<<

MEMO POLICY

THE EU AND AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS Andrew Wilson

Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an impasse. SUMMARY Relations between the EU and Ukraine are at an The last two years have been dominated by rows over the impasse after two years dominated by rows over selective prosecution of regime opponents, in particular the the selective prosecution of regime opponents, conviction of former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko in particular the conviction of former Prime in October 2011, and an accelerating trend towards a more Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko in October 2011, authoritarian and corrupt of rule in Ukraine. Attention and authoritarianism and . has now turned to the parliamentary elections held on 28 However, the real danger following the elections on 28 October is not electoral fraud but the way that October 2012 as a different test of Ukraine’s democratic the authorities are now entrenching themselves in bona fides. The opposition rightly feels aggrieved that the power by every possible means. Members of the authorities have denied them a possible victory. There literal and metaphorical “family” around President was some direct fraud, particularly in the new territorial Yanukovych are using their power to enrich constituencies.1 But in general the authorities sought to themselves on an unprecedented scale. The EU rig the election by other methods such as the covert use of cannot afford to simply wait until the next contest “political technology” and a change in the voting system in 2015. that the opposition ironically agreed to back in 2011. Paradoxically, this meant that in many ways the election The EU must think creatively to find a way to was more competitive than expected – but only because the move beyond this impasse. It should better define authorities were confident they would win. conditionality in the three key areas of selective prosecutions, the conduct of elections and “reform”. It should apply the Association Agreement and The recent focus on the elections has broadened the European Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement view from the Tymoshenko case to look at how things have with Ukraine that have been on hold since last deteriorated across the board. But there is also a danger December, if necessary selectively or provisionally, that the EU will move the goalposts and make the conduct but take a tougher line in other areas, for example by of the elections the only criterion for deciding whether or imposing a visa ban on leading figures in the regime not it should restart relations with Ukraine, or judge the and auditing suspect “family” companies in the EU. authorities more on past than on present behaviour and At the same time, the EU should liberalise visas, use a critique of the elections to move towards a de facto encourage educational exchanges and support the 1 The Ukrainian parliament has 450 MPs. After the “” in 2004, it was emergence of new independent actors in Ukraine thought better that all of them should be elected by proportional representation. But in who are worried by the rise of the “family”. 2011 the government forced through a return to the earlier system, under which half of MPs would be elected by PR, and the other half in territorial constituencies, where so- called administrative resources (that is, state-directed fraud) had more weight. 2 ECFR/65 November 2012 www.ecfr.eu THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS in each others’ favour in the constituencies. Each suspects suspects Each constituencies. the in favour others’ each in Party – could only reach a partial agreement on withdrawing Freedom far-right the and Klichko) Vitaliy boxer the by led parties opposition – Fatherland, UDAR (known main as “Punch” because it is three The constituencies. the in directly own its on party lists rather than take on the ruling despite was it well, weaknesses. Many of did its leading figures played safe and opposition stood the Where fundamental more problem. this solve not would Tymoshenko of theft by oligarchs of each others’ businesses. Even the release enemies and to silence legitimise the increasing to problem of raidertsvo, used or the is judiciary The percent. 99 over are rates conviction politicised; totally become has system legal The prison. in wants it anyone put to power the state The judicial “reform” pushed through in 2010 now gives the ways. other many in undermined being now is Ukraine in democracy opponents, political of prosecution selective the and fraud election on focus to tended has EU the while But party came second, even though she was not allowed to stand. Opposition coalition built around Tymoshenko’s Fatherland United The races. constituency contested hotly key several in prevail to unable were authorities The temporarily. only if little, a up opened media mass The elections. October the There were some encouraging signs of democratic vitality in The returnof“politicaltechnology” next contestin2015. the until wait to afford cannot EU The scale. unprecedented Yanukovych are using that power to President enrich themselves on an around “family” metaphorical and literal the of themselves in power by every possible means, and members there will be worse to come. The authorities are entrenching traction, regains EU the unless But enough. bad was case Tymoshenko the over row The elections. the is after possible sector NGO independent strong still the on and easily media could Ukraine in deteriorate further. situation A tightening of political the screws on the independent because least not – values on lines red maintaining while influence regaining of ways creative of think to The needs leverage. therefore EU without EU the leaves ice on them leaving conditionality; undermine would prematurely agreements Ukraine into transform the kind of society the EU would like to see. Signing the help will approach neither However, lines onpoliticalprosecutionsordemocraticdeterioration. red enforce to agreements the use to want Others anyway. of ratification by member states is likely to get bogged down process the because part in agreements, the sign to minded are EU the in Some enthusiastic. particularly is side neither though year, this of end the before time some for scheduled since last December. The annual EU-Ukraine summit is still hold on been have that Ukraine with (DCFTA) Agreement Trade Free Comprehensive and Deep and (AA) Agreement Association the with forward move to whether decide will Council Affairs Foreign the November In policy. isolation 3 September 2012. 