Texas A&M University School of Law Texas A&M Law Scholarship Faculty Scholarship 1-2005 Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives Andrew P. Morriss Texas A&M University School of Law,
[email protected] Jason Korosec Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol'y 393 (2005). Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/133 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. 2005] PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CARD CONTEXT: STRUCTURE, REPUTATION, AND INCENTIVES Andrew P. Morriss, Ph.D.* & Jason Korosec, J.D.* ABSTRACT Explosive growth in credit, debit, and other card payment systems in recent years has produced a parallel growth in private dispute resolution systems based on the web of contracts entered into by merchants, merchant acquirers, consumers, card issuers, card associations, and transaction proc- essors. These contracts have produced legal systems based on contract and the enforcement of which rests primarily on reputational constraints. To cost-effectively resolve disputes, these private legal systems have evolved innovative procedures using resources at the lowest-possible level, includ- ing incentive-payments for producing information and rigid deadlines for parties' actions. This paper describes and analyzes these legal systems and their procedures as a potential model for resolving other categories of dis- putes.