Foreword 1 Introduction

Notes

Foreword

1. http://www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/jeffrey-rubin/what-will-a-greek-default_b _1521461.html. 2. Graciela Laura Kaminsky and Pablo Vega-García, ‘Varieties of Sovereign Crises: Latin America, 1820–1931’ Department of Economics, George Washington University and NBER, June 2012, www.crei.cat/conferences/ief-workshop/ Vega.pdf. 3. Eurostat’s ﬁgures of Richest & Poorest NUTS-2 Regions at GDP PPP 2009. NUTS stands for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.

1 Introduction

1. Lack of a ‘global fault-lines’ perspective in the early 1990s had led one of us to see the collapse of the Greek political system as imminent, because the elements factored into the analysis were mainly economic and of domestic political origin, overlooking global security and geo-political implications brought to bear upon Greece following the end of the Cold War, a fact which gave a lease of life to Greece’s political system for another 15 years; see, Vassilis K. Fouskas (1995) Populism and Modernisation: The Exhaustion of the Third Hellenic Republic, 1974–94 (Athens: Ideokinissi). 2. Ibid., pp. 57 ff. in which an analysis of Leninism as a continuation of Russian populist tradition towards power is made, followed by Lenin’s social democratic turn after the Bolsheviks assumed power in 1917 (the ‘tax in kind’, electrification, etc.). This approach to Leninism, that is, Lenin’s own transformation from a radical semi-populist Marxist to a social democrat has been conveniently ignored by all ‘Communist’ or ‘Radical’ parties across the world to date. 3. Norberto Bobbio (1978) Compromesso e alternanza nel sistema politico italiano (Roma: Mondo Operaio/Edizioni Avanti!) p. 29. 4. This was sensed by Nikos Beloyiannis in a book on the history of Greece’s foreign borrowing and dependence, which he must have finished in the first part of the 1940s; see, Nicos Beloyiannis (2010) The Foreign Capital in Greece (Athens: Agra), especially the section of the book that discusses when ‘a loan is good and bad’, pp. 325–33. Using a number of mainstream Greek economists of the inter-war period, such as Xenophon Zolotas, Beloyiannis also observes how foreign loans increased the tax burden on the Greek citizen. 5. For instance, this is the case with John Mearsheimer (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton). 6. Karl Marx (1857–58/1973) Grundrisse (Harmondsworth: Penguin) p. 90.

192 Notes 193

7. A typical example of positivist methodology in the ﬁeld of International Rela- tions (IR) is the work by Stephen Van Evera (1997) Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

2 The Sinews of Capital and the Disintegrative Logics of Euro-Atlanticism

1. V.I. Lenin (1917/2008) Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers), pp. 96–7. The methodological similarities of Lenin’s forms of thought with realist IR scholarship are striking. We discuss these similarities in more detail later. 2. Of paramount importance here is the work by Richard Peet (2007) Unholy Trinity (London: Zed Books). 3. The paternity of hub-and-spoke (informal) American neo-imperialism, as opposed to the formal European empires before World War II, can be traced back to the famous NSC-68 document put together by Paul Nitze’s national security team in March 1950. For a thorough discussion on how Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson outﬂanked George Keenan’s notion of ‘containment’ of the Soviet threat with the idea of US primacy within the capitalist world based on hub-and-spoke arrangements, see Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bülent Gökay (2005) The New American Imperialism; Bush’s War on Terror and Blood for Oil (Connecticut: Praeger), Chapter 2. 4. Josef Jossef (1997) ‘How America does it’, Foreign Affairs, v. 76, n. 4, September–October, pp. 16–17, 21. 5. From this perspective, the debate between John Mearsheimer and Zbigniew Brzezinski reads with interest. See, ‘Clash of the titans’, Foreign Policy,5Jan- uary 2005 www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/01/05/clash_of_the_titans (accessed on 1 July 2012). Brzezinski takes sides with the historians’ claim ‘we cannot predict the future’, whereas Mearsheimer takes sides with ‘offensive realism’s’ typical thesis that war is unavoidable not just when the balance of power is destroyed (a claim put forth by ‘defensive realists’, such as Kenneth Waltz), but because great powers want always to maximize their power in the system – he makes a case about the unavoidable rise of China in global affairs, a rise that is bound to be translated into military power in the not too distant future. 6. Nicos Poulantzas (1978), L’Etat, le pouvoir, le socialisme (Paris: PUF), p. 24. 7. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2012), The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire (London: Verso) p. 3. 8. The key text on the ﬁscal crisis of the state in the 1960s and early 1970s is by James O’Connor (1973), The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin’s Press). O’Connor refers basically to the US state, but its relevance to all other states of the capitalist core is evident. 9. It is precisely class analysis that is lacking in certain variants of construc- tivism that discuss the agency/structure binary in IR theory via Anthony Giddens’ ‘structuration’ theory – see, for instance, Alexander Wendt (1987), ‘The agent-structure problem in international relations theory’, International Organisation, v. 41, n. 3, pp. 335–70. 194 Notes

10. The term ‘globalization/financialization’ applies, primarily but not exclusively, to the external environment of the state. The term ‘neo-liberalism’ applies, primarily but not exclusively, to the domestic environment of the state. For further analysis, both historical and theoretical, and definitions see Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bülent Gökay (2012), The Fall of the US Empire; Global Fault-lines and the Shifting Imperial Order (London: Pluto Press), Chapters 1–4. 11. Karl Polanyi (1944/2001), The Great Transformation: The Political and Eco- nomic Origins of our Time (Boston: Beacon press), pp. 145, 147. In the event, this is Polanyi’s very notion of ‘double movement’. Capitalism, according to Polanyi, is constituted along two opposing movements: the liberal/free market movement and the state-led movement that resists the disembedding of the economy from politics, religion and social relations. This is, in our view, erroneous, because the state, whether liberal or Keynesian, is always embedded in the social/technical division of labour. The state as such does not possess power to embed or disembed into the economy; it draws power from the social relations of production and the social/technical division of labour. Arguably, then, Polanyi does not possess a political theory. 12. David Harvey (2010), The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism (London: Profile Books). 13. The best theoretical discussion on the ‘state of emergency’ comes from the works of Carl Schmidt and Giorgio Agamben – see, Carl Schmidt (1922/1985), Political Theology (Cambridge: MIT Press); Giorgio Agamben (2005), State of Exception (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). Agamben discusses perceptively Schmidt’s position that sovereign is the one who can create a state of emergency, not the one who is said to be so in the state’s Constitution. 14. Nicholas J. Spykman (1938), ‘Geography and foreign policy II’, The American Political Science Review, v. xxxii, n. 2, April, p. 236. Spykman’s ‘rimland theory’, which argued for a control by the United States of Eurasia’s rim- lands (Western Europe, Middle East and South-East Asia), so that it can maintain its global mastery given to it naturally by its geography of the two oceans, had eventually been embraced by key US policy makers and advisers to US presidents. Spykman’s ‘rimland theory’ can be found in his classic America’s Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power, published in 1942 by Harcourt, Brace and Company Inc. On the issue of appreciation of Spykman’s work by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, see Neil Smith (2003), American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalisation (Berkeley: University of California Press). 15. One could argue, for example, that Greece did in fact have a greater geo- strategic significance during the Cold War, which was lost soon after the end of it. As we shall see in detail below, this is not the case. 16. Pantelis Pouliopoulos (1934/1980), Democratic or Socialist Revolution in Greece? (Athens: Protoporiaki Vivliothiki), p. 69. Pouliopoulos was the first translator of the first volume of Capital. Expelled from the party due to his Trotskyist beliefs, Pouliopoulos was executed by the Nazis and fascist troops at Nezero, near Athens, in June 1943. 17. In Capital, Marx defines the relation M-C-M’ as representing a sum of money used to buy a commodity that is resold to obtain a larger sum of money (M’). The relation M-M’ means money lent out at interest to obtain more money, Notes 195

or one currency or financial claim traded for another. The relation C-M-C’ represents a commodity sold for money and buying another, different commodity, with an equal or higher value (C’). Commodities are repositories of value, which are a crystallization of socially necessary labour time. Value is always social. 18. Karl Marx (1857/1973), Grundrisse (Middlesex: Penguin), p. 852. 19. David Harvey (1982/2006), Limits to Capital (London: Verso), p. 425. 20. Drawing from the work of Joseph Schumpeter, many economists and heterodox political economists disagree with this claim. Broadly speaking, the argument goes as follows. Schumpeter pioneered a theory of economic development and value creation through the process of technological change and innovation. Disequilibrium results from innovation. According to Schumpeter, innovation means value creation and the notion of ‘creative destruction’ denotes that, because of technological change and innovation, certain rents become available to entrepreneurs, which later diminish as innovations become established practices in economic life. See, for example, Raphael Amit and Christoph Zott (2001), ‘Value creation in e-business’, Strategic Management Journal, v. 22, pp. 493–520. 21. ‘The smaller the portion exchanged for living labour becomes’, Marx says in the Grundrisse, ‘the smaller becomes the rate of profit. Thus, in the same proportion as capital takes up a larger place as capital in the production process relative to immediate labour, that is, the more the relative surplus-value grows – the value creating power of capital – the more does therateofprofitfall’(emphasis by Marx); Karl Marx (1957/1973), Grundrisse (Harmondsworth: Penguin), p. 747. 22. Further comments on this by Alex Callinicos (2009), Imperialism and Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 53 ff. A number of key works by Marxisants since the 1950s has focused on this aspect of Marxist theory to explain economic crises. See, especially, Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn and John Harrison (1984), Capitalism since World War II (London: Fontana), Fred Moseley (1992), The Falling Rate of Profit in the Post-War United States Economy (New York: St Martin’s Press); Robert Brenner (2006), The Economics of Global Turbulence (London: Verso); Andrew Kliman (2007), Reclaiming Marx’s Capi- tal; A Refutation of the Myth of Inconsistency (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books). We discuss these works in detail in The Fall of the US Empire. 23. Nikolai Bukharin (1915/2003), Imperialism and World Economy (London: Bookmarks), p. 99. From this purely theoretical perspective, every capitalist country is part of an imperial chain and is, potentially, imperialistic. This is, of course, historically and empirically, inaccurate. The fact that Greece exports sheep yogurt to the USA does not make her an imperialist country. Bukharin and Lenin refer to the imperial chain composed of the great powers of their time and Lenin is especially careful in examining the degree of dependency of subaltern states upon core capitalist states in both his book Imperialism, quoted above, and his Notebooks on Imperialism. Yet such theoretical formulations can be misconstrued and interpreted as if all capitalist states are, in reality, the same. See, for instance, the, otherwise significant work, by John Milios and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos (2009), Rethinking Imperi- alism: A Study of Capitalist Rule (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan). See also our review of this work in Vassilis K. Fouskas (2010) ‘Imperialism – again?’ The 196 Notes

Political Quarterly, v. 81, n. 4, pp. 634 ff (the book is reviewed jointly with Alex Callinicos’ Imperialism and Global Political Economy). 24. See, Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (2008), American Empire and the Polit- ical Economy of Global Finance (New York: Palgrave); Greg Albo, Sam Gindin and Leo Panitch (2010), In and Out of Crisis (Oakland: PM ress). 25. Rudolf Hilferding (1910/1981), Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (London: Routledge). Bukharin, far more than Lenin, adopts entirely Hilferding’s concept to define imperialism as finance capitalism; see Nikolai Bukharin (1917/2003), Imperialism and World Economy (Sydney: Bookmarks publications), esp. p. 144, where he defines imperialism as ‘the policy of finance capitalism’. Lenin, however, wrongly saw this as the ‘latest’ stage of capitalist development, pointing out global capitalism’s irreversible decay. 26. Kautsky’s classic 1914 text can be found in www.marxists.org/archive/ kautsky/1914/09/ultra-imp.htm (accessed: 2 July 2012). Aspects of the important theoretical work on US imperialism produced in the journal, Monthly Review, have clear Kautskyan features. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many Marxists and Marxisants saw a triumph of Kautsky over Lenin’s and Trotsky’s theory of uneven (and combined) development; see, for instance, Peter Wollen (1993), ‘Our post-Communism: the legacy of Karl Kautksi’, New Left Review, p. 202, November–December. Paradoxically, Leo Panitch’s important work has also the tendency to overestimate the abili- ties of US capital today to shape developments around the world in ways that serve the interests of the US imperial state. Panitch tends to under- play the different forms of neo-imperial strategies and structures that prevail between the Western core and the global South, as opposed to the arrangements that prevail in core-core relations. This transpires in Panitch’s most recent co-authored work, The Making of Modern Capitalism and, importantly, in his conversation with Peter Gowan in a rare gathering at SOAS, University of London, on 9 July 2001; see Peter Gowan, Leo Panitch and Martin Shaw (Autumn 2001) ‘The state, globalisation and the new imperialism’, Histori- cal Materialism, n. 9, www.historicalmaterialism.net (accessed in December 2001). 27. Many writers, such as Lapavitsas, speak of an ‘increased autonomy of the financial sector’. See, Costas Lapavitsas (2008), Financialised Capitalism: Direct Exploitation and Periodic Bubbles (London: SOAS University of London), www.leftlibrary.com/lapavitsas1.pdf and ‘Financialized capitalism: Crisis and financial expropriation’ (2009), Historical Materialism, v. 17, pp. 114–48. Lapavitsas’ definition of financialization was challenged by such authors as Ben Fine and Alex Callinicos; see Ben Fine (2010), ‘Locating financialisation’, Historical Materialism, v. 18, pp. 97–116 and Alex Callinicos (2010), Bonfire of Illusions (Cambridge: Polity Press), Chapter 1 and pp. 149–50. 28. ‘Volcker shock’ comes after the name of the Chairman of the US Federal Bank, Paul Volcker, who is widely credited with beating the stagflation of the 1970s with an interest rate spike up to 20 per cent (the prime rate rose by 21.5 per cent in less than two years). Volcker was appointed the Fed’s Chairman by Carter in August 1979 and re-appointed by Reagan in 1983. Against the neo-liberal orthodoxy, Panitch and Gindin argue convincingly that Volcker’s real aim was not inflation, but the labour movement; see Leo Notes 197