2 Authorinterviewwithleadinglocalpolitical technologistTarasBerezovets,20 project was threatening to take votes off the Party of of Service. Customs the of Party head the Koletnik, Ihor by million the off votes take $25 of tune the to sponsored are Communists The Regions. to threatening the was because funding project Forward cut on allegedly he million Rinat though – $80 man, Ukraine! spent richest supposedly Ukraine’s Akhmetov, ranks. the own from even often authorities’ sponsors, oligarchic on dependent financially all now are parties opposition genuine the Even super-majority. future any of part reliable a be will Communists the knows it about as Communists, the as sanguine such parties other to relatively votes losing is Regions of Party the where parties such as UDAR from campaigning in opposition eastern Ukraine, some prevented authorities The Tymoshenko. Yuliya with compete to leader female glamorous young, of a choice the hence – opposition old to the of try place that the take oligarchs leading by financed parties copies other is, of that – “clones” as in locally are known but is what forces, reality opposition radical like act Korolevska Nataliya leader its and Ukraine! Forward authorities. the of parties running in the election were in reality covert projects black arts of covert manipulation). Many of the “opposition” local (the technology” “political so-called of revival the by weakened further being is opposition the of position The Languages inJuly2012. on Law new the or 2011 November in itself law election the like measures key resist effectively or block to defections failure to and led repeatedly has ranks its in disunity But 2007. in elections the last in the won it as opposition parliament, the outgoing be even shouldn’t opposition The influence. malign authorities’ the by created are they exist within the main parties are manifold, and where they do not to ally with the Party of Regions after the elections. Divisions planning secretly and horse Trojan a as acting of other the and are pre-programmed to defect after the election the after defect to pre-programmed are and bribeable easily be to known are who individuals – tushki so-called with seeded been also have parties opposition The of the“opposition”. independence real the reduces funding such however, time, oligarchs feel by the rise of Yanukovch’s Ukrainian “family”. some At the threatened same how illustrates financing This parliament it needs to change the constitution. The three three The constitution. the change to needs it parliament new the in seats 450 of out 300 the of reach within is and opposition, “independents” and tushki, it still has a majority of of Party Regions did not the win the headline vote, though together with the even fake percent Thus means. 80 same the by camp least At decision. “independent” MPs will be persuaded to join that the authorities’ reversed court constitutional the 2010 in ruling partial blatantly a in But individuals. than rather parties of up government made was the “majority” that ensure to and serve to elected they were parties the in stay to MPs required that agreed were been has MPs of defection around for a long time. In 2004, changes to the constitution the and bribery of problem Tushka meansthecorpseofa smallanimal–somethinglike“roadkill”. 3 . The . 2 main opposition parties will have to show an uncharacteristic Fragile pluralism level of solidarity to prevent this happening. The authorities are not far short of a two-thirds majority in the new parliament that would allow them to change The rise of the “family” the constitution. For example, they could decide to allow Yanukovych to be “re-elected” by parliament in 2015 rather Corruption has also increased substantially since the 2010 than directly by the people. Alternatively, as the authorities elections. Yanukovych has increasingly vested power and now control almost all political branches of state, they could wealth in a literal and metaphorical “family”. The president’s target remaining independent centres of power before any oldest son Oleksandr Yanukovych and his associates have taken such challenges arise. Since 2010, the authorities have over the central bank and tax, finance and law enforcement been gradually tightening control over independent media, agencies, and used that power to take over rival businesses.4 not by restoring direct censorship, but by challenging This began with businesses owned by supporters of the losing and redistributing oligarchic control. As Serhiy Kudelya side in 2010 and Ukraine’s vulnerable SME sector. Now the puts it, “control over the leading television channels by “family” has shifted to targeting major oligarchs. “Grabbing oligarchic moguls close to Yanukovych has produced a property started with the supporters of the orange elite, but more decentralized system of self-censorship”.7 The new now it is danger of spreading to the relatively loyal guys,” preference is for so-called usnyky, or verbal instructions says leading Ukrainian analyst Mykhailo Honchar.5 Over from the presidential administration to TV owners in the last year, the “family” has begun moving into the coal person. Thus the media remains pluralistic but is highly business, electricity, telecommunications and agriculture. corrupt. According to one UDAR adviser, “all media is now Land privatisation is scheduled finally to move forward after paid for, and we have to play that game”.8 the elections, but amendments to the law recently created a new state land bank that would have first right of purchase The authorities may drop their relatively hands-off approach if peasant farmers chose to sell their land, leading to fears to the media once the vote is over, just as they did once the that “family” businesses will quickly accumulate the largest Euro 2012 final in was out of the way, in part so that parcels of Ukraine’s rich farm land. the “family” can muscle in on the local media market. The campaign that began in the summer against Ukraine’s last Ukraine’s co-hosting of the Euro 2012 football championship remaining TV channels like TVi and independent outlets finals was marred by controversies over the privileged role like the paper and popular web site Left Bank, as well as of shadowy contractor companies linked to the “family” like sites modelled on Alexey Navalny’s campaigns in Russia like Altcom. Rake-offs and over-payments cost the Ukrainian parklikeidiot.com.ua and nashigroshi.org (“Our Money”), taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars. In August 2012, which looks at corruption in public contracts, may well be Yanukovych signed a law cancelling the obligation of state resumed. companies to hold tenders for the purchase of goods and services when they use their own funds. Yuliya Mostova, Meanwhile Ukraine’s relatively free NGO sector looks the editor of Ukraine’s main independent paper Mirror like an increasing anomaly. The number of registered of the Week, argues that Yanukovych’s goal is simple. “He NGOs has actually grown in recent years. Ukraine has not wants to be the richest man in Eastern Europe”, she says. yet followed Russia by forcing out “foreign” NGOs and “Yanukovych is the first president of Ukraine who needs a substituting them with Kremlin-friendly “government- controlling share not only of all power in the country but of organised NGOs” or GONGOs (Russia’s own measures all its business too.”6 were ironically a reaction to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004). But the Ukrainian authorities are now setting up The power of the “family” is likely to grow further after the “clone” NGOs such as For Fair Elections, which predictably elections as , the current head of the central gave the October elections a clean bill of health.9 Ironically bank and “curator” of the many “family” businesses, moves to and sadly for the country that staged famous mass protests become first deputy prime minister or even prime minister. against the last rigged elections in 2004, the organisation of Because the interests of the “family” are currently all within crowds and demonstrations is now a professional business Ukraine, its members are immune to the argument that – demonstrators, often students, are paid to turn up.10 Ukraine needs the agreements with the EU. However, other Precisely because many NGOs played a key role in election oligarchs who trade or invest abroad are deeply worried monitoring, a “final front” against them about the threat to their business interests. could be opened after the elections.

