering ground, were cited as additional reasons for purity. Under these conditions and also considering the great depth and capacity of the lake, even a sludge pipe to drain the lowest level of the reservoir was deemed unnecessary. No considerable deposit was anticipated over any portion of the bottom.""

Harrison rightly points out that it was only from the 1870s onwards that the Government became concerned about supply of filtered water and that too for the barracks of the troops, since, by this time, the military authorities began to

MASC. op. cit. on the Report of the Bombay Municipality for 1875. pp 5-6

''GAR. op. cit. 1870-71. ppl-lll Anne Hardy, op. cit. p 84 Professional Papers., op. cit. Vol. 3. 1866. p 387

138 acknowledge that there was a strong link between the spread of cholera and water supplies."'

In Bombay, the motivation for change, proved to be the increase in the vegetable matter in the lakes. By 1875, the Vihar water, being delivered to the city, was so impure and had such large contents of albuminoid ammonia, that its continued consumption would have been injurious to public health; a fact accepted by the Health Officer himself. The Calcutta supply was qualitatively better at this time. However, in a mood of denial, an unwilling Health Officer felt that Bombay could congratulate itself for having a purer water supply than Madras.^^ Even after the severe cholera epidemic of that year, the Health Officer's report categorically mentioned that there was no evidence to support the connection between the water supply and cholera outbreak. With the greatest number of deaths in Kamathipura, and surprisingly among people who had consumed Vihar water, the belief, that the germs of cholera lay in the people, was further strengthened. The attack only gave an occasion to shut impure wells.

Instead an attempt was also made to push the onus of filtration on the people, thus giving a boost to domestic filtration. Therefore, those who got the Vihar supplies were strictly recommended that, no one 'who could afford' should drink Vihar water till it was filtered. "Every house should have a filter". The Aitkin's and Company water filter was recommended as a result.^''

The Army Sanitary Commission, on the other hand, felt that the sanitary state of the island could not guarantee the recurrence of the epidemic, and it pressed for filtration and for paying more attention to the gathering ground, which had not been done till that point of time. The injunction of the Commission, the rumour that

"' Mark Harrison, Public Health, op. cit, pp 66-68 '" MCR, op. cit, 1875. pp 144- 146. The changes in Vihar water were detected by Wanklyn's process. Based on this procedure the Health Officer decided the wholesomeness or the lack of it of drinking water. -'Ibid. ppl60- 164 -^ MCR. op. cit. 1876. pp 144-146

139 contaminated water was being supplied to the ships ^' and the impossibility of placing a sludge pipe, at the bottom of the lake, to remove the debris and dirt due to engineering difficulties, forced the Municipality to consider the option of filtration. In 1876, arrangements were finally made, for the filtration of water through 5 feet of sand before it entered the reservoir."^

Cholera however persisted. Pure municipal supplies of water thus failed to protect public health. In 1878, 982 people, who drank Vihar water, died of Cholera." Throughout this and the later period, the typical response was eviction of the stricken people, as for example in 1878, 6000 Municipal labourers in Boree Bunder Chawls were turned out from their buildings and forced to sleep wherever they could find shelter. The anxiety caused by Cholera also prompted the creation of the Harbour Sanitary Staff ^^

In the meantime, the continued deterioration of Vihar water and the endemicity of cholera in the city, with the greatest number of victims in Girgaum and Chaupati, led to the creation of the Bhandarwada Reservoir (1880-84) and in 1885 slow sand filters that cost Rs. 1 lakh were built near the Vihar Lake by contractors M/s Jeewanji Dhanjibhoy and M/s Mohanlal Bechardas, and the filtered water was supplied through a 24 inch main to the northern part of the city.^'^

Action was also taken against the wells of the city. By the Act of 1888, which codified sanitary provisions, the Commissioner was empowered to prohibit the use water for drinking from any tank or well, if he felt it could endanger public health.^

Even these measures proved ineffectual and cholera repeatedly attacked Vihar water drinkers showing that the cause of the disease lay elsewhere. In 1889, cholera

""^ MCR 1875. pp 138-139. A sensation was caused when Messrs. Bates and Co. wrote, about this, to the press in connection with this contaminated water supply.

-"RABP, op. cit, 1876-77, pi53 -^MCR 1878. p 32! -** MCR. op. cit, 1879. pp 292-296 Mumbai's Water, op. cit, p21 '" BMC Acts. op. cit. Volume 11, p 306

140 attacked 553 Vihar water drinkers, out of whom. 423 died, and 40 well water drinkers of whom, 32 died. Since the percentage of deaths among the well water drinkers was marginally higher, cholera was once again, conveniently, attributed to the increased population.^' The mortality report of 1898-99 showed that 80 people using Vihar water had been attacked by cholera.

The installation of the technology therefore, did not insure the supply of pure water to the city. This was so as the technology of filtration was not without its limitation. Faced with low levels of water in the lakes, these were rendered worthless. In 1906- 07, due to low levels of the Lake, unfiltered water was very often supplied to the northern part of the city despite the installation of Filter beds.^^

In the case of Tulsi. it was the unusual and increasing amount of sickness among the troops at Colaba, being supplied with Tulsi water that caused concern to the Government. The problem, at Tulsi, common to all impounding reservoirs, lay in the manner in which water was extracted. In such reservoirs, it was necessary to keep a line below which water could not be drawn as it would be impure. At Tulsi, the first dangerously impure supplies were therefore unavoidable, as there was decaying vegetation of a newly submerged area. The whole area of the Lake had been dug up to supply the earth for the dam resulting in the settling of the finest and the foulest dust at the bottom of the reservoir. Indecision about its nature, had led to the stoppage of the works, for more than three years. This had created a stagnant pond in which the vegetable organisms proliferated. Unusual draw off, in 1879 led to a, considerable amount of water being drawn from the lower depths of the lake thereby leading to alarming impurities.^"* Public attention was drawn to the impure state of the water by Nowrojee Furdoonjee. a Corporator, as a result of which the Corporation decided upon the measure to filter the water and improve its

^' MCR 1889-90, p 389 '- L Michael, p 300 ^^MCR. op. cit 1906-07. p 129 '^ GD 1880. Vol. 75, Letter, no 1941 B of 1880. from the Sanitary Commissioner for the Government of Bombay to the secretary to Government, GD. 30''^ July 1880. pp 353-54

141 distribution. ^ These therefore, developments led to the inclusion of a Settling Tank. Filtration Beds and a storage tank under one bed, under the Malabar Hill Reservoir.

Tansa water supply however was not filtered till 1900 since the areas available for creation of filter beds at an elevated level was limited. Additionally, Tansa water did not pass into any reservoir, but rather into the mains for direct distribution and not filtered as the Corporation was convinced that "Tansa water, under what may be taken as almost the worst possible conditions, is still a good drinking water, and there is nothing in the present circumstances of the case to justify an expenditure of some 9 or 10 lakhs of rupees for the extra security of filtration.^^

The Testing Laboratory: Kamathipura

A proper drainage scheme was also seen as one of the remedies. Further, in view of the fact that cholera also threatened the image of the city, at the international level; an attempt was made to improve the drainage of the most cholera prone district that is Kamathipura, situated in a swampy but centrally located area. Therefore, in the late 1860s, earthen ware pipes were substituted for foul open drains in this place and the pumping station at Love Grove was enlarged. Satisfied with the work then. Commissioner Crawford declared this place, with an area of 5 acres and a population of the lowest class numbering 26,000 people, as immensely improved by this work of drainage and he recommended the same for Kumbharwada. ^

However, in 1869, the true principles of drainage had only just begun to be understood. Based on the Chadwickian system, they consisted exclusively of small pipes, which, though efficient, suffered from serious defects such as imperfect joints, fracture, and obstruction. Further, there was a faulty assumption, that drainage work done with pipes was work done once and for ever. Contemporary England had

''MCR. op. cit. 1879. p 277 ^^' L Michael, op. cit. Letter to the Municipal Secretary, 2'"^ August 1900. No. 11413 of 1900-01. from the Municipal Commissioner. William Harvey, pill "RABPop. cit. 1879. p 321

142 experienced this problem at Croydon, London, Dover and Sandgate. In fact, at Sandgate, this system had resulted in fever and cholera.^^

Besides, they were difficult to lay, required excavations of long sections and could be misaligned thereby increasing the scope for future problems. Not unexpectedly therefore, the Kamathipura system had to be overhauled within the next 10 years. By the late 1870s, the condition of the district was so bad that it was proposed by Rao Saheb Vishvanath Narayan Mandlik, and seconded by Dr. Bianey that the drainage works of the district be re-hauled. By this time, it was not considered sufficient to provide channels for the removal of the sullage. Free admission of air into the sewers was considered equally important. Sanitary engineers now opined, that the ordinary system of sewer ventilation by holes opening in the street often created nuisance, and was open to many objection and it was finally declared that "The best system of sewer ventilation in a tropical city can only be ascertained by experience". Eager to test ventilation by shafts practically, they were now provided an opportunity to do so, and they openly admitted that the greatest advantage of this proposal was that it would give opportunity for testing the merits of different systems of sewer ventilation.^^

Kamathipura was therefore re-sewered in 1883 at a cost of Rs. I '/2 lakhs."*" These sewers, though highly commended then, were after wards condemned by Mr. Baldwin Latham in 1890, as seen in the previous chapter. In spite of these engineering feats Kamathipura continued to maintain a high rate of mortality among children as well as adults.

Subsoil drainage

Increased subsoil water, was also viewed as a possible source of cholera, by Dr. Leith and Weir, who felt that when water was obtained from them, before the construction of Vihar, the action directly tended to lower the sub soil water with the onset of the dry season. On the other hand, the water brought into the city by Vihar, augmented the water lying below the ground. High level of subsoil water added to

" Engineers and Officials, op. cit, pp 17-19 ^' RABP. op. cit. 1879. pp 323-324 CC James, op. cit.. p25l

143 the dampness of the soil which led to the diseases. In the 1880s, it was even statistically proven by that the great majority of cholera deaths took place on the ground floors of the houses."*'

In the wake of the sub soil water C.4: Cholera deaths as per locality | controversy, the Health Officer once again in 1881. Locality Cholera | strongly mooted for house connections. Cases Deaths • Waste water was linked with rising subsoil Ground floor 515 391 j water and therefore he bemoaned the good First floor i 111 90 supply to the city. In the dwelling houses Second floor 34 25 of the poor it was found to run to waste Third floor 16 16 and above more often. Therefore, he recommended Unknown 11 9 cutting off the supplies to this class of Boat 16 15 buildings all together. He urged for the Memorandum of the Army Sanitary amendment of Section 372 (f) so as to Commission on the Report of the Bombay Municipality for 1881, permit the evidence of the municipal p277 officer being taken to abate this nuisance. 1 42

But even the introduction of the G.IO: Cholera deaths in the city 1901-1908. Turner Malaria, p 2 new underground drainage 2000 •attacks system, did not solve the problem 1500 1241 of subsoil water. Rather it 1000 •deaths confounded the difficulty as 500 0 26 95 water closets, were very often •Linear oooooooo (attacks) found near wells, cook rooms, as a result of which cholera and diarrhea prevailed in the city. "Dangerously" located water closets were to be found even in the finest of buildings in the city "*' till the end of the century.

41 MASC. op. cit. on the Report of the Bombay Municipality for 1881, p 277 42 MCR. op. cit. 1894-95. p 529 A:-,' GD 1898. vol. 101. Abstract of Report of the Health Officer of the Bombay city for 1896. pp 170-171

144 Small wonder therefore, that at the seventh International Congress of Hygiene and Demography in London, in 1891, Surgeon Mac Rury voiced concern over the fact, that no kind of diseases except smallpox had declined in Bombay Presidency, because the measures adopted were few, inadequate and incomplete. British administrators, however, happily declared Bombay free from the epidemics of cholera.'*^ As can be seen from the subjoined chart cholera attacks continued in the next century as well.