Panitch and Sam Gindin (2005) ‘Finance and the American empire’, Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press). For a perceptive critical analysis of the entire ‘Volcker period’ by an investigative reporter, see William Greider (1987), Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country (New York: Simon & Schuster). 29. Richard Duncan (2012), ‘A new global depression?’ New Left Review, v. 77, September–October, pp. 13–14. Duncan then goes on to outline the main characteristics of ‘creditism’, which are (a) an expanded role for the state; (b) the centrality of central bank, which creates money and manipulates its value; (c) a reverse in the way growth happens: under capitalism business persons invest, make profit and accumulate, and then all over again. But, Duncan’s argument goes, under ‘creditism’ the growth dynamic of the American economy and even of the world economy has for some time now been driven by ‘credit creation and consumption’. Our point here is not that these arguments are completely false. Rather, we contend, first, that this is not the case in a large part of the globe and, second, that this form of US supremacy is, in the long run, unsustainable. 30. See, Robert Brenner (2003), The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy (London: Verso). 31. John M. Keynes (1936/1993), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Cambridge: CUP), p. 159. The previous quote is from p. 378. 32. David Harvey (1982/2006), The Limits to Capital (London: Verso), p. 272. 33. Ibid., p. 269. 34. See also, Alex Callinicos (2010), Bonfire of Illusions (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 44 ff., who much appreciates Harvey’s contribution to the debate over financialization and crises. 35. Joseph Schumpeter (1961), The Theory of Economic Development (New York and Oxford: OUP), p. 126. 36. One of us has examined the notion of Germany’s ‘variable geometry’ strategy in the 1990s; see, Vassilis K. Fouskas (1997), ‘The Italian Left and the enlargement of the European Union’, Contemporary Politics,v.3,n.2, pp. 119–37. 37. Martin Wolf, ‘The riddle of German self-interest’, Financial Times, 29 May 2012, p. 11. 38. But even then, Gideon Rachman argued, ‘many were sceptical. One top EU official scoffed that “France needs Germany to disguise how weak it is; Germany needs France to disguise how strong it is”,’ Gideon Rachman, ‘Welcome to Berlin, the new capital of Europe’, Financial Times,23October 2012, p. 13. 39. V.I. Lenin (1917/2008), Imperialism,op.cit.,p.29. 40. On the definition of imperialism as appropriation of international value, see the important contribution by Guglielmo Carchedi (2002), ‘Imperial- ism, dollarisation and the Euro’, in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds) Socialist Register, pp. 154–73. However, Carchedi fails to explore the complexities of contemporary imperial structures, which involve not just economics and politics, but also geo-politics, especially in the orbits of the Euro-Atlantic area and the greater Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 41. The concept of uneven (and combined) development was first formulated by Trotsky and further elaborated by George Novack, Ernest Mandel and Michel 198 Notes

Löwy. The best contemporary exponent of this concept is Justin Rosenberg; see, for example, his exchange of letters with Alex Callinicos (2008), ‘Uneven and combined development: the social relational substratum of “the international”: A exchange of letters’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs,v. 21, n. 1, pp. 77–112, March. We are following here the arguments developed in Fouskas and Gökay (2012). 42. Preface (2009) to the Spanish translation of The Economics of Global Turbu- lence,mimeo,p.2. 43. The Boom and the Bubble, pp. 14–15. 44. Ernst Mandel (1972/1976), Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books), p. 85. 45. See, for example, his rather forgotten essay ‘On the slogan of a United States of Europe’ (1915) www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/aug/23.htm If one brushes aside some sloganeering expressions, Lenin’s argument makes perfect sense: ‘Of course, temporary agreements are possible between capitalists and between states. In this sense a United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the European capitalists [ ...] but to what end? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty against Japan and America, who have been badly done out of their share by the present partition of colonies, and the increase of whose might during the last 50 years has been immeasurably more rapid than that of backward and monarchist Europe, now turning senile. Compared with the United States of America, Europe as a whole denotes economic stagnation. On the present economic basis, that is, under capitalism, a United States of Europe would signify an organisation of reaction to retard America’s more rapid development. The times when the cause of democracy and socialism was associated only with Europe alone have gone forever’. This is a significant statement and parallels can and must be drawn with today’s global dynamics of a stagnation of the US and European economies and the relative economic power-shift to the ‘global East’ (China, India, Russia, Brazil, etc.). 46. Imperialism and World Economy, op.cit., p. 145. 47. Classic statements in this ﬁeld come from Joseph Nye, Robet Keohane, John Ikenberry and others; see, for instance, Robert Keohane (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: PUP). The bibliography on this subject is vast. On cosmopolitanism and the ‘global democracy’ thesis, see also the more recent collection of texts in Daniele Archiburgi (ed.) (2011), Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge: CUP). 48. Apart from the classic works by Thucydides, E.H. Carr, Raymond Aron and Hans Morgenthau, we would distinguish here Kenneth Waltz (1959/2001), Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press), which pro- vides the best theorization for the realist school. In the ﬁeld of IPE, we would include the work of Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner. See, for instance, Robert Gilpin (1981), War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: CUP); Stephen Krasner (1983), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); for a critique from a Marxisant perspective, see Benno Teschke (2003), The Myth of 1648: Class, Geo-politics and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso). The bibliography is immense. 49. This is one of the most perceptive criticisms Peter Gowan advanced against the ‘offensive realism’ of John Mearsheimer in reviewing his work, The Notes 199

Tragedy of Great Power Politics, see Peter Gowan (2010), A Calculus of Power (London: Verso), esp. pp. 111–32. 50. The Limits to Capital, p. 428. Constructivist theorizing has recently used the notion of ‘crisis displacement strategies’, but without any reference or acknowledgement to Harvey’s work; see, for instance, Colin Hay (1999) ‘Cri- sis and the structural transformation of the state: interrogating the process of change’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations,v.3,n.1, pp. 317–44. 51. The Limits to Capital, ibid. 52. The classic source on Open Door imperialism remains the seminal work by William Appleman Williams (1959/1972), The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Norton). 53. On this issue, see the interesting comments by Christopher Layne (2006), The Peace of Illusions; American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), Chapters 1–5. 54. Karl Marx, Capital, v. 1, op.cit., p. 748. 55. See, Immanuel Wallerstein (2011) ‘Dynamics of (unresolved) crisis’, in Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derluguian (eds) Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown (New York and London: Social Research Council and New York University Press), pp. 69–88. 56. Karl Marx, Capital, v. 1, op.cit., p. 580. 57. Ibid., p. 786. Nikolai Kondratieff, a Russian economist writing in the 1920s, observed certain cyclical regularities in advanced capitalist economies (USA and UK). He looked at prices over long periods and since the 1790s, which led him to conclude that the existence of long waves was quite proba- ble. He saw the capitalist world economy as evolving and self-correcting and, by implication he denied the notion of an approaching collapse of capitalism, which at the time prevailed among Marxist economists. In the 1930s, Schumpeter endorsed this concept. In the 1970s, in one way or another, the ‘K-waves’ concept began to be used by ‘world system’ theorists, such as Immanuel Wallerstein. But one of the most erudite and rather unknown attempts at theorizing Kondratieff waves through, as he called it, a theory of conjuncture is the work of the young Soviet economist Pavel Maksakovsky, The Capitalist Cycle: An Essay on the Marxist Theory of the Cycle, which he wrote in 1927–28. His premature death in 1928 at the age of 28 prevented him from seeing his work published by the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors in 1929. His essay was published in English in a book-form in 2009 by Haymarket books, and with a very good introduction by Richard B. Day. Many arguments advanced here can also be found in Fouskas and Gökay (2012). 58. We are referring to: Giovanni Arrighi (1994/2009), The Long Twentieth Cen- tury: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times (London: Verso); Giovanni Arrighi and Beverley Silver (eds.) (1999) Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press); Giovanni Arrighi (2007), Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the 21st Century (London: Verso). 59. See Arrighi’s ‘Postscript to the Second Edition of The Long Twentieth Century’ (March 2009), published by Verso in 2010, and his joint text with Beverly Sil- ver, ‘The end of the Long Twentieth Century’, in Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derluguian (eds), Business as Usual, op.cit., pp. 53–68. 200 Notes

60. We do not wish to re-launch here the old, but always relevant, discussion about the definition of capitalism in history. For the unaware, we would like to remind you of an old debate between Wallerstein and Frank, on the one hand, and Ernesto Laclau on the other, which dwells precisely on this issue – see, Anthony Brewer (1980), Marxist Theories of Imperialism (London: Routledge) Chapters 8, 9 and 10. 61. Fouskas and Gökay (2012), Further criticism of Arrighi’s work by Benno Teschke (2003), The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Mod- ern International Relations (London: Verso). A big question here is the extent to which the shift of material production to China is accompanied by Chinese control of the distribution of values, especially in the emerging economies. It seems to us that this is not the case, as the US still pos- sesses significant advantages in technology (read also: military technology), nanotechnology, biotechnology, etc., while at the same time enjoying primacy in the currency markets due to the dollar’s role as world money. This makes even more urgent the wide recognition of the concept of ‘global fault-lines’, which shows precisely the complexity of transition from US hegemony to a multi-polar world, centred more and more on China and India. 62. We contend that ‘global fault-lines’ is not a post-structuralist concept. We embrace the concept of Hegelian totality but in a structuralist man- ner in which the instances of that totality are discursively articulated in time and space with the economic instance being prominent only in the ‘first’ but not in the ‘last’ analysis. Put differently, and in disagreement with post-structuralist and post-modern theorists, we accept binary oppositions and argue that structures are not self-sufficient precisely because they are determined by social struggle. 63. We say ‘partly’ because the price of paper claims over value do not always reflect the amount initially borrowed, inasmuch as they circulate according to their own ‘logic’. We are thankful to Joseph Choonara for his comment on this issue. 64. David Harvey (2003), The New Imperialism (Oxford: OUP), p. 135. It would be wrong to suggest that Harvey was the first who extrapolated a pattern of recurrence from Marx’s analyses on primitive accumulation. Marxists and value theorists, such as Werner Bonefeld and Massimo de Angelis, had drawn similar inferences well before Harvey; see, for instance, Werner Bonefeld (1988), ‘Class struggle and the permanence of primitive accumulation’ Com- mon Sense, 8; Massimo de Angelis (2001), ‘Marx and primitive accumulation; the continuous character of capital’s enclosures’, The Commoner,2. 65. Christine Lagarde (25 May 2012), interview with The Guardian www. guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/25/payback-time-lagarde-greeks (accessed on 2 July 2012). 66. This is a point Harvey makes repeatedly in his The Enigma of Capital,op.cit., and in his more recent work on Rebel Cities. 67. The best critical appraisal of ‘shock therapy’ and Sachs’ agenda comes from Peter Gowan (1995), ‘Neo-liberal theory and practice for Eastern Europe’, New Left Review, p. 213, September–October, pp. 3–60. This work builds on Gowan’s earlier contributions to problems facing Eastern European societies that appeared in Labour Focus on Eastern Europe. Notes 201

68. Capital, v. 1, op.cit., p. 777. We say ‘in theory’, because in reality resources depletion and the cost of access to natural resources influence the rate of profit, thus increasing the vulnerability of the capitalist system as a whole. 69. Benno Teschke (2003), The Myth of 1648, op.cit., p. 264. 70. Office of International Security Affairs (1995), United States Strategy for the Middle East (Washington DC: Department of Defence), May, p. 6. 71. Further discussion on these points in Vassilis K. Fouskas (2003), Zones of Conflict (London: Pluto press) Chapter 2. See also, The New American Impe- rialism (2005), Chapter 1, and The Fall of the US Empire (2012), pp. 23 ff. The second work, in particular, brings into discussion the defence/security dimension, by way of critically discussing Jonathan Nitzan’s and Shimshon Bichler’s notion of ‘petro-dollar/weapon dollar coalition’ that can be found in their The Global Political Economy of Israel. 72. Alec Rasizade (2005), ‘The Great Game of Caspian energy: ambitions and realities’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans (renamed into Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies), v. 7, n. 1, pp. 3–4, April. 73. The crisis in Dubai is directly linked to oil and other geo-political factors; see, for instance, Mina Toksoz (2010), ‘The Gulf Cooperation Council and the global recession’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, v. 12, n. 2, June, pp. 195–206, and David Jones (2010) Manpower Challenges in the Middle East (Singapore: Hewitt) http://www.iesingapore.gov.sg/wps/wcm/connect/ fb7fff00442f7ed78f208f1191531275/iadvisory1oct10_5_v2_Manpower_and_ Recruitment_Challenges_in_the_Middle_East_-_Mr_David_Jones.pdf?MOD= AJPERES (accessed: 27 July 2012). 74. Gowan (1999), conducts a masterful geo-political and geo-strategic analysis in his The Global Gamble, Chapter 12, ‘The enlargement of NATO and the EU’, pp. 292–320. 75. One of the few comprehensive accounts that consider the Greek/Eurozone crisis within Marx’s own value theory is that by John Tolios (2011), op.cit. Unfortunately, this extremely useful work is available only in Greek. 76. See, among others, Nicos P. Mouzelis (1986), Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America (London: MacMillan). 77. We are basically referring to Christopher Chase-Dunn (1998), Global For- mation. Structures of the World Economy (Boston and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield), Andre Gunder Frank (1998), ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press). 78. Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, London 1975, p. 71. 79. Capital, v. 1, op.cit., p. 261. 80. Cf., Gavin Kitching (1989), Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective: Populism, Nationalism and Industrialisation (London: Routledge); Gino Germani (1975), Autoritarismo, fascismo e classi sociali (Bologna: il Mulino); Vassilis K. Fouskas (1995), Populism and Modernisation,op.cit. 81. We draw here from the superb work by Leonardo Paggi and Massimo D’Angelillo (1986), I comunisti Italiani e il riformismo (Torino: Einaudi), pp. 60–70, passim. The Italian case of ‘trasformismo’ the authors argue, should not be seen as a phenomenon that replaces modernity in Italy, but as a strategy of the dominant elites to circumvent the rise of the labour movement to power. One of us has examined these issues in the Italian context in 202 Notes

detail; see, Vassilis K. Fouskas (1998), Italy, Europe, the Left: The Transformation of Italian Communism and the European Imperative (Aldershot: Ashgate). 82. This is, for example, the point of view developed in the, otherwise signiﬁ- cant, work by Giulio Sapelli (1995), a Professor of political economy at the University of Milan, Southern Europe since 1945: Tradition and Modernity in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey (London: Longman), and our review of Sapelli’s work in Vassilis K. Fouskas (1996), ‘Review of G. Sapelli Southern Europe since 1945’, Modern Italy v. 1, n. 2, Autumn. 83. The bibliography on this issue, especially sources from the 1970s and 1980s, is vast. We conﬁne ourselves here to point to Gramsci’s work itself: Antonio Gramsci (1996), Selections from Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart), pp. 257 ff., passim, and also Perry Anderson’s superb (1976), ‘The antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, New Left Review, p. 100, November– December. 84. See, Poulantzas (1978), L’Etat, le pouvoir, le socialisme, pp. 225 ff. 85. Ibid., p. 919. 86. Among others: Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2012).