7 Serhiy Kudelya, “Politics and Democracy in Ukraine”, in Taras Kuzio and Daniel Hamilton (eds.), Open Ukraine: Changing Course Towards a European Future (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011), pp. 1-20 and pp. 10-11. 8 Author interview, 19 September 2012. 9 “The observers from For Fair Elections saw no serious violations and talk about the 4 See the analysis of his expanding empire by Sevgil Musaeva, “How the Business of the ‘new developments’ in the upcoming ”, Komsomolskaya Pravda in President’s Elder Son Works”, Forbes Ukraine, 3 September 2012, at http://forbes.ua/ Ukraine, 25 October 2012, available at http://kp.ua/daily/251012/362845/ magazine/forbes/1336398-kak-rabotaet-biznes-starshego-syna-prezidenta 10 Yegor Vasylyev, “The Funny Business of Ukrainian Political Rallies”, Transitions 5 Author interview, 8 November 2011. Online , 9 February 2012, available at www.tol.org/client/article/22988-the-funny- 6 Author interview with Yuliya Mostova, 8 November 2011; Yuliia Mostova, “Semostiinyi business-of-ukrainian-political-rallies.html; Richard Boudreaux, “Bucks Populi: Making Yanukovych”, Dzerkalo tyzhnia , 1 June 2012, available at http://dt.ua/POLITICS/ Democracy a Going Concern in Kiev”, The Wall Street Journal , 5 February 2010. semostiyniy_yanukovich-103152.html. 3 4 ECFR/65 November 2012 www.ecfr.eu THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS 2012, http://ukrainianweek.com/Economics/63007. 12 YevhenHrebenyuk,“Foreign BanksFleeUkraine”, commentary/2012-10-18/prospects-euukraine-free-trade-agreement for EasternStudies,18October2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw- three all 11 in voices EU many too are There “reform”. and elections of conduct the prosecutions, selective of areas key three the in conditionality define better to is step first The the onlyimmediategoal. not but goal ultimate an be should release Her many of problems. one only is case Tymoshenko The page. another onto relations move and impasse the round needed get to order in therefore is thinking Creative current impunity. of regime’s sense the deepen and prosecutions, selective completely would It undermine dangerous. conditionality, which was originally applied over as just is bad” too “not mooted The worse. solution get of signing to the agreements if trends the elections are worrisome deemed these allow simply will nothing doing that means impasse current The Policy recommendations such a large proportion of the implementing of cost the – given downside insignificant, not is their which stressing increasingly been has media . Since the agreements were frozen, the Ukrainian 2011, the EU was not good at explaining the benefit of them to Even before the AA and the DCFTA were frozen in December The customsunionbluff it can. wherever pluralism economic of and political support signs should are there EU The elite. and ruling the within division and dissatisfaction parliament new the in position defensive strong a has opposition the hand, other the On more opentoRussiancapital. more Even Russia. were with Ukraine if all at gain not would “family” the ironically, union customs a of idea the by tempted be may that oligarchs, the than rather sector, SME hard-pressed the is it Ironically, union. a such in gains see would lobby, gas so-called the mainly oligarchs, of handful the join to a only fact, In bluff. threatening a is this But union. customs by Russia-led West the blackmail will they to elections the forthcoming, not is it If West. the in legitimacy their restore use to intend authorities Ukrainian The oligarchs –whichoftenmeansthemselves. first half of 2012. of half first the in percent 25 to 2009 early in percent 42 of peak a from the fallen has – banks Western by owned assets 2008 banking of share since renationalised been have they because GDP. of percent particularly 20 SMEs, to lending stopped than virtually have Banks less to years recent in shrunk was sector SME already too small for an economy of its size, but has actually Ukraine’s recession. another into going be to seems economy Ukrainian the as suffering are which SMEs, hard-pressed with traction particular has argument See RafałSadowski,“TheProspectsfortheEU-Ukraine freetradeagreement”,Centre 12 The new owners favour lending to big big to lending favour owners new The acquis communautaire Ukrainian Week ,23October , 11 This is the beginning of a trend towards the construction of List”. of “Magnitsky the construction of the equivalent Ukrainian towards a trend a of beginning the is The elsewhere. taken resolution on being Ukraine passed by is the US Senate in action September that see can they if will forward approach going agreements the about tougher happier feel a hopefully of advocates The revived. be to agreements the allow to order in areas other in line tougher agreements to punish Ukraine. Rather, the EU should take a long the block to sense the little makes it But in lines. red for and run, society Ukrainian transform help will agreements, which the for both case strong a always was There not impossible. but difficult be will competence member-state is what and DCFTA) the of (most competence