Grasping Sanitary Control

Following Koch" discovery of the comma bacillus in 1884 and the subsequent study of cholera, by Macnamara, in the light of the bacteriological facts with a further study by Grieg between 1913 to 1918,'*^ cholera was firmly accepted as a water borne disease.

At the same time, from now on, the onus of cholera prevention also shifted from the Government to the people. It began with the move towards the sanitary education of the people. Although in favour of this move, Indian converts to the new cause of sanitation, such as Surgeon Major Kirtikar (Civil Surgeon Thane) felt that, it was not enough to provide only copious water. The latter had to be pure as well. Since majority of the Indians were not aware of the importance of pure drinking water, the responsibility of providing this fell upon the Government and not even the Municipalities. They openly favoured long term debts for the financing of water supply projects which would benefit the posterity as well.

But Municipal Commissioners, such as Charles Ollivant, while admitting need for the increase in water supply to prevent cholera, considered it equally important to

^^ TSICHD, op. cit, p 42. ^-' MCR. op. cit, 1894-95, pp xv-xvi ^ Major General E.W.C. Bradfield, Director General Indian Medical Services. An Indian Medical Review, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1938. p201. Hereafter. IMR ^'' TSICHD, op. cit. Surgeon Major K R Kirtikar. On the Sanitary wants of the Bombay Presidency, ppl 19-120.

145 impart education and provide efficient drainage. Rienzi Walton considered finance the chief difficulty in this area 48

Wells and tanks were decried by a large number of Indian sanitarians by now as being sources of various diseases and insanitation. The necessity of a public enquiry of sanitary projects such as that which took place in England, before they were launched by the municipalities, to prevent the failures of works was also pointed out and the Indian system of endless speeches and minute writing, before the sanctioning of the works was criticised as it created bad debt as had happened in the case of drainage works of Bombay.

By the beginning of the 20' century, voluntary agencies such as the Bombay Sanitary Association, formed in 1903 by Health Officer, Dr. J A Turner, tried to use sanitary education as tool for the prevention of diseases. The Indian Research Fund Association, founded in 1911 also furthered the cause by its investigations and established standards of purity for water supply, methods of water filtration and so on. The Association also started the Indian Journal of Medical Research.^"

Similarly, water supply figured prominently in Conferences organized on the issues of sanitation. The preventive role of hygiene was also emphasized in these conferences which led to the creation of sanitary primers. In 1910. a conference was held at the behest of the Governor, Sir George Russell Clarke, on the subject of Moral, Civic and Sanitary instructions. Clarke reemphasized the need for sanitation, which he felt was a worrisome and difficult question for the Government, since the stringency of measures applicable in the western countries, were impossible to execute in India as they would be regarded as oppressive. Thus, while Government felt it could provide clean drinking water, other steps were considered equally important. As a result, the area of schooling, which could impart elementary sanitary

^'^Ibid. pp 101-104 ^" Ibid. Russel Aitken. pp 105-106 '" ED. 1915. File No. 322. Indian Sanitary Policy, pp 1107-09. Hereafter. ISP

146 knowledge, emerged as one of importance.^ Thus, school hygiene, water supply drainage, type of building, lighting etc. figured prominently in the field of sanitary education. However, this measure failed to touch the imagination of the people as it was not practical in nature. The familiarity of the subject and the fact, that it was not linked with the elementary principles of health, failed to create an impact. ^''

By now. it also came to be accepted that Cholera was not a contagious disease in the ordinary sense of the word. At about the same time Bombay waters began to be subject both to chemical and bacteriological analysis. Water quality however, continued to be poor, a point accepted by even Major Leonard Rogers of the I.M.S, who admitted that there had been no reduction in the mortality as a result of the vast amount of research on bacteriological lines.^

This was true as cholera attacks continued in the city. Turner, nevertheless, insisted that the city was in a better position to prevent cholera; The 'occasional instances' of cholera were attributed to unpaved wells in the city and inadequate control over the gathering grounds and catchment areas of the lake, by him. ^''

His claim was disputed by Indian sanitarians who acknowledged, that Bombay water was still not up to the mark and that it could not be judged by Western standards. Colon bacilli regularly showed up in the Bombay water. Similarly B. enteritidis sporogenesis. Streptococci and Staphylococci were also occasionally found in the city's water-supply. As far as the gathering grounds of the Lakes were concerned these developments led to establishment of firm measures for the maintenance of water purity. Thus, no village was allowed to grow up within 10 miles. Similarly, location of residences within 10 mile of such lakes; fishing or shooting, picnic

^' Report of the Proceedings of a Conference on Moral, Civic and Sanitary Instruction held on the 6''^ and 7*'^ of April 1910, Government Central Press. Bombay 1910,p8 ^' Ibid. LR Chitale, Suggestions Regarding The Actual Teaching Of The Sanitary Principles in our Schools, p 91 ^^^ TBMC, op. cit. Major Leonard Rogers, IMS, Cholera With Special Reference To Its Treatment, p 6 •'^ Ibid, p 480

147 parties or bathing, cattle grazing cultivation by manure, were also prohibited near the gathering ground of the lakes. Afforestation of the nearby areas and constant dredging to remove the vegetation were also recoursed to. '"^ However, in spite of this move, the Tansa catchment area, which was not in the possession of the Municipality, remained a source of problem; a case that has been discussed later in this work.

Technological Glitches

Cholera undoubtedly stimulated the growth of water purification technology. But the latter did not prove efficacious in exterminating the disease for several reasons.

Faulty method of storage was one of the causes. Research in England had proved that storage of water tended to devitalize the microbes of epidemic diseases such as cholera and typhoid. Storage also tended to lengthen the life of filters. But in case of Vihar. it was found that the lake itself contained the Cholera vibrios especially when its levels were low. Higher rate of filtration added to the problem. In the case of Malabar Hill and Bhandarwada Reservoirs, the bottoms of the filter-beds not being water-tight they, besides causing great leakage allowed the ground water to mix with the filtered water, thus seriously damaging the case of filtering. In bad conditions this water passed from one filter to another, thereby creating further risks.^^

More importantly, when Vihar water level proved to be insufficient as it did on many occasions, the water could not be delivered through filter beds. Effective filtration required regular cleansing of the sand through which the water passed. This had to be done by scraping a thin layer from the top, the average depth required to be removed being 1/8"^ -1/4"' inch. In the Malabar Hill beds however these were scraped once in 3-5 weeks and the sand removed was hardly 1/8'^ of an inch in depth. In England on the other hand, 1/4'^ to 3/8'^ of sand was scraped. '^ Further.

Ibid. Dr. K. E. Dadachanji "Water Supplies." Measures for Ensuring Purity, pp 345-350 ^"^ Ibid. Dr. KE Dadachanji. Purity of Water And Measures Necessary For The Purity Of Water, pp 339-43 Turner Sanitation, op. cit. pp 354-56

148 while the Malabar Filters were covered, owing to their proximity to the Tower of Silence, the Bhandarwada Filters were not. Worse still, in Bombay, filtered water was used for street water despite suggestions that unfiltered water be used for the same.

Faulty, intermittent distribution and storage, within the city, rendered the situation shoddier: a fact which was exemplified by the cholera outbreak of 1912. More than half a century, after the introduction of the modern water supply system, people in the city were still found to be supplied questionable water by Bhistis, whose services they were forced to avail due to intermittent supply. The latter filled their mashaks while people washed their clothes at the standpipes. Water was then stored in earthen vessels which were kept in the open streets. In Bombay, the problem was compounded by the privies overflowing into drains and gradually soaking into the subsoil or storm water drains. The proximity of the sewer pipes with those of water supply further increased the risk. As a precautionary measure water was treated with the permanganate of potash.^^

Thus, though, quantitative advances were made in the water supply of the city, qualitatively the water did not conform to the standards of potability required by sanitary authorities. This was especially true in the case of TuIsi where the water quality deteriorated to such an extent that the supply had to be discontinued in the hot weather, except for industrial use. TuIsi water actually required both filtration and chemical treatment. In fact, as the Sanitary Engineers to the Government admitted, there were very few sources of water, in the entire Presidency, which came up to the modem standards without such treatment."^

In 1917. investigations of the Tulsi water supply by Lt. Col. Clemesha, IMS led to the installation of mechanical filters at Tulsi Lake.^" The construction of these filters began in 1919, but remained incomplete even in 1923 as the contractors failed to

-'^'' Ibid, pp 490-496 ''' PWD Gen. I9I8-192I, Vol. 1046, Letter from Shoubridge, Sanitary Engineer to Government . to The Secretary Government. General department. 5''^ January 1917. p225

"'MCR. op. cit. 1917-18. p 12

149 fulfil their contract. Similarly, the pumping plants and filters installed at Powai were found inefficient and the contractors were called upon to remedy the defects. 61

In order to purify water Chlorination was introduced in 1923. " By 1923-24 part of the Tansa water was being chlorinated and the whole of it was expected to undergo chlorination by 1926. ^'' which proved to be a year of cholera incidentally. But though it was considered necessary to make prompt arrangements for chlorinating the whole of the Tansa supply near the Bhandup duct, to check the spread of Cholera, the filters installed for Tansa failed. It was also accepted that though chlorination made a marked improvement in the quality of water, yet the ultimate

r~ • • 64 success was a matter oi opinion.

Besides, chlorine was found to be corrosive, thereby increasing the problem of maintenance. At Vihar the action of chlorine completely corroded the plant and the absorption tower which had to be remodelled by 1933. By 1938 sterilization was introduced. As an experimental measure, copper sulphate was also used. Similarly, the Gourami fish was also tried and in 1942, Vihar was also cleaned. ^^

In post independence Bombay, in addition to disinfection of water, isolation of patients and immunization of people, by anti cholera injections were also adopted to check the spread of disease.^^

MALARIA: THE NEW SANITARY BUGBEAR

"Where there are many wells there is much Malaria: where there are few wells there is little Malaria.""

^' Ibid, 1923-24. pviii ''' Bombay Municipality, op. cit, p 77 ^^ MCR. op. cit. 1923-24, px ^Mbid. 1926-27. pv ^' Mumbai's Water, pp 25-32 ^^ Bombay-1951-52 A Review of the Administration of the State. Government Central Press. Bombay 1954. p 106. Hereafter. Bombay Administration. 1951-52.

150 Malaria was yet another problem of an Imperial magnitude. The response to this disease helped the Government to extend its control over the traditional water sources all over the city. The role of the nuisance laws, in this respect, has already been noted in a previous chapter.

Malaria was the derivation of the Italian words mala aria which meant bad air. Hitherto, the miasmatic theory attributed the disease to air tainted by injurious emanations from animal or vegetable matter or noxious exhalations of marshy land. But Sir Patrick Manson"s research had pointed out. in 1894. the possibility of the mosquito as a carrier of the disease. In 1897. Major Ross" discovery convicted the mosquito as the cause of malaria.^^

Malaria eradication, as a 'part of routine sanitation', had received the attention of the Government of India since 1895. Government measures to control the disease, at this time, ranged from palliatives such as quinine prophylaxis to radical ones such as removal of dwellings, liable to be inhabited by persistently malarious people. Coolie labour was considered an important factor in the diffusion of malarial fevers and it was considered necessary to control their numbers. The advice of the drainage engineer also commanded great respect in this field. Legal measures to control the highly malarious areas were also in the pipeline. By 1900s the 'mosquito brigade" method had become highly popular as also the prophylactic use of quinine.