3 The Vassal and the Lords

1. Geo-cultural aspects were also present, as Greece was being considered by Enlightenment philosophers as the ‘cradle of Western civilization’. Witness the large number of ‘philhellenists’ across Europe and England, with Lord Byron as a prominent example. 2. Angelos Angelopoulos, Governor of the Bank of Greece (1974–79), claimed that ‘between 1821–1893, 34 per cent of the proceeds never reached Greece because they were absorbed by commissions, fees, discounts etc’. Also, some 15–30 per cent of all the foreign bonds were held by expatriate Greeks; quoted in Andrew F. Freris (1986) The Greek Economy in the 20th Century (London and Sydney: Croom Helm), p. 28. 3. ‘The example of Andreas Syngros’, George Dertilis writes, ‘and his society is very instructive. His proﬁteering and speculative activities with the bonds of the 1867 loan were achieved and transacted, according to his words, ‘under the nose of the National Bank of Greece and with its own money’; George Dertilis (1980) The Question of Banks (1871–73); Economic and Political Debates in Greece during the 19th Century (Athens: Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece), pp. 61 ff.; Stefanos Tzokas (1998) Development and Modernisation in Greece during the Last Quarter of the 19th Century (Athens: Themelio), pp. 53 ff. 4. George Dertilis (1984, no editor) ‘Comparison and relations of the Greek economy with Western Europe’, in Themes in Modern Greek History (Athens- Komotini: Sakoulas), p. 291. 5. As we saw earlier, on 3 September 1843 the Bavarian regency, following a serious budgetary crisis – the country effectively defaulted on its debt obligations for a second time – and growing popular discontent, was forced by the army to concede a Constitution. Elites embraced nationalism in order to divert the public’s attention away from the debt crisis and pushed for an Notes 203

increase in defence spending. During the parliamentary debate discussing the articles of the new Constitution, pro-French Vlach politician, Ioannis Kolettis, integrated officially the irredentist notion of the ‘Great Idea’ into the nationalist political project of the new state. In a speech that, in some of its parts, resembles the geo-political discourse that was to be exhibited by Communist party leader, Pantelis Pouliopoulos, nearly a century later, Kolettis said: ‘As it stands geographically, Greece has the West on its left and the East on its right. Its fall is destined to enlighten the West, while its regeneration is destined to enlighten the East. The first has happened in the past and was carried out by our ancestors. The second is a requirement assigned to us. In the spirit of this oath, in the spirit of this Great Idea, the representatives of the nation should from now on be convening not in order to discuss the destiny of the Greek state, but the fate of the Greek race’; quoted in Constantine Dimaras (1994) Greek Romanticism (Athens: Ermis) pp. 405–6; also, Paschalis Kitromilides (1996) The Greek Enlighten- ment (Athens: Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece), pp. 487–88. 6. The pioneering work on this subject is that by Lefteris Papagiannakis (1982) The Greek Railways, 1882–1910 (Athens: Educational Foundation of the National Bank of Greece). 7. See, Thanos Veremis (1997) The Military in Greek Politics; From Independence to Democracy (London: Hurst and Co.) p. 33. 8. Among others, George Dertilis (1980) passim, Spyros Tzokas (1998) pp. 132 ff.; Constantine Tsoukalas (1985) Dependence and Reproduction; The Social Role of Educational Apparatuses in Greece, 1830–1922 (Athens: Themelio), p. 232. 9. For example, a business society headed by Andreas Syngros and Evangelos Baltatzis bought the mines at Lavrio and sponsored the railway network Athens-Lavrio, in view of facilitating their profitable trade transactions. 10. See, Tsoukalas (1985) pp. 91 ff.; Costas Vergopoulos (1975) The Agrarian Ques- tion in Greece (Athens: Exantas) passim. To this expansion, the annexation of Thessaly and Ionian islands played a significant role. 11. This is an issue which is directly linked to the so-called question of ‘National Lands’. A total of over 10,000,000 of land (in square metres) (cultivated, forestry or barren) possessed by the Ottoman state, Muslim individuals and charitable institutions, were expropriated without compensation by the newly founded state. The issue turned out to be of critical significance for the development of both public finance and land property relations, because at least until the reforms of Koumoundouros in 1871 – when a first serious attempt for land distribution was made – the ‘National Lands’ were being conceded as a warrant for internal and external borrowing by the Greek state. This had prevented de jure distribution, although de facto violation and cul- tivation of lands had begun well before 1871. Wealthy diaspora Greeks were keen on purchasing land but without bothering very much about its productive use. Moreover, poor peasants cultivating ‘National Lands’ were heavily and anachronistically taxed. These developments discouraged large farm production for the market while the amount of the ground-rent finally reaching state hands was minimal. Moreover, dependence on borrowing meant that the Greek governments could not sell land by auction, something which 204 Notes

would have extended landowning elites with possible export-led capacities and large-scale agricultural production. In fact, large farming properties were the exception in the agricultural system of Greece, not the rule. Only after the annexation of Thessaly did large estate property begin to be of importance. At any rate, the state appeared to mismanage the resources of the country’s most productive sector. We draw here heavily from George Dertilis (ed.) (1988) Banquiers, Usuriers et Paysans: Réseaux de Crédit et Stratégies du Capital en Grèce, 1780–1930 (Paris: La Découverte); W.W. McGrew (1984) Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800–1881: The Transition in the Tenure and Exploitation of Land Reform from Ottoman Rule to Independence (Ohio: Kent State University). 12. See, George Dertilis (1984) The Greek Economy and Industrial Revolution, 1830– 1922 (Athens: Sakoulas), p. 36. 13. Costas Papathanassopoulos (1984) ‘The Greek merchant shipping: from sail to steam’, in Dimitris Tsaoussis (ed.), Aspects of the 19th Century Greek Society (Athens: Estia), pp. 79–106. 14. George Leontaritis (1987) Greek Merchant Shipping (Athens: Mnimon) pp. 63–4; Papathanassopoulos (1984) pp. 86–90. 15. An objection can be raised as to what contribution leading Greek shipowners made towards productive investment in Greece. Contrary to the British example, George Dertilis argues that Greek productive sectors received little, if any, support from Greek shipping capital. In this context, we cannot consider shipping capital as part of the total Greek capital – a thesis put forth, for example, by John Milios (1988) The Greek Social Formation (Athens: Exantas), pp. 236–42, 389 ff.; see, Dertilis (1984) pp. 35–6. We cannot go into this problem in detail, although it is important to note the economic signiﬁcance of sailors’ income transferred into Greece. This form of invisible revenue, together with the remittances of emigrants, has constituted an important source of income for Greece for the greatest part of the 20th century. 16. Among others, Papagiannakis (1982) pp. 88 ff., 205. Trikoupis also paid lip service to modernization, when he raised import tariffs to protect the large landowning elites whose key production was concentrated on wheat. It proved a total failure. As Andrew Freris noted, ‘instead of encouraging the expansion of domestic production and reducing imports, the tariffs led to an increase in the latter. Taking 1885 as the base year for 100, by 1911 the volume of wheat imports had grown to 176 and that of domestic output to 132’, Freris (1986) p. 22. 17. Angelos Angelopoulos quoted in Freris (1986) p. 27. 18. Tsoukalas (1985) pp. 298–301. 19. Ibid., p. 281. 20. Quoted in John Kordatos (1958) History of Greece, 1900–1922, v.XII (Athens: Twentieth Century Publishing), p. 527; this statement by Lloyd George and his full rationale can also be found in Winston Churchill (1929) The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London: Macmillan), pp. 390–2. 21. Quoted in Ioanna Pepelassi-Minoglou (1988, no editor) ‘Venizelism and foreign capital’, in Symposium on Eleftherios Venizelos: The Minutes (Athens: Association for the Study of Greek Literature and Historical Archives, Benaki Museum), p. 148. Notes 205

22. It is interesting to note that the King enjoyed not only the electoral support of the old tzakia elites, but also of the newly born Socialist anti-imperialist groups, who tended to see a defeat of Venizelos as an anti-imperialist and anti-liberal victory. Also, for obvious reasons, Muslim and Turkish elements within the Greek Kingdom were fierce opponents of Venizelos’ politics. Regional rifts too played a major role in the politics of the Schism: Greeks residing in the so-called ‘old Greece’ tended to support the King, whereas those living in the territories liberated during the Balkan wars were over- whelmingly behind Venizelos. In this context, the remark by Seraphim Maximos (1899–1962) – a prominent Communist leader and Marxist during the inter-war period – that the National Schism was, in the final instance, a class conflict should be taken seriously, Seraphim Maximos (1975) Parliamentarism or Dictatorship? (Athens: Stochastis), p. 14, passim. 23. Michael L. Smith (1998) Ionian Vision; Greece in Asia Minor (London: Hurst), pp. xii–xiv, 35–61. Shortly after Venizelos stepped down as Prime Minis- ter, and when it became clear that Bulgaria would not be won over by the allies, Cyprus, on 16 October 1915, was promised to Greece again together with western Thrace and Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis). But ‘the Germans had already offered Cyprus to Greece and so the Greek Royalists, who believed that the Germans would win the war, declined the British offer’, see, Joachim G. Joachim (2000) Ioannis Metaxas; the Formative Years 1871–1922 (Mannheim und Mohnesse: Bibliopolis), p. 225. 24. Joachim (2000) pp. 170–72, 178–79, 203–10. 25. For Metaxas’ full rationale, see Alexander A. Pallis (1937) Greece’s Anatolian Venture – and After (London: Methuen), pp. 20–25. 26. Metaxas’ rigorous analysis came later to coincide with the view of the Chief of Imperial Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, and many others, including Lord Curzon and Harold Nicolson, when the Anglo-Greek engagement in Asia Minor had begun politically (1918–19). By then, however, it was clear that the Turkish question had been settled only on paper. The allies, with their armies demobilized and with Britain facing severe domestic difficul- ties (a contracting empire in economic crisis, the Irish issue), was not in a position to enforce the partition of Anatolia. In the event, however, the Entente powers and Bolshevik Russia came progressively not only to abandon the partition plan, but also – with the partial exception of Britain – to support overtly the nationalist movement of Kemal Ataturk, whose diplo- matic skills and military ability since the Gallipoli campaign were beyond question. 27. Smith (1998) pp. 279–80. France’s objection apart, the British rationale was chiefly based on the correct assumption that a Greek occupation of Constantinople would have strengthened the alliance between Kemal and Lenin. This can also be seen from the instruction sent to the Greek Royalist government by Lord Curzon as early as 21 April 1921, which recognized no rights to the Greek government to intervene either in the Straits or Constantinople. This was even more of an absurdity, if one takes into account the fact that Greek warships were in full action in the Black Sea intercepting sea reinforcement missions sent to Kemal by the Bolsheviks. 28. Churchill, The World Crisis; The Aftermath, op.cit., p. 377. 29. Among others, Freris (1986) p. 64. 206 Notes

30. Freris (1986) p. 39 and Tsoukalas (1985) pp. 263 ff; See also, Spyros Tzokas (2002) Eleftherios Venizelos and the Experiment of Bourgeois Modernisation (1928–1932) (Athens: Themelio), pp. 99 ff. 31. Mazower (1991) Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 251. 32. Nicos Mouzelis (1986) Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America (London: Macmillan) pp. 39 ff., passim. 33. A counter-argument to this has been that big landowning elites used their power to keep wheat production low in order to keep domestic prices high, while also concentrating on letting the land out for pasture and grazing (Freris, 1986, p. 46). But this is besides the point. Precisely for this reason, the state policy should have been the mechanization of those farms in order to increase productivity and employment and the placement of farms under modern forms of management and administration, not the fragmentation and distribution of the land to jobless peasants. Our thesis basically is that the chosen policy was politically motivated in order to deter the rise of socialist and communist forces. As a result, the entire social economy had also been irreparably damaged for decades to come. 34. Among others, Mazower (1991) p. 152, Table 6.2. 35. Freris (1986) p. 65. 36. Mazower (1991) pp. 140 ff. 37. Britain returned to gold in 1925. Gold convertibility was essential for the Europeans to fight inflation. In fact, countries that had experienced hyper- inflation were the first to adopt gold convertibility, such as Germany (1924), Austria (1923), Poland (1924) and Hungary (1925). 38. We are relying here heavily on Costas Costis (1986) The Banks and the Crisis, 1929–1932 (Athens: Commercial Bank of Greece). 39. Mazower (1991) p. 146. 40. The ‘troika’ of the time subverting national sovereignty was the League of Nations Financial Committee (LNFC), the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) and the International Financial Commission (IFC). In his wide-ranging work on the impact of the Great Depression on Greece, Mazower notes that Venizelos, unlike Kemal Ataturk, pursued ‘a policy of reconstruction which involved relying heavily on foreign loans’; Mazower (1991) p. 179. 41. Michael Hudson (2003) Super Imperialism; the Origins and Fundamentals of US World Domination (London: Pluto Press), p. 2. 42. Ibid., p. 76. 43. Mazower (1991), p. 140. 44. Mazower (1991) Chapter 7 and Costis (1986) provide a detailed examination of the 1929–33 conjuncture in Greece. 45. See in particular, George V. Leontaritis (1979) The Greek Socialist Movement during the First World War (Athens: Exantas). 46. Cf., Nicos Mouzelis (1986) passim; Costas Vergopoulos (1978) Nationalism and Economic Development (Athens: Exantas) pp. 92–3. 47. Beth A. Simmons (1994) Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Eco- nomic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 141–42. Notes 207

4 Passive Revolution and the ‘American Factor’, 1940s–70s

1. This was not captured even by acute observers of the organization of US hegemony in Europe, such as Nicos Poulantzas. In one of his key writings on USA-EEC relations, while debating Ernest Mandel’s position on the decline of American supremacy after the end of Bretton Woods, Poulantzas argues that the power of US capitalism turns all states into its relays: ‘The states themselves assume responsibility for the interests of the dominant imperialist capital in its extended development actually within the “national” formation.’ That is why Europe, according to Poulantzas, cannot (or could not at the time) become a real rival to the USA. In order to compete, Europe must outstrip the power relations and technical organization of production developed by the dominant US capitals operating in Europe. By accepting the domination of US capital, Poulantzas argued, Europe disorganizes its own class and productive structure. Two comments here are necessary. First, at the time that Poulantzas was writing in France (early 1970s), US capital was indeed dominant in Western Europe, especially in France and (West) Germany, something which is not the case today. Sec- ond, Poulantzas does not consider applying his remarks to the periphery of Europe and the peculiar form(s) in which the Greek state ‘assumed responsibility for the interests of the US capital’ within Greece. In fact, as we shall see, US capital and aid agencies organized directly post-war Greek capitalism and the Greek state apparatus; see, Nicos Poulantzas (1974/78) Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left Books), pp. 50–67, passim. 2. Among others, Alexis Papachelas (1997) The Rape of the Greek Democracy: The American Factor, 1947–1967 (Athens: Estia), pp. 121 ff., Makarios Droussiotis (1996) Junta’s Invasion of Cyprus (Athens: Stachy). 3. The best account in this vein is by Mark Mazower (1993) Inside Hitler’s Greece (New Haven: Yale University Press). 4. Rouhollah Ramazani (1966) The Northern Tier: Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 8–10; Howard Jones (1989) A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (Oxford: OUP), pp. 13 ff., 58 ff. 5. Bruce R. Kuniholm (1980) The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conﬂict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. xv. We are drawing here from Fouskas (2003) Zones of Conﬂict. US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East (London: Pluto press). 6. Ibid., p. 380. 7. Constantine Tsoukalas (1969) The Greek Tragedy (London: Penguin Press), p. 100. The partisans were aided by Marshall Tito but the rupture between Tito and Stalin in June 1948 undermined the collaboration between KKE and the Yugoslavs. Since June 1948, the KKE became increasingly dependent on Tito’s representative in Macedonia, Svetozar Vulkmanovic-Tempo, who never kept secret Yugoslavia’s intention to have access to the Aegean Sea. It is in this context that Zachariades re-opened the ‘Macedonian question’; see, Peter J. Stavrakis (1989) Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 128–29, 179 ff., 214. Tito also wanted to annex 208 Notes