EU is what between line dividing a Defining agreements. sectoral parallel of basis the on integration sectoral with continue could EU the but freeze, deep in remain could sections. agreements the Alternatively, justice and “political” the without own their on enacted be be to parts could sectoral AA and DCFTA the the allow to split necessary, If EU. the with the of agreements application provisional be should step second The liberalisation. visa with incompatible are that legislation discrimination anti- the in provisions the dropping as such fronts, other on progress enable that areas in “reform” for press should EU The prevail. not did schemes or will authorities’ the which “political at looking possible, in areas noting also but fraud, simple as well as technology” as rounded as report be OSCE-ODIHR should one final is the Rights elections, On Human on possibility. Court European the of ruling any with fully comply to authorities Ukrainian the asking actionable: and substantive both is that standard a agree to needs therefore EU The held. is she which in conditions the criticised have others and her; against laid being charges new at complained have others release; her for asked have areas, particularly on the Tymoshenko case: some EU leaders serhyi-leshchenko-tax-haven-of-yanukovych-and-kluyev/ January 2012,translated athttp://eastbook.eu/en/2012/01/material-en/news-en/ 14 SeethearticlebySerhiyLeshchenko“TaxHaven ofYanukovychandKluyev”,22 cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=26d65aab-4ed1-4173-8f61-c05809c5b0ac. 13 of Westerninterestwouldbe fatal forUkraine. and circulating it back home tax free. money budget off siphoning are that circles government for front a as acts allegedly Vienna, in based is which company, Solar Activ the example, For Islands. Virgin British the like dependencies elite’s and EU the Ukrainian within the is of malfeasance financial most but line, tougher a taking currently is US The agencies. security financial national by undertaken be can it “sanctions”; formal be not need This in (and Luxembourg Liechtenstein and and Switzerland), which break Cyprus existing EU law. Austria, in companies “family” suspect of activities the audit also should EU The and former InteriorMinisterYuriyLutsenko. Tymoshenko of trials the for responsible prosecutor deputy the Kuzmin, Renat on ban visa a with start should EU The Gazprom. investigating is Commission European Thetextcanbefoundathttp://inhofe.senate.gov/public/index. 14 In this sense, the lack 13 The The The third step should be to press ahead with parallel measures. The authorities’ propaganda relies heavily on the argument that the EU cares only about Tymoshenko and not about ordinary Ukrainians. Visa liberalisation should therefore be a part of any scenario. Ratification by the of the new amended Visa Facilitation Agreement signed in July has also been blocked because of the Tymoshenko affair, but should now move forward. Now that Ukraine has introduced biometric passports it should be within sight of the second, post-legislative stage of its Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. Wider travel will liberalise Ukraine in the long run. So would easier internal travel, if budget airlines could be attracted to Ukraine as a result of an Open Skies Agreement.

Changes to the Erasmus education exchange programme will also benefit Ukraine, but the EU needs to be wary of encouraging a “brain drain” from Ukraine and should instead encourage a two-way process with schemes to encourage visiting students and experts from the West.

The EU should also be much more proactive about advertising the economic and social benefits of the agreements. It should develop a positive communication strategy, involving local NGOs, to sell the agreements to local stakeholders.

The EU should also support the emergence of new independent actors in Ukraine. Western loans and investments, for example, help protect business against raidertsvo. The EU should help revive lending schemes for SMEs, which are not working as they might – from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank.

Finally, the EU should open other channels to circumvent the current dialogue of the deaf. The European Parliament’s Kwasniewski/Cox mission to monitor selective prosecutions, which is currently suspended for the duration of the elections, can be replicated and expanded. The EU should give a voice to business circles that are worried by the rise of the “family”.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s leaders behave like they have immunity and impunity, as if Ukraine were a vital raw material supplier or possessed of other geopolitical importance. In reality, they only have power in isolation. The EU should not fear continuing to apply tough standards to Ukraine. But the EU needs leverage and should also work harder to show it is on the side of Ukraine’s beleaguered democratic, liberal and economically constructive forces. Once Ukraine develops proper relations with Europe appropriate to its size, location and economic potential, the EU’s leverage will be much higher. It’s time to show Ukraine some tough love.