The visit of the Malaria Commission in 1900, which included Christopher Stephens and Daniels, acted as a catalyst in the systematic investigation of malaria. This research indicated a variety of causative factors in the spread of malaria. ™

^^ Charles A Bentley. Report On An Investigation Into The Causes of Malaria in Bombay and The Measures Necessary For Its Control, Government Central Press Bombay. 1911. p 106. Hereafter, Bentley Proceedings of the Imperial Malaria Conference held at Simla in October 1909, Government Central Branch Press. Simla. 1910. Address of His Excellency the Viceroy, p 2. Hereafter. Imperial Malaria Conference. ^•^ Ibid. Col. WG King. The Difficulties Which Beset The Practical Application Of Anti Malarial Measures, pp 49- 53 70 IMR.op. cit. pp 199-200

151 THE CASE OF BOMBAY

Malaria is believed to have been endemic in India from the very early times. It was generally accepted that this disease constituted the major health and social problem in the country. The prevalence of fever, a peculiar feature of Bombay, was typically attributed to its overcrowding and insanitation and foul air. In comparison, cities of Calcutta and Madras showed lesser mortality by Malaria 71

Malarial conditions were to be chiefly seen in the southern part of the city. The Esplanade. North Fort. Dhobi Talao and Mandvi were most impacted by it and Parsis, as a community, showed greater vulnerability to this disease. The Northern part of the island, still under cultivation, in the first decade of the 20"^ century was free from Malaria as it lacked the means of communication with the southern part.

Malaria did not cause much mortality, but M.3: Malaria Map of Bombay City was directly associated with a loss of wage p^^p,y ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^j^ earning capacity, which stood at 10 Vi lakhs centres of Malaria. Report on an Investigation into the Causes of of rupees a year and indirect losses to the ^^^^^.^ j^ Bombay and the city which were 29 lakhs annually.^" Measures Necessary for its Control bv Charles A. Bentlev. n.p Besides, it gravely interfered with the work ' ' of the Port Trust and the GIPR owing to the absence of coolies and the staff The •grave embarrassment", caused to the business of the city, and the fact that malaria prevention, a must to surmount these losses, represented an "insignificant" sum.

^' Deaths in Bombay During 1856. Bombay Education Society"s Press, Byculla, 1863. p viii. Hereafter. Deaths in Bombay. 72 Bentley. op. cit. Undated Government Resolution of 191 1. pp 4-6 73 Ibid, p 91

152 which amounted to less than l/IO"' the amount lost by the city to the epidemic, 74 prompted the Government to look seriously into the problem.

The Malaria Committees, appointed by the Corporation in 1901 and 1902, recommended the necessity of draining marshy land, provision of surface drainage and destruction of mosquitoes with the aid of larvicides. From 1902 onwards, attention began to be focused on tanks and wells where mosquitoes were to be found to a limited extent. M.4: Wells in North Fort in 1911. (33 but abundantly in fountains, pools formed by leaking reservoirs, stand Report on an Investigation into the Causes of Malaria in Bombay and the pipes and water taps. Two classes of Measures Necessary for its Control by breeding grounds, temporary and Charles A. Bentley | permanent, were identified. As regards the permanent ones, which consisted of wells tanks, fountains etc; the suggested measures were cleaning, stocking with fish, draining or filling up. In some cases (e.g. wells within houses, cisterns and storage tanks) the water could be protected by wire gauzes or perforated metal sheets. From 1903 a regular system of cleaning tanks and wells came to be organised 75

The severe malaria epidemic of 1908. which impacted Punjab and Bengal, prompted the Government to execute more draconian measures. In Bombay, it especially affected the A and B wards. A careful examination of the city revealed, that the several breeding places of the mosquitoes were the new Dock works, the deep excavation at the western extremity of the New General Post Office; the compound of the Saint George's Hospital, owing to accumulation of vegetation and empty

74 Ibid, p 156 75 J. A. Turner. Report on Malaria in Bombay from 1901-1909. British India Press. Byculla, 1909, pp 19-22. Hereafter. Turner Malaria barrels, tins and iron basins; the yards of the BB&Cl and GIPR Railways which had large quarries with stagnant pools of water, which contributed to an profusion of mosquitoes in the A ward; extensive building operations in the different parts of the city, which led to soil disturbances; innumerable stagnant tanks and wells in the city, cisterns and storage tanks, low-lying grounds, dirty stables, sceptic tank installation at Malabar Hill, and the leakages from both the latter and Bhandarwada Reservoirs; unpaved gullies between chawls and imperfectly cleaned drains. The turning point came with the appointment of an expert Malariaologist, Dr. Bentley. in August 1909, whose report, on Anopheles Stephensi, submitted in 1911, mentioned very stringent measures against the wells in the city.^^

The Malaria Crusade

From now on, malaria emerged as a weapon to systematically shut down the tanks and wells in the city. Mosquito breeding was declared a statutory nuisance and the Municipal Commissioner was empowered to take action himself, for the abatement of such a nuisance and also to delegate power to the Executive Health Officer or to a responsible assistant. Registration of wells and acquiring licenses, for the same, became mandatory. Suitable amendments were also made to the Municipal Act to aid the Commissioner in his move to prevent Malaria. Of the 5000 wells, the city had by 1911. 65 % were declared infected with malaria mosquitoes.^** of the Neocelia Stephensi type. By 1912, a special Malaria Department was organized, which caused wells to be tilled up or hermetically covered or provided with mosquito proof wire gauze covers.

The Gowalia Tank fell prey to Bentley's Report. Its case offers an interesting insight into the noso-politics of the age. As per the original plan of the Bombay Improvement Trust, this tank was to be excluded from filling in, but since it was not cleaned, the Health Officer insisted that the tank be filled in. When the Trust's Gamdevi Estate was completed, the frightful reputation of the Tank prevented the

^' Ibid, pp 5-8 Turner. Sanitation, op. cit. pp 670-671 ^'^ Bentley, op. cit. p 132 ^'RABP, op. cit. 1912-13. p 36

154 area from being developed further for building purposes. Advantage was therefore taken of. of Dr. Bentley"s report, to have the tank examined and proved as a mosquito breeding ground in order to have it filled. At first the Trust decided to fill it and to make the scheme pay, so that want of funds would not come in the way of the development of this area. But ultimately the tank was filled in by the Municipality.^"

Powerful land interests in the Corporation, now tried to persuade it to use the land, so reclaimed, for construction of building and tried to convince the Corporation that it would lose heavily if the land was kept an open ground. It was argued, that there were plenty of recreation parks in the vicinity of Gowalia Tank, such as Malabar Hill garden and Chowpatty, to warrant the allotment of another place for the purpose. But the relentless efforts of Homi Mody, prevented the land from being devoured for building purposes.

On the eve of the First World War, Bombay had a well organized Malaria Department, under the supervision of the Executive Health Officer and under the control of a Special Malaria Assistant with a 'card system" covering each house, from A to E wards, showing wells, tanks, cisterns etc. Cards were also prepared for those houses, which showed no potential for mosquito breeding, so that they could be entered, if in the subsequent inspection, larvae were detected there. Letters were sent to suspect houses and the occupants were asked to hermetically seal the water sources. If this was not complied with, within 15 days, the water in the case of wells was sent to the Municipal Analyst, for chemical analysis. The report was then sent to the Commissioner to get sanction from the Standing Committee. In addition to these, the Municipality also maintained a Mosquito Record Book and a Mosquito Street Register which showed, at a glance, the Mosquito Record of each and every house. '

In order to empower the Municipal Commissioner further, over and above the Standing Committee, the municipal law was amended. From now. on the

'''^ BIT op. cit. Report for I9ll,p II. **' D R Mankekar. Homi Mody A Many Splendoured Life. A Political Biography. Popular Prakashan. Bombay. 1968. p 26 " Turner. Sanitation, op. cit. pp 661-662

155 Commissioner, without the sanction of the Standing Committee, could fill up wells, after giving notice to the people, if it was deemed urgent. Apart from this, no new tank. well. pond, cistern or fountain could be constructed without the previous permission, in writing, from the Commissioner. Work begun, without the permission of the Commissioner, could be filled up or demolished. Water connection rules were also amended.**^

Even though, the Municipality received grants from the Government, in this campaign, the onus of filling the wells was transferred completely to the owners, since the Municipality feared that any kind of generosity would lead to misconceptions. At first, orders were issued for the covering in of wells with wire gauze covers, but this, having proved unsatisfactory, the Municipality later insisted on concrete covers. Initially, only wells were targeted. Afterwards even smaller privately owned tanks, or those owned by charitable institutions, came under the Malaria net.

Contestations

Malaria control measures aroused universal criticism. Public and the medical fraternity strongly associated malaria with the bad state of Bombay drains and insufficient sewerage system. Indian medical doctors also suspected the sceptic tanks while others like Wacchha, who believed Malaria to be a preventable disease, lamented the closing of these auxiliary sources of water, provided by the foresight, benevolence and humanity of a bygone people.**^

Reluctance, towards this policy of filling tanks, had been shown earlier too, by some engineers who opined that "hesitation should always be exercised before filling up tanks and making reclamations throughout the city." The tanks were sinks, to which surface and sub soil waters gravitated, and therefore performed a very useful function which could not be "lightly disregarded". The special drainage engineer.

'' Ibid, pp 672-674 GD 1914. Compilations No. 474. Letter from the Municipal Commissioner, to GD. No. 26818.11"' December. 1913. p 7 •'*'Shells, op. cit.pp 449-451

156 James Smith, said emphatically "1 am convinced that no presently existing tank can safely be filled up until the drainage system be greatly improved and extended." Even Indian doctors such as Drs. Cursetji and Masters, denounced the act and argued that the onus of cleaning the tanks be put on the people, who owned them, rather than recourse to closing them. This was an opinion which received general acceptance of the public as well. Agitatedly, they appealed to the Government that such an action would cause "much harm and mischief to the general health." The Parsis, who were the most impacted by malaria, also protested against the measure. Not content with petitioning, a large body of property owners and rate payers even

go threatened to file suits against the Malaria Inspectors.

The policy of the closure of tanks and wells was criticized by the eminent Town Planner, Patrick Geddes who visited India in 1915 and held "Cities and Town Planning Exhibitions" at Madras and Bombay at this time. He viewed these as valuable environmental assets with aesthetic functions. Convinced, that maintaining such tanks was not beyond the skill of the engineers, he strongly advocated their conversion into water parks instead.**' As for the wells he regarded them "an ancient policy, of life insurance" and exhorted that those in use should be kept pure, and "their regular inspection and cleansing be understood as part of the duty of Sanitary Department; and those in disuse should be relieved of dirt, and then covered over, but not filled up.'-'"

*"' PWD Gen. 1898-1903. Vol. 150, Letter No. SD -1160 of 1897-98, to the Municipal Commissioner, from James Smith, Special Drainage Engineer. 2"'' September 1897, p 192. '" TBMC, op. cit. Jehangir J. Cursetji and Dinsha Bomanji Master Unhygienic Bombay. Its Causes and Its Remedies, p 378 **** Bentley, op. cit, pp 137-138 **' G.D. 1916, Compilations. File No. 1005. Notes On Nadiad, 27"' March 1915. pp 4-5 Professor Patrick Geddes. Reports on Re-planning of Six Towns in Bombay Presidency 1915. Government Central Press. Bombay 1965. Note on Thana. p 3

