Adapting the Full-Range Leadership Model to the Study of Political Leaders Across Time and Regime Type: a Case Study of Venezuela

Adapting the full-range leadership model to the study of political leaders across time and regime type: a case study of Venezuela

Natasha Lindfield

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Business May 2018 THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname or Family name: Lindfield

First name: Natasha Other name/s:

Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: PhD

School: School of Business, UNSW ADFA Faculty: N/A

Title: Adapting the full-range leadership model to the study of political leaders across time and regime type: a case study of Venezuela

Abstract 350 words maximum:

The political science discipline lacks a comprehensive model of leadership through which to conduct the systematic analysis of political leaders. This is surprising given the critical impact that political leaders have on all sectors of society. The management discipline, however, has multiple leadership models that could be adapted for the analysis of political leaders. This thesis addresses the absence of a systematic model of leadership in the study of political leaders by modifying the full- range leadership model utilised in management studies. When this model is applied in the realm of political science it facilitates analysis of both different styles of political leadership and the influence of political regime type in enabling or constraining leadership behaviour. This thesis also adopts a defining moments lens to provide focus for data collection. Such a lens has been utilised by other studies of leadership in the private sector. However, its application in political science is undeveloped.

Venezuela provides an ideal case study to test how the full-range leadership model can be adapted to a political context, involving comparison of presidents across differing times and three distinct regime types: authoritarian, democratic and hybrid. From applying the full-range leadership model and defining moments framework, four key contributions emerged. First, the full-range leadership model was expanded to include a broader range of leadership styles to facilitate a deeper analysis. Second, the examined presidents from democratic and hybrid regime types were shown to predominantly utilise a hybrid leadership style approach, indicating that the ethical foundation of the regime type was not the most influential factor in the presidents’ choices of leadership style in defining moments. Third, the defining moments of the examined presidents were interconnected and served as a legitimating force for their leaderships. Fourth, in looking forward, the research suggested that a focus on the outcomes of the leadership style, rather than the ethical foundation of the leadership style in itself, was a more useful focus for the study of political leaders.

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I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).

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i Abstract

The political science discipline lacks a comprehensive model of leadership through which to conduct the systematic analysis of political leaders. This is surprising given the critical impact that political leaders have on all sectors of society. The management discipline, however, has multiple leadership models that could be adapted for the analysis of political leaders. This thesis addresses the absence of a systematic model of leadership in the study of political leaders by modifying the full-range leadership model utilised in management studies. The conceptual basis for the full-range leadership model was originally conceived by the political scientist, James MacGregor Burns, but further developed by the organisational psychologist Bernard Bass and extensively applied to leadership in the private sector. When this model is applied in the realm of political science it facilitates analysis of both different styles of political leadership and the influence of political regime type in enabling or constraining leadership behaviour. This thesis also adopts a defining moments lens to provide focus for data collection. Such a lens has been utilised by other studies of leadership in the private sector. However, its application in political science is undeveloped.

Venezuela provides an ideal case study to test how the full-range leadership model can be adapted to a political context, involving comparison of presidents across differing times and three distinct regime types: authoritarian, democratic and hybrid. From applying the full- range leadership model and defining moments framework, four key contributions emerged. First, the full-range leadership model was expanded to include a broader range of leadership styles to facilitate a deeper analysis. Second, the examined presidents from democratic and hybrid regime types were shown to predominantly utilise a hybrid leadership style approach, indicating that the ethical foundation of the regime type was not the most influential factor in the presidents’ choices of leadership style in defining moments. Third, the defining moments of the examined presidents were interconnected and served as a legitimating force for their leaderships. Fourth, in looking forward, the research suggested that a focus on the outcomes of the leadership style, rather than the ethical foundation of the leadership style in itself, was a more useful focus for the study of political leaders.

ii Copyright & Authenticity Statements

I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all proprietary rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstract International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only). I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material; where permission has not been granted I have applied/will apply for a partial restriction of the digital copy of my thesis or dissertation.

Signed

Date 23 May 2018

AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT

I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis. No emendation of content has occurred and if there are any minor variations in formatting, they are the result of the conversion to digital format.

Signed

Date 23 May 2018

iii Statement of Originality

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Signed

Date 23 May 2018

Acknowledgements

This thesis is truly the result of the support I have received from my village of supervisors, colleagues, friends and family. A huge thank you, first of all, to my supervisors Professor Mark Turner and Dr Anthea McCarthy-Jones for their patience and support throughout the years. Under their guidance I have grown immensely, both as a researcher and as a human being. I will always appreciate the opportunities, inspiration, time and energy they gave to my PhD.

Special thanks to Professor Michael O’Donnell at UNSW ADFA for his support and guidance during the second half of my PhD. I am grateful for the many valuable learning opportunities he facilitated for me. I am also grateful for the support of my UNSW ADFA colleagues and peers – thank you for creating a wonderful learning community.

I wish to acknowledge my Shut Up and Write buddies, especially Kath Whitty, at both the University of Canberra and UNSW ADFA, for their companionship, empathy, and encouragement throughout this PhD. Their support and camaraderie made all the difference. Thank you to my friends for their patience with me during these last few years as I focused much of my energy on writing my thesis. Thank you also to Corina de Araujo, who checked my Spanish translations, and to Lulu Respall-Turner for her proofreading skills.

The support and encouragement of my family not only throughout the PhD but in my life in general has been a huge factor in getting this far. Thank you to my brothers Matthew and Shaun for their light-hearted sibling rivalry and belief in my ability to complete the PhD. Thank you to my father, David, for the encouragement he has given me to be ambitious, develop a curious mind, and to dust myself off and start again no matter how many times I fail. Thank you to my mother, Angela, whose memory and example gives me the drive to keep pushing forward. Thank you to my family-in-law, the Myrtles, for their curiousity and support throughout this process.

Finally, thank you to my husband, Patrick Myrtle, for his unwavering belief, patience, love, and support. He has been with me every step of the way and words are not enough to express how much I deeply appreciate his companionship throughout this wild ride.

List of Publications Arising From This Thesis

Refereed journal article Lindfield, N. & McCarthy-Jones, A. 2014. Leadership and local government effectiveness: a framework for analysis. Asian Review of Public Administration, 25(2), 47-63.

Refereed conference paper Lindfield, N. 2015. Is there a relationship between leadership style and regime type? The case of Venezuela. Paper presented at the Australian Political Studies Association Annual (APSA) Conference 2015. University of Canberra, 28-30 September, 1-32.

Table of Contents Thesis/Dissertation Sheet ...... i Abstract...... ii Copyright and Authenticity Statements...... iii Statement of Originality ...... iv Acknowledgements ...... v List of Publications Arising From This Thesis...... vi List of Abbreviations ...... xii List of Figures ...... xv List of Tables...... xvi Chapter One: Introduction ...... 1 The Aims and Significance of this Research...... 2 Case Study Background ...... 4 Research Questions...... 6 Thesis Structure ...... 6 Chapter Two: Understanding Leadership, Political Regimes and Defining Moments ...... 10 Introduction ...... 10 Understanding Leadership ...... 11 Transactional and Transformational Leadership ...... 13 Transactional Leadership...... 13 Transformational Leadership ...... 17 Full-Range Leadership ...... 23 Cultural Considerations ...... 25 Latin American Leadership: Personalismo and Caudillismo ...... 27 Political Regimes ...... 32 Liberal Democracy...... 33 Electoral Democracy ...... 36 Ambiguous Regimes ...... 37 Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ...... 37 Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian Regimes ...... 39 Politically Closed Authoritarian Regimes ...... 39 Rentier States ...... 40 Political Legitimacy ...... 41 Defining Moments ...... 45 Conclusion ...... 47 Chapter Three: Methodology ...... 50 Introduction ...... 50

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A Qualitative Research Strategy ...... 50 Case Study Method of Data Selection...... 52 Document and Archival Analysis ...... 53 Selection and Justification of the Case Study ...... 54 Potential Limitations of the Research ...... 55 Conclusion ...... 56 Chapter Four: Venezuela’s Authoritarian Period, 1811-1958 ...... 57 Introduction ...... 57 The Defining Moments of Bolívar’s Leadership, 1811-1830 ...... 57 Bolívar’s Revolutionary Defining Moments, 1811-1821 ...... 58 Bolívar Challenges the Status Quo to Establish a Revolutionary Reputation………………..58 Bolívar Unifies the Caudillos…………………………………………………………………62 The Angostura Address and the Manifestation of Bolívar's Vision: Gran Colombia………...64 Bolívar’s Post-Revolutionary Defining Moments, 1821-1830 ...... 67 Bolívar Persists With His Vision: the 1826 Bolivian Constitution………………………….. 67 Bolivar's Management of Resistance to His Vision…………………………………………..69 Bolívar's Dictatorship………………………………………………………………………...70 The Defining Moments of Gómez’s Leadership, 1908-1935 ...... 73 Gómez’s Broken Promise of Democracy ...... 73 Gómez’s Use of Patronage Networks for Economic and Political Control ...... 77 Gómez’s Justification of the Nature of His Regime: Cesarismo Democrático ...... 79 Gómez’s Management of Dissent Through Political Repression ...... 81 The Defining Moments of Pérez Jiménez’s Leadership, 1952-1958 ...... 83 Pérez Jiménez’s Use of Electoral Manipulation to Protect His Power ...... 83 Pérez Jiménez’s Use of Patronage Networks ...... 86 Pérez Jiménez’s Grandiose Vision ...... 88 Pérez Jiménez’s Use of Political Repression to Protect His Political Survival ...... 90 Conclusion ...... 92 Chapter Five: Venezuela’s Democratic Period, 1958-1998 ...... 93 Introduction ...... 93 The Defining Moments of Betancourt’s Leadership, 1945-47 & 1959-64 ...... 93 The Defining Moments of Betancourt’s Provisional Presidency, 1945-1947 ...... 94 Betancourt's Strategy of Fast-Paced Political Change………………………………………95 Betancourt's Social Vision for Venezuela…………………………………………………….98 Betancourt Maintains Venezuela's Reliance on Oil Revenue……………………………….100 The Defining Moments of Betancourt’s Constitutional Presidency, 1959-1964 ...... 102

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Betancourt: A Key Architect in the Pact of Punto Fijo and the 1961 Constitution…………102 Betancourt's Conciliation of Key Power Wielders……………………………………….....105 Betancourt's Exclusion of the PCV from the Political Process: an Escalation of Conflict…107 The Defining Moments of Pérez’s Leadership, 1974-79 & 1989-93 ...... 110 The Defining Moments of Pérez’s First Presidency, 1974-1979 ...... 111 Pérez's Electoral Dominance and Use of Decree Powers…………………………………..111 Pérez's Grandiose Vision for Venezuela…………………………………………………….112 Pérez's Practice and Tolerance of Corruption……………………………………………...115 The Defining Moments of Pérez’s Second Presidency, 1989-1993...... 117 Pérez's Backtracking on His Promise Against Austerity Measures………………………....118 Pérez's Response to El Caracazo…………………………………………………………....119 The Defining Moments of Caldera’s Leadership, 1969-74 & 1994-99 ...... 122 The Defining Moments of Caldera’s First Presidency, 1969-1974 ...... 122 Caldera's Early Defining Moment: Key to His Rise to the Presidency……………………..122 Caldera's Election to the Presidency and Decision to Eschew Coalition Governance……..123 Caldera's Pacification of Leftist Guerrillas…………………………………………………125 Caldera's Management of Dissent: the Closure of Tertiary Institutions……………………125 The Defining Moments of Caldera’s Second Presidency, 1994-1999 ...... 126 Caldera's Rebuke of Punto Fijismo………………………………………………………….127 Caldera's Management of the Economic Crisis……………………………………………..128 Conclusion ...... 129 Chapter Six: The Defining Moments of Chávez’s Leadership, 1992-2004 ...... 131 Introduction ...... 131 Chávez’s Early Defining Moments ...... 131 Chávez’s Bolivarian Vision ...... 135 Chávez’s Implementation of the Bolivarian Revolution ...... 137 The Creation of the ANC ...... 138 The 1999 Constitution ...... 139 Chávez Reintroduces the Military into Venezuelan Politics and Development ...... 141 Chávez’s Re-Nationalisation of PDVSA and the 2002 Coup Attempt ...... 142 The 49 Laws Package...... 143 The 2002 Coup D’État Attempt ...... 145 Chávez Strengthens His Moral Authority: the 2002-2003 Oil Lockout ...... 149 Conclusion ...... 152 Chapter Seven: The Defining Moments of Chávez’s Leadership, 2004-2013 ...... 153

Introduction ...... 153 Chávez Consolidates His Legitimacy ...... 153 The Misiones ...... 154 The Recall Referendum ...... 157 Chávez’s Use of His Electoral Dominance ...... 161 Mandate to Change the Venezuelan Polity...... 161 Chávez’s Reconstitution of the MVR ...... 162 Chávez Maintains His Electoral Popularity ...... 163 Chávez Evolves His Vision: Twenty-First Century Socialism ...... 166 The Basis of Twenty-First Century Socialism ...... 166 Implementing His Vision: Chávez Legislates Twenty-First Century Socialism ...... 167 The “Crowding Out” of Opposition Media and the Judiciary ...... 170 Chávez Hides His Cancer Diagnosis and Ascends to Idol Status...... 174 Conclusion ...... 176 Chapter Eight: The Defining Moments of Maduro’s Leadership, 2013-Present ...... 177 Introduction ...... 177 An Early Defining Moment: Maduro’s Designation as Chávez’s Heir ...... 177 Maduro’s Defining Moments in Venezuela’s Political Crisis ...... 180 Maduro’s Management of the 2014 Protests ...... 181 Maduro’s Jailing of Opposition Leaders ...... 182 Maduro’s Response to the MUD’s Win at the 2015 AN Elections ...... 183 Maduro’s Blocking of the 2016 Recall Referendum and Delay of Regional Elections ...... 185 Maduro’s “Self-Coup” and the Creation of the ANC in 2017 ...... 188 Maduro’s Use of Ley Habilitante Powers to Circumvent the MUD-Controlled AN ...... 191 Maduro’s Defining Moments in Venezuela’s Economic Crisis ...... 193 Maduro’s Management of Venezuela’s Economic Crisis ...... 194 The Cost of Protecting Chávez’s Vision: Declining Productivity & Increased Debt ...... 195 Maduro’s Management of Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis ...... 198 Maduro’s Practice of Military Patronage and Nepotism ...... 200 Conclusion ...... 203 Chapter Nine: Understanding the Use of Leadership Styles in Venezuela ...... 204 Introduction ...... 204 Synthesis of the Analytical Framework ...... 204 A Defining Moments Lens ...... 206 A Chain of Defining Moments ...... 207 Cross-Leader Defining Moments ...... 208 A Hybrid Full-Range Leadership Model ...... 210

Leadership Style Utility ...... 210 Leadership Style Hybridity...... 213 Leadership Culture ...... 221 Bolívar as the Precedent for Venezuelan Leadership……………………………………….222 The Appropriation of Bolívar's Memory…………………………………………………….223 The Relationship Between Regime Type and the Use of Leadership Styles ...... 225 The Preferencing of Pseudo Styles ...... 226 Conducive Environments and Followers...... 228 The Influence of Rentier Statism ...... 230 Constructive and Destructive Outcomes Instead of Ethics ...... 234 Conclusion ...... 235 Chapter Ten: Conclusion ...... 237 Reference List ...... 246

List of Abbreviations

AD Acción Democrática (Democratic Action) AGE Asociación General de Estudiantes (General Association of Students) AN Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly) ANC Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (National Constituent Assembly) BANFANB Banco de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (Bank of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces) BGV Bolivarian Government of Venezuela CAF Corporacion Andina de Fomento (Development Bank of Latin America) Camimpeg Compañía Anónima Militar de Industrias Mineras, Petrolíferas y de Gas (Anonymous Military Company of Mining, Oil, and Gas Industries) CD Coordinadora Democrática (Democratic Coordinator) CLAP Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (Local Committee of Supply and Production) CN Convergencia Nacional (National Convergence) CNE Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Council) COPEI Comité de Organización de Política Electoral Independiente (Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organisation) CTV Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela (Confederation of Trade Unions of Venezuela) CTITI Comisión de Tierras del Instituto Técnico de Inmigración y Colonización (Land Commission in the Technical Institute for Immigration and Colonisation) CTUs Comités de Tierras Urbanas (Urban Land Committees) CVF Corporación Venezolano de Fomento (Venezuelan Development Corporation) Encovi La Encuesta sobre Condiciones de Vida en Venezuela (The Survey on Living Conditions in Venezuela) FALN Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation)

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FEDECÁMARAS Federación de Camaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Produccion de Venezuela (Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce) FEI Frente Electoral Independiente (Independent Electoral Front) FND Frente Nacional Democrático (National Democratic Front) GDP Gross Domestic Product Generación de ’28 Generation of 1928, a group of students persecuted by Gómez GLOBE Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness GMVV Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela (Great Venezuela Housing Mission) GNI Gross National Income GPP Gran Polo Patriótico (Great Patriotic Pole) HRW Human Rights Watch IMF International Monetary Fund LGBTQI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex MAS Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism) MBR-200 Movimiento Bolivarianio Revolucionario 200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200) MINCI Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y la Información (Ministry of Popular Power for Communication and Information) MIR Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) MLQ Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire MPPC Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura (Ministry of Popular Power for Culture) MUD Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (Democratic Unity Roundtable) MVR Movimiento V República (Movement of the Fifth Republic) NGO Non-Government Organisation OAS Organisation of American States OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries OVS Observatorio Venezolano de la Salud (Venezuela Health Observatory) OVV Observatorio de Venezolano de Violencia (Venezuelan Violence Observatory) PAP People’s Action Party PEP Plan de Enfrentamiento a la Pobreza (Confronting Poverty Plan) PCV Partido Comunista de Venezuela (Communist Part of Venezuela)

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PDVSA Petróleos de Venezuela (Petroleum of Venezuela, the state oil industry) PJ Primero Justicia (Justice First) PROVEA El Programa Venezolano de Educación Acción en Derechos Humanos (Venezuelan Program for Education and Action in Human Rights) PSUV Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) PV Proyecto Venezuela (Project Venezuela) RCTV Radio Caracas Televisión SIDOR Siderúrgica del Orinoco (Orinoco Steel, a state-owned steel corporation) SN Seguridad Naciónal (National Security) TeleSUR La Nueva Televisión del Sur (The New Television of the South) TRCA Tribunal de Responsabilidad Civil y Administrativa (Tribunal of Civil and Administrative Responsibility) TSJ Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (Supreme Tribunal of Justice) TVES Televisora Venezolana Social (Venezuelan Social Television) UBE Unidad de Batalla Electoral (Electoral Battle Unit) UCV Universidad Central de Venezuela (Central University of Venezuela) UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNT Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Era) UPM Unión Patriótica Militar (Patriotic Military Union) URD Unión Republicana Democrática (Democratic Republican Union) USA United States of America

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List of Figures

Figure 2.1. Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model ……………………………………26

List of Tables

Table 9.1 Regime Type, Defining Moment, and Leadership Style(s) of Selected Venezuelan Presidents ……………………………………………...205

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Chapter One: Introduction

Leadership is widely regarded as a key requirement for success in the private sector, civil society and government. Its proponents argue that organisations have a limited chance of being effective without successful leadership, while nations’ development can be threatened if the political leader is incompetent or corrupt. As a result, leadership is extensively studied, with hundreds of definitions, training programs, and “how-to” internet articles, as well as thousands of studies, academic journal articles and books available on the topic. Within academia, leadership is primarily examined in the management, business, and organisational psychology disciplines. Studies from these disciplines focus on how to be a better leader within the workplace to maximise results from employees. Other studies look at “what not to do” as a method of drawing lessons for improvement.

In the realm of politics, the study of leadership is considered important, but the analysis of leaders tends to be conducted through theories of populism, elite dynamics, power relations, and institutions. Due to this focus, political science theories devised to understand political leaders do not have the same level of detail or empirical validation as the management leadership theories. This does not mean, however, that political scientists are uninterested in political leaders. On the contrary, interest in political leadership is evident throughout history and is seen in the classic works of Plato, Socrates, Machiavelli, and Weber. Each of these scholars, and many others like them, has sought to understand the nature of political leadership and the qualities and conditions that influence its effectiveness. In contemporary times, however, analysis of political leadership has adopted more of a biographical lens. As a consequence, a comprehensive framework of analysis for political leadership that draws together and contrasts lessons, as well as provides insight on generalisable conditions, experiences, and behaviours of leadership is lacking.

The disconnect in leadership studies between the disciplines of management and political science has resulted in the absence of the systematic application of comprehensive and empirically validated leadership theories developed by management scholars to the analysis of political leaders. It is surprising that political science has largely overlooked the leadership phenomenon as explored in management, yet there is also potential for the political science

and management disciplines to work together to gain greater insight into political leadership. The application of management theories of leadership - more comprehensive and empirically tested than those in political science - to political science case studies can serve to further develop the field of leadership. Management theories of leadership have also not been widely tested against cross-cultural case studies and hence largely reflect a Western understanding of leadership. This is where the research contained within this thesis can help to bridge the disconnect between political science and management in the analysis of political leadership and also explore cross-cultural aspects.

The focus of this thesis’s research is the leadership of selected presidents from the country of Venezuela. It borrows an analytical framework of leadership primarily from management and applies it to the case study of Venezuela. In particular, the research focuses on the leadership styles of the presidents from different times and regime types in an effort to test the framework against varying political structures and conditions. The following sub-sections provide more detail on the aims, significance, choice of case study, research questions, and thesis structure to guide the reader through the research and analysis contained in this thesis.

The Aims and Significance of this Research This thesis seeks to gain insight into political leadership by applying theory developed in the management discipline to political subjects. It utilises the full-range leadership model, whose key elements ironically originated in the work of a political scientist, James MacGregor Burns (1978), yet its further development was undertaken by the organisational psychology and management scholar, Bernard Bass (1985). Since the 1980s, the full-range leadership model has been empirically tested in countless studies of mainly private sector organisations. The range of leadership styles attributed to the full-range model offers a wide yet nuanced framework through which to conduct analysis. The benefits of using this model centre on its comprehensive delineation of leadership styles that reflect the different behaviours, choices, and actions of leaders. This allows for microanalysis of individual leaders as they operate in the context of political structures, socio-economic conditions, and domestic and international events, in order to obtain in-depth understanding of political leadership.

This research thus has three core aims:

1. To test the theoretical suitability of the full-range leadership model to a political science case study. 2. To determine whether there is a relationship of influence between regime type and the use of leadership style(s). 3. To establish whether there is an identifiable pattern of leadership in Venezuela that transcends time and regime type.

These aims will be achieved through the chronological exploration of the leaderships of the Venezuelan presidents selected for this research. In order to implement these aims, the full- range leadership model has been adapted to include the authentic and pseudo-full-range leadership styles identified by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999). This adapted model, referred to in this thesis as the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model (Figure 2.1) guides the presentation of the case study data and their analysis in Chapter Eight.

The first aim of this thesis seeks to address the need for a comprehensive analytical model of leadership for political science. There is a basic assumption in this research that the full-range leadership model is suitable for political science analysis due to its origins in the work of Burns (1978) and the wide scope of the model. This scope was achieved by Bass (1985) in his adaptation of the model for the study of leadership in business. In re-applying it to political leadership, this thesis aims to test the model’s analytical utility for a political science case study. As a consequence, while the model’s origins make it theoretically suitable, there is still the question of how theoretically suitable it is in its modified form and what else is needed to further refine it for political science.

The second core aim of this thesis is to examine the extent to which political regime type influences leaders’ choices of leadership styles. In this regard, this thesis seeks to identify the degree to which the leadership styles align with regime characteristics and to explore the relationship of influence between regime type and leadership styles. If the leader operates within an authoritarian regime structure, will he/she only utilise pseudo leadership styles? Or, if the leader operates within a democratic regime structure, will he/she primarily utilise authentic leadership styles? What about leaders of hybrid regimes, which combine both democratic and authoritarian elements? Can they be expected to utilise a combination of both authentic and pseudo leadership styles? These questions guide the second aim of this thesis in its analysis of various presidents and regime types in Venezuela.

The final aim of this thesis is to identify whether there is a pattern of leadership style in Venezuela that is independent of time and regime type. In pursuing this aim, the leadership of Simón Bolívar, Venezuela’s foundational leader, is integral to the concept of an “ideal type” of leadership in the country. Various attempts have been made by different presidents across time to replicate perceived qualities of Bolívar’s leadership. Thus, part of this research aim is to assess the degree to which the memory and interpretation of Bolívar’s leadership has played a role in establishing patterns of leadership in Venezuela. A secondary influential factor that is taken into account is the role of oil after its discovery in the twentieth century. If there are patterns of leadership that transcend time and regime type, do they remain consistent despite the discovery of oil and Venezuela’s transformation into a rentier state?

The significance of this research is evident in two key areas. First, it tests the full-range leadership model within a systematic, qualitative research design. This is lacking in current research employing this model. The model’s adaptation to a political science case study also assists in its development and returns it to its discipline of origin. Second, if the model proves to be an effective explanatory framework for political leadership in Venezuela, its adaptation can provide a robust basis for future studies of political leadership. In this regard, this research addresses the absence of a comprehensive analytical framework through which to conduct systematic research of political leadership.

Case Study Background Venezuela is an oil-rich nation situated in the north of the South American continent. It is bordered to the north by the Caribbean Sea, and to the west, south and east it shares borders with Colombia, Brazil and Guyana respectively. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report 2016 recorded Venezuela’s population as 31.1 million people with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US$15,129 (GNI based on data from 2011, the most recent data available). This places it within the World Bank’s (2017a) upper middle-income category, using the Atlas method of GNI calculation. The country has a variety of regions, ranging from desert, to savannah, jungle, and coastal. Venezuela’s territory spans 916,445km2, and the nation’s primary industry is oil, arising out of its immense oil reserves (MPPC 2012). Venezuela possesses the largest crude oil reserves in the world, totalling over 300 billion barrels. In comparison, the next largest oil reserves belong to Saudi Arabia at 266 billion barrels (OPEC 2017).

Prior to the discovery of oil in the early twentieth century, Venezuela was of little geopolitical importance and its main industries were cattle, tobacco, and coffee (Briceño- Leon 2005, 2). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Venezuela led the way in the Independence Wars against the Spanish Empire. The Latin American independence hero Simón Bolívar was born in Venezuela and, through his leadership, united significant portions of the wider region to expel the Spanish colonisers from present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Panama and Guyana. After his death in 1830, Venezuela was ruled by a succession of caudillo dictators until a brief period of democracy from 1945-1948 before the military reclaimed control over the country.

Democracy was restored in 1958 and its protection was guaranteed through an elite power- sharing agreement known as the Pact of Punto Fijo. During this period, Venezuela was hailed by regional powers such as the USA as the best example of democracy in the Latin American region. However, from the 1980s a persistent economic crisis and failure of leadership contributed to the decay of Puntofijismo. This led to the rise of Hugo Chávez to the presidency in 1999 and the transformation of the Venezuelan polity, at first, from a representative democracy to a participatory democracy. However, the longer Chávez’s rule continued, the further Venezuelan democracy decayed until it morphed into a hybrid electoral authoritarian regime in the mid-2000s. Chávez’s death in 2013 led to the narrow electoral victory of his nominated heir, Nicolás Maduro. Yet, this has resulted in present-day Venezuela transforming into a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime (Diamond 2002) as Maduro seeks to implement his interpretation of Chávez’s vision. Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the highs and lows of the global oil price have had profound effects on Venezuela’s economy and leadership.

Venezuela provides a useful case study for two key reasons. First, within a relatively short period of time – approximately 200 years – it has experienced three different regime types: authoritarian, democratic, and hybrid. This enables an in-depth analysis of leadership styles within different regime contexts and provides a platform for the comparative analysis of assumptions regarding the presence of leadership styles across different regime types. Second, as the development of the full-range leadership model has occurred within a Western setting, Venezuela serves as a case study to test not only the universality of the model’s styles but also its applicability to a political science case study.

Research Questions The study that follows is a combination of leadership theory, history, and analysis. It seeks to not only provide an in-depth study of Venezuelan presidential leadership across time and regime type but also to contribute to building a strong analytical model of political leadership. In order to achieve these aims, Venezuela’s economic, political and social development is traced through the leaderships of eight selected presidents across each regime type: three presidents from Venezuela’s authoritarian period, three from its democratic period, and two from its hybrid/authoritarian period. The following research questions have guided data collection and analysis:

1. Does regime type influence a leader’s choice of leadership style in defining moments? 2. Is there a pattern of leadership style in Venezuela that is independent of regime type and time? 3. How does the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model help us to understand and explain leadership styles within the political context and across time and regime type in a non-Western country?

These questions guide the research and assist in providing conclusions for the research aims. The defining moments lens referred to in the first research question assists in focusing analysis. This lens adopts the position put forth by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) that leadership styles are most clear in the defining moments of the leader in question. Defining moments are significant events, policies, speeches, or actions that distinctly demonstrate the use of a leadership style. Because of this focused approach, the research is able to consider multiple leaders. The use of the defining moments lens also contributes to the aims of this research. First, it is one component of what needs to be added to the full-range leadership model in order to facilitate its application to political leadership. Second, the defining moments lens aids in the exploration of patterns and relationships of influence because of its ability to clearly reveal the type and nature of the leadership style. This will aid the analysis of the use of leadership styles across time and regime type by selected Venezuelan presidents.

Thesis Structure This thesis is divided into ten chapters that cover the relevant literature, research logic, data, and analysis of selected Venezuelan presidents through the lenses of the Integrated Full- Range Leadership Model and defining moments.

Chapter One: Introduction opens with an overview of the reasoning for this research; namely, that the field of political leadership has much to benefit from the analytical application of management models of leadership due to the high-level of empirical development these models have been exposed to. The chapter then establishes the aims and significance of this research and provides a country background of the case study, Venezuela. The chapter also details the questions guiding the research of this thesis before concluding with the thesis structure.

Chapter Two: Understanding Leadership, Political Regimes and Defining Moments provides a literature review of the leadership and regime theory utilised to form an analytical framework for the exploration of Venezuelan presidents’ choice of leadership styles in their defining moments. In particular, the chapter surveys the history of leadership theory before providing an in-depth explanation of the full-range leadership model. It then proposes an Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model through which to conduct the analysis of the selected Venezuelan residents. The second part of the chapter addresses relevant political regime literature and, in particular, utilises Diamond’s (2002) typology of political regimes through which to situate the regimes of the examined Venezuelan presidents. The third part of the chapter proposes a defining moments lens to focus data collection and analysis. It concludes with an explanation of the analytical framework for this research.

Chapter Three: Methodology justifies and sets out the research design and methodology used in the application of the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model to the Venezuelan case study. It explores the importance of qualitative studies of leadership. Then, it details the process used to gather and analyse the case study data. This process includes the employment of a longitudinal, embedded single case study design, and the use of document and archival analysis of secondary and tertiary data. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the potential limitations to the research.

Chapter Four: Venezuela’s Authoritarian Period, 1811-1958 introduces three selected Venezuelan presidents: Simón Bolívar, Juan Vicente Gómez, and Marcos Pérez Jiménez. Their use of leadership styles in defining moments is explored. In particular, the chapter focuses on the ways in which these leaders consolidated power, articulated goals, justified their rule, and responded to dissent within the broad context of social, political, and economic forces influencing their defining moments.

Chapter Five: Venezuela’s Democratic Period, 1958-1999 looks at the selected leaders of Venezuela’s Punto Fijo democracy: Rómulo Betancourt, Carlos Andrés Pérez, and Rafael Caldera. It explores their defining moments in the context of democratic electoral politics and rentier statism. The chapter first focuses on Betancourt’s attempts to establish and consolidate democracy in Venezuela. Second, it looks at Pérez’s presidencies in times of both prosperity and economic crisis. Finally, the chapter explores Caldera’s roles as both peace-maker in the late 1960s and as the final president of the Punto Fijo era.

The exploration of Venezuela’s hybrid period is divided into three chapters. This is because of the vast influence on contemporary Venezuelan society by the leaders in the hybrid period – Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. Chapters Six and Seven focus on the defining moments of Chávez’s leadership, while Chapter Eight applies the same defining moments focus to the leadership of Venezuela’s current president, Maduro.

Chapter Six: Defining Moments of Chávez’s Leadership, 1999-2004 centres on the transformation of the Venezuelan polity in the early years of Chávez’s rule. In particular, it explores Chávez’s defining moments as he established a reputation as an authentic, anti- establishment leader prior to 1999 and during the early years of his presidency. These early years also included challenges to Chávez’s leadership by his opposition, such as a 2002 coup d’état attempt and the 2002/2003 oil lockout.

Chapter Seven: Defining Moments of Chávez’s Leadership, 2004-2013 covers the period of 2004-2013. Chávez’s victory at the 2004 recall referendum consolidated his moral authority and electoral popularity. This consolidation involved increasing his domination over political, judicial, and media opposition and demonstrated Venezuela’s slide from (flawed) democratic to hybrid regime status. This period also witnessed the change in Chávez’s vision for Venezuela and the transformation of the Bolivarian Revolution into twenty-first century socialism. This change established the conditions for Chávez’s successor, Maduro, to continue the transformation of the Venezuelan regime from electoral authoritarian to hegemonic electoral authoritarian.

Chapter Eight: Defining Moments of Maduro’s Leadership, 2013-Present explores present-day Venezuela under Maduro. It examines his leadership in defining moments within the context of an economic and humanitarian crisis and an opposition determined to remove

him from power. The chapter also explores the dependence of Maduro’s legitimacy on the memory of Chávez and contextualises his defining moments within his quest to carry out Chávez’s vision of twenty-first century socialism.

Chapter Nine: Understanding the Use of Leadership Styles in Venezuela provides an analysis of Venezuelan presidential leadership in defining moments by applying the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model proposed in Chapter Two.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion reflects upon the aims of this research and the use of the Integrated Full-Range Leadership model and defining moments lens in the analysis of political leadership. It reviews the data presented in Chapters Four to Eight and links the findings in Chapter Nine to their broader implications to the study of political leadership.

Chapter Two: Understanding Leadership, Political Regimes and Defining Moments

Introduction Leadership is an area that has long fascinated scholars and laypersons alike. Since classical times, theorists have tried to conceptualise, understand, and even replicate styles that are thought to make a great leader. The examination of political leaders from different regime types has also generated interest. However, in-depth studies mostly utilise a biographical lens. Although there are theories of political leadership in the political science discipline, a comprehensive framework is lacking due to the fragmentation of the field of study. This same issue confronts leadership studies more generally, and neither field has “progressed to a point where they can identify a consensual body of theory which those in their respective disciplines can use in a deductive manner” (Peele 2005, 188).

This chapter addresses the literature on leadership and political regimes that is relevant to this thesis. The first part of the chapter considers the leadership literature. It provides an overview of the field of leadership literature, and presents an in-depth analysis of the transactional, transformational and full-range leadership theories. The full-range leadership model has been utilised to identify different leadership styles, largely in the private sector. But it is yet to be used to systematically analyse political leaders. The chapter then explores specific characteristics of Latin American leadership, particularly the caudillo effect. The second part of this chapter examines the nature of political regimes, and presents an overview of the authoritarian, democratic, and hybrid types. The concept of rentier states is also addressed, as the unique interplay between leadership, oil rents, and legitimacy is of particular relevance to the case study of Venezuela. The chapter then explores the question of legitimacy in relation to regime types, paying particular attention to the possible varying societal expectations of regime performance. The third part of the chapter considers the lens of defining moments as a useful mechanism to focus data collection and presentation. Finally, the chapter proposes a cross-disciplinary analytical framework to assist data collection and analysis of the case study of Venezuela’s political leadership.

Understanding Leadership Leadership occurs throughout every level and sector of society; it is the influence that individuals exert – consciously and unconsciously – in their daily lives. It can be democratic, grassroots and communitarian, or it can be top-down, coercive and hierarchical. Yet, whatever form it takes, leadership has always been evident in societies and organisations across the world and throughout history. A consequence of the sustained interest in and variable nature of leadership is that there is no consistently accepted definition and “no clear understanding of the boundaries of the construct space” (Dickson, Den Hartog & Mitchelson 2003, 731). In the late twentieth century, Rost (1993, 112) identified over 100 definitions of the concept. Such definitional differences have contributed to the multitude of perspectives that have been created to answer the question of what makes good leadership. Leadership has been analysed as a trait or behaviour. It has been studied in terms of context or exchanges between leaders and followers (Northouse 2001) and has been considered in terms of culture (Bass 1997a; 1997b). Despite the competing frameworks, what can be agreed on is that historical, economic and social forces influence the kind of leader that is produced in a nation (Bass 1997b, 9).

This thesis adopts a definition of leadership that combines elements drawn from two scholars. It accepts Fiedler’s (1996, 241) simple assertion that leadership is a power relationship between leader and follower. However, this understanding does not adequately acknowledge the ability of followers to influence the leader. Instead, Burns’s (1978, 19) definition of leadership as a dialectical relationship between leader and follower, whereby both can act to mutually influence each other toward goals, captures the complexity of its nature:

Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done to realise goals mutually held by both leaders and followers… [italics in original text].

Consequently, this thesis understands leadership to be the process and relationship through which the leader and follower interact with each other to influence or control in an effort to achieve outcomes. Context determines what those goals and outcomes are, as well as the nature of the relationship between the leader and the followers. For the purposes of this research, a political leader, operating within the offices of the state, is a person who occupies

a position of authority and who can exert his or her will on a group of people for the purpose of achieving a goal. However, both leader and follower are able to influence each other and exert power over the other to varying degrees. The regime type and the method through which the leader strives to maintain legitimacy may mediate the nature of the influence relationship. A leader’s choice of leadership style is likely to be related to this quest for legitimacy and goal attainment.

This thesis has adopted a model of leadership based on transactional, transformational and full-range leadership theories that have evolved in the last three decades from a diverse tradition of scholarship on leadership. This tradition includes a trait/personality perspective that was popular until the 1940s (Derue et al. 2011) and which focused on the premise that there were particular, innate leadership traits that only certain kinds of people – great leaders – were born with (Galton 1972; Northouse 2001). However, the belief that only certain individuals could be leaders gradually shifted to one where any person could embody perceived successful leadership styles. This led to the development of a behavioural approach to leadership involving the identification of leadership styles through the classification of the behaviours of leaders. Researchers hoped that the identification of successful styles would then allow more people to adopt such behaviours and hence become effective leaders themselves (Avery 2004).

Since then, there have been various amalgamations of the behavioural approach with the context in which leadership occurs. Attribute pattern approach (Mumford et al. 2000), situational/contingency theory (House 1971; Vroom & Yetton 1973; Fiedler 1981), and the Integrated Psychological Theory (Scouller 2011) – to name a few – are examples of this amalgamation. However, as stated at the beginning of this section, this chapter will focus on the theories of transactional, transformational and full-range leadership to provide a framework for the examination of key leaders during three distinct regime types in Venezuela. These theories are associated with the essentialist school of thought that adheres to the idea that a leader can adjust his or her actions and behaviour to suit their situation (Grint 2005). This thesis adopts the full-range leadership model due to the wide-range of leadership styles associated with it and the large body of empirical research generated by the management discipline to support its analytical utility.

Transactional and Transformational Leadership In his seminal work Leadership, the political scientist James MacGregor Burns (1978) first introduced the concept of transforming leadership and expanded upon the idea of transactional leadership, situating the two concepts in direct contrast to each other. As a result, a paradigm shift occurred which essentially rejuvenated the stagnated field of leadership preoccupied with trait and behaviour theories (Hunt 1999). In rejuvenating the analysis of leadership, Burns identified two distinct types of leadership – transformational and transactional – that can be attributed with vastly different features and outcomes. In Burns’s (1978, 19) view, transactional leadership demonstrates the development of policy as a means to secure votes. This form of leadership is “utilitarian, needs based, and provides goods depending on the bargain between the leader and the follower” (Bell 2014, 91).

By comparison, transformational leadership is associated with a special relationship between the leader and the followers, whereby the leader has an ability to morally elevate his or her followers and engage the followers in a philosophical rejuvenation that concludes in a transcendence of the status quo (Burns 2003). Bell (2014, 91) notes that transformational leadership “is a type of political leadership that moves society and achieves collective goals that are long term, and works through the leader’s understanding with the followers.” History has been peppered with both transactional and transformational leaders. Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela are prime examples of transformational, while Burns (1978) considers Charles de Gaulle, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Jimmy Carter as transactional. The following review of both theories provides an understanding of the elements of each model. This review forms the basis of an examination of full-range leadership as put forth by Bass and Avolio (1994).

Transactional Leadership The transactional theory of leadership seeks to understand the nature of reciprocity and the interplay of expectations between leaders and followers. Transactional leadership is characterised by Burns (1978, 258) as “the leader and the follower exchanging gratifications in a political marketplace.” In other words, transactional leadership involves an exchange “that allows for mutual satisfaction of goals and needs” (Chemers 1997, 61). The promise of the delivery of a policy in exchange for votes, as measured by opinion polls and electoral victories, is an example of this.

Bass (1990a), O’Shea et al. (2009, 239) and Lussier and Achua (2010, 253) identify transactional leadership as possessing the following characteristics:

(a) Contingent reinforcement (rewarding or punishing follower behavior to ensure compliance); (b) Active management-by-exception (monitoring followers’ performance and taking corrective action if deviations from standards occur); (c) Passive management-by-exception (failing to act until problems become serious).

These characteristics serve to support a leader-follower exchange in which the leader rewards specific follower behaviours or punishes behaviour that does not meet expectations (Lussier & Achua 2010). Consequently, transactional leadership only encourages followers to act or participate to the extent that their self-interest is satisfied. As such, the styles associated with transactional leadership are sometimes said to be more appropriately identified as skills for managers rather than leaders, due to the fact that the styles focus on identifying target behaviours and delivering reinforcement through reward or punishment (Chemers 1997, 69). Accordingly, two skills affect what constitutes an effective transactional leader: first, an ability to initiate and organise work, and, second, an ability to satisfy the self-interest of followers who act in a favourable manner (Bass 1997b, 319). Transactional leaders “clarify for their followers their responsibilities, the tasks that must be accomplished, the performance objectives, and the benefits to the self-interests of the followers for compliance” (Epitropaki & Martin 2005, 573). In the context of organisations, the leader achieves legitimacy, and hence maintains followers, through the fulfilment of promises and the rewarding of follower behaviour, such as through pay rises. Legitimacy occurs when the leader is perceived to be delivering on the commitments he or she makes to followers, acts with integrity, and respects the principles and institutions that make up the organisation (Bass 1990a).

Meanwhile, followers who do not behave in the way set out by the leader are penalised. An example of this is an employee being placed on disciplinary action for failing to satisfactorily carry out their work duties (Bass 1997b, 319). However, the extent to which the reward or punishment is effective is dependent upon a number of variables. These include the extent to which the follower values the anticipated effect; the amount, timing and perceived fairness of the reward or punishment; the effort made by both the leader and the follower; and the needs of the follower (Avolio & Bass 1995). A drawback of transactional leadership is the

engagement of the follower in a reciprocal reward cycle that says little or nothing about leaders engaging with followers on a higher visionary level or establishing emotional engagement. As a result, it is argued that follower loyalty is often weak and provisional due to the fact that they are only connected to the leader’s mission out of self-interest (Bass & Riggio 2006).

Burns (1978, 258) conceptualises the transactional relationship between leader and follower within a political context. He identifies transactional leaders as “bargainers seeking to maximise their political and psychic profits”. Burns’s understanding of transactional leadership differs from management scholarship, however, in his argument that transactional leadership only results in short-lived relationships as there cannot be a repetitious identical exchange of desires on the part of both leader and follower. Rather, “both must move on to new types and levels of gratifications” in order to maintain the relationship (Burns 1978, 258). Bell (2014), citing Burns (2003), argues that transactional leadership is primarily a needs-based relationship that depends upon the agreed-upon exchange between the leader and the follower. It differs from transformational leadership in that it does not unite or engage followers to serve a higher moral purpose that transcends the status quo, or challenges and re- creates societal structures and institutions. Transactional leadership is only effective to the extent that the followers’ self-interest is satisfied. Consequently, the transactional leader must keep offering newer rewards in return for follower support. A transformational leader does not need to do this, as he or she fulfils the higher needs of the followers, and the followers shed self-interest to adopt the leader’s goal or vision as their own (Ewen et al. 2013, 520).

Just as transactional styles can be used to achieve outcomes that result in enhanced work efficiency or follower support, such styles can also be used to engage in acts associated with political phenomena such as corruption and voter/supporter coercion. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) introduced the idea of pseudo-transactional and pseudo-transformational leadership in an effort to distinguish between effective and ineffective forms of both theories. An authentic transactional leader will ensure that “the truth is told, promises are kept, negotiations are fair and choices are free”, but the leader is considered pseudo-transactional when “information harmful to followers is deliberately concealed from them, when bribes are proffered, when nepotism is practiced, and when authority is abused” (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999, 192).