5 6 ECFR/65 November 2012 www.ecfr.eu THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER THE 2012 ELECTIONS About theauthor Andrew Wilson Unexpected Nations(thirdedition,2009).Hispublications Eastern Neighbourhood(withNicuPopescu). Last EuropeanDictatorship (2011) and (SSEES) atUniversityCollegeLondon.Hehaspreviously and Cambridge.Hismostrecentbooksare Council onForeignRelationsandareaderinUkrainian held academic positions at the London School of Economics Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies for ECFRinclude Turning PresenceintoPower:Lessonsfromthe is aSeniorPolicyFellowattheEuropean Ukraine aftertheTymoshenkoverdict (2011)and The Ukrainians: Belarus: The Acknowledgements Taras Berezovets, Yuliya Mostova, Alyona Getmanchuk, Getmanchuk, Alyona Mostova, Yuliya Berezovets, Taras Jana of help the acknowledge to like would author The Kobzova for her useful advice and Hans Kundnani for for Kundnani Hans and advice useful her for Kobzova Mykhailo Honchar, Oleksandr Lytvynenko and members of members and Lytvynenko Oleksandr Honchar, Mykhailo the EUdelegationinKiev. interviewees in Ukraine: Olexiy Haran, Rostyslav Pavlenko, Rostyslav Haran, Olexiy Ukraine: in interviewees his excellent and speedy editing, as well as the following following the as well as editing, speedy and excellent his Among members of the European Council on Foreign Relations are John Bruton (Ireland) Hanzade Dog˘an Boyner Heidi Hautala (Finland) Former (Turkey) Minister for International Development former prime ministers, presidents, Ambassador to the USA; former Prime European commissioners, current Chair, Dog˘an Gazetecilik and Dog˘an Minister () On-line Sasha Havlicek (United and former parliamentarians and Kingdom) ministers, public intellectuals, Ian Buruma (The Netherlands) Andrew Duff (United Kingdom) Executive Director, Institute for Strategic business leaders, activists and Writer and academic Member of the European Parliament Dialogue (ISD) cultural figures from the EU member Erhard Busek (Austria) Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia) states and candidate countries. Chairman of the Institute for the Former Foreign Minister Connie Hedegaard (Denmark) Danube and Central Europe Commissionr for Climate Change Hans Eichel (Germany) Asger Aamund (Denmark) Former Finance Minister Steven Heinz (Austria) President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S Jerzy Buzek (Poland) Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S Rolf Ekeus (Sweden) Member of the European Parliament; Former Executive Chairman, United Lansdowne Partners Ltd Urban Ahlin (Sweden) former President of the European Parliament; former Prime Minister Nations Special Commission on Iraq; Annette Heuser (Germany) Deputy Chairman of the Foreign former OSCE High Commissioner on Executive Director, Bertelsmann Affairs Committee and foreign Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) National Minorities; former Chairman Foundation Washington DC policy spokesperson for the Social Minister for International Development Stockholm International Peace Democratic Party Cooperation Research Institute, SIPRI Diego Hidalgo (Spain) Co-founder of Spanish newspaper Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Maria Livanos Cattaui Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Denmark) El País; President, FRIDE Chairman of the Board, Crisis Chairman, Baltic Development Forum; Management Initiative; former (Switzerland) former Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (The President Former Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce Steven Everts (The Netherlands) Netherlands) Giuliano Amato (Italy) Adviser to the Vice President of the Former NATO Secretary General Former Prime Minister and vice Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) European Commission and EU High President of the European Convention; Director of Melak Investments/ Danuta Hübner (Poland) Representative for Foreign and Security Member of the European Parliament; Chairman, Centre for American Journalist Policy Studies; Chairman, Enciclopedia former European Commissioner Treccani Carmen Chacón (Spain) Former Minister of Defence Tanja Fajon (Slovenia) Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) Member of the European Parliament Member of the European Parliament Gustavo de Aristegui (Spain) Charles Clarke (United Member of Parliament Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Kingdom) President, Chamber of Deputies; Former Ambassador and former Viveca Ax:son Jonhson Visiting Professor of Politics, University former Foreign Minister Executive Director, Crisis Management (Sweden) of East Anglia; former Home Secretary Initiative Chairman of Nordstjernan AB Joschka Fischer (Germany) Nicola Clase (Sweden) Former Foreign Minister and vice- Toomas Ilves (Estonia) Gordon Bajnai (Hungary) Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Chancellor President Former Prime Minister former State Secretary Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) Chairman, Alliance Trust Plc Chairman, Munich Security Member of Parliament; former Foreign Member of the European Parliament Conference; Global Head of Minister Lykke Friis (Denmark) Robert Cooper (United Member of Parliament; former Minister Government Affairs Allianz SE Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland) Kingdom) for Climate, Energy and Gender Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US) Professor of Economics at the Warsaw Counsellor of the European External Equality International Advocacy Director, Open School of Economics; former Deputy Action Service Society Foundation Prime Minister Jaime Gama (Portugal) Gerhard Cromme (Germany) Former Speaker of the Parliament; Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) Lluís Bassets (Spain) Chairman of the Supervisory Board of former Foreign Minister Professor, London School of Economics Deputy Director, El País the ThyssenKrupp Timothy Garton Ash Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey) Marek Belka (Poland) Maria Cuffaro (Italy) (United Kingdom) Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister Governor, National Bank of Poland; Anchorwoman, TG3, RAI Professor of European Studies, of Turkey on foreign policy and public former Prime Minister Oxford University diplomacy Daniel Daianu (Romania) Roland Berger (Germany) Professor of Economics, National Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) Sylvie Kauffmann () Founder and Honorary