2. 6 PUBLIC WARNING RESPONSE FOLLOWING TORNADOES IN NEW ORLEANS, LA, AND SPRINGFIELD, MO: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS William R. Donner*, Havidan Rodriguez*, and Walter Diaz** *Disaster Research Center (DRC), University of Delaware, Newark, DE **Center for Applied Social Research (CISA) University of Puerto Rico-Mayagüez ABSTRACT 1 This study examines public response to tornado that a meteorological approach to public safety warnings through an application of the could be greatly augmented through the framework laid out by Mileti and colleagues incorporation of social science methods and (2000). A qualitative approach was adopted to data. For instance, paying greater attention to supplement our knowledge of public warning how cultural myths about tornado threats shape response with detailed descriptions of how risk communication could improve the individuals interpret and react to risk information. effectiveness of watches and warnings. Following tornado outbreaks, data were collected from individuals in regions surrounding 1. INTRODUCTION New Orleans, LA, and Springfield, MO, using in- depth interview guides. As each region is We possess few empirical records characterized by significant diversity, documenting how socio-cultural factors affect researchers developed a purposive sampling public response to tornado threats (Donner strategy to ensure the collection of 2006; Mitchem 2003; Balluz et al 2000; Aguirre representative data. Interviewees (n=40) were 1988; Legates and Biddle 1999, Schmidlin and asked about how they received, interpreted, and King 1998). Partly to address this problem, responded to warning information. Researchers qualitative data were collected using in-depth then used content analysis to analyze these interviews with respondents in New Orleans and data in order to evaluate and supplement Mileti's southwestern Mississippi following tornado model. Ongoing analysis confirms Mileti's model, touchdowns in each region. Data were yet reveals a high degree of complexity with organized and interpreted by using Mileti’s regard to a) stage transition, b) interaction and model of warning response (1999), which communication, and c) social factors. Findings incorporates research on disasters, from this study will contribute to the communication, and risk perception. Findings development of quantitative models intended to shed much light on warning system design establish end-user policies. These policies will difficulties, diagnose future complications, and guide the deployment and use of radar suggest ways to guide radar development in a technology currently under development by the manner consistent with end-user needs. Engineering Research Center for Collaborative Adaptive Sensing of the Atmosphere (CASA). 2. PROBLEM From a forecasting perspective, findings suggest When warnings are issued, research 1 This work was supported primarily by the demonstrates that a considerable number of Engineering Research Center’s Program of the people will not respond, react too slowly, or take National Science Foundation under NSF Award incorrect steps towards protecting themselves. Number 0313747. Any opinions, findings and Meteorologists, engineers, and public officials conclusions or recommendations expressed in this attempt to mitigate these problems through the material are those of the author(s) and do not development of new technologies. In itself a necessarily reflect those of the National Science necessary but insufficient solution, this approach Foundation. We would also like to recognize the remains unchallenged among scientists and work of our undergraduate research assistants Megan policymakers despite our understanding of how Gunyuzlu, Jennifer Westfall, Mike Clark, Michelle social factors influence risk perception, Moses, and Caroline Bomfim whose contributions to communication, and protective action. Many this project have been extremely valuable. public officials, moreover, consider public 1 response a problem of individual choice experiences difficulties comprehending warnings (Sorenson 2000). A potential outcome of conveyed solely by way of sirens (Tierney 1987; ignoring social factors is that the technologies Lachman, Tatsuoka, and Bonk 1961). That we develop will fail to offer sufficient protection multiple sources of warning increase chances of to communities. The objective of this research comprehension is consistently observed in is to develop an understanding of non- studies (Mileti and Darlington 1995, Mileti 1975). technological (e.g., social, psychological, When it comes to belief, evidence economic, etc.) features of warnings systems indicates that one’s proximity to a given threat often at the root of response problems and also shapes warning response: a closer location solutions. to the threat for which the warning was issued elicits greater credulity (Sorenson 1982; Diggory 3. LITERATURE 1956), which, admittedly, may simply result from exposure to an upsurge of environmental cues From a sociological perspective, the (Hammer and Schmidlin 2002; Mileti 1993; principal problem of warning response lies at the Tierney 1987; Saarinen and Sell 1985; level of interpretation, interaction, and protective Sorenson 1982; Quarantelli 1980, 1984; Drabek action. In order to address these issues in a 1969). Further findings suggest that how more systematic fashion, Mileti (1999) information is conveyed determines whether summarizes the work of Mileti and Sorenson someone will believe the warning. Specific (1990) and Perry and Lindell (1992) into a information is preferred over general information generalized model of warning response (Carter 1980, Greene, Perry, and Lindell 1981, applicable to a wide range of disaster agents. Fritz 1957; Perry, Lindell, and Greene 1980; The model is used to interpret and organize the Perry, Lindell, and Greene 1981; Perry 1979), data colleted in this research. Principal and studies point out that official sources, such components of the warning process, according as government and media, enhance the to Mileti (1999), include: potential for belief (Drabek 1994; Rogers 1985; Perry, Green, and Mushkatel 1983; Sorenson 1) Receiving a warning 1982; Perry, Lindell, and Green 1981; Flynn 2) Understanding the warning 1979; Drabek 1969). In spite of such 3) Believing the warning is credible observations, nevertheless, other researchers 4) Confirming a threat make a strong case that warning belief is 5) Personalizing a threat enhanced within personal channels or through 6) Determining whether protective action is the actions of “significant others” (Clifford 1956; needed Li 1991; Perry and Greene 1983; Nigg 1987; 7) Determining whether protective action is Sorenson 1982). feasible Researchers observe a common tendency to confirm questionable or uncertain With the problem of reception, it is information. What conditions present the need important to consider that the public is likely to to verify warning messages? Interestingly hear warning messages via the mass media or enough, the more times one receives warning television (Schmidlin and King 1997). While the information, the more likely one is to confirm it mass media appears, however, to have become (Nigg 1982). Additionally, those in possession an important means of communicating warning of information confirming the threat are more information, one should still bear in mind that it likely to believe and/or personalize a warning is through multiple channels that a warning message (Perry and Greene 1982). Indeed, it is message is most likely to reach its intended often through personal channels that warning audience (Lindell and Perry 1987). information is confirmed: Kirschenbaum’s Research also reveals a trend among (1992) study of public response following a some warning recipients to misunderstand the major gas explosion in Israel found that a instructions or misinterpret the meaning of majority of those who attempted to confirm warnings (Blanchard-Boehm 1998). In some official information did so not through formal cases, degrees of understanding vary according channels (e.g., police), but through immediate to the number of channels through which a neighbors. warning is conveyed, as well as the attributes Acknowledging the presence of a risk, and characteristics of those channels. There is however, is not tantamount to believing that one some evidence, for instance, that the public personally is at risk. In many cases, warning 2 messages fall short of eliciting response simply care in the event of disasters or other because the risk they convey is too uncertain disruptions in social life.” Thus, the decision to and abstract. Before action is taken, one must access public shelter may be contingent on a define oneself as “at risk”—one must number of factors, ranging from the physical “personalize” a risk. It is such personalization characteristics of certain social groups, as well that so often takes the form of social behavior. as dominant cultural patterns with respect to Repeated studies of earthquake response, for housing styles and cooperation. Some cultures instance, demonstrate that one’s likelihood of may actively avoid engaging in protective preparing for a disaster increases when others behavior because of hegemonic control exerted are seen as doing so (Mileti and Darlington through culture (Webb, Wachtendorf, and Eyre 1997; Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1992). Mileti and 2000). Darlington (1998) write, “Our most robust The objective of the study is to describe conclusion is to underscore the value of an the data using Mileti’s