From a political perspective, pseudo-transactional leadership may manifest in clientelism or

patronage with the leader presiding over a network of clients who receive favourable treatment for their loyalty to the patron (Khan 2005; Blunt, Turner & Lindroth 2012). Contingent reinforcement diverges from its usual role in the management theory of positive reinforcement to provide incentives, either monetary or political favour, to a leader’s supporters. The leader often attempts to forge an emotional bond with the followers, but his or her self-interest is still high. Consequently, the leader secures his or her support base through enticement or coercion rather than through adherence to a popular vision for the community. From the clientelistic perspective, pseudo-transactional leadership is similar to the concept of predatory leadership that has emerged in the development literature (Goldsmith 2004; Hadiz 2007; Bavister-Gould 2011). A political leader who primarily engages in pseudo-transactional behaviours such as clientelism will have a power base rooted in networks that are founded on such actions, and “the politician’s dilemma” in this situation “is to distribute sufficient resources to keep loyalists happy (so they will finance campaigns, canvass neighbourhoods, intimidate rivals), while avoiding economic hardship that may alienate the rest of society and destabilise the government” (Goldsmith 2004, 90). Predatory leaders also “[maintain] their position by largely appropriating the institutions of local power including elections, parliaments, and parties” (Hadiz 2007, 874), and have been characterised by Bavister-Gould (2011, 2) as existing in environments that involve:

• Concentrated political and economic power within the sphere of influence of the leader. • Fear or incentive (e.g. coercion or clientelism/patronage), which underpins loyalty to the leader. • Little or no vision for progress on the part of the predatory leader, and hence the status quo is preserved.

These characteristics fit with the pseudo-transactional model of leadership that emphasises clientelistic relationships and the preservation of the status quo. However, in a developing nation context, clientelistic leadership may in certain circumstances support positive outcomes related to development (for example, if the leader’s constituency is among the poor) but available evidence suggests that clientelistic behaviours are more often associated with efforts to maintain the status quo and to provide rewards which may not be particularly developmental (Hulme & Siddiquee 1999). For example, Rosser et al. (2011) conducted a

review of four Indonesian district leaders in the areas of health care and education. Two leaders of neighbouring districts were compared in terms of their policies for health care, and two other leaders were similarly compared in relation to education. The review found that the leaders who focused on delivering both affordable or free health care and education to the majority poor in their districts relied on appealing to the popular base in order to secure support and legitimacy. These leaders, in their campaigns for election and support, articulated an appealing vision of community and progress to their constituents, and relied on their support for re-election and their continuing political career. In contrast, the two leaders who engaged in patronage distribution utilised a network of criminal and business associates to intimidate political opponents and disseminate resources to those in their favour. One leader used his private wealth to purchase votes and support for his nomination. He also had close connections to thug networks that he used to intimidate political rivals, at one point using them to pressure the national leadership of his party to overturn the nomination of his successor in favour of a close family member (Rosser et al. 2011, 24-25). What these examples show is that transactional leadership can be used to achieve both positive and negative developmental outcomes, depending on its authentic or pseudo nature (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999).

Transformational Leadership Where transactional leadership is focused on the exchange of favours, resources, and reward and punishment in return for support or compliance, a transformational leader will fulfill a moral need on behalf of followers. Burns (1978) introduced the concept of transforming leadership (later to be termed “transformational leadership” by Bass) in Leadership. Burns’s (1978, 4) transforming leadership “engages the full person of the follower”, and the leader possesses the intuition to foresee, articulate and act upon followers’ wants and needs. From this, a relationship develops between the transforming leader and the followers: the transforming leader elevates the followers to a higher moral and philosophical awareness, priming them for a change in the status quo. Typically, transforming leaders possess the ability to combine both analytical and normative ideas, often involving “socio-structural dissent” that seeks to recreate the social order and alter the status quo (Burns 1978, 142). In this sense, the transforming leader provides followers with an encompassing values-based vision supported by evidence-based argument.

The followers’ connection to the transformational leader is not one of just votes in exchange for a service. The connection takes on an emotional element in which the leader does not simply seek to satisfy the wants and needs of the followers. Instead, what emerges is a mutual journey. Within this understanding, Burns (1978, 19) defines leadership as the influencing of followers by a leader “to act for certain goals that represent the values and motivations – the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations – of both leaders and followers” [italics in original text]. When this occurs, the leader and his or her supporters engage in a dynamic where they each “raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns 1978, 20).

As a result of this relationship, followers feel elevated to a higher moral plane by their interactions with the transformational leader and, by extension, become more engaged in their society, inducing a flow-on effect of creating new leaders. This is because followers adopt the goals of the leader and are empowered by the leader to support and pursue changes to the status quo. Importantly, Burns (1978, 142-43) identifies transformational leaders as often arising in times of moral and social conflict. In fact, Burns posits that conflict is essential in bringing transformational leaders to the forefront. Transformational leadership thus differs from transactional leadership in that it (a) elevates followers to a higher moral ground, and (b) requires conflict to produce a transformational leader. In certain cases, a transformational leader seeking to revolutionise his or her society must demonstrate a willingness to risk their life and undergo imprisonment or exile. In essence, the transformational leader must be absolutely dedicated to the cause (1978, 202). However, revolutionary conflict is much more extreme than conflict in a reformist context. In a revolutionary context, conflict is

dramatised in the characters of saints and devils, heroes and villains. As the lines become more sharply drawn between the establishment or elite and the poor and the rebelling, doctrine and purpose are hardened in the crucible (Burns 1978, 202-3).

What results from revolutionary conflict is “a powerful sense of mission” which raises the social and political consciousness on the part of both leaders and followers (Burns 1978, 203). Burns identifies Martin Luther King Jnr. as an example of a transformational leader in a revolutionary context. The conviction Luther King Jnr. demonstrated; the impassioned articulation of the morals he held and derived from his faith; and the self-belief he managed to stir in his followers all point to the styles of a transformational leader. Grint (2005, 145-

48), on the other hand, paints a more complex picture of Luther King Jnr. and identifies the importance of distributed leadership. The popular history of the black civil rights movement in the United States identifies Luther King Jnr. as the instigator of the movement. However, Grint suggests that Luther King Jnr. was instead a figurehead of a wider movement that involved many networks of “non-hierarchical” actors all demonstrating leadership for the cause in a variety of ways.

Following Burns, other scholars have worked to establish the essential styles of a transformational leader. O’Shea et al. (2009, 238-39) examined follower responses to 726 leaders to identify the perceived styles of a transformational leader:

(a) Idealised influence/charisma: displaying conviction, taking stands on difficult issues, and emphasising the importance of purpose, commitment, and the ethical consequences of decisions; (b) Inspirational motivation: articulating an appealing vision of the future and challenging followers with high standards; (c) Intellectual stimulation: questioning old assumptions and stimulating in others new perspectives and ways of doing things; (d) Individualised consideration: considering individuals’ unique needs, abilities, and aspirations.

A transformational leader draws on these styles to engage followers in their vision, and, in doing so, alter the societal or organisational order. As a result of these styles, transformational leadership was perceived to provide a useful framework to analyse a leader’s effect on positive organisational change and, subsequently, was very popular in management literature during the 1980s and 1990s. The theory has also been considered as part of a charismatic paradigm that developed after Burns’ Leadership emerged. Other theories that are included in this paradigm include charismatic leadership and visionary leadership (Fiol et al. 1999). At face value, transformational leadership and charismatic leadership are very similar. However, it is important to acknowledge both the similarities and differences.

Max Weber in the Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (1947) first brought charisma to the forefront of political leadership scholarship when he dissected the concept of

charismatic authority. To Weber (1947, 358), charismatic authority is “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities”. A high level of emotion and trust is invested in the leader by followers, and followers have a tendency to connect to a leader “who is most spectacular, who promises the most, or who employs the most effective propaganda measures in the competition for leadership” (Weber 1947, 389). Such a connection may not be sustainable because followers are engaged with the leader and his or her vision in a transactional dynamic, rather than the leader satisfying the higher needs of the follower. Instead, such a leader demonstrates transactional styles of reward or punishment in exchange for support.

However, similar to transformational leadership, charismatic authority rejects bureaucracy and tradition – it is a revolutionary force that has the potential to result in:

[a] radical alteration of the central system of attitudes and directions of action with a completely new orientation of all attitudes toward the different problems and structures of the ‘world’ (Weber 1947, 363).

According to Weber, a charismatic leader is born out of suffering or conflict, and is credible only to the extent that their followers continue to believe in their sincerity. A challenge for the charismatic leader within this understanding is that they must maintain their authenticity and momentum so as to sustain their followers’ loyalty. Followers will only remain loyal to the charismatic leader to the extent that the charismatic leader is able to maintain the security of the followers’ new status under the reformed society. However, Weber (1947, 364) argues that the revolutionary possibilities of charismatic leadership begin to be weakened the moment it comes into being due to the rationalistic tendency of modern society, which wears down the fervour of ideas and potential.

More contemporary scholars attribute characteristics such as opportunism and strategic vision to charismatic leaders (Conger 1989; Klein & House 1995; Strange & Mumford 2002). The key difference between transformational leadership and charismatic leadership is the role of ethical and moral decision-making and the leader-follower relationship. Lang (1991, 399) argues that ethical and moral decision-making is the sine qua non of transformational leadership, whereas, the “personal follower-to-leader” relationship is central to charismatic leadership. The focus of the former introduces moral thought into the leader-follower

relationship, and there is an expectation of the follower to “accept full responsibility for their behaviour” [italics in original] (Lang 1991, 399). In contrast, followers of a charismatic leader will be personally loyal to such a leader, but ethical and moral issues may not be taken into account, and “responsibility for behaviour is passed to the authoritative figure” [italics in original] (Lang 1991, 399).

Another key difference between transformational leadership and charismatic leadership is the role that a leader plays in developing followers (Mittal 2015). Followers of the transformational leader will develop independently and become leaders themselves, whereas followers of a charismatic leader will be dependent upon that leader, given that charismatic leadership involves the perception of the leader as “extraordinary” and has the potential to over-attribute power in the competency of the leader (Mittal 2015, 27). The final difference between the transformational and charismatic leadership theories is that the influence process is top-down in charismatic leadership. In contrast, the leader and the follower in transformational leadership engage in a reciprocal influence relationship, and both embark on a mutual journey together and in which the follower is encouraged to develop his or herself into a leader (Burns 1978; Mittal 2015).

Although transformational leadership literature focuses on a reciprocal power and influence relationship between leader and follower, concerns have been raised over the potential for an abuse of power on the part of the leader. This may be due to the fact that scholarship on transformational leadership tends to focus on leaders who have positively revolutionised their societies. As mentioned previously, Nelson Mandela, Mother Theresa and Gandhi are examples of this focus. Yet, it is also important to acknowledge the dark side of transformational leadership. Concerns among scholars regarding the potential of transformational leadership to negatively influence followers arise over the idea of leader agency – particularly in relation to the assumption that leaders are heroic and selfless (Gemmil & Oakley 1992; Tourish 2013).

Numerous scholars have also addressed the morality of leadership (Conger & Kanungo 1998; Bass & Steidlmeier 1999; Price 2003; Barling, Christie & Turner 2008; Christie, Barling & Turner 2011). Tourish (2013, 23) suggests that definitions proposed by Burns (1978) and Bass & Riggio (2006) of transformational leadership actually encourage a superman mentality that implies an idealised and overstated ability to lead effectively. In this lies a

tendency on the part of societies to hope for a “Messiah” to come along in troubled times, capable of resolving all problems (Gemmil & Oakley 1992). Tourish (2013) investigates the way in which transformational leadership styles can be used to attract followers to cults in an analysis that he calls “the dark side of transformational leadership”. Tourish’s main concern is the possibility that self-serving leaders can employ all manner of techniques to deceive followers in attributing leaders with more power. Another issue raised by Tourish (2013) focuses on the idea that in the business world there is an expectation for executives to exhibit transformational styles, despite the fact that they may not be capable of performing these styles. This can result in such leaders taking their companies down the path of potential destruction. This same concern can be applied to politics, particularly when a nation is experiencing a period of crisis.

Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) acknowledge the dark side of transformational leadership in their work on pseudo and authentic leadership styles. They use styles identified by Conger and Kanungo (1998) as a typology for this dark side. These styles are characterised by “narcissism, authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, flawed vision, a need for power coupled with lack of activity inhibition and promotion among followers of dependency, personal identification, and lack of internalisation of values and beliefs” (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999, 182). Leaders who manifest these styles are referred to as pseudo-transformational leaders (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999; Bass & Riggio 2006). To differentiate pseudo-transformational leaders, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999, 186) suggest the use of the term authentic transformational leadership. Authentic transformational leadership involves concern and commitment on the part of the leader to improve the lives of family, friends, and community above his or her own self-interest. The leader will also encourage followers to question and be creative, and followers are motivated to be involved in the leader’s vision because of an “authentic inner commitment” to that vision, rather than being forced to participate through coercion.

Bass and Steidlmeier (1999, 187) provide a detailed comparison of the behaviours of pseudo- transformational leaders versus authentic transformational leaders in relation to the four transformational leadership styles identified earlier in this review. For example, when implementing the idealised influence style, a pseudo-transformational leader will engage in “us-them” differences to create division. In contrast, an authentic transformational leader will advocate for “universal brotherhood”. A pseudo-transformational leader, when engaging in

the inspirational motivation style, will bring out the worst in people. They will focus on “demonic plots, conspiracies, unreal dangers, excuses, and insecurities”.

An authentic transformational leader, on the other hand, will focus on “harmony, charity, and good works”, and will be “inwardly and outwardly concerned about the good that can be achieved” for their organisation or society (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999, 188). In regard to the intellectual stimulation style, a pseudo-transformational leader will “overweight authority and underweight reason”. He or she will “substitute anecdotes for hard evidence” and “feed on the ignorance of their followers”. An authentic transformational leader will instead persuade followers on the “merits of the issues” and bring about changes in followers’ values and vision by engaging in open debate and creative solution-making (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999, 188-89). Finally, when engaging in the individualised consideration style, a pseudo- transformational leader will seek to continue the dependence of followers, whereas an authentic transformational leader will aim to develop their followers into leaders themselves. Bass and Steidlmeier’s (1999) discussion of pseudo and authentic transformational leaders provides a helpful analytical distinction regarding the ethics and morality of leadership and is particularly relevant to political case studies.

Full-Range Leadership A critique of both the transactional and transformational models of leadership is that both identify leaders as being either one or the other. They make little or no consideration of individuals moving between the two leadership modes and practicing both modes at the same time. To counter this pigeonholing of leaders, Bass (1985; 1997a) and Avolio and Bass (2002) propose a full-range leadership model which encompasses the four types of transformational leadership – idealised influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualised consideration – as well as the characteristics of transactional leadership – contingent reinforcement, active management-by-exception and passive management-by-exception.

Other theorists have also added a fourth category to the transactional component of full-range leadership: laissez-faire leadership, in which the leader allows the followers to make decisions for themselves. This style is generally perceived to be ineffective, unless the followers are competent enough to carry out the leader’s vision themselves (Avolio & Bass

1998; Pounder 2008; O'Shea et al. 2009). It is argued that the combination of both types of leadership allow for a full-range leader to exercise transactional and/or transformational behaviours according to the situation (O'Shea et al. 2009). This model has found a considerable amount of favour amongst scholars in the field and is supported by a large number of empirical studies (Hater & Bass, 1988; Howell & Avolio, 1989; Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam 1996; Yammarino, Spangler & Bass 1993; Antonakis & House 2013). Bass (1997a) suggests that this model is universal across organisational type and national culture. Full-range leadership makes the argument that when transformational leadership is combined with transactional leadership, outcomes are more effective.

The Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ), developed by Bass (1990a) is the most effective and widely used tool for measuring full-range leadership. Findings arising from data collected by the MLQ identify a hierarchy of effective leader characteristics, suggesting that leaders should display transformational behaviours most frequently, followed by contingent reinforcement, then active management-by-exception, and passive management-by- exception. Leaders should avoid laissez-faire leadership (Antonakis & House 2013). According to the model, leaders can possess a range of leadership behaviours and tools. Leaders display these behaviours at “various frequencies depending on their mental model of leadership, personality, and the situation” (Burke & Cooper 2006, 35). For example, the full- range leadership model includes the notion that a leader may display transactional styles in times of organisational stability, and transformational styles in times of organisational turbulence; or the leader may display more transformational styles as they mature as a leader (Pounder 2008).

Full-range leaders employ both transactional and transformational styles as their situation demands. They can adapt as required, and reward behaviour (transactional); or actively motivate followers to a higher moral plane (transformational). The focus of full-range leadership theory, therefore, is on adaptation to the situation. Even Burns (1978, 344), who characterises transactional and transformational leadership as fundamentally different, recognised, before the theory of full-range leadership had been fully conceptualised, that “individual leaders, like institutions, can embrace various kinds of leadership at various times and under varied conditions”. Thus, Burns (1978) acknowledges the possibility that transactional leaders can become transformational over time as their own and their followers’ needs evolve.

The benefits of using the full-range model to understand leadership is that it allows for an exploration of complex leadership interactions. This entails an analysis of the context in which the leadership styles are employed, as well as the consequent impact of the styles on supporters and non-supporters (Avolio & Bass 1995). The full-range model has been designed to capture the varying leadership styles that the leader employs to respond to the situation in which they find themselves. In this regard, the full-range leadership model can assist in identifying a wide range of leadership styles that contribute to leader legitimation and survival within the context of regime type. Its suitability would be broadened by the integration of the pseudo styles identified by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) but these styles should be clearly distinguished from the authentic styles in the full-range model. A proposed model combining authentic and pseudo styles is presented in Figure 2.1. The model excludes the active-management-by-exception and passive-management-by-exception transactional leadership styles as the characteristics of these styles fall under the authentic and pseudo- contingent reinforcement styles. In particular, active-management-by-exception can be seen in authentic contingent reinforcement through the clear and reasonable setting of goals and expectations, while the passive-management-by-exception style is demonstrated in the pseudo-contingent reinforcement style through the use of fear and unpredictability to exert control over the follower.

Cultural Considerations An additional factor that must be considered in regard to the full-range model, and leadership theory in general, is that of culture. As the models and theories addressed in this review were developed in a Western context, questions have been asked as to their universal applicability (Karakitapoglu-Aygün & Gumusluoglu 2013). Blunt and Jones (1997, 7) argue that the development of mainstream leadership theory “promotes a culturally determined and largely North American view of the world at work”. The extent to which the theory accurately represents the leadership values and styles evident in, or deemed attractive to, Asian, African and Latin American cultures is debatable (Hofstede 1980). Moreover, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) acknowledge that their distinction between pseudo and authentic transformational leaders is grounded in Western moral discourse of right/wrong and good/bad. A study that began in 1993, named the Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) Research Project, did attempt to identify cross-cultural, universally accepted

Figure 2.1: The Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model. Based on Bass and Steidlmeier (1999).

Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model

Authentic Pseudo

Intellectual stimulation Intellectual stimulation

Persuades followers on the merits of issues Questions Uses anecdotes instead of evidence Takes credit for old assumptions Stimulates innovation & new ways of others’ ideas Manipulates follower ignorance doing things Encourages the expression of ideas & Intolerant of differences of opinion Uses emotional creative solutions to problems arguments Manipulates values agenda at expense or harm of others

Individualised consideration Individualised consideration

Provides coaching, mentoring & growth opportunities Promotes favouritism and competition amongst to followers Considers followers’ unique abilities, followers Maintains distance from followers Expects

needs and aspirations Develops followers into leaders blind obedience Seeks to maintain a dependent Transformational Promotes attainable, shared goals Creates competent relationship Promotes fantasy in vision of the future followers for succession Utilises self-serving biases

Inspirational motivation Inspirational motivation

Focuses on harmony & charity Articulates an Focuses on demonic plots & conspiracies Deceptive

appealing vision of the future Challenges followers Seeks control Creates & maintains dependency in with high standards Provides encouragement & followers Plays on excuses and insecurities Sacrifices meaning to goals Inwardly & outwardly concerned for means for ends Makes unsubstantiated claims the good of society

Idealised influence Idealised influence

Charismatic Envisioning Confident Demonstrates Divisive Grandiose vision Seeks power and position conviction Explains ethical consequences of decisions at the expense of followers’ needs Charismatic Promotes ethical policies, conduct & processes Sets Attention seeking Inconsistent & unreliable Deceives high standards for emulation Calls for universal self about competencies Seeks to become an idol brotherhood Uses inflammatory language

Contingent reinforcement Contingent reinforcement Transactional

Clarifies objectives, tasks & responsibilities Delivers Conceals information Engages in bribery Abuses on commitments Acts with integrity Respects authority Uses coercion & fear Nepotistic & institutional rules Fair Means of achieving task is clientelistic Maintains status quo Makes promises morally legitimate Truthful Establishes impartial that knows cannot be kept Disregards institutional

processes to settle conflicts & claims rules

Laissez-faire leadership

Leader does not attempt to influence or direct followers

characteristics of leadership. It found that across 62 cultures, an outstanding leader was considered to be encouraging, motivational, dynamic, and possessed an ability to plan for the future (House et al. 2004). The GLOBE Project also found that, in developing nations, the kind of leadership that is valued is often paternalistic in nature due to the lack of a formal welfare system (House et al. 2004, 566). Paternalism in developing nations is characterised by strong family bonds, a sense of fatalism and an expectation of employers to look after their employees, as well as the employees’ families. Dickson, Den Hartog and Mitchelson (2003) draw on the GLOBE study to suggest that a reason why cultures of developing nations possess a strong tendency towards paternalism is that there is often a greater emphasis on power distance - “the extent to which society accepts the fact that power in institutions and organisations is distributed unequally” (Dickson, Den Hartog & Mitchelson 2003, 737). This concept is important as it can help to explain the expectations of a society of its government and leaders. If there is a high power distance in a society, its citizens generally expect a more paternalistic, less consultative style of governance from leaders. Conversely, societies that have a small power distance are more democratic, with subordinates able to contribute and critique styles of governance (House et al. 2004). The GLOBE study indicates that while there is a common conception of what constitutes a good leader, cultural relativities and the socio-economic and historical situation of the nation also have an impact on the type of leader that is produced and accepted by the population.

Latin American Leadership: Personalismo and Caudillismo With any case study, the local, regional, and cultural context must be taken into account. As this thesis examines leadership through the case study of Venezuela, it is pertinent to consider Latin American experiences and conceptions of leadership. Subsequently, personalismo (personality leadership) and caudillismo (a cultural phenomenon of a charismatic military leader) will be examined.

Burns (1978, 266) suggests that the “organisation of a large personal following” through the politics of personalismo features heavily in the cultures of Latin American countries. Such an approach follows the belief that if a leader amasses enough followers devoted personally to her/him, any internal conflicts that arise in the nation or within the followers themselves are essentially quashed. This is because these leaders are generally charismatic and thus can create a large personal following that involves a top-down influence process whereby authority is vested in the persona of the leader, rather than the role they occupy. As a result,

Latin American leaders are often larger-than-life personalities. The issue with personalismo, however, is that it is not sustainable in the long term. It fits well with the charismatic leadership model, yet in the achievement of tangible social change it falls short as loyalty and momentum rest on the popularity of the leader.

Another issue that arises with personalismo pertains to that of succession. Followers generally cannot be transferred to a successor due to the nature of personalismo, whereby loyalty has been invested in the personality of one particular leader (Burns 1978, 267). An example of this is the personal support base for former Argentine President Juan Perón. Peronism emerged due to Perón’s immense popularity with the Argentine people and was a political movement based on his ideology and approach to governance. Perón was elected to the presidency of Argentina twice before being deposed in a coup d’état in 1955. During this time, support for the government severely waned and it was only after Perón’s return from exile to the presidency for the third time in 1973 did a resurgence of support for his leadership reoccur, although this quickly decreased following his death in 1974 (Craig 1976, 705).

While personalisimo can help to connect followers to the goal or vision of the leader, it can also raise the leader to the status of what could be considered a demi-god or Messiah (Gemmil & Oakley 1992). Such personal loyalty could excuse any questionable behaviour on the part of the leader and enable pseudo leadership through practices such as clientelism and corruption to occur. Consequently, while transformational leadership styles are necessary for initiating and carrying through radical change in a society, the dark side of transformational leadership – unchecked power invested in the personality of the leader – is a potential consequence of this model.

Personalismo is also a feature of caudillismo. In Latin America, the phenomenon of the caudillo emerged in the wake of the continent’s fight for independence from its colonial masters in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Linz 2000, 155). The term caudillo in Spanish translates to leader. However, its colloquial usage implies strongman or chieftain, and is often military in nature (Vera 1983). Historically, caudillos have been associated with personalismo and authoritarian rule (Chapman 1932; Deonandan 2004). A caudillo has been defined as

… a man with a personal following largely independent of any institutional leadership role. The great majority were military men. Few caudillos attracted their followers by proposing specific changes in government policy. Instead, they tended to mobilise support through family and friends, and through the networks of patronage and clientele that linked them to people below them in the social hierarchy (Chasteen 1997, 37).

Consequently, such a leader appears transactional due to the use of patron-client ties to gain and maintain power. Similar to Chasteen, Close (2004, 5) describes caudillos as being akin “to the Big Man dictator common in late twentieth-century sub-Saharan Africa” who require a patrimonial or clientelistic culture to survive. Similar to charismatic leaders, a key characteristic of a caudillo is personalismo, or rather, “the force or magnetism of the man’s own personality” (Beezley 1969, 349) to establish and maintain loyalty amongst his followers. Caudillismo has also been described as “the union of personalism and violence for the conquest of power” (Gilmore 1964, 47). Caudillos are most often driven by personal ambition and their primary concern is the preservation of their power rather than the strengthening of governance institutions. Coercion and charisma are common tools used by caudillos in achieving this goal. To ensure that his followers remained loyal, or at the very least compliant, it was essential that:

On either level [regional or national], the caudillo … [created] the myth that he embodied the best aspects of Táchira or Mexico, or whatever his region might be. If excessive displays of his greatness were not entirely successful, the caudillo might turn to force or other repressive measures in order to command loyalty. If the caudillo held national power, he might use foreign wars or the threat of foreign intervention to unite his nation behind him. Others turned to the relief of national problems such as rampant violence and banditry, thus fostering the idea that they were national benefactors (Beezley 1969, 349).

In his review of the historical usage of the term, Vera (1983) notes that a number of Latin American scholars apply a broader understanding to the caudillo. For example, Ramón Díaz Sánchez argued that caudillismo is a concept not just “restricted to military men, but [one that] also embraces ideological, intellectual and political activities” (Vera 1983, 8). Domingo Alberto Rangel labelled “leaders of the oil industry as ‘caudillos del petróleo’”, while Francisco García Calderón contended that “practically any Spanish American in a position of political authority – even a democratically elected president” was a caudillo (Vera 1983, 8- 10). This range of understanding demonstrates that the concept is not confined to a military leader but can be applied to a variety of situations. Yet, Vera (1983, 18) also contends that conservative Latin American scholars appropriated the caudillo term and attached to it a

negative connotation of authoritarianism. While the original meaning of the term may have been much more general, this thesis nonetheless contends that the application of the term in the fields of political science and Latin American leadership over many years demonstrates the continuing relevance of the concept of caudillismo within the context of authoritarianism.

The predominant focus of the literature is of caudillos as military leaders. The colloquial meaning of the caudillo is believed to have emerged in Latin America in the nineteenth century during the wars of independence from the Spanish (Beezley 1969; Linz 2000). In the political power vacuum created by the weakening of Spanish control and influence, power on both a regional and national level was frequently contested, secured, and retained by force. The “disappearance of effective state power, centrifugal regionalism, and the disorganisation of trade” in the wake of independence contributed to this vacuum (Chasteen 1997, 37). During this time, the successful caudillo leader would stay in power until his death, or until he was unseated by another caudillo rival (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986, 34). Once federalism became the accepted system of government, a central caudillo would emerge in the form of the president, while smaller, regional, caudillos loyal to the president maintained the central caudillo’s power. Such an arrangement served to provide stability to the country if the caudillo was able to retain power for long enough (Chapman 1932). In examining the structure of caudillismo, Linz (2000, 156), and Wolf and Hansen (1967, 169), identified the following features:

1. The repeated emergence of armed patron-client sets, cemented by personal ties of dominance and submission, and by a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms. 2. The lack of institutionalised means for succession to offices. 3. The use of violence in political competition. 4. The repeated failures of incumbent leaders to guarantee their tenures as chieftains.

Over the course of the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries the term caudillo has come to encompass a number of characteristics in addition to charisma and authoritarianism. Caudillo leaders often engage in strategies such as populism, verticalism, clientelism and neopatrimonialism (Deonandan 2004). Populism involves charismatic leadership, a reformist agenda and an appeal to the people. Verticalism refers to:

an uneven distribution of power in society whereby one group, those in command of state resources, exert dominance and control over societal groups, with the latter having little or no means by which to compel the state to respond to its demands (Deonandan 2004, 186).

Clientelism includes the practice of the patron (in this case the caudillo) distributing benefits “in the form of goods and services, in return for the client’s (societal groups or individuals) political loyalty and support” (Deonandan 2004, 185). Finally, neopatrimonialism involves the commandeering of state property for the personal use of the caudillo. Deonandan (2004, 187) demonstrates these practices through the example of Arnoldo Alemán, former president of Nicaragua, who, for example, used the Ministry of Transportation to build roads to his various private properties.

A modern caudillo will generally take a subtle approach to consolidating his or her power. For instance, he or she will seek to manipulate state institutions rather than use violence or make an outright grab for power. Often, this will come in the form of strengthening executive powers at the expense of weakening state institutions. Corrales (2008) argues that Latin America’s neocaudillismo employs an anti-establishment discourse and polarising politics and, similar to Beezley (1969), recognises that in order to be successful, modern caudillos must “transform themselves into ‘impressive monuments’” of history in order to evoke feelings of loyalty from their followers (Hamill 1965, cited in Corrales 2008, 24). Such an act can be linked to the pseudo-transformational leadership style of inspirational motivation, and even Weber’s understanding of charismatic exceptionalism.

Neocaudillismo presidential candidates alter institutions within their political parties and within government to maintain power and prevent new candidates from gaining political influence and popularity (Corrales 2008, 25). Candidates elected on an anti-establishment campaign must then deal with the consequences of radical and mobilised supporters, such as a highly polarised society due to the “animosity of groups targeted for criticism” and the zealous support of the neocaudillo by his or her followers (Corrales 2008, 26). Consequently, a neocaudillo will often demonstrate many pseudo-transactional and pseudo-transformational leadership styles. They can demonstrate transformational styles, such as presenting an appealing vision for the future and encouraging follower loyalty to that vision and to the neocaudillos themselves. However, the pseudo or authentic nature of the neocaudillo largely

depends upon the subjective interpretation of the styles by his or her supporters and opposition. The institutional structures that leaders operate within are also important to their selection and use of leadership styles. The next section explores the range of political regimes in which leaders function.

Political Regimes A major contextual factor for the examination of political leadership using the full- range model is the type of political regime. This is because regime elements such as institutions and norms serve to constrain and enable the behaviour of political actors. As a leading aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship of influence between leadership style and regime type, it is important that we understand the range of political regimes identified in the literature.

Political regimes are the governance structures through which social and political life is organised. Regimes consist of a set of rules as to how government and society will operate (Steinberg & Malhotra 2014, 493). These rules also determine “who has access to power; who is allowed to select the government; and under what conditions and limitations authority is exercised” (Kailitz 2013, 39). Consequently, leaders can wield differential amounts of power in setting the goals and priorities of the nation, granting privileges and concessions to allies, and controlling the legitimate use of violence to enforce the regime’s rules, depending on the regime type in which they operate.

There is a variety of regime types in existence in the contemporary world. Previously, the predominant regime classifications described countries as either democratic or authoritarian. However, Diamond (2002) argues that the nature of a regime is no longer clear. Where once there was an obvious distinction between countries that followed liberal democracy and those that were autocratic, the situation is now “a lot messier than it was two decades ago, and so, in a way, is the never-ending dialogue on how to think about and classify regimes” (Diamond 2002, 22).

Diamond contends that it is increasingly difficult to classify regimes due to two reasons. First, there is still no accepted definition for democracy, which in turn prevents a standard measure of analysis from being widely used (Diamond 2002; Schedler

2002). Second, many regimes are adopting practices that contain both democratic and authoritarian features. Put simply, such regimes – known as hybrid regimes – may engage in elections but “fail to meet the substantive test” that demonstrates that the voters are experiencing conditions such as free, fair and competitive elections. Accordingly, classifying a regime is not a simple task. It requires significant analysis of the regime’s features, as well as an analysis of “the intentions and capacities of ambiguously democratic ruling elites, something that is very hard to do” (Diamond 2002, 22). Diamond’s statement is relevant to the focus of the thesis, as it highlights a gap in the literature regarding the study of leaders and the styles they use to gain and maintain power in any given regime type.

The question remains as to whether leadership styles are reflective of the regime in which the leader operates. Not only is this area lacking in systematic analysis, but also classification systems are contentious. In an attempt to organise a coherent understanding of varying regime types that acknowledges hybridity and ambiguity, Diamond (2002) presented a six-part typology moving from liberal democracy to full authoritarian, and with various hybrids in between:

• Liberal democracy • Electoral democracy • Ambiguous regimes • Competitive authoritarian • Hegemonic electoral authoritarian • Politically closed authoritarian

Liberal Democracy In Diamond’s (2002) typology, liberal democracy is conceived at one end of a spectrum of possible regime types. Many countries, both developing and developed, claim to be liberal democracies (Joshi 2013). This may be in part due to the international pressure placed upon nations to conform to, or at least have the appearance of conforming to, liberal democratic values and practices in order to receive aid or to benefit from trade agreements (Diamond 2002, 24).

The definition of democracy is subject to much debate and is perceived in a number of ways. For example, democracy can be examined as a set of political institutions or as an attempt to organise decision-making and political competition; it can also be perceived as a set of principles to guide a way of life (Blaug 2002). A multitude of scholars including Schumpeter (1943), Dahl (1989), Beetham (1999), Arendt (1973), Carter (1973) and Putnam (1992) have contributed to democratic theory and practice through varying perspectives. One major difference is the distinction between a descriptive and normative definition. Essentially, the debate

... is about what actually occurring polities are (or reasonably could be) and about what they should be. Since definitional consensus is necessary for obtaining consensus over measurement, the goal of arriving at a single universally accepted measure of democracy is, in some very basic sense, impossible. If one cannot agree on what X is, one cannot measure X in an authoritative fashion (Coppedge et al. 2011, 248).

There is a basic understanding that, in a democracy, elections should be held and that these elections should be competitive. However, there are additional criteria for defining democracy, such as those by Levistky and Way (2002, 53). This thesis follows these clear criteria:

1) Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; 2) Virtually all adults possess the right to vote; 3) Political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected; and 4) Elected authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.

A liberal democratic regime satisfying these criteria encourages political pluralism and is based on the premise that participation from a range of different groups in society will create a more effective governance system (Dahl 1986, 236). In theoretical terms, a liberal democratic regime involves rule by the people (Coppedge et al. 2011; Rhoden 2013). Its foundations rest on the principles of popular control and political equality. This model contains strong protections for civil and political rights; strong horizontal and vertical accountability; a respect for the separation of powers and rule of law; and the internalisation

of democratic principles by the elites and the masses (White 1998; Coppedge et al. 2011). Venezuela during the latter twentieth century was lauded as the leading example of liberal democracy in Latin America. However, Schedler (2002, 38) notes, “democratic norms are not perfectly realized anywhere, even in advanced democracies” [italics in original text].

The transition to, and consolidation of, democracy relies on the elites in the nation internalising democratic values, committing to a fair election process, and relinquishing power peacefully if a majority of citizens vote for another political party. Consequently, leadership is a key factor in determining whether a nation successfully transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy (Linz 1990). The willingness and legitimacy of those in power to negotiate, compromise, and reform impacts on the nature of the transition. Moreover, the ease and success of transition is determined by “a constellation of social and political forces in the different societies, the nature of the regime, and to some extent the international context in which the transition takes place” (Stepan, cited by Linz 1990, 149). Overall, new leaders during transition

… must convince people of the value of newly gained freedoms, of security from arbitrary power, and of the possibility to change governments peacefully, and at the same time they must convey to them the impossibility of overcoming in the short-run the dismal legacy of some nondemocratic rulers and the accumulated mistakes that have led or contributed to their present crisis. Leaders have the hard and ungrateful task of telling people that with democracy the economy will not improve immediately; that without economic change, social change and justice will not be achieved, although some improvements might be possible; and that, ultimately, the success of a society is not the result of activities of the state or even the best possible government, but of the efforts of the whole society (Linz 1990, 161).

Evidently the array of challenges that leaders face in attempting to guide a regime through democratic transition and consolidation are vast. Likewise, the broader context of any regime is extremely important when attempting to understand the leader of the time and the styles he or she uses to respond to imminent challenges. For example, Beetham (1994, 162) suggests that if a state transitioning to democracy was previously ruled by a politically closed authoritarian military regime, the state would face challenges of “depoliticising the armed forces, and reorganising them in ways that make their intervention in politics more difficult in the future”. On the other hand, a government within a former communist regime faces the task of establishing a market economy “simultaneously with the democratisation of the state” (Beetham 1994, 162). Both situations require governments to be capable of enforcing the

democratic system across their territories. If a government is unable to do this, the democratic principles and the institutions that it is building have little consequence on successful transition. It is at this point in the literature that hybrid regimes emerge. Once viewed as stages of transition, such regimes are now believed to be distinct systems of governance in their own right (Diamond 2002).

Electoral Democracy Diamond identifies an electoral democracy as a form of hybrid regime. Hybrid regimes, conceptualised as the “grey area” between democracy and authoritarianism, are seen to materialise during the transition to democracy (Zinecker 2009). However, other research contends that hybrid regimes may be more permanent forms of political organisation than otherwise originally thought (Diamond 2002; Levitsky & Way 2002; Schedler 2002; Wigell 2008; Ekman 2009). The Democracy Index generated annually by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2017, 3) indicates that 51 authoritarian regimes and 40 hybrid regimes are in existence throughout the world, meaning that just over 50% of the world’s population lives under one of these forms of governance. Diamond (2002, 24), one of the first scholars to address the issue of hybridity amongst regimes, notes a number of general features, although the degree to which these are evident across regimes varies:

All such regimes lack an arena of contestation sufficiently open, free, and fair so that the ruling party can readily be turned out of power if it is no longer preferred by a plurality of the electorate. While an opposition victory is not impossible in a hybrid regime, it requires a level of opposition mobilization, unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a democracy.

Following Diamond’s definition, if a liberal democracy is the ideal form of democracy where a broad range of freedoms are protected and institutionalised, an electoral democracy is considered a “diminished subtype” of democracy. This form may contain many elements of democracy yet fail to satisfy the complete criteria for a liberal democracy (Collier & Levitsky 1997). For example, an electoral democracy will “comply with minimal democratic norms” through the provision of elections (Schedler 2002, 38). However, there is no guarantee that these elections are free, fair or regular, or that a transfer of power occurs (Beetham 1994; Coppedge et al. 2011). Diamond (2002, 28) points to India as an example of an electoral democracy. Its institutions reflect liberal democratic values. However, in some states political violence mars the electoral process. In particular, kidnapping, murder, and corruption are weapons against voters and candidates alike. Diamond (2002, 28) argues that an election is

free “when the legal barriers to entry into the political arena are low, when there is substantial freedom for candidates and supporters of different political parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters experience little or no coercion in exercising their electoral choices.” In an electoral democracy, civil liberties are “compromised” (Bogaards 2009, 399) and other facets of democracy “such as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and public deliberation” will not be effectively institutionalised (Schedler 2002, 37). Therefore, electoral democracy is characterised by a lack of consistent conformity to democratic values and practice.

Ambiguous Regimes While an electoral democracy contains identifiable characteristics of democratic values and practices, the features of an ambiguous regime will be unclear. This may be because there is not

… enough information now to know whether electoral administration will be sufficiently autonomous and professional, and whether contending parties and candidates will be sufficiently free to campaign, so as to give the political opposition a fair chance to defeat the government in the next elections (Diamond 2002, 22).

Ambiguous regimes are thus considered to contain blurred systems of governance where the level of genuine of public participation and interaction, as well as the independence of various democratic institutions, are unclear (Diamond 2002). However, Diamond (2002, 26) states that the ambiguity concerns the distinction between whether such nations classified as ambiguous fall within the competitive authoritarian or the electoral democracy categories. Nations such as Venezuela, Ukraine and Nigeria, at least in 2002, were considered by Diamond (2002) to be ambiguous regimes. Other scholars such as Bogaards (2009) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011), however, have chosen not to include the ambiguous regimes category in their own analyses due to the unclear nature of the classification.

Competitive Authoritarian Regimes In contrast to ambiguous regimes, a competitive authoritarian regime will clearly contain both authoritarian and democratic features. For instance, such a regime will primarily view formal democratic institutions as “the means of obtaining and exercising political authority” (Levitsky & Way 2002, 52). Although this is similar to the legitimation strategies of democratic regimes, those who hold political authority in competitive authoritarian regimes will frequently and systematically abuse such power by using state resources for personal and

party benefit. They will also restrict media coverage of the opposition; harass opposition, its supporters, and journalists; manipulate electoral results; and jail or even assassinate members of the opposition.

Such a regime is not classified as outright authoritarian due to the fact that it does not “openly violate democratic rules” but instead does so surreptitiously through bribery and the use of state resources and institutions to “legally harass” opponents (Levitsky & Way 2002, 54). This form of regime will have established different branches of government, judicial systems and constitutional courts, as well as a constitution and agencies of accountability (Schedler 2010). The regime will manipulate these institutions to support its rule. Some characteristics of this form of regime are: little-to-no judicial independence from the executive; the use of tactics such as voter or opposition intimidation at election time on the part of the incumbent; the use of state resources to benefit the incumbent’s election campaign; the domination of regime supporters in the legislature; and the restriction of opposition groups in political activity (Ekman 2009). In short, institutions and opposition groups will never be independent or free to operate within the political sphere (Schedler 2010). Ultimately, a competitive authoritarian regime may possess the institutions of democracy but this will be a façade (Bogaards 2009; Zavadskaya & Welzel 2014).

Some scholars (Mainwaring 2012; Levitsky & Loxton 2013) identify Venezuela as an example of a competitive authoritarian regime. In 2013, the opposition narrowly lost the election by 1.59% of the vote despite voter and opposition intimidation by the government and its supporters, as well as the use of state resources by the ruling party to promote its campaign (The Economist 2013). Close contestation or incumbent defeat at elections is not unheard of and can occur when the masses possess emancipative values that emphasise “freedom of choice, equality of opportunities and voice” (Zavadskaya & Welzel 2014, 2). Importantly, elections serve as a source of legitimacy for competitive authoritarian regimes, and as a result may be “bitterly contested” (Ekman 2009, 9), as the Venezuelan election in 2013 was, despite the ruling party ultimately remaining in power. However, theorists such as McFaul and Petrov (2004, 30) consider “elections [to be] of limited consequence” in competitive authoritarian regimes but are “better than no elections at all” due to the hope that their existence may one day open up more competition within the political arena.

Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian Regimes The final variant of hybrid regimes identified by Diamond (2002) is the hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime. This form of regime contains stronger authoritarian elements, although there will be the appearance of democratic institutions. There is little-to-no space for opposition to act, and there is a greater and more obvious abuse of power. In defining the features of a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime, Diamond (2002, 26) noted that

Their elections and other “democratic” institutions are largely façades, yet they may provide some space for political opposition, independent media, and social organisations that do not seriously criticise or challenge the regime.

Schedler (2002, 49) observes that in a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime, leaders are often “invincible”, whereas in a competitive authoritarian regime there still remains a “genuine battleground for power”, albeit with the odds skewed in the latter regime’s favour. Examples of hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, at the end of 2001 when Diamond’s research was submitted for publication, included Singapore, Maldives, Azerbaijan, and Egypt (Diamond 2002, 30-31).

Perhaps one of the most well-known examples of a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime is Singapore. The People’s Action Party (PAP) has ruled the nation since 1959 (George 2007, 128; Wong & Huang 2010, 525), and the nation’s legal system significantly limits political participation, civil liberties, and competition for representation in the nation’s parliament (Ortmann 2011). After the May 2011 elections, the PAP controlled 93% of the seats in Parliament, with the remaining seats belonging to the Worker’s Party. Yet, Ortmann (2011, 153) notes that during this election the PAP “won its smallest share of the popular vote (60.1%) since 1959, while the Workers’ Party won the most seats ever for the opposition.” Consequently, the ability of the opposition to win seats at all has led to other scholars to recently classify Singapore as in transition to competitive authoritarianism (Ortmann 2011; George 2007; Berna 2013). Nonetheless, the nation’s record of over 40 years of hegemonic electoral authoritarianism means that it is one the most enduring examples of this type of regime in the world.

Politically Closed Authoritarian Regimes Finally, a politically closed authoritarian regime sits at the opposite end of the spectrum to liberal democracy. Diamond’s (2002) conception of this form of regime is characterised by a

complete absence of competitive elections and an inability of opposition political parties and representative organisations such as labour movements to operate. Traditionally, such a regime was classified as a form of dictatorship. It was originally conceived as one half of a dichotomous view of dictatorship, with the other half being a totalitarian regime (Hagopian 1984, 118; Calvert 1994, 62; Hadenius & Teorell 2007). In general, politically closed authoritarian regimes can be identified by restricted political freedom, centralised executive power, and violence. Linz (1964, cited in Linz & Stepan 1996, 38) famously defined authoritarian regimes as

political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive or intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.