Chairman, School of Political and Administrative Chairman of the Portuguese Institute Editorial Director, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants Studies (SNSPA); former Finance of (IPRI) GmbH Minister Olli Kivinen (Finland) Teresa Patricio Gouveia Writer and columnist Erik Berglöf (Sweden) Massimo D’Alema (Italy) (Portugal) Chief Economist, European Bank for President, Italianieuropei Foundation; Trustee to the Board of the Calouste Ben Knapen (The Netherlands) Reconstruction and Development President, Foundation for European Gulbenkian Foundation; former Minister for European Affairs and Progressive Studies; former Prime Foreign Minister International Cooperation Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Minister and Foreign Minister Chairman, Prime Minister’s Economic Heather Grabbe (United Gerald Knaus (Austria) Council; former Prime Minister Marta Dassù (Italy) Chairman of the European Stability Under Secretary of State for Foreign Kingdom) Initiative and Carr Center Fellow Carl Bildt (Sweden) Affairs Executive Director, Open Society Foreign Minister Institute – Brussels Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Foreign Minister Charles Grant (United Kingdom) former State Secretary President, Polish Confederation of Director, Centre for European Reform Private Employers – Lewiatan Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Bassma Kodmani (France) Poet and Cultural Critic Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Executive Director of the Arab Reform Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the Initiative Founder, Communitas Foundation and Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) United Nations and the League of President of Venture Equity Bulgaria Member of the European Parliament; Arab States on Syria Rem Koolhaas (The Ltd. former Prime Minister Elisabeth Guigou (France) Netherlands) Ingrid Bonde (Sweden) Gianfranco Dell’Alba (Italy) Member of Parliament and President Architect and urbanist; Professor at the CFO & Deputy CEO, Vaffenfall AB Director, Confederation of Italian of the Foreign Affairs Committee Graduate School of Design, Harvard Industry (Confindustria) - Brussels University Emma Bonino (Italy) office; former Member of the European David Koranyi (Hungary) Vice President of the Senate; former EU Parliament Fernando Andresen Guimarães Commissioner (Portugal) Deputy Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Pavol Demeš (Slovakia) Center of the Atlantic Council of the Stine Bosse (Denmark) Head of the US and Canada Division, United States Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German European External Action Service Chairman and Non-Executive Board Marshall Fund of the United States Bernard Kouchner (France) Member (Bratislava) Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kemal Dervis (Turkey) (Germany) Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) Han ten Broeke Vice-President and Director of Global Former Defence Minister Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal (The Netherlands) Economy and Development Strategies Member of Parliament and István Gyarmati (Hungary) Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) President and CEO, International Aleksander Kwas´niewski spokesperson for foreign affairs Centre for Democratic Transition and defence President, DEMOS Hungary (Poland) Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) Former President Former Chairman, Defence Commission; former Defence Minister Mart Laar (Estonia) Minister of Defence; former Prime 7 Minister Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Marietje Schaake Stelios Zavvos (Greece) Former Foreign Minister CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) (The Netherlands) Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) Member of the European Parliament Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia) Minister CEO, European Council on Foreign Klaus Scharioth (Germany) EU Representative to Kosovo; Former Relations; former Europe Director, foreign Minister Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Dean of the Mercator Fellowship Amnesty International on International Affairs; former (Germany) Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Member of the European Parliament Mabel van Oranje (The Germany to the US Netherlands) Pascal Lamy (France) Senior Adviser, The Elders Pierre Schori (Sweden) Honorary President, Notre Europe and Chair of Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Director-General of WTO; former EU Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) former Director General, FRIDE; former Commissioner Member of the Board, Fomento de SRSG to Cote d’Ivoire Construcciones y Contratas; former EU Bruno Le Maire (France) Commissioner Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) Member of Parliament; Former Minister Member of Parliament; former for Food, Agriculture & Fishing Monica Oriol (Spain) Chancellor CEO, Seguriber Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) Karel Schwarzenberg Director, European Council on Foreign Cem Özdemir (Germany) Relations Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Green (Czech Republic) Party) Foreign Minister Jean-David Levitte (France) Ana Palacio (Spain) Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy) Former Sherpa to the President of the Former Foreign Minister; former Senior Executive Vice President, Head of Public French Republic; former Ambassador to President and General Counsel of the Affairs, UniCredit Spa the United States World Bank Group Narcís Serra (Spain)