157 Indeed, the colonial practice of closing wells went against the social organization of the people for whom wells and tanks were objects of sanctity and worship. Water was worshipped both by Hindus and Parsis, due to its great economic value. Wells and springs were regarded an asset. Religious sentiments were, hurt when owners were asked to fill up wells or cover them with a wire gauze or trap door. Several objections were raised. To the Parsis, it was necessary that well water be exposed to the sun. while to the Jains, it was necessary that water be drawn, at a stretch, from a well exposed to the rays of the sun and the moon. Water drawn from wells, by means of pumps, could not be used by Hindus for religious ceremonies. Hence, it was a must to provide a trap door, which however was anathema to the Marjadis. according to whom, the water pot that touched the trap door would defile the water and thus interfere with their religious ceremonies. There were yet others who welcomed trap doors since they believed that such an action would "enable the spirit in the well to come out''. These spirits, it was believed, influenced not only the health and strength but also the fortunes of the victims. Even building contractors were averse to disturbing these spirits. The least objectionable method of protecting the well was using fish which was recoursed to in a few cases, on an experimental basis, but objected to by the Jains as they felt that the fish would devour larvae and it was against their religion to harm any creature. Water thus united the Hindus. Mahomedans. Parsees and Christians, without any distinction of caste or creed, and they voluntarily joined to give expression to their grievances and hardships. "^^

The Marjadis were a sect of the Jains who had apparently attained a higher level of religious merit after a pilgrimage to the shrine of Gocul. They were strictly enjoined to drink well water only; Turner. Sanitation, op. cit. pp 847-48 ''" RP Masani. Folklore Of Wells Being A Study Of Water Worship In East And The West. D B Taraporewalla and Company. Bombay 1918, pp 4- 11. The Bhikha Behram well in Churchgate Street and the well near the high court well on the Mayo road were supposed to contain water with curative properties. Similarly a tank in the Mahim district was supposed to cure persons suffering from skin diseases: Ibid, p 50 and p 56

158 The Corporation remained unmoved and despite its assurance, the concession of trapdoor was not granted in many cases, where it was most necessary, since it appears to have always rested with the Special Assistant to the Health Officer Malaria and his staff to report and decide, as to whether the request was made on religious ground. But even in cases where concession was granted, the hardships of the well owners increased day after day due to the unnecessary harassments and vexatious requisitions. To add salt to the wounds, people, who were required to till up ponds and tanks, in pursuance of the anti malarial measures, received no compensation.

Not only this, the malaria campaign also highlighted the incompetence of Government Laboratory and Government Analyzers, of the first city of the Indian Empire, to examine water. The highly illustrative case of the 50, 000 Marjadis, who refused to use pipe water, proved this. At a well in Bhatia Mahajanwadi at Kalba Devi road, while the first chemical analyses made by the Chemical Analyzer to the Government, showed no mosquito larvae in it, a second examination by the Malarial inspector showed the larvae. The water of this well was used by hundreds of Bhatia tenants who were Marjadis. Additionally, it was also used for feasting in the Oarts where it was situated. A concession of a wire gauze cover, asked for to prevent water from deteriorating, even though recommended by Dr. Bentley. was refused. Ultimately, the members of the managing committee of the Oart were dragged to the Police court and fined by the Chief Presidency Magistrate in respect of their own wells and forced to carry out the requisitions of the Malarial Assistant to the Health Officer. This case also proved the strength of the anti-malaria campaigns in the city.

Even the functioning of the BIT added to the malaria problem for which the ordinary citizens had to pay. Its demolition drives, combined with its apathy for drainage, led to the creation of stagnant pools of water. In order to protest against all this, people assembled on the 4"^ August 1914. at the Town Hall in Bombay. Convinced, that the real cause of malaria was not the wells, but the defective drainage system and inspired by Patrick Geddes "Lecture on Town Planning in Indian Cities Historic and Recent", they tried to persuade the Government, that the quality of such water could be improved and Malaria stamped out. without recoursing to the closing of wells and tanks. The example of the Government of FTH. Gaikewar of Baroda. who. at a cost

159 of about Rs. 60 only, got rid of malaria from a big pond, instead of closing it up at a cost over a lakh of Rupees, was cited. Resentment was also expressed over the Government policy of not compensating for the filling of tanks and wells. An unsupportive Government however refused to accept any of these views. The allegations made in the petition by the people, as to the high handed and unnecessary enforcement of the malaria measures, in connection with wells by the Municipality, were considered baseless.''^

Unmindful of these protests the anti malarial campaign continued vigorously. Filling of tanks and wells persisted too. The Nawab Tank was filled up in 1917 and the Naigaum tank inl922.''' By filling in the remaining tanks the Corporation calculated to acquire a total of 89,913 square yards or 18.57 acres of land. "^^ By December 1917 it was able to acquire created 28.01 acres of open spaces leading to a complete transformation of the city landscape.''^

^ GD Compilations 1916, File No 1099, Petition of Citizens of Bombay with regard to the hardships they have to undergo in the name of malaria, to Lord Willingdon Governor in Council, Bombay, 3'^ Jan 1916, pp 3-7. Two Maratha widows, who were ordered by the Malaria Officer to fill up the land where rain water collected, were subsequently prosecuted for non compliance. The reason for the collection of the rain water was the demolition of the drains on the frontage of the land which had been acquired by the BIT. The latter had left no outlet for the drainage of the rainwater which thus accumulated on the lands of the neighbours. The BIT would not allow the poor ladies to erect a suitable drain nor would do the task itself ''"* MCR. op. cit, 1917-18, p vi. Town planning measures after 1915 acerbated the drive for the closure of Tanks. Thus, a large number of Tanks in Dadar. such as Hansali. Manmala, Gopi, Nardula and others were closed to create open spaces, gardens or for development schemes of the Improvement Trust. Read. Kamat Prakash (Editor), Bahurangi Bahudhangi Dadar, Published by DD Kamathe, Mumbai. 2007. p 29. '•'MCR. op. cit. 1922-23, p 10

Report of the Bombay Development Committee, 1914. pp 170-71. Hereafter. RBDC Prceti Chopra, op. cit. p 329

160 The anti malaria campaign C.5: Status of some tanks by 1914 ( area in clearly revealed the weak square yards) position of the Corporation Bombay Development Report, 1914, pp 170-171 vis a vis the Executive Tanks Status Area Engineer and the Executive Gowalia Tank Recently filled 25322 Khara Tank 2489. Health Officer who had Foras Tank Filled in 11.235 emerged as important figures Dhobi Talao 2759 in the areas of sanitation and Tank CP Tank Sanctioned for 868. who were subject to the sole being filled in orders and control of the Mastan Tank Being filled in 4597 K. • • , r^ , Nana Bhoy Being filled in 520 Municipal Commissioner. In ' r^ , ^ lank 1918. the Malaria Nawab Tank Partly tilled in 3283. Naigaum Tanlk ! Being filled 32562. Department, having finished Footka Tank Being filled 3499 all its work, was abolished Jambli Tank Being filled in. 8857 and its work distributed Hassali Tank Bein<; filled in 5731 among department Health Officers,"^'^ Even so. tilling in of wells remained a passion with the Municipality. The Malaria Branch was reopened in 1923. The Bhuleshwar tank fell prey to the anti Malaria campaign in 1926. The land, thus created, was then thrown into the roadway without any compensation and the rest was converted into a garden reserved exclusively for the Hindus. 100

Insulated

As compared to the common people, mill owners appeared to enjoy greater immunity from the anti malarial measures of the Corporation. In 1925, when notices were served on Rachel. Alexandra and E.D. Sassoon and Apollo mills, under the nuisance clause, on grounds of the tanks breeding the malaria mosquito and asked to cover their tanks, the mills resisted the measure. They appealed that water was required for fire extinguishing purposes. The difficulty of location of tanks, insufficient quantity of suitable earth, required to fill these tanks were cited as

RABP. op. cit. 1918-19, p 38 94 MCR. op. cit. 1933-34. Report of the Health Officer's, p 41 100 MCR. op. cit.. 1926-27. Report of the Health Officer, pp 24-25

161 additional reason for not complying with the demands of the Municipality. In reality the costs of these filling operations varied between Rs. 10.000 to Rs. 28.000; a cost which the mill owners wanted to escape. They also feared that the filling of the tanks would secure the mills additional land, which though of no remunerative purpose, would have added to their lands and led to increased municipal assessment. Expectedly. they immediately denied the charge and attributed mosquito breeding to the unused tanks of the city. ""

The case of the Mill Association was represented by Mr. Homi Mody and as per the arrangement arrived at. a series of experiments was made by the medical staff of the Sassoon Group of mills, which reached the conclusion that, in mills driven by steam power the danger of mosquito breeding was nil, while the same could not be said about the electrically driven mills. The medical staff here even claimed that mosquito breeding experiments on their tanks had obtained only non malarial 102 varieties.

Even with regard to the Anti malarial measures, through the intervention of Mody, the mills were allowed to cover their tanks and ponds, in order to make them mosquito proof, with the cheapest possible material, instead of the wrought iron sheets expected by the Corporation.'"^

The Mosquito Net

April 1928 witnessed a further Malaria re-survey of the city by Major Covell. Assistant Director. Malaria Services of India. Covell opined that there was only one type of malaria carrying mosquito in Bombay and therefore the eradication of malaria was very much practicable in the city. According to him. all of its breeding places were artificial and either capable of being completely abolished or rendered innocuous. Thus, there was no natural malaria in Bombay, the chief reason being the

"" Report of the Bombay Mill Owners" Association. Times Press Bombay. 1927. Report on Anti-Malaria Measures in relation to Mill Ponds by Medical Officers attached to E. D. Sassoon Group of Mills, pp 244-252. Hereafter. RBMA '"- RBMAop.cit.l927.pp 54-55 "" RBMAop. cit.. 1928. p 33

162 absence of natural streams in the city. Covell's study showed that the disease had become very widely diffused in the city and was located more intensely, in the mill section of the city, more especially in the Worii section. Covell therefore suggested an effective organization of the Anti Malaria Staff. Along with this, the unity of control of anti malarial measures in the whole of the island of Bombay; the adoption of a systematic campaign, with the object of abolishing all permanent breeding places of the malaria carrying mosquito; permanence of preventive measures wherever possible; provision of effective legislation to enforce the necessary measures and the application of this legislation to the Railways, all Government Departments, and in fact to all public and private bodies in the island were also suggested. Covell especially urged the active cooperation of all public bodies in this move. By this time, the estimated annual average loss due to malaria, in Bombay, was reported to be not less than Rs. 50 lakhs.'

Fresh clean water was, henceforth, held as much responsible for mosquito breeding, especially the anopheles, as stagnant water. Hence, the foul smelling open sewers of Bombay, however unpleasant and harmful in other respects, and stagnant swamps and natural ponds were exonerated as having no bearing on the Malaria problem, 'it must be emphasized that the 'mosquito nuisance" and the question of adequate schemes of drainage in Bombay are problems entirely separate from that of malaria control." Rather, the new mantra given by Covell was that "every well in the island must be filled in or covered over with concrete, with, if desired, the provision of a pump, by a certain specified date; in the event of non compliance the Municipal Commissioner should cause the work to be carried out". Trap doors, recommended by Bentley, were condemned as worse than useless by Covell, as they engendered a false sense of security and rendered proper inspection impossible. The wells in the northern part of the island were not to be covered up immediately, provided they were not a source of breeding mosquitoes; were at a safe distance from dwelling houses and the water was being used for agricultural purposes. However, no guarantee was given that wells in these categories would not be closed in the future. As expected, the anti malarial measures aroused a lot of public attention.