Italy’s Friuli-Venezia-Giulia area, creating problems for Palmiro Togliatti’s Italian Communist Party (PCI). Stalin broke with Tito, not only because of his commitments to Yalta and elsewhere, or because he did not want to see Tito expanding his realm, but also because he – quite rightly – never believed that the USA and Britain would ever relinquish control of Italy and Greece; the best work on this issue is by Ivo Banac (1988) With Stalin against Tito (Cornell: Cornell University Press); see also, Jones (1989) pp. 63 ff. 8. There were no ethnological grounds to raise politically such an issue, even by resorting to extreme ideological forms of ‘proletarian internationalism and solidarity’. Ever since the settlement of Asia Minor refugees in Greek Macedonia after 1922 and the various exchanges of population that took place, the ethnic composition of Greek Macedonia has been overwhelm- ingly Greek; see, among others, Evangelos Kofos (1964) Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies); Evangelos Kofos (1991) National Heritage and National Identity in 19th and 20th Century Macedonia (Athens: ELIAMEP). 9. Cemil Bilsel (1944) ‘International Law and Turkey’, American Journal of International Law, v. 38, p. 553, quoted in Harry J. Psomiades (1968) The Eastern Question; the Last Phase – A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy (Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies), p. 58. 10. Dean Acheson (1969) Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton), p. 219. 11. James Chase (1999) Acheson: The Secretary of State that Created the American World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 166. All previous quotations are from the same source. 12. For a detailed analysis of US aid to Greece, see George Stathakis (2004) The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan: The History of American Aid to Greece (Athens: Vivliorama). 13. In 1943–44, the ‘Big Three’ (Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin) were instrumental in dividing the Balkan states into spheres of influence. Yugoslavia, unlike Greece (10 per cent pro-Soviet, 90 per cent pro-Western), Romania and Bulgaria (both: 10 per cent pro-Western, 90 per cent pro-Soviet), were bro- ken down equally between the West and the East; see, Gavin Scrase (2000) ‘The Balkans and international politics in the 1940s: on the Eden-Gusev pre-percentages agreement’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,v.2, n. 2, November, pp. 163–76. What an irony of history that the pro-Soviet KKE’s electoral power hardly went above 10 per cent of the total vote since it became legal in 1974. 14. Freris (1986) The Greek Economy in the 20th Century (London and Sydney: Croom Helm), p. 130. 15. Bruce R. Kuniholm (1984) The Near East Connection: Greece and Turkey in the Reconstruction and Security of Europe, 1946–52 (Massachusetts: Hellenic College Press), p. 16. 16. Mazower (1991) Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon press) p. 202. 17. Ibid., p. 237. 18. Most secondary sources and even some statistics confuse weaves with textiles. The former is unfinished material for export, the latter is a developed/finished brand for export. Greece, basically, exported weaves rather Notes 209

than textiles. Many analysts, even sharp ones, such as Mazower (1991) or Freris (1986), make that mistake although this does not affect their inferences, which are almost identical to ours. 19. ECA’s mission was replaced in 1952, the year Greece and Turkey became ofﬁcially members of NATO, by the Mutual Security Agency (MSA). Dean Acheson was directly involved with this. 20. Freris (1986) p. 130. 21. Among others, Paul Ginsborg (1990) A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–88 (London: Penguin Books). 22. The best account here is by Alan S. Milward (1984) The Reconstruction of Western Europe (London: Routledge), pp. 56 ff. See also, Michael J. Hogan (1987) The Marshall Plan (Cambridge: CUP) especially Chapter 1 (pp. 26–53). 23. Before the war, tourism was unimportant. After the war, due largely to improved standard of living in the West and the creation of a robust middle class, as well as the improvement in air travel, tourism became an important source of income for Greece and other South European countries. 24. Freris (1986) p. 91. His main opponent in the economic and banking circles of Greece at the time, Kyriakos Varvaressos, insisted from very early on that Greece should abandon the gold standard and turn to autarky. In the early 1950s, Zolotas opposed Varvaressos’s plan, which tried to postpone plans for the country’s industrialization in view of reduced US aid. 25. Stathakis (2004) and especially George Stathakis (1995) ‘US economic policies in post-Civil War Greece, 1949–53: stabilization and monetary reform’, The Journal of European Economic History, v. 24, n. 2, Fall, pp. 375–404. In March 1952 Acheson announced the formation of an inter-departmental group, the Welldon Group, that was to be sent to Greece and, following consultation with the Embassy and the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), the Group would produce policy recommendations that were acceptable to US policy-makers. Stathakis is right when he argues that US policy in Greece ‘was transformed immediately after the war from Wilsonian to colonial practices’ – the quote from Stathakis (1990) ‘Approaches to the early post-war Greek economy: A survey’, Journal of Modern Hellenism, n. 7, p. 178. 26. It should be noted that in 1946 the US government sold to Greek shipowners 100 ‘Liberty’ ships under a scheme backed by loans guaranteed by the Greek state. All Laws introduced and approved by right-wing Greek governments from 1950 to 1974 were very favourable to shipping capital. By 1960, Greek-owned ships were the third largest category in world shipping, with glamorous families such as Onassis and Niarchos dominating global sea trade. 27. Anna E. Bredima (1991) ‘The shipping sector’ in Speros Vryonis Jr. (ed.) Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas), p. 235. 28. See, in particular, Takis Fotopoulos (1985) Dependent Development; the Greek Case (Athens: Exantas). 29. See especially, Yiannis Theotokas and Tzelina Harlauti (2007) Greek Shipowners and Shipping Business (Athens: Alexandria), pp. 150 ff. 30. Freris (1986) p. 149. These monies, according to the Statistical Yearbook of 1957 and during the bloody decade of 1946–56 were distributed as follows: 3458.8 million drachmas were given gratis for military assistance, 75 million 210 Notes

drachmas were loans to serve military needs and services, 203.1 million drachmas were given gratis for welfare purposes, 1966.5 million drachmas were given gratis for investments and public utilities, 336 million drachmas were given gratis for earthquake victims and 1300 million drachmas were given gratis for economic stability purposes. 31. Among others, Michele Salvati (1984) Economia e politica in Italia dal dopoguerra a oggi (Milano: Grazianti); Augusto Graziani (1972) ‘Introduzione’ in his L’economia italiana, 1945–1970 (Bologna: il Mulino). For further discussion and comparisons, see Donald Sassoon (1986) Contemporary Italy (London: Longman) and Vassilis K. Fouskas (1998) Italy, Europe, the Left (Aldershot: Ashgate). 32. Time and again, this should not be considered a Greek peculiarity. Anti- Communism reigned supreme in all of Western Europe. Characteristically, we should be reminded here of (West) Germany’s Berufsverbot, aLawdis- qualifying radical democrats and Communists from becoming civil servants. What was peculiar about Greece and other countries in the periphery was the degree of exclusion as it comes to be incorporated into different institutional socio-political and cultural settings (weak institutions and disobedient cultural norms in the periphery, robust ones in the core). 33. il Gattopardo is a remarkable Italian novel written by Tomassi in 1956 and published posthumously in 1958. The most remarkable line in the book is by Don Fabrizio’s nephew, Tancredi, who tries to convince Don Fabrizio to abandon his allegiance to the collapsing ‘Kingdom of the two Sicilies’, push- ing him instead to ally with Garibaldi: ‘Unless we take matters on our hands, they will foist a Republic on us. If we want things to remain the same, things will have to change’. 34. ‘Interpellation’ and ‘direct contact of charismatic leadership with the people without the mediation of party bureaucratic organisations’ are some of the key features of what social theorists, such as Ernesto Laclau and Nicos Mouzelis, have deﬁned as populism. Laclau’s theorization draws from the work of Louis Althusser, whereas Mouzelis’s own draws from Max Weber. We do not wish to enter into a discussion with this problematic, which has already been presented and critiqued in our earlier work; see, Vassilis K. Fouskas (1995) Populism and Modernisation. The Exhaustion of the Third Hellenic Republic (Athens: Ideokinisi). However, we would like to point out that all political agencies, to a certain degree, present populist characteristics, not least because they cannot deliver on their programme once they assume power. This is not happening because their politicians and leaders are ‘demagogues’, whether charismatic or not. This is happening because of the insuperable structural constraints they are facing once in power. 35. Cf., Jean Meynaud (1966) Political Forces in Greece (Athens: Bayron), pp. 123 ff., passim; Christophoros Vernardakis and Yiannis Mavris (1991) Parties and Social Alliances in Greece before the Dictatorship (Athens: Exantas), pp. 218 ff. 36. Meynaud (1966), pp. 181 ff., passim. 37. Quoted in Stan Draenos (2012) Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick (London: I.B. Tauris), p. 72. Andreas G. Papandreou expressed clearly his pro-Keynesian views in his (1962) A Strategy for Greek Economic Development (Athens: Centre for Economic Research). Notes 211

38. See, among others, Dimitris Charalambis (1985) The Army and Political Power: The Structure of Power in post-Civil War Greece (Athens: Exantas). 39. In fact, Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 reads as follows: ‘Turkey thereby renounces all rights and titles whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of those territories and islands being settled by the parties concerned’. Although this wording seems to be favouring Greece’s point of view, ‘it left the door open to subsequent debates between Turkey and Greece concerning which nations could legally be regarded as “parties concerned” with reference to the fate of Cyprus’, see, James A. McHenry (1987) The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919–1939 (New York: Garland Publishing), pp. 48–9. 40. The best works on this British policy of ‘divide and rule’ are by Robert Holland (1998) Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus (Oxford: Clarendon), esp. pp. 64–70, 72–5; William Mallinson (2005) Cyprus: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris); Diana Weston Markides (2001) Cyprus 1957–63: From Colonial Conﬂict to Constitutional Crisis: The Key Role of the Municipal Issue (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press). 41. Any time Makarios made any public reference to enosis in the 1960s and early 1970s, this was in view of appeasing mainland Greek and Cypriot nationalist elements, who wanted to eliminate him as they perceived him as being a traitor to the ‘patriotic cause’. 42. On these issues, Vassilis K. Fouskas and Alex O. Tackie (2009) Cyprus: The Post-Imperial Constitution (London: Pluto), pp. 21 ff. 43. See in particular, Suha Bolukbasi (1993) ‘The Johnson letter revisited’, Middle Eastern Studies, v. 29, n. 3, July, pp. 505–25. 44. Draenos (2012), p. 102 and Chapter 7. 45. Ibid., p. 140. 46. Le Monde (4 October 1964), quoted in Draenos (2012), p. 104. 47. Ibid., p. 78. 48. See, Andreas G. Papandreou (1972) Paternalistic Capitalism (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press). 49. Quoted in Draenos (2012), p. 248. 50. Draenos (2012), pp. 227–8. 51. Ibid., p. 269. 52. This was one of the most famous propaganda slogans of the junta: patris (fatherland), thriskeia (religion, meaning the Christian orthodox religion), oikogeneia (family). 53. On this issue, see the pioneering article by Van Coufoudakis (1976–77) ‘US foreign policy and the Cyprus question: an interpretation’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, v. 5, n. 3, Winter, pp. 245–68; cf. also, Vassilis K. Fouskas (2005) ‘Uncomfortable questions: Cyprus, October 1973–August 1974’, Contemporary European History, v. 14, n. 1 and William Mallinson (2011) Britain and Cyprus (London: I.B. Tauris), esp. Chapters 4 and 5. 54. The continental shelf issue of the East Aegean islands arose in 1973, when oil was discovered off the island of Thassos in the Northern Aegean. On 1 November 1973 Turkey announced in its ofﬁcial Government Gazette licence rights to its oceanographic ships to search for oil in the Aegean 212 Notes

in areas Turkey delimited unilaterally. The ships went indeed out in 1974, before the fall of the junta and the operations in Cyprus in July. At the same time, Turkey began challenging the area of responsibility of Athens’s FIR (Flight Information Region), arguing instead that it should be subject to Istanbul’s FIR. 55. Andreas G. Papandreou argues exactly the same in his book Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front, published in 1970 by Andre Deutsch. Contempo- rary historical research conﬁrms Papandreou’s claims. Apart from Draenos’s work, see especially the historical account by Papachelas (1997). 56. Draenos (2012), p. 307.

5 Kampfplatz-4 and the ‘European Factor’, 1974–89

1. Further discussion and critical analysis on these points in Fouskas and Gökay (2012); see also Chapter 2 of this book. 2. See especially, The National Security Archive at www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NS AEBB/NSAEBB66/ (accessed on 2 January 2013). 3. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2005) ‘Finance and the American empire’, Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press), pp. 46–80; also their The Making of Global Capitalism,op.cit. 4. Louis Althusser (1994) The Future Lasts a Long Time (London: Vintage). 5. On this issue, see Peter Gowan (2000) ‘The Euro-Atlantic origins of NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia’, in Tariq Ali (ed.) Masters of the Universe? NATO’s Balkan Crusade (London: Verso), pp. 18–19. 6. ELSTAT (2000), Annual Statistical Yearbooks: Revenue on the Basis of State Budget by Category of Source, 1959–1999 (Athens: ELSTAT). Our statistics on Greece’s public ﬁnances are based on a compilation of aggregate data from ELSTAT’s Yearbooks. We also account for changes in methods used in ELSTAT’s calculations. 7. See, Nicos Poulantzas (1976) ‘The transformation of the state today, the political crisis and the crisis of the state’, in Nicos Poulantzas (ed.) The Crisis of the State (Athens: Papazissis), pp. 11 ff. 8. Careful analysts of European and Greek politics did realize this aspect of Greece’s post-1974 predicament. For instance, in examining PASOK’s ﬁrst austerity programme in 1985–87, Loukas Tsoukalis wrote: ‘The adverse change in the international economic environment, which started in 1974–84, coincided with the Cyprus crisis and the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Greece. This had a very simple consequence, namely that political consolidation took precedence over economic adjustment’, Loukas Tsoukalis (1991) ‘The austerity program: Causes, reactions and prospects’ in Speros Vryonis, Jr. (ed) Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas), p. 195. 9. The bibliography on this subject is immense; the best representative exam- ples are: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press); Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds) The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Per- spective (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press); Richard Clogg (ed.) Notes 213

