ch ar F se o e u R n r d e a v t r i e o s n b O THE DYNAMICS OF LTTE’S COMMERCIAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE BY VIJAY SAKHUJA ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER PAPER OCCASIONAL ORF APRIL 2006 www.orfonline.org Jaffna in Sri Lanka.3 in general public support for the LTTE in Tamil Nadu and THE DYNAMICS OF LTTE’S COMMERCIAL The LTTE’s maritime infrastructure was till then centered this forced the LTTE to dismantle much of its infrastructure MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE on small but fast vessels for operations across the Palk Bay, and logistics in India. Much of this was shifted to northern off Trincomalee and Batticaloa sea areas. At the same time, it Sri Lanka. The LTTE could no longer rely on Tamil Nadu and had begun to explore the possibility of acquiring larger vessels Kerala for logistic support. The ruthless combing operations too. Reportedly, the first large vessel purchased by the LTTE of Indian intelligence agencies and security forces resulted in in 1984 was named MV Cholan.4 This second-hand cargo ves- adversarial conditions for the LTTE. The loss of Indian logisti- his paper examines the maritime in- the Palk Strait. sel was purchased from a Mumbai-based shipping magnate. cal support was the primary reason for the LTTE to augment frastructure of the Liberation Tigers of The 1983 anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka had The LTTE also obtained permission from the Myanmar gov- its ocean-bound maritime fleet that could provide a reliable Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—tracing the history a major impact on the Tamil community. Tam- ernment to establish a modest shipping base in the island of logistical support for transporting arms and ammunition from Tof the development of its maritime organisation, ils living in Colombo and the Jaffna area began Twante located off the Irrawady delta. MV Cholan was essen- distant markets. infrastructure and strategy. The paper focuses on to flee the country and moved towards Tamil tially used for smuggling arms and other military requirements What emerged was a fleet of about a dozen vessels that were the salience of sea power as perceived by a vio- Nadu. Consequently, Tamil Nadu emerged as a as chartered ships had become risky. To cover this activity, the 1,000 to 1,500 tons dead weight tonnage (dwt). The LTTE also lent non-state actor and provides a perspective on safe haven for the Tamil refugees and the LTTE. vessel was also used for the legitimate transportation of gen- acquired some smaller vessels that could engage in coastal how non-state actors employ sea power in asym- There were strong anti-Sri Lanka feelings among eral cargo. At about the same time, the LTTE is also known to trade and also began its indigenous shipbuilding at extensive metric conflicts. the refugees. A sympathetic state government in have placed orders for construction of another vessel from a and camouflaged boatyards located along the Vanni coastline. The paper also highlights the LTTE’s under- Tamil Nadu provided the LTTE with money and shipbuilding yard on the Kerala coast that was later identified Reportedly, in an operation codenamed ‘Yal Devi’ on Septem- 5 OCCASSIONAL PAPER standing of the sea as an instrument of power in land to set up training camps. as Kadalpura. ber 28, 1993 the Sri Lankan Navy destroyed the LTTE’s Kilali the strategic thinking of its leaders. The paper Domestic conditions were also favourable to The sudden urge to acquire its own vessels was partly driv- boatyard and captured some 500 boats. Kilali had emerged as focuses on the impact of the post 9/11 maritime establish a network among the Indian and Sri en by the fact that the LTTE wanted to have its own shipping a primary shipbuilding yard of the LTTE and also a vital transit security regimes, including the Proliferation Se- Lankan Tamil fishermen who became an impor- vessels to facilitate both arms procurement as well as run its le- point by sea having access to Jaffna. This was quite evident in curity Initiative (PSI), the International Ship and tant source of strength for the LTTE. The LTTE gitimate maritime commercial activity. The fleet thus increased 1994, when the two land routes, namely the Elephant Pass and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code and impact of conducted operations with the assistance of the to five or six small freighters, which were registered under Pooneryn, which link Jaffna peninsula to the northern prov- the Flag of Convenience (FOC) registry on the local fishing community and enjoyed total im- the ownership of several dummy companies having their of- ince were closed. The Sea Tigers held on to the Kilali sea route LTTE’s fleet of ships. punity. The understanding between Indian and fices in Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong (Kilali lagoon) that linked to the Jaffna peninsula. According Tamil fishermen was such that it resulted in the Kong.6 These