PWD DD 1929, FileNo.3/8. GD Resolution no. 6073. 17"' December 1928. p 1

163 Consequently, the Municipal Commissioner was forced to clarify the details of the Malaria policy via a press note. 105

The release of the note, on 4'^ June 1929. was followed by a meeting between the Commissioner and a deputation of 21 Hindus, who had to be pacified."^ Once again, there was a good deal of opposition against the closure of wells. Therefore, the Commissioner recommended that the wells in religious places such as Hindu Temples, Mosques and Agiaries be kept open. In addition, it was also agreed to keep open certain private wells, where no other well within 500 yards was available, for the people who needed well water for religious purpose. A subcommittee was appointed by the Corporation in 1929 to recommend the number of wells to be closed and kept open in each ward. This was expected to remove all groundless opposition. But as usual, reluctance was shown by the Government, the Railway and the Port Trust to submit to the directions of the malaria operations in their spheres. They insisted on a rigid delimitation of powers. '"^

Although wells used for cultivation were promised exemption, the farmers at Worii Koliwada, who did not know how to use pumps fitted on wells. " were forced to oblige to the commands of the Municipality. For this, the agency of the Improvement Trust was used once again. 110

Hereafter, the Malaria Department, determined to stamp out the disease, set about examining even domestic cisterns; weekly, fortnightly or monthly. "Malaria Staff special crusades' were organized to keep the overhead tanks free of mosquitoes. In January 1931, a new rule was brought into force by which owners were required to

'"^ Ibid, Press Note of Municipal Commissioner A.R Dalai. 4"" June 1929. pp 53-56 Ibid. Note of a Deputation Of Hindus Which Waited Upon The Municipal Commissioner. AR Dalai, 19-6 1929. pp 1-3 "" MCR, op. cit 1931 -32, Part II, p 33

"'^'MCR 1929-30. pix 109 BIT. op cit. Proceedings of the Improvements Committee and The Board. 1929- 30.Chief Officer's Note. 11"' September 1929. pp 378-79 Ibid. Municipal Commissioner's Letter No. HM -58-3. 4"^ November. 1929. pp 484-485

164 fix malaria proof flushing tanks for new water closets. Provision of iron ladders, to provide safe and easy access to the water cisterns for the sake of inspection, by the Malaria Branch, became compulsory. In the absence of these, no new cisterns were to be allowed. Changes were brought about in the structures of the manhole covers of these cisterns which were, from now on. to be provided with bolts and nuts, instead of locks, to render them tamper free. Anti malaria measures, were also applied in the building construction as well, where water was used to soak concrete or bricks.'"

Routine inspection of dwellings and premises for sanitary defects became a regular feature from the 1930s. For this Medical Assistants and Medical Inspectors were deputed. They were expected to cover at least 17. 500 houses annually."" The GIP and the BB and CI Railways and the BPT continued with their policy of non compliance with the instructions of the Municipality. In 1933, 15 over head tanks of these bodies were not rendered mosquito proof Tanks of the mills, which had been closed down, also continued to be a source of nuisance. It was now acknowledged that there was more to the mosquito control problem than Malaria, as mosquitoes, other than Anopheles Stephensi, were invariably found to breed in these tanks. "^

A new feature was added to the Malaria campaign with the introduction of the DDT in the post independence period."** Inaccessible villages, situated at the foothills of Vikhroli, Pawai and Bhandup. were thoroughly sprayed. The rapid development of the suburbs, however, resulted in drainage problems on lands, with high water tables, like the Sindhi Immigrant Society at Chembur, Kherwadi and Santa Cruz. Here, premises with a limited supply of water from wells had been provided with municipal water connections. But this also increased drainage problems and consequently created malarious grounds. Excessive and uncontrolled use of waste water irrigation by grass cultivators from open drains in places like Bandra, Kherwadi, Bramhanwadi and Chembur further aggravated Malaria. It was

''' MCR. op. cit. 1931 -32. Report of the Ex Health officer, pp 33- 34 "- MCR. op. cit. 1932-33. Report of the Ex. Health Officer, p 41 "' MCR op. cit. 1933-34. Report of Health Officer, p 36 Bombay Administration op. cit. 1951-52. p 107

165 optimistically hoped now, that with the improvement of road construction and drainage in these areas the problem would be gradually alleviated. II .S

THE SANITARY WATERLOO: PLAGUE 1896

The plague in Bombay has been the subject of much research. But historical work thus far has been limited to the State response to this epidemic. Hence, much has been written about the slum demolition drives and the sanitary revival of the city in this period through the works of the Bombay Improvement Trust. The recent work of Kidambi throws a search light on this functioning of the latter body. Kidambi has focused on the role of the State in the removal of filth and squalor."^ However, the role of water in the sanitary planning and redemption of the city has been omitted. The intercourse of plague with water proved to be of a different nature as it brought out in sharp focus the sanitary aspect of housing. The following narrative therefore, highlights the changes brought about in the building construction; especially the chawls built for the masses. It also takes a look at the resultant politics of water supply.

Plague was first discovered in the Mandvi quarter in 1896. Since nothing was known about its causes, contradictory opinions set in immediately. While many attributed it to the inadequacy of the sewerage and drainage, others attacked the new scientific system of drainage. Former Municipal Commissioner, Arthur Crawford, blamed the Corporation for creating the conditions for the plague outbreak by not enforcing law and regulation. It was only by 1909, that it was amply proven that the sole carrier of plague was the rat fiea and that insanitary conditions had no relation to the occurrence of plague, except in so as they favoured infestation by rats.

The city was panic stricken and Imperial authorities feared that trade and all sanitary operations would come to a standstill. To deal with the sanitary emergency. The

"' MCR. op. cit. 1955, Report of Health Officer Suburbs, pp 3-4 " Kidambi. Indian Metropolis, op. cit. pp 49-50 "^TBMCop. cit, px.

166 Epidemic Diseases Act was promulgated in 1897. Local self governance was suspended as a result. Further, to deal with the 'imperial necessity" a special committee was constituted, under the chairmanship of Brigadier General Gatacre. to take measures for the suppression and prevention of the spread of Plague."

Plague operations necessitated the provision of water by the Corporation, to the suburbs of the city, due to large scale migration of people there. Water had to be supplied to the detention camp at Bandra. Since majority of the people were residents of Bombay, it was supplied, free of cost, for a while at the rate of 20 gallons per person per day till so long as the camp was in existence. It was stipulated that any water consumed over and above this was to be charged at the rate of 6 annas per 1000 gallons."*^ The Thana Municipality however was not shown a similar liberality. Therefore, when it requested the Bombay Corporation to supply water, free of cost, from April to June and thereafter at the rate of 4 annas per thousand gallons, the Corporation declined and decided to supply water at the rate of 12 annas per 1000 gallons. On account of the amount of water used for the Plague operations, villages like Andheri were so badly affected that a charitable Parsi had to erect a standpipe connected with the Tansa main to provide water to the people. "

Plagued by Improvement

The plague further vilified the traditional sources of water in the city and the Municipal Commissioner was empowered to prevent the use of such tanks and wells. Uncertainty about the causes of the epidemic, led to the execution of harsh sanitary measures in the city especially in the area of water connections. Empowered by Sections 421-434 of the Municipal Act. the Commissioner could inspect the areas affected by the epidemic and forbid the use of water for drinking purposes and prescribe special temporary regulations.

'"* R Nathan. The Plague in India 1896-97, Vol. I, Government Central Printing Office. Simla. 1898. pp 144- 146. Hereafter. Nathan Plague I 19 Procs SC. op. cit. Record of 1897-98. Vol. XXI. Part 2. p 973 i;() Ibid, p 7 Plague CCouchman . op. cit. General Plague Report. No. 5017 of 1897. p 17 Nathan Plague, op. cit. Vol. I. pp 134-35

167 Water connections in the "worst" category of houses were cut off. These were buildings which, constructed in a flimsy manner, leaked from top to bottom as people here apparently avoided turning off the tap. They had also earned the ire of the Corporation by rejecting the proposal of water meters.'"^ In 1897. therefore 327 connections were cut off to render houses drier and less unhealthy. The Commissioner was convinced that a large quantity of unmetered water was recklessly wasted by the people. Instead 246 standpipes were erected. ' This measure continued in the subsequent years as well. The next year another 204 water connections were cut off and substituted by 151 stand pipes. '' Thus, the epidemic further contributed to the making of water supply public; a measure that was resented by the people from Kamathipura. which however, went unheard.' ^ But there were also some private parties, on the other hand, who asked for the erection of standpipes from the Municipality.'^^ Large quantities of water were used for flushing drains and gutters.

Drainage and sewerage operations intensified. House connections in the Mandvi District were put into working condition at the expense of the house owners. Likewise, sanitary arrangements in various parts of the city were remodelled at a cost to the owners. House gullies were remodelled and repaired and manholes were constructed. The Government's policy of pressing ahead with the house connections, at this time, hurt people financially. At Parel village, the residents petitioned to the Government against the policy of being made to pay for the house connections, since they had already incurred considerable expenses on account of the plague operations. But threatened with magisterial action, they requested the Municipality to carry out these operations.'"** But the latter refused to do.

'"^ Plague Couchman. op. cit, pp 23-24 '-^ MCR, op. cit. 1897-98, pp xiii- xiv

'-'RABP, op. cit, 1898-99, p 87 '-^ Procs SC op. cit. Record. 1897-98, Part 2. Vol. XXI, pp 528-29 '-^ Ibid, p 260 Ibid. Letter to the President and Members of the Municipal Corporation for the city of Bombay, 17" September 1897, from Rowji Raghunath Rao. Narayan Abaji and 45 others, p 499

168 The plague also proved to be a turning point from the point of view of construction of sanitary housing. From now the building bye-laws began attaching greater importance to the space, ventilation plinth and water supply arrangements of the houses. For, the latter it was specified that all washing places, courtyard and nahanis were to be paved with stones or with tiles or drained and cemented. Privies or water closets were to have open air space of at least three feet all around. Each building was to have sufficient privy or water closet accommodation. The drainage of each building was to be in proper working order. No wells or tanks were to be within the distance of 8 feet from any privy. '"'' But once again the responsibility for structural improvements was thrown on the people.

More draconian measures followed with the implementation of the Epidemic Diseases Act, (EDA) as several buildings were characterized as Unfit for Human Habitation (UHH) and owners of such buildings were prohibited from occupying them. The Commissioner was also authorized to order the demolition of buildings if he felt that they could not be adapted to sanitary requirements. Surveys, conducted by the house inspection establishment, engaged by the Commissioner, for this purpose, condemned 90% of the houses.'^*^ But the 'professional reports" on insanitary houses, made by Sanitary Inspectors, who were by no means experts, were not always reliable. These randomly served notices only inflicted unreasonable demands on the house owners, who appealed to the Corporation to remedy the situation. Unfortunately, the Epidemic Diseases Act did not provide for any redressal mechanism. "

Even the administration of the EDA. manifested blatant discrimination. While a large number of notices were served upon poor rate payers, only few Government

CD 1901, Vol. 73. Memo of Instructions for the guidance of officers of the Municipal Executive Engineers Department, appointed to examine buildings in Bombay with regard to their tltness for human habitation, n.d., pp 101-104 Ibid. Draft Representation from the President to the BMC, to the Secretary to the Government. GD. no date, pp 90-91 Ibid. Letter from Municipal Commissioner for the City of Bombay. No. 25972A. 29"^ December 1900. pp 123-24 ''- 1M.I. op. cit. 1?"' February 1901. pp 112-113

169 buildings were targeted and fewer still examined. Native barracks continued to be in the same insanitary condition as before. Thus, it showed the existence of 2 kinds of administration; one for the poor rate payers and yet another for the high officials of the Government. A large number of people, unable to carry out the required improvements, had to thus sell their houses. ' '

Keen to support the cause of sanitary housing, while at the same time sympathising with the lot of the poor, the Corporation found itself in a supreme predicament. It therefore, requested the Commissioner that the poor be financially assisted on a feasible rate of interest. By 1901 the Corporation was even in favour of the cessation of the move towards the improvement of insanitary houses; a suggestion not countenanced either by the Commissioner or the Government which regarded the measure as a preventive rather than a suppressive one.'^"*

The Sanitary Messiah: Bombay Improvement Trust (1898)

In the meanwhile, the mill industry having suffered tremendously with a wholesale fiight of mill operatives from the island, found itself in a critical condition. Bombay being an intermediary port, its trade in exports of foreign merchandize suffered a decline due to plague. Driven by self interest, sanitary housing for these workers emerged as a prime area of concern for the Government now.