(1993) Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade (New York: St. Martin’s Press). For attempts at going beyond this discourse, although terms such as ‘clientelism’, ‘democratic transition’, ‘consolidation’, etc. still dominate their ﬁeld of inquiry, see, Yiannis Voulgaris (2001) Greece after the Junta, 1974– 1990 (Athens: Themelio), as well as Christos Lyrintzis’s work, such as his (1987) ‘The power of populism: The Greek case’, European Journal of Political Research, v. 15, n. 6, pp. 667–86. 10. Fouskas (1995) Populism and Modernisation. The Exhaustion of the Third Hellenic Republic, 1974–1994 (Athens: Ideokinisi). 11. The best analyses on this theme derive – via Michel Foucault – from Nicos Poulantzas in his last theoretical statement (1978), especially pp. 135 ff. 12. According to Stephan Leibfried (1991) the Greek welfare state is a ‘rudimen- tary’ one, in his Towards a European Welfare State? (Bremen: University of Bremen), pp. 23 ff., See also, Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press). 13. The ‘First Hellenic Republic’ refers to the years of the war of independence in the 1820s until 1832 when King Otto with his entourage arrived in Greece from Bavaria; and the Second Hellenic Republic corresponds to the inter-war years from 1922 to 1936. 14. KKEes (Communist Party of Greece-interior) followed the Italian Communist Party’s line of Eurocommunism. Although lacking the dogmatic and rigid character of the pro-Soviet KKE, the KKEes did commit serious political mis- takes. For instance, it attempted an instrumental application of Berlinguer’s ‘historic compromise’ notion in totally different socio-political and historical conditions by claiming an alliance with the ND in the 1977 general election, because, according to the ruling group of the party, the danger for a fascist coup in Greece was possible (the so-called line of ‘National Anti- dictatorial Unity’, in Greek EADE). This notion had been utterly defeated both electorally and politically. It is worth noting that many Greek intel- lectuals at the time, such as Nicos Poulantzas and Sakis Karagiorgas – the latter being a major contender for PASOK’s leadership in 1974 – had opposed EADE’s political line. Santiago Carillo’s PCE in Spain made the same blunder when it tried to outdo even the socialist Gonzáles in extolling the Moncloa Pact (institutional negotiations with the UCD Right of Soares) as a formula for a government of ‘national concentration’, in which ‘the Communists would work shoulder to shoulder with the UCD’; see Patrick Camiller (1994) ‘Spain: the survival of socialism?’, in Perry Anderson and Patrick Camiller (eds) Mapping the West European Left (London: Verso), p. 246. 15. See, Paul Dunne, Eftychia Nikolaidou, Dimitrios Vougas (1998) ‘Defence spending and economic growth: a causal analysis for Greece and Turkey’, paper presented to the ERC/METU International Conference on Economics, Ankara, 9–12 September. 16. Svi Yehuda Hershlag (1988) The Contemporary Turkish Economy (Routledge: London), p. 86. 17. Tassos Giannitsis (1991) ‘Transformation and problems of Greek industry; the experience during the period 1974–85’, in Speros Vryonis, Jr. (ed) op.cit., p. 216. 18. For a radical explanation on the issue of the collapse of Yugoslavia that factors in the IMF intervention in the country in the 1970s and 1980s, see 214 Notes

Susan Woodward (1995) The Balkan Tragedy (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution). Woodward argues that, in the 1970s, Yugoslavia borrowed large amounts of money from the IMF in order to finance growth and industry via exports. But the Western economies entered into the long stagflation and blocked Yugoslav exports. From then on, a vicious cycle of borrowing began with the IMF asking for fiscal consolidation and discipline, including Con- stitutional reform and moving away from the quasi co-federal settlement of 1974. To this imposition – which, it should be said, Slobodan Milosevic was happy to implement – there had been fierce opposition by the wealth- iest of the Yugoslav republics, such as Slovenia and Croatia, which would have carried the fiscal burden of the IMF-imposed neo-liberal reform pack- age. Nationalism, Woodward argues, became a political force when leaders in the republics sought popular support as bargaining chips in federal disputes over constitutional centralization. From this perspective, the disintegration of the country was not primarily the result of internal ethnic conflict, but the unintended consequences of the IMF’s intervention. 19. Giannitsis (1991), p. 216. 20. Ibid., p. 224. 21. Poulantzas (1974/1978) p. 57. It should be noted, however, that Poulantzas saw Germany (and Western Europe as a whole) as a vehicle for the supremacy of US capitalism in Europe, so the more US capital goes to Germany the more dominant Germany becomes within Europe – a position with which we disagree, as it does not take into account the antagonism between US and European capitals. 22. Quoted in the original research conducted by Aris Kalafatis, Ilias Koliopoulos and George Maroussis (1990) Redundant Working Population in Lame-Duck Enterprises (Athens: OAED), p. 11. 23. This is the view, among others, of George Alogoskoufis (2009) Greece after the Crisis (Athens: Kastaniotis); George Pagoulatos (2003) Greece’s New Political Economy (London: Palgrave-Macmillan). From 2004 until 2009, Alogoskoufis served as Minister of Economy and Finance in the cabinet of Constantine Karamanlis Jr. 24. Giannitsis (1991), pp. 221, 227. 25. For a detailed account see, among others, Stelios Alexandropoulos (1990) Collective Action and Representation of Interests Before and After 1974,unpub- lished PhD dissertation, Panteion University, Athens. 26. However, one should not underestimate the legislative work of PASOK especially during its first term in office, which were long overdue legal reforms the Greek political system and society badly needed. From this perspective, the political programme and deeds of PASOK and the ND were two worlds apart. But dwelling on this subject falls behind the scope of this book. 27. The generosity was especially pronounced for those working in public utilities and the Ministry of National Economy, but not for the average employee of the public sector, let alone the worker in the private sector, or the majority of the elderly. 28. OECD Economic Surveys, Greece 1993, Paris 1993, p. 45, passim. 29. Credit for this empirical term, which nevertheless captures successfully the social milieu of the 1980s and early 1990s, belongs to Constantine Tsoukalas Notes 215

(1993) ‘Free-riders in the wonderland of Greece’, Greek Review of Political Science,v.1,n.1,January,pp.39ff. 30. The austerity programme came as a result of the failure of a ‘five-year plan’ (1981–85) mainly administered by Economy Minister, Gerassimos Arsenis. It achieved neither socialism, nor improvement of capitalist malaise (inflation, unemployment, debt problems, etc.). In 1983, Arsenis, in order to improve the country’s international competitiveness, also devalued the drachma by 16 per cent but no meaningful positive outcome had been accomplished; see Gerassimos Arsenis (1987) Political Testament (Athens: Odysseus). 31. Andreas Papandreou did not hesitate to sack his then economy minister, Costas Simitis, when Simitis, backed by the pro-monetarist economic assessor of the Bank of Greece, and later Governor, Nicos Garganas, wanted to continue to deepen the austerity programme. The programme, of course, failed not because of Simitis but because of the reasons we explain below. Papandreou, essentially, used Simitis as a scapegoat. 32. We are drawing here on the excellent long essay by James Petras, Evangelos Raptis and Sergio Sarafopoulos (1993) ‘Greek socialism: the patrimonial state revisited’ in James Kurth and James Petras (eds) Mediterranean Paradoxes: The Politics and Social Structure of Southern Europe (Oxford: Berg), p. 195, passim. 33. Ibid. 34. Among others, Marc Lombard (1995) ‘A re-examination of the reasons for the failure of Keynesian expansionary policies in France, 1981–1983’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, v. 19, n. 2, pp. 359–72. 35. See also, European Commission (various years) http://ec.europa.eu/ economy_finance; cf. also, Donald Sassoon (1997, 2nd ed) Contemporary Italy: Politics, Economy and Society since 1945 (London: Longman). 36. The national accounts published from the statistical services of Greece offer data about the level of wages the government pays but say nothing about the number of people receiving salaries/wages, and what sort of wages, from the state per se. 37. Constantine Tsoukalas (1986) wrote marvellous essays on these issues that one can find in his State, Society, Labour in Post-War Greece (Athens: Themelio). Tsoukalas’s contribution is the introduction of the concept of ‘polyvalence’ in understanding employment structures in Greece. Polyvalence refers to the unassailable economic activities of all sorts of people making income from a number of professions, while at times even being employed by the state (e.g., a civil servant having ‘rooms to let’ to tourists on a Greek island). 38. Fouskas (1995) and Fouskas (1997) ‘The Left and the crisis of the Third Hellenic Republic, 1989–97’ in Donald Sassoon (ed) Looking Left. European Socialism after the Cold War (London: I.B. Tauris). 39. Virtually, this is the concern of all bourgeoisies in the periphery and even in the core, although it takes on different forms in the core. From Latin America and Africa, to the Balkans, Turkey and Eastern Europe, the list is endless. The best exposition of this argument, as we have cited it in the first part of our work, can be found in the splendid work by Leonardo Paggi and Massimo D’ Angelillo (1986). 216 Notes

40. Claus Offe (1984) ‘ “Crisis of crisis management”: elements of a political crisis theory’, in J. Keane (ed.), Contradictions of the Welfare State (London: MIT Press), pp. 35–65. In this essay, Offe concludes that state regulation has a self-obstructing character and can provide the conceptual framework for a political crisis theory going beyond the sphere of production relations. Offe says: ‘This theory enlarges the ﬁeld of vision of traditional economic crisis theories in so far as it no longer traces the origins of crises exclusively to the dynamics of the sphere of production. Instead, it explains crises with reference to the inability of the political system to prevent and compensate for economic crises. This inability results from the self-contradictory imperatives of state policy: while it must organize the dysfunctional social consequences of private production, state policy is not supposed to infringe on the primacy of private production. If state policy is not to be adequate, however, it is forced to rely on means which either violate the dominant capital relation or undermine the functional requirement – the legitimacy and administra- tive competence of state regulation itself’, p. 61. The Greek version of the ‘crises of crisis management’ regards the continuing inability of the ruling coalition of power to reformulate their class interest as a coalition in power, mediating between political power and international capital via traditional strategies of political recruitment, such as clientelism and nepotism. 41. Arsenis (1987), pp. 123 ff., passim.

6 Debt and Destruction: The Making of the Greek and Euro-Atlantic Ruling Classes

1. This news item was on the front page of almost every British newspaper on 10 January 2013. 2. Chinese textiles and stores have also penetrated the Greek market and Athens has now a small China town. Importantly, since 2008, the Chinese company Cosco Paciﬁc Ltd. has acquired the exclusive right of use of two piers in the port of Piraeus. 3. See, China Daily, 9 November 2012, www.chinadaily.com.cn (accessed on 14 January 2013). 4. Cf., Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geo-strategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books); Fouskas (2003) which discusses critically Brzezinski’s positions, and especially Chapter 2 (‘The new geo-politics of oil and gas’) with direct reference to Greece, Balkans and the Near East/Turkey; Salavrakos Ioannis-Dionysios (1999) The Black Sea Eco- nomic Cooperation (Athens: Kritiki). Interesting research on the topic of Black Sea Cooperation was also produced by the Centre for Research and Docu- mentation in the 1990s, directed by John Dragassakis, a prominent political economist of the Greek Left of Syriza; see, John Dragassakis (1995) ‘European integration, trans-Balkan and Black Sea cooperation’, Balkan Review, n. 3, pp. 11–15. For a full-ﬂedged report produced by the research group under Dragassakis, see Report on the Black Sea (1995) Kerdos, May (special insert). 5. See Gowan’s last interview in Peter Gowan (2009) ‘The ways of the world’, New Left Review, n. 59, September–October. Gowan draws from his empirical Notes 217

work on Europe’s eastward drive and the way in which the so-called ‘technical assistance programs’, such as Phare and Tacis, had been used; see also Gowan (1999) Chapter 9. 6. Fouskas and Gökay (2005). 7. Further comments and analysis on these points in Fouskas (2003) Chapter 3, and Ronald Steel (1998) ‘Instead of NATO’ The New York Review of Books, 15 January. See also Christopher Layne (2006) The Peace of Illusions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 8. To the best of our knowledge, the only work, at least in Greece, that places the issue in a similar analytical framework – although makes no reference to ‘global fault-lines’ nor deepens that insight – is that by Nikos Kotzias (2012) The Politics of Salvation against the Troika (Athens: Livanis) especially Chapter 2. 9. On the concept of neo-revisionism, see Donald Sassoon (1996). Sassoon operates within a Bernsteinian framework, which suggests that when capitalism changes itself the strategy of socialist parties should also adapt and change. In this respect, Jospin’s, Blair’s, Occhetto’s and Shroeder’s attempts to adjust to the new capitalism of financialization and free markets were, under certain conditions, welcomed as adaptation and survival strategies of the Left. The strength of this argument lies less in what these neo-revisionist parties ended up becoming today, and more in the fact that Sassoon sees socialist party renewal as a conditio sine qua non for the success of socialism. Socialism is thus a historical and structural project becoming a continuous historical reminder/threat and shadow of capitalist development per se. This is an aspect of his work his reviewers worldwide have so far failed to grasp and analyse. 10. Martin Wolf (2012) ‘Will the Euro-zone survive the crisis?’ Lecture given at Richmond University, The American International University in London, 3 October [mimeo]. 11. Costas Lapavitsas et al. (2011) Breaking Up? A Route Out of the Euro-zone Crisis (London: SOAS, Research on Money and Finance) pp. 34–5, passim. Also, Costas Lapavitsas et al. (2010) ‘Euro-zone crisis: beggar thyself and thy neighbour’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, v. 12, n. 4, December, pp. 321–73. This approach is dear to Keynesians and Marxisants. 12. George Pagoulatos and Christos Triantopoulos (2009) ‘The return of the Greek patient: Greece and the 2008 global financial crisis’ South European Society and Politics v. 14, n. 1, March 2009, pp. 34–5. Similar views by the Brussels-based think-tank, ‘Bruegel’, see, for instance Zsolt Darvas, Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir (2011) ‘A comprehensive approach to the euro- area debt crisis’ Bruegel Policy Brief, Brussels, February. In the main, this approach is common to neo-liberal economists. 13. Harris Dellas and George S. Tavlas (2012) ‘The road to Ithaca: the gold standard, the Euro and the origins of the Greek sovereign debt crisis’, Working Paper 149 (Athens: Bank of Greece), pp. 6–8; George Moschovis and Mateo Capo Servera (2009) ‘External imbalances of the Greek economy: the role of fiscal and structural policies’ ECFIN Country Focus,v.6,n.6,10July,pp.3–4, passim. 218 Notes

14. Editorial (2012) ‘Greece on the spot’, Financial Times, 11 February, p. 12. Being fully aware of this, however, the troika, with the second Memoran- dum of February–March 2012, imposed on the ruling parties the creation of an escrow account in which all revenues raised by the state will be deposited there ﬁrst in order to serve the debt. Thus, even this hope of a possible budgetary independence, which was to have been achieved after so many sacriﬁces on the part of the people, was lost. 15. See, John Milios and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos (2010) ‘Crisis of Greece or crisis of the Euro? A view from the European “periphery” ’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, v. 12, n. 3, September, p. 232, passim. For a similar view at that level of discussion, see also Loukas Tsoukalis: ‘There was systemic failure: the surveillance mechanism set up at Maastricht clearly did not work. The stability and growth pact was inadequate in its conception and poorly implemented. And when the crisis came, we all discovered (or were just reminded) that the EU had no mechanism to deal with it’, Loukas Tsoukalis (2012) The Political Economy of the Crisis: The End of an Era? Dahrendorf Symposia Series at http://www.dahrendorf- symposium.eu (accessed on 12 January 2013); in a similar vein also the papers presented to the conference ‘Lessons from the Euro-zone crisis’, UCL- University of London, London, 2 June 2011 (speakers included Edmond Alphandery, Giles Merritt, Yiannos Papandoniou, Wendy Carlin and Sir John Gieve). 16. On this, Milios is in total accord with Leo Panitch, Sam Gindin and other scholars, such as Ray Kiely; see Fouskas and Gökay (2012). 17. See, Spyros Lapatsioras, Leonidas Maroudas, Panayotis G. Michaelides, John Milios and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos (2009) ‘On the character of the current economic crisis’, Radical Notes, 10 April http://radicalnotes.com (accessed on 4 November 2012). 18. John Milios and Elias Ioakimoglou (1990) The Internationalisation of Greek Capitalism and the Balance of Payments (Athens: Exantas). 19. Ibid., p. 172. 20. Ibid., pp. 213–15. 21. Milios and Sotiropoulos (2010), p. 230. 22. Ibid., p. 236. 23. Also, this view refutes as ‘mythical’ that the EMU is exclusively the servant of the ‘insatiable’ and imperial schemes of Germany as the most competitive economy within the EU. 24. See especially the article by Michel Husson (2011) ‘A European strategy for the Left’, International Viewpoint, 28 January, http://internationalviewpoint. org/spip.php?article1981 (accessed on 5 November 2011); see also the response by Costas Lapavitsas (2011), ‘A Left strategy for Europe’ International Viewpoint 13 April, http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article2091 (accessed on 5 November 2011). Especially important to understand this point of view is the collective work edited by Elena Papadopoulou and Gabriel Sakellaridis (2012) The Political Economy of Public Debt and Auster- ity in the EU (Athens: Nissos), especially the interesting contributions by John Dragassakis, George Stathakis, Euclid Tsakalotos, John Milios and Yanis Varoufakis. Notes 219