A politically closed authoritarian regime is therefore a system of governance in which political power is centralised within one person or small group of persons. It may contain a political system that does not allow opposition groups to engage in political activity, and competitive elections will not be held for governmental offices (Steinberg & Malhotra 2014). As a result, political pluralism will either be non-existent or present to only a very limited degree. There are a number of forms that a politically closed authoritarian regime can take. These include: military regimes, no-party civilian regimes, single party regimes, personalist regimes, and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes.

Diamond (2002) argues that liberal democratic and politically closed authoritarian regimes occupy two ends of a spectrum that contains multiple forms of hybrid regimes. He contends that regime classification is not a simple task in the face of the complexities of the political sphere and contemporary trends of hybridity or ambiguity. Diamond’s typology identifies a number of structural features associated with various regimes, which in turn will be helpful in establishing the political context in Venezuela for each of the selected presidents in the case study.

Rentier States A further concept that is pertinent to this thesis is rentier statism. Although it is not a regime type, the concept refers to the structure of a state whose economy is centred on the exploitation of natural resources. Venezuela, since the early twentieth century, has been

identified with this structure due to the domination of the export of oil in its economy (Karl 1997). Rentier statism has been a persistent feature of all regimes in Venezuela since the discovery of oil.

A rentier state is defined as “a country that garners a substantial portion of its income from external sources, most generally from the sales of resources such as oil and gas” (Losman 2010, 427). However, this can also include “external rents” such as “rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments” that involve the use of mines, pipelines, or passage through land or sea territory (Mahdavy 1970, 428). Rentier states have been associated with both politically closed authoritarian and hybrid regimes. This is because the social contract between government and citizens allows for reduced political or civic rights in exchange for the distribution of rents, most often in the form of reduced or no taxation, extensive social welfare, and economic prosperity (Kuru 2014). This is particularly pertinent for states that have oil as the major resource. Mahdavy (1970, 432) observes:

The oil industry’s major contribution is that it enables the governments of the oil producing countries to embark on large public expenditure programmes without resorting to taxation and without running into drastic balance of payments or inflation problems that usually plague other developing nations. And since the oil revenues typically increase at a faster rate than the GNP of the local economies, the public sector of the oil producing countries expands rapidly. This need not necessarily result in some kind of socialism, but may turn into what can be considered as a fortuitous étatisme [statism]. The government becomes an important – or even dominant – factor in the economy.

As the state derives significant revenue from the rents, it is not reliant on opposition groups, various stakeholders or even citizens for electoral support. Consequently, the leader of the nation is able to use rents to pacify interest groups (Bjorvatn & Naghavi 2011). Such an arrangement can be linked to the transactional form of leadership, in which the government distributes resources and provides a high standard of living in exchange for the limited political participation of its citizens. Yet, there is a variety of ways to legitimate and each regime type often has a predisposition for particular strategies. The following section will review these strategies.

Political Legitimacy Political legitimacy is crucial to the sustainability of a regime. All regimes, and therefore the leaders of these regimes, rely on legitimacy to justify their rule. This is particularly pertinent for leaders of democratic regimes. However, even leaders of politically closed authoritarian

regimes seek to legitimise their rule. Understanding the various legitimation strategies used by leaders is important to this thesis, as it gives insight into the political dynamics of Venezuela’s experiences with leadership and regime type.

Political legitimacy can be understood as the acceptance of a person or party’s authority to rule. Consequently, citizen and elite acceptance of authority translates into support or acceptance for the prevailing regime type (Muller & Jukam 1977). Recent research by Mazepus et al. (2016) focuses on the concept of “input” and “output” legitimacy strategies. The authors, drawing on the work of Easton (1975) and Huntington (1991) argue that an authoritarian regime will rely predominantly on output sources of legitimacy, such as economic performance, whereas a democratic regime will rely on input sources of legitimacy, such as open political debate and a fair election process. Hybrid regimes will utilise a combination of both input and output strategies, yet differ in the content, or “narrative” of this strategy (Mazepus et al. 2016).

What are these legitimation strategies? Rothstein (2009, 312-13), building on Beetham (1991), identifies four ways in which a leader, of any regime type, may acquire legitimacy with the population and/or elites. These are: (a) tradition, (b) the personal appeal of the leader (charisma), (c) the government’s production of goods and services, or (d) belief in the fairness of the procedural mechanisms responsible for selecting leaders.

Legitimacy through tradition pertains to an established political order such as a monarchy. Roles and expectations are entrenched in customs and institutions, and there is an established acceptance of those who exercise authority (Weber 1978, 215). Similarly, the personal appeal of leaders is linked to a strong follower loyalty ingrained in cultural symbolism and history, as well as the charisma and popular appeal of the leader (Turner 1990; McCarthy-Jones & Turner 2015). Turner (1990) draws on the example of Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines from 1965-1986 to demonstrate the use of personalism in legitimation strategies. Specifically, development projects, civic works and even a “Marcos Mount Rushmore” carved into a mountainside were linked to Marcos and designed to connect his image to prestige and modernity (Turner 1990, 357). An additional tactic of personalism is for the leader to “[cast] doubt on the legitimacy of alternative agencies of leadership”. These leaders will emphasise a relationship with civic or national security, and reaffirm “the value of

leadership continuity” (Foley 2013, 140-41). If these strategies fail, the leader may then utilise more coercive tactics to enforce his or her authority and maintain political survival.

In contrast to personalism, legitimacy relating to the production of goods and services concerns the performance of the leader and regime. The guarantee of a certain living standard, or the promise of socio-economic development, is connected to the performance legitimacy of a leader (Turner 1990; Rothstein 2009). A rentier state similarly relies on legitimation strategies based on performance. This is because the relationship between the state and the citizens is one of a distribution of rents rather than the collection of taxation. In turn, this “enormously weakens the population’s negotiation capacity, while strengthening the elites’ power and authority” (Izquierdo Brichs & Lampridi-Kemou 2013, 26). If the regime’s economic performance remains strong, the population will be far less willing to undertake action that threatens or opposes the leader’s power (Staub 2003). A patron-client relationship emerges in which the regime relies upon strong economic performance and the distribution of benefits to demonstrate its right and suitability to rule. When the regime can no longer satisfy client expectations, perhaps due to a decline in the global price for its product, it can no longer fulfil its role in the patron-client dynamic and its legitimacy comes into question.

This performance legitimation strategy is particularly common in politically closed authoritarian and hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, as these types of regimes must obtain legitimacy in ways other than through the open electoral process (Magstadt 2008; Rothstein 2009). Many leaders of authoritarian regimes, particularly those from Asian nations, have relied on performance-based legitimacy focusing especially on economic development and improving citizen welfare (McCarthy-Jones & Turner 2015). However, if developmental gains are not maintained or improved then the leader’s legitimacy comes into question. For example, former President Suharto’s “New Order” in Indonesia utilised performance legitimacy to justify authoritarian rule but when the Asian Financial Crisis hit the country particularly hard in 1997, opposition to Suharto greatly increased and led to his ousting (Eklof 1999).

Conversely, leaders from democratic regimes tend to derive their legitimacy from the procedural norms associated with democracy. Procedural legitimacy involves the use of various institutional mechanisms to select leaders through transparent and fair competition

for political office. An example of this is the citizen participation in elections, as well as other constitutional guarantees regarding the election process, such as universal suffrage, secret ballot, and an impartial electoral council to monitor the fairness of the elections (Rothstein 2009). In democracies, the electoral process plays a key role in legitimation strategies due to the institutional guarantees of procedural fairness. However, the use of procedural legitimation tactics is not confined to democratic regimes. The work of Mazepus et al. (2016, 1) argues that hybrid regimes will “combine formally democratic institutions with authoritarian political dynamics.” This means that hybrid regimes may also rely on either the perception of, or limited, procedural legitimacy in order to justify the leader’s rule.

In addition to the four categories suggested by Rothstein (2009), the work of Turner (1990) provides a useful additional category: international legitimacy that is awarded through the recognition and support of international partnerships, notably with other nation states. This can be helpful to the leader on two levels. First, international legitimacy ensures that such regimes have access to trading partners to guarantee an exchange of goods that are essential to a functioning economy and hence domestic legitimacy. Second, “legitimacy awarded by foreign countries,” grants the leader more domestic credibility and thereby aids his or her claim to legitimacy (Turner 1990, 358). President Marcos of the Philippines utilised the United States’ silence on his increasing authoritarianism as a source of legitimacy during his rule. When Marcos declared martial law, the United States made no recriminations, nor cut its aid to the nation (Turner 1990, 359). The silent acceptance of the Marcos regime was viewed both domestically and internationally as support for the regime.

Legitimacy appears to be important for regimes of all types, but the types of legitimating measures and the strategies to achieve them differ. But is there a consistent pattern of legitimation attaching to particular regime types and the leaders in those regimes? This is what the case study of Venezuela will explore. The key element to the relationship between leadership style and regime type may be the content of the narrative that the leader weaves to “gain, maintain, and repair” legitimacy (Mazepus et al. 2016, 4). Consequently, legitimation strategies within the context of regime type may help to shed further light on the relationship between regime type and leadership styles. Finally, the next sub-section details one last element of the analytical framework used in this thesis: defining moments. These moments help to highlight the interaction between leader, leadership styles, political regime type, and broader environmental forces in order to focus analysis.

Defining Moments The scope of this research covers a wide range of times, leaders and their leadership styles, political regime types and legitimation strategies, and broader environmental forces. As such, it was necessary to ensure a focused data collection and presentation in order to take this scope into account. To facilitate this, the lens of defining moments during data collection was utilised to narrow the focus of the research and select relevant events, practices, and policies of the examined presidents. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) contend that this lens is most useful when identifying which leadership style is being used by the leader, as the styles are at their clearest due to the importance and impact of the moment on the community that the leader serves.

While Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) identify defining moments as a key analytical lens, their research does not deal with the term in any depth. The general concept, however, is not foreign to leadership studies and a variety of terminology has been employed. For example, Morris (2015, 3), drawing on Mackoff and Wenet’s (2001) term “moments of meaning”, adopts the view of defining moments as “singular instances in a person’s life which assume greater significance or personal meaning” and have the power to shape and re-shape the person’s value system and hence behaviour. Avolio and Luthans (2006) utilise the term “moments that matter”, while Bennis and Thomas (2007) employ “crucible moments”. Badaracco’s (1997) “defining moments” are events or experiences that cause the individual to prioritise his or her goals and values.

Scholars such as Badaracco (1997), Avolio and Luthans (2006) and Morris (2015) view defining moments as having inherently positive outcomes whereby, even though the moment itself may have been physically or emotionally challenging, the subsequent internal development of the leader was positive as he or she grew from the experience. Yet, in a political context this may not always be the outcome, as poor decision-making in defining moments can create dire consequences for a country or constituency. Moreover, an exploration of the values transformation of Venezuelan presidents is beyond the scope of this research, particularly because seven of the eight examined presidents are deceased and hence life-story interviews and analysis, the primary research method used by the previously mentioned scholars, is not possible.

Therefore, a definition of defining moments has been adapted for this thesis. This definition understands defining moments in a political leadership context as key events, policies, decisions, speeches, and writings that are either created by the leader or responded to by the leader, and which have significant consequences for the constituency the leader serves. In determining what events, speeches, policies, decisions, and writings are key, a historical analysis is applied to the defining moment in order to examine the significance of the consequences that followed. In contrast to the previously discussed definitions, the definition in this thesis moves the unit of analysis from the micro to the macro, or, specifically, from the self-perception and values transformation of the president to the outcomes that arise from his defining moments.

In addition, defining moments are not restricted temporally or by scale. The moment can be immediately and obviously defining, or it may only be defining in hindsight. It can also be a prolonged moment, for example a long-term practice of patronage. The moment can also be a split-second decision, such as the announcement of an off-the-cuff policy on live television. Immediately defining moments require an urgent and exceptional response rather than a business-as-usual approach. Such a moment can be brought about by a collapse in the price of a key commodity, a political group challenging the leader’s goal or mode of governance, a natural disaster, or a health pandemic.

These moments have the potential to strongly influence public administration and leadership culture and practice; morale, both within public administration and the constituency; and the achievement of the leader’s goals/vision. At a national political level, a leader’s response to defining moments can impact the nation’s economy, foreign relations, interactions with key groups such as unions and elites, as well as the health and wellbeing of the population. Finally, a leader, through an important policy or influential leadership practice, can create a defining moment. This may be brought on by the leader’s choice to include or exclude a particular group, adopt a particular policy, or by something they say that alters public perception of their leadership. The effects of a defining moment, however, may only be truly felt years later. Examples of this include a policy in which its outcomes are delayed until implementation is complete and its effects have time to be experienced by the constituency, or a speech or political writing that signals a change of policy or governance approach that subsequently alters the course of the nation.

The defining moments lens serves as an important focus of analysis as the leadership styles are clearest in these moments (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999). Thus, it is a useful tool in identifying when a leader is using the authentic and pseudo leadership styles. Moreover, at a national political level, the consequences of defining moments are powerful influencers of leadership culture, public administration, foreign relations, the economy, and society. The defining moments lens therefore helps to situate a macroanalysis of change in political leadership styles and can assist in identifying the combination of leadership styles and events that facilitate the erosion, maintenance, or strengthening of a regime and its associated leadership culture and practice.

Conclusion The concepts and models presented in the literature review has enabled the construction of a robust framework to guide data collection and analysis in the pursuit of addressing the aims and questions posed in Chapter One of this thesis. The framework is comprised of three elements. These are the adapted Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model, the authoritarian, democratic, and hybrid regime types and their associated legitimation strategies, and the defining moments lens.

This first element, consisting of the full-range leadership theory, is ideally situated to capture the variations and similarities in leadership modes that have been demonstrated by Venezuelan leaders. The full-range leadership model (Bass 1985) forms the basis of the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model (Figure 2.1) because of the wide-ranging styles it makes available for the analysis of leaders, as well as its acknowledgement of the ability of both leaders and followers to influence the other and the leader’s ability to adapt styles to suit his or her approach to policy issues in a constantly changing external environment. On their own, theories such as the transactional and transformational leadership models do not account for the multitude of ways in which leadership can be exhibited. In contrast, the full-range leadership model offers more styles and considers the most effective leaders to possess the ability to move between styles that are inspirational, pragmatic, or neglectful, depending on the situation. Consequently, this model has great potential to reflect the dynamics of leadership within a political setting. However, the full-range model is inadequate on its own and requires supplementation. In this regard, the addition of Bass and Steidlmeier’s (1999) pseudo styles to form the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model provides additional styles through which to analyse the leader and recognises that a leader does not have to be cast

solely as either “authentic” or “pseudo”, but rather his or her choice of style is influenced by a range of factors such as the regime type and the broader environmental forces he or she faces. Within the context of Venezuela, one further element is required to further investigate the political leadership of the nation and its relationship to regime types. This is caudillismo. It helps to explain the historical and cultural experience of leadership in Venezuela, and provides insight into the leadership styles that have persisted across time.

The second element in the analytical framework is regime type. One of the aims of this thesis is to establish whether there are systematic relationships between particular leadership styles and regime types. To facilitate this, Diamond’s (2002) regime typology has been adopted. This typology provides a more nuanced understanding of the regime in which each Venezuelan leader is examined than a simple authoritarian-democracy dichotomy. The typology is helpful to the case study because it acknowledges that in the contemporary world, the nature of a regime is complex and difficult to determine. The spectrum of hybrid regimes is particularly useful for in-depth understanding of political history in Venezuela. Associated legitimation strategies of the different regime types assist in providing a greater contextual basis for the identification and analysis of the regimes explored in this research. Moreover, factors such as the economy, as well as cultural and historical experiences of leadership and governance, will impact the nature of the regime. As such, the framework incorporates the concept of rentier states for the analysis of Venezuela, as it has a strong relationship with legitimacy strategies, evidenced in the political rhetoric about “sowing the oil” and resultant domestic development programs dating back to the late Third Republic and the duration of the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

The third and final element of the framework utilised in this thesis is the concept of defining moments. These moments serve as the connection between leader, time, regime type, and will assist in the identification of leadership styles within the context of these structures and forces. They provide clarity to the nature of the leadership style and therefore serve as an important tool in not only focusing the scope of this thesis but also in aiding the exploration of the relationship between leadership style and political regime type.

The combination of these elements in one comprehensive framework facilitates the aims of this research to test the theoretical suitability of the full-range leadership model to a political science case study, determine whether there is a relationship of influence between regime

type and leadership style, and establish whether there is an identifiable pattern of leadership in Venezuela that is independent of regime type and time. These aims, explored through the above-mentioned analytical framework, enable a systematic analysis of the leadership styles of political leaders from different regime types. This is lacking in the field of political leadership studies and thus builds upon the conceptual basis of the full-range leadership model to facilitate a robust study of political leaders.

Chapter Three: Methodology

Introduction This chapter presents the research methodology used in this thesis to undertake a qualitative case study analysis of selected Venezuelan presidents across time and regime type. First, this chapter addresses the research strategy employed in the design and data collection for this thesis. It provides an explanation of the importance and application of the qualitative research methodology to the study of political leadership. Second, the chapter outlines the specific qualitative methods used in this research and presents a justification for the case study of presidential leadership in Venezuela. Third, the chapter explores some of the potential limitations to this research and the efforts made to address them.

A Qualitative Research Strategy As a key aim of this research is to explore the relationships between political regimes and leadership styles, a qualitative case study approach has been employed. Klenke (2008) contends that qualitative research design in leadership studies is of vital importance, due to the complex and context-rich nature of the field. Epistemologically, the qualitative approach “privileges no single methodological practice over another” due to its interpretative nature and core belief that all research practices and fields “can provide important insights and knowledge” (Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg 1992, 2, cited in Denzin & Lincoln 2011, 6). Within this understanding, the qualitative research methodology is viewed as

… the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials – case study, personal experience, introspection, life story, interview, artifacts, and cultural texts and productions, along with observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts – that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, 3-4).

This position has been adopted in order to accommodate the socially fabricated nature of leadership, which is subject to local, cultural contexts. Conger (1998, 107, 109-10) has long called for the expanded use of the qualitative research methodology in leadership studies, arguing that, for a field “as contextually rich” as leadership studies, qualitative methodologies are best placed to capture “the extreme and enduring complexity of the leadership phenomena”. While quantitative methodologies are suitable for analysing causation and

correlation relationships between variables, qualitative methodologies allow the researcher to engage with the processes of social experience (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, 8). In the context of leadership, this is crucial as different societies and organisations place varying values on differing leadership attributes and behaviours.

Yet, researchers in the field of leadership have traditionally preferenced quantitative methods (Bass 1990b; Bass & Avolio 1990; Bryman 2004; Hollenbeck, Ilgen & Sego 1994; Hunter, Bedell-Avers & Mumford 2007; O’Shea et al. 2009). This is partly to do with the development trajectory of leadership studies, which has coincided with the industrial revolution and an emphasis on rationalist and scientific epistemology within the fields of management and business (Bryman 2004). Value has been placed on the perceived “objective” results of quantitative methods, while qualitative methods have been considered subjective and therefore unreliable (Klenke 2008, 10). However, a limitation of the quantitative methodology is its inability to provide an in-depth account of “the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry” (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, 8).

Qualitative research methodologies bring a number of benefits to the study of leadership. Leadership, it has been argued, is “acutely context sensitive”, in that the latter element “shape[s] the practice … and … determine[s] what leaders can do in any given context” (Klenke 2008, 12; Pettigrew & Whipp 1991; Bryman, Stephens & à Campo 1996). Such methodologies also enable researchers to create “conceptual road maps of previously unchartered territory” and “investigate symbolic dimensions” of leadership which are essential to its effective study (Klenke 2008, 12). This can, however, present a difficult task for the researcher, due to the multitude of theories within a variety of disciplines, as well as leadership’s existence as “interpretative phenomena” (Peele 2005, 190). Yet, the multi- disciplinary nature of leadership studies, which include psychology, management, organisational studies, politics, history, and sociology, indicate that qualitative research would be an effective methodology for understanding the leadership phenomenon.

Bryman’s (2004, 751-56) review of journal articles utilising qualitative research in leadership studies found that the qualitative methodology was important for improving the understanding of how leaders generate change, with particular regard to how the leader secured commitment, appealed to multiple constituencies, and instilled a vision. Bryman’s

review also found that qualitative methodologies not only revealed the influence of context, as the leader utilised certain leadership styles in response to his or her environment, but also identified different forms of leader behaviour (styles) and were better situated to recognise a transformational relationship between the leader and the follower. Moreover, qualitative methodologies are ideal for exploring the ethics of leadership and for interpreting symbols used by leaders to promote their vision and reflect their relationship with followers. However, a drawback of the approach is the interdisciplinary nature of the qualitative methodology, which is “partly theoretical, partly epistemological, partly ideological, and partly ontological” (Bryman 2004, 755). The consequence of this is that qualitative researchers may find it difficult to build on each other’s studies in the way that quantitative researchers are able to. This has implications for theory building, study replication and empirical validation using qualitative studies.

Case Study Method of Data Selection This thesis employs a qualitative case study approach to the analysis of leadership styles of selected Venezuelan presidents across time and regime type. The case study is used in the social sciences as a standard method, due to its ability to help researchers “understand complex social phenomena” (Yin 2014, 4) through a “process of conducting systematic, critical inquiry … and generating understanding to contribute to cumulative public knowledge of the topic” (Simons 2009, 24). It is ideal for this topic of research as it allows for an in-depth exploratory analysis and acknowledges the context-rich nature of political leadership.

This research utilises what Yin (2014, 50) identifies as an embedded single case study design to examine the leadership styles of presidents of differing regime types and times in Venezuela. The embedded single case study consists of three elements: the context, the case, and the embedded units of analysis. Within this framework, the differing regime types of Venezuela serve as the broad context of a case study of political leadership styles at the presidential level. The embedded units of analysis are the selected Venezuelan presidents examined in the thesis. The benefits of the embedded single case study design include a high degree of focus and resulting insight into the case study, although there is a risk of that focus slipping from the case study to the embedded units of analysis (Yin 2014). A further risk of the case study approach is the possibility that the “entire nature of the case study may shift, unbeknownst to the researcher, during the course of the study” (Yin 2014, 55-56). However,

the risk of this happening in the research of this thesis is minimal, due to the predominantly historical approach I have adopted in the selection of presidents.

Another benefit of this case study design is its longitudinal nature, which allows for the examination of a cohort (Venezuelan presidents) across time in order to make generalisations and explain patterns (Burnham et al. 2004, 50). The advantages of the longitudinal study are that it contributes to a systematic analysis of political leadership that is absent in the literature and provides large amounts of data to compare and track patterns of leadership style within a particular country or organisation (Conger 1998; Parry et al. 2014). However, the 200-year time span of the case study in this research also has implications for analysis. One implication is the context of the time in which the leader operated, as this would have had an impact on “human interactions and participant worldviews” (Saldaña 2003, 16). Thus, certain leadership styles that are viewed in today’s world as immoral or poor practice may have been viewed differently in the past. Consequently, there is a risk of retrospectively applying a contemporary ethical lens and skewing analysis, yet such risk is unavoidable when interpreting historical events.

Document and Archival Analysis This research utilised document and archival analysis in its research design due to the nature of the case study and the fact that seven of the eight units of analysis (Venezuelan presidents) are deceased. Document and archival analysis involves the use of multiple primary, secondary and tertiary sources including news reports, memoirs and autobiographies, academic research in books and journals, media interviews, government policy documents, and speech transcripts, to inform data collection and analysis (Burnham et al. 2004). Secondary and tertiary sources were predominantly utilised and supplemented by selected primary evidence in the form of quotes by the examined presidents. These quotes were derived from speech transcripts, political writings, or contained within academic sources such as journal articles and books. Information was sourced from both the English and Spanish languages. As Yin (2014, 106) notes, document and archival sources of evidence allow a study to be conducted over a long span of time and cover a broad range of events. As a consequence, this form of evidence was most suited to the research design.

There are, however, potential weaknesses to this approach. In gathering evidence and undertaking analysis the researcher must consider the authenticity and credibility of the

information source. This involves examination of the context in which the source was created and the biases that may be held by the author (Burnham et al. 2004, 186). A further critique of this form of evidence is that representativeness may be lacking if only a narrow type of source is utilised. It is thus necessary for the researcher to ensure that the sources used are “representative of the totality of relevant documents” or is, at the very least, the researcher is cognisant of the limitations of the documents (Scott 1990, 24). To mediate this, I consulted multiple sources such as journal articles, books, and news reports in English and Spanish to assist in verifying my interpretation of events, as suggested by Yin (2014, 107). Moreover, documentary and archival evidence was the most appropriate and effective data source for this thesis as all but one of the examined presidents are deceased.

Selection and Justification of the Case Study Venezuela was selected as the case study for the exploration of presidents’ use of leadership styles across time and regime type for a number of reasons. First, Venezuela has experienced the three regime types identified in this thesis – authoritarian, democratic and hybrid – within a relatively short period of time (just over 200 years). Second, the country presents a useful opportunity to apply Western-developed theories of leadership to a cross-cultural case study. This enabled me to test assumptions of the universality of the styles and provided an opportunity to expand understanding of the styles included in the theory. Fourth, the general application of the full-range leadership model to a political science analysis returns the core tenets of transformational and transactional leadership to the domain of political leadership, as originally established by Burns (1978). The case study of Venezuelan presidents facilitates this.

The Venezuelan presidents featured in this thesis were selected according to two criteria: the length of their rule and the changes that occurred during that rule. Of the authoritarian era, each president ruled for at least 10 years, while in the democratic era each president was elected for two terms or an equivalent. The length of rule allowed these presidents to have a significant impact on Venezuelan politics and society. For instance, Bolívar governed during independence and the construction of a national and regional governance system. Gómez oversaw the bureaucratisation of the Venezuelan state and the adoption of a rentier state model, while Pérez Jiménez ruled during an intense period of modernisation and military- bureaucratic governance. Betancourt led Venezuela’s transition to democracy and Caldera assisted in its consolidation and also served as the last Punto Fijo president. Pérez also

governed during a period of intense modernisation but simultaneously fast-tracked the decay of the Punto Fijo system.

In relation to the hybrid era, Chávez was allocated two chapters and Maduro one chapter, due to the vast impact their leaderships have had on transformational events in Venezuela over the past 19 years. The election of Chávez not only instigated the dismantlement of the Punto Fijo system but also oversaw the intense polarisation of politics and the transition of the Venezuelan regime from democratic to hybrid authoritarian. Maduro has deepened this transformation and currently governs during the worst humanitarian and economic crises experienced in contemporary Venezuela.

Finally, the selection of eight Venezuelan presidents enables a systematic and longitudinal comparison of leaders within the same case study as a method to explore patterns and contrasts of leadership styles during different regime types and times. Such exploration is lacking in studies of political leadership, and therefore this thesis will provide a systematic, comparative analysis of leaders of different regime types across time and within the one country.

Potential Limitations of the Research There are some limitations to this research. First, leadership studies prize quantitative research for many reasons. One of these reasons is that quantitative results often provide an immediately clear answer to the research question. Qualitative research, particularly of a concept and practice as intangible as leadership, often produces more questions than answers. Yet, this does not mean it is any less valuable. This thesis does not utilise quantitative analysis. To some, this will be a major weakness of the study as it does not facilitate easy replication. However, I contend that the Integrated Full-range Leadership Model (see Figure 2.1, p.26) of this thesis provides a comprehensive framework through which to analyse political leaders. This framework must be implemented in combination with a review of the leader’s context, with such a review guided by the holistic questioning outlined in Chapter Ten’s conclusion.

In addition, interviews were not utilised during the research stage of this thesis. While interviews are useful to understand the leaders’ individual motivations and thinking processes, this was not possible in this research as all but one of the examined Venezuelan

presidents are deceased. Moreover, as it was the presidents’ leadership styles being examined, rather than, for example, a relationship with followers, it was not necessary to conduct interviews with supporters or opposition. Again, for the majority of the presidents, interviews with followers would not have been possible. In this regard, there is a risk of imposing an incorrect assumption of motive on a leader’s choice of leadership style. Indeed, a leader does not always consciously select a leadership style but instead focuses on the leadership style’s utility to his or her goal.

Moreover, the aim of this thesis is not to divine motive but rather to provide a longitudinal exploration of the use of different leadership styles across different times and environmental conditions of national political leaders within the one country. To address these limitations, I have utilised a range of secondary and tertiary sources to provide a holistic view of each selected leader’s context. I have used a Spanish interpreter to check my translations, and I have adopted definitional frameworks by established and respected academics for the key concepts used in this thesis. Finally, the full-range leadership model is one of the most widely tested and empirically validated leadership models in the management discipline, providing a solid base for adaptation and analysis for the study of political leaders.

Conclusion This chapter has provided an overview of the importance of qualitative research methodologies to the study of leadership. It detailed the usage of a qualitative, longitudinal, and embedded single case study design drawing on document and archival sources of a secondary and tertiary nature. The combination of these methodological elements reflects the observation by scholars such as Conger (1998), Bryman (2004), and Parry et al. (2014) of the need for more qualitative and longitudinal case study analyses of leadership. The chapter concluded by discussing the potential limitations of the research and highlighted the methods employed to resolve such limitations. The next chapter is the first of the data chapters and examines the leadership styles in the defining moments of three presidents from Venezuela’s authoritarian regime era, a time period spanning some 150 years.

Chapter Four: Venezuela’s Authoritarian Period, 1811-1958

Introduction This chapter examines the defining moments of the leaderships of Simón Bolívar, Juan Vicente Gómez, and Marcos Pérez Jiménez during their authoritarian rule. These leaders were selected for the significant impact they had on Venezuelan politics and development during this time. The chapter explores Bolívar as a foundational leader of Venezuela and looks at the ways in which subsequent leaders, particularly Gómez, drew on aspects of his leadership to justify autocratic rule. Overall, the chapter seeks to identify the leadership styles used by these leaders in their defining moments in order to provide insight into one of the central research questions of this thesis, that being whether the use of certain leadership styles in Venezuela transcend time and regime type.

The Defining Moments of Bolívar’s Leadership, 1811-1830 This section explores the defining moments of Simón Bolívar, a revolutionary military leader often referred to as El Liberatador (the Liberator). Specifically, the section is divided into Bolívar’s defining moments of the revolutionary period (1811-1821) and his defining moments of the post-revolutionary period (1822-1830). Bolívar rose to political prominence during the Latin American Independence Wars of 1810–1821 and in the immediate subsequent years as he sought to create a unified region known as Gran Colombia. Prior to the independence wars, Bolívar’s family was one of the richest in Venezuela, and provided him with an extensive education during his youth, as well as important connections and status in Venezuelan society (Lynch 2006). This gave Bolívar a privileged space in society to voice his opinions and rebel against the Spanish colonial system. During the independence wars, the archetype of the caudillo1 ruled. The collapse of the Spanish colonial system created a power vacuum that allowed regional strongmen to control small patches of territory throughout Venezuela. At this time, however, Bolívar distinguished himself as a unique leader due to his combined usage of caudillismo, intellectual argument, and inspirational motivation to inspire and control his followers.

1 A Latin American military strongman that derives power and legitimacy from military success, charisma, and an ability to distribute benefits to his followers.

Bolívar’s Revolutionary Defining Moments, 1811-1821 In liberating Venezuela and the broader Latin American region from the Spanish, Bolívar drew on a range of authentic and pseudo leadership styles as his situation demanded. In promoting his cause, Bolívar primarily used authentic transformational and transactional leadership styles to stimulate discussion and convince observers of the merits of his mission, challenge the international community’s acceptance of Spain’s treatment of its colonies, and offer rewards and benefits for other nations’ support of the independence movement. However, in the actual implementation of his quest for independence, Bolívar primarily utilised pseudo-transformational and transactional leadership styles.

Bolívar’s political writings published during the revolutionary period best demonstrate his use of authentic leadership styles. These writings were either produced as a result of defining moments or served as a catalyst for a defining moment. In particular, this sub-section explores texts and policies such as the 1812 Cartagena Manifesto, the 1813 Admirable Campaign, the 1816 Jamaica Letter, and the 1819 Angostura Address and examines the defining moments related to them.

Bolívar Challenges the Status Quo to Establish a Revolutionary Reputation “The Cartagena Manifesto: Memorial Addressed to the Citizens of New Granada by a Citizen of Caracas”, published in December 1812, was the first influential text released by Bolívar. Its contents and publication were a defining moment for Bolívar’s leadership as the text not only won him support in New Granada (present-day Colombia) for his goal to liberate Venezuela, but also proved to be a catalyst for the launch of the Admirable Campaign and the subsequent establishment of his reputation as both a competent military commander and a visionary leader.

The Manifesto emphasised the rights of the Venezuelan people to independence, the need of the nation to break free from the “yoke” of colonialism, and the necessity of solidarity in times of conflict (Bolívar 1812). However, the primary purpose of the Manifesto was to provide both an authentic transformational and transactional argument to New Granada as to why it should assist in securing Venezuela’s independence. In this text, Bolívar appealed to the common humanity shared by the citizens of Venezuela and New Granada, identifying the citizens of New Granada as Venezuela’s “beloved compatriots”, “brothers”, and the need to “avenge death, to give life to the dying, succour to the oppressed, and freedom to all”

(Bolívar 1812, 11). He also appealed to the self-interest of New Granada, arguing that if it did not assist in securing Venezuela’s freedom “nothing can stop [an] emigration from Spain” that would reinforce the presence of pro-royalists on the Latin American continent (Bolívar 1812, 9). Consequently, Bolívar argued, New Granada’s own freedom was contingent upon the freedom of its neighbours.

The Manifesto was an early example of Bolívar’s transformational political thought that a highly centralised government was essential to securing Venezuela’s independence and generating prosperity. He contended that Venezuela’s First Republic2 would not have fallen to the Spanish if “Caracas had been governed by a single authority that could have quickly and vigorously set about repairing the destruction [of the 1812 earthquake], without the complications and conflicts that slowed down the recovery in the provinces…” (Bolívar 1812, 7). The most significant contributor, according to Bolívar, was that the First Republic was governed by a federal system and led by “citizens [who were] not yet ready to take on the full and independent exercise of their rights” (Bolívar 1812, 6).

By this, Bolívar meant that a vast majority of Venezuela’s citizenry did not have adequate education or experience in leadership or public administration at a time when the newly- founded country was struggling to secure its independence. Thus, the only way to secure a sustainable independence was to implement a highly centralised regime, capable of quickly responding to the needs of the country. A further guiding belief of Bolívar evident in the Cartagena Manifesto was the necessity of designing a system of government that was tailored to the needs and experiences of Venezuela. Bolívar (1812, 6) contended that, in the case of an uneducated and politically inexperienced citizenry, the design of a regime required “an adjustment” to the “context of the times, men, and circumstances in which it operates”. If these times were

…prosperous and serene, it [the regime] has to be gentle and protective, but if they are calamitous and turbulent, it has to be severe and armed with a strength equal to the dangers, without regard for laws or constitutions until such time as happiness and peace are restored.

2 The First Republic of Venezuela was the first independent government of the country. It was in existence from 5 July 1811 until 25 July 1812 during the Independence Wars with Spain. The First Republic fell due to a combination of factors: a shortage of provisions, a slave uprising, a devastating earthquake in Caracas, and the ongoing conflict with Spain (Lynch 2006, 63).

Yet, it was the initial argument contained in the Cartagena Manifesto for the need to expel the Spanish from Venezuela that generated Bolívar support from key leaders in Cartagena, including the President of the United Provinces, Camilo Torres, to grant him a military unit to command (Masur 1969, 118). However, Torres was unable to give Bolívar his support for the Venezuela campaign until the Spanish were expelled from New Granada. Within four months, and working with other resistance movements, Bolívar achieved this (Masur 1969, 118-19).

In early 1813, Bolívar embarked on the Admirable Campaign with the aim to expel Spanish troops from Venezuela. This campaign was such a success that on 6 August 1813, eight months after the Manifesto was published, Bolívar recaptured Caracas and the Second Republic of Venezuela began (Lynch 1983a). The success of the Admirable Campaign, combined with the call to arms and rationale for unity in the quest for independence that were featured in the Cartagena Manifesto, established Bolívar as an inspirational leader in the independence movement and generated belief in his abilities to liberate Venezuela from the Spanish.

The uncertain times resulted in Bolívar utilising violence to ensure obedience and consolidate his authority. In part, the Admirable Campaign was a success because of a “war to the death” policy adopted by Bolívar. Announcing the policy, Bolívar stated: “Spaniards and Canarians, even if you profess neutrality, know that you will die unless you work actively to bring about the freedom of America. Americans, know that you will live, even if you are guilty” of fighting for the Spanish (Bolívar 1813, 116). The policy allowed the execution of any captured continental Spanish soldier, but granted life to Venezuelan-born soldiers who defected to the side of the independence movement. In doing so, Bolívar attempted to create of a sense of Venezuelan nationalism through an emphasis of the universal brotherhood of those born in the Americas. Bolívar (1813, 116) reassured those fighting on the Spanish side that “your brothers forgive you” and “the mere title of Americans will be your guarantee and your safeguard”. This was an attempt by Bolívar to generate both transformational and transactional outcomes: first, a sense of brotherhood and unity towards a common cause, and second to attract more men to increase the size of his army.

The “war to the death” policy was instrumental in the Admirable Campaign’s victory, and was “the calculated result of strategies put into place by two rival leaders who were intent on

unnerving their enemies…” (Arana 2014, 165). Specifically, it was implemented in retaliation to the brutal tactics of the pro-royalist caudillo José Tómas Boves, whose army executed pro-independence prisoners and terrorised the inhabitants of the towns and villages it passed through in an effort to turn them against the independence movement.

Such a practice had a significant impact in Venezuela, as not only did it decimate the population, but it displaced and maimed survivors, and destroyed villages and agriculture. Despite the physical devastation of “war to the death”, such a policy was perceived as necessary by Bolívar to defend his leadership and ensure his political survival in order to achieve his goal of liberation for Venezuela and Latin America. In justifying “war to the death”, Bolívar wrote that “a government of a country in revolution must follow routes very different from the ordinary” (Bolívar 1813, cited in Lynch 2006, 79). This statement encapsulates the main tenant of Bolívar’s leadership as he sought, first, to triumph in the Independence Wars, and second, to create a customised governance structure for Venezuela and the broader liberated region that drew on what he considered the best elements from other governance systems throughout the world. In terms of immediate consequences of the policy, it not only bolstered his forces with desertions from the Spanish royalists, but it also garnered him respect with the caudillos, because “retaliation gave him credibility” and convinced them “that he was a leader to be reckoned with” (Lynch 2006, 79). Hundreds of defections from the Spanish to the independence army, in addition to a “storm of violence”, ensued (Arana 2014, 143; Lynch 2006, 64). Accordingly, Bolívar’s decision to implement the “war to the death” policy was a defining moment for his leadership, as it strengthened his army and demonstrated to the caudillos that Bolívar was a formidable military leader.

The “storm of violence” (Arana 2014, 143) that characterised the fight for independence was intensified by conflict between self-interested caudillos, and an emergent race war. The power vacuum created by Spain’s loss of control in the region allowed a number of caudillos, some neutral, some pro-Spanish, and some pro-independence, to emerge and fight among each other for territory and resources (Lynch 1983a). The caudillos had little vision beyond the pursuit of wealth and arms, with followers attracted to such leaders as a result of “rural distress” and impoverishment caused by the war (Lynch 1983a, 5). At this point in time, Bolívar was unable to offer the caudillos and their followers sufficient reward for their loyalty. This was for two reasons. First, Venezuela had no sense of national unity, having always been subjugated to the will of the Spanish. Second, Bolívar did not have the required

resources to offer the caudillos in a transaction for their loyalty. As a consequence, “delinquency was stronger than [the] ideology” that Bolívar advocated (Lynch 1983a, 5). Moreover, Bolívar’s pro-royalist caudillo rival, Boves, ignited a race war by encouraging African slaves to rise up against their masters and engage in revenge attacks, thereby creating another front on which Bolívar had to fight (Arana 2014, 154; Lynch 1983a). Bolívar’s independence movement, while initially successful, was unable to fight two wars: the independence war against the Spanish royalists and the chaos of the caudillo power vacuum complicated by Boves’ race war. It rapidly lost territory until the movement was confined to the Isla de Margarita off the north-east coast of Venezuela. Bolívar and his supporters then entered into exile, ending the Second Republic of Venezuela 1814.

The experience of the Second Republic confirmed Bolívar’s belief that Venezuela required a government tailored to its particular circumstance, and his argument for such a system was expanded in writings such as “The Jamaica Letter: Response from a South American to a Gentleman from this Island” (1815). The Jamaica Letter, published by Bolívar while in exile in Jamaica during 1814-1815, built on the ideas presented in the Cartagena Manifesto to explain the failure of the Second Republic. Bolívar’s arguments centred on the treatment of the inhabitants of Venezuela and the rest of Latin America by Spain, contending that

From the beginning we were plagued by a practice that in addition to depriving us of our rights to which we were entitled left us in a kind of permanent infancy with respect to public affairs. If we had even been allowed to manage the domestic aspects of our internal administration, we would understand the processes and mechanisms of public affairs… (Bolívar 1815, 19).

By this logic, Bolívar later justified his implementation of an authoritarian system of government, and argued that “[t]he American states need the stewardship of paternalistic governments to cure the wounds and ravages of despotism and war” (Bolívar 1815, 24). Bolívar’s immediate solution to this was the provision of a strong leader to ensure stability. Key to this was the unification of the caudillos and the creation of a strong regional governance system. The next sub-section examines these elements in greater detail as important defining moments surrounding the publication of the Angostura Address.

Bolívar Unifies the Caudillos Bolívar’s eventual unification of the caudillos was a further defining moment for his leadership, as it enabled him to create an army large enough to expel the Spanish. As a

consequence, this unification allowed Bolívar to progress his vision for a united region he named Gran Colombia, as outlined in the Angostura Address of 1819.

While in exile following the collapse of the Second Republic, Bolívar travelled to Haiti in 1815 to petition its government for assistance, as he had not relinquished his dream for the independence of Venezuela. Bolívar made a series of transactions to revive the movement. The first was a deal with the president of Haiti, Alexandre Pétion, for Haiti to supply Bolívar with troops and armaments. In exchange, Bolívar promised to abolish slavery in Venezuela once he had regained power (Arana 2014, 179). This was important to Pétion, as he was a mulatto3 that sympathised with the black slaves. Moreover, Pétion was also influenced by French enlightenment and democratic ideals after having spent a period of exile in France and, most significantly, he was the president of the first black independent nation, whose independence was won by a slave revolt (Bellegarde 1941).

Bolívar’s promise to Pétion to end slavery, however, was only partially fulfilled. Upon his return to Venezuela in 1816, Bolívar abolished slavery but initially made freedom conditional upon the slave joining the republican army (Arana 2014, 249). The initial decree read:

The new citizen who refuses to take up arms in order to carry out the sacred duty of defending his liberty, will remain in servitude as will his children under fourteen years of age, his woman, and his aged parents (Bolívar 1816, cited in Bierck Jr. 1953, 367).

While the slave trade had been abolished in 1810, and a number of decrees were issued thereafter calling for compliance, a law for slave emancipation did not come into effect until 1821. This manumission law granted freedom to the children of slave mothers born after 1821 (Helg 2003, 450), although its priority was to compensate slave owners (Lynch 2006, 147). This capitulation was made so as to not upset the elite who depended upon slavery for their plantations and whose support Bolívar required for the long-term viability of his political project (Bierck Jr. 1953, 368; Lynch 2006, 151). Bolívar was unable to effectively enforce the abolition of slavery due to the distance between haciendas4 (Lynch 2006). According to the model in Figure 2.1, this reflects the use of pseudo-transactionalism, as Bolívar did not deliver on his promise to Pétion and instead pursued his broader goal of establishing a sustainably independent Venezuela.

3 The coloured class, comprised of slaves, mixed races, and the poor. 4 Large landholdings, such as ranches or plantations.

The second deal, and a defining moment of his leadership, occurred upon Bolívar’s return to Venezuela with the support of Haitian troops. On his return, Bolívar negotiated unity among the caudillos whose lack of cooperation had originally contributed to the collapse of the Second Republic. The Haitian troops were important for demonstrating to the caudillos that Bolívar had the capacity to revive the independence movement. But, without the support of the caudillos, Bolívar could not advance the quest for independence. An arrangement was reached in which Bolívar was accepted as supreme commander of the combined caudillo armies. In return, the caudillos were rewarded with official military ranks within Bolívar’s army, while their officers were granted parcels of land and regular troops received booty from captured towns that had been under Spanish loyalist control (Lynch 1983a, 6; Lynch 2006, 176). Yet, there was also a visionary element to the caudillos’ loyalty to Bolívar, as they had come to view him as the one person who could unite them. Daniel Florencio O’Leary (1970, 101), Bolívar’s chief aide-de-campe throughout the independence wars, remarked in memoirs originally published by his son between 1879 and 1888, that, when approached by Bolívar in February 1816 with a proposal to unite their forces, the caudillos “did not hesitate to make a choice between this seemingly desperate project and the cruel alternative of leading a wandering and dishonourable existence in the Antilles”. The caudillos had recognised in Bolívar’s absence that only a united force could expel the Spanish from their land. With the caudillos behind him, Bolívar had consolidated his leadership and could now turn his attentions to finally expelling the Spanish from Venezuela and unifying the region.