Sanitary housing, with water supply, sewerage and ventilation as its major constituents, was simply an extension of the earlier Victorian idea of sanitation, which linked defective house accommodation with crime, pauperism and disease. Although its importance for workers was understood, and the efforts of Mr. Peabody and Ms. Burdett Coutts. in the same direction in England'^"^ were appreciated and had also engaged the attention of the Scoble Commission in 1869. nothing much had been done because of the precarious financial status of the Municipality. The plague now catalyzed the move towards sanitary housing for workers. In 1897, a committee was appointed by the Government of Lord Sandhurst for the purpose of considering

" L Michael, op. cit. pp 238-39 "^GD 1901. Vol. 73. G.D. Note, 14-01-1901. p 107 '^ Deaths in Bomba\. op. cit. during 1856. p ix

170 and suggesting practical measures for the improvement of the city. The report of this committee resulted in the constitution of the City improvement Trust for Bombay . officially on 9"^ November 1898.

The main objective of the Trust was to provide sanitation by making new streets, opening out crowded localities, and reclaiming lands from the sea. This would provide for the expansion of the city and construction of dwellings for the poor. The Trust was both into chawl construction and the development of the Northern parts of the island and took up schemes at Dadar, Matunga, Sion, Sewri, Wadala and Dharavi areas. The Government looked at it as a messiah of sanitation, whose greatest aim was to be "a maximum result at a minimum expenditure." The role of the Corporation was relegated to the provision of water supply and drainage schemes to these areas.'"

Unfortunately, no mature consideration was given by the Trust to its schemes of improvement, which completely lacked sanitary planning. Neither the Corporation nor the public was given any opportunity of fully considering and discussing them. Till as late as 1914, dominated by "economic elites", the Trust, '^'^ which had come into possession of estates aggregating a tenth of the total area of the island, could however provide housing to only a lO' of the population. Of about 3 % crores spent by the Trust, I VA crores had gone towards communication schemes and only VA crore towards Improvement Schemes, by this time. The desirability or necessity of these communication schemes, at the expense of improvement schemes, was questioned by Indian legislators such as Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola.'""'

'^''BLCProcs., op. cit, I911,p31 '" L Michael, op. cit. Letter no. 5242 of 1897, GD from J De C Atkins, Secretary to Government, to the President of the Municipal Corporation, 28' September 1897, p 242 Caroline E. Arnold, The Bombay Improvement Trust, Bombay Millowners And The Debate Over Housing Bombay's Millworkers, 1896-1918. Essays in Economic & Business History Vol. XXX 2012. p 110.

'-'RABP, op. cit, 1915-16, pix '^" RBDC, op. cit. Minute of Dissent by Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola. lO"' May 1914, p xxv

171 These communication schemes, which improved the commercial infrastructure of the city, interfered with sub surface drainage by 1920s.''*' Further, the road construction activity of the Trust cut up the water mains and therefore led to a new form of road construction, in which the mains were placed in small subways, under the foot path, along with other service mains such as the gas, electrical cables etc. It is interesting to note that the new roads were completed at a period when the motor car had made a timely and firm entry into the city. This led to the development of an industry in automobile showrooms naturally occupying new areas developed by the Trust.'"'^ Thus, even though the road network increased to 168 miles of roads,'•*•* the problem of housing still lingered.

Construction of sanitary dwellings, inspired by European experience, failed miserably, right from its inception for several reasons. High rents proved to be a deterrent right from the beginning as a result of which, the Indian mill hands could not occupy the chawls. The Trust defended the high rents by professing to have created sanitary chawls, with privies and water taps on every floor. It thus claimed to have set minimum sanitary standards for the poorest class of people, who would learn to appreciate the higher standards of comfort, so that when their wages rose they would demand the same and be willing to pay for it.'"*"^

As for the poor state of sanitary housing, blame was conveniently put on the private builders. This was partly true, as the defective bye- laws of the Municipality, and the lack of desire among the private builders, to build as per the 'sanitary standards" of the Trust, increased congestion in Bombay. Private builders preferred to build on land which was easily available, outside the Trust estates, and to build to the lower standards permitted by the Municipal bye- laws. Absence of sanitary standards and

'^' Ira Klein. Death in India. 1871-1921, Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 32. No. 4. August 1973. p 646 ' " BIT. op. cit. Administration Report For 1915, p 1 15 '•*^ The first automobile had been brought to Bombay in 1897-98 by Mr. Forster of Greaves Cotton and Company. Registration of cars commenced in 1905 and Motor taxis were introduced in 1911, Sharda Dwivedi. op. cit. p 166 '^^RABP, op. cit. 1915-16. p 33 "^ BIT. op. cit. Administration Report For 1911. pp 85-86

172 failure to amend the Municipal law. to define sanitary housing norms, on account of opposition of members such as Ibrahim Rahimtoola compounded the problem. 46

The Trust thus easily explained that the dishoused people could not be induced to go far from their original areas near the chief business centres. Consequently, the demand for housing was the greatest in the areas where demolition had taken place on sanitary grounds. But much of this land was taken up for building roads and open spaces to improve sanitation. Thus, the new accommodation was quantitatively much lesser than the demolished accommodation. This made rehousing all the more problematic and demanded improved communication so that these people could be rehoused elsewhere. This argument was expediently used by the Trust to 'improve communication" via the construction of roads, with a view to developing residential estates outside the congested areas.'^^

Both the plague and the operations of the Trust created deep financial problems for the Corporation. To make matters worse, the Municipality, which was pledged to provide a fund of 2% to the Trust's finances, as a part of its contribution, unburdened itself by imposing additional taxation of 2 % on the rateable value of the property in the city. Nonetheless, the Government only echoed the Trust's desire claiming that the taxation in Bombay was light. "As compared with European cities - — the rate payers of Bombay, being the principal beneficiaries, could afford and could very reasonably be required to undertake the finances of the proposed Improvement Trust."

Yet these had long term implications for the city's water supply systems, which then needed to be overhauled. Although the need to provide additional reservoirs, to stabilise the water supply to the city, had been pointed out by Santo Crimp in 1899, the Corporation could not do so. because nothing definite was known about the development of the northern part of the island. Since the improvement of the city

'^''BLC Procs. op. cit. 191 l.pp 49-50 BIT. op. cit. Administration Report For 1916. The Dishousing And Rehousing Of The Middle Class Population In Bombay ( Appendix 0-2). pp 121 -122 Edwardes Gazetteer op. cit. Vol. III. p 26 '^' BLC Procs. op. cit. 1898 Vol. XXXVl. Speech of the Governor, pp 13-15

173 was in the hands of the Trust, the Corporation could not determine its future course of action with regard to the water supply schemes.'•^'^' In 1912. a critical situation was created once again. With the Tansa duplication scheme and sewerage and drainage of the city under consideration, a loan of at least Rs. 160 lakhs was required by the Corporation. But unfortunately the financial demands of the Trust had eroded the city's taxable capacity.'^'

Pecuniary liabilities apart, the Municipality also had to provide extra staff for the sanitary upkeep of the work done by the Trust. It was forced to keep an exact record of the establishment for all new streets and contiguous ones as also a correct record of water consumed by the streets as distinguished from the old ones. Thus, while the liabilities of the Municipality assumed an unlimited shape, those of the Government continued to be defined and small.

The Trust, therefore, as Chandavarkar has argued, only 'strengthened the social apartheid' and redrew the contours of the city's 'social geography'.''^ In the words of Susan Chaplin, it gave rise to the policy of slum clearance, as an instrument of modernization of towns.'" Sanitary policing, via sanitary surveys, gained importance.'^'* Displacement emerged as one of the biggest defects of the Improvement Schemes, which did not give due consideration to the fact that dispossessed people had to live somewhere. As a result, improvements in one area added to overcrowding in others. "^"^ The Governor of Bombay, however, is reported to have stated, that the Trust had brought 'our great city into line with modern progress'. As always, overcrowding was attributed to the increase in population. 156

"'" L Michael, op. cit. Letter to the Municipal Secretary. No. 11413 of 1900-01. from the Municipal Commissioner, William Harvey. 2"'' August 1900, pp 109-110 '^' BLC Procs, op. cit. Journal 1912. Speech of Chimanlal Setalvad. p 515. ^~ Chandavarkar, Indian City, op. cit. pp 54-55 •' Chaplin Cities, op. cit, p 60 ' "* BIT. op. cit. Administration Report For 1901. p4 '^^ GD 1920. Compilations. No. 797. Report on Sanitary Matters. No. LL 1068. from CN Sedon, Acting Commissioner CD.. 12"^ October 1916. p 75 '^*' BLC Procs. op. cit. .lournal 1912. Speech by His Excellency the President, p 691.

174 Eventually, the Trust, after having created unhealthy and ugly tenements, was amalgamated with the Municipality in October 1933. 157

THE WHITE ELEPHANT: BDD

BUiLDiMSS fca *Cȣ

Sanitary housing for the poor, in consequence, aCBAI 'OWN a ISLAMO continued to be an unfulfilled dream. In the decade from 1911-1921, about 4 lakhs of people migrated to the city of Bombay. The strain on accommodation was thus enormous but this period did not witness a commensurate rise in residential building. These only increased by 11 per cent, despite "improvement' schemes. On the other hand, mills and factories increased by 328 per cent, godowns (warehouses) used by commercial enterprises, railways, tramways and docks. grew by over 400 per cent. 158

Diseases bred easily in such circumstance Sickness and mortality was the highest among ]y| 5. Buildings per acre in 1921 in the lower castes that constituted the principal the sections of Town and Island of Bombay. Deeply shaded areas had mill hands in Bombay, due to their appalling above 15 buildings living and working conditions. Malaria Census of India 1921, Vol. IX, Pt. I Fevers. Phthisis, Cholera. Smallpox and Plague were the common ailments. These epidemics, coupled with the failure of monsoon and depletion of stocks, due to abnormal grain exports during the war and to inter provincial export of grains, translated into a sudden burst of industrial unrest. ^ Poor wages, long hours of work and lack of primary education led to acute

157 MCR, op. cit. 1933-34. pi 158 Sandip Hazareesingh. Colonial Modernism And The Flawed Paradigms Of Urban Renewal. Uneven Development in Bombay. 1900-25. Urban History. 28. 2 (2001). p 244 154 RABP. op. cit, 1918-19. pvii

175 dissatisfaction among the labourers. Roughly 60 strikes, involving, almost 200.000. for economic reasons, convulsed the city. The most important of these, was the mill strike in Bombay city of 1919 involving 120.000 hands, which lasted a month."'"

At this time, one of the chief reasons for unrest, among the industrial labour in Bombay, proved to be the deplorable state of housing in the city, which encouraged them to migrate to their native places. "Better housing" (for factory labour), had been categorically pointed out as a "most urgent necessity" by the Report of the Industrial Commission of 1916-18. especially in the large congested industrial cities. It also insisted on the need for domestic sanitation, in large towns, on moral as well as economic grounds, if the existing and future industries of India were to hold their own in the ever-growing and fierce competition that had emerged during this period. Thus, the question of Industrial Housing emerged as one of paramount

^ 161 importance.

The Government approach to this issue was based on the presumption that, the class that was to be housed would appreciate properly constructed sanitary dwellings only with the passage of time. Since the question of housing concerned the private sector, other Government servants being provided with housing, the issue of finance emerged as a crucial one. Thus, it was decided that the industry which employed the largest labour force would be taxed as they would ultimately benefit by having, at their command, a more contented, healthy and intelligent labour force. Those which adequately housed their own labour were to be exempted from taxation. Since these houses were to be constructed for the lower middle class the idea of cooperative housing societies was also to be encouraged from now on.'''" The other guiding principles were, the choice of the cheapest available' ground, the cheapest substantial materials and the cheapest methods of building, consistent with the attainment of a reasonable standard of comfort" which had to be distinguished from necessaries.