25. Savas Robolis (2012) Economic Crisis and the Welfare State (Athens-Salonica: Epikentro) pp. 186–204; INE-GSEE (2012) Annual Report on the Greek Economy and Employment (Athens: INE-GSEE). 26. See, Athena Belegri-Roboli, Maria Markaki and Panayiotis Michaelides (2010) Inter-branch Relations in the Greek Economy (Athens: INE-GSEE). 27. In the end, this is the view that came to dominate Syriza’s leading group. However, this perspective downplays the role of international/social and technical division of labour, as well as of geo-politics, as a determining framework mapping out the possibilities for the country’s sustainable development. Moreover, this programme presupposes a total overhaul of political and social structures of the country, not to mention the broader issue of social agency and culture, which are issues that this perspective passes over in silence. 28. See, Yanis Varoufakis (2012) ‘Of debts and fault-lines: Greece and the Euro- zone crisis in a global context’ http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2011/02/28/of- debts-and-faultlines-greece-and-the-euro-crisis-in-a-global-context/ (accessed on 12 January 2013). Varoufakis’s main argument is that the real cause of the sovereign debt crisis has been the lack of, what he calls, ‘Surplus Recycling Mechanism’. But this can exist only in the framework of a sovereign state and the EU is not a (federal) state. What he says, therefore, is right, but it is rather common sense. 29. One of the most perceptive analyses of the crisis of the EMU comes from Phillip Arestis and Malcolm Sawer, which show the deficiencies of the so-called ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ as ‘not being fit for the purpose’. These deficiencies are: the independence of the ECB and its inability to produce fiscal policy, coupled with the absence of mechanisms to resolve patterns of current account deficits and surpluses. See, Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer (2010) ‘The problems of the economic and monetary union: is there any escape?’ Journal of Economic Analysis,v.1,n.1,pp.1–14. 30. A role, not entirely insignificant, in the ASE’s ascendance was played by the social security funds. Until the mid-1980s the goose with the golden eggs had been the stocks of social security funds locked into the Bank of Greece on an interest-free basis. In the main, these funds were used to provide cheap loans to the public and private sectors, the funds themselves receiving no significant returns. As these funds matured and the number of pensioners increased rapidly in the 1990s – Greece has a large ageing population – the ASE became an important outlet for capitalization and speculation (it should be noted, however, that social security funds cannot invest more than 20 per cent of their funds in the stock market); see, Panaghiotis Petroulas, Savas Robolis, Evangelos Xydeas (1990) Social Insurance in Greece. The Case of IKA (Athens: INE-GSEE). 31. It should be noted that all the privatizations that occurred from 1991 to 2010 brought only 20 billion euros to the state, mainly used to sustain borrowing and the remaining lame-ducks. 32. Union of Greek Banks (2011) ‘The Greek banking system’ (Athens: UGB), pp. 14 ff. 33. Bank of Greece (1998) Annual Report of the Governor (Athens: Bank of Greece), pp. 273–7, 274. 220 Notes

34. Constantine Manolopoulos (2011) ‘The Greek economy and the banking sector’, (Athens: Marfin Investment Bank), February, pp. 21–27, also available at http://elearn.elke.uoa.gr/ppetrakis/dialexis/2012/trapeziki/dialexi02. pdf (accessed on 12 January 2013). 35. Bank of Greece (1998) Report of the Governor (Athens: Bank of Greece) p. 279. 36. In this respect, we disagree with the rather rushed conclusion by Lapavitsas et al. (2011), that the ‘Greek banks drew closer to the state’ seeking protection, implying that nationalization of the banking sector in Greece is imminent. What is observed here is a rather conjunctural phenomenon of Summer-Fall 2011 during which time the ECB was reluctant to re-capitalize periphery and other European banks, tempting Lapavitsas to foresee a breaking-up of the Euro-zone. 37. According to the Union of Greek Banks (2011), 45 per cent of their share value is owned by foreign and Greek institutional investors, 37 per cent are individuals, 13 per cent are owned by the state and 5 per cent by various insurance funds. According to a top assessor of the Alpha Bank, George Michalopoulos, some 70 per cent of the investors in the Greek banks are from Central and Northern Europe, and 59 per cent belong to EU banks; see George Michalopoulos (2012) ‘Financing Greek banks during the crisis’ (Athens: Alpha Bank) pp. 233 ff., http://62.1.43.74/5Ekdosis/UplPDFs// syllogikostomos/12-c%20Michalopoulos%20229-246.pdf (accessed on 12 January 2013). 38. Interestingly, and when the Commercial Bank was in full neo-liberal swing, its managing director from 2000 to 2004 was Yiannis Stournaras, Minister of National Economy since June 2012. 39. See, Kerin Hope (1998) ‘A big market close to home’ Financial Times Special Survey of Greece, 8 December, p. 2. 40. Ibid. 41. Greek shipping capital, a prime international force in world seaborne trade with no substantial base in Greece, should also be brought into this equa- tion. Also, part of the Greek merchant fleet is listed in the shipping register under flags of convenience, so no substantial tax income can be raised by the Greek state. This loss of income becomes even more significant in the 1990s and 2000s, as the world share of the Greek merchant fleet – under confirmed Greek ownership – which was 1 per cent in 1947 and 12 per cent in 1970, soared to 17.4 per cent in 2000. Unlike other nationalities, Greek ship-owners are under no legal compulsion to enter or remain on the Greek registry and they do so only in periods in which favourable tax regimes – such as laws 2687/1953, 89/1967 and 378/1968 – come into force. Most Greek shipping is ‘tramp’, rather than ‘liner’ shipping. The former is conducted by vessels, which go like taxis wherever the charterer wants, with freight rates fixed in a free global market. The latter is conducted by vessels/liners, which run like buses on regular schedules and according to predetermined routes and tariffs. Having said this, the only significant contribution of Greek shipping to the Greek economy is its net contribution to invisible earnings and employment. See, among others, John Theotokas and Gelina Charlauti (2007) Greek Ship-owners and Maritime Business (Athens: Alexandria) pp. 33 ff., Anne E. Bredima (1991) ‘The shipping sector’, in Speros Vryonis Jr. (ed.) Greece on the Road to Democracy; Notes 221

from the Junta to PASOK, 1974–1986 (New York: Aristide D. Karatzas), pp. 233–45. 42. An effort to estimate the size of tax evasion of the new bourgeoisie is made by George Stathakis (2011) ‘The fiscal crisis of the Greek economy’ in a volume edited by the Scientific Association of Greek Political Economists, Economic Crisis and Greece (Athens: Gutenberg), pp. 193–205. 43. Even in the middle of the debt crisis in September 2011, Athens daily press reported that Mytilineos S.A. buys from the state electricity company, DEI (PPC S.A.), energy at 41 Euros per MegaWh, only to sell it back to DEI for Euros 55 per MegaWh. How is this possible? Mytilineos, who runs an aluminium business, received a licence by the Greek state to buy cheap electricity for his aluminium business. But he had set up a separate energy unit for himself, ending up selling back energy to DEI at a higher price. This type of domestic comprador activity against the very interests of the public at large is not just damaging to state performance; it is insulting. None of the press reports about it have been denied or contradicted. 44. On these issues, see the analysis by Christoforos Vernardakis (2011) Political Parties, Elections and Party System. The Transformations of Political Representa- tion, 1990–2012 (Athens-Salonica: Sakkoulas), pp. 38 ff., 333 ff. 45. Among others, John Tolios (2011), pp. 67–8. 46. www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed on 2 November 2011). 47. An Athens-based think-tank dealing with offset and procurement par excel- lence is ‘Epicos’, with a very revealing website, www.epicos.com/Portal/Top/ ContactUs/Offices/Pages/default.aspx. 48. A comment here is necessary. In the 1980s, as we saw earlier, the EEC tried to bridge the gap between core and periphery with various Mediterranean programmes and other forms of aid. It failed. Later, it tried to do virtually the same by creating the so-called structural and cohesion funds. Coun- tries whose per capita income was below 75 per cent of Europe’s average were classified as ‘Objective 1’ countries; countries whose per capita income was below 90 per cent of Europe’s average were the so-called ‘Cohesion countries’ for whom a Cohesion Fund was set up in order to assist con- vergence between core and periphery. Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain (PIGS) became organic parts of this programme, which failed in its entirety to bridge the economic and technological gap between core and periphery. Interestingly, all post-2004 new EU members of East-Central Europe and the Balkans became part of the same failed programme. 49. In the wake of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, its southern republic, Macedonia, claimed international recognition under the name of Macedonia, the name of a northern province of Greece. Obviously, Greece opposed the name and the issue remains unresolved to the present day. In 1995 the PASOK government under Andreas Papandreou imposed an embargo on FYROM, prohibiting embarkation of commodities to the Greek port of Salonica whose final destination was FYROM. In the main, Andreas, primarily, and Antonis Samaras, who broke away from ND over the Macedonian issue, were respon- sible for the unacceptable slogan ‘Macedonia is Greek’. Andreas launched this slogan in order to be re-elected in 1993, which he was. But the other three issues (Imia/Kardak, S-300 and Ocalan) are directly related to Turkey. Imia/Kardak: in January 1996, and soon after Simitis succeeded Andreas in 222 Notes

office, Turkish commandos challenged Greek sovereignty over the uninhab- ited islets of Imia/Kardak removing the Greek flag there – the crisis was defused only after the intervention of US President, Bill Clinton. S-300: In January 1997 the president of the (Greek Cypriot-led) Republic of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides, announced the purchase of a system of S-300 missiles from Russia. Turkey immediately threatened Cyprus (and Greece) with war and destruction of the missiles on their way to Cyprus. As a consequence, the Republic of Cyprus decided to send the missiles to Crete. The Ocalan affair: late in 1998, Ocalan, the Kurdish leader of PKK (Kurdistan’s Workers Party) leading the secession of Kurdish-populated areas in South-eastern Turkey, was forced by Syria to leave his operational base in northern Syria (Turkey amassed a lot of pressure on Syria to stop protecting Ocalan). Apparently, and after Russia refused to grant asylum to the PKK leader, Ocalan was assisted by a network of Greek nationalists who brought him to Nairobi, Kenya (the Greek government of Simitis and his Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos, were fully aware of what was going on). Eventually, Turkish special forces captured Ocalan in Nairobi and brought him to Turkey. Ocalan was sen- tenced to death, but has not been executed to date. Turkey then launched a big campaign against Greece harbouring terrorists (PKK was officially listed by the USA and a number of EU states as a terrorist organization). All these cases damaged Greece in a variety of ways: The Imia/Kardak crisis created a disadvantageous precedent for Greece in the Aegean, demarcating ‘grey zones’; the S-300 crisis failed to serve the purpose for which they were bought (defence of the Republic of Cyprus); Greece’s Macedonian policy, profoundly nationalistic and self-serving, was deemed as unacceptable by the EU and the USA alike; and the Ocalan case humiliated Greek nationalism acting behind the scenes, while damaging the Simitis government ‘who knew what was going on but it did not deliver’ (Pangalos was forced to resign after his failure to manage the case). Some of these themes are tackled well by Takis Tsakonas (2010) The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasp- ing Greece’s Socialisation Strategy (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan). Tsakonas (pp. 6–65) also discusses the Greek foreign policy of rapprochement (official from 1999, but informally in operation since 1995, when Greece allowed Turkey to enter into a customs union agreement with the EU in return for Turkey’s concession to allow a divided Cyprus to begin accession negotiations. For a Turkish perspective, see the comprehensive account by Ahmet Davutoglu (2010) Strategic Depth. Turkey’s International Position (Athens: Poiotita). 50. Bank of Greece (2010) Report of the Governor of the Bank of Greece for 2009 (Athens: Bank of Greece); Association of Greek Banks (2011) The Greek Bank- ing System in 2010 (Athens: Association of Greek Banks); Richard Milne and Gerrit Wiesmann (2011) ‘ECB ready to reject Greek downgrade’ Financial Times, 5 July, p. 1. Despite the fact that the Report of the Governor, George Provopoulos, presents the banking system as a problem-free financial area, he does not fail to mention the degree of dependency of the Greek banks on euro-zone capitals, esp. pp. 171–200. 51. Similarly, the value of imports from France is 3.1 billion euros, whereas the value of Greek exports to France is down to 0.7 billion euros. For Italy, the Notes 223

numbers are 6.9/1.8 against Greece. See, ELSTAT (2009) Concise Statistical Yearbook (Athens: ELSTAT), pp. 168–72. 52. Lapavitsas et al. (2010), p. 344. 53. As opposed to the continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zones have to be declared by a state. Recent discoveries of gas south of Cyprus, prompted the Republic of Cyprus to declare its EEZ with the support of Israel, taking advantage of bad relations between Israel and Turkey. But Greece has not delimited its EEZ yet. Joint delimitation of Greek EEZ with the Repub- lic of Cyprus would have been advantageous in asserting sovereignty over the newly discovered hydrocarbons south of Crete and Cyprus (see also the following footnote). 54. We do not wish to expand significantly on this subject, because it would require a separate book. However, it is worth mentioning the large quantities of gas found in the Cypriot continental shelf (South) and the interest registered by a number of companies and states, including Israel and Russia, as well as the large quantities of hydrocarbons south of Crete. Reliable reports (see, Ta Nea, 5 December 2012) indicate that gas reserves south of Crete may be over 3.5 trillion of cubic metres with a value of up to 427 billion euros. A kind of ‘new great game’ seems to be taking place here, the main protagonists being the current Greek government (ND, PASOK and Democratic Left [DIMAR]) and the troika. The Russians and the Chinese seem to be sidelined. The Second and Third Memoranda have established an escrow account to be funded by Greek revenues to service the Greek debt obligations. Thus, any revenue reaching Greek state energy companies will go directly to the escrow account, which will be swallowed up by the troika. In case, however, the state energy company, Hellenic Petroleum, enters the new privatization programme imposed by the troika (something which has been announced in the Third Memorandum), then the income can again be appropriated via the majority shares that foreign interests will have in Hellenic Petroleum, whereas any other income will have to go to the escrow account. In an interview with SKY TV, the director of the Institute for Hydrocarbon Research, Vassilis Karkoulias, argued that the exploitation of the new gas deposits south of Crete must include all major oil multinationals, such as British Petroleum (BP), Exxon Mobil etc, adding that the real extraction of gas for Greek interests will begin between 2021 and 2024. But that is when it is deemed by the troika that the Greek debt would be viable and manageable, assuming of course that the current austerity brings about a successful outcome. Why should all this be a coincidence? At any event, all the real assets of the country are mortgaged to the imperial undertakings of the troika and its bankers. Thus, Greece has entirely sold out one of its most important bargaining tools, that is its crucial geo-political position. See the interesting interview by Karkoulias in www.skai.gr/tv/show/?showid=65140; see also the Institute’s webpage www.elliny.gr/. 55. Vassilis K. Fouskas (2011) ‘A Greek tragedy: the making of the Greek and Euro-Atlantic ruling classes’ www.opendemocracy.net, 5 December. 56. We do not employ any particular theory concerning the definition of social class. Instead, we use one or two ‘rules of thumb’. The first is what we have 224 Notes