The Angostura Address and the Manifestation of Bolívar’s Vision: Gran Colombia The Angostura Address was a further defining moment for Bolívar’s leadership, as it communicated his vision for a united Latin American region. Delivered to the Congress of Angostura in 1819, a meeting of delegates from the provinces of Venezuela and New Granada, Bolívar’s Address sought to persuade the body to adopt a central governance system for the two countries. This governance system, known as Gran Colombia, eventually came to encompass the territories of former colonies, including Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, and parts of present-day Peru, as Bolívar’s armies liberated more territory on the Latin American continent.

Bolívar’s Angostura Address adopted a heavy tone of paternalism in his plans for Gran Colombia. In particular, Bolívar argued that a governance system for the region had to take

into account the fact that the citizens had “never experienced knowledge, power, or virtue” due to their “[enslavement] by the triple yoke of ignorance, tyranny, and vice” while under the control of the Spanish (Bolívar 1819, 34). A failure to create a “virtuous” people educated in civics and governance would result in the citizenry being a “blind instrument in its own destruction” (Bolívar 1819, 34). In this regard, Bolívar identified the masses as their own enemy in sustaining freedom in Venezuela and the broader region.

The Angostura Address proposed a number of measures to combat this perceived problem. One involved the creation of a moral power “whose dominion is childhood and the hearts of men, public spirit, wholesome customs, and republican morality” (Bolívar 1819, 49). This power drew inspiration from the ancient Roman censors and the Greek guardians of customs and laws, and was to be situated within a tribunal that had the authority to determine public education curricula and advise on criminal penalties. Another proposal was the establishment of a hereditary senate as a means to provide a “neutral body” whose existence was not dependent upon the will of the government or the will of the people, but which still remained “part of the people, shar[ing] their interests, their feelings, and their spirit” (Bolívar 1819, 43). According to Bolívar, this would make the senate incorruptible, as it would be “intensely interested in the existence of a society whose failures and successes affect it vitally” (Bolívar 1819, 44). Bolívar saw a hereditary sentate as ensuring stability in times of crisis, but still reflecting popular will. A further element of Gran Colombia was a life-term presidency whereby all power was to be vested in the president. Government ministers, however, would have the power to bring charges against the president before the senate (Bolívar 1819). Bolívar’s support for life term presidency was not to install a dicatorship in Gran Colombia, but rather to provide another measure against instability:

…let us entrust him [the president] with sufficient authority to carry on the struggle against the difficulties inherent in our current situation, the state of war weighing on us and the kind of external and domestic enemies against whom we must wage a protracted struggle (Bolívar 1819, 47).

The Congress delegates appointed Bolívar the Supreme Commander of the military and of Gran Colombia. Although the regime that Bolívar led was, in effect, authoritarian as he had the final word on all decisions, he did not use his position to enforce his legislative agenda. The delegates at the Congress of Angostura were allowed to vote on legislation, and their role was to administer Gran Colombia’s governance system while Bolívar continued to liberate

other colonies fighting for independence. Despite the nature of his regime, Bolívar relied upon intellectual argument to persuade the delegates of the merits of his proposals. His choice to avoid coercion to pass legislation was evident when the Congress of Angostura rejected his proposals for a life term president and the moral power to guide the nation’s civic development in the constitution of Gran Colombia. The proposal for the life term president was rejected out of fear of the creation of a military aristocracy, with the Congress instead choosing to grant senators a life tenure, which would not automatically pass on to their heirs upon death (Johnson 1968, 92). Bolívar’s avoidance of coercion demonstrates his attempts to tailor his leadership styles to his ultimate goal of establishing a sustainable governance system that was independent of the force of his leadership.

Overarching Bolívar’s proposal for a strong executive was a human rights discourse, informed by the enlightenment ideals of the time, yet which often appeared in direct contrast to his governance practice. Bolívar espoused enlightenment ideals such as liberty, dignity, reason, and equality (Masur 1969, 36). However, he did not have the opportunity to translate them into policy until the republicans had won back half of northern Venezuela and established Gran Cololmbia. When addressing the Congress of Angostura in 1819, Bolívar announced:

…the fundamental principle of our system demands that equality be immediately and exclusively established and put into practice in Venezuela. That all men are born with an equal right to the benefits of society is a truth sanctioned by most wise men, as is the following: All men are born equally capable of aspiring to the highest attainments (Bolívar 1819, 39).

Following the establishment of Gran Colombia, the degree to which enlightenment ideals were implemented in policy varied. For example, although Bolívar proclaimed a need for equality, he conceptualised an “active” and “passive” citizenry in his governance philosophy (de Madariaga 1979, 338). The active citizenry were the elites – those who had creole origin and were literate, educated or who had trades. The passive citizenry were those who were illiterate, consisting of former slaves and mulattos. Those considered to be a part of the active citizenry would attend schools to train them in the governance of the nation, whereas those of the passive citizenry would be left to their current social station. The right to vote was confined to property ownership, thereby excluding many of the pardos and mulattos from full citizenship (Lynch 2006, 149). Although Bolívar declared equality for all, in practice he not adhere to it.

The defining moments of Bolívar’s leadership during Venezuela’s revolutionary period demonstrate the use of authentic transformational political thought combined with pseudo- transformational and pseudo-transactional leadership styles. Post-revolution, this approach was maintained until 1828 when Bolívar declared an outright dictatorship in response to growing resistance to his vision. The next section explores Bolívar’s choice of leadership styles in his post-revolution defining moments.

Bolívar’s Post-Revolutionary Defining Moments, 1821-1830 Following the creation of Gran Colombia and the final victory over the Spanish army in the Second Battle of Carabobo, Bolívar set his sights to the implementation of what he believed would be a sustainable governance system for the region. Ultimately, however, his pursuit of this goal alienated other powerful voices in Gran Colombia due to his unwillingness to compromise. As Bolívar faced increasing resistance to his vision for Venezuela, his leadership styles changed to predominantly pseudo. This sub-section examines the defining moments of Bolívar’s management of resistance to his governance vision as reflected in events surrounding the the 1826 Constitution of Bolivia, Vice-President Páez’s attempted rebellion, the failed Ocaña Convention, and Bolívar’s 1828-1830 rule by dictatorship.

Bolívar Persists With His Vision: the 1826 Bolivian Constitution Bolívar’s creation and promotion of the 1826 Constitution of Bolivia was a defining moment for his leadership as it not only crystallised his governance vision for Gran Colombia but also ultimately alienated key supporters, such as his vice-presidents in Venezuela and New Granada, who did not back elements of his vision such as the life term presidency and hereditary senate outlined in the Angostura Address. The Constitution of Bolivia “was a testament to how the social realities of the continent had altered his liberating vision” (Arana 2014, 350), as it contained a combination of enlightenment ideals and authoritarian regime structures. Although the Congress of Angostura had rejected key elements of Bolívar’s governance proposal for Gran Colombia, such as a life term presidency, his belief in their necessity was not diminished. In 1826, he crafted his proposals into a constitution for the new country of Bolivia5, named in his honour. This text is often referred to as the ultimate example of Bolívar’s matured governance vision for South America (Lynch 2006, 201; Masur 1969, 395). However, its contents also reflected Bolívar’s increasing preference for leadership styles such as pseudo-intellectual stimulation and pseudo-inspirational motivation

5 Formerly known as Upper Peru; a former territory of Peru.

as he sought to promote and protect his governance vision for the Latin American region through a centralised authoritarian regime.

Bolívar’s vision as encapsulated in the 1826 Constitution of Bolivia abolished slavery, ensured citizens equality before the law, and instituted a jury-based system of justice (Arana 2014, 350). It closely resembled the USA’s federal system in that it provided for executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. However, it also introduced a fourth branch modelled on the classical Roman Republic that consisted of sentators to make legislation, tribunes to manage the central government’s finances and oversee war, and censors to protect civil liberies and guide public morality. This latter element would be steered by a moral power constituted by elites, as they were part of what Bolívar defined as an “active” (literate and educated), as opposed to a “passive” (illiterate and poor) citizenry (de Madariaga 1979, 338). Such an understanding contrasts with the full-range model’s authentic transformational leadership which emphasises the concern of the leader to encourage “universal brotherhood” (Bass & Steidlmeier 1999, 187).

The primary element of the Constitution which met resistance was Bolívar’s insistence on a life term presidency, originally proposed at the Congress of Angostura. Moreover, Bolívar (1826, 59) believed that a life term president of Bolivia should have the power to choose his own successor in order to avoid elections, as he had come to believe that they “produce the scourge of republics, anarchy”. This was an example of Bolívar’s disillusionment with elections as a result of the resistance he had met in the implementation of his vision from the delegates at the Congress of Angostura. Lynch (2006, 202) contrasts this position with Bolívar’s assertion just a few years earlier at the Congress that “repeated elections are essential in proper systems of government” (Bolívar 1819) to highlight the change in Bolívar’s governance vision. This demonstrates how Bolívar adjusted his leadership and the methods to achieve his vision based on the “social realities of the continent” as part of his strengthened belief that the inhabitants of Venezuela and Gran Colombia were not prepared for self-governance (Arana 2014, 350). Such an approach indicates a pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style, whereby the leader ignores the concerns of followers and disregards institutional rules in favour of his or her goals. The next sub-section explores the resistance to Bolívar’s governance vision and his response to managing it in greater detail.

Bolívar’s Management of Resistance to His Vision Bolívar’s management of resistance to his vision was a defining moment of his leadership because it ultimately ended his political career. For instance, his unwillingness to negotiate on his vision for Gran Colombia, particularly some of the more authoritarian elements such as the life tenure presidency, generated opposition to his absolute rule. This is evident in Bolívar’s need to assert his authority over the caudillo-turned-General and Vice-President of Venezuela, José Antonio Páez. Páez opposed the nation’s union with present-day New Granada and its incorporation into Gran Colombia, believing that Bogotá, which had been named as the capital of Gran Colombia, was too far away from Venezuela to govern it effectively, and that stability in Venezuela required rule by its own citizens and control over its own resources (Lynch 2006, 221).

Páez had become more powerful since his promotion to the rank of general in 1817, acquiring additional land holdings and significant wealth, as well as a new power base among the elite in the north (Lynch 2006, 221). In 1826, Páez was arrested for forcibly conscripting civilians into his militia in Caracas and charged with illegal and arbitrary conduct (Lynch 2006, 223). Páez, however, resisted arrest and declared independence for Venezuela, taking an oath “to observe and enforce the established laws, but not to obey the new orders from the Bogotá government” (cited in O’Leary 1970, 349). Bolívar was reluctant to engage in outright conflict with Páez, as that would threaten his own authority. Instead, Bolívar utilised a contingent reinforcement style to emphasise his own power and the benefit of being in his patronage network, as other caudillos had experienced:

General Castillo opposed me and lost; General Piar opposed me and lost; General Mariño opposed me and lost; General Torre Tagle opposed me and lost. It would seem that Providence condemns my personal enemies, whether American or Spanish, to perdition. But see how far Generals Sucre, Santander, and Santa Cruz have gone (Bolívar 1826, cited in Lynch 2006, 225).

Páez acquiesced but not before obtaining a guarantee from Bolívar that all rebels would receive total amnesty for their role in the rebellion (Lynch 2006, 225). Bolívar’s forgiveness of Páez’s rebellion may have been an error in judgment, as it allowed the rebellion to continue and ultimately destroyed the unity of Gran Colombia by enabling Páez to re-group and continue his push for federalism in Venezuela (Masur 1969). Following the rebellion, Bolívar engaged in what could be considered pseudo-transactionalism, as he “granted promotion and commands to persons unworthy of them, merely because they were of Páez’

faction” as a method to buy support (de Madariaga 1979, 544).

Yet, Bolívar also attempted to channel dissent through institutional mechanisms. From April- June 1828 he held a constitutional convention, known as the Ocaña Grand National Convention. Constitutionally, this convention was scheduled for 1831 and in bringing it forward Bolívar defied the 1821 Constitution of Gran Colombia which was meant to be inviolable for 10 years (Arana 2014, 388). In doing so, Bolívar utilised a pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style to break institutional rules in an effort to appease critics of Gran Colombia and prevent its disintegration.

The convention was an opportunity to reform some of the elements of Gran Colombia, although Bolívar would not permit the system to be completely transformed. Francisco de Paula Santander, Bolívar’s vice-president in New Granada, had become a vocal opponent of Gran Colombia and pushed for a federalist sytem. To Santander, Bolívar’s proposals for a life-term presidency in the 1819 Angostura Address and the 1826 Bolivian Constitution were alarming and generated fear that he was attempting to assert control over the continent in the same way that the Spanish did. Because of Santander’s opposition, the Ocaña Convention was a failure (Lynch 2006, 388). Santander and supporters blocked Bolívar’s reforms that would have allowed for a stronger and more centralised executive. A bill to implement a federalist structure of government – the opposite of what Bolívar was trying to achieve – was almost passed. To prevent the bill from passing, Bolívar and his supporters withdrew from the convention which closed proceedings early (Belaunde 1967, 361). In doing so, Bolívar again demonstrated the pseudo-contingent reinforcement and pseudo-indvidualised consideration leadership styles as he sought to prevent changes to his governance vision.

The failure of the Ocaña Grand National Convention meant that resistance to Bolívar’s vision for the governance of Gran Colombia was not resolved. Rather than continue to negotiate, Bolívar chose to declare himself dictator on 27 August 1828 on the grounds of providing stability to Gran Colombia. The next sub-section explores Bolívar’s final two years in power as dictator of Gran Colombia.

Bolívar’s Dictatorship Bolívar’s dictatorship from 1828 to 1830 was a final defining moment for his leadership as his decision to implement it alienated key elites, confirmed fears that he sought absolute

power, and signalled the end of Gran Colombia. The Congress remained in existence, yet Bolívar no longer accepted its input into legislation. Instead, to strengthen his absolute rule, Bolívar utilised a number of transactional tactics designed to erode the power bases of his opponents and control political discourse in the region. Belaunde (1967, 375) notes of Bolívar during this period,

It can be said that dictatorship, with increasing momentum, usually dominates the dictator. Even Bolívar is not, unfortunately, an exception to this law – at least, not in the years 1828 and 1829.

A key transactional tactic was the expansion of the armed forces. In August 1828, the army for Gran Colombia numbered approximately 9,980, however Bolívar sought to increase its numbers to 40,000 in order to strengthen his regime and defend it from the factions that supported Páez and Santander (Belaunde 1967, 373). Bolívar also sought the support of the Roman Catholic clergy to legitimise his rule, as the clergy had strong influence with the majority of the population. He won this support by promising to protect “the religion of the state”, granting the Archbishop of Bogotá a place in his advisory council, and by supporting the recruitment of civilians to various religious bodies (Belaunde 1967, 373).

In addition to this, Bolívar reversed a number of policies that promoted human rights in the region, but which had not aligned with the church’s teachings (Bushnell 1983, 68). For example, Bolívar banned the teaching of the philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s writings. He “[denounced] the study of ‘principles of legislation by authors like Bentham and the others, whose works contain not only enlightening ideas but also many that are hostile to religion and morality and public order’” (Lynch 1983b; Lynch 2006, 246). This was a further attempt on the part of Bolívar to gain favour with the Catholic Church, as well as stamp out any revolutionary ideas that could challenge his own plans. Bolívar also abolished muncipalities in an attempt to erode the power bases of Santander and Páez, replacing them with prefects from his support base to manage the different regions of Gran Colombia. Finally, on 15 October 1828, Bolívar reintroduced the taxation of “tributes” on the indigenous tribes of the region. The tributes were abolished when independence was achieved in 1824, and had been a key revolutionary promise to the indigenous tribes in return for their support during the independence wars. However, Bolívar required the extra revenue to fund his growing military (Belaunde 1967, 375).

Instead of creating stability, Bolívar’s dictatorship further angered his political rivals. Shortly after his declaration of dictatorship, a failed assassination attempt took place on 25 September 1828 (Murray 2001, 292). For the next two years, Bolívar faced continual uprisings, mostly in Venezuela and New Granada (Lecuna & Bierck 1951, 751). The persistent resistance to Gran Colombia led Bolívar to concede the dictatorship in January 1830 and enter into exile to New Granada. Although Bolívar led Venezuela to its independence and served as a national and regional Supreme Commander for over a decade, by the end of his life he was destitute. On 10 December 1830, Bolívar wrote one of his final letters to the Latin American people. He said: “Colombians: You have been witness to my efforts to establish freedom where tyranny previously reigned. I have worked without thought of personal gain, sacrificing my fortune and even my peace of mind. I relinquished my power when I became convinced that you mistrusted my detachment.” (Bolívar 1830b, 150). According to Bolívar, he reconciled his mind against dictatorship as soon as he realised that his ideas for government were futile in the political climate and no longer appealing to the masses. In stepping down, Bolívar demonstrated an authentic inspirational motivation leadership style as he recognised that his continued hold on power would not benefit society. This realisation had an impact on how he viewed his efforts for independence. Just a month prior to his death from tuberculosis in December 1830, Bolívar (1830a, 146) expressed his dillusionment:

You know that I have ruled for twenty years, and I have derived from these only a few sure conclusions: (1) America is ungovernable, for us; (2) Those who serve revolution plough the sea; (3) The only thing one can do in America is emigrate; (4) The country will inevitably fall into the hands of the unrestrained multitudes and then into the hands of tyrants so insignificant they will be almost imperceptible, of all races and colors; (5) Once we’ve been eaten alive by every crime and extinguished by every ferocity, the Europeans won’t even bother to conquer us; (6) If it were possible for any part of the world to revert to primitive chaos, it would be America in her last hour.

This statement highlihts Bolívar’s bitterness at Venezuela’s secession from Gran Colombia and its ultimate rejection of his vision for Latin America. He viewed his fight for Venezuela’s independence as ultimately worthless, due to the belief that independence was unsustainble because of the nation’s inexperience with self-governance. Following Bolívar’s death on 17 December 1830, Venezuela was ruled by a series of caudillos until it transitioned to democracy in 1958. The next authoritarian leader examined in this chapter, Juan Vicente Gómez, was the country’s first leader after Bolívar to signficantly alter Venezuela’s political and economic landscape.

The Defining Moments of Gómez’s Leadership, 1908-1935 This section explores the defining moments of Juan Vicente Gómez, also known as the Tyrant of the Andes (Bond 1984) and the father of the modern Venezuelan state (Uzcategui 2012). Gómez was a military general and the ruler of Venezuela for 26 years from 1908 until 1935. He governed during the era of oil exploration and discovery, allowing him to establish extensive patronage networks and hold monopolies over Venezuela’s most profitable resources and fertile agricultural land (Burggraaff 1972, 19; Vera 1983, 48). Gómez treated Venezuela as his own personal business, with a philosophy of “What is Venezuela’s is his. Her soldiers plow his fields, tend his horses, his motors, his cattle, and his beloved zoo” (Gilbert 1929, 707).

Although there is a time period of 78 years between Bolívar’s death and the beginning of Gómez’s regime, the leaders of Venezuela during this time were caudillos engaged in continuous conflict for power. Between 1830 and 1908, Venezuela experienced 39 presidents, resulting, on average, in a change of president every two years. It was only Gómez’s leadership that altered this cycle. This does not necessarily mean that Gómez was not a caudillo himself, but rather he succeeded in offering sufficient transactional rewards for unification. Ewell (1984, 69) argues that Gómez “built a political bridge between the personalistic caudillo system of the past and the modern bureaucratic state of the future”. Under Gómez, a centralised, autocratic government emerged that, for the first time, was supported by a unified national army (Burggraaff 1972; Bond 1984; Vera 1983).

Gómez’s Broken Promise of Democracy The first defining moment of Gómez’s leadership during his rule of Venezuela was his decision to break his public promise to implement democracy. Like Bolívar, Gómez employed the language of authentic transformational leadership styles yet, in practice, he utilised pseudo leadership styles to achieve his goal of remaining in power.

Gómez first came to power following his usurpation of the presidency in 1908 from Cipriano Castro while he was in Europe receiving medical treatment. At the time, Gómez received support for this move, as Castro had become increasingly unpopular due to sickness and paranoia, and he had damaged Venezuela’s international reputation through disputes with Britain, Germany, and Italy involving the repayment of debts (Ewell 1984, 40, 46; Jones 1936, 89). Upon claiming power, Gómez declared his regime La Rehabilitación, “The

Rehabilitation”, with its purpose to restore peace and prosperity to Venezuela (Cohen 1997, 119; McBeth 2001).

Gómez’s promise (cited in McBeth 2008, 3) of a “genuinely democratic regime” was part of his desire for “peace and harmony” and an attempt to generate goodwill with Castro loyalists. However, his promise of democracy, yet subsequent implementation of an authoritarian regime, was a defining moment for Gómez’s leadership as it cemented the governance of Venezuela within this regime type for another 50 years, save for a brief three year period of democracy from 1945-1948 known as the trienio. The consequence of this was the continuing political repression and underdevelopment of the country, while it clearly demonstrates the practice of deception via a pseudo-inspirational motivation consistent with the typology identified by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999).

At the beginning of Gómez’s regime, a quasi-democratic governance system was established that consisted of a Council of State that had the ability to approve or dismiss all new laws proposed by Gómez relating to credit, land, and mining. The Council was comprised of old caudillos and representatives of political parties, such as the Liberals and the Nationalists (McBeth 2008, 16). Moreover, political freedoms were initially revived and Gómez pursued a path of conciliation. For instance, in April 1909, he granted an amnesty to all political prisoners incarcerated following protests by Castro loyalists against the coup of December 1908. This also included charges levelled against Castro, who had been found guilty of conspiring to murder Gómez and of the execution of an opponent, General Antonio Paredes, in 1907 (Consalvi 2011; Ewell 1984, 47; McBeth 2001; McBeth 2008). Although the charges were dismissed, Castro could not return to Venezuela without the threat of imprisonment (Ewell 1984). Gómez also initially allowed a free press and dismantled the various monopolies established during the Castro regime in industries including cigarettes, explosives, and salt. Not included were the monopolies that Gómez and his family controlled, such as cattle, paper, cement, and frozen fish (McBeth 2008, 2-3, 13-14).

Gómez believed that political parties were pointless and early on in his leadership he “urged [them] to cease their incessant bickering by working together to create an atmosphere of mutual respect for each other in order for Venezuela to ‘equal itself with its continental sisters in civilized life and progress…’” (Gómez n.d. cited in McBeth 2008, 31). As time progressed and factional politics threatened to destabilise his leadership, Gómez did away

with the democratic experiment and by 1914 had instituted his dictatorship. Similar to Bolívar, Gómez believed that the Venezuelan people were “not ready for self-government” and required a leader “who could keep order” with the goal of generating a prosperous state that would eventually be governed by popular will (Jones 1936, 90). Until that undefined time, the leader of Venezuela had to be viewed as “the embodiment of the Nation: his will was the unwritten Constitution. He was the highest expression of the democratic will of the people, and to oppose the strongman would be to oppose the Nation” (Vera 1983, 51).

Consequently, the regime implemented by Gómez removed “all regional political importance” from the state presidents, whereby they became “local representatives of the Head of the Cause [president]”, operating under guidelines that set out the “duties and extent” of their power (McBeth 2008, 15). Gómez appointed loyal state presidents but expected them to act as an extension of his will in the pursuit of “Peace, Union and Work”; his slogan for his regime. This indicates a pseudo-individualised consideration style, as Gómez expected blind obedience from his followers. Obedience was

… something that I request and demand from my officials and government. I do not demand from the latter that they should go against their conscience but I believe that the best way of defending this principle is by maintaining discipline because anarchy among the members of the regime only serves to diminish the efforts made to improve the State (Gómez 1909, cited in McBeth 2008, 15).

Finally, Gómez utilised the constitution to provide a legal basis for his leadership. He changed it on multiple occasions, and at times ruled through a puppet president before seizing explicit control again. Congress, stacked with Gómez’s supporters, would inevitably pass any legislation he presented to it, and there were no direct elections for the presidency (Coronil 1997, 85):

Constitutionally, the national Congress elects a President. The Congress in turn is elected by what is termed popular franchise. But there is rarely, if ever nowadays, more than one candidate from a Congressional District. And that candidate is appointed by General Gómez. In the less vital matters of state there is even an Opposition when Congress casts a vote – a decorous and plausible Opposition, always in a very respectable minority (Gilbert 1929, 706).

While the existence of a constitution, elections, and an opposition party gave Gómez’s regime a veneer of legitimacy, in reality the suppression of political freedoms and limited suffrage were the norm (Coronil 1997). Such a mirage was particularly important to his

international credibility, given that Venezuela was seeking investors in the 1920s for the development of its oil industry (Ewell 1984). If Venezuela possessed a constitution that provided a legal basis for the legitimacy of Gómez’s reign, potential and actual trading partners could raise fewer objections about the regime.

As Turner (1990, 351) notes in his analysis of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, the tactics of legitimation through legal and constitutional frameworks involves the manipulation of election results, the acceptance of a token opposition, the use of the resources of the state in campaigning, the control of the electoral commission by the leader in question, and the use of the constitution to justify unequal rules of the game. These tactics were all used by Gómez to establish and maintain his leadership. For example, Gómez instituted seven different constitutions during the course of his rule over Venezuela (Ewell 1984, 48; Kornblith 1991, 62). The first, issued in 1909, was created to reflect Gómez’s promise of a democracy. It set a term limit of four years for the presidency but removed popular elections for the office and replaced them with elections held by the Congress. However, as the caudillo factions began to create more instability in the nation, particularly in relation to the Council of State, Gómez moved to centralise the executive.

Examples of this include the suspension of constitutional guarantees in July 1913 and the subsequent granting of emergency powers to Gómez to institute martial law. Elections scheduled for December that year were then suspended under the guise of a threat of rebellion from Castro, which foreign observers such as British diplomats believed was “engineered” to justify a delay in scheduled presidential elections (McBeth 2008, 81). The following year, an amendment was made to this constitution to increase the presidential term limit to seven years, allow for the re-election of the president, abolish the Council of State, and create a position of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces for Gómez (McBeth 2008, 88). When the threat of the Castro invasion was resolved, Gómez, reflecting on the level of popular support he received, stated that he was filled with “great satisfaction and pride that I have not ploughed the sea” (cited in McBeth 2008, 84), alluding to one of Bolívar’s final statements about the failure of his own revolution. Rather than holding the promised presidential elections of 1914, Gómez retained an active military presence and replaced the state president positions held by the old caudillos with his own supporters and family members. Some ministers resigned in protest and entered into exile, while a number of university students from the Asociación General de Estudiantes (AGE - General Association

of Students) were arrested before the headquarters of the AGE was shut down and demolished within a matter of days of the protests (McBeth 2008, 86). The constitutional change was justified by the claim that Venezuela required a strong government to encourage foreign investment and ensure peace and progress (McBeth 2008, 88).

Subsequent changes to the constitution varied in form but all had the purpose of strengthening Gómez’s power in the nation. For instance, the fifth constitution of Gómez’s regime, issued in 1925, centralised public administration by “[reserving] to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power … everything relative to the organisation, collection and investment of stamp taxes, cigarettes, title deeds, matches, alcoholic beverages, and all the rest that may be established by law with a national tax character” (Mariñas Otero 1965, cited in Diaz-Cayeros 2006, 161). This removed the ability of the states to collect any significant revenue and created a dependency on Gómez for the distribution of funding. The use of legal mechanisms to justify Gómez’s rule and limit the power of supporters and critics was a key element to the survival of his leadership and a demonstration of a style of pseudo-contingent reinforcement.

Gómez’s Use of Patronage Networks for Economic and Political Control Gómez’s establishment of vast patronage networks to assert greater political and economic control over Venezuela was a defining moment of his leadership, as it contributed to the underdevelopment of the country, with its national resources and profits serving the interests of the few. The discovery of oil impacted Venezuela in a variety of ways, especially economically as this new wealth enabled Gómez to utilise a pseudo-contingent reinforcement style to establish and maintain a large patronage network to support his rule. Gómez primarily did this through the granting of land concessions to his supporters, as well through the provision of generous tax breaks to encourage foreign investment. Between 1908 and 1929, exports from Venezuela increased by 790%, easily overtaking the value of the traditional exports of coffee and cocoa (McBeth 1983, 109). In 1918, when Venezuela had installed the appropriate infrastructure to begin large-scale oil extraction, the Minister of Development, Gumersindo Torres, proposed new regulations to increase royalties and taxes on the oil, thereby allocating the state more revenue (Vera 1983, 49; Coronil 1997, 80). Until this point in time, foreign oil companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, had been paying very little tax – only 2 bolívares per tonne of oil and 1 bolívares per hectare of land (Coronil 1997, 78). However, at the protest of these companies, Gómez fired Torres in 1922 and allowed the companies to compose oil

legislation (Bucheli & Aguilera 2010, 365; McBeth 1983). The legislation drafted by these companies was in effect from 1920–1943 and meant that foreign oil companies operating in Venezuela continued to pay very little in taxes – only 9% – to the Venezuelan government, as well as receive tax concessions on their imports (Coronil 1997, 82).

Gómez also rewarded his key supporters with high-level military and political positions to build a loyal patronage network. Tinker Salas (2015, 67) notes that Gómez expanded the military by stacking its officers with men from his home state in Táchira. He professionalised the military by supplying it with modern equipment and additional training by foreign experts (Tinker Salas 2015, 67). Castro loyalists in the military were removed from their commands and were replaced by officers close to Gómez. This was not difficult for Gómez to do, as the most recent attempt to overthrow Castro (1901-1903) by various caudillos had had a devastating impact on the nation. Ewell (1984, 46) claims that the conflict was the “most extensive since the Independence Wars. Over 12,000 people were killed in over 210 armed encounters. Livestock and crops were destroyed. The old political parties disintegrated.” The conflict greatly weakened the caudillos. This allowed Gómez to assert his dominance over the remaining caudillos. Very quickly, men loyal to Gómez dominated the top ranks of the national army, indicating the use of pseudo-individualised consideration and contingent reinforcement:

… cronyism, favouritism, and corruption dominated the upper ranks of the army during the 1920s and 1930s. Even though reforms to the laws that governed the armed forces in 1903 and 1923 had established impartial criteria for advancement within the officer corps, Gómez granted promotions on a personalistic basis (Trinkunas 2005a, 32).

Although Gómez established extensive patronage networks in the military, politics, and business, he limited the power that was available to persons in these networks. For instance, he maintained control of the national armoury by limiting the number of armaments accessible by the states in order to prevent any attempt by his state presidents to remove him from power (McBeth 2008, 6). In business, Gómez had a strong hold over the Venezuelan cattle industry, and would appoint his business partners to various positions such as the regional military commander or state governor to strengthen ties (Yarrington 2003, 94). These supporters supervised his ranches and plantations, as well as searched for new opportunities for investment. Any sizeable ranch or cattle stock that came up for sale had to be first offered to Gómez to restrict the operations of competing interests in the cattle

industry and protect Gómez’s own interests (Yarrington 2003, 94, 98). An example of this occurred in 1912, when Gómez, his nephew José María García who was the state president of Zulia, and his brother-in-law Francisco Antonio Colmenares Pacheco, purchased a controlling interest in a cattle ranch that led to exclusive concessions and contracts being granted to it by the government in subsequent years (Linder 1992, 230-36). Alexander (1982, 11) aptly captures the vast reach of Gómez in Venezuela, observing: “Gómez practiced nepotism to the extreme”, appointing his vast array of children, brothers, and cousins “[to] positions as state governors, generals in the armed forces, and numerous other posts”, while his family “were also vastly favoured with lands, money, and other material benefits. Everything was at the disposal of ‘El Benemérito’ (‘The Well Deserving’) as he had himself called.”

Gómez’s Justification of the Nature of His Regime: Cesarismo Democrático Gómez justified his choice of regime with the theory of Cesarismo Democrático (Democratic Caesarism). This theory was based upon Bolivarian Positivism, which had initially emerged as a school of thought out of the Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV – Central University of Venezuela) in the 1860s. Bolivarian Positivism, constructed from the political works of Bolívar, emphasised the requirement of a leader to tailor the regime according to the unique needs, environment, and resources of the nation. Drawing on this premise, Cesarismo Democrático was developed to give “ideological coherence to his [Gómez’s] mandate” (Uzcategui 2010, 143) by two of his supporters, Laureano Vallenilla Lanz Snr. and Pedro Manuel Arcaya (Vera 1983). Consequently, Gómez’s regime was enfolded in the veneer of a social theory developed to legitimise his rule. As a result, the regime took on a personalist character that emphasised Gómez as the only leader capable of delivering order and progress to Venezuela (Morón 1964, 193; Coronil 1997, 84). Gómez’s decision to create and rely upon this theory to justify his method of rule was a defining moment of his leadership as it demonstrated an attempt to create a reliance upon his leadership, situate all power within his position at the expense of the country’s needs, and ascend to idol status (pseudo-idealised influence).

Similar to Bolívar, and following the political theory of Bolivarian Positivism, Gómez argued that Venezuelans were not capable of governing themselves, and that an authoritarian leader supported by the military was the best form of government for them (Pendle 1963, 167). While both Bolívar and Gómez created political institutions to maintain their power, the key

difference was the actual use of that power. For example, Bolívar, one of the richest men in Venezuela prior to the independence wars, spent his fortune on financing the independence movement and, in the aftermath, providing pensions to the widows of soldiers who had died in the wars. At the end of his life, he was destitute (Lynch 2006). Gómez, on the other hand, was said to have treated Venezuela as his own personal hacienda, which he used to enrich himself and his allies (Morón 1964; Erlich 1974).

The key text that presented this theory was published in 1919 by Vallenilla Lanz Snr., and titled Cesarismo Democrático: estudio sobre las bases sociológicas de la constitución efectiva de Venezuela (Democratic Caesarism: study of the sociological bases of an effective constitution of Venezuela) (see Morón 1964, 193; Vera 1983, 51; Uzcategui 2010). This work argued that “the rule of the strongman in Venezuela, or anywhere else in Spanish America, was not the negation of democracy, but rather the fulfilment of true democracy”. “True democracy”, according to Gómez, Arcaya and Vallenilla Lanz Snr., was the authority of the strongman as the “highest expression of the democratic will of the people”, with the strongman conceptualised as a “messiah” who possessed “superior qualities” with “an undefined special spiritual relationship with the people” (cited in Vera 1983, 51-2). Such a leader was necessary, argued Vallenilla Lanz Snr., drawing on Bolívar’s arguments that the Venezuelan people, due to “a legacy of civil strife, fragmented economies, racial mixing, and the lack of educational institutions”, were “unprepared for democratic institutions” (Coronil 1997, 175).

The strongman could also be understood as a gendarme necesario, “necessary policeman”, a concept based on leaders such as Bolívar and José Antonio Paéz, who, according to the theory, exemplified qualities such as political astuteness and military talent, to provide the country with stability and defend national unity (Morón 1964; Vera 1983, 51-52). According to Arcaya, the caudillo Páez was the epitome of the “Prestige” required to establish order over the “primitive nature of the Venezuelans”, while Bolívar was the ultimate archetype of perfect leadership in Venezuela, possessing the right combination of strength and vision (Vera 1983, 61). This philosophy of leadership influenced political discourse in Venezuela from the nineteenth century. The conception of the ideal leader as a paternal Bolívar – tough and ruthless or visionary and progressive as required – has subsequently underpinned ways of understanding, embodying, and justifying leadership in Venezuela, regardless of regime type or the time period in which it occurs.

Gómez’s Management of Dissent Through Political Repression A final defining moment of Gómez’s rule was his decision to suppress alternative political voices due to the threat they posed to his political survival. This included the barring of opposition political parties and the use of a secret police force known as La Sagrada Familia (The Sacred Family), populated almost entirely from his home state of Táchira (Trinkunas 2005b, 32), to persecute opposition. Over the course of his rule of Venezuela, Gómez suppressed over 20 uprisings (McBeth 2008; Tarver & Frederick 2006), with the Generación de ’28 (Generation of 1928) being one of the most notable due to the widespread protests it generated.

Although Gómez’s regime initially began with a stated promise of democracy, political factionalism amongst the caudillos and the traditional political parties prompted Gómez to centralise in an effort to avoid “anarchy and chaos” (McBeth 2008, 27). Over the course of his regime, over 20,000 Venezuelans went into exile (Jones 1936, 90), while another 38,000 political opponents were imprisoned (Cohen 1997, 119; Parejo 2005, 8). Vast roads and highways throughout the country were built with the labour of “road gangs” – political prisoners sentenced to hard labour (Burggraaff 1972, 24; Morón 1964, 193; Trinkunas 2010, 240; Kozloff 2006). Many political opponents were also held in La Rotunda prison in Caracas, where mass torture and killing occurred (Ewell 1984, 55; Gilbert 1929). The Sagrada Familia secret police were Gómez’s means of collecting intelligence and controlling his opponents. According to Gómez, this suppression was all in the name of progress:

Upon coming to the Presidency, I determined that the national energies, instead of continuing to lose themselves in unfruitful fields, should begin to run through fertile and generous lands … I was ruthless and inexorable until I affected a change (Gómez n.d., cited in Jones 1936, 91).

Although La Sagrada’s reach in Venezuela was extensive, Gómez still experienced challenges to his rule. The first major challenge occurred in 1914, when he failed to hold the promised presidential elections. This resulted in a number of supporters adopting an anti- Gomecista (anti-Gómez) position and either entering into exile or openly rebelling. A second major challenge occurred in 1919, when a faction within the military, backed by some civilian support, attempted to rebel against Gómez’s monopolisation of Venezuela’s key industries (Ellner 2008, 37).

To control these emerging movements Gómez utilised La Sagrada to monitor, harass, torture, and murder, dissidents, while no mass political organisations were allowed to exist (Levine 1973). Gómez also used the army to subdue any strikes in the oil fields, and this in turn lent him more support from foreign powers, such as the USA, with interests in Venezuela’s oil production (Vera 1983, 49). When high-ranking military officers attempted a rebellion in the mid-1920s, Gómez’s response was to close the military academy, only reopening it in 1931 when it had been relocated to his personal base in Maracay (Trinkunas 2005b, 32). Trinkunas (2005b, 33) notes that the power of Gómez to do this “is the strongest indication of the complete absence of autonomy” in the military at that time. Student protests against Gómez’s regime also occurred in 1912, 1917, 1921, and 1928 (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 83).

The student protest of 1928 is significant in the nation’s history, due to the involvement of a number of students, such as Rómulo Betancourt, who would go on to become important figures in Venezuela’s democratic transition (Ellner 1995). The protest was a defining moment because it provides insight into Gómez’s leadership during direct challenges to his rule. It was initiated by the arrest of three students from the UCV in Caracas for speaking out against Gómez’s regime and calling for “the radical reform of the nation’s electoral system” (Bond 1984, 53; Martz 1995). The imprisonment of the three students led to further protests and arrests before culminating in a heavy-handed response from Gómez which included the deployment of the military and a number of students being imprisoned, exiled, or killed (McBeth 2008, 222-25; Tarver & Frederick 2006, 83). Although key Gómez supporters viewed the protests as essentially harmless, Gómez responded with force, which in turn generated widespread popular discontent (McBeth 2008). Supporters such as Pedro Manuel Arcaya, the interior minister, and Vicentico, Gómez’s son and the inspector general of the army, lobbied Gómez to release the students, but he refused and instead moved 300 arrested students to the dungeons at Puerto Cabello fort (McBeth 2008, 224). This move escalated tensions and resulted in the closure in protest of a number of businesses, employees of the Bank of Venezuela and the dockworkers at La Guaira port going on strike, and the suspension of the telephone service in Caracas. Gómez then arrested another 300 employees of the businesses involved for their part in the “sympathetic strike” against the regime (McBeth 2008, 224-25). McBeth (2008, 225) notes that it was only after more public protests that Gómez realised that the resistance to his regime was “receiving the wholehearted approval of public opinion”. This prompted the release of some, though not all, of the imprisoned students, many of whom fled to exile.

Trinkunas (2010) suggests that the political repression Gómez engaged in throughout his rule destroyed the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties in Venezuela, but it also allowed for a new kind of politics to emerge; one that pushed for democracy. The exile of many future leaders of Venezuela’s democratic period contributed to their political and leadership development. Abroad, they were able to engage in a level of networking, discussion, and learning that would not have been available to them in Venezuela. As a result, an unintended consequence of Gómez’s political repression was the development of the nation’s democratic movement.

Gómez’s rule of Venezuela ended in 1935 when he died of natural causes. The longevity of his political rule has been attributed to a financially weak and fragmented opposition, as well as his ability to distribute oil concessions and other material benefits to vast patronage networks (McBeth 2008). Following Gómez’s death, Venezuela was ruled by a further three authoritarian presidents: Eleazar López Contreras (1936-1941), Isaías Medina Angarita (1941-1945) and Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1948-1958). The next section examines the rule of Pérez Jiménez, Venezuela’s last “iron-fisted” dictator (The Guardian 2001; The Economist 2001).

The Defining Moments of Pérez Jiménez’s Leadership, 1952-1958 Marcos Pérez Jiménez, a military general, was the final ruler of Venezuela’s Third Republic. Following the death of Gómez, there were two interim presidents and a brief three-year period of democracy from 1945–1948 known as the trienio. Pérez Jiménez and co- conspirators staged a coup d’état to re-establish control of Venezuela by the military (Derham 2002). Upon officially taking power in 1952, although allegedly having a hand in the assassination of one interim president and controlling another “puppet” president between 1948 and 1952, Pérez Jiménez requested that the Venezuelan people “unite unquestioningly” behind his regime and forego any “political activity, personalism, foreign ideology, freedom of expression, and, especially, any elements of conflict within Venezuela” (Erlich 1974, 29). In return, Pérez Jiménez promised transactional rewards in the form of development and prosperity.

Pérez Jiménez’s Use of Electoral Manipulation to Protect His Power Pérez Jiménez, similar to Gómez, utilised a legal veneer to legitimate his regime. This was a defining moment for his leadership, as it demonstrated the lengths he would go to ensure his

political survival. The legal veneer of Pérez Jiménez’s was primarily achieved through the appearance of elections. However, in order to ensure that he maintained his hold on the presidency, Pérez Jiménez also engaged in tactics such as political repression and the outright manipulation of electoral results. These tactics align with the electoral authoritarian typology and indicate that Pérez Jiménez’s regime was moving away from the traditional authoritarian model and adopting a hybrid character, which coincided with a move by the West towards the promotion of democracy.

Pérez Jiménez’s manipulatory tactics could be clearly seen in the 1952 election for the presidency. It was considered fraudulent due to two reasons. First, some political parties including Acción Democrática (AD – Democratic Action) and the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV - Communist Party of Venezuela) had been outlawed and were unable to participate in the elections. Upon taking power in the coup in 1948, the military accused AD of being controlled by “extremists” in an attempt to de-legitimate the party (Burggraaff 1972, 116). As Pérez Jiménez rejected the communist philosophy, the PCV was outlawed as well. Other parties such as the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI, otherwise known as the Social Christian Party) and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD – Democratic Republican Union) were given approval to run. The second reason was the fact that, on the day of the election, government reporting of the results indicated that the URD candidate, Jóvito Villaba, had won. Alexander (1964, 41) observes that URD received 54% of the vote, COPEI 15%, and junta’s own party, the Frente Electoral Independiente (FEI - Independent Electoral Front) received 25%. Upon realising that the FEI would not win the election, Pérez Jiménez halted the announcement of results and then declared that the FEI had won the elections. As a result, many URD and COPEI members joined the AD and PCV in exile (Ewell 1984, 107), with Pérez Jiménez deporting the leaders of URD (Alexander 1964, 41). Yet, similar to the effect of the exile of students under Gómez, while abroad these leaders were able to continue the development of the democratic movement and formulate policies and strategies for an eventual transition to democracy in Venezuela.

Within this same election a constituent assembly was established, and a recount of votes ordered by Pérez Jiménez revealed that the FEI had won a majority of seats in the assembly, with 59 out of the 104 available seats (Alexander 1964, 41). Many representatives from other parties did not attend the assembly sessions out of fear of arrest (Ewell 1984). The FEI- dominated constituent assembly then wrote a new constitution for Venezuela and elected

Pérez Jiménez to the role of “constitutional president” with a five-year term (Alexander 1982, 386). These events indicate an abuse of power on the part of Pérez Jiménez, as he and supporters manipulated the election results in an effort to establish himself as the president of Venezuela and provide a veneer of legality to his regime. Pérez Jiménez’s use of elections in this regard fits with the electoral authoritarian model of regime classification due to the management of elections to that only one pre-determined winner is possible. However, following the election and in response to the political repression ordered by Pérez Jiménez, a “clandestine coalition of civilian groups, military officers, and urban masses” began to form in preparation for the promised elections of 1957 (Ewell 1984, 108).

Pérez Jiménez promised that an election would be held for the position of president in 1957, but he instead chose to hold a plebiscite. This plebiscite was a simple “yes” or “no” vote to determine whether he would rule for another five years. Voters had the choice of two cards – one “yes” or one “no” – to deposit into the voting box. Government workers and employees of private firms in business with the government were forced to vote “yes” for Pérez Jiménez and had to prove their vote by bringing in the “no” card to their place of work (Alexander 1964, 49). The New York Times reported that moments before the first ballot box opened, it was announced that Pérez Jiménez had won with 85% of the vote (Kantor 1959, 245). This resulted in an uprising in parts of the air force and navy. It was, however, subdued because, at that point, Pérez Jiménez still maintained a majority of support from the army. While Pérez Jiménez was not a particularly charismatic leader, he did have strong patronage networks within the military high command that protected the threat to his rule during this event (The Economist 2001; The Guardian 2001). This patronage network was the key to his power, yet an approaching economic crisis, an uneven distribution of patronage, and the targeting of military officers for monitoring and arrest by the SN eroded his support base.