'"'ibid. 1919-20, pvii ''"' AE Mirams. Plans and Specifications of Houses Suitable For Occupation by The Working Classes. Government Central Press. Bombay 1925. pp I- 2 "'" GD Compilations 1920. No. 1258, Letter no. 628 from Mr. Sharpe. Secretar> to Government, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay. 12''^ August 1920. pp 13- 18.

176 Besides, to avoid travel expense, workers had to be housed as near their mills and factories as possible. But since erection of such building, in the heart of the city, would have resulted in the depreciation of the other high cost houses, land, which was not easily accessible by main roads, or with divided ownership, sites next to the railway station, the graveyards or other open spaces had to be chosen as ideal housing sites for the poor mill hands. '^^

The axe fell on the powerful cotton mill industry in Bombay which, at this time contributed, by way of municipal rates and taxes Rs. 3 Vi lakhs or 1/16''^ part of the total property tax. In their own 'enlightened interests" the mill owners had realized the necessity of housing their operatives in more sanitary conditions. But uptil the First World War only two mill companies had satisfied these requirements. ^' Unwilling to bear the burden of housing for labour they had backed the Improvement Trust and had wanted it to continue to devote special attention in this matter. In 1907, in response to the questions of the Bombay Development Committee, the Association had recommended the Salsette region for the relocation of all offensive trades, and migration to the latter region to alleviate the problem of overcrowding. They also upheld the responsibility of the Railway companies and the Municipality in this area, and even mooted for legislation to solve the problem. People like Dinshaw Waccha felt that it was no business of the employers to house their operatives. In fact it was the duty of the Government to do so. Another pervasive feeling was. that "Better housing will not improve the physical conditions of the operatives unless they understand how to make full use of the facilities provided." At this critical juncture they grudgingly showed willingness to contribute Rs. 1 per month per head of 20% of the operatives, provided, the Government acquired land using their power, the Municipality forfeited all taxes and supplied

J.E P. Orr, Social Reform and Slum Reform Part I General, a Lecture delivered to The Social Service League. Bombay. In The ' Servants Of India Society's Hall, on 3'^'' September 1917. The Times Press. Bombay, pp 7-9 "'^RBMA,op. cit.1918. p 17 ""'RBMA. op. cit. 1914. pv

177 water, free of charge, for a period of 15 years and. above all. the Government helped financially.

'Ware Housing' and Sanitation

Determined to provide such one-room tenements in Bombay. Governor Lloyd George, who was fond of impressive measures, created a department "new and up to-date" for the purpose of carrying out this programme even though the Public Works Department could have been entrusted with this work.'^^ The Government justified its move by saying that employers could not be ideal house builders. Hence an outside agency was requi red.'"'^ The year 1920. thus, saw the establishment of the Bombay Development Department (BDD). The duties of the Development Department were primarily of a financial nature. Having received keen attention from the Secretary of State, it was to facilitate the process of loans to the local bodies for the purpose of development. It was mandated to carry out the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme and any other reclamation which might be found necessary in or near Bombay city, and undertake the whole of the industrial housing scheme.'^'^

Once again, the relationship of the new department with the Municipality was unclear. To begin with, the latter had not been informed about the DD. It was therefore in a fix. As before, the new body had to be helped financially for which a sum of Rs. 28 lakhs was to be raised. Part of this amount, was to be raised by increasing the duties on cotton, of which the Corporation was to be allocated a sum of Rs. 12 lakhs. As usual the liabilities which the Corporation was saddled with were tremendous, even though it was not to have any representation in the Development Department. Over and above this, the Corporation had to bear the obligatory duties of providing sanitary services or whatever was required for the development

'^''RBMA op. cit, 1918, pxi-xiii Report of the Special Advisory Committee on the Industrial Housing Scheme, Government Central Press, Bombay 1927. Report by Mr. Manu Subedar on the Housing Scheme, p 26. Hereafter. RIHS, "'** Labour Gazette, Vol. I. April 1922. No. 8. p 28. Hereafter. LG "' BLC Procs.. op. cit.. 1920. Vol. LVI. Speech of the Governor, pp 563-65 '^" Ibid. Speech of Mr. Phiroze C. Sethna, p 571

178 of these schemes. The Government insisted that "We recognize that these things have got to be satisfied by the Municipality. It is no use our preparing new lands for development if you cannot help to make them habitable."'^'

Sanitary Schemes

The Industrial Housing Scheme however, started on the wrong foot. This was so. since it assumed that all land taken up for the scheme would be fully developed with roads, water supply mains, sewers; storm water drains etc. Therefore, no provision was made for these vital items of sanitation in the estimates, which only included the cost of construction and land. "" Nevertheless, armed with power of compulsory land acquisition, the BDD, like the BIT, set about providing more insanitary houses for the workers.

At any rate, it was not easy to secure the 300 hundred acres of land, required for the purpose, in suitable areas. Naigaum (3500 tenements), Worii (13,000 tenements), Sion Matunga (2000), The Flats (2000) Sewri Wadala (6,600) Dharavi (7000) were chosen finally, where a total of 34,000 tenements were proposed. For the balance, the land outside the island was to have been found subsequently, assuming that industrial development would take place outside the town. The Naigaum and WorIi estates belonged to the BIT, while the DeLisle road plots belonged to private owners and the BMC. The Sewri plot belonged to the BPT which was handed over to the DD. The Dharavi plot and those on Haines road and Sewri Wadala were never acquired owing to the programme of the curtailment of the construction as early as 1924. The Naigaum estate had been more or less fully developed by the Trust. All the DD had to take care of. was the drainage sewerage and water supply. Since no sewage disposal arrangement existed north of the island for many years, the DD had to construct a sceptic tank which existed even in the 1930s. But the water supply gave considerable trouble due to the insufficient pressure from the mains of the

'^' ibid. Speech of the President in Council, pp 576-77 '^- PWD DD 1927-30, File No. 53/36 Pt. I Bombay Industrial Housing Scheme, p 2. Hereafter. BIHS. It seems that determined to resolve the problem of industrial housing, the government launched upon chawl building at a furious rate of 1 chav\l per 5 working days. RIHS. op. cit. p 26

179 Municipality and hence could not reach the storage tanks on the chawl roofs. The DeLisle road plots were in a most insanitary condition, as the land was marshy and had been used for dumping refuse and obnoxious material and due to the existence of dirty storm water drains. Here, little or no water could be drawn, since it was supplied by a small water pipe, and the DD was constrained to build 2 reinforced concrete reservoirs with sufficient pumping machinery. Sceptic tanks had to be constructed as well, to treat the sewage, since the perennially surcharged municipal sewer was at a very high level.

Drainage, all the same, remained a bone of contention between the DD and the Corporation especially at the DeLisle Road plot. The DD refused to close open municipal drains of the DeLisle road area, as it was considered a municipal responsibility. The latter, on the other hand, was keen on postponing the issue for a later date.' Matters reached such a head, that certain chawls at DeLisle Road had to be left vacant for want of a drainage system to serve that area. Thus, a loss of Rs. 3360/- per month was sustained by the DD.'^^ Failure of ejectors led to flooding and therefore mosquito breeding here '''^ for which the Corporation refused to take responsibility either.' At Sewri too. matters were equally bad. Thus, not a single site given to the DD had been fully developed and few facilities were offered in terms of water supply and sewage and drainage. The absence of these facilities naturally redounded unfavourably on the cost of the scheme of housing as well as the maintenance charges for the first few years of occupation.

Sanitary Arrangements

The DD chawls were based on the design of the police chawls containing four storeys, on account of the scarcity of land. This design was initially approved by the

'"BIHS. op. cit. pp4-8 '^^ PWD DD 1925, File No. B-3/9, DD UOR. W-4-4/1461, 12''^ March 1923, p I "' PWD DD 1922-24, File No. B-3/3. Letter No. B-3 to the Municipal Commissioner for the City of Bombay, from the DD. T' September 1923. p 20 176 Ibid. DD UOR No. W-4-4 / 5658, 16"' September 1924. p 35 177 Ibid, Letter No. E of 2976/o. from the Municipal Commissioner for the City of Bombay to the Deputy Director of Development. 18-10-1924. p 61

180 Governor of Bombay, as well as others associated with the scheme. Designed by Major Johnstone, each room was 16"into 10"into 10' feet containing a nahani, with a screen wall and a loft and a fire place with a flue. At the end of the chawl. was a block of WCs and bath room, likewise provided with taps, and a spiral staircase fitted to give access to sweepers. After the first chawls were completed it became apparent that if the original number of chawls were done in the same manner then the city would be studded, in prominent places, with large unsightly structures and therefore an attempt was made to provide more pleasing elevations.

Soon it was also discovered that the practice of providing nahanis was not approved by the health authorities of the Bombay Municipality, owing to the insanitary uses to which the nahanis were put by the tenements, who choked the traps, down pipes and drains by the cinders and sand with which they cleaned their vessels. Later chawls therefore, did not have nahanis. This design was then termed as the Harvey design". This was highly approved by many members of the public bodies and regarded as a step in the 'right direction". Apparently, the first tenements too did not find fault with the arrangements and seemed to be satisfied with the accommodation provided and willing to pay high rents. But once the immediate demands had been fulfilled, it was difficult to find tenants for the remaining chawls, which were rapidly being completed and placed in the market. Faults now began to be found with the design and therefore the design was re-modified to provide a 'nahani" along with benches for water pots in each room and additional WCs on each floor.'^'' Further, tenants suffered from an acute scarcity of water for cleaning, drinking and bathing purposes. Questions regarding these agitated the Legislative Assembly. But the Government expected the Corporation to solve these problems."*"

True enough, in 1923, although the rooms in the chawls tilled up quickly, thereafter the rate was slow. In 1925. due to the industrial strike, the Government suffered severe losses. So it was suggested that, as an experimental measure, one chawl in each scheme be converted into a 2 or 3 room tenement with separate water tap for

'^^'BIHS, op. cit. pp2l-23 '^'ibid, pp 26-27

'''^"LG. op. cit. August 1923. Vol. II. No. 12. p3I

181 each tenement, in order to attract the better paid members of the working classes. However, occupancy remained low since the rent of the chawis. Rs. 14. was almost 3 times as much as the average monthly rent paid by the working class then. The Government defended itself by claiming that the private chawis demanded a rent of Rs. 20 '^" and echoing the argument of the Improvement Trust, it stoutly maintained that sanitary tenements with water supply, drainage and roads, could not be provided at a cheaper rate.

Water supply: The Case of Worli

The case of the Worli chawis epitomizes the conflicts between the Bombay Corporation and the DD over the issue of water supply. In 1923, it was not possible to supply water to the Worli chawis due to insufficiency of water, pending the completion of the Tansa duplication scheme. So serious was the water shortage, it being supplied only in small quantities at night, that the DD even considered closing down construction or to allow the already constructed chawis to stand empty.

To solve the water supply problem permanently, the DD conceived a centralized storage for Worli, DeLisle Road and Naigaum schemes, since these chawis were concentrated on particular sites only. With no other suitable site for naturally elevated reservoirs, elevated reinforced concrete reservoirs, one for about 20 chawis. were envisaged. Tanks, it was felt could be placed on the chawis roofs for flushing water for the latrines. Later, the plan changed to one main elevated reservoir on the Worli Hill. Here, the BDD sought cooperation from the BIT and the BMC. It was felt that the Trust could help in the matter by offering a site for the reservoir on the Hill and. at the same time, could also join the scheme to use the reserve water in their housing area. By combining the distribution systems, costs could have been economised."*^

'^' RIHS. op. cit. p3 - Bombay Legislative Council. Debates Official Report. Vol. X. Government Central Press. 30"' July-6"' August 1923. p 470. Hereafter. BLC Debates '**^ PWD DD 1924. File No. 37/ Worli. DD Note W-6-3/ 5664. 8"' December 1922, pp 81-85

182 However, the requirements of the Trust and the DD clashed. The buildings of the former body were about 55 feet higher than the DD chawls and apparently required lesser water; around 1/7''^ the requirements of the DD chawls. Hence, a common supply would have called for a much higher reservoir, which, in turn, would have meant additional pumping, which was not economical. The DD was therefore instructed to construct small elevated balancing reservoirs in the middle of the chawl

184 area.