already implied above and was grasped as long ago as 1852 by Marx: never mind the power the bourgeoisie can draw from being the dominant class in the sphere of production and finance, its political regime will be shaken if it fails, via its political representatives, to enlist the political and ideological support of middle and lower middle classes. Having the immediate producer of real value, that is, the working class, as a permanent class opponent is something that the bourgeoisie can get away with. But it cannot afford losing the support of the middle classes, which is paramount in the exercise of its hegemony. One way of losing the support of middle classes is by having something going terribly wrong in capitalism as a social system, such as the inability of the system to redistribute part of the value (whether real or fictitious) for the cause of extended reproduction of the middle and lower middle classes. In other words, capitalism should be doing well as a social system and produce enough wealth and money to sustain not just the reproduction, but the extended reproduction of middle social strata over long periods of time. But this is not always the case, because the greatest misfortune of capitalists is that they cannot control capitalism, that is, its contradictions. Crises and downturns occur which undermine the social contract between the ruler and the ruled, the bourgeoisie and the middle classes (we make the theoretical assumption that the immediate producer is always confronta- tional and ‘at war’ with the bourgeois, the non-producer of value). The second ‘rule of thumb’ we use here is that we prefer to ‘catch’ social class in action rather than providing a static definition of it, however comprehensive. After all, neo-liberalism and financialization keep displacing the productive- material base of the Euro-Atlantic core, outsourcing material production to the ‘global East/South’, whereas unorthodox patterns of migration, especially from/to/within the EU, social mobility and population movements make any rigid or abstract definition of class a rather precarious theoretical undertaking. 57. Bank of Greece (2012) Annual Report of the Governor (Athens: Bank of Greece), pp. 102 ff. 58. Migrants in Greece from the former Ottoman and Soviet space number more than a million and, as expected, statistics fail to capture their employment records and impact on the social economy of the country. But racist feelings in Greece have taken on a disturbing turn over the last two years, as racist groups across the country find easy scapegoats in the migrants, especially Albanians and Muslims. This is political raw material for the pro-Nazi party, Golden Dawn. 59. According to the Pan-Hellenic Union of Public Works (PESEDE), public works contractors number more than 6200 businesses, half of which are run by one individual. Again, the fragmentation of the sector pertains to the clientelistic-corporatist nature of the party and state system, creating political clientele by contracting out public works to individuals of unknown technical ability and skill. 60. The analyses by Peter Gowan on this issue are superb, see Gowan (1999), pp. 187–248. See also, Tolios (2011), pp. 86–93; Vassilis K. Fouskas (2011) ‘Dealing with sovereign debt crises today: Lessons from Eastern Europe and the Balkans’ Debatte; Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe,v.19, n. 3, December, pp. 633–48. Notes 225

61. Ralph Atkins et al. (2013) ‘Greece over worst of crisis, says Provopoulos’, Financial Times,30January,p.5.

7 By Way of a Conclusion: Greece’s Debt Crisis Today and Some Normative Reﬂections

1. Antonio Gramsci (1973) ‘The modern Prince’, in Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds) Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart), p. 151. 2. Nationalism and historical inaccuracies mar many ideological analyses on the current crisis; see, for example, Stathis Kouvelakis (2011) ‘The Greek caul- dron’, New Left Review, v. 72, pp. 17–32 (for Kouvelakis, the ‘extreme-right LAOS party returns to office for the first time since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974’ (an example of inaccuracy); or ‘the Greeks may find themselves once more at the forefront of historical developments’ as in ‘1821 when they were the first continental country to win national independence’ (an example of both historical inaccuracy and patriotic triumphalism). 3. Very close to our argument, Tsoukalas, in his last book, connects the problems of post-World War II Greece with its geo-strategic significance for NATO and the USA in Cold War conditions. More concretely, he makes a master analysis of ideological and moral aspects of the current crisis, arguing that their causes can be traced back to the consequences of the Civil War (1946–49) and the choice of US neo-imperialism to reconstruct Greek micro-capitalism as a dependent and parasitic appendage in order to use it against the Soviet bloc. Tsoukalas, however, parts company with us when he argues that Greece’s geo-strategic position was downgraded, and not re-ordained – as we argue in this book – after the end of Cold War. Thus, Greek parasitic micro-capitalism was bound to collapse after adopting forms of extreme financialization in EMU conditions and having lost the protection of the ‘American factor’. See, Constantine Tsoukalas (2012) Oblivious and Truthful Greece: From the Long Puberty to Forceful Maturity (Athens: Themelio). 4. Martin Wolf (2013) ‘A perilous journey to full recovery’, Financial Times, 30 January, p. 11. Bibliography

We ﬁrst present sources what could be considered as ‘primary’ material, followed by the secondary sources discussed in the book. We have also used a plethora of websites, quite imperative in our digital era, for which the reader should consult the endnotes in each chapter. We have avoided citing and commenting on all primary material and reports for reasons of space.

Primary Sources

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Note: Locators followed by ‘n’ refer to notes accumulation by dispossession, 19, social agencies and, 170 37, 40 under capitalism, 24 Acheson, D., 84, 86, 92, 100, 102–3, under communism, 77 105, 107, 134, 167 Austria, 69–71 Adalya, 70 autarky, 77, 80, 88, 89, 145, 150 Adam Smith in Beijing, 36, 37 authoritarianism, 49, 50, 54, 79 Afghanistan, 41, 43, 52, 84, 187 AGET-Hercules, 152 bailout, 47, 139, 164, 190 Aegean Sea, 18 Balbo, Cesare, 3 AIG insurance, 185 The Balkans, 37, 43, 61, 68–70, 77, Albania, 83, 161, 183 79, 81, 82, 84, 100, 117, 137–9, Alexandria, 68 146, 152, 155, 157, 161, 166, 167, Alpha Bank/Group, 154, 156 173, 185 Althusser, L., 110 Bank of Greece, 153 Anatolia, 70–1 bank recapitalisation, 12 Argentina, 48 Banks and banking capital, 12, 22, 65, Armstrong, P., 29 67, 122, 129, 161 Arrighi, G., 4, 35–7, 49, 135 Belgium, 3, 73, 126, 151 Arsenis, G., 133 Belgrade, 157 Asia Minor, 5, 64, 70–2, 74, Beloyiannis, N., 91 85–6 Bichler, Shimshon, 42 Aspida (Shield) case, 99 Black Sea Economic Cooperation Association of South East Asian (BSEC), 137 Nations (ASEAN), 31 Blair, Tony, 151 ATE Bank, 154 Bobbio, N., 3 Athens, 68–9, 72, 77, 87, 91, 96, 98, Bobolas S.A., 156 105, 108, 148, 151, 155–7, 166, Bolshevik revolution, 67, 79 181, 183, 189 Bonapartism, 4, 168 Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), 151, borrowing (internal and external), 63, 161 79, 123, 133, 161, 165 austerity programs Brazil, 11, 48, 135, 137 banking beneﬁts, 145 Brenner, R., 4, 19, 24, 29–30, 36, in the core-periphery, 15–17 109, 166 by IMF and ECB, 182 Bretton Woods system, 23, 51, 92 crisis and, 150 Britain, 64–76, 78, 84–6, 100–3, in Germany, 164 110, 115, 118–19, 126, 134, 158, harsh measures, 148 168, 187–8 middle classes, impact on, 168 British Petroleum (BP), 223n54 PASOK announcement, 123–6 budget deﬁcit, 66, 79, 93, 120, 133, by pro-bailout cabinets, 139 156, 162, 182

237 238 Index

Bukharin, N., 12, 21–2, 31 credit Bulgaria, 69–71, 73, 83, 85–7, credit default swaps (CDS), 149 157, 161 ECB credit line, 165 expansion, 92 Cairo, 157 flows in peripheral countries, 166 Cameron, David, 134, 168 institutions in Greece, 171–2 capital goods, 5, 27, 95, 111, 129, 1929 crunch, 77, 79 135 paper, 186 capitalism to peasants, 73 core characeristic of, 52, 54, 114 Credit Default Swaps (CDS), 149, European, 113, 149 185 credit system, 20, 24, 28, 40, 50 in globalization era, 110 creditism, 23–4 regular return of crises, 34, 51 ‘crisis of crisis management,’ 6, 131 role of state, 45–9 cyclical crises, 16, 34–7, 42, 45, 146–7, structural fault-lines, 42 149 Caspian Sea, 42–3, 137, 138, 185 Cypriot banks, 157, 164 Catalonia, 3 Cyprus, 18, 26, 38, 43, 53, 63, caudillos, 54 70, 73, 81–3, 87, 93, 98, Cementamica USJE, 157 100–7, 112, 115–16, 119–21, Central Intelligence Agency (USA), 131, 134, 137, 157–9, 161, 164, 82, 104, 105 182–3, 185, 190 Chase-Dunn, C., 46 Cyprus issue, 5, 73, 82, 83, 98, 100–1, Chase, J., 86 107, 115 China, 1, 38, 11, 13, 33, 37, 45, 51, 54, 110, 159, 184–5 Damascus, 157 Churchill, W., 70, 72 debt civil society, 32, 48, 49, 167–8 cancellation, 189–90 Civil Transportation Organization of creation, 19, 26, 37, 42, 44, 46, 50, Athens (OASA), 121 52, 125, 130, 178, 189 Civil War, 47, 83, 106 destruction and, 134–85 clientelism, 49, 55, 128, 144 mechanism, 62, 182 political clientelism, 48, 112, 114, public, 53, 126, 136, 147, 151, 158, 130, 133, 146 159, 182 Clinton admininstration, 29, 30, 110 structure, 151, 158 Cold War, 44, 81–3, 87, 100, 104–7, see also Greek debt 111–12, 116, 137–8 debtors, 11, 27, 59, 144, 145, 189–90 commercial banks, 93, 119, 121, dependency, 13, 32, 45, 47, 51, 53–4, 152–3, 178, 182 62, 82, 87, 96, 106–7, 111–12, commodification, 40, 44, 46 132, 144, 146, 148, 158, 167 comprador bourgeoisie, 7, 46, 52, 96, dependent/subaltern position, 59, 76, 107, 118, 129, 132, 161 97, 132, 162, 188 comprador capital, 48, 49, 63, 107, deténte, 104–5, 109–11 111, 121, 157, 189 dictatorship, 6, 47, 72, 77, 82, 83, 88, Constantinople, 67, 68, 70, 71 92–3, 98–9, 106–7, 111, 118, 190 containment, 83, 86 di Lampedusa, Giuseppe Tomasi, 96 core-periphery, 30–1, 39–40, 45, 146, disintegrative tendencies, 1–3, 11, 19, 150, 189 26, 45, 132, 144, 186, 188 Credi Agricole, 154 Division of Offsets (DO), 159 Index 239 dollar (as reserve currency)/dollar shock therapy, 15, 23, 40 hegemony uneven and combined British pound and, 74 development, 20–34 devaluation, 109, 135 Euro-merchant Balkan Fund, 157 during war periods, 75 European Central Bank (ECB), 26, 39, -euro relation, 190 147, 150, 155, 165, 182, 190 exchange rate, 46 European Community (EC), 123, 124, as geo-political commodity, 42 131–2, 160 in global market, 13, 51 European Currency Unit (ECU), 125 gold and, 24 European Economic Community USA’s imperial primacy and, (EEC), 6, 53, 99, 106, 111, 113, 83–4 116–19, 121, 124, 129, 131, 132, Drachma, 65, 72, 74, 76, 79, 111, 121, 188 123–4, 155 European Financial Stability Facility goldern age of, 88–100 (EFSF), 164 Dubai, 157 European Monetary Union (EMU), Duncan, R., 23 145–6, 149, 156, 169–70, 188–9 European Union (EU), 31, 39–40, Economic and Financial Affairs 43–4, 53–4, 106, 131–2, 134–5, Council (Council of the European 149–50, 159–66, 182–84, 190 Union, ECOFIN), 124 Exchange Rates Mechanism (ERM), Economic Cooperation 155 Administration (ECA), 90 exchange value (stock), 42, 53, 151, Economic Research Department 157–8, 166, 177 (ERD), 147 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 166 economies of scale, 1875, 107, 118 Exxon Mobil, 223n54 EFG-Eurobank, 154, 157 Egypt, 86 fascism, 49, 59, 80 Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece), 100–1, 103 fictitious capital, 20–34, 35, 38–9, 49 Euro (the Euro-zone) fictitious commodities, 54, 175, 185 -dollar relation, 190 financial capital, 12, 23–4, 34, 50–1, exchange rate, 149 68, 144, 151, 156, 182, 184, 189 monetary base, 26–8 financialization role in Europe’s political unification, 54 crisis theory, 11, 25, 36, 53–4 Euro-Atlanticism (Euro-Atlantic core) empirical categories, 110 comprador bourgeoisie, 46, 52 extreme, 23, 26, 40, 44, 51 comprador capital, 48, 49 gloabalization and, 135, 137 cycical crises, 16, 34–7, 42, 45 Greek geopolitics and, 178, 185 disintegrative tendencies, 11, 19, international trends of, 133, 174 26, 45 neo-liberal, 135, 139, 154, 162, extreme financialization, 23, 26, 40, 169–70, 189 44, 51 ‘first-cut’ crisis theory, 19, 20, 35 fictitious capital, 20–34, 35, fiscal/budgetary crisis, 15, 24, 79, 139, 38–9, 49 144, 147 global fault-lines, 12, 19, 21, fixed capital, 33, 95, 120 34–45, 50 Flight Information Region (FIR), offensive realism, 32 211–12n54 Open Door policy, 33, 50–2 Fordism, 49 240 Index foreign capital, 46, 66, 75, 96, 104, Greece 107, 121 capitalism in, 60–1, 65, 68, 78, 81 Foreign direct investment (FDI), 29, exports in, 89–91 92, 107, 165, 166 tobacco market, 65, 66, 73, 89,95 Former Yugoslav Republic of unemployment rate, 94 Macedonia (FYROM), 157, 161 see also specific entries France, 13, 30, 59–62, 64, 68–70, 73–8, Greek bankruptcies, 167, 185 86, 91, 109, 125–6, 130, 132, 135, Greek banks, 152–3, 155–6, 165, 183 156, 158–9, 165, 183 Greek Communist Party (KKE), 18, 84 Frank, A.G., 35, 37, 46 Greek Communist Party Interior Friedman, Milton, 110 (KKEes), 115 FYROM, 157, 161 Greek debt banking sector and, 164 General Armaments Directorate current account deficit, 147, 165 (GAD), 159 Eurozone entry and, 139 General Armaments Directorate haircut strategy, 134, 164, 166, 172 (Greek Ministry of Defence, internal and external sources, 66, GAD), 159 73, 79, 108, 113, 166, 167 General Confederation of Greek investment portfolio, 153–4, 157 Workers (GSEE), 219n25, 219n26, main holders of, 158 219n30 in 2009–2010, 138 Genetically Modified (GM) food, The Greek Ministry of Defence, 159 157 Greek Postal Services, 154 geo-culture, 37, 186 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) geo-strategy, 41, 67, 84 black economic sector (Greece), 175 geopolitics China, 159 Cold War, 81 defense budget (Greece), 95, 116, of Cyprus crisis, 98, 182 158 in Euro-Atlantic area, 11–55, defense spending (selected) 186 Countries, 122 in Greek nationalism, 61, 78, 166, economic indicators, 122 185 in EEC countries (public debt), 127 national security and, 103 European (selected) Countries, 95 Germany, 11–14, 26–30, 59–61, external debt (Greece), 171 131, 135, 147–9, 155–6, 158, income tax and, 123 182–3, 185 inflation and, 119, 156 Gindin, S., 14, 23 lending and borrowing, 127 ‘global East/South,’ 2, 7, 135, 136, Metaxas policy, 89 139, 184 Mutual funds (Greece), 155 global fault-lines, 2–4, 12, 19, 21, 1977–1991, 124 34–45, 50, 109, 187–8 1994–2009, 161 globalisation/financialisation cum in PIGS countries, 160 neo-liberalism, 41, 110 public debt and, 126, 147, 149, 162, Golden Age of capitalism, 29–30, 182 81, 88–91, 94, 96–7, 112, public sector (Greece), 116 116, 120 Scandinavian, 130 Gowan, P., 41, 43, 137 Sectoral composition, 94, 117 Gramsci, A., 49, 80, 187 2002, 2007–2012 (selected Great Depression, 73, 76, 79, 80 countries), 136, 184 Index 241