The fraudulent election of 1952 and the plebiscite of 1957 demonstrate the use of pseudo- contingent reinforcement on the part of Pérez Jiménez, as an abuse of power took place to manipulate results. To Pérez Jiménez, the will of the people was of lesser importance than the benefit that he believed his regime could bring to the modernisation of Venezuela. In reflecting on his government during this period, Pérez Jiménez stated:

Yes, we did that for appearance’s sake, to fulfill that formality. But not because we gave it the full importance we gave to other things. The achievements of the government

continued to be of capital importance. Since I understood that if the parties were once again given full powers, the exceptional undertaking the government was carrying out in Venezuela would be truncated, I decided to use a democratic form in order to extend my government for one more period. Just one more period, so as to then withdraw from the field because I knew that within this period of time it would be possible to accomplish a sum of works which would have been impossible to achieve in twenty-five years of democracy (cited in Blanco 1983, 187; Coronil 1997, 164).

This statement demonstrates Pérez Jiménez’s justification for his regime and identifies that his key measurement for success was the regime’s performance. As performance was the benchmark, this necessitated styles of leadership that precluded pluralism and instead focused on efficiency. The manipulation of legal mechanisms such as elections and plebiscites was a strategic choice on the part of Pérez Jiménez in an attempt to provide a veneer of legal legitimacy.

Pérez Jiménez’s Use of Patronage Networks Like Gómez, Pérez Jiménez chose to strengthen his power through the provision of generous concessions to foreign oil companies in return for their investment in Venezuela. An oil boom beginning in 1950 as a result of an increase in global prices due to events such as the Korean War coincided with Pérez Jiménez’s rise to power. According to Karl (1997, 97), during his rule crude exports grew 7.4% per annum, while oil sales increased 14% per annum for the period 1948-1957. Treasury reserves tripled as a result and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita rose to be the highest among all Latin American countries (Wilpert 2007a, 11). This growth was useful to Pérez Jiménez for several reasons. It enabled him to utilise a pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style to engage in performance legitimation strategies, secure support through patronage networks, and attract international support and investment. Pérez Jiménez’s choice to focus on wealth distribution through his patronage networks was a defining moment for his leadership because, again like Gómez, national resources and profits were captured by a small elite.

Pérez Jiménez and his supporters “naively assumed that the benefits of prosperity would trickle down to the poor” and provide material advancements for the people of Venezuela (Erlich 1974, 29). However, the benefits of this growth were mainly felt in the capital Caracas and other highly populated areas, while economic growth in rural areas remained stagnant, contributing to the construction of the “two Venezuelas”, one rich and the other poor, as identified by Tinker Salas (2015, 89). The primary cause of the “two Venezuelas”

was the capture of profits from Venezuelan industries by Pérez Jiménez and his patronage network. Pseudo-contingent reinforcement was an integral style for Pérez Jiménez’s political survival, as he used material rewards to secure and maintain support. This came not only in the form of the funnelling of Venezuela’s oil wealth to elites, but also the practice of nepotism. For instance, Pérez Jiménez granted leading supporters key government positions: of his 38 principal supporters “20 held the 25 most important civil or military positions” in 1957 (Taylor 1968, 38). Key military supporters were also rewarded with elite facilities, equipment and training programs. Examples of this include the construction of the Círculo Militar (Military Circle), an “opulent military facility” (Trinkunas 2005b, 89) that contained exclusive leisure facilities, such as swimming pools, hotels, and restaurants, for the military (Ewell 1984, 100), and a scholarship program to send officers overseas for training and education.

Oil revenue was distributed through construction project contracts awarded by the state to private companies and individuals connected to Pérez Jiménez (Karl 1997, 97). These contracts would often be awarded on a non-competitive basis, or the tenders would quote far above the actual cost required to deliver the work. For instance, Ewell (1984, 110-11) notes that:

In the 1948-58 period, of the sixteen principal contracting firms engaged in Public Works, only four lacked well-known links with the government. Government workers, and Pérez Jiménez himself, shared in the lucrative subcontracting business. EVICSA, founded for the sole purpose of receiving government contracts, divided up the profits with Pérez Jiménez. The rapid urban construction also saw a new boom in speculation on urban land and a rapid rise in the banking and mortgage businesses. Pérez and his ministers benefited by the government purchase of land for freeways and other public works; one option which an intermediary of Pérez’s purchased for Bs 30 per square meter was subsequently sold to the government for Bs 120 per square meter, with the intermediaries presumably pocketing the difference.

The impact of corruption was the accumulation of debt despite the wealth that was being generated by oil revenue. From 1945, government income increased eight times over and oil income increased 11 times over. Yet, by 1957, government debt had risen to US$1.4 billion (Coronil 1997, 201). This was in part due to the government’s practice of “[postponing payment of] its debts to the construction companies with which it had contracted for projects” in the pursuit of modernising the country (Coronil 1997, 201). The next sub-section examines Pérez Jiménez’s grand modernisation plan in greater detail.

Pérez Jiménez’s Grandiose Vision Pérez Jiménez used grand development projects as a symbol of prosperity for the nation, which in turn provided legitimacy to the regime and his leadership. This was a defining moment because he implemented a grandiose vision in a short-sighted manner that prioritised his patronage networks and generated over US$1 billion in debt (Coronil 1997, 201).

Pérez Jiménez rejected the personalism often associated with authoritarianism and instead tied the justification for his regime arrangements to the idea of economic growth and progress. Pérez Jiménez was a leader concerned with demonstrating the wealth and modernity of the nation by creating a “revolution of the physical geography of Venezuela” (Coronil 1997, 176). Pérez Jiménez believed that the nation first needed prosperity before democratic freedoms could be guaranteed:

Man will defend property more when he has it than when it covets it; he will preserve his health better when he has felt the full enjoyment of it; he will try to inform himself more when he has felt the benefits of education, and he will use liberty better, protecting it from ambushes of demagogues or tyrants, when he has lived in its legitimate environment of respect and of order (cited in Erlich 1974, 32).

Pérez Jiménez’s guiding governance strategy for his regime was called the Nuevo Ideal Nacional, “New National Ideal”, which argued, like Bolívar and Gómez before him, that dictatorship was a necessary tool for progress and efficiency (Coronil 1997; Levine 1973). An advisor and, at one point, Minister of the Interior, to Pérez Jiménez was Laureano Vallenilla Lanz Planchart, son of Vallenilla Lanz Snr., the author of Cesarismo Democrático. Vallenilla Lanz Jnr. advanced his father’s argument that dictatorship was “the happiest state for the Venezuelan people” until the collective was mature enough to manage democracy (Erlich 1974, 42). He further posited that “an enlightened dictatorship [w]as the ideal tool for imposing progress and social justice” (Plaza 2008, 4). In grounding the basis of his regime in Bolivarian Positivism, Pérez Jiménez was able to garner legitimacy through the historical precedents set by the likes of Bolívar and Gómez.

Pérez Jiménez’s vision focused on the material advancement of Venezuela and the physical demonstration of its greatness. Despite this vision, the regime of Pérez Jiménez “was not particularly unique in an age and on a continent which glorified a special military mission, national discipline, and material development, usually to the exclusion of social justice”

(Erlich 1974, 29). The Nuevo Ideal Nacional asserted that it was the duty of the military to remove political discord from society and channel the state’s energies toward the progress of the nation and the public works that would embody it (Coronil 1997). In arguing the necessity of the Nuevo Ideal Nacional, Pérez Jiménez stated:

We must admit that we have lacked that fundamental element of the life of people which consists of clear and precise formulation of a national ideal, capable of binding us into an agreement of wills for its full realization. That ideal, of which so much as been said among us, but for whose concretion we have done so little, has two fundamental forms of objective expression: on one hand, the utilisation of our historical estate as a source of moral values, and on the other, the adequate utilisation of the material resources of the country to better the luck of living Venezuelans, especially the luck of the least favoured, and to bequeath future generations a more prosperous country (cited in Erlich 1974, 30- 31).

State-owned industries in steel and hydroelectric power, a national railroad and production of atomic energy and aluminium were part of Pérez Jiménez’s development plan for Venezuela (Ellner 1995). There were countless construction projects tendered out by the government, a steady stream of immigrants to supplement the labour force, and an expansion of power infrastructure, agriculture, irrigation, transportation and communication (Erlich 1974, 35). Ellner (2008, 47) has emphasised the “nationalist overtones” of these policies, in that Pérez Jiménez focused on developing state-owned industries in areas such as steel with Siderúrgica del Orinoco (SIDOR), telecommunications, petrochemicals, and hydroelectricity (Ellner 1995, 105; Coronil 1997). Pérez Jiménez’s economic policy strayed little from the foundations laid by Gómez in building upon domestic industry and is closely linked to the “military developmental ideologies of Perón in Argentina, Odría in Peru, and Rojas Pinilla in Colombia” (Coronil 1997, 174-75). These developmental ideologies were implemented alongside military rule and emphasised nationalist anti-imperialism, populist policies targeted at workers, and modernisation through infrastructure projects (Dix 1985).

Finally, in addition to his emphasis on economic advancement and prosperity, Pérez Jiménez articulated themes of nationalism and modernity through the “organisation of culture as an apolitical area” (Plaza 2008, 5). Pérez Jiménez invested in activities such as “the Week of the Fatherland” that involved parades and ceremonies, with the aim to link his regime to the glory of past leaders such as Bolívar to underscore “a line of continuity between political and economic independence on the one hand and the founders of the nation and its present-day builders on the other” (Coronil 1997, 169). Folklore that emphasised national unity was

incorporated into the school curriculum, while funding was given to traditional dance groups (Ewell 1984, 109). Significant investment in museums, sports such as baseball, and associated infrastructure also occurred (Ewell 1984; Tinker Salas 2015, 88). This was all done with the purpose of “building a homogenizing national culture” (Coronil 1997, 172) to discipline “cultural creativity” and control dissent (Plaza 2008).

Pérez Jiménez’s Use of Political Repression to Protect His Political Survival Pérez Jiménez utilised political repression and the SN to identify and remove potential opposition. The use of these two tools was evident throughout the entirety of Pérez Jiménez’s administration, and was a defining moment of his leadership because it reflected his continual efforts to prevent the articulation of an alternative vision for Venezuela by other political groups.

Pérez Jiménez carried on Gómez’s legacy of severe political repression and persecution. The threat of punishment in the form of exile and even death ensured that potential dissenters conformed to the regime’s objectives (Morón 1964). Many opponents were jailed or exiled, and the assassinations of two key AD leaders, Leonardo Ruiz Pineda and Antonio Pinto Salinas, have been attributed to the regime (Alexander 1982, 332-33; Ellner 2008, 48). Moreover, the interim leader of Venezuela from 1948-1950, Delgado Chalbaud, died in 1950 in “obscure circumstances”, with the implication being that Pérez Jiménez had arranged Chalbaud’s assassination (Alexander 1964; Ellner 2008, 48). Following the 1948 coup d’état, the ruling junta suspended constitutional guarantees and forbade public meetings (Lott 1957, 543), while political parties such as AD and PCV were banned (Ellner 2008, 47), although URD and COPEI were permitted to openly operate until the 1952 election. In 1952, a new regulation required political parties wanting to hold public meetings to submit to the government “an organic act” which contained the purpose of each party’s operation as well as the signature of each member. Details of meetings, income, expenditure, party correspondence, and members, including age, sex, profession and address, were required by the government. Political parties also had to gain government permission to hold meetings at least 48 hours prior to the planned meeting time (Lott 1957, 543-44). Although the Pérez Jiménez government relaxed the outright ban on political parties and public meetings, it was still necessary for genuine opposition to operate clandestinely. Despite COPEI and URD complying with these requirements, leaders from these parties were regularly arrested, and

each “party had its quota of long-time political prisoners, deportees, and martyrs” (Alexander 1964, 47).

In addition to restrictions on political parties, there was no freedom of the press, labour unions were outlawed, and only pro-government universities were allowed to operate (Alexander 1964; Tarver & Frederick 2006, 97-8). Political opponents were jailed, and concentration camps in the jungle were created to house the overflow of prisoners (Kantor 1959, 245; Levine & Crisp 1999). The most notorious jail, Guasina, was located on a small island on the Orinoco Delta in the west of Venezuela. COPEI condemned the jail in 1952 in an open letter to the junta. It argued that such a place “merits public censure” due to the regime’s efforts to subject the political prisoners “to continuous maltreatment, and to forced labour, under pain of severe and terrible punishment” (COPEI 20 June 1952, cited in Alexander 1964, 40). Guasina was operated by the SN, which was used by Pérez Jiménez to monitor, harass, torture or murder opposition and those who fell from his favour (Erlich 1974; Alexander 1982). Tarver and Frederick (2006, 97) contend, “thousands of Venezuelans were tortured and murdered during his [Pérez Jiménez’s] administration”.

By 1957, the influence and reach of the SN had infiltrated the military. This cultivated mistrust among the officers, and many began to resent its influence over security matters in Venezuela. This mistrust was returned: Pérez Jiménez began to use the SN to target military officers for surveillance, arrest and torture, thereby leading his primary support base to turn on him (Levine 1973; Koeneke 1983, 48). In addition, the SN’s intelligence network included “the security departments of the major foreign oil companies” (Tinker Salas 2015, 90), generating fear and anger about its reach and the regime’s collusion with foreign interests. Pérez Jiménez’s patronage network also began to fail, as young officers in the armed forces resented the lack of “promotional opportunities” (Tinker Salas 2015, 91). In 1957, the SN arrested five Catholic priests following the publication of an open letter on 1 May of that year that condemned political repression under Pérez Jiménez and criticised the regime’s social policy. This act resulted in an increase of “open hostility” between the Church and the regime (Alexander 1964, 48), and was significant due to the strong societal influence that the Church had, and still has, in Venezuela. Ultimately, Pérez Jiménez was unseated due to an accumulation of these factors combined with the growing organisation of a clandestine opposition that included AD, URD and COPEI. On 22 January 1958, the military requested his resignation and Pérez Jiménez fled the nation in exile. His removal from power ended

Venezuela’s Third Republic and initiated its transition to democracy under the Pact of Punto Fijo.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the leaderships of three key presidents during Venezuela’s authoritarian period. It has demonstrated the importance of Bolívar’s political thought to subsequent regimes as a legitimating agent, particularly during the twentieth century. The chapter also demonstrated the differences in the authoritarian regimes of Bolívar versus Gómez and Pérez Jiménez. While Gómez and Pérez Jiménez relied upon a centralised executive, oil wealth, extensive patronage networks, and political repression to establish and defend their leaderships, Bolívar utilised a centralised governance structure to ensure stability for his vision in a time of nation building. Gómez and Pérez Jiménez consistently used violence throughout their regimes to maintain their power. In contrast, Bolívar used fear and violence in critical situations, such as during the Second Republic. This was evident in the war to the death policy, which was enacted to counteract the ruthlessness of the pro-royalists. However, such a choice does not negate the presence, in other events, of authentic leadership styles. Rather, the case of Bolívar demonstrates the hybrid nature of the styles, as well as the interchangeable use of styles according to how the leader perceives the demands of the situation. The next chapter examines three key leaders from Venezuela’s democratic period to further explore this proposition.

Chapter Five: Venezuela’s Democratic Period, 1958-1998

Introduction This chapter examines presidential leadership during Venezuela’s democratic period (1958- 1998). The chapter explores the leadership styles that three influential presidents used to secure their political survival, gain legitimacy, and resolve conflict within a democratic institutional framework. Specifically, the chapter looks at various defining moments in the administrations of Rómulo Betancourt (1945-1947 & 1959-1964), Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979 & 1989-1993), and Rafael Caldera (1969-1974 & 1994-1999). These presidents were chosen due to their major influence on Venezuela over two presidential terms. No other leaders in Venezuela’s history, except for Hugo Chávez during the Fifth Republic, won two terms as president via electoral ballot. The defining moments of these leaders will provide a comparative position to assess the relationship between regime type and leadership style, as outlined in Chapter One’s research aims.

The Defining Moments of Betancourt’s Leadership, 1945-47 & 1959-64 Rómulo Betancourt, often referred to as the “father of Venezuelan democracy” (Tinker Salas 2015), ruled Venezuela as an unelected provisional president from 1945-1947 during an attempt to transition the country to democracy and again as a constitutionally elected president from 1959-1964. Betancourt’s motivations for his advocacy of democracy centred on restoring Venezuela’s political and economy integrity, which, he thought, could only be achieved by installing a regime that was governed by, and for, all citizens (Betancourt 1978). Betancourt’s role as one of the leading architects of the Pact of Punto Fijo, a power-sharing agreement between the three major democratic parties, was significant, as it established the Fourth Republic’s institutional framework to consolidate democracy (Alexander 1982). The following section explores Betancourt’s defining moments of his provisional and constitutional presidencies.

The Defining Moments of Betancourt’s Provisional Presidency, 1945-1947 Betancourt’s provisional presidency of Venezuela for the majority of the period known as the trienio adeco6, commenced in October 1945 when the political party AD, of which he was a key leader, partnered with a military faction known as the Unión Patriótica Militar (UPM - Patriotic Military Union) to launch a coup d’état against the regime of General Isaías Medina Angarita (1941-1945). The UPM consisted of middle-ranking army officers interested in a transition to democracy, and among this group was Marcos Pérez Jiménez, Venezuela’s final dictator during the Third Republic.

According to Kantor (1959), AD agreed to participate in the coup d’état for two reasons. First, AD recognised that there was no constitutional path for it to gain power. This was because, constitutionally, the legislature elected the president, and the legislature was stacked with supporters of Medina Angarita. AD first attempted to avoid a coup by proposing to Medina Angarita that “a neutral person chosen by agreement among all the political groups” take on the role of the presidency for a period of one year while a new constitution guaranteeing secret and universal suffrage was created and elections were organised (Kantor 1959, 241). Medina Angarita rejected this proposal and AD went on to collude with UPM to launch the coup. The second reason that AD participated in the coup was because the UPM had made clear to AD that with or without its participation, a coup d’état would take place. AD thus guaranteed its involvement in order to prevent another military government from taking power (Kantor 1959, 242).

The coup was successful with little resistance from Medina Angarita, and Betancourt was subsequently appointed the provisional president by the civil-miltiary junta established to oversee the country’s transition to democracy. From his beginnings as the unelected provisional president, Betancourt’s priority (1978, 102) was “to put a program of national salvation into effect” which included economic integrity and diversification, enhanced labour rights, and improvements in education, healthcare, and housing.

This “program of national salvation” constitutes a defining moment for Betancourt’s leadership as, in the short-term, the sudden change to the Venezuelan polity caused important societal groups to withdraw support for democratic transition. A second defining moment of

6 A three-year period in which AD ruled the country.

his leadership during the trienio had a longer-term impact. This was Betancourt’s oil policy, which continued the consolidation of Venezuela as a petro-state. This is significant due to the issues that petro-states often face, such as a weak government bureaucracy, an overreliance on export revenue from a single, finite resource, resultant vulnerabilities in the global market, high levels of foreign ownership and control, and an industrial sector that is capital-intensive and functions as an “enclave”, generating underemployment for unskilled workers and artificially high wages for the workers employed in the resource extraction industry (Karl 1997, 47-48). Venezuela’s consolidation as a petro-state under Betancourt had repercussions for the democratic Fourth Republic period as it both constrained and enabled the leaderships of subsequent presidents examined in this thesis.

Betancourt’s Strategy of Fast-Paced Political Change One element of the country’s democratic transition during the trienio was the fast-paced political change that constitutes a defining moment for Betancourt’s leadership for two reasons. First, it represented a fulfilment of his promises to institutionalise democratic practices and yet, second, it alienated key societal groups such as the Catholic Church, the military, and big business, that still wielded a significant level of power in Venezuelan society. Betancourt’s failure to sufficiently offer transactional rewards in exchange for these actors’ support stalled the country’s democratic project for another decade.

Betancourt was clear in his attempts to institutionalise democracy. On 30 October 1945, Betancourt (cited in Powell 1971, 66) announced “the unfettered participation of the citizenry” in elections and proceeded to implement a number of reforms to facilitate democratic transition. The key initial reform pertained to the creation of a National Constituent Assembly, whose purpose was to establish Venezuela’s governance structure, draft an electoral law that included universal suffrage, draft a new constitution, and organise elections at the municipal, congressional, and presidential levels (Coronil 1997, 132). Members for the Constituent Assembly were to be elected by popular vote, and four political parties – AD, COPEI, URD and the PCV, participated in its October 1946 elections. AD won a majority, taking 137 out of the available 160 seats in the Assembly (Powell 1971, 67).

New electoral norms such as universal suffrage were enshrined in the constitution shortly thereafter, and AD’s presidential candidate, Rómulo Gallegos, won the election with over 70% of the vote in December 1947, while AD also won 38 out of 46 seats in the Senate and

83 out of 109 seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the congressional vote (Powell 1971, 67). Finally, at the municipal elections just months following the presidential election, AD won another majority. Betancourt’s encouragement of political pluralism, combined with AD’s success at the polls, gave even more legitimacy to the emerging democratic system and AD’s right to govern. Powell (1971, 68) contends that Betancourt used elections as a strategy of “authority legitimation by means of political mobilisation” to increase and capture popular support for democracy. At the grassroots level, he increased political participation by allowing and encouraging political organisation. A large number of workers’ unions and political parties emerged, with the number of unions increasing from 215 in 1945 to over 1,000 in 1948 (Neuhouser 1992, 121). The two political parties that would be signatories to the Pact of Punto Fijo in 1958 – COPEI and URD – were also established during this time.

An outcome of increased political participation was the expansion of AD’s political reach. The party’s strategy prior to the coup was to have a presence throughout the country, using the slogan of “Not a single district, not a single town without its party organisation” (Betancourt 1978, 64). Though it was an ambitious goal to have a party presence in every town in Venezuela, party membership in the AD grew from approximately 80,000 in 1941 to nearly 500,000 by 1948 (Ewell 1984, 99). However, this had an adverse effect on the strength of other political parties in the fledgling democracy. AD’s infiltration of civil society organisations such as labour unions, its expansive party presence throughout the country, and its control of the provisional government and its policy agenda, led to accusations that it was attempting to monopolise political power by using its extensive party membership presence in worker’s unions and peasant syndicates to crowd out support for the other parties (Burggraaff 1972, 80). A defining moment for Betancourt’s leadership was thus the achievement of electoral domination and the far-reaching integration of AD into civil society. This is because its outcome was the alienation of other political parties such as COPEI and URD in the process of democratic transition and governance, and ultimately eventuated in their lack of support for AD in the 1948 military coup d’état which re-established dictatorship in Venezuela for another decade.

Moreover, while political pluralism and activity were encouraged through mobilisation and elections, Betancourt received criticism for turning the presidential palace of Miraflores into a “decree machine” (Burggraaff 1972, 80) and for centralising power in the junta (Coronil 1997, 136). During his term as provisional president, Betancourt (1979, 110) primarily ruled

by decree as he believed that it was necessary to implement fast-paced changes simply “because, for all we knew, our time in government would leave only a collection of laws for those who would come in the future.” In 1946, Betancourt centralised powers in the executive and temporarily limited constitutional guarantees as rumours circulated of a military conspiracy against his government (Tinker Salas 2009, 44). He assumed the power to appoint governors, though, as noted by Coronil (1997, 136), the move was a “marked shift of its [AD’s] own program that specified that governors would be elected by each state”. To combat criticism arising from this move, Betancourt utilised populist measures by promising in May 1947 to give every worker in the country 3,000 bolívares and provide five million bolívares through a housing loan scheme. Betancourt was able to do this largely due to a 240% increase in government revenue as a result of changes made to the taxation of foreign oil companies by the Medina Angarita government with the 1943 Hydrocarbons Act (Coronil 1997, 136-37). While this promise appealed to the poor, it was a defining moment for Betancourt’s leadership as it foreshadowed the practices of future presidents from Venezuela’s Fourth Republic, who, when able, compensated for centralised decision making with populist policies.

In addition to the accusations of the monopolisation of political organisation and a centralisation of power, a further defining moment for Betancourt’s leadership was his prosecution of elites with associations to the regimes of Medina Angarita, López Contreras, and Gómez, as it alienated some powerful business and military elites. On 30 October 1945 in his first address as provisional president, Betancourt (cited in Alexander 1982, 243) announced that those associated with past regimes “must also give account of the origin of their fortune, and return to the nation what they robbed from the nation.” In 1946, Betancourt established the Tribunal de Responsabilidad Civil y Administrativa (TRCA - Tribunal of Civil and Administrative Responsibility). It bypassed the existing court system and investigated the financial accounts of 125 ex-government officials, including Medina Angarita, López Contreras and other leading figures such as Arturo Uslar Pietri, the originator of the popular phrase “to sow the oil” which AD adopted for its state agency Corporación Venezolano de Fomento (CVF - Venezuelan Development Corporation) (Alexander 1982, 244; Coronil 1997, 134; Ewell 1984). The decision to hold to account the beneficiaries of previous regimes has been regarded as one of Betancourt’s most controversial measures during the trienio, as accusations of partisanship and political reprisal reduced for him and that of AD’s political project of democratic transition (Ewell 1984, 106).

The consequence of AD’s electoral domination and fast-paced political change was the absence of support for AD when the military regained control of the government in 1948. The change manifested in increased political freedoms for the general population but lacked the inclusion of other important sectors of civil society. Moreover, Betancourt’s prosecution of still-powerful elites, while an attempt to deliver justice, was strategically miscalculated and damaged the democratic project in Venezuela.

Betancourt’s Social Vision for Venezuela Betancourt’s government during the trienio has been described as “nationalist, democratic, and socially oriented”, with a focus on reforms to improve living conditions (Alexander 1964, 22). While the political changes had alienated other political parties, Betancourt’s socio-economic policies, although benefiting the poor majority, threatened the influence of important societal groups such as the Catholic Church and landowners. This was a defining moment for his leadership, due to the consequences of the fast-paced nature of the changes, which saw Venezuela returned to dictatorship for another decade. The following sub-section examines his reforms for the public education system to reduce the Catholic Church’s influence in the education sphere, and agrarian reform to increase land and home ownership as key events surrounding this defining moment (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 91).

Betancourt’s socio-economic reform policies were the manifestation of his transformational vision of a democratic and egalitarian Venezuela. For Betancourt, educational reforms were one element in achieving this. Yet, these reforms caused controversy due to the threat they posed to the Catholic Church’s influence in the education sector and generated fears that AD was attempting to establish a state monopoly over education (Molina 2004, 155). Betancourt’s most controversial decision in this regard was the enactment of Decree No. 321 on 30 May 1946, which established more stringent controls on private and public schools relating to student exams and teacher training. Widespread protests from private high school teachers, students and their families, and Catholic Church bureaucrats, caused most of the 1947 school year to be lost to protests, as the decree was viewed as encroaching upon the Catholic Church’s “philosophy of education”, its autonomy over training its teachers, and the availability of private education (Ewell 1984, 105).

The result of this policy, despite Betancourt’s attempt to rescind its effects through the 1947 Organic Law of Education, was the political mobilisation of Catholic high school students

against Betancourt and AD, as well as the alienation of the Catholic Church and its constituents from AD during the trienio. Educational changes instituted by Betancourt in this regard constitutes a defining moment, as he did not allow time to build the Church’s trust in the democratic system he was attempting to create. The consequence of this was the Church’s participation in the increasing cacophony against Betancourt and his government, and its lack of support for AD during the 1948 military coup d'état.

An additional defining moment for Betancourt’s vision for Venezuela and the resulting fast- paced change of the country’s polity was his agrarian reform policy. This policy was an attempt to create a more egalitarian nation by redistributing vast tracts of state land acquired during Gómez’s regime to “organised peasantry”, of whom it was alleged that “AD affiliated syndicates received priority” (Ewell 1984, 105). This policy extended land ownership in Venezuela, with the total number of beneficiaries ranging between 55,000 and 80,000. Moreover, the immediate impact of the policy was politically “safe” for Betancourt, as the majority of redistributed land was state-owned or had been confiscated from the estates of the previous dictators and their allies, and thus did not significantly impinge upon private property rights (Ewell 1984, 105).

While Betancourt did not expropriate land, he granted new powers to regional governments that allowed them to halt evictions of tenants or squatters by landowners and readjust landlord-tenant relationships where it was deemed relevant. He also gave a directive to regional governments to “solicit” the owners of arable, yet uncultivated and economically viable lands, to rent those lands out to “poor farmers” or sell the lands to the government (Powell 1971, 69-70). The Comisión de Tierras del Instituto Técnico de Inmigración y Colonización (CTITI - Land Commission of the Technical Institute for Immigration and Colonization), while initially created in December 1945 to facilitate the migration of European farmers to develop the country’s agricultural sector, became the main body through which Betancourt’s government redistributed land to the peasant unions created by AD Venezuelan peasantry. A further measure, the 1947 Decree of Rural Rental Properties, formalised the control by peasant syndicates over private land in rural areas. This had political repercussions for Betancourt, as it shifted power from large private landowners to peasant leaders and was used as evidence to support accusations that he and AD were monopolising political support and engaging in partisanship by prioritising AD-associated syndicates. Rafael Caldera, leader of COPEI and future president in the Fourth Republic,

issued a public letter in June 1946 attacking Betancourt and accusing him of using government land reform agencies to facilitate “gross irregularities and partisan favouritism in the selection of recipient groups” (Powell 1971, 75, 78, 82). Despite denials from Betancourt’s government, economic elites and big business felt threatened by the rapid organisation of workers and peasants, and the “numerically superior” presence of AD in trade unions and peasant syndicates (Alexander 1982, 240; Karl 1997, 96).

Betancourt Maintains Venezuela’s Reliance on Oil Revenue The oil policy changes that occurred just prior to, and during, Betancourt’s provisional presidency have been labelled as “the most fundamental in Venezuelan history” (Lieuwen 1963, 64) due to the lack of impact these policies had on the state’s reliance on oil revenues. Betancourt’s oil policy during the trienio is considered a defining moment for his leadership, as it strengthened Venezuela’s status as a petro-state. The origin of Venezuela’s petro-state economy is situated in the rule of Gómez, whose personalist authoritarian rule and management of the country “as if it were one of his farms” established a weak state bureaucracy subject to the preferences of foreign oil companies (Karl 1997, 77). For Gómez, this was necessary in order to continue receiving the investments of foreign oil companies and the resulting state income to maintain his patronage networks.

It was not until 1943 when Medina Angarita, subject to political pressure from a growing civil society and its evolving preference for state intervention in development, introduced the Hydrocarbons Act that Karl (1997, 85) described as “the most important piece of legislation in the history of Venezuela” due to its “consolidation” of the country as a petro-state. This Act contained the 50-50 principle that was carried over to both Betancourt’s provisional presidency and his constitutional presidency. According to the principle, no foreign oil company could earn more than the state in oil revenue, and it was implemented through a number of tax and royalty measures. Under Medina Angarita, this principle established a new significant source of revenue for subsequent governments, yet it also became

a new set of incentives governing state actions that would overdetermine the preferences and choices of all future governments by proving irresistible to state authorities, regardless of whether they were authoritarian or democratic (Karl 1997, 87-88; italics in original).

Betancourt was a critic of previous regimes’ reliance on oil revenue to fund state activities. His economic rhetoric emphasised the importance of the country strengthening its economic

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sovereignty by increasing its control over oil taxation and profits, and he held a long-term belief that the regimes of Gómez and his successors had given too much power to foreign oil companies and had failed to adequately invest in the development of the nation. For example, in 1936, Betancourt (1978b, 24) critiqued the López Contreras regime’s reliance on oil revenue and argued for the need to improve diversity in Venezuela’s economy as a method to reduce the influence of foreign oil companies and their parent countries:

The Venezuelan government may have no foreign creditors, but our country’s subsoil has been divided up among the great oil trusts. 80 per cent of our exports are made up of oil, an industry in which Venezuelan capital plays no part at all. And when the government receives 45 per cent of its revenues from that industry, the country is only independent on paper, because in fact it is bound very tightly to the big foreign concerns.

Despite Betancourt’s critique of the Venezuelan state’s dependence on oil revenue, his oil policy during the trienio was largely a continuation of the policies enacted during the Medina Angarita regime. The 50-50 principle was retained with the aim to increase the government’s share in oil profits from 15% to 50%, and it also required the reinvestment of the oil profits from foreign companies into other areas of the Venezuelan economy, such as agriculture and industry (Liss 1978, 135). While the policy was announced in late 1945, it was not enacted until just months before the fall of the Gallegos government in 1948. As such, neither the government nor the oil sector felt the full effect of the policy until it was reinstituted under Betancourt’s constitutional presidency in 1959. In addition to the provisional government’s commitment to the 50-50 principle, Betancourt improved work conditions and wages for the oil workers. This involved higher wages, three weeks’ annual paid vacation, and other benefits including housing allowances (Ewell 1984, 101-102). Betancourt also created a government-owned oil company and allocated all future oil concessions to this company as part of a “no more concessions” agreement with the foreign oil companies (Alexander 1964).

Although Betancourt attempted to stimulate the country’s agricultural industry, his oil policy, as the key economic policy of his provisional presidency, did not drastically alter the relationship between the Venezuelan state and its reliance on oil revenue to fund its activities. According to Karl (1997), this is because Venezuela’s governmental institutions had been constructed around a petro-state model during Gómez’s regime and, in the maintenance of the oil exploitation model introduced by the 1943 Hydrocarbons Act. This model has been perpetuated throughout the country’s subsequent history. Betancourt’s provisional presidency ceased on 14 December 1947, when Rómulo Gallegos, AD’s candidate in Venezuela’s first

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democratic elections, won the presidency with 78% of the vote while AD won 86% of seats in the Constitutional Assembly (Monaldi et al. 2006, 11). Gallegos’ presidency, however, lasted just nine months before a military coup d’état, led by some of the officers including Pérez Jiménez, who had originally installed AD in power, delayed Venezuela’s democratic transition for another ten years.

The Defining Moments of Betancourt’s Constitutional Presidency, 1959-1964 The defining moments of Betancourt’s constitutional presidency (1959-1964) can be explored through a theme of inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, Betancourt demonstrated that he had learnt the lessons from the trienio to consult and conciliate with broad sectors of Venezuelan society and to implement a moderately paced reform agenda. His legitimacy in the lead up to the 1959 election was bolstered by the credibility he developed during the trienio. At the beginning of his provisional presidency in 1945, Betancourt and the rest of the junta promised not to run for the position of president in the scheduled elections (Alexander 1964, 22; Rey 2008, 36-7). This promise was kept and marked Betancourt as a leader willing to respect the peaceful transfer of power and uphold institutional integrity according to the rule of law, with such actions reflecting the authentic leadership style of contingent reinforcement. His provisional presidency during the trienio thus formed a retrospective defining moment for his leadership, as Betancourt had, in essence, demonstrated his democratic credentials during that earlier time.

On the other hand, Betancourt’s inclusion of other political groups extended only as far as he viewed them to be legitimate. When civil disturbances arose as a result of the exclusion of the PCV, Betancourt aggressively subdued dissenters. His means to achieve his ultimate goals – to protect Venezuela’s democratic transition and consolidate democracy – ironically contradicted the very principles he was attempting to instil in Venezuelan society. The following section explores the inclusionary and exclusionary defining moments of Betancourt’s constitutional presidency.

Betancourt: A Key Architect in the Pact of Punto Fijo and the 1961 Constitution The key inclusionary defining moments of Betancourt’s leadership during his constitutional presidency are the creations of the Pact of Punto Fijo and the 1961 Constitution. Betancourt’s role in the production of these documents are defining moments for his leadership as they paradoxically not only established the institutional structure for Venezuelan democracy and

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assisted its consolidation but also included provisions for elite capture of the political arena and an “authoritarian outlet” that allowed presidents of Venezuela’s democratic period to govern in a centralised manner. These elements impacted the quality of Venezuelan democracy and assisted in its demise.

The Pact of Punto Fijo emphasised the integrity of democratic institutions and was a power- sharing agreement to organise political relations in the country. Signatories to the Pact included COPEI and URD, and its ultimate aim was to facilitate the transition to democracy. Conditions of the Pact included respect by the various political parties of the peaceful transfer of power at elections in accordance with the rule of law, the “depersonalizing” of political debate, and “interparty consultation” on sensitive policy areas (Levine & Crisp 1999, 132). The Pact obligated Betancourt to include minor parties in the governance process and enshrined principles of mutual respect and cooperation between parties in a formal agreement (Levine & Crisp 1999). It also obligated the signatory parties to commit to “a minimum common program of government” for cooperation and collaboration and avoid “hegemony in the cabinet” so as to ensure representation of “all the national political currents and independent sectors of the country” (Alexander 1982, 427; Koeneke 1983, 56).

The commitment to avoid “hegemony in the cabinet” obligated Betancourt to include other political parties in the process of governing Venezuela. The underpinning of the Pact of Punto Fijo and Betancourt’s administration was coalition governance as a method to promote inclusivity and avoid accusations of partisanship that plagued his provisional presidency. Although URD was a signatory to the Pact in 1958, it exited the agreement in 1960 when the URD Foreign Minister, Ignacio Luis Arcaya, refused to support AD’s opposition to Cuba under the Betancourt Doctrine, a policy that prohibited Venezuela from engaging in foreign relations with other countries ruled by dictatorial regimes (Kelley 1997, 29). Following this refusal, Betancourt fired the minister and replaced him with an AD member (Koeneke 1983, 58). Although Betancourt engaged in coalition governance, he reserved the most important ministries for AD control (Kelley 1977). Kelley (1977, 30) argues that this was a form of patronage system that rewarded loyal coalition partners, such as COPEI, URD, and the FND (Frente Nacional Democrático – National Democratic Front) with higher budgets and salaries for the ministries they controlled. Nevertheless, the inclusion of other parties in government fulfilled his commitment to Puntofijismo, which, in turn, helped to consolidate democracy in the nation.

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The core conditions contained in the Pact of Punto Fijo not only protected Betancourt’s leadership, but also the leaderships of presidents to come. These conditions were complemented by the 1961 Constitution, which Betancourt played a key part in drafting. The 1961 Constitution is notable for the strong powers it provided to the executive, particularly in relation to rule by decree. Karl (1997, 105) argues that the Constitution “reaffirmed state intervention and extreme presidentialism.” The executive controlled national defence, foreign affairs, the nation’s monetary system, all tax and tariff policy, subsoil rights, and the appointment of cabinet ministers, state governors and other enterprise officials. It could also declare a state of emergency and rule by decree (Karl 1987, 83-84).

The 1961 Constitution was designed to protect Venezuela’s consolidation of democracy, but the longer-term impact of the constitution also “insulated” political actors and policies “from pressures for change” (Crisp 2000, 10). In particular, it enabled an emerging political elite to dominate political representation. For instance, rather than voting for a particular candidate, voters were only able to select a party. Each party, due to voter illiteracy concerns, was represented by a colour: white for AD, green for COPEI, and yellow for URD. The parties then decided internally to whom it would grant the seat. Consequently, this often meant that congressional representatives were “accountable to the leaders of their parties rather than their constituents”, as it was the party leader who had the final say in their pre-selection (Crisp 2000, 11). Under the 1961 Constitution, Congress had the power to introduce and pass any bill it desired as long as it had a majority (Crisp 1998). It could also override the president’s suspensive veto on legislation with a simple majority. This meant that, in circumstances where the president’s party did not hold a majority in Congress, Congress’ influence on legislation was strong.

Despite Congress’ robust legislative powers, it passed an average of 28 laws per year (Crisp 1998, 23). Strong party discipline across both AD and COPEI meant that legislative decisions were made by the executive and party headquarters and thus Congress, in reality, was a weak legislative force and executive power was strong. The 1961 Constitution gave the president three types of decree authority: the first was “simple rulemaking authority in the process of executing a law” (Article 190: 10) which was commonplace and did not require special congressional consent as it concerned the administration of a law already passed by Congress. The second was the “delegated decree authority in certain matters by Congress” (Article 190: 8), also known as leyes habilitantes (enabling laws). This power was granted to

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the president when Congress was not in session and, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, allowed the president to “dictate extraordinary measures in economic and financial matters when the public interest requires it”. The third decree power was the president’s assumption of “decree authority while constitutional guarantees are suspended or restricted” in order to deal with unusual or emergency circumstances (Articles 190: 6 and 241) (Crisp 1998, 27-29). The second and third decree authorities subsequently played an important role in Venezuelan politics, as they were often used in times of defining moments to control dissent and push through the policy agenda of a president. Presidents with a majority in Congress were delegated authority “for the longest time and with the widest scope of activity” (Crisp 1998, 29). This attracted criticism, as it often turned governments into “decree-machines” by bypassing Congress, thus reducing representative accountability to constituents and creating legislation unchecked by debate.

During his constitutional presidency, Betancourt drew on these powers in defining moments of his leadership, particularly when it came to protecting Venezuela’s democratic transition and quelling political dissent. Examples of this include, again somewhat paradoxically, the immediate suspension of a number of constitutional guarantees as soon as the 1961 Constitution came into effect in order to protect the fledgling democracy. Among the guarantees suspended were the right to economic liberty, the prohibition of arrest without warrant, the inviolability of the home and of private communications, freedom of expression and the right to protest (Crisp 1998, 156). Betancourt also used delegated decree authority in the June 1961 Law of Urgent Economic Measures. This gave him the power to legislate without congressional approval in all matters relating to the economy. With this power he issued 15 decree laws ranging from lowering employee salaries, to instituting new tax laws, and reorganising the telecommunications services (Crisp 1998, 147). The next sub-sections explore Betancourt’s management of different societal interest groups and his use of decree powers to control dissent.

Betancourt’s Conciliation of Key Power Wielders A defining moment of Betancourt’s leadership during his constitutional presidency was his ability to learn from past lessons and conciliate key societal power wielders to ensure the sustainability of his political project of democracy. In particular, Betancourt’s relationship with the Catholic Church improved during his constitutional presidency, primarily due to transactional arrangements he made to improve the Church’s standing beyond what it had

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been during the Third Republic and the trienio (Levine 1977). Government subsidies given to the Church for the salaries and travel of its officials, as well as the construction and repair of its buildings, increased three-fold, which in turn allowed the Church to expand its dioceses and activities to include youth groups and Church clubs in addition to the education and health care work it already provided. Changes to legislation through the Law of Ecclesiastical Patronage enabled the Church to own property, enter into contracts, and have greater independence in selecting bishops and clergy (Crisp 1996, 35). Levine (1977, 161) also notes that Betancourt’s inclusion of the pro-Church COPEI in his cabinet provided “symbolic guarantees of political security to the Church as well as practical opportunities for Catholic and lay leaders to work together in a variety of areas.”

Similarly, Betancourt’s inclusion and conciliation of the business elite focused on a number of transactional deals, such as an economic stimulus package and the inclusion of business representatives in his government. Alexander (1982, 467) notes that Betancourt made an effort to “keep in regular personal touch” with important business leaders, as well as speak at meetings held by the Federación de Camaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Produccion de Venezuela (FEDECÁMARAS – Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce), demonstrating a style of individualised consideration and inclusion of business interests. He gave key business leaders positions in his cabinet and in other important positions in government. For instance, successive business leaders served as the minister for finance, while other business leaders were appointed to the head of the Central Bank and the Development Corporation (Alexander 1982). The private sector approved of Betancourt’s plans to stimulate industrialisation in the country, and thus was more inclined to support his administration. The private sector also played a strong role in policy implementation and overseeing progress (Gil 1977, 152). Thus, Betancourt adopted a strategy of inclusion in development and governance, as well as provided transactional rewards in the form of government positions and policies that were pro-business, especially in regard to industrialisation.

Betancourt’s conciliation of the military involved two different tactics. The first was a transactional exchange similar to that of previous regimes to improve wages and equipment in return for loyalty. In speeches at military events, Betancourt emphasised that conditions for the military under his government were drastically better than the conditions under Pérez Jiménez’s regime. He utilised an intellectual stimulation leadership style as seen in Figure 2.1

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to argue that the military did not profit from the dictatorship. For instance, in one speech he reminded the military that, under Pérez Jiménez, 40 to 50 favoured officers built themselves “palaces”, while the salaries of the rest of the military were inadequate to live on. On a different occasion shortly after he assumed the presidency, Betancourt (cited in Alexander 1982, 473-4) expressed his shock at the conditions of the various barracks and bases he had visited, where many did “not even [have] the minimum living facilities”. Improved conditions for the military included an improved social security system and the creation of a loan system that assisted officers in buying homes (Alexander 1982, 472).

The second tactic of conciliation with the military was what could be considered a respectful exclusion from political matters and involved Betancourt’s assertion of his authority over the military as president. Betancourt emphasised the loyalty that the military owed him as commander-in-chief and any disobedience was dealt with fairly by a court martial as per the institutional rules. Betancourt was moreover “very careful in the selection of middle-ranking officers” and those “whose loyalty was doubtful, were retired or sent on military assignments abroad” (Alexander 1982, 475). Officers were court martialled at any sign of subversion, and Betancourt was immediately informed if weapons were used without permission on bases. Betancourt also reinforced the notion that the military was to be an “apolitical institution” by disallowing military officers from publicly commenting on political issues (Alexander 1982, 476). Instead, Betancourt sought to re-orientate the military’s role in the country. He “deliberately over-emphasised” the military’s mission to protect the nation’s borders and insisted that it was his responsibility to respond to criticism of the armed forces as its commander-in-chief (Lieuwen 1963, 351).