THE EU AND UKRAINE AFTER 2012 ELECTIONS Sonia Licht (Serbia) Simon Panek (Czech Republic) Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Vice President, Belgrade Fund for Political Chairman, People in Need Foundation President of the Spanish Government Excellence Radosław Sikorski (Poland) Juan Fernando López Aguilar Chris Patten (United Kingdom) Chancellor of Oxford University and co- Foreign Minister (Spain) chair of the International Crisis Group; Aleksander Smolar (Poland) Member of the European Parliament; former EU Commissioner Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory former Minister of Justice Diana Pinto (France) Foundation Adam Lury (United Kingdom) Historian and author Javier Solana (Spain) CEO, Menemsha Ltd Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Former EU High Representative for the Monica Macovei (Romania) Director, Bruegel; Professor, Université Common Foreign and Security Policy & Member ot the European Parliament Paris-Dauphine Secretary-General of the Council of the EU; former Secretary General of NATO Emma Marcegaglia (Italy) Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) CEO of Marcegaglia S.p.A; former Member of Parliament; Chairman of the George Soros (Hungary/USA) President, Confindustria Foreign Affairs Committee Founder and Chairman, Open Society Foundations Katharina Mathernova (Slovakia) Lydie Polfer (Luxembourg) Senior Adviser, World Bank Member of Parliament; former Foreign Teresa de Sousa (Portugal) Minister Journalist Inigo Mendez de Vigo (Spain) Charles Powell Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia) Secretary of State for the European Playwright and Academic (Spain/United Kingdom) Union Director, Real Instituto Elcano Rory Stewart (United Kingdom) Member of Parliament David Miliband (United Andrew Puddephatt (United Kingdom) Alexander Stubb (Finland) Kingdom) Minister for Foreign Trade and Member of Parliament; Former Director, Global Partners & Associated Ltd. European Affairs; former Foreign Secretary of State for Foreign and Minister Commonwealth Affairs Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) Foreign Minister Michael Stürmer (Germany) Alain Minc (France) Chief Correspondent, Die Welt President of AM Conseil; former Robert Reibestein chairman, Le Monde (The Netherlands) Ion Sturza (Romania) Director, McKinsey & Company President, GreenLight Invest; former Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) Prime Minister of the Republic of Foreign Minister; former Defence Moldova Minister; former Member of the George Robertson European Parliament (United Kingdom) Paweł S´wieboda (Poland) Former Secretary General of NATO President, Demos EUROPA - Centre for Dominique Moïsi (France) European Strategy Senior Adviser, IFRI Albert Rohan (Austria) Former Secretary General for Foreign Teija Tiilikainen (Finland) (France) Affairs Director, Finnish Institute for Finance Minister; former Minister for International Relations European Affairs Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland) Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Luisa Todini (Italy) Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Group Council of Europe Commissioner for on Difficult Matters, Commissioner of Chair, Todini Finanziaria S.p.A Human Rights Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Hildegard Müller (Germany) Norbert Röttgen (Germany) Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband Professor, University of Athens and Minister for the Environment, President, ELIAMEP der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft Conservation and Nuclear Safety

www.ecfr.eu Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) Olivier Roy (France) Foreign Minister President, Eurointelligence ASBL Professor, European University Institute, Florence Daniel Valtchev, (Bulgaria) Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Romania) Former Deputy PM and Minister of Professor of Democracy Studies, Hertie Daniel Sachs (Sweden) Education School of Governance CEO, Proventus Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia) Kalypso Nicolaïdis Pasquale Salzano (Italy) Former President Vice President, International Institutional (Greece/France) Affairs, ENI Professor of International Relations, Antonio Vitorino (Portugal)

November 2012 Lawyer; former EU Commissioner University of Oxford Stefano Sannino (Italy) Director General for Enlargement, Andre Wilkens (Germany) Daithi O’Ceallaigh (Ireland) European Commission Director-General, Institute of Director Mercator Centre Berlin and Director Strategy, Mercator Haus International and European Affairs Javier Santiso (Spain) Director, Office of the CEO of Telefonica ECFR/65 Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain) Editorialist Europe Former Ambassador to Brazil 8 Also available Supporting Moldova’s Egypt’s Hybrid Revolution: European Foreign Policy from ECFR Democratic Transition a Bolder EU Approach Scorecard 2012, February 2012 Nicu Popescu, October 2009 Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski (ECFR/48) New World Order: The Balance (ECFR/17) and Nick Witney, May 2011 of Soft Power and the Rise of (ECFR/32) The long shadow of Herbivorous Powers Can the EU rebuild failing Ordoliberalism: Germany’s Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, states? A review of Europe’s A Chance to Reform: How the Approach to the Euro crisis October 2007 (ECFR/01) Civilian Capacities EU can support Democratic Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, Evolution in Morocco Guérot, February 2012 (ECFR/49) A Power Audit of EU-Russia October 2009 (ECFR/18) Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu Relations and José Ignacio Torreblanca, The end of the Putin consensus Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, Towards a Post-American May 2011 (ECFR/33) Ben Judah and Andrew Wilson, November 2007 (ECFR/02) Europe: A Power Audit of March 2012 (ECFR/50) EU-US Relations China’s Janus-faced Response Poland’s second return to Europe? Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, to the Arab Revolutions Syria: Towards a Political Paweł Swieboda, December 2007 October 2009 (ECFR/19) Jonas Parello-Plesner and Solution (ECFR/03) Raffaello Pantucci, June 2011 Julien Barnes-Dacey, March 2012 Dealing with Yanukovych’s (ECFR/34) (ECFR/51) Afghanistan: Europe’s Ukraine forgotten war Andrew Wilson, March 2010 What does Turkey think? How the EU can support Daniel Korski, January 2008 (ECFR/20) Edited by Dimitar Bechev, June reform in Burma (ECFR/04) 2011 (ECFR/35) Jonas Parello-Plesner, March Beyond Wait-and-See: 2012 (ECFR/52) Meeting Medvedev: The Politics The Way Forward for What does Germany think of the Putin Succession EU Balkan Policy about Europe? China at the crossroads Andrew Wilson, February 2008 Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus Edited by Ulrike Guérot and François Godement, April 2012 (ECFR/05) and Daniel Korski, May 2010 Jacqueline Hénard, June 2011 (ECFR/53) (ECFR/21) (ECFR/36) Re-energising Europe’s Security Europe and Jordan: Reform and Defence Policy A Global China Policy The Scramble for Europe before it’s too late Nick Witney, July 2008 (ECFR/06) François Godement, June 2010 François Godement and Jonas Julien Barnes-Dacey, April 2012 (ECFR/22) Parello-Plesner with Alice (ECFR/54) Can the EU win the Peace in Richard, July 2011 (ECFR/37) Georgia? Towards an EU Human Rights China and