Gross National Product (GNP), 137 inflation, 1 56, 26–7, 30, 92–3, Grundrisse,21 110–11, 113, 118–19, 121, 123–6, 150 Harvey, D., 4, 16–20, 22, 24–5, 28, 33, interest rates, 26, 27, 110, 125, 145, 35, 37, 39–43 147, 165, 181 Hayek Friedrich, 110 International Commission of Hay, John, 33 Economic Control (ICEC), 66 Hellenic Industrial Development Bank International Financial Commission (ETVA), 152 (IFC), 206n40 Hellenic Statistical Services (ELSTAT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 95 31, 39, 40, 83, 118, 155, 182 heterodox theory of money and International Political Economy (IPE), finance, 186 31, 42, 109 Hilferding, R., 12, 22–3 International Relations (IR), 12, 31, Holland, S., 150 108, 109 hub and spoke Intracom Holding S.A., 156 imperialism/arrangements Iraq, 41, 52, 187 in Euro-Atlantic area, 11–13, 18, 43, Ireland, 12, 126, 155, 168, 169, 190 47, 51, 54 Italy, 12, 28, 60, 61, 70, 80, 86, 109, in France, 91 126, 130, 146, 151, 155, 181, 190 in Germany, 190 in Greece, 107 Japan, 26, 30, 32, 33, 37, 81–3, 89, 93, in Italy, 91 109, 130, 138, 198 in USA, 138, 168, 188 Johnson, Lyndon, 102, 103 in Western Europe, 91 Hudson,Michael,75 Kampfplatz European factor and, 109–33 ideational (elements), 37, 43 fault-lines and, 97–100 Idionymon (Law), 88 Greek Depression and, 80 il Gattopardo,96 19th century exit, 64–6 imperial(ist) chain, 21–2, 31, 46 post-war political regime, 82 imperialism/neo-imperialism 20th century exit, 67–8 in Euro-Atlantic area, 11, 18, 19, 31, Kautsky, K., 22, 31 37, 47, 51, 52 Keynes, J.M., 24 geopolitics and, 53 Keynesianism, 24, 129, 166, 188 in Great Britain, 50, 67 Kolko, Gabriel, 138 in Greece, 68–70, 72, 107 Kosovo, 43, 52, 157 Marxist theorization of, 31, 35 Koumoundouros, Alexander, 65 in USA, 52, 138, 168, 186, 188 Kuniholm, B., 88 Western European, 67 Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), world system theorists on, 45 221–2n49 see also hub and spoke imperialism/arrangements Labour Institute-General import-substitution Confederation of Greek Workers (industrialisation), 48, 77, 79, 89, (INE-GSEE), 219n25, 219n26, 92, 121 219n30 India, 2, 5, 7, 11, 51, 67, 68, 135, labour-power, 20, 21, 39, 40 137, 159 LaFeber, Walter, 138 Indonesia, 11, 135 Lagarde, C., 40 242 Index laissez-faire, 16, 88 Middle East, 13, 42, 44, 52, 59, 68, 70, Lapavitsas, C., 144, 145, 147, 165 84, 99, 105, 134, 137, 138, 167, Latin America, 51, 74, 77, 80, 82, 88, 173, 194 126, 136 MIG, 156 Latsis, 157 migration, 95, 96 law 281, 77 Milios, J., 148 law 509, 91 M-M’ (money begetting money’), 20, law 2687, 92 24, 110 law 3433, 159 mode of production, 36 law 4171, 92 monopoly capital, 64, 67–8, 72, 99 law 4229, 77 Moscow, 157 League of Nations Financial Mutual Security Agency (MSA), 92 Committee (LNFC), 206n40 Mytilineos, 156–7 lenders, 26, 39, 62, 66, 156, 171, 190 Lenin, V.I., 12, 22, 28, 31, 114 National Bank of Greece, 153 Levant, 61, 70 National Health System (NHS), 122 liberal democracy, 4, 17, 33–4, 45, nationalism, 17, 61, 96, 101, 105, 109, 83, 114 138, 150 The Limits to Capital,20 National Organisation of Cypriot Lloyd, George, 69, 70 Fighters (EOKA), 100–1 loans, 62, 64, 66, 74–5, 81, 107, 111, National Radical Union (ERE), 97, 98 121, 124, 135, 149, 162, 178, 181 ‘National Schism,’ 69 Near East, 11, 61, 67, 69, 100, 139, London, 38, 54, 75, 100–1, 144–5, 157 152, 155, 156, 161, 166, 185 London-Zurich agreements, 101–2 neo-liberalism financialization and, 23, 41, 44, Macedonia, 67, 73, 85, 157, 161, 166 51–2, 54, 110–11, 113, 119, Mandel, E., 30 128, 132 Manolopoulos, C., 153 globalization and, 35, 44, 110, 135 Manpower Employment Organisation The Netherlands, 165 (OAED), 214n22 New Democracy (ND), 111–13, 115, Marphin Bank, 156 128–33, 139, 151, 158, 160–61, Marshall Plan, 47, 81, 83, 87, 134 167–68, 172–73, 176, 178, 183–85 Marx, K., 8, 12, 14, 16, 20–2, 24, 33–5, Nitzan, Jonathan, 42 40–1, 47, 49–50, 53, 110, 113, Noble (US energy company), 182 165, 168, 184 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Marxism/Marxisant, 14, 17, 24, 31, (NATO), 32, 40, 44–5, 51, 53, 34–5, 37 82–3, 95, 97, 101–5, 111, 115–16, Mazower, M., 73, 89 121, 131, 137–38, 186 M-C-M’ (Money-Commodity-Money’), Northern Tier programme, 100 20, 110 Mearsheimer, J., 32, 37 Offe, C., 6, 131 Mediterranean, 59, 60, 65, 67–9, 72–3, oil and gas pipelines, 137 78, 82, 84–6, 88, 105, 116, 183 Olympic Airways, 152 Megali Idea (Great Idea), 64, 67–8 Open Door policy, 33, 50–2, 74, 81, Mesopotamia, 5, 70 83, 91 Metaxas, Ioannis, 69–72, 77, 88–9 Organisation of Economic middle classes, 15, 83, 113, 126, 151, Cooperation and development 161, 166, 168–85 (OECD), 123 Index 243

OTE, 156 Poulantzas, N., 15, 30, 46, 49, 118, 184 over-accumulation (crisis), 16, 21, 36, Pouliopoulos, P., 18 50, 51, 116 power-shift, 1 38, 11, 34, 37, 72, 135, 184, 186 Palestine, 69, 70, 100 primacy, 13, 36, 45, 51, 83–4, 86, 138 Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement primitive accumulation, 40, 53, 165, (PASOK) 182, 184 crisis management, 121–31 Prison Notebooks,80 economic environment, 116, private sector, 96, 145 119, 121 public debt, 53, 126, 136, 147, 151, eurozone entry, impact on, 155 158–9, 182 first term, 133 Public Electricity Corporation geopolitical issue and, 113 (DEI), 91 vs ND, 108, 111, 132, 139, 151, 158, 160, 161, 167–68, 172, 173–76, Rare Earth Elements (REE), 136 178, 183–85 Rasizade, A., 42 second term, 112 rate of growth, 164 Simitis, 144, 159 rate of profit, 20–2, 30, 52, 112, see also Papandreou, Andreas, G.; 119, 132 Papandreou, George real capital, 20–34 Pan-Hellenic Union of Public Works realism and neo-realism in IR, (PESEDE), 224n59 31–2, 69 Panitch, L., 14, 22, 23, 110 re-cycling of financial surpluses, 26 Papandreou, Andreas, G., 48, 82–3, 97, Refugees, 73, 74, 75, 77, 85 99–100, 106, 108, 115–16, 119, Refugee Settlement Commission 121, 128, 129, 144, 152 (RSC), 206n40 Papandreou, George, 82, 97–9, Robolis, S., 150 103, 112 Rom Telecom, 157 Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI Italian Romania, 86, 87, 157 Communist Party), 207–8n7 Russia, 11, 13, 43, 51, 61, 70, 84–5, passive revolution, 49, 80, 81–108, 135–8, 182, 184 116 petro-dollars, 42, 109 Sacred Bond of Greek Officers PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece (IDEA), 99 and Spain), 221n48 Salonica, 68, 69, 77, 92, 96, 98, Piraeus, 65, 72, 77 108, 181 Piraeus Bank, 153 Schmidt, C., 3 Poland, 157 Schumpeter, J., 26 political phenomenology, 6, 63, 82–3, Scotland, 3 97, 100, 108, 112, 132, 185 SC Somerta Copsa Mica, 157 Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), ‘second-cut’ theory, 20, 35 225n2 seisachtheia, 137, 187–91 populism Serbia, 43, 70–1, 157 communist influence, 128 Sfakianakis Group, 156 democratic consolidation, 114 Silk Road Strategy Act 1999, 42 modernization of, 130, 144 Silver, B., 35, 36 state’s role, 45–55 Sinews of capital, 11–55 Portugal, 6, 12, 26, 53, 111, 112, 116, see also Euro-Atlanticism 124, 126, 155, 158, 168, 190 (Euro-Atlantic core) 244 Index

Smith, M., 71 Turkish-Greek War 1897, 66 Smyrna, 67, 68, 70, 71 Turkey socialism, 7, 49, 52, 125, 139, 146, British hegemony, 74 173, 184 Cyprus issue, 101, 112, 116, social struggle, 21, 44, 77, 113, 158, 161 133, 150 decline of US hegemony, 135, 137 socio-economic system, 16, 35, 50, 54, as geo-strategic bloc, 81, 82, 84–8 106, 107, 132, 160 Germany, supporting, 69 Sofia, 157 Greek labour market, 172 South Africa, 11, 135, 137 hub-and-spoke arrangement, 47 Sozialdemokratische Partei NATO’ presence, 44, 100, 102–4, Deutschlands (German Social 106, 121 Democratic Party SPD), 80 pipeline option, 183 Spain, 12, 40, 53, 111, 112, 116, 124, proxy war, 72 126, 132, 155, 158, 168, 169, 181, Tzakia/nea tzakia, 65, 67, 123 185, 190 Spykman, N., 18 Ukraine, 137, 157 spatial/temporal fix, 17, 19–21, 28, 33, ultra-imperialism, 22, 31 37, 39–40, 49 uncommitted capital, 23 stagflation, 30, 109, 112, 118, 120, unemployment, 21, 76, 94, 96, 122, 131, 148, 184, 186 128, 170, 172, 182–3 State (capitalist state), 15–19, 21, 30, uneven and combined development, 41, 45–9, 54, 86 20–34 State Information Service, Greece (KYP), 104 crisis theory of debt, 49–50 Stathakis, G., 92 in global periphery, 45, 53 Steel, R., 92 United Democratic Left (EDA), Stockholm International Peace 97, 98 Institute (SIPRI), 159 United Kingdom (UK) surplus value, 20–4, 54, 61, 65, domestic economy in1990, 161 77–8, 89 housing mortgages, 181 sustainable development/growth, 5, over-accumulation crisis, 36 93, 107, 131, 139, 148, 150–1, property bubble, 40 160, 165, 190 United Nations (UN) Suez Canal, 5, 43, 63, 68, 100 as global regulatory institution, 31 Syros, 65 resolution 186, 102 US, USA (United States/United States terminal crisis, 19, 36 of America) Teschke, B., 41 aid to Greek economy, 111, 121, Theories of Surplus-Value,21 134 The Times,75 decline and fall, reasons, 36, 49, ‘third-cut’ crisis theory, 19, 20, 25, 28, 109, 135, 187 37, 39 Federal Reserve, establishment ‘Third Hellenic Republic’, 115 of, 74 Thirteen Constitutional Amendments geopolitics, 42 (1963), 102 hub-and-spoke system, 47, 51, 54, Troika, 47, 91, 134, 139, 148, 155, 138, 168, 188 168, 170, 172, 183–84 military capabilities, 44 Tsoukalas, C., 123, 175 Open Door policy, 33, 50–2 Index 245

passive revolution (1940–1970), Wallerstein, I., 34, 35 81–108 Weimar Republic, 77 proﬁtability, non-ﬁnancial Welldon Group, 92 corporate sector, 29 Williams, W.A., 138 stagnation effects, 30 Wolf, M., 144, 147, 191 technological aid, 157 World Bank, 83 total debt (1964–2007), 23–4 World Trade Organization treasury, 182 (WTO), 31 USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist World War I, 50–1, 59, 69, 187 Republics), 84, 85, 102, 106, 110, World War II, 59, 80, 83, 85, 95, 99, 136, 137, 138, 185 108

Value Added Tax (VAT), 183 xenophobia, 183 variable capital, 18, 19, 50 Varoufakis, Y., 150 Ýnönü, Ýsmet, 102 Venizelos, E., 18, 67–73, 76, 77, 89, 115, 181 Zolotas, X., 81, 92, 103 Vietnam, 52, 109 Zavitsianos, Constantine, 77