Betancourt’s Exclusion of the PCV from the Political Process: an Escalation of Conflict Hand-in-hand with Betancourt’s inclusionary defining moments of the Church, business community, and military, was his political exclusion and marginalisation of groups such as the PCV and the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR – Movement of the Revolutionary Left), a radical splint group from AD, as he considered them illegitimate and a threat to the nation’s fledgling democracy (Velasco 2011, 165). This initial position is reflective of the pseudo-full-range leadership styles and constitutes a defining moment for Betancourt’s leadership, as his decision to exclude these groups generated further conflict and instability in Venezuela.

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In a broader context of the Cold War and as a long-time critic of communism, Betancourt refused to recognise the legitimacy of the PCV, whose philosophy he had determined as “not compatible with the development of Venezuela” due to the PCV’s support of the regimes of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin during the Second World War (Betancourt 1959, cited in Tinker Salas 2015, 94). As a result, Betancourt refused to allow the PCV to participate in the creation and practice of Puntofijismo. In 1960, the MIR was formed from a splinter group of young AD members, many of whom were university students that ideologically supported Fidel Castro (Tarver 2001, 70). Antagonism between Betancourt and these groups had grown due to Betancourt’s anti-communist stance and his pardoning of business leaders associated with the Pérez Jiménez regime. This angered the PCV and the MIR, who had called for the execution of Pérez Jiménez loyalists (Ewell 1984) and accused Betancourt of “betraying revolutionary ideals” and being complicit with US imperialism (Radu & Tismaneanu 1990, 357). Subsequent tensions between Betancourt, the PCV, and the MIR strengthened due to the high-pressured environment of democratic transition which meant that, according to some scholars, it was not possible for Betancourt to rule “without resorting to extraordinary measures” to contain perceived and real threats (Koeneke 1983, 59). These “extraordinary measures” included, on four occasions, the suspension of constitutional civil rights that allowed Betancourt to rule by decree.

The October 1960 arrest of three journalists – Humberto Cuenca, Pérez Marcano and Rafael José Muñoz – from the MIR newspaper, Izquierda, marked the beginning of the PCV’s and the MIR’s insurrection in Venezuela and Betancourt’s use of “extraordinary measures” to control them. The arrests came after the paper’s publication of an article that called for a popular revolution against Betancourt’s government, with a number of violent protests erupting in Caracas in response. The protests ended in a shoot-out at the UCV campus between MIR members and the armed forces (Tarver 2001, 70). This was significant, as the 1961 Constitution had granted autonomy to universities and the deployment of troops to the campus violated the rights of the UCV. The following month, Betancourt suspended constitutional civil rights during a worker’s strike involving bank clerks and telephone workers. To break the strike, Betancourt restricted freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom from seizure (Alexander 1964). These suspensions lasted for a year and a half and was one of the main justifications used by the MIR to accelerate its armed insurrection (Radu & Tismaneanu 1990, 358). At the time, the MIR accused Betancourt of

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moving to the right on the political spectrum following his electoral success and condemned his refusal to execute supporters of the Pérez Jiménez regime (Alexander 1964, 120).

The MIR and the PCV’s insurrection attempts partnered with rebellious factions of the military and were materially supported by Castro in Cuba (El Nacional 2015a; Radu & Tismaneanu 1990, 358-59). In 1962, the PCV and the MIR partnered with rebelling factions of the military to instigate the Carupanazo and the Porteñazo in the cities of Carúpano and Puerto Cabello respectively. Betancourt responded by deploying the military on both occasions, with a number of deaths and hundreds of arrests incurred (Parejo 2005). Following these events in 1962, Betancourt outlawed the PCV and the MIR (Uzcategui 2010, 28), forcing their members underground and their creation of the guerrilla movement Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN – Armed Forces of National Liberation) in 1963 (Tarver 2001, 17). By 1965, FALN was supported by approximately 1,500 militants and it had carried out a number of attacks on oil pipelines, hijacked the freighter ship Anzoátegui, bombed the USA embassy in Caracas, embarked on a urban terror campaign to reportedly “kill a policeman a day” (Moss 1972, 168, organised general strikes in partnership with communist-aligned unions and student groups, and kidnapped a Real Madrid soccer star named Alfredo di Stefano (Tarver 2001, 110). Betancourt’s strategy for managing groups such as the FALN involved a heavy police and military presence among the urban poor in the barrios while he also “channelled all patronage or services through AD or COPEI loyalists”, providing a material incentive for support for his government (Ewell 1991, 758; Moss 1972, 170; Velasco 2011).

The FALN’s use of terrorism to destabilise Betancourt’s regime had the opposite of its intended effect and turned a large portion of the civilian population against it, as evidenced in the 90% voter turn-out in the 1963 presidential elections after the FALN had specifically called for a boycott (Moss 1972, 169). By 1966, the FALN’s activities were brought under control due to the combination of a strong military presence in areas sympathetic to the FALN cause, public support for democracy, a withdrawal of material support from Cuba, Betancourt’s ability to channel formal government support and services to loyal civil society groups. In this regard, Betancourt utilised both the pseudo-contingent reinforcement and authentic contingent reinforcement leadership styles to control the threat of the FALN and win the support of the public. The initial conflict between Betancourt and the PCV, however, was induced by his exclusionary approach to the group’s involvement in Venezuelan politics.

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Constitutional civil liberties were suspended for a total of 778 out of the 1,847 days Betancourt was in office due to the guerrilla insurrection involving the PCV, the MIR, and the FALN (Koeneke 1983, 59). A consequence of Betancourt’s initial exclusionary approach to the PCV was the accusation by both domestic critics and foreign journalists that he had “[betrayed] his belief in democracy” (Alexander 1982, 493). However, Betancourt’s uncompromising position led to an overall increased domestic and international legitimacy for his leadership. On the domestic front, it established a common enemy and united the Church, the military, and business in support of Betancourt and his new government. On the international front, it aligned with the US’ anti-communism Cold War policy and led to a strengthening of Venezuela’s friendship with the US, where the Kennedy administration in 1961 declared Venezuela to be a model for “Latin American progressive democracy” (Alexander 1982, 554).

Betancourt’s leadership influenced the nature of Venezuela’s democracy. As a key architect of the Pact of Punto Fijo, Betancourt’s primary concern was to undertake democratic transition and achieve its consolidation. He did this through demonstrating that he was a trusted and experienced leader committed to institutional integrity, as well as through diplomatic conciliation with key power holders in Venezuela. However, the long-term impact of Puntofijismo is well documented as a system that resulted in the elite capture of the political process (Canache & Kulishek 1998; Coppedge 1994; Coppedge 1997; Crisp 2000; Levine & Crisp 1999; Karl 1997; Trinkunas 2002). AD and COPEI, as the dominant parties, infiltrated almost every sector of Venezuelan life, including civil society groups such as labour unions and business councils. This had significant consequences for the deterioration of the Fourth Republic, as it led to the erosion of accountability of the political parties to the public.

The Defining Moments of Pérez’s Leadership, 1974-79 & 1989-93 Carlos Andrés Pérez was an AD President of Venezuela from 1974-79 and 1989-93 who has been described as a “modern populist” leader possessing determination, self-confidence, a belief in progress, and charisma (Tarver 2004, 1). He was a protégé of Betancourt, who had publicly declared him “the son I never had”, although they later parted ways over internal party politics (cited in Karl 1997, 122). Pérez’s first presidency coincided with a huge boom in the global oil price and AD’s electoral dominance at every level of government. His second presidency, however, was markedly different. Pérez inherited a severe economic

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crisis and returned to power on the back of promises to reject an IMF structural adjustment package and restore Venezuela to the prosperous times of his first presidency. Very soon after taking office, Pérez retracted this promise and announced the implementation of austerity measures. This greatly impacted on his legitimacy and widespread political unrest occurred until he was impeached in 1993 for corruption.

The Defining Moments of Pérez’s First Presidency, 1974-1979 The key defining moments of Pérez’s first administration reveal a legacy of grand vision, nationalism, corruption, economic mismanagement, and a preservation of the political status quo. Upon coming to power in 1974, Pérez and AD enjoyed a majority in both chambers of Congress. This was an unparalleled electoral success in the Fourth Republic era, with AD holding “a virtual monopoly at the national, state, and municipal levels” of government (Rey 1998, 117). A key defining moment of Pérez’s first presidency was his decision to use AD’s electoral dominance to facilitate a “politics without limits” (Karl 1997) approach to the economic management and development in Venezuela. This resulted in reduced political consultation and inclusion, as well as economic wastage and corruption. The combination of these practices contributed greatly to the decay of the Punto Fijo Fourth Republic.

Pérez’s Electoral Dominance and Use of Decree Powers A key defining moment during Pérez’s first term was the weakening of political consultation due to AD’s electoral dominance and his extensive use of leyes habilitantes to rule by decree and fast track his development plans. This was a legitimate use of power as determined by the 1961 Constitution, yet its original purpose was to allow the president to act swiftly in times of emergency. The president’s request for such powers required approval by both chambers of Congress, the powers were limited to certain areas of state activity, such as the economy, and they had a sunset clause on their usage (Garcia-Serra 2001). For example, Pérez’s first decree powers, as provided by the ley habilitante session approved by Congress in 1974, expired after one year (Crisp 1998). Crisp’s (1998) research into the use of these powers by Venezuelan presidents found that they were most widespread under leaders whose political party controlled a majority in both chambers of Congress.

Under Pérez, the ley habilitante power had the broadest scope in its usage compared to other administrations. These powers allowed him to bypass Congress approval to reform the national finance system, nationalise the iron ore industry, pay off the debts of government

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institutions, establish a new minimum wage, and reform pension and worker rights (Garcia- Serra 2001, 278). However, Pérez was accused of abusing the ley habilitante power by issuing an extensive number of decrees, bypassing debate in Congress, and not consulting with elected representatives on legislation during his first term. In a nine-month period, Pérez issued over 100 decrees, causing some observers to label his government a “decretocracia” (decree-tocracy) (Gordon, cited in Tarver 2004, 15). In total, over the course of his first administration Pérez issued more than 3,000 decrees (Crisp 1998, 147-46), and although AD, in collaboration with eight other parties, formed a decree oversight commission in an attempt to put a check on this power, Pérez ignored them by simply not consulting with the committee prior to the announcement of decrees (Crisp 1998, 167).

As an official justification for his request for ley habilitante powers to rule by decree, Pérez (cited in Karl 1997, 128) stated that, due to the “complexity” and “urgency” of the problems brought about by the oil boom such as the threat of high inflation on the cost of living, his government could not “develop its plans efficiently through normal channels”. However, interviews subsequently conducted by Karl (1997, 128) in 1978 with anonymous advisors and ministers, also identified Pérez’s “impatience” to implement his vision, with his “style” being that of “action, speed, plans, [and] ideas”. A minister from Pérez’s cabinet stated that the democratic system “was not the best way…out of underdevelopment” and measures such as leyes habilitantes were necessary to facilitate speedy development. The anonymous minister in Karl’s (1997, 128) research acknowledged that Pérez’s use of the ley habilitante power in 1974 was not democratic, yet believed bypassing Congress was necessary as Pérez was working to “preserve democracy in the end”. In reality, the ley habilitante power as contained in the 1961 Constitution served as a democratic paradox, as it allowed the bypassing of democratic processes through what was essentially a democratic clause. Yet, as a consequence, this clause was vulnerable to abuse when the sitting president’s party controlled both houses of parliament.

Pérez’s Grandiose Vision for Venezuela Pérez’s vision for Venezuela was a defining moment for his leadership during his first term as president. It involved modernising the country but was facilitated by a “politics without limits” (Karl 1997) approach that resulted in economic mismanagement and severe debt problems during the 1980s. Despite these shortcomings, Pérez was later able to construct a narrative of a prosperous first term to secure his re-election in 1988.

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Pérez’s vision for the country was epitomised in his V Plan de la Nación, also known as La Gran Venezuela (the Great Venezuela). This was a wide-reaching policy designed to modernise the nation through industrialisation and nationalisation. Over the course of Pérez’s term, more than US$53 billion was poured into the project that resulted in the creation of over 300 state-owned companies in industries such as steel and aluminium to facilitate state- led industrialisation (Coronel 2006; Tarver & Frederick 2006, 126). The program also included the nationalisation of the iron and oil industries, mega projects such as the construction of apartment blocks, dams, and highways, the growth of the public service, and increased benefits for the poor through the introduction of price controls and a higher minimum wage (Tinker Salas 2009, 228; Martz 1977).

The creation of the vision of La Gran Venezuela was a fulfilment of Pérez’s campaign promises to institute Democracia con Energía (Democracy with Energy) (Karl 1997, 116). This slogan was a play on words that pointed not only to Pérez’s youthful and energetic personality, but also alluded to his promise to “sow the oil” (distribute oil wealth) (Pietri 1936, cited in Ewell 1984) to the Venezuelan people through development. Pérez promised to turn the nation into “one of the most highly industrialised countries in the world”, and as his term progressed the country became known as Venezuela Saudita (“little Saudi Venezuela”) (Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso [Petroleum Minister under Betancourt], cited in Karl 1997, 72). This label reflected the excessive funding committed to La Gran Venezuela, as well as the high wages and low taxation experienced by the population due to burgeoning state revenue from the high crude oil price (Romero 2010).

The success of La Gran Venezuela is attributable to high global crude oil prices rather than any economic talent on the part of Pérez and his government. Specifically, the Yom Kippur War and subsequent Arab oil embargo increased global oil prices and provided Pérez’s government with revenue of 9.95 billion bolívares (US$2.3 trillion) in 1974 alone (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 125). In real terms, Pérez’s government received revenue 54% higher than the combined revenues of all previous governments since 1917 (Coppedge 1994, 47; Karl 1997, 116-17). This unprecedented level of government revenue allowed Pérez to engage in “politics without limits” (Karl 1997, 118) to transform the Venezuelan economy and society (Ellner 2008; Martz 1977; Wilpert 2007a). Pérez was able to buy support through tactics such as “patronage, subsidies to consumers, an overvalued currency, wage increases, and a high rate of economic growth” (Coppedge 1994, 46). This in turn enabled Pérez to establish a

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reputation as a leader with an ability to generate prosperity. Such a reputation was critical to Pérez’s return to power in 1988 when Venezuela was undergoing a severe economic crisis in part brought about by the excessive spending of his first administration. Moreover, the actual implementation of La Gran Venezuela was a reflection of what Karl (1997, 188) has critiqued as “politics without limits”, as the vision was pursued without long-term planning and consultation:

The decision to build a modern industrialised economy was mine. There were others who wanted to move more slowly. But we had to take advantage of this moment given to us, pull Venezuela out of her underdevelopment, and propel her into the twentieth century. There was no real decision to make. This had to be done – and quickly. We couldn’t lose time. We even began without a plan because we had already decided what we were going to do (Pérez 1979, cited in Karl 1997, 123).

The “politics without limits” approach to La Gran Venezuela was initiated by the nationalisation of two key industries, iron and oil, at the beginning of Pérez’s first administration in 1974. He contended that the nationalisations of these industries were important to a broader strategy “to obtain economic independence” (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 124). The nationalisation of the country’s oil industry was of particular importance so as to allow the government to capture even more revenue from its leading export. According to Pérez (1974, cited in Romero 2010), the historically “outrageously low prices” for Venezuela’s oil were used as “a weapon of economic oppression” in an explicit policy on the part of developed countries, such as the USA, to maintain their hegemony.

In 1975, the iron ore industry was the first to be nationalised, with government advertising campaigns proclaiming “el hierro es nuestro” (the iron is ours) (Ewell 1984, 194). In reality, however, the nationalisation gave generous compensation to foreign companies such as the Orinoco Mining Company, and the iron ore was still sold at low prices to these companies for several years. This indicates a gap between rhetoric and policy, due to a desire to increase popular support but retain the investment of the foreign companies in the country (Ewell 1984). In 1976, the oil industry was nationalised in order to gain control of an economic sector worth, at the time, more than US$10 billion annually (Keen & Haynes 2012, 502). A holding company named Petroven (later to be known as PDVSA) was created to coordinate and oversee the activities of 16 subsidiaries of foreign oil companies. At the official ceremony to announce the nationalisation of the oil industry, Pérez linked the project to economic nationalism, arguing that “engaging in this all-out national effort will [help make]

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the country become increasingly autonomous, [and] truly [reduce] economic dependency along with technological and cultural dependency” (Pérez 1976, cited in Tarver & Frederick 2006, 124). Yet, the nationalisation of the oil industry was very similar to that of the iron ore industry. The foreign oil companies were well compensated to the sum of over US$230 billion, and the government immediately entered into contracts with these foreign companies for technical assistance and management (Ewell 1984, 195; Tarver & Frederick 2006, 125). Consequently, though the oil sector was nationalised, little changed in terms of operations, management and revenue distribution. A “state within a state” had been created, with PDVSA exercising considerable control over subsequent Venezuelan governments in terms of access to revenue (Mommer 2002, 132).

Romero (1997, 10) argues that La Gran Venezuela, though it improved Venezuela’s immediate social and economic circumstances, “reinforced the country’s dependence on the oil-based model”. Critique of Pérez’s regime by subsequent presidents such as Luis Herrera Campíns, the COPEI presidential successor to Pérez, argued that Pérez’s governance style was “oil-subsidised statism” which resulted in the misuse of Venezuela’s oil wealth and the creation of “a mortgaged country” vulnerable to the global economic recession of the 1980s (cited in Romero 1997, 10). In particular, the vast array of state-owned enterprises, though initially established to avoid “a ‘bureaucratic nightmare’ for the central government”, took on enormous foreign debt as their semi-autonomous nature allowed for them to be “independent of central government accounting” (Tarver 2004, 5). Close to the end of Pérez’s term in 1978, government debt had increased 400% to US$12 billion, with 70-80% of this debt contracted by the state-owned enterprises (Tarver 2004, 5). While La Gran Venezuela contained visionary elements, its actual implementation process was haphazard and allowed corruption to flourish. The vast revenue flowing through the government treasury absorbed the immediate repercussions of the “politics without limits” method of implementation. As such, these repercussions were only felt from 1980 when the revenue declined. The next sub- section examines corruption during Pérez’s first term to explore, especially as it relates to his “politics without limits” approach to modernisation.

Pérez’s Practice and Tolerance of Corruption Pérez’s practice and tolerance of corruption during his first term as president was a defining moment for his leadership because it demonstrates what Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) would consider the use of the pseudo-contingent reinforcement style in his disregard institutional

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rules and practice of clientelism. Although Pérez’s first presidency became known for its corruption, an important component of his 1973 campaign for the presidency was an anticorruption message that accused the Caldera government of being untrustworthy. In particular, Pérez (cited in Rey 1998, 116-17) attacked both the legitimacy of Caldera and COPEI during the campaign by focusing on the “galloping administrative corruption” of Caldera’s government that, he claimed, “[posed]…a threat to democracy itself” and was “undermining morality”. Ironically, despite his denunciations of corruption, Pérez was eventually impeached for the issue in 1993 and subsequently found guilty by the Corte Suprema de Justicia (Supreme Court of Justice) of the misuse of state funds in 1996 (Canache 1999, 224).

AD’s electoral domination and the global crude oil price boom facilitated the presence of corruption in Pérez’s government. Without revenue constraints on the government, as well as effective debate within Congress, the government under Pérez’s leadership “gave way to the relaxation and slackening of the control mechanisms that could have guaranteed an efficient administration of public funds” (Rey 1998, 117). Consequently, a culture of widespread government corruption took hold during Pérez’s first administration. A former AD leader (cited in Rey 1998, 117) stated that corruption “was rather discreet” until 1973 and then “entered the Miraflores Presidential Palace through the front door in 1974” when Pérez came to power. Administrative corruption grew during Pérez’s presidency as a result of the “ethical slackness” associated with his leadership (Rey 1998, 117).

Pérez himself was plagued by allegations of corruption, favouritism, and inefficiency by the end of his term (Tinker Salas 2015, 112), with the contents of the allegations reflecting Bass and Steidlmeier’s (1999) characteristics of the pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style. By the early 1980s, Venezuela had accumulated considerable debt that was in large part attributed to the waste and corruption of the Pérez government. A number of shell companies under Pérez had won government contracts for fake projects, indicating that Pérez had been siphoning off government funds (Tinker Salas 2015, 112). The most well-known example, in which Pérez was directly implicated, was the purchase of a refrigeration freighter named the Sierra Nevada. The Pérez government acted as the intermediary in the sale, and the ship was acquired for US$20 million when its actual price was US$11.9 million (Tarver & Vivas 2004, 42). The US$8 million disparity was absorbed by a number of intermediaries who charged exorbitant commissions for their role in the sale, while a subsequent joint session of

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both houses of Congress found Pérez politically responsible for the scandal (Tarver & Vivas 2004, 44; Tinker Salas 2015, 110). An investigative commission led by Pérez’s own party, AD, also found him politically, administratively, and morally responsible for the scandal (Tarver & Vivas 2004, 44).

The allegations of corruption and rampant use of the enabling law powers led to AD’s loss in the 1978 elections. This damaged Pérez’s relationship with his party to the extent that “AD’s ethics committee sanctioned [him] for corruption and unsuccessfully sought to expel him from the party” (Coronil 1997, 372). Yet, over the next 10 years, Pérez rebuilt his reputation within the party to win AD’s pre-selection for the 1988 presidential campaign by renewing his connections with influential business groups and distinguishing himself as a critic of Jamie Lusinchi’s government (Coronil 1997, 372).

The Defining Moments of Pérez’s Second Presidency, 1989-1993 In contrast to Pérez’s first presidency, which was characterised by an overabundance of revenue and associated wastage, Pérez’s second presidency inherited a severe economic crisis. An event in Venezuela in 1983 known as Black Friday saw the bolívar, the country’s currency, significantly devalued by President Luis Herrera Campíns in response to an international drop in petroleum prices in 1982 (Raby 2006, 140-41). This contributed to high levels of inflation and foreign debt, lowered living conditions, a devalued domestic currency, and poor government revenues (Raby 2006, 140-41). Inflation in Venezuela reached 28% in 1987, climbing to 29.48% in 1988 (Lander & Fierro 1996, 51). By 1991, inflation had reached an “unprecedented” 150% (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 140). Meanwhile, poverty levels increased by 32% between 1982 and 1989, while in 1989 22% of the population were unable to meet their basic needs (Canache 1999, 20).

Pérez was re-elected to the presidency in 1988 due to his ability to construct a narrative of prosperity during his first term. In an effort to harness the concerns of voters about the economic crisis, during the 1988 presidential election campaign Pérez promoted the restoration of Venezuela to the glory days of his first administration. He stated that he was not interested in making money, but rather in turning “History” around (Coronil 1997, 374). Coronil (1997, 374) argues that Pérez, in the campaign for his second presidency, embodied the “myth” of a “powerful” leader of progress who utilised an energetic “style” and relied

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on the unexpected, on impulsive decisions often made outside formal political institutions and regular control that produced the illusion that he could make anything happen. This style of politics sustained the expectation that he was in tune with History’s pulse, that through him the nation was already on the path to progress. Because it made for frequent blunders in the conception and execution of state projects this style could only be sustained by speed – but then no politician was faster than Pérez, “the man who really walks”, “the man with energy”. Speed made it possible for Pérez to deny mistakes by leaving them behind, frenetically advancing from one spectacular undertaking to another and keeping the expectant collectivity open to the marvels of his power.

This strategy was successful and enabled him to win the presidency with 53% of the vote (El Universal 2014). During the campaign, Pérez (cited in Tarver & Vivas 2004, 48) situated himself as a saviour for Venezuela and framed the crisis as a chance to reform Venezuela’s society and economy:

I am coming to the rescue of the country … with the certainty that the times yet to come will be better. It is not a matter of ignoring the significance of the crisis, but rather to confront it with a positive attitude. We must understand that the difficulties we face as a historical warning, as a challenge presented to us by the future and as the opportunity to leave behind the mirage of easy riches…

Pérez’s Backtracking on His Promise Against Austerity Measures In light of the country’s economic crisis Pérez’s plan to rescue Venezuela specifically excluded the IMF. In fact, during the election campaign Pérez (cited in Ali 2006) rejected IMF and World Bank pressure to implement austerity measures, declaring that the economists employed by the World Bank were “genocide workers in the pay of economic totalitarianism” and likened the IMF to “a neutron bomb that killed people, but left buildings standing”. Yet, while he publicly made these claims, he also privately sent a message to the IMF that he would comply with its measures (Coronil & Skurski 1991, 295). In a speech at his inauguration ceremony, also referred to as the “coronation” due to its lavishness (The Economist 2011), Pérez (cited in Rush 1989, 27) called on the Venezuelan people to display “discipline, productivity, and sacrifice” before, days later, backtracking on his promises and announcing an austerity package known as El Gran Viraje (the Great Turnaround). The combination of Pérez’s campaign promises and El Gran Viraje constitute a defining moment for Pérez, as it indicates the use of deception associated with the pseudo-leadership style of inspirational motivation, with the result being that of expansive social unrest, a loss of moral authority not only for Pérez but also for the Punto Fijo system, and two coup d’état attempts by the military in 1992.

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In particular, El Gran Viraje was designed to move Venezuela’s economy from being state- controlled to one that was more market-driven. The rapid change in policy stunned the public, particularly given Pérez’s staunch campaign against austerity measures (Rivas 2004, 66). The package included an increase in prices for state-provided services, a sudden stoppage of state subsidies for petrol and basic goods, the lowering of trade tariffs, and the creation of a floating exchange rate (Coronil & Skurski 1991, 295). One key effect was a 100% increase in the price of petrol virtually overnight which, in turn, increased the cost of public transport fares and led to widespread protests (López Maya 2003, 120-21). In announcing the package, Pérez (cited in Tarver 2004, 50) argued that a reliance on oil revenue was to blame for the economic crisis and contended that “the old way of cutting corners by placing a band-aid [of oil revenue] over an ailment while the real problem threatens to destroy us” had to come to an end. However, this about-face, in combination with several years of economic downturn, triggered the public riots known as El Caracazo that forced Pérez to fight for his political survival just weeks into his second presidency and served as a justification for the coup d’état attempts of 1992.

Pérez’s Response to El Caracazo Pérez’s management of El Caracazo was a defining moment for his leadership during his second presidency, as it not only significantly damaged his own political legitimacy but also the legitimacy of the Venezuelan democratic system. The initial protests were triggered by the rise in the cost of public transportation as a result of the increased domestic petrol price. The protests, led by students and workers who depended on public transportation, evolved into rioting against Pérez’s broader economic measures when he failed to adequately respond to their concerns and persuade them of the need for El Gran Viraje (Rincón 2004, 79). As the riots spread, over 1,000 businesses in Caracas were looted and burned (Coronil 1997, 376). Pérez’s response came days into the riots when he declared a state of emergency, suspended the 1961 Constitution, and ordered the military to contain the protestors, as the local police did not have the capacity or the equipment to deal with the unrest (López Maya 2003, 123). This was a defining moment decision, as the military, unaccustomed to “policing”, violently suppressed the riots by shooting indiscriminately into crowds and buildings in the barrios (poor neighbourhoods/informal settlements built on the hills surrounding Caracas) (López Maya 2003, 128). Pérez’s decision to deploy the military resulted in an estimated 200 to 2,000 deaths, mostly within the barrios, and government-authorised acts of retribution were carried out by the military for several days after the protests ceased (Wilpert 2007a, 16;

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Ellner 2008, 95). Official government figures at the time reported the death toll as 277, and Pérez (cited in Coronil 1997, 378) subsequently labelled claims by NGOs of a higher death toll “a lie”. Pérez’s refusal to acknowledge a higher number of civilian casualties from El Caracazo further damaged his moral authority to lead. Following El Caracazo, Pérez’s popularity rating stood at just 15% (The Economist 1990).

The resulting loss of moral authority, not only for Pérez’s leadership but also for the Punto Fijo system, was used as a justification for the 1992 coup d’état attempt by future president Hugo Chávez and his co-conspirators. To the coup plotters, the economic crisis and Pérez’s leadership in responding to public concern and anger was evidence of the failure and illegitimacy of the Punto Fijo model and the politicians associated with it. Tarver and Vivas (2004, 52) note that the conspirators “invoked their traditional role as the ‘protector of the homeland’”, which foreshadowed the military’s re-entry into Venezuelan politics from the 2000s. Moreover, a new cadre of military officer had emerged in Venezuela as a result of a military leadership-training program in the 1970s known as “Plan Andrés Bello”. This program instilled values such as social justice and the protection of democracy in the officers who received the training, of which Chávez and his co-conspirators were in the first graduating class (Trinkunas 2005b).

The coup d’état failed due to the discovery of the conspirators’ plan by military intelligence. Specifically, a traitor to the movement informed the minister of defence, who was then able to assign additional, loyal troops to guard Pérez. The additional troops meant that the coup plotters were outnumbered, and thus unable to carry out their plans (Gott 2011). Although the coup d’état failed, it resulted in the deaths of over 50 civilians and military and triggered widespread support for the removal of Pérez, with public confidence in his ability to lead under 20% (Kamm 1992). It also triggered an investigation into the corruption of Pérez, which would ultimately lead to his impeachment (Ellner 2008).

Pérez’s damaged legitimacy led to a second coup against his administration just months later. This time, high-ranking officers in the air force and a coalition of small leftist groups challenged Pérez due to dissatisfaction within the military regarding wage and equipment conditions (Gott 2011, 73). The group initiated the coup by capturing a number of television stations to convey their rallying cry of rebellion. However, Pérez ordered the bombing of rebel positions in Caracas and Maracay until the rebels fled or surrendered. In this event, over

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170 people died (Gott 2011, 72). Public anger was directed towards the Pérez government for its failure to adequately respond to the concerns of the rebels and institute satisfactory reforms, contributing to a further decay of his legitimacy and that of the Fourth Republic. Moreover, according to Levine and Crisp (1999, 40), popular support for Pérez’s government in the wake of the coup attempts was low in comparison to the guerrilla insurgency during Betancourt’s regime:

Then [the 1960s], citizens responded with public marches and other displays of support for the regime. By late 1992, merely not coming out in support of the coup plotters was considered an endorsement by the democratic regime.

El Caracazo and the coups of 1992 signified the breakdown of the historical model of democracy in Venezuela and the collapse of the moral authority of Pérez’s leadership. By May 1993, Pérez was impeached for corruption and forced to resign from the presidency. In these circumstances, Pérez was accused of illegally accessing a secret fund of US$17 million to finance democratisation efforts in Nicaragua and fund “his lavish inauguration” ceremony (Coronil 1997, 380).

Although democratically elected for both of his presidencies, Pérez’s legacy is one of corruption and the heavy-handed response to El Caracazo. He had a grand vision for Venezuela, at least during his first presidency, but the effects of corruption and clientelism dulled its effectiveness. Pérez’s response to both the economic crisis and the riots of his second presidency demonstrate a pseudo-transactional leadership approach. First, he failed to keep his election promises to refrain from adopting IMF policy to reform the economy, and second, the tacit approval of the military to engage in retribution against the protestors demonstrates an abuse of power. Moreover, throughout both his presidencies, Pérez engaged in, and allowed, acts of bribery, nepotism and clientelism to occur, indicating that, in the defining moments of his leadership of a democratic regime, Pérez primarily utilised pseudo- transactional leadership styles. Pérez’s first presidency demonstrated his use of a range of pseudo-transformational styles while, in contrast, his second presidency reflected the use of predominantly pseudo-transactional styles. The cumulative effect of the use of these styles resulted in the loss of moral authority not only for Pérez but also for the Punto Fijo system.

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The Defining Moments of Caldera’s Leadership, 1969-74 & 1994-99 Rafael Caldera was the founder of COPEI and the party’s first elected president. He served two terms as president of Venezuela: the first from 1969-1974 and the second from 1994- 1999. As a leader, Caldera was described as possessing “rigorous personal honesty” (Coronil 1997, 380), yet was also considered a “paradox” due to his legacy as “an anti-communist who legalised the Communist party, a devotee of electoral politics who pardoned guerrillas and coup-plotters, and a professed believer in social justice who found himself defending an IMF austerity plan” (Gunson 2010). Despite this paradoxical legacy, Caldera had comparatively less defining moments than the other presidents examined in this research. It is posited that this is because Caldera’s environment constrained his ability to fully respond to, and generate, defining moments for his leadership. For instance, Caldera’s first presidency was constrained by COPEI’s lack of majority in both chambers of Congress and meant that, at a legislative level, his ability to implement an ambitious vision was restricted. His second presidency was again constrained, not only by a lack of majority in both chambers of Congress but also by a severe economic crisis which meant his leadership focused on the short-term economic welfare of the country. The defining moments of Caldera’s leadership across his two presidencies demonstrate a mixed leadership style profile identified by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) as being frequently found among leaders. The following section explores Caldera’s mixed use of authentic and pseudo leadership styles in greater detail.

The Defining Moments of Caldera’s First Presidency, 1969-1974 The key defining moments of Caldera’s first presidency showcase his efforts to increase the political power of COPEI and protect democratic consolidation through peacemaking with the leftist guerrillas and the control of domestic dissent. This sub-section will first, however, explore an early defining moment in Caldera’s political career, as it was key to his rise to the presidency. This was his participation in the creation of the Pact of Punto Fijo.

Caldera’s Early Defining Moment: Key to His Rise to the Presidency Similar to Betancourt, Caldera’s participation in the creation of the Pact of Punto Fijo generated for him a moral authority with the Venezuelan population that was bolstered by his long-standing advocacy and commitment to Venezuela’s political and social development. This commitment was first demonstrated during his university days as the secretary of the Juventudes Católicas Venezolanas (Venezuelan Catholic Youth) and a member of the Unión

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Nacional Estudiantil (National Student Union) (Ewell 1984), as well as his participation in various governments, such as a Deputy in Congress in the López Contreras administration and as Attorney General in Betancourt’s provisional government during the trienio. Throughout this time, Caldera was known for promoting progressive reforms in labour law and provisions for an eight-hour work-day were established under his guidance (Tugwell 1965, 247). Following the military coup d’état in 1948, COPEI “was treated with the least harshness” out of all the political parties during the Pérez Jiménez regime because of its pro- business stance and traditional Catholic affiliation. It assumed a position of “passive cooperation” until 1952 when it entered into open opposition and its activities were restricted (Tugwell 1965, 252). Pérez Jiménez briefly imprisoned Caldera in 1957 when rumours circulated that he planned to contest the presidency in the 1958 elections.

Upon his release, Caldera fled to New York where he began to draft the Pact of Punto Fijo with Betancourt (Ewell 1984). Caldera returned to Venezuela following the removal of Pérez Jiménez from power and became one of the signatories of the Pact of Punto Fijo, named after his home where the Pact was signed. The signing of the Pact of Punto Fijo was a defining moment for Caldera’s early leadership as it legitimised his campaigns for the presidency and identified him as an authentic leader with a background of long-term commitment to democratic transition. While Puntofijismo was virtually discredited by the time he achieved power again in 1993, Caldera had earned a reputation as a trusted leader and, in the 1990s, was believed to be “the last honest president” due to his commitment to democracy dating back to the pre-Punto Fijo era (cited in Karl 1997, 184). His role in the creation of the Pact not only demonstrated to the public that he was committed to abiding by democratic institutional rules, but also showed that he possessed a clear vision for the nation’s democratic future.

Caldera’s Election to the Presidency and Decision to Eschew Coalition Governance Caldera first came to national power in 1968 after three unsuccessful campaigns for the presidency under the COPEI banner, and even his win was by a slim majority of just over 31,000 votes (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 119), or with a margin of 0.8% (Dunning 2010, 395). His election was largely aided by a division of AD, whereby internal party disputes regarding the Betancourt Doctrine, a foreign policy initiated by Betancourt to shun relations with countries governed under dictatorship, split the party in two (Tinker Salas 2015, 99). Although Caldera won the presidency for COPEI, the party failed to achieve a majority of

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seats in either chamber of Congress. As such, he was in a weak position to promote his agenda.

This was complicated by the fact that Caldera’s 1969-1974 term was the first administration of Venezuela’s democratic period to eschew coalition governance. As such, his minority government “attempted to forego the grand-coalition style of Betancourt and [his successor] Leoni” (Crisp 1997, 185) and resulted in no multi-party representation in Caldera’s cabinet. A reason for this was that, by 1968, the need for a formal coalition between the three original signatories of the Pact of Punto Fijo had subsided due to the reduced threat of guerrilla violence and the “steady accretion of mass and elite acceptance of the [democratic] regime” (Kelley 1977, 35). An unintended consequence of the decision to not engage in coalition governance was that it set a precedent for subsequent presidents from both COPEI and AD also not to utilise a coalition governance approach. As a result, a core objective of Puntofijismo – the inclusion of the members of other parties in positions of power – was not upheld. Although there were a number of factors at play that led to this decision, it constitutes a defining moment for both Caldera’s leadership and pacted democracy in Venezuela, as its consequences changed the initial collaborative nature of Puntofijismo to adversarial politics between the various political parties. A more immediate consequence was the difficulties Caldera encountered in influencing key policy areas, due to his minority government and the absence of coalition governance.

For example, Caldera had campaigned on a platform of the nation needing cambio (change) (Martz 1977, 102) from AD, and thus when the time came to form government he was faced with a hostile AD. While an informal arrangement was reached with AD in 1970 to secure its support on some legislation, Caldera was in general rendered powerless in the reform arena. A key example of this was Congress’ proposal to change the method by which judges were selected by establishing a National Judicial Council that would have the responsibility of appointing up to 2,800 judges below the Supreme Court level. This power resided with the executive and Caldera attempted to retain it by vetoing the legislation. However, without a majority in either chamber of Congress, the legislation was passed and the repercussion for Caldera’s veto was the exclusion of COPEI from the Council and therefore the selection of judges (Crisp 1997, 186). Other examples of Caldera’s inability to assert his own policy agenda include pieces of legislation by AD to raise petroleum taxes and limit the activity of foreign-owned banks. Caldera “signed [these laws] … in silence” once they were passed

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through both chambers of Congress (Kelley 1977, 40). As a result, Caldera’s domestic policy platform was not significantly different from that of Betancourt and Leoni’s, as he was subject to AD’s legislative decisions in Congress. Caldera’s exclusion of AD from his cabinet worked against him, as, rather than protecting his own agenda, it instead alienated AD as a key power holder in the legislative and policy arenas.

Caldera’s Pacification of Leftist Guerrillas Caldera used authentic transformational leadership styles such as inspirational motivation and idealised influence to achieve peace with the leftist guerrilla movement that arose during Betancourt’s administration. This was a defining moment for Caldera’s leadership as it established his reputation as a peacemaker. The pacification was a campaign promise by Caldera and it enabled him to bring those on the radical left “into the institutional political discourse” (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 120). However, this was an easier task for Caldera as, in comparison to the administrations of Betancourt and Leoni, the radical left was fragmented and reduced in numbers and supplies (Tarver & Frederick 2006).

Caldera also made an effort to include these groups in the formal political system and process their concerns through established democratic channels. Upon taking office, Caldera re- legalised the PCV under its traditional name, which demonstrated to the guerrillas in the FALN that Caldera was serious about peace (Alexander 1982, 583). The MIR’s legalisation occurred in 1973, and prior to that Caldera allowed leftist exiles such as Teodoro Petkoff to return to Venezuela. Caldera continued his efforts for peace beyond amnesty for the leftist guerrillas; for example, political prisoners were freed and the police force was reformed (Ewell 1984, 170). Caldera also improved relationships with a number of regional neighbours by ending the Betancourt Doctrine to re-establish relationships with other communist and dictatorial countries (Ewell 1984, 168; Tinker Salas 2015). These acts contributed to a defining moment for Caldera that established his reputation as a leader able to achieve peace, and later assisted his return to power in 1993.

Caldera’s Management of Dissent: The Closure of Tertiary Institutions Another defining moment stands in contrast to Caldera’s message of peace to the guerrillas. Protests by high school and university students, some of whom were linked to the communist youth group and the embryonic Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS – Movement Toward Socialism), rocked the tertiary education sector for two years from 1969. Ewell (1984, 172)

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notes that the protests were, in part, caused because “the rapid expansion of educational institutions had not kept up with the rising expectations of young high school graduates” due to there being greater demand than places available at the universities. Within the universities, the protests had two dimensions: on one level, they were part of a broader global movement known as the “Academic Renovation” which called for reforms to universities for complete freedom for “inquiry and analysis” (Ellner 2008, 70). On another level as identified by Ewell (1984), university students in Venezuela were unhappy with the quality of education and the number of places available. In 1970, Caldera attempted to initiate reforms to the university sector that would change the definition of a student and place a limit on the terms of office of university authorities. These reforms were “violently opposed” by students and university staff and spread to other universities and high schools (Tinker Salas 2015, 99). In response, Caldera utilised the military to quell the protests and closed the UCV for two years, while he permanently closed the Escuela Técnica Industrial (Industrial Technical School) (Ewell 1984; El Universal 2009). His response reflects the pseudo-inspirational motivation and pseudo-intellectual stimulation leadership styles, whereby Caldera sought control over dissent and demonstrated an intolerance of differences of opinion.

The Defining Moments of Caldera’s Second Presidency, 1994-1999 Caldera was returned to the presidency in 1993 following the impeachment of Pérez and the interim presidency of Ramón Velásquez. However, he was not elected as a COPEI president but rather as the leader of a new, smaller party consisting of COPEI defectors. This was because the COPEI party had refused to endorse Caldera as a presidential candidate. As a result, he quit the party he had founded and quickly forged a new party named Convergencia Nacional (CN - National Convergence) (Coppedge 1994), stating that he had returned to politics at the age of 79 to “save a democracy threatened by corruption” (Caldera 1993, cited in Painter 2009). During the election campaign, Caldera provided an appealing vision of the future through an authentic inspirational motivation leadership style. He did this by adopting an “antiparty, anticorruption, [and] anti-neoliberal platform”, promising to “restore the days of consultative consensus building” and return to the practice of state interventionism in the economy (Crisp 2000, 38, 180). Caldera won with 30% of the vote – the lowest winning percentage in the history of voting in the country, indicating that though he had won, public faith in the Punto Fijo system had waned (Coppedge 1994, 53).

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Caldera’s Rebuke of Puntofijismo A key defining moment that led to Caldera’s election was his rebuke of the Punto Fijo system as it created a public image that he was a politician willing to own the mistakes of the Fourth Republic. Caldera (1989, cited in Gott 2000, 69), who at the time of the speech was a senator in the Congress, condemned the decay of Puntofijismo, arguing that “it is difficult to ask the people to sacrifice themselves in a struggle to defend liberty and democracy, when you know that democracy and the rule of law have not been able to provide them with food…”. This was a comment on the broader economic crisis that had been gripping the nation for several years and the failure of successive governments to address the root causes of the crisis that he identified as the corruption of Pérez and the Fourth Republic in general. Caldera went on to contend that Pérez’s government “have not been able to put a stop to the terrible round of corruption that has eroded the institutional legality of the country”, acknowledging that it was “not something that can be hidden” (Gott 2000, 69).

Caldera’s election thus represented a compromise for voters: he was part of the old guard; both a crafter and a product of the Punto Fijo system, as well as an experienced and established leader within Puntofijismo, yet he had rebuked the system and acknowledged that it was corrupt and required reform. His election was a censure by voters of the Punto Fijo system, but it also reflected their desire for a candidate that was not completely anti- establishment. Caldera’s reputation for honesty and pacifism, earned during his first presidency, were qualities that Venezuelans desired in a leader in the economic and political turmoil of the early 1990s.

Upon assuming the presidency in 1994, Caldera fulfilled an election campaign promise to release Chávez and his co-conspirators from prison (Canache 1999). This proved important to Caldera’s legitimacy as a leader willing to rebuke the Punto Fijo system. Chávez’s revolt was not viewed in the same light as the coup attempts and guerrilla warfare conducted against Betancourt’s regime in the early 1960s. This was largely because Chávez established himself and his cause as the protectors of Venezuela’s democracy, which had been damaged by the ills of the Punto Fijo system. Chávez’s pardoning was an acknowledgement on the part of Caldera that public concerns regarding Puntofijismo were legitimate. The release of Chávez from prison proved not only to be a defining moment for Caldera but also for Venezuela as Chávez went on to become Caldera’s presidential successor.

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Caldera’s Management of the Economic Crisis When Caldera assumed office, he inherited “the worst economic crisis in Venezuelan history” (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 147). At this time, the number of households living below the poverty line was 34.3%, while the number of households living in critical poverty was 23.5%, and extreme poverty was at 11.2% (Kornblith 1998, 19). Interest on credit had risen to 60%, inflation was at 70%, and official unemployment was at 20% in the formal economy and 50% in the informal economy by 1995 (Tinker Salas 2015, 129). Moreover, a banking crisis had commenced three weeks prior to Caldera’s inauguration. This crisis was caused by the deregulation of the sector under Pérez’s second administration, which allowed the banks to “[attract] the public’s money by offering unrealistically high interest rates”, yet they then “loaned it freely to their own directors and associates, who carried out highly speculative projects” (Coronil 1997, 380). Though efforts were made to resolve the crisis through the bailout of affected banks, capital flight remained a significant problem and Caldera suspended a number of economic freedoms. For example, Caldera spent 75% (US$57 billion) of the 1994 national budget to virtually take over the banking sector and stem the loss of the public’s savings, which had been squandered through mismanagement. A number of bankers then fled to Europe with a “substantial portion” of this bailout and were never prosecuted (Coronil 1997, 381).