vessels carried timber and grain from Myanmar to a terrorism expert, Rohan Gunaratna: Sri Lanka government sending a note of concern and during the return voyage, brought back fertilizer, cement “By 1995, Sea Tiger dockyards had manufactured four types EARLY DEVELOPMENT to the Indian government.1 and other bulky goods . By the early 1990s, Phuket in southern of fibreglass craft: the 45kt Thrikka, with four crew, a single From very humble beginnings, the LTTE’s mari- A Sri Lankan report highlighted that Tamil Thailand also emerged as a port for LTTE’s commercial mari- machine-gun and used for deploying frogmen; the 10kt Sudai, time infrastructure has come a long way and to- Nadu was the hub of LTTE’s maritime activity.2 time activity. manned by a crew of six, armed with a single machine-gun day boasts of a sophisticated network. Its mari- The report unambiguously pointed out that the David alias Captain Piraisudi started the Tigers Shipping and used for attacks against naval craft; the 45kt Muraj, with time assets and organisation are quite capable and LTTE’s activities were flourishing with the knowl- Corporation.7 In February 1991, David was arrested in Madras 10 crew and three machine-guns, used for attacks against naval can well compete with the maritime facilities of edge of the political establishment of Tamil Nadu. and was interrogated by the Indian Intelligence Bureau. In his craft, logistics and for landing attack teams; and the two-man a small island state. The present-day LTTE com- M.G. Ramachandran, then the Chief Minister. confessional statement he disclosed: Idayan, a 45kt suicide craft fitted with explosives that detonate mercial maritime infrastructure includes a fleet of There were 25 LTTE training camps in Tamil “ ‘KP’ [KP alias T.S. Kumaran] has been dealing not only on impact with the target.”9 merchant ships, a large number of fishing trawl- Nadu in the districts of Anna, Chengalpattu, with the financial transactions of the LTTE but also in procur- The LTTE changed its operations towards the late 1990s ers, high-speed motor launches, and profession- Madurai, Puddukkotai, South Arcot, Salem, ing arms and ammunition, communication equipments, fibre- and in early 2000 in the apprehension that LTTE-owned ships ally trained crew to steer these vessels. The LTTE Thanjavur, Tiruchi and Ramanathapuram. The glass boats/engines and other essential electronic gadgets for would be monitored. The LTTE began to charter a number of may also have some vessels capable of carrying LTTE supply bases were in the districts of Tiru- his organisation. Most of the arms and ammunition required vessels to transport military goods. Although LTTE procure- one to two shipping containers. chi, Coimbatore, Dharampuri, Madurai, Periyar, by the Tigers are purchased through the underworld arms ment officers have been active in Africa and in South and Cen- In the early stages, the LTTE had at its disposal Pudukkotai, Thanjavur and Rameshwaram. Co- dealers operating in various European countries such as the tral America, there is very little intelligence of the LTTE pro- a large fleet of locally made small fishing boats, imbatore served as a source for ammunition and UK, West Germany, Yugoslavia, Belgium, France, Austria and curement and shipping activities in these regions. With arms trawlers and motor launches. These were used explosives; Dharmapuri for explosives, and Peri- Cyprus. ‘KP’ has been in this line since August 1986. Earlier transport spanning across the globe, LTTE ships cross both the to transport domestic cargo such as food grain, yar for uniforms. While Tuticorin was a sanctuary Shankar alias Sornalingam of the LTTE had been dealing in Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean. building material and other general necessities for smugglers, hospitals in Tiruchi provided the purchase of arms from the underworld arms dealers. ... The of daily life. These vessels were also used to ferry medical facilities for the wounded LTTE cadres LTTE has been purchasing arms and ammunition worth three LTTE personnel and military hardware, including and operatives. Thanjavur was the communica- to four million US dollars per annum through the contacts of THE SEA PIGEONS: THE MARITIME WING arms and ammunition. The LTTE had also estab- tion base for LTTE operations. Nagapattinam was ‘KP’ since 1986....”8 The force structure of the LTTE has been multi-dimensional, lished a shipping lane from Tamil Nadu in south- the hub of professional smugglers who ferried The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 was a dramatic tasked according to combat and logistic requirements. Peter ern India to Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka through arms and ammunition across the Palk Strait to reversal of fortunes for the LTTE. There was a major decline Chalk, a noted scholar on LTTE activities, has described the 1 | www.orfonline.org | April 2006 2 | www.orfonline.org | April 2006 ‘Sea Pigeons’ as follows: Easan @ Easwaran and ..