But the question finally boiled down to water shortage, the source of which lay in the insufficiently sized municipal pipes that supplied water to the Worli estate. A harried Corporation, at this juncture, had to choose between supply to these chawls or the suburbs, for which it had allotted 2.7 million gallons a day, to be distributed via the agency of the DD. Favourably inclined to the DD estates, within the city, than those outside the city in Salsette, it seemed to be disposed to allot 500,000 gallons of water per day to the Worli area. For this however the supply to the suburbs would have to be cut down.'**^ However, the DD and the BMC could not agree on the manner in which the supply could be augmented. While the DD desired additional mains to be laid through the Mahim Woods, to increase the overall supply to Worli. the Municipality on the other hand insisted on laying mains within the chawl area, which would not have helped till additional mains were laid, outside.'**^ It persistently ignored the demand of the DD. As a result, the alternative schemes to provide a permanent supply of water to Worli '**^came to a dead end. Not only this, the Municipality was also determined to pay only 25 gallons per head, a quantity it deemed sufficient for the chawls, instead of the 30 gallons, the DD asked for. '^'^ Frustrated with the attitude of the Corporation, the DD now put pressure on the

'^•^ Ibid. Note from JF Watson. Trust Engineer. 11/1/ 1923. p 93 Ibid. Letter from H.B. Clayton. Municipal Commissioner to the Director of development, 31-1-1923. pp 11-12 "*'' Ibid, Official Note from DD. UOR No. W-6-3/ 1330, 5-3-1923, p 31 '^^ Ibid. Letter from DD to HB Clayton, 6*'^ March 1923, p 35 ^^^ Ibid. Note on the Proposal For Permanent Water Supply to Worli Chawl estate. 26/2/1923. pp 101-05 "*''Ibid. DDNote. W-6-3/3458of22"''May 1924. pp 147-149

183 Government to compel the Municipality to pay for the mains which the DD would have to lay instead.' " The mains remained a source of conflict between the Municipality and the DD.

The water woes did not end here. Heavy water charges were imposed by the BMC on the DD chawls, in comparison to private chawls. The latter too had to pay the Municipality irrespective of the occupancy of the chawls which naturally impinged on its finances. To compensate for the high water rates, charged by the Corporation, the DD had two alternatives; either increasing rents proportionately or restricting water supply to 7 gallons per day per head. In both the cases it was the poorer classes who would suffer.'^' Excessive rates led to non occupancy which impacted the Corporation also since it led to a reduction in its receipts of General Tax, forcing the latter to relent. The Commissioner, therefore, decided that the water tax on the DD chawls be the same as that imposed on private chawls and the BIT chawls and also that an unlimited supply of water be made to these chawls of the poor, even though this would entail losses for the Municipality.''^^

Regardless of these measures, water shortages, remained a permanent feature, owing to the lack of pressure in the municipal mains. Moreover, due to the want of low level sewers of adequate capacity, in the neighbourhood of the chawl areas, only temporary water supply arrangements could be made to the chawls. It was also declared that these conditions would prevail indefinitely as rectification would entail considerable work and expenses in the years to come. ''^'' Draw off, by tenants in the lower storeys, of an undue share of supply also created further problems.

'''*' Ibid. DDNote W-6-3/2330 of 3''' April 1924. p 131 ''*' Procs S.C. op. cit. Jan to March 1926. Letter No. 37 Chawls (D.B.) from Acting Deputy Director of the Development Commissioner. 18''^ May 1925. pp 1585-86, '''-ibid. Letter from the Commissioner No. A& C. 6"'November 1925. pp 1584-85 Ibid. Report of the Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee regarding a proposal to levy on valuation the water and Halalkhor taxes in respect of the Development Department chawls. Bombay. 28"^ January 1926. pp 1768-70 Report on the Working of the Development Directorate. The Times of India Press. 1923. pp 6- 10. Hereafter. DD Reports

184 In the long run. of the 16,244 houses provided by the DD. only 6000-7000 were occupied while the rest remained vacant. The houses, built with a commercial intent, were in the words of Burnett Hurst "pestilential plague spots", with little or no plinth and therefore liable to flooding. Shortage of water and an insufficiency of taps remained a frequent complaint. '^ Such was the density of human beings packed into them, that Patrick Geddes referred to them as "not housing but warehousing people", while the eminent architect Claude Batley described them as "single room tenements from which neither heaven nor earth could be seen'"."^ Thus, Bombay was flooded with a large number of sick buildings.

The 'experimental nature" of these chawls actually did a lot of damage to the construction of buildings, in the rest of the city, by raising the cost of construction. Tenders of the Indian Companies were rejected, even though some of the firms that had applied were extremely efficient and enterprising.'^^ Having evoked a lot of criticism the BDD was abolished on P' March 1930, and its work distributed between other departments of the Government

CONGRESS AND INDUSTRIAL HOUSING: 1938

In the 1930s, despite the problem of severe overcrowding the DD chawls hung like an albatross round the Government's neck due to non occupancy, forcing the Government to use all kinds of methods to force people to live in them. The recession of the 1930s prompted a change of housing policy. In 1933. the Government proposed to withdraw that all kinds of housing concessions except those granted to menials. The latter, were to be forced to occupy the rent free accommodation at these chawls at DeLisle Road, Naigaum and Sewri, which in any

1 • 198 case were lying vacant.

'"^•^ A. R. Burnett -Hurst, Labour And Housing In Bombay, A Study In The Economic Conditions Of The Wage Earning Classes In Bombay, London P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1925, p 24 '"^^ Sharda Dwivedi. op. cit. pp 196-198 '''^ RIHS. op. cit. Report by Mr. Manu Subedar on the Housing Scheme, pp 27-28 '''^ Report of the Reorganization Committee. Bombay. Government Central Press. 1933. pp 99-103

185 In September 1937, when the Congress Government came to power, it was petitioned by 800 people, for the reduction of the rent of the Worii chawls. The Government responded by appointing the Industrial Housing Committee to deal with the problem of housing of the industrial labour in Bombay. Worli. at this time, was a splendid example of contrasts. While palatial buildings were being built on the hill side of Chowpatti, where fresh air poured in the whole day the DD chawls were close by a stinking drain.'^'^ Chawls number 117. 118 and 119 were so offensive in nature that they were not occupied. Infested with mosquitoes,^"' they had been rejected for the purpose of jail accommodation as well, till the drain was tilled; a task entrusted to the Bombay Municipality.

But the biggest problem here was the scanty water supply, caused due to smallness of mains, and lack of lighting arrangements. In order to deal with the question of water supply, especially on the top floor, the Congress won a promise from the BMC for the construction of a new reservoir at Worli. Further, to popularize these chawls, the Prime Minister of Bombay and the minister for Public Works Department often paid visits here and addressed its tenants. '""

The efforts of the Congress were however in vain. The Bombay Sentinel of IS"^ September 1937 noted, that although the Government had employed highly paid Sanitary Engineers, no one ever thought of providing WCs for children who were allowed to answer the calls of nature around the chawls, thus making the compound dirty. Children could not use the WCs provided since the steps were too far apart. Similarly, the washing arrangements were most filthy since the tanks made available were wrongly assumed to be provided for the purpose of washing. The 'waste not

^''^ Vanessa R Caru, The Making Of A Working Class Area, The Worli BDD Chawls (1920-1940), in Neera Adarkar (Edt.) The Chawls of Mumbai Galleries of Life, Imprint One, Gurgaon, 2011, p 33 -"" PWD Development Branch, 1937-38, 2032/36 Pt. I, Bombay Chronicle, 6"'^ October 1937, p 77 -"' Home Department C Branch 1939. Files. 1687/ 4. Letter number 17492. from the IG of Prison Province of Bombay to the E.xecutive Engineer. PWl Presidency Division, Bombay, 29*'^ November 1938. p 1. Hereafter. HD -"- PWD Development Branch. 1937-38. File no. 2032/36 Pt IV, pp 1-4

186 taps", provided were highly unpopular and either smashed or otherwise lying useless. ~ Since all the water pipes were fixed at one place they caused great inconvenience to the people. People now demanded water pipe in every room and separate latrines for men and women. But this entailed an expense, which the Government did not favour.^""*

Many therefore felt that the problem of sanitary housing for labour in Bombay was an immensely difficult one and could not be solved by any tinkering measure. The only thing that could be done was to pull down the chawls and use the land for better purpose. No amount of alteration would ever make them popular.""^ In the light of this narrative, Dossal's claim, that housing for the middle and poor classes did receive considerable attention from the Government, between 1920-1940s, with the establishment of the Development Department, needs to be re-evaluated.^"*

Taking note of the new demands, there were some positive developments, by 1939. It was now definitely suggested that every new type' of tenement was to be provided a " Nahani ", a partition to separate the kitchen from the living room and impervious flooring; and the building with a sufficient number of latrines, washing and bathing places, metal dust bins and lights in common passages. In order to secure adequate water supply, a direct water-connection from the main for each fioor and a storage tank were also recommended as a part of minimum equipment of a building."'"

Uptil 1939, the problem of sanitary housing largely concerned the unhealthy housing conditions of the industrial labour and low income groups in and around the

-"' Ibid, Pt. I, pp 72-73 -'" Ibid, The Sadaqat. 17"" April 1938, p 156 -'" Ibid. Bombay Sentinel, 4"' February 1938. p 135 -'"' Mariam Dossal, EPW, September 3. 2005. A Master Plan For The City Looking At The Past, p 3899. A somewhat similar comment has been made on the urban problems of Bombay. Read Bombay's urbanization, an overview in Dr. MD David. Urban Explosion of Mumbai: Restructuring of Growth. Himalaya Publishing House. Mumbai 1996. pp 4-5 • Report of the Rent Enquiry Committee, Volume I Parts 1. II and III. Government Central Press, Bombay 1939. p 43

187 industrial zones. Post independence the Government changed its approach and began to deal with the general problem of housing.

CONCLUSION

A lot of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing narrative. Diseases like cholera, as Arnold rightly says, received a slow response from the Government since they were considered native diseases. However, there was a silver lining too, as cholera episodes stimulated water purification technology. The success of the latter depended on finance and efficient execution. Inadequacy of both the factors however, limited their success. Besides, technology itself was not flawless and needed up gradation from time to time. Malaria on the other hand emerges as a tool of control, which obliterated the traditional water supply sources. Plague catalysed the move towards sanitary housing with water supply, drainage and sewerage as some of its vital components. Nevertheless, bodies such as BIT, followed by the BDD, which came up immediately in the post plague years failed utterly in fulfilling their said objectives of providing sanitary housing. This was so as water supply was not a part of the planning process adopted by these bodies. Burdened with these developmental works, without adequate financial support, a beleaguered Corporation resorted to the politics of water supply.

Above all these diseases left an indelible footprint on the traditional water supply sources of the city i.e. they prompted the closure of these systems. Malaria and plague also dictated sanitary arrangements within the houses. Thus, the layout of the houses came to be greatly influenced by the manner in which water was to be supplied and discharged.

With the phenomenal growth of its population, the dilemma of insanitation continued to haunt the city. Therefore, it looked northwards to the suburban regions to alleviate its sanitary problems. The next chapter explores this suburban development through the water lens.

188