This created a situation where citizens began to withdraw their saving from the banks, which in turn either forced the collapse of these banks or forced the banks to deny clients their money. Protests outside the banks became a daily occurrence. Caldera was heavily criticised, with his approval rating falling from 78% at the beginning of his term in 1994 to 31% in 1995 (Tinker Salas 2015, 128, 129). Allegations of nepotism and corruption were made against Caldera, as his son in-law, Fernando Araujo, was one of the bankers that fled the country after the state bailout, while Caldera’s children and friends also held high ranking government positions (Tinker Salas 2015, 129).

As a result of this situation, Caldera requested, and received, ley habilitante powers to respond to the economic crisis and growing social unrest. He first suspended some constitutional guarantees. They included the suspensions of the right to be protected from arbitrary searches and arrests, the right to freedom of movement, and the right to engage in any legal economic activity. Also, the government was allowed to expropriate property without having to provide compensation. These suspensions generated tension in Congress,

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with it “[voting] to re-establish virtually all constitutional guarantees”. However, Caldera re- instated the suspensions straight away and then threatened to dissolve the Congress should it continue to “challenge his decision” (Levine & Crisp 1999, 142). Over the course of 1994 and 1995, Caldera used the Guardía Nacional (National Guard) to control rising crime, while protests increased against his government. In March 1996, 700,000 public sector employees went on strike to demand wage increases. However, this preceded Caldera’s announcement of a neoliberal austerity package backed by the IMF (Levine & Crisp 1999).

Venezuela’s deteriorating economic situation led Caldera to reverse his election promise of no neoliberal reforms and introduce an IMF-backed austerity package called Agenda Venezuela (Venezuela Agenda). This decision constituted a final defining moment for Caldera, as it damaged his public image and drove the public to support an anti-establishment presidential candidate in 1998. Agenda Venezuela involved the privatisation of the steel industry, the closure of the second national airline, and the implementation of an “Oil Opening” strategy that was intended to gradually privatise the oil industry. A reduction in government expenditure cut the education budget by over 40%, housing by 70%, and health care by 37% (Fernandes 2007, 107). However, unlike Pérez’s El Gran Viraje, Caldera’s Agenda Venezuela was able to avoid violent social unrest. This was because Caldera implemented a consultative approach, having taken a lesson from Pérez’s “non-consultative ‘shock treatment’ approach to neoliberalism” (Ellner 2003, 164). Instead, Caldera implemented a “systematic” and widespread information campaign to explain the reforms (Kornblith 1998, 6), demonstrating the authentic contingent reinforcement and intellectual stimulation leadership styles where he attempted to set goals and explain his reasoning for them.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the ways in which Betancourt, Pérez, and Caldera from Venezuela’s democratic period practised their leaderships at a national level to promote their visions for the nation and respond to challenges encountered in pursuit of their visions. The chapter examined the establishment of a democratic political institutional framework in Venezuela and its gradual erosion during the Fourth Republic, particularly as, from the 1970s onwards, limited accountability allowed political corruption to flourish in line with rising oil revenues. It also explored how the presence of a weak legislature and strong executive, with frequent use of rule-by-decree powers, was often a repeated experience during Venezuela’s

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democratic period when the president’s party controlled the Congress. The chapter delineated the defining moments of the selected leaders within a democratic regime setting so as to be able to later explore whether their leadership styles in these moments align with the regime type. Caldera’s defining moments were comparatively fewer than the defining moments of other presidents explored in this research, due to additional constraints on his leadership such as the absence of a legislative majority and the economic crisis of the 1990s. The next chapter continues this exploration with Hugo Chávez’s leadership in a hybrid regime setting.

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Chapter Six: The Defining Moments of Chávez’s Leadership, 1992-2004

Introduction One of the most important and contentious of Venezuela’s leaders to date was Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela from 1999 until his death in March 2013. Throughout his leadership of Venezuela, Chávez was labelled a “dictator” (Shifter 2000), an “unconscious authoritarian” (Fernando Henrique Cardoso, cited in Naím 2001, 29), a “charismatic and visionary leader” (Collins 2005, 367), an “enchanter of the masses”, a “magician of emotions” (Bruzual & Uzcátegui cited in Fassin & Vasquez 2005, 394), and a “populist” (Hawkins 2010a). Chávez’s leadership both united and polarised various sectors in Venezuela as he pursued his goal of implementing the Bolivarian Revolution.

The aim of the next two chapters is to explore Chávez’s leadership styles within the defining moments of his leadership and, as a result, the evolution of the Venezuelan polity. The review of Chávez’s leadership is divided into two chapters due to the immense impact it has had in altering the Venezuelan polity and its implications for present-day Venezuela under the leadership of Nicolás Maduro. This first chapter traces Chávez’s establishment of his reputation as an authentic leader and then explores his mixed use of authentic and pseudo- leadership styles in the defining moments of his first four years as president.

Chávez’s Early Defining Moments Chávez’s early defining moments were essential in his rise to the presidency in 1998. In particular, the combination of Chávez’s officer training under Plan Andrés Bello in the 1970s and his participation in the February 1992 coup d’état attempt constitute two early defining moments for his leadership. The training was integral to Chávez’s philosophical development of the Bolivarian Revolution and, as a consequence, his motivations to launch the coup. Moreover, Chávez’s ideals, developed under Plan Andrés Bello, provided important insight into how the nature of the Venezuelan polity would change under his leadership. Chávez’s subsequent participation in the coup propelled him to national prominence and established

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him as a leader willing to sacrifice his life and freedom for his vision of a more democratic Venezuela: a key characteristic of transformational leadership. Later, the 1992 coup gave credibility to Chávez’s reputation as a neocaudillo, anti-establishment leader, and it was this reputation that aided his election to the presidency in 1998. Without this military training and the coup attempt, Chávez may very well have never risen to the peak of Venezuelan political leadership. The following sub-section looks at these defining moments in more detail.

Chávez began his leadership journey as a clandestine political activist within the Venezuelan military during the 1970s and 1980s. Chávez’s officer training under Plan Andrés Bello encouraged this activism, and he was a member of the first graduating class (Trinkunas 2002). The purpose of the Plan was to revolutionise officer training through an emphasis on Latin American leaders, resistance movements, and ideologies that past cadets had not been exposed to, including “a populist, equity-oriented vision of development” (Trinkunas 2002, 46). Plan Andrés Bello prioritised leadership training in order to “inculcate a mystique of honour, discipline and self-sacrifice in a new generation of officers” (Trinkunas 2002, 45). This training had a significant impact on Chávez and his peers, and, as a result, an ideological shift occurred within the military in which a generation of soldiers became conscious of Venezuela’s, and more broadly Latin America’s, experiences of colonisation, resistance, and democracy. Plan Andrés Bello created a new type of leader in Venezuela: a military leader with a distinct mentality of equality and nationalism. Exposure to such ideas led Chávez to form a number of revolutionary groups in the military during his time there. The most prominent of these groups was the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario – 200 (MBR-200 – Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200) in 1982. This group was created in response to corruption within the military and politics, as well as the elites’ mismanagement of the state in the face of worsening economic conditions due to volatility in global oil prices and significant foreign debt.

Seven years later, El Caracazo proved to be the turning point for Chávez and MBR-200. To Chávez, the use of the military against Venezuelan citizens violated a sacred civic-military relationship and destroyed the legitimacy of the political order of the Fourth Republic. In reflecting on El Caracazo and the nature of the Venezuelan regime under President Pérez, Chávez stated:

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During the terrible days of the Caracazo, people took to the streets to protest against neoliberalism, against the “electro-shock” therapy of the IMF, against universal privatization, unemployment, and hunger. They sent us soldiers to fill those people with lead. The political leaders, so-called democrats, spoke of justice and democracy. What democracy? That was not democracy, it was pure dictatorship: an oligarchic government using the armed forces and the media to brainwash and confuse the people. … In those days we had a true dictatorship, exercised through the political parties that were fighting over the spoils of the Fourth Republic (Chávez, cited in Guevara 2005, 32).

Between 200 and 2,000 civilians are estimated to have died during El Caracazo, the lower figure being representative of the official government position at the time, and the higher figure being estimated by Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and other civil society groups (TeleSUR 2015). Government-authorised acts of retribution in the form of “forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, tortures, [and] raids” were carried out by the military for several days after the protests ceased (TeleSUR 2015; Ellner 2008, 95; Wilpert 2007a, 16). The experience of El Caracazo attracted many young disaffected military officers to Chávez’s cause (Levine & Crisp 1999, 140), with some scholars reporting that membership of MBR-200 consisted of 10% of all army officers (Trinkunas 2005b, 182-83). El Caracazo spurred Chávez and co-conspirators to plot a coup d’état.

Plans for a coup d’état materialised on 4 February 1992 to challenge the legitimacy of the Pérez regime and, more broadly, the Fourth Republic, and catapult Chávez to political prominence. The aim of the coup was to restore democracy to the nation and allow society to make “a clean break from the Fourth Republic”, particularly following the traumatic events of El Caracazo in 1989 (Chávez cited in Guevara 2005, 13). Yet, despite years of planning, it failed due to the discovery of the plot by Venezuela’s military intelligence. Loyal officers assigned additional troops to Pérez’s guard, thereby preventing Chávez and his co- conspirator’s attempts to capture the president (Gott 2011, 63-64).

The key event, however, that arose from the failed coup was Chávez’s brief address on live national television calling on his co-conspirators to surrender. His short speech, known famously as the por ahora (for now) speech, cemented Chávez in the minds of the Venezuelan people as a leader willing to accept responsibility for his actions. In his address, Chávez stated:

Comrades: unfortunately, for now, the objectives that we had set ourselves have not been achieved in the capital. That’s to say that those of us here in Caracas have not been able

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to seize power. Where you are, you have performed well, but now is the time for a rethink; new possibilities will arise again and the country will be able to move definitively towards a better future … I alone shoulder the responsibility for this Bolivarian military uprising (Chávez 1992, cited in Gott 2011, 67).

Leader responsibility and sacrifice is a key element of transformational leadership, with the speech representing a crucial turning point in Chávez’s leadership journey, as it thrust him into the political spotlight and established him as the face of the MBR-200. His promise that the revolution had failed por ahora implanted in the minds of the Venezuelan people that there was in existence a movement committed to addressing the issues concerning many Venezuelans. It also implicitly promised the return of Chávez. His final comment stood out in the minds of many Venezuelans, as it was the first time that a public figure had taken responsibility for his or her actions (Gott 2011, 68). This early defining moment reflected Chávez’s deep commitment to reforming the Venezuelan polity as well as a willingness to go to prison for his beliefs. He conveyed a sense of honesty and integrity that was perceived as lacking in Venezuelan politics. The popularity of Chávez and his co-conspirators following the coup was reflected in the support they received, whereby

For weeks after, slum residents rallied in support of the rebels, chanting “Viva Chávez! The people are with you!” Relatives of the rebel officers collected 20,000 signatures on a petition calling for amnesty, and the government had to transfer Chávez to a jail in the interior to prevent crowds from gathering in front of the barracks where he was being held in Caracas (Silverstein 1993, 906).

Chávez, despite his key involvement in the coup and subsequent imprisonment, became a new political figure in Venezuela that represented a distinct alternative to the Punto Fijo elite. Following his surrender, Chávez spent two years in prison before President Rafael Caldera, spurred by public pressure, pardoned him on 26 March 1994 (Nelson 2011, 179). Chávez immediately began touring the country and establishing Círculos Bolivarianos (Bolivarian Circles). These were organised neighbourhood groups designed to discuss the Bolivarian ideals of a new economy and social structure in order to generate support for the upcoming presidential campaign. During the campaign, Chávez had the support of a number of key leaders from Venezuela’s leftist guerrilla movement of the 1960s and 1970s who had since assimilated into the mainstream through minor political parties. These leaders, such as Douglas Bravo (from MBR-200), Teodoro Petkoff (from MAS), and Luis Miquilena (from URD and, later, MBR-200), mentored Chávez and assisted his transformation from military coup leader to politician (Nelson 2011). Miquilena, in particular, was a key mentor to Chávez

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in the early years, although their relationship broke down in 2001 after Chávez, using enabling law powers, pushed through the controversial 49 laws package (Ellner 2008, 113). Later, Miquilena publicly denounced Chávez on national television for the deaths that occurred during the protests of 11 April 2002 (Nelson 2009). Later, Miquilena (cited in El Nacional 2015b) frequently referred to Chávez as a farsante (phony).

With the assistance of experienced political campaigners such as Miquilena and Bravo, Chávez won the presidency in 1998 with 56% of the vote (Gott 2011, 139; McCaughan 2005). Initially, he was not a front-runner in the race, yet this changed when the lead candidate accepted the support of COPEI and public opinion turned against her (Gott 2011, 138; Garcia-Serra 2001). This demonstrates the extent to which endorsement from the traditional political parties had become a “poisoned chalice” (Gott 2011, 139) and signalled Venezuela’s entrance to an era of neocaudillismo, with the Venezuelan people searching for a leader with a vision independent of the Punto Fijo political parties.

Chávez’s Bolivarian Vision Chávez was inaugurated as President of Venezuela on 2 February 1999, and immediately announced a referendum for a new constitution that reflected the principles of the Bolivarian Revolution. This was a political movement devised by Chávez to guide the establishment of a new regime for Venezuela and provide an alternative to the prevailing neoliberal approach to economics and development. It borrowed ideas from the political thought of a number of Latin American heroes, the most prominent being that of Simón Bolívar. Trinkunas (2005a, 39) notes that Bolivarianism was

Based on Chávez’s interpretation of the thinking of Venezuelan founding fathers Simón Bolívar and Simón Rodríguez, [and] … brings together a set of ideas that justifies a populist and sometimes authoritarian approach to government, the integration of the military into domestic politics, and a focus on using the state’s resources to serve the poor—the president’s main constituency.

In particular, an emphasis was placed on the principles of equality, solidarity, and social wellbeing, the construction and mobilisation of a politically active citizenship that demanded universal social rights, and the implementation of participatory democracy through which to facilitate these principles (De Venanzi 2010, 66). A focus on universal education, healthcare, and the development of a social economy were also defining features of the Revolution. This vision reflected authentic idealised influence and inspirational motivation leadership styles as

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Chávez’s vision emphasised the ethical importance of equal opportunity for Venezuela’s poor majority and a reinvigoration of integrity and ethics in public administration. Throughout Chávez’s leadership of Venezuela, these principles took the form of policy innovations, such as the “democratic redistribution and collective development strategies of the misiones [social missions], private sector business cooperatives, endogenous development centres (Núcleos), communal councils, and land, health, cultural, and recreational committees” (Valencia Ramírez 2008, 55).

A primary element of the movement was the rejection of the corrupt Punto Fijo era of democracy. Chávez argued that the Punto Fijo era was democracy in name only, as the political process was dominated by a select group of the economic and political elites. To combat this, the Bolivarian Revolution stressed the devolution of decision-making power to local communities. In the 1998 presidential campaign, Chávez promised the re-design of the Venezuelan Constitution in order to deepen democracy and enshrine the participatory principles of Bolivarianism:

…I'm raising awareness, calling the national consciousness, the problem is collective and the constituent [assembly] is the only peaceful path for what we want. To what end? To end this rotten system through a democratic measure and lay the foundations of a new Executive, Legislative, Judiciary, a fourth power, the moral [power], and that is the decision of the national majorities. So I'm not offering to fix things overnight because it is impossible; it is a transition project (Chávez 1998).

Another key idea of Bolivarianism was the provision of widespread social services to lift the historically marginalised out of extreme poverty. This was essential to the broader Bolivarian project, and Buxton (2008, 13) observes that “[f]or the chavistas, participatory democracy based on routine citizen engagement in community politics would only be possible if there was investment in social capital…” This included wealth redistribution in the form of the allocation of more government revenue to areas such as welfare, healthcare, and housing. From an economic perspective, emphasis was placed on diversifying the national economy away from oil production, encouraging the growth of small and medium sized businesses, and establishing worker cooperatives. Chávez (cited in McCoy & Neuman 2001, 80) argued that the nation needed to create a new regime that

Gradually eliminates the savage system of income distribution that exists in Venezuela, that progressively eliminates the great difference that exists between a

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minority that has everything and a huge majority that has virtually nothing except hope.

In his campaign for the presidency, Chávez promised a number of structural reforms of the economy, society, and politics to implement his Bolivarian transformation:

First, a national constituent assembly, elected from all social sectors. It will establish a new and genuinely democratic constitution, political system, and Congress. We’ll also attend, for once, to basic needs, like health care and education, and transform the current, brutal neoliberal economic model (Chávez 1998, cited in McCaughan 2005, 40).

Chávez considered the 1961 Constitution illegitimate, as it was associated with the Punto Fijo elite that he claimed to be corrupt and self-interested. At his inaugural address in 1999, Chávez stated (1999, cited in Hawkins 2010a, 86): “[The 1961 Constitution] must die, and with it the disastrous political system that it gave birth to during these past forty years”. In order to achieve this, Chávez focused on the creation of a participatory democracy to return power and autonomy to the Venezuelan people in deciding the nature of the political regime. In implementing this, Chávez’s (cited in Guevara 2005, 23) approach was initially to “create a revolutionary assembly that will unleash the pent up, transformative power from which the new Venezuela will spring”.

Chávez’s Implementation of the Bolivarian Revolution Three key defining moments are evident in Chávez’s initial implementation of the Bolivarian Revolution as President of the Fifth Republic of Venezuela. The first defining moment was Chávez’s creation of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (ANC - National Constituent Assembly) and his dismissal of all recently elected representatives under the Punto Fijo model of governance, as well as sitting judges. To do this, Chávez claimed he had an electoral mandate and argued that the Punto Fijo institutions had no legitimacy in the Bolivarian Revolution. The second defining moment was the creation of the 1999 Constitution that provided the basis of institutionalising the Revolution, thus fulfilling Chávez’s election promise. The third defining moment in the implementation of the Bolivarian Revolution was Chávez’s efforts to generate citizen goodwill to the military through Plan Bolívar 2000. This was important to Chávez as it was linked to his desire to implement Bolívar’s civil-military governance model. The result, however, was the reintegration of the military into national development programs: an integration that Punto Fijo leaders such as Betancourt and Caldera had tried to prevent in order to ensure the armed

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forces remained apolitical. The following section looks at the above-mentioned defining moments in more detail.

The Creation of the ANC Chávez’s promised reform of the Venezuelan political regime was delivered by the ANC. On 25 June 1999, the delegates for the ANC were elected. Chávez supporters won 123 out of 131 seats, allowing him to institute his agenda without restriction (Garcia-Serra 2001, 273). Following its election, the ANC assumed the power to fire judges, mayors, and governors (McCaughan 2005, 91). Chávez argued that the bicameral parliament of the Fourth Republic had no legitimate authority, as it was an institution of the Punto Fijo era (Chávez, cited in Guevara 2005, 35). As such, all state-level representatives that had previously won their positions in the 1998 elections had their tenures terminated. Likewise, the Corte Suprema de Justicia was dissolved, and new judges loyal to Chávez were appointed to the newly created Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ - Supreme Tribunal of Justice). Opponents protested these acts, arguing that it was unconstitutional and an attempt by Chávez to accelerate “the Cubanization of Venezuela” and implement a socialist dictatorship (Jorge Sucre [president of Proyecto Venezuela], cited in Webb-Vidal 2004). Despite the opposition submitting 25 challenges to the TSJ, the Court ruled in Chávez’s favour. These acts demonstrated a willingness on the part of Chávez, early on in his leadership journey, to utilise a pseudo- contingent reinforcement leadership style to bypass democratic procedures in order to fast- track change he viewed as vital for the nation. Chávez’s dismissal of opposition concerns regarding his comments about the 1961 Constitution and its associated institutions, as well as the actual act of dissolving public office positions connected to the Fourth Republic also demonstrate a willingness to ignore sectors of society who did not agree with his governance approach or goals.

To institutionalise the Bolivarian Revolution in 1999, the ANC was tasked with consulting, researching, and writing the new constitution. The consultation process increased Chávez’s legitimacy exponentially as it was a clear demonstration of the change that he promised during the election campaign. It was also a way for Chávez to show authentic transformational leadership styles such as inclusivity and develop an emotional bond with the Venezuelan people. This was evident in the consultation process for the new constitution, of which Chávez remarked:

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Every major issue was discussed [before the new constitution was ratified]: homosexuals arrived [at the palace] to demand same-sex marriages; women’s groups came to demand the right to abortion; indigenous peoples from the jungle arrived in traditional costume, playing drums, dancing, and demanding respect for their rights; black Venezuelans from Barlovento came with their drums and dances, and took over congress. Children came and formed their own assembly. … All this anguish became a flood. I had unleashed a tide of desire for justice among the people (Chávez, cited in Guevara 2005, 34).

Over 624 proposals were submitted during the consultation process for the new constitution, and of this more than 50% were included in the final document (McCaughan 2005, 97). The act of responding to the desires of marginalised sectors of Venezuelan society earned Chávez popular support and increased his legitimacy as the historically marginalised felt they finally had a leader that was governing for all of Venezuela, rather than the wealthy elite. This was demonstrative of the authentic idealised influence and intellectual stimulation leadership styles that promote universal brotherhood and new, creative solutions to issues facing the followers. The involvement of the historically marginalised reinforced a widespread belief that Chávez was a leader different from the Punto Fijo elite. For instance, the consultation process demonstrated to them that Chávez was a leader who implemented practices of inclusivity, and it instilled confidence that Chávez would deliver on his election promises of a more equal economic and social order, reflecting an authentic idealised influence style of ethical practices. At the end of 2000, a poll conducted by Latinobarómetro (2000) revealed that over 68% of Venezuelans had strong confidence in Chávez’s presidency.

The 1999 Constitution On 15 December 1999, Venezuela’s new constitution was accepted with 70% of the vote (McCarthy-Jones 2014, 48). On 20 December the new constitution was proclaimed, ending the Punto Fijo Fourth Republic, signalling the birth of Fifth Bolivarian Republic and re- founding the nation as the Bolívarian Republic of Venezuela7. The new constitution was an important example of Chávez’s use of an authentic contingent reinforcement style as an outcome of authentic inspirational motivation: Chávez had kept his promise to implement his vision for a new era of Venezuelan politics.

The 1999 Constitution was considered “one of the most advanced in the world in terms of entrenchment of human rights and citizen participation”, due to its emphasis of the right of all

7 Renamed from the Republic of Venezuela.

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citizens to pursue human and social development (Raby 2005, 11). Participatory democracy was the vehicle through which to achieve this, with an emphasis on citizens and the government communicating and holding each other accountable. This emphasis correlates with the concept of mutual journey between leader and follower in the authentic full-range leadership model. In Venezuela, Chávez institutionalised the concept in Article 62 of the 1999 Constitution, which contains a clause that specifies the participatory nature of the regime:

The participation of the people in the formation, execution, and control of public administration is the necessary means for achieving the involvement that ensures their full development, both individual and collective. It is the obligation of the State and the duty of society to facilitate the generation of the most favorable conditions for putting this into practice (BGV 1999).

The “pent up, transformative power” of the revolution that Chávez spoke about was thus the engagement of the citizens with Chávez and the Bolivarian principles; each needed the other to reform the Venezuelan polity. Article 62 of the 1999 Constitution demonstrated the mutual obligation that the state and the citizenry now had in keeping the other accountable.

The 1999 Constitution structurally changed the Venezuelan regime. The presidential term was extended from five to six years, and the bicameral parliament was replaced with the unicameral Asamblea Nacional (AN - National Assembly) (Nelson 2009, 4). In addition to the legislative, executive, and judiciary, the 1999 Constitution created two other branches of government – the citizen and electoral branches – to carry out the application of the nation’s new Bolivarian principles. The citizen branch was based upon Bolívar’s own conception of a moral power, whereby its task was to “prevent, investigate, and punish deeds that go against public ethics and administrative morality …” (Wilpert 2007a, 37). Chávez’s changes to the nature of the regime thus had a significant moral element which, given the ethical decay of the Punto Fijo regime, made it very difficult for the opposition to counter. The creation of the 1999 Constitution epitomised Chávez’s authentic inspirational motivation leadership style, as it encapsulated his vision for the nation; one that emphasised extensive human rights and created new avenues for engagement in the political process for many historically marginalised citizens.

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Chávez Reintroduces the Military into Venezuelan Politics and Development A final defining moment in Chávez’s initial implementation of the Bolivarian Revolution was the re-introduction of the military into Venezuela’s politics and development. When establishing democracy in 1959, Betancourt had sought to establish the military as an apolitical entity in order to prevent a return to Venezuela’s history of military dictatorship. Chávez, however, desired the return of the military to Venezuela’s politics and development in order to align the Bolivarian Revolution with Bolívar’s views on governance. Chávez’s aim was to “restore the true role of the armed forces as servants of the people”, and rebuild civilian trust in the military, which had remained low following El Caracazo (Chávez, cited in Guevara 2005, 25). This initially manifested in two ways: the inclusion of military colleagues in cabinet and the creation of a poverty-reduction program known as Plan Bolívar 2000.

Chávez’s significant win at the 2000 presidential and AN elections (McCarthy-Jones 2014, 49) allowed him to reintegrate the military into politics and development. With a two-thirds majority in the AN, he and his supporters dominated the legislature, the judiciary, and the top governmental positions in Venezuela (Nelson 2009, 4). Opponents feared a “militarization of the government”, largely due to Chávez’s appointment of

former military colleagues and coup plotters to important posts, including minister of transportation, governor of the Federal District, chief of the Federal Bureau of Taxation, and director of the secret police. Military personnel were appointed as members of PDVSA's board of directors and as vice-ministers and directors within state ministries (McCoy 1999, 74).

The integration of military colleagues into government allowed Chávez to establish a loyal patronage network – a characteristic reflective of the pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style. The military’s increased involvement in areas of the Venezuelan polity, such as social programs to reduce poverty, resulted in corruption. One of the clearest examples of this is demonstrated in an early poverty-reduction programme known as Plan Bolívar 2000. This plan was a civilian-military partnership that centred on “an ambitious programme of public works and social action using the military in cooperation with local communities, repairing roads, schools and community centres, providing basic health care and other services for poor communities” (Raby 2006, 160). Approximately 40,000 troops participated in the plan, and unemployed civilians received a small payment for assisting in the development (McCaughan 2005, 89, 113). However, the project was marred by accusations

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of corruption whereby a significant amount of money was reportedly siphoned off by troops (McCaughan 2005, 14; Trinkunas 2005b, 216; Wilpert 2007a, 50). Coronel (2006, 10-11) estimates that, of the US$300 million budget for Plan Bolívar 2000, US$150 million was lost to corruption, primarily through false invoicing and the creation of contracts with non- existent companies. Consequently, “a shadow of suspicion” regarding the involvement of the military in civilian matters was cast over Plan Bolívar 2000 (Wilpert 2007a, 50). Yet, such a shadow did little to stop Chávez from creating additional development programs involving the military and placing his allies in command positions (Coronel 2006, 11). The impact of diverting the delivery and funding for social programs away from civilian organisations resulted in a reduction of their capacity to provide such services and thus increased reliance on the military (Trinkunas 2005b, 215). Following Chávez’s rise to power, the military quickly became “one of the principal executors of government social and political policy” under (Trinkunas 2005b, 212). Aside from its new role in the delivery of social policy, the military’s role in politics and public administration expanded. 29 active-duty military officers were appointed to senior ministerial and administrative positions in government, while one- third of portfolios in the presidential cabinet were held by retired and active-duty officers in the year 2000 alone (Trinkunas 2005b, 213). The military’s presence in government social welfare programs and politics more broadly was integral to Chávez’s patronage networks and the support he required for the pursuit of his vision of the Bolivarian Revolution. The next section explores the re-nationalisation of PDVSA and the resultant coup d’etat attempt as key defining moments of Chávez’s implementation of his political project.

Chávez’s Re-Nationalisation of PDVSA and the 2002 Coup Attempt Chávez’s re-nationalisation of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) was a defining moment for his leadership for two reasons. PDVSA became, for the first time in Venezuela’s oil production history, truly controlled by the state. Yet, the means of re-nationalising PDVSA also led to the 2002 coup d’état attempt that removed Chávez from power for 47 hours. Both events are significant, as Chávez’s increased control over PDVSA gave him access to vast amounts of government revenue when the global crude oil price was high. This allowed him to engage in “politics without limits” (Karl 1997) and implement a pseudo-idealised influence style incorporating grandiose vision, similar to that of Pérez in the 1970s. Chávez’s survival of the 2002 coup attempt strengthened his legitimacy with the poor majority. His restoration to the presidency by hundreds of thousands of barrio residents was a physical

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manifestation of the will of the people. Following this event, Chávez increasingly utilised a pseudo-idealised influence style that facilitated his transformation to an idol as he argued that he was the people’s instrument in delivering on the goals of the Bolivarian Revolution (Chávez 2002c). The next sub-section looks at the 49 laws package as the key instigator of events surrounding the re-nationalisation of PDVSA and coup attempt.

The 49 Laws Package The roots of the coup d’état attempt of 11 April 2002 lay in Chávez’s attempts to increase the state’s control over PDVSA. In particular, the 49 laws package of 2001 and the sacking of the seven PDVSA executives on Chávez’s weekly television show, Aló Presidente, in early April 2002, contributed to the coup attempt. A ley habilitante (enabling law) session was granted to Chávez by the AN at the end of 2000 due to continuing economic turbulence and widespread poverty. In particular, an unemployment rate of 11% and a budget deficit of 9.5% of GDP due to a fall in the price of oil to US$8.43 contributed to Venezuela’s economic woes (Garcia-Serra 2001, 274).

This was the second ley habilitante session granted to Chávez since assuming the presidency in 1999. He did not utilise the power, however, until 13 November 2001 - the day before the second session was due to expire. Nelson (2006, 6) notes that this act was a shock, as the economic crisis, which had spurred the AN to grant Chávez the enabling power, had seemingly passed by the end of 2000. Moreover, the fact that he implemented 49 laws, rather than one or two, also reverberated throughout Venezuelan society. The extensive changes initiated by the package threatened the status quo of the wealthy elite and their landholdings, as well as the flow of profits from PDVSA. The package also included vast changes to the agricultural, education, and hydrocarbon sectors that, opposition argued, were deserving of consultation and debate (Barracca 2007).

One of the most controversial pieces of legislation concerned the ability of the government to expropriate land it considered “idle” and served as the backbone of opposition claims that Chávez was threatening private property rights (Nelson 2009). As Nelson notes, the vagueness of the term “idle” allowed the government to adopt a liberal definition and confiscate whatever land it desired to redistribute to the poor. Nelson (2009, 40) claims that while some reclaimed land was redistributed, a portion of it was also used in a “patronage system, bestowing land titles on loyal party members”. Consequently, the clientelistic

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linkages that Chávez had condemned as systemic in the Fourth Republic were being reproduced in the new Venezuelan regime. Such linkages indicate the use of the pseudo- contingent reinforcement leadership style, whereby the leader either engages in or condones clientelistic relationships.

In later years, there have also been claims that Chávez and his government used the idle lands law to punish critics by confiscating their property. For example, Diego Arria, a governor of Caracas in the 1970s who was labelled by Chávez as an “unburied corpse”, had the farm on which he lived expropriated following his comments to media at the Oslo Freedom Forum in Norway that Chávez “would one day face international justice for his crimes against the Venezuelan people” (Halvorssen 2010). Various human rights groups (Amnesty International 2010; HRW 2010) have also observed Chávez’s use of legislation and the legal system to punish and silence critics, indicating that, in response to perceived attacks on his legitimacy and the progress of the Bolivarian Revolution, Chávez utilised the pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style to bend or break institutional rules to secure his political survival and continue his goal of revolutionising Venezuelan society.

Public dissatisfaction with the process was significant, as the 49 laws were formulated with little input from the AN, Cabinet, or civil society (Hawkins 2010a, 19). The nation’s economic and landowner elite were threatened as there were concerns that the package was anti-business, threatened private property laws, and was non-consultative (Barracca 2007; Cannon 2004; Ness & Cope 2016, 464). FEDECÁMARAS, the peak body for business in the nation, and CTV (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela – Venezuelan Confederation of Trade Unions), the largest worker’s union, were the most vocal opponents. They argued that the rights to participation and consultation enshrined in the 1999 Constitution had not been respected and demanded a public review of the 49 laws (López Maya & Lander 2004, 226; USA Department of State 2002).

To counteract criticism, Chávez argued that the fast-tracked legislation via enabling law was necessary to deepen the Revolution and reinvent the social order in Venezuela (Chávez 2001). Yet, Hellinger (2006, 9) notes that Chávez,

Although acting within constitutional boundaries, by issuing such far-reaching reforms by decree … acted more in the tradition of a populist caudillo than the architect of a

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more “protagonistic democracy,” that is, one where deep reforms are designed and implemented within a participatory framework.

Historically, the enabling law was limited in its “scope and duration” (Garcia-Serra 2001, 278). Under the 1961 Constitution, its use by five previous presidents - Betancourt, Pérez, Lusinchi, Velasquez, and Caldera - had been limited to the areas of finance and the economy, and ranged in duration from 30 days, four months, or one year. In the 1999 Constitution, the enabling law power was expanded to include areas such as “finance, the economy and society, infrastructure, personal and legal security, science and technology, and the civil service” and allowed for the president to legislate “whichever law … [he or she] deems appropriate” (Garcia-Serra 2001, 276, 281). However, as past presidents had used the ley habilitante mechanism, parliamentary granting of such powers to the president was familiar in the historical political process in Venezuela and to the Venezuelan public (McCoy 1999, 73). In fact, throughout both of his administrations, Pérez used the ley habilitante power to enact over 3,000 pieces of legislation (Crisp 1998).

The 2002 Coup D’État Attempt The initial response to the package of 49 laws was a two-day nationwide general strike from 2 December 2001 in order to protest Chávez seeking an additional enabling law session over public education (Nelson 2009, 4; Corrales & Penfold 2007, 102). Another strike on 10 December was the largest strike in the nation’s history and paralysed the nation by shutting down approximately 90% of the economy (Nelson 2009, 56). For instance, along with PDVSA halting oil production, the private sector also participated in the strike. Food distribution slowed, small and medium-sized businesses were pressured by FEDECÁMARAS and CTV to close, and gasoline was unavailable for gas stations, airlines, bus companies, and taxis, making the nation come to a “virtual standstill” (Tinker Salas 2015, 159). Disturbances of this nature continued into 2002 and led to the April 2002 coup d’état attempt. Chávez reacted in anger to these strikes and threatened to “turn the screws” on the “immoral and cowardly oligarchs” (Chávez, cited in Lifsher 2001).

Pedro Carmona, leader of FEDECÁMARAS at the time, and future coup leader, argued that the work strikes were a way for “the whole country to express the sentiment that changes are needed and that the president should demonstrate a new, tolerant disposition to dialogue” (cited in Lifsher 2001). In this regard, Chávez’s antagonistic reaction to dissent can been seen to correlate with the pseudo-intellectual stimulation style of intolerance to difference of

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opinion and the pseudo-idealised influence style of divisiveness. On the day of the coup, Carlos Ortega (cited in Gott 2011, 224), president of CTV, encouraged hundreds of thousands of protestors to march on the presidential palace, Miraflores, and forcibly “expel the man who has betrayed the Venezuelan people”. The protests quickly descended into violence as the opposition marched closer to Miraflores, where pro-Chávez supporters were already holding their own rally.

The government and opposition accounts submitted to the AN following the event vary greatly and it was impossible to reach compromise or agreement on what exactly unfolded on 11 April 2002 (Cannon 2004). For instance, according to the opposition, Chávez was at fault for the violence of the day as he gave consent to groups such as the Círculos Bolivarianos, the Armed Forces, and the Guardía Nacional to use weaponry against the protestors (Cannon 2004, 295; Nelson 2009, 228). Following reports that Chávez had ordered the military to take control of Caracas and subdue the protests, General Efraín Vásquez Velasco appeared on national television to declare that Chávez had issued illegal orders for troops to contain the protests and announced that he would not follow the directive (Trinkunas 2005b, 219). If the opposition’s version of events is true, Chávez’s orders reflect the use of a pseudo-contingent reinforcement style. The coup leaders used this version of events to argue that Chávez was complicit in the violence and that Article 350 of the Constitution obligated the Armed Forces to intervene in order to protect the citizens. The opposition then claimed that Chávez has resigned and had been moved to a secure location by the military. Following this, the Armed Forces identified a “constitutional political vacuum”, and consequently endorsed Carmona as provisional president with the understanding that the 1999 Constitution would be upheld (Cannon 2004, 296).

However, when Carmona was sworn in, he ordered the closure of the AN and the TSJ, the abolition of the 1999 Constitution, and the dismissal of mayors and governors (Gott 2011, 31; The Revolution Will Not Be Televised 2003). He also announced an “ultraconservative” interim government, contrary to agreements reached prior to the coup with organisations such as CTV to include its representatives (Encarnación 2002, 43). For those who had supported Chávez’s resignation and removal, such an act on the part of Carmona was alarming because it was perceived to be authoritarian in nature and a reversal of his deal with CTV. For instance, Carlos Ortega (cited in Encarnación 2002, 43), following Carmona’s announcement

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of the conservative interim government, stated: “The CTV was not consulted, and we feel betrayed by this violation of the rights and freedom of the workers' movement”.

In contrast, Chávez and his supporters claimed that a coup d’état had been planned (Chávez 2010), and that rebellious factions of the Armed Forces, in coalition with right-wing opposition, private media, and right-wing business, deliberately fired upon both pro-Chávez and anti-Chávez protestors in order to generate violence and discontent (Cannon 2004, 295- 96). Private media’s role in supporting the coup was significant. A number of army generals who supported the coup publicly thanked the private media channels for their assistance:

After the overthrow appeared to have succeeded, another coup leader, Vice Admiral Victor Ramírez Pérez, told a journalist, "We had a deadly weapon: the media. And now that I have the opportunity, let me congratulate you." Another grateful leader remarked: "I must thank Venevisión and RCTV." RCTV news director Andrés Izarra later testified at National Assembly hearings on the coup attempt that he had received clear orders from superiors at the station: "Zero pro-Chávez, nothing related to Chávez or his supporters... The idea was to create a climate of transition and to start to promote the dawn of a new country" (Edwards 2007, 52).

At the peak of the protests against Chávez’s removal from office, almost one million people were protesting in the streets of Caracas, and, by the end of the event, at least 17 people had been killed (Arbatli 2012, 147; Hawkins 2010a, 21). Word had also spread that Chávez had not resigned, but rather the coup plotters had forcibly removed him. This led some factions within the military to turn on the provisional government, as they perceived Carmona and his cohort to have violated the 1999 Constitution. Simultaneously, a popular protest was taking place. Hundreds of thousands of pro-Chávez supporters were emerging from the barrios in the hills of Caracas, assembling at the gates of the Miraflores palace, and demanding Chávez’s return (Ellner 2010, 81). This gave confidence to loyal factions of the Armed Forces and the Guardía Nacional to re-take Miraflores and key military bases, and have Chávez returned to power. Footage from the protests (The Revolution Will Not Be Televised 2003) calling for Chávez to be returned to the presidency showcases the anger and the injustice that many Venezuelans felt at having a democratically elected president removed in a coup d’état. McKenna (2009, 130) notes that this was a critical moment in Chávez’s leadership, as it forged a deeper connection between Chávez and his followers:

The masses emerged decisively in defence of Hugo Chavez precisely because in him they recognise someone that represents their own struggle, a figure who embodies their culture and is able to grasp organically their inner life … it is the paradox of the Venezuelan revolution that, in defending Chavez and returning him to power, the masses

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became a force which far surpassed the government they sought to restore. In returning power to Miraflores, a new type of power was itself created.

Chávez’s legitimacy with his supporters following this event was high, as his return to the presidency was an example of the popular power of the people. It was also evidence of the messages he had been promoting about the Bolivarian Revolution: the desire of the right to remove him from power, his role as the instrument of the people, and the strength and value of participatory democracy. One effective strategy that Chávez had utilised to help the population become aware of its rights was the publication of small, hand-held copies of the 1999 Constitution (Corrales 2006). Millions of these copies were printed and distributed for free. Such a strategy was one example of Chávez’s desire to encourage a participatory and protagonistic democracy and can also be linked to the authentic leadership style of individualised consideration on a mass scale. The distribution of the mini constitutions was a way for Chávez to educate and mobilise the population to be aware of its rights and engage in conversation and debate about such rights.

Post-coup, the opposition was unwilling to accept Chávez’s mandate to rule. Ellner (2010, 119-20) notes that this unwillingness “locked them into a position of intransigence in which they subsequently refused to acknowledge any positive aspect of his rule and denied that he enjoyed popular backing.” The opposition campaigned on a slogan of Prohibido Olvidar, Prohibited to Forget, which referred to Chávez’s alleged role in the violence of the coup (Ellner 2010, 118). Following the coup, Chávez had attempted to engage in reconciliation with the coup supporters. For example, he instituted the Presidential Commission for a National Dialogue to allow opposition and the government to discuss policy issues, replaced a number of chavista “hardliners” (group members who adhered uncompromisingly to party ideology) in his ministry with more moderate chavistas, instituted some decentralisation reforms that would ease the way for state opposition governors, and re-hired some of the PDVSA management he had publicly fired in the days leading up to the April coup (Ellner 2010).

Such efforts indicate willingness on the part of the Chávez to compromise and find a middle- path to resolve the polarisation occurring in the nation. However, the opposition was unwilling to engage with these efforts. This attitude may have been driven by the opposition’s firm position that Chávez had no legitimacy to rule following the coup and his

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alleged role in inciting the violence of the protests. As the opposition continued to refute his attempts at dialogue, Chávez instead

resumed his inflammatory rhetoric, allowed the National Assembly to eviscerate the commission investigating the incidents before the coup, and removed the officers who had rebelled. The private media increasingly became the targets of threats and violence (Hawkins 2010a, 21).

An example of these threats is an incident that occurred on national television, when Chávez (cited in Nelson 2009, 74) addressed the editor of the daily newspaper El Nacional about an unfavourable editorial: “I know where you move, I know who you meet with, I know you are behind this editorial”. Chávez would also label opposition as “traitors” for supporting policies or political positions he deemed obstructionist to the Bolivarian Revolution, as well as other names such as “coup-mongerers”, “Pontius Pilates”, and “the Devil” (Chávez 2003b; Chávez, cited in Hawkins 2010a, 61). Chávez’s comment to the editor of El Nacional demonstrates the depths to which relations between Chávez and the media had descended. Utilising threats and intimidation is indicative of pseudo-intellectual stimulation and pseudo-idealised influence, as Chávez, in this case, demonstrated an intolerance of a difference of opinion and used inflammatory language. Scholars such as Ellner (2008), Gott (2011), and Wilpert (2007a), note that the increased antagonism between Chávez and the media in part contributed to the commencement of the oil lockout in December 2002, as powerful interests in Venezuela resolved again to remove him from power.

Chávez Strengthens His Moral Authority: the 2002-2003 Oil Lockout The 2002-2003 oil lockout8 served as a defining moment for Chávez’s leadership as it not only strengthened his moral authority but facilitated the use of a pseudo-idealised influence leadership style to create division by rallying his supporters against a common enemy. Ultimately, this defining moment contributed to the collapse in legitimacy of the opposition and enabled Chávez to progress his plans for the Bolivarian Revolution. This section examines this defining moment in greater detail.

Opposition attempts to destabilise Chávez’s leadership continued following the failed April coup d’état. In December 2002, an oil lockout of PDVSA facilities was implemented by the

8 An event in Venezuela over December 2002-February 2003, whereby management of PDVSA “locked out” workers from PDVSA facilities in order to participate in broader general strikes.

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company’s management in a challenge to Chávez’s attempts to regain control of the company. It was also a strategy by the opposition to turn the tide of popular opinion against him. Regaining power over PDVSA’s management was integral to the success of Chávez’s goals for the Bolivarian Revolution, as whomever controlled PDVSA controlled the country, due to the power derived from the oil wealth. Chávez’s weathering of the oil lockout was another defining moment for his leadership, as he used it as further evidence for his claims that foreign influence and elites from the Punto Fijo era – embedded in the management of PDVSA – were trying to prevent a “true democracy” from being implemented in Venezuela.

In this defining moment, Chávez’s primary goal was the implementation of the 2001 hydrocarbons law, which had been part of the 49 laws package. This piece of legislation was designed to increase the royalties paid by PDVSA to the government from 16% to 30%, and it also required “51% government participation in all oil ventures” (Henry 2014, 120). In 2002, 80% of the nation’s export revenue was earned from oil (Nelson 2006, 7). Yet, historically, executives from foreign oil companies, as well as Venezuela’s traditional economic elite, had managed PDVSA and therefore its profits. At the time of the oil lockout, 80% of profits from the sale of oil went to foreign companies instead of the national government (Raby 2006, 172). With such an arrangement in place, the PDVSA elite was unwilling to relinquish control without significant resistance, yet without control over the oil profits Chávez was unable to deepen his Bolivarian Revolution.