Germany: Why the Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Strategy for a Post-Western Palestinian Statehood at the emerging special relationship Andrew Wilson, August 2008 World UN: Why Europeans Should matters for Europe (ECFR/07) Susi Dennison and Anthony Vote “Yes” Hans Kundnani and Jonas Dworkin, September 2010 Daniel Levy and Nick Witney, Parello-Plesner, May 2012 A Global Force for Human (ECFR/23) September 2011 (ECFR/38) (ECFR/55) Rights? An Audit of European Power at the UN The EU and Human Rights The EU and Human Rights at After Merkozy: How France Richard Gowan and Franziska at the UN: 2010 Review the UN: 2011 Review and Germany can make Brantner, September 2008 Richard Gowan and Franziska Richard Gowan and Franziska Europe work (ECFR/08) Brantner, September 2010 Brantner, September 2011 Ulrike Guérot and Thomas Klau, (ECFR/24) (ECFR/39) May 2012 (ECFR/56) Beyond Dependence: How to deal with Russian Gas The Spectre of a Multipolar How to Stop the The EU and Azerbaijan: Pierre Noel, November 2008 Europe Demilitarisation of Europe Beyond Oil (ECFR/09) Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard Nick Witney, November 2011 Jana Kobzova, May 2012 with Dimitar Bechev, Jana (ECFR/40) (ECFR/57) Re-wiring the US-EU relationship Kobzova & Andrew Wilson, Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and October 2010 (ECFR/25) Europe and the Arab A Europe of Incentives: How to Mark Leonard, December 2008 Revolutions: A New Vision for regain the trust of citizens and (ECFR/10) Beyond Maastricht: a New Democracy and Human Rights markets Deal for the Eurozone Susi Dennison and Anthony Mark Leonard and Jan Zielonka, Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge Thomas Klau and François Dworkin, November 2011 June 2012 (ECFR/58) Daniel Korski, March 2009 Godement, December 2010 (ECFR/41) (ECFR/11) (ECFR/26) The Case for Co-operation in Spain after the Elections: the Crisis Management A Power Audit of EU-China The EU and Belarus after “Germany of the South”? Richard Gowan, June 2012 Relations the Election José Ignacio Torreblanca and (ECFR/59) John Fox and Francois Godement, Balázs Jarábik, Jana Kobzova Mark Leonard, November 2011 April 2009 (ECFR/12) and Andrew Wilson, January (ECFR/42) The Periphery of the Periphery: 2011 (ECFR/27) The Western Balkans and the Beyond the “War on Terror”: Four Scenarios for the Euro Crisis Towards a New Transatlantic After the Revolution: Europe Reinvention of Europe Dimitar Bechev, August 2012 Framework for Counterterrorism and the Transition in Tunisia Mark Leonard, November 2011 (ECFR/60) Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, (ECFR/43) (ECFR/13) Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney, Lebanon: Containing Spillover March 2011 (ECFR/28) Dealing with a Post-Bric Russia from Syria The Limits of Enlargement-lite: Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and Julien Barnes-Dacey, September European and Russian Power in European Foreign Policy Nicu Popescu, November 2011 2012 (ECFR/61) the Troubled Neighbourhood Scorecard 2010 (ECFR/44) Nicu Popescu and Andrew March 2011 (ECFR/29) A Power Audit of EU-North Wilson, June 2009 (ECFR/14) Rescuing the euro: what is Africa Relations The New German Question: China’s price? Nick Witney and Anthony The EU and human rights at the How Europe can get the François Godement, November Dworkin, September 2012 UN: 2009 annual review Germany it needs 2011 (ECFR/45) (ECFR/62) Richard Gowan and Franziska Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard, Brantner, September 2009 April 2011 (ECFR/30) A “Reset” with Algeria: The Transnistria: A bottom-up (ECFR/15) Russia to the EU’s South Solution Turning Presence into Power: Hakim Darbouche and Susi Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra, What does Russia think? Lessons from the Eastern Dennison, December 2011 September 2012 (ECFR/63) edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark Neighbourhood (ECFR/46) Leonard and Andrew Wilson, Nicu Popescu and Andrew Why the Euro Crisis threatens September 2009 (ECFR/16) Wilson, May 2011 (ECFR/31) Ukraine after the Tymoshenko the European Single Market verdict Andrew Wilson, Sebastian Dullien, October 2012 December 2011 (ECFR/47) (ECFR/64) 9 www.ecfr.eu individuals orinstitutions. with other organisations but does not make grants to Stiftung Mercator and Steven Heinz. ECFR works in partnership Communitas Foundation,theItalianUniCreditgroup, Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), the Bulgarian Spanish foundation FRIDE (La Fundación para las Relaciones ECFR is backed by the Soros Foundations Network, the •  •  • that defineitsactivities: ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements values-based Europeanforeignpolicy. across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its The European CouncilonForeignRelations (ECFR) is the ABOUT ECFR Ahtisaari, JoschkaFischerandMabelvanOranje. within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Martti and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people distinguished Council of over one hundred Members - A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a media outlets. media outlets. of ECFR’ gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic policy reports, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends focus. ECFR’s activities include primary research, publication of its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished A distinctiveresearch and policydevelopmentprocess. communications. offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and In the future ECFR plans to open an office in Brussels. Our in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw. ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices A physicalpresenceinthemainEUmemberstates.

[email protected] SW1H 9JA,UnitedKingdom 35 OldQueenStreet,London, on ForeignRelations(ECFR), Published bytheEuropeanCouncil ISBN: 978-1-906538-65-1 © ECFRNovember2012. Council onForeignRelations written permissionoftheEuropean use. Anyotheruserequirestheprior your ownpersonalandnon-commercial content fromthispublicationexceptfor republish orcirculateinanywaythe Relations. Youmaynotcopy,reproduce, by theEuropeanCouncilonForeign Copyright ofthispublicationisheld views ofitsauthors. Foreign Relations,representsonlythe publications oftheEuropeanCouncilon positions. Thispaper,likeall Relations doesnottakecollective The EuropeanCouncilonForeign

Design by David Carroll & Co davidcarrollandco.com