The 2002-2003 oil lockout was the result of a two-fold resistance. First, the elite who governed PDVSA wanted to maintain their hegemony over its operations. Although PDVSA had been nationalised in 1976 under President Pérez, its management had remained under the control of foreign interests. As part of the 49 laws package, Chávez attempted to essentially “re-nationalise” PDVSA by reasserting government control over its profits. The hydrocarbons law in this package gave PDVSA a 51% stake in any oil project in the nation (Mommer 2003, 141). This stake would then be utilised by the government to support projects in the realms of health care, education and job creation, as required of the government by the 1999 Constitution (Wilpert 2007a). In his pursuit of this, Chávez attempted to force PDVSA to “increase taxes on the oil industry, to reduce costs, to increase transparency in its international operations, and to appoint a pro-Chávez board of directors” (Wilpert 2007a, 94-5). However, the PDVSA board resisted this, as its historical role had

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been to operate as a “state within a state”, largely autonomous from the federal government (Henry 2014, 119).

The second element of resistance was the unification of the opposition in a coalition called Coordinadora Democrática (CD - Democratic Coordinator). CD had made the decision to pursue the constitutional path of removing Chávez from office. As such, it adopted the strategy of making Venezuela ungovernable to force Chávez to call an early recall referendum on his presidency (Tinker Salas 2015). In its campaign to remove Chávez from office, CD called upon Article 72 of the 1999 Constitution that allows for a president to be recalled from office halfway through his or her term should 20% of registered voters petition the government (McCarthy-Jones 2014, 52-53; Hawkins 2010a, 1; BGV 1999). However, the halfway point of Chávez’s presidency was months away in June 2003. In December of 2002, CD, in collaboration with FEDECÁMARAS, CTV, and PDVSA executives, called a general strike of the oil industry. It did so in order to compel Chávez to announce an early recall referendum or simply resign (Ellner 2008, 114-15; McCarthy-Jones 2014, 53). The consequence of this event was the sabotage of refinery technology and equipment, food and petrol shortages, and a severe economic recession, reducing GDP by 24% (Weisbrot & Sandoval 2007, cited in McCarthy-Jones 2014, 53; Chávez 2003a, 32).

Chávez’s initial response was to wait it out. He spoke strongly against the actions of CD, CTV, FEDECÁMARAS and PDVSA executives. Chávez’s discourse during this time reflected a pseudo-idealised influence leadership style as he identified those behind the lockout as “terrorists”, “criminals” and “saboteurs” (Chávez 2003a, 24). In a speech on 5 January 2003 responding to the deaths of two government supporters as a result of clashes with the opposition, Chávez stated:

We will catch the criminals even if they hide beneath rocks or even if they try to hide behind the smoke of the money of those protecting them, of those who have tried to destroy our country, of the plotters who are trying to strangle the nation by sabotaging the oil industry … They should understand it once and for all: they will not be able to destroy the institutionalised order; they will not be able to attack the Republic and, above all, and most important, they will not be able to do away with the dreams of this people, who are defending this process with their souls and with their joy, but also with firmness and unselfishness, and even with their lives (Chávez 2003a, 21).

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Chávez connected those involved with the oil lockout with the forces behind the coup of April 2002. In doing so, Chávez was able to expand his categorisation of the forces that he claimed were against the Bolivarian Revolution. The forces against Chávez and the Revolution were no longer just the corrupt political elite of the Fourth Republic, but now also included members of the opposition who had supported the April 2002 failed coup and the December 2002 oil lockout. This approach is indicative of the pseudo-idealised influence leadership style, whereby the leader will employ divisive language and behaviour to create an “us versus them” mentality in order to further unite his or her power base against a tangible enemy.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the defining moments that led to Chávez’s rise to political prominence and the initial years of his presidency. These moments have demonstrated his mixed use of authentic and pseudo leadership styles as he sought to implement and defend his vision of the Bolivarian Revolution. The next chapter continues the exploration of Chávez’s defining moments from 2004 until his death in 2013 as he sought to deepen the Bolivarian Revolution and transform the Venezuelan polity.

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Chapter Seven: The Defining Moments of Chávez’s Leadership, 2004-2013

Introduction The second chapter of Chávez’s leadership explores his defining moments for the period of 2004-2013. During this time, Chávez predominantly utilised pseudo-leadership styles as he sought to defend and strengthen his Bolivarian project against further opposition attempts to discredit and destabilise it. However, this defence resulted in Venezuela’s transformation into an electoral authoritarian regime. In particular, this chapter considers events such as the creation of the misiones sociales (social missions), Chávez’s survival of the opposition’s recall referendum, his electoral dominance throughout this period, the move to twenty-first century socialism, the “crowding out” (Corrales & Penfold 2007) of non-chavista media and judiciary, and his cancer diagnosis and final presidential election campaign as defining moments of his leadership for this period.

Chávez Consolidates His Legitimacy Chávez’s survival of the 2002-2003 oil lockout enabled him to remove the final impediment to his control of PDVSA – that being skilled foreign workers and managers whose loyalty was to the profits of PDVSA rather than the Venezuelan state. Conveniently for Chávez, his win over the oil lockout coincided with an increase in the global crude oil price. This allowed him to implement a range of welfare initiatives, known as the misiones sociales, targeted at the country’s poor majority. The social missions rapidly became a key policy for Chávez’s main support base, which in turn protected him against the opposition’s recall referendum held to decide on the continuation of his presidency in August 2004. The misiones and the recall referendum are considered defining moments, as they enabled Chávez to consolidate his legitimacy and accelerate the Bolivarian project and introduce its next phase, known as twenty-first century socialism. This section examines the misiones and the recall referendum in greater detail to establish the basis for the subsequent section: the implementation of twenty-first century socialism in the context of Chávez’s electoral domination.

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The Misiones The creation of the misiones was an important defining moment of Chávez’s leadership. On the one hand, the misiones an authentic expression of his care for them, and they served as an essential component of his transformational vision for Venezuela. On the other hand, the misiones were also viewed as a clientelistic tactic to attract cheap support and buy votes. In particular, the establishment of the misiones in the lead-up to the recall referendum in August 2004 cast doubt upon the authenticity of Chávez’s motivations. This sub-section explores the possibility of Chávez’s leadership styles being understood as both authentic or pseudo, depending on his audience. It provides an overview of the misiones and the differing perceptions of Chávez’s leadership in relation to them.

The misiones are a collection of state-funded services that fulfil a range of needs, such as healthcare, subsidised food, housing, and education. They are funded by oil revenue distributed by PDVSA. The use of oil revenue to attract electoral support has been a tactic of Venezuelan leaders since the development of the oil industry under the regime of Gómez in the 1920s. Consequently, its distribution to fund social policy has been common practice. For instance, the first administration of Pérez instituted La Gran Venezuela, while his second administration created the Plan de Enfrentamiento a la Pobreza (PEP - Confronting Poverty Plan). Meanwhile, the second Caldera administration introduced Agenda de Venezuela (Agenda Venezuela) (Fernandes 2007). The backbone of Chávez’s support base was the poor majority who were the recipients of the benefits of extensive social welfare policies, and the most prominent example of these policies was the misiones.

Chávez introduced the misiones in the year prior to the recall referendum of August 2004. Sources close to Chávez acknowledge that it was important to implement the misiones as a way to demonstrate to supporters that Chávez could actually implement the welfare improvements he had promised. For instance, Germán Sánchez (2005, 3), Venezuelan ambassador to Cuba at the time of the oil lockout, noted that the misiones were crucial to establish because:

It was essential to act quickly and create benefits within the reach of the largest possible number of poor people, to show them with concrete examples that the revolution they had mobilised and fought for in April, and ardently backed in December, had social and economic content in addition to political and moral strength.

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The misiones covered all aspects of life, and at the program’s height there were over 30 misiones in existence. The main misiones, however, dealt with healthcare, employment, education, housing, and food/nutrition. For instance, Misión Barrio Adentro, established in April 2003, provides free universal health care through small centres in poor communities. Misión Sucre offers free university level education, while Misión Robinson and Ribas deliver literacy, and remedial primary and secondary education. Misión Mercal provides subsidised staple foods (Hawkins 2010b, 39; Raby 2006, 173) and was extended to include free, ready- made meals for the very poor (Howard-Hassman 2015, 1028). Misión Habitat provides free and subsidised housing. There are also additional misiones in the areas of employment, vocational training, indigenous land rights, environmental sustainability, land redistribution, and the promotion of arts and culture (Hawkins, Rosas & Johnson 2011, 191).

Misión Barrio Adentro was by far the most popular program. Its provision of basic health care in the barrios and staffed by thousands of Cuban doctors, “consummated Chávez’s bond with the poor” (Carroll 2012). By 2005, Misión Robinson eradicated illiteracy in the nation, teaching over two million people to read and write (TeleSUR 2015). A participant of Misión Robinson reflected that her job prospects had improved following her literacy training, and that, as a result of Chávez, “We live better … We live like people” (The Economist 2008). Comments such as this can help to explain the attachment that many poor Venezuelans felt to Chávez and his continuing support in the face of opposition attempts to delegitimise and remove him from power. The misiones became the physical manifestation of Chávez’s care for the Venezuelan people. Francia Urbina, a neighbourhood leader in Caracas, stated:

If it were not for Chávez, things would be much worse. I'm not a learned person. I'm not educated. I was taught by the streets. I was trampled on. I was used. But my president taught me to value myself, to love myself. We have never had a president like President Chávez. He is the best, the very best (Frontline 2008).

Such a stance is indicative of the level of support Chávez experienced from the country’s historically marginalised majority. Chávez was not just a national leader providing welfare; instead, he mobilised a huge, previously ignored, sector of society and engaged them on an emotional and visionary level to desire and demand more of their rights. As time progressed, however, it became increasingly clear that the misiones were not the efficient, democratic or transparent institutions that the government claimed them to be. Numerous reports highlighted the mismanagement of the misiones (El Nacional 2004), including a lack of auditing and

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transparency by PDVSA regarding funding (El Nacional 2005), and the lack of accurate quantitative data published by the government to enable informed analysis (Daguerre 2011).

Moreover, misiones such as Barrio Adentro that were reliant on foreign workers (Cuban doctors, in the case of Barrio Adentro), experienced mass desertions as working conditions and the nation’s economy worsened from 2013 (López Ballesteros 2014). Finally, the Tascón and Maisanta lists, published during the recall referendum campaign, identified those who had voted against Chávez and were used as a basis for exclusion from the misión programs by Chávez supporters working in government (Hsieh, Ortega & Rodriguez 2009). The misiones acted as a medium for “symbolic inclusion” (Hellinger 2006, 9) and provided a way for Chávez to connect with and demonstrate his care and concern for his followers.

Simultaneously, the misiones also acted as an incentive for electoral support from poor voters who did not necessarily subscribe to the Bolivarian ideology. Scholars such as Penfold- Becerra (2007) have argued that the misiones were a patronage strategy for Chávez to increase his popularity in the lead-up to the recall referendum. In this regard, the creation of the misiones sociales reflect the pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style and can be viewed as a form of output legitimacy. As identified in Chapter One, output legitimacy relates to the economic performance of the regime and the ways in which it invests, or is unable to invest, government revenue in policies that appeal to the population (Mazepus et al. 2016, 3). For instance, at the time of his election in 2000, Chávez experienced a popularity rating of 80%, yet by 2003 it had fallen to 30% as a result of persistent economic troubles and the numerous opposition challenges to his legitimacy (Notimex 2004). In addition, between 2001 and 2003 poverty levels rose from 39% to 55.1%, while extreme poverty (less than US$1.25 per day) rose from 14.4% to 25% during this same period (Daguerre 2011, 841). Yet, as the global oil price recovered in 2003, Chávez was able to launch the misiones and regain some of the legitimacy he had lost. This was reflected in winning the recall referendum with 60% of the vote on a campaign platform of “Que no te quiten tus misiones” (“Don’t let them take your missions”) (Daguerre 2011, 841; Notimex 2004).

Other views support this idea of the misiones sociales as an output legitimacy strategy to attract electoral support. These views focus on a clientelistic, rather than an emotional or ideological, relationship between Chávez and the poor. For instance, Hidalgo (2009, 81) suggests that the misiones are “fast and flexible instruments for funneling resources to the

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lowest social classes in a classically clientelistic fashion.” Similarly, Penfold-Becerra (2007, 63) argues that in some circumstances such policies can be used to “‘buy votes’ for re- election purposes or to build political constituencies that strengthen support for the government.” Corrales and Penfold (2007, 103) contend that the “deluge of money” invested in the misiones was key to initially improving Chávez’s popularity by almost 15% in the polls and suggest that the policy was the means of attracting more support in the lead up to the recall referendum.

The nature of the misiones changes depending on the audience and it is possible that they served as both an authentic expression of Chávez’s relationship with his supporters and an incentive or bribe for those not entirely dedicated to his political vision. In any case, the misiones functioned as an important political resource in Chávez’s success the recall referendum. The following sub-section examines this further.

The Recall Referendum The recall referendum, held in August 2004, served as a defining moment for Chávez as his victory at the time exhausted opposition attempts to discredit the Bolivarian project and force a change in national leadership. The opposition’s subsequent collapse following the recall referendum allowed Chávez to accelerate his vision and further consolidate his electoral power.

Article 72 of the 1999 Constitution allows for a recall referendum to occur on any public office where the position is subject to popular vote. The incumbent of the public office must have completed half of his or her term, and 20% of registered voters must petition for the recall. In order to successfully recall a holder of public office, at least 25% of registered voters must participate, and the number of “yes” votes must equal or surpass the votes originally received for that office (BGV 1999). In order to initiate the recall referendum, the opposition had to collect 2.5 million signatures from registered voters (Corrales & Penfold 2007, 102). However, the process was delayed due to irregularities identified by the CNE, which claimed that a number of signatures were fraudulent (Raby 2006, 174). Other views, however, suggest that Chávez and his government “bombarded the opposition with an array of legal and administrative obstacles” to prevent the opposition from engaging in “valid- signature collection” (Corrales & Penfold 2007, 103).

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One such obstacle was the decision that the opposition had not collected the signatures within the correct period, and thus any signatures collected outside that period were unusable. The referendum was consequently delayed a year before being held on 15 August 2004. Results were declared with Chávez claiming 59% of the “no” vote versus the 40% “yes” vote achieved by the opposition (CNE 2004). The opposition “cried fraud” despite a number of international observers, including the Organisation of American States (OAS), the UNDP, and the Carter Center, declaring the vote clean (Raby 2006, 174-75; Corrales & Penfold 2007, 103). The success of Chávez at the recall referendum has been linked to the popularity of the misiones, and the campaign of “Que no te quiten tus misiones” (“Don’t let them take your missions”) (Daguerre 2011, 841). Such a campaign is indicative of a pseudo-intellectual stimulation leadership style, whereby the leader uses emotional argument to sway voters.

The misiones and the campaign were a success on multiple levels. First, the misiones served a dual purpose: the first was to demonstrate to Chávez’s followers that he cared for them and that he was fulfilling the promises of the Bolivarian Revolution and the new rights enshrined in the 1999 Constitution. Second, the misiones appealed to those that were undecided about Chávez’s leadership but desired the benefits of the welfare policy. The emotional connection forged between Chávez and supporters is a key characteristic of transformational leadership. This connection, combined with the threat of the dismantlement of the misiones should Chávez be removed from power, undoubtedly attracted electoral support for Chávez at the recall referendum. Consequently, the misiones fulfilled a dual function not recognised in the leadership literature: emotional connection and the fulfilment of rights as reflective of an authentic idealised influence leadership style, as well as a form of bribery for electoral support via a pseudo-contingent reinforcement style. The campaign slogan of “Que no te quiten tus misiones” also demonstrated the utilisation of pseudo-idealised influence through an “us versus them” approach. This was a method to de-legitimate opposition by creating the perception that the opposition were out of touch with the needs and desires of the poor majority. Yet, at the same time, supporters perceived such an approach as authentic because Chávez was understood to be defending the Bolivarian Revolution.

Another tactic used by Chávez during his campaign throughout the recall referendum was the mass mobilisation of his supporters. The campaign for mass mobilisation was dubbed Campaña de Santa Inés, named after a battle in 1859 between the liberal and conservative parties during a civil war. In the case of the battle, the liberals prevailed against the

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conservatives by making it seem that they had withdrawn, when in reality they had established a trap. Chávez’s use of historical events to stimulate nationalism within Venezuela and imbue his speeches with a sense of myth and awe has been well noted by scholars (Emerson 2011; Frajman 2014; McCarthy-Jones & Turner 2015; Mixon 2009; Zúquete 2008). Such an approach drew legitimacy from historical figures and events and instilled this in Chávez and his vision, thereby increasing his credibility and incorporating him into national myths and traditions.

The Maisanta Command was created within the Santa Inés campaign to coordinate grassroots support for Chávez. This command drew its name from Chávez’s great-grandfather, who was a revolutionary fighter against the Gómez regime. According to Hawkins (2010a, 2), the Maisanta Command was responsible for the creation of over 8,000 neighbourhood groups in the barrios (urban slums) called Unidad de Batalla Electoral (UBE - Electoral Battle Unit), which were in part formed from the Círculos Bolivarianos. These units, in turn, organised over 120,000 patrullas electorales (electoral patrols) that “carried out neighbourhood voter education and registration drives, posted campaign literature, organised rallies, and kept a scrupulous count of voters on election day” (Hawkins 2010a, 2). Moreover, the Chávez campaign had a “highly consistent set of slogans and images” encouraging voters to vote “no” in support of Chávez while, in contrast, CD had no clear leader or policy platform, and relied on campaigning via television (Hawkins 2010a, 3). The combination of these approaches allowed Chávez to generate a comprehensive and widespread message to convince voters of his position, whereas CD remained fractured in the wake of its failures during the 2000 election, the 2002 coup attempt, and the 2002-2003 oil lockout.

Following the referendum, Chávez and his followers initiated retribution against those who had supported it. A key example of this was the publication of a list of all citizens who had signed the referendum petition calling for Chávez’s removal from office. In the lead up to the referendum, Chávez declared on national television:

Whoever signs against Chávez … their name will be there, registered for history, because they’ll have to put down their first name, their last name, their signature, their identity card number, and their fingerprint (Chávez 2003c).

This list, known as the Tascón list, was given by the CNE to AN member Luis Tascón, who then published it on his website (Corrales & Penfold 2007; Hawkins 2010b, 62-63; Tinker

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Salas 2015, 163). In January 2004, Chávez had written to the CNE requesting that it provide Tascón with the list in order to expose what he claimed were “bogus” signatures on the petition for the recall referendum (HRW 2008, 17; Uzcategui 2012). The government allowed the publication and distribution of the list (Hawkins 2016). Those featured in the Tascón list have claimed to have been fired from government jobs or lost business contracts, and others claim to have been refused public services such as access to welfare or a passport (Noriega 2006, 5; Corrales & Penfold 2007). The health minister at the time, Roger Capela, publicly fired department employees who had petitioned for the recall referendum and identified them as “traitors” (Noriega 2006, 5-6). Hawkins (2010b, 62-63) argues that Chávez and his government used the Tascón list to restrict voter registration and “punish” government employees who supported the opposition. However, opposition business owners also used the list in the same way to punish employees who supported the government.

Shortly afterwards, another, more in-depth, list was created. The Maisanta Program was developed from the Tascón list, and it has been alleged that it was widely disseminated throughout the public service as an “enemies list” (Hsieh, Ortega & Rodriguez 2009, 1). This program was a database of over 12 million registered voters and included their names, addresses, voting preferences, and whether or not, as well as how, the individual had voted in the recall referendum (HRW 2008; Hsieh, Ortega & Rodriguez 2009; Noriega 2006). Wilpert (2007a) argues that the publication of the program created a new dynamic in the nation that was a reaction on the part of Chávez supporters to the consistent and aggressive discourse of private media in its attempts to delegitimise Chávez. However, the attempts by private media instead provided “a stronger justification for supporters of the project [the Bolivarian Revolution] to argue that they had to protect themselves from infiltrators and traitors” (Wilpert 2007a, 205). The dynamic that emerged, therefore, was one of increased political polarisation and mistrust between supporters and opponents of Chávez.

The Tascón list and Maisanta Program are evidence of the pseudo-idealised influence and pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership styles that reflect divisive behaviour on the part of Chávez to scapegoat particular groups as a method of discrimination. Chávez’s threats to the citizens who chose to sign their name for the recall petition, and his allowance of the Tascón list and Maisanta Program to remain in the public sphere, demonstrate of an “us versus them” mentality. More broadly, control over the media and judiciary in Venezuela were important to Chávez in defending his Bolivarian Revolution, as it enabled him to

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regulate the narrative of twenty-first century socialism and resist legal challenges to his policy platform by opponents. The next section explores the importance of electoral legitimacy for the promotion and protection of Chávez’s political project.

Chávez’s Use of His Electoral Dominance The 2004 recall referendum was but one example of Chávez’s electoral dominance in Venezuela. Legitimacy via electoral mechanisms was a key element of Chávez’s leadership, and Chávez was described to have been in “permanent campaign mode” throughout his rule (Block 2015). Chávez’s use of his electoral dominance was a defining moment for his leadership, as it enabled him to claim the mandates for the changes made to the Venezuelan state and regime and to continue his elevation to idol status amongst his followers. The following sub-sections explore the evolution of the Bolivarian Revolution into twenty-first century socialism as facilitated by Chávez’s electoral dominance and his attempts to legislate his vision.

Mandate to Change the Venezuelan Polity Throughout his administrations, Chávez relied on electoral victories to lend legitimacy to his vision for Venezuela and the policy implications that this carried. Wilpert (2012, 40) noted that

… elections and referenda are important tools with which Chávez and his supporters counter the opposition claim that the Chávez government is an authoritarian regime … [and that] elections in Venezuela do not represent merely a choice among politicians and parties, but a choice between two fundamentally different political-economic systems: capitalism or socialism.

Electoral success, then, was integral to providing a mandate to Chávez to do whatever he considered necessary to implement his political vision. Over the course of a 14-year period between 1998 and 2012, Chávez and his party won 14 of the 15 votes held for the presidency, AN, governorships, municipalities, and various referenda including a new constitution, the recall referendum, and the 2009 referendum on term limits (Reuters 2012).

The opposition assisted in Chávez’s electoral dominance by boycotting the 2005 AN elections and withdrawing from the legislative process for five years. Following its failure at the 2004 recall referendum, the opposition fractured and had no united strategy to contest Chávez’s political vision. In particular, the boycott was preceded by the collapse of the

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opposition coalition umbrella party, CD, while various other smaller opposition parties had been in talks with the European Union and the OAS to negotiate their participation in the elections. Five key parties – AD, COPEI, MAS, PJ (Primero Justicia – Justice First), and PV (Proyecto Venezuela – Project Venezuela) – had threatened to boycott, as they claimed that the CNE could not be trusted to facilitate a fair election process.

This was attributed to the 2004 leaks of the Tascón list and the subsequent Maisanta program, with the fear that the digital fingerprint machines that recorded the votes would be used to identify how citizens had voted, thus leading to intimidation and/or further discrimination against opposition voters (Sullivan 2009, 7; López-Maya & Lander 2011, 136). As a consequence of the boycott, Chávez’s MVR party won 114 out of the 167 available AN seats, while smaller chavista parties won the remainder (Reel 2005). Although the opposition had tried to use the boycott to challenge the legitimacy of the elections, their absence became a defining moment for Chávez’s leadership as it gave him virtually absolute legislative power to progress his plans for twenty-first century socialism.

Chávez’s Reconstitution of the MVR Part of the plans for instituting twenty-first century socialism included the reform of Chávez’s political party, MVR, into the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV - United Socialist Party of Venezuela). Chávez’s announcement of the creation of the PSUV came a year after the chavista victory in the 2005 AN elections. Chávez’s speech on 15 December 2006 was steeped in historical symbolism, whereby he linked the struggle of twenty-first century socialism to the struggle of Latin American revolutionaries such as Bolívar and Ezequiel Zamora. In his speech, Chávez declared that Venezuela was entering into a new era, and that it required a vehicle capable of facilitating the changes necessary for such a period: “…we need for this new era that commences, a political structure, a political instrument at the service, not of biases or colors, to serve the people and the revolution, in the service of socialism” (Chávez 2006). Chávez utilised a pseudo-intellectual stimulation leadership style by situating his justification for change on historically legitimating forces in an effort to establish an emotional connection to the changes. There was also a personalistic element to the speech indicating a pseudo-idealised influence style, whereby Chávez (2006) declared that: “Those votes are for Chávez! Those votes are not for any party” when reflecting on elections. By early 2007, the PSUV had over 5.7 million members enrolled, many of whom had been incorporated from the Círculos Bolivarianos (Ellner 2010, 81;

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Hawkins 2010b, 41). A key function of the PSUV was to politically mobilise members into electoral battalions or cells to support the government during electoral campaigns. These groups engaged in voter education, and campaigned on behalf of the government, such as during the 2007 and 2009 referendums (Ellner 2010).

Chávez Maintains His Electoral Popularity Chávez’s electoral dominance under the new banner of the PSUV continued in the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections, where he enjoyed victories with healthy margins. The margin over opponent Manuel Rosales of the centre-left party Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT – A New Era) in the 2006 elections, for instance, was 26%, the highest of his political career (CNE 2007a). This was because a serious policy miscalculation on the part of the opposition served to reinforce Chávez as more “in touch” with the people’s needs. During this election the opposition united in a single ticket behind Rosales. However, Rosales had a number of challenges to face in order to garner national legitimacy and erode Chávez’s support base. For instance, in 2002 he had supported Pedro Carmona’s dissolution of the 1999 Constitution during Carmona’s brief period as provisional president. Consequently, Rosales was linked to the “coup-mongerers” Chávez would frequently refer to (Tinker Salas 2015, 201).

Moreover, while Rosales’ presidential campaign promised to retain the misiones sociales, he made it clear that he would modify them. For example, the free Bolivarian University would no longer focus on Bolivarian philosophy, and Misión Barrio Adentro would no longer be staffed by Cuban doctors. Rosales also promised to end the sale of discounted Venezuelan oil to Cuba (Mather 2006). The proposal that received the most criticism, however, was mi negra (my black [card]). This proposal involved a debit card, black in colour to symbolise oil, which, monthly, would have between 600 bolívares fuerte and 1000 bolívares fuerte (US$260-$480 in 2006 exchange rates) deposited into it. Such a payment would be provided to over three million Venezuelans who earned below the minimum wage (Valencia Ramírez 2009). However, the proposal backfired on Rosales as it failed to capture the poor majority because it was perceived to be racist by those it targeted (Ellner 2008, 129, 145). For example, advertisements for the card featured “toothless, grinning Afro-Venezuelans singing the praises of Mi Negra and Rosales …” (Valencia Ramírez 2009, 117; UNT 2006).

The combination of these issues meant that Rosales was unable to gain political traction during the campaign. Rosales’ efforts, rather than attracting supporters and growing his

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legitimacy to challenge Chávez, instead served to affirm Chávez’s position that the opposition were out of touch with the people, and thereby increased Chávez’s legitimacy. As a result, Chávez won the presidential elections with 62.84% of the vote. Rosales earned 39.9% of the vote, and the elections had a voter turnout of almost 75% (Tinker Salas 2015, 201; CNE 2007a). Chávez’s success at the 2006 presidential elections gave him mandate to begin instituting changes according to twenty-first century socialism ideals, and it was after this point that Chávez created the PSUV to function as the main driver of twenty-first century socialism.

At a regional electoral level serious criticism has been directed at Chávez for politically motivated interference in election outcomes. The best example of this was the 2008 state and mayoral elections, due to the number of opposition candidates who were banned by the government from participating for alleged corruption, as well as the public threats Chávez made against Manuel Rosales, his opponent in the 2006 presidential election. Specifically, over 300 candidates – of which 80% were from the opposition - were disqualified from participating in the election by the Comptroller-General on the basis that they were being investigated on corruption charges (Ingham 2008). The disqualified candidates took their cases to the TSJ, arguing that the 1999 Constitution only allowed for disqualification if the candidate had been convicted of a crime. The TSJ, however, upheld the disqualifications (Reuters 2008).

One particular disqualified candidate, and perhaps the most well-known, was Leopoldo López. He was banned from holding public office for six years due to allegations of nepotism and misappropriation of funds dating back to the early 2000s. López was a strong critic of Chávez and his government and had been involved in the 2002 coup attempt. His disqualification began in 2008, when he completed his term as mayor of the Chacao municipality in Caracas. López, however, was never charged with a crime or tried. In 2011, López was cleared of all charges, and at the time of the disqualification stated that the government had barred opposition “because they know we can win” (cited in Ingham 2008), indicating his belief that the disqualifications were politically motivated. This claim was also made by Freedom House (2009) and Corrales (2010), who argued that the government’s failure to win key seats in important economic zones such as Caracas would have slowed plans for the implementation of legislation designed to progress twenty-first century socialism. The regional elections concluded with the PSUV winning 17 out of 22 governor

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and mayoral positions. After the announcement of results, Chávez (cited in Carroll 2008) declared his intentions to deepen the revolution: "[t]his is a great victory for the party. The path of building socialism has been endorsed and now we will focus on the task of deepening and extending our project."

Chávez’s response to opposition victory in the regional elections was to change the powers and responsibilities of mayors and governors. For instance, mayoral responsibilities were transferred to a new office, titled “head of government”, whose head was appointed by Chávez. The establishment of this office removed various decision-making powers and budgeting from the mayoral and governor offices, generating an adverse impact on offices held by opposition. Antonio Ledezma, the opposition mayor of Caracas, lost over 90% of his budget due to this change (Eaton 2013). Henrique Capriles, the opposition governor of the state of Miranda at the time, “lost control of ports, airports, a hospital, and an asphalt plant”, while the state’s police force, “one of the best performing in the country” was ordered to relinquish 3,000 weapons to the federal government (Corrales 2010, 38). Chávez claimed that opposition governors were attempting to establish paramilitary “nests”, declared them “enemies of the people”, and threatened to prosecute them (Chávez 2009; Corrales 2010). These examples are demonstrative of both the pseudo-contingent reinforcement and pseudo- idealised influence leadership styles, whereby Chávez manipulated institutional rules to disqualify political opponents and remove administrative power from key opposition- controlled areas. He also utilised inflammatory language to generate division and unite his followers against a common enemy.

A final example of Chávez utilising pseudo-leadership styles during the regional elections was the public intimidation of Manuel Rosales, his main opponent in the 2006 presidential race, and who was re-contesting for the position of governor in the state of Zulia. Chávez accused Rosales of misusing public funds during his time as governor of the state of Zulia. He also repeatedly threatened Rosales with prison, “taunting him at rallies by saying that a prison cell was waiting for him” (BBC 2008). As a consequence, Rosales fled Venezuela and applied for political asylum in Peru, claiming that he was being persecuted for his criticism of Chávez (Carroll 2009a). Chávez’s behaviour in this circumstance can be linked to the pseudo-full-range leadership style of contingent reinforcement, whereby Chávez demonstrates an abuse of authority and the use of fear to intimidate Rosales.

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Chávez Evolves His Vision: Twenty-First Century Socialism Chávez’s win at the 2004 recall referendum gave him the mandate to continue the implementation of his political vision for Venezuela. The evolution of this vision was flagged in early 2005 when Chávez declared Venezuela’s pursuit of a twenty-first century socialism. This evolution is considered a defining moment for his leadership as it facilitated the Venezuelan regime’s transformation from a flawed democracy to that of an electoral authoritarian regime and the personalisation of power in the figure of Chávez. The following section examines twenty-first century socialism in the context of the regime’s transformation, with a particular focus on Chávez’s attempts to legislate it.

The Basis of Twenty-First Century Socialism Chávez first announced his vision for twenty-first century socialism at the World Social Forum, held in Brazil in early 2005 (Webber 2010, 29). At that time, there was no programmatic clarity to the vision in Chávez’s address, although it emphasised the values of social justice, equality, and solidarity. According to Chávez, a primary motivation of twenty- first century socialism was to put “humans and not machines or the state ahead of everything” (Chávez 2005, cited in Valencia Ramírez 2008, 165). This involved establishing parallel state structures, consisting of cooperatives, communal councils, and co-managed enterprises, with the aim of developing a “popular power” and “social economy” (Larrabure 2013, 178). Later in 2005, Chávez and his government called for the “progressive dismantling of the political, economic and institutional obstacles that have made it impossible to meet social needs”, and highlighted the need to reform the 1999 Constitution in order to “add the elements that can reinforce the move towards a break with the bourgeois, capitalist model. Popular power was especially crucial to twenty-first century socialism, as it would establish “the foundations for a new mode of production based on new relations of production, new forms of property, and the democratization of capital” (BGV, cited in Bruce 2008, 177-178).

The application of this vision to the Venezuelan polity became evident from mid-2005 with a re-focus on land reform, whereby large estates owned by domestic and international “agro- capitalists” were expropriated by the state and re-distributed to landless peasants (Webber 2010, 30). At the same time, urban land reform was also addressed through the creation of thousands of Comités de Tierras Urbanas (CTUs - urban land committees). The CTUs were set up in poor urban neighbourhoods across the country and possessed the power to survey, allocate land titles, and design public spaces for their neighbourhoods (Webber 2010).

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Wilpert (2007a, 77) notes that during this period the number of worker cooperatives, misiones sociales, co-management enterprises, and social production businesses exploded to more than 100,000 registered initiatives. However, corruption was rampant due to many registered initiatives never actually running. Ellner (2008, 130) predicted that the financial loss to the government during this time was potentially hundreds of millions of dollars.

Chávez’s win at the 2006 presidential elections with 63% percent of the vote gave him the mandate to progress the Bolivarian Revolution’s evolution into twenty-first century socialism. Just one month after his re-election, Chávez announced the five motors of twenty- first century socialism:

1. An enabling law was granted to Chávez by the MVR-controlled AN to hasten the implementation of twenty-first century socialism. 2. A reform of the 1999 Constitution to help establish twenty-first century socialism. Reforms included the removal of term limits on the presidency. 3. A public campaign called Moralidad y Iluminación (Morality and Enlightenment) run by the communal councils and designed to be “consciousness-raising” on the ideals of twenty-first century socialism. 4. Revisions of the country’s political and territorial units to redistribute power more equitably on geographic terms throughout the country’s cities, states, and countryside. These revisions also aligned with situating more AN seats in geographical chavista strongholds. 5. The devolution of economic, social, political, and democratic power to the communal councils, thereby reducing the decision-making power of mayors (Webber 2010, 30- 31).

To accomplish these tasks, changes to the Venezuelan constitution were required. The following sub-section explores Chávez’s attempts to legislate twenty-first century socialism. These attempts constitute a defining moment for his leadership, as his response to opposition resistance illustrates his use of pseudo leadership styles in pursuit of his vision.

Implementing His Vision: Chávez Legislates Twenty-First Century Socialism In order to legitimate and advance the political project of twenty-first century socialism, Chávez needed to incorporate its principles into the 1999 Constitution. There were 69 amendments, with key proposals including the removal of term limits on the presidency and the expansion of the presidential term from six to seven years. Chávez also sought increased powers for the presidency and the state that included control over the nation’s international

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monetary reserves, the right of the state to expropriate private property without judicial authorisation, state control of the central bank, and state financing of the ruling party. Other amendments included the reduction of the average work-week from 44 to 36 hours, social security benefits for informal workers, and increased recognition of Afro-Venezuelans, and protections for LGBTQI citizens in the constitution (Wilpert 2007b; BBC 2007a). Moreover, expanded powers were to be given to the consejos comunales (communal councils) regarding budget and community project discretion, “thereby bypassing and possibly replacing elected offices at sub-national levels”, and new regional administrative areas with vice-presidents appointed by Chávez would be also established in an effort to “enshrine a socialist and communal state” (Kornblith 2013, 54). Finally, the updated constitution would reflect the designation of a “domestic enemy” (the oligarchy) and an “external enemy” (imperialism) for the armed forces (Corrales 2011, 86). Many of the amendments reflected an authentic intellectual stimulation leadership style, whereby they set high standards for Venezuelan society in relation to equality and social justice. However, a number of the amendments, such as the removal of term limits and the increased power of the consejos comunales, reflected a pseudo-contingent reinforcement style designed to accrue all power to Chávez and his supporters.

Initially, Chávez attempted to pass these amendments via constitutional referendum in 2007, but this resulted in his first electoral defeat since 1998. The opposition used the proposal of indefinite term limits to rally support against Chávez. Specifically, their platform argued that Chávez was seeking to become a “president for life” similar to the proposal made by Bolívar in the nineteenth century (Bruce 2008, 177). A student movement, activated by the closure of RCTV earlier in 2007, was influential in leading protests against the amendments and calling for more time to study the proposal (BBC 2007b). This latter critique of the process may help to explain why the reforms failed at referendum. Concern over the rushed nature of the amendments, in which the amendments were passed the required three times by the AN within a six-month period, contradicted the participatory and consultative nature of the Revolution. Moreover, in contrast to the consulting period for the creation of the 1999 Constitution, this time “a small, secretive group of advisers” drafted the 33 amendments before the AN designed an additional 36 amendments (Bruce 2008, 176; Corrales 2011a, 85).

A former ally of Chávez and former commander of the army, General Raúl Isaías Baduel, who split from the PSUV in the months approaching the referendum vote, critiqued the lack

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of consultation on the amendments, stating that “the people did not propose one comma or period in the text” (Baduel cited in Romero 2007a). Finally, the abstention rate in the referendum was 44%, indicating that perhaps many Chávez supporters were unsure about the changes and chose not to participate in order to avoid having to make a judgment on the amendments and therefore on Chávez himself. Meanwhile, the opposition was able to mobilise its supporters against the amendments through the student movement, historically a politically active body (BBC 2007c). The amendments failed at referendum with a result of 51% no to 49% yes (CNE 2007b). The ‘no’ vote consisted of a number of blocs that included not only stringent opposition and the student movement, but also moderate chavistas who were not comfortable with the changes proposed by Chávez, and a military faction connected to General Baduel. One of the largest PSUV-allied parties, Podemos (“We can”), also refused to endorse the proposed constitutional changes, thus detracting from Chávez’s support base and sending a powerful message to voters (McCoy & Diez 2011, 197). In conceding defeat, Chávez (2007d) congratulated the opposition yet promised that he would continue to implement the vision of twenty-first century socialism, noting that, and linking back to his famous words from the 1992 coup, that “for now, we were unable” to achieve the established goals.

Chávez kept this promise and was eventually able to institute many of the proposed changes via ley habilitante powers and a subsequent referendum in 2009. He passed four-fifths of the package as legislation through the ley habilitante session, which was granted to him by the chavista-dominated AN in January 2007 to accelerate the implementation of twenty-first century socialism. This particular session lasted for 18 months and Chávez had the power to legislate in 11 “broadly defined” areas such as the “transformation of the state”, “popular participation”, “finances and taxation”, “energy policy”, and “territorial order” (Wilpert 2007a, 226). The opposition claimed that this power would solidify Chávez’s position as a dictator and render the AN useless (Marx 2007). His use of the ley habilitante mechanism to pass constitutional changes rejected at referendum reflects both a pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style, as well as a pseudo-inspirational motivation style that prioritised his vision over the means to achieve it.

The removal of term limits for the office of the president could not be legislated via the ley habilitante session. Consequently, if Chávez was unable to pass this amendment via referendum he legally could not run for the presidency when his term expired in 2013. In a

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second attempt for the amendment in 2009, Chávez expanded the terms to include any public office, such as that of mayor or governor. He also embarked on an extensive campaign with the use of state resources to encourage supporters to vote in support of the amendment. This involved “posters urging a ‘yes’ vote saturated the country, state TV networks cheered for the ‘sí’ and civil servants were sent out to canvass” (Carroll 2009b). Carroll (2009b) notes that a flyer was distributed citing 10 reasons to vote yes in the referendum, with the number one reason being “Chávez loves us and love is repaid with love”, and the second reason: “Chávez is incapable of doing us harm”. In February 2009, Chávez put the amendment to the Venezuelan people again through referendum and it passed with 54.85% of the vote (Acosta- Alzuru 2014, 217). Declaring victory, Chávez stated: “I asked you not to fail me, and that I would not fail you … I knew that you would not fail me. I ratify to you that I will not fail you, the people of Venezuela, the hopes of the people” (Chávez 2009, cited in Forero 2009). Chávez’s discourse reflected a transformational leadership style of mutual obligation and dedication between himself and his supporters. He emotionally linked the success of the amendment to a broader, uniting vision (authentic idealised influence and authentic inspirational motivation). However, while, to his supporters, this was an example of Chávez delivering upon his promises, his critics viewed it as emotional manipulation and evidence of his increasing personalisation of power (pseudo-idealised influence and pseudo-intellectual stimulation). The next section further explores Chávez’s response to his critics through his gradual repression of opposition media and the judiciary.

The “Crowding Out” of Opposition Media and the Judiciary Chávez’s strategy of “crowding out” (Corrales & Penfold 2007) opposition media and the judiciary from Venezuela’s institutions was a defining moment for his leadership because his means of doing so restricted the freedom of speech of anyone who did not support his political project and its associated changes. Chávez created an “us-versus-them” mentality indicative of the pseudo-intellectual stimulation and pseudo-idealised influence leadership styles. It is in these examples that Venezuela’s transition to a hybrid electoral authoritarian regime model is most evident.

Following his win at the 2004 recall referendum, Chávez focused on altering the power dynamics in the media and judiciary. His fraught relationship with private media resulted in the inability of one of Venezuela’s oldest private media channels to continue to broadcast, due to the government’s refusal to renew its operating license. Other critical, private

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television channels moderated their broadcasting as a result of this event. This was coupled with the creation of a number of state-owned television stations that broadcast only positive stories of the government in an attempt to counter the private media’s negative narrative of Chávez. This sub-section explores these key events in order to further demonstrate the gradual change in Chávez’s use of leadership styles during phase two of his leadership as he continued to consolidate power over his opposition.

In the years after the coup, Chávez’s treatment of private media changed. Specifically, his view of private media’s anti-Chávez role in the 2002 coup attempt significantly hindered relations. Its portrayal of authoritarian behaviour by Chávez prompted a one-sided, and frequently racist and dismissive, critique of Chávez, his policies and his supporters (Lupien 2013, 231-32). Despite many human rights organisations and news groups arguing that Chávez was restricting press freedom and enforcing his own narrative through the state- owned television channels (Committee to Protect Journalists 2012; Freedom House 2008; HRW 2012; Reporters Without Borders 2008; Romero 2007b), in 2010 the private media still controlled over 94% of the content viewed by the public, giving them an inordinate level of influence across the nation (Lupien 2013; Weisbrot & Ruttenberg 2010).

From 2004, Chávez began to limit the space in which private media could operate. This began in December of that year with a media content law titled the Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión (Law on Social Responsibility in Radio and Television), which was expanded in 2010 with the Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio, Televisión y Medios Electrónicos (Law on Social Responsibility in Radio, Television and Digital Media) to encompass the internet. The initial creation of the law was a response to private media involvement in the 2002 coup attempt. The new law increased penalties for defamation and slander against public officials and forbade channels from airing information that was contrary to the security of the nation, such as inciting riots or calling for the assassination of the president (Lendman 2011; Corrales 2010). The issue with the new law, however, was that it could be applied liberally by the chavista-dominated courts to silence any opinion Chávez or his government did not like.

Chávez used the 2004 law, in part, to justify the decision not to renew the operating licence of Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV – Radio Caracas Television), the nation’s oldest, private news channel. Chávez based this decision on RCTV’s role in the 2002 coup, its one-sided,

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critical coverage of Chávez and his government in the subsequent years, and its disregard of existing broadcast laws, particularly in regard to the clauses on defamation of elected officials (Knight & Tribin 2016, 5-6; Wilpert 2007a, 223). When RCTV’s operating licence expired on 27 May 2007 it was immediately replaced with Televisora Venezolana Social (TVES – Venezuelan Social Television), a government-run channel (Knight & Tribin 2016). RCTV argued that its broadcast licence was not due for renewal until 2022 and that any contentions regarding its licensing were “unproven” and had not been subjected to wider discussion within the AN or the broader public (Corrales 2011a, 84). However, Chávez was uncompromising on his decision, and sought to associate RCTV with the oligarchical enemy of the nation:

...but in that channel they will not continue, gentlemen, it's over ... what date is it today? April 24, they have one month and three days then; 33 days is what they have left, go prepare for it to be over and leave in despair… they want to fill Venezuela with blood again; they are calling these marches for when it is least expected to produce wounded, blood, pain and death, as they did on April 11, to later say that it is I who commanded to kill them; it's the same format ... I promise you ... gentlemen of the Venezuelan oligarchy, gentlemen of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie, lackeys of the empire, I promise you, and I swear to you, with the right hand and with the left hand, that if it occurs and you all fill the streets of Venezuela once more with blood and terror and Hugo Chávez, I swear you will regret it, gentlemen of the Venezuelan oligarchy; I swear to you all, you will regret it (Chávez 2007e).

RCTV moved to cable television, but in January 2010 Chávez ordered cable-television operators to stop broadcasting the channel (Palmer 2010, 27). Human rights organisations cited Chávez’s targeting of RCTV as evidence of an attack on free speech, and authoritarian behaviour (Committee to Protect Journalists 2012; Freedom House 2008; HRW 2012; Reporters Without Borders 2008; Romero 2007b). As a result of the effective closure of RCTV, Chávez’s approval rating fell to 31%, the lowest since the lead-up to the coup in 2002 (Corrales 2010).

Moreover, Chávez frequently clashed with, and threatened to shut down, Globovisión, a channel identified in the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” analogy used by Chávez following the 2002 coup to associate private media with death and destruction. He accused it of “inciting insurrection for its coverage on the government’s response to national disasters”, and thereby “contaminating Venezuelans” (Corrales 2010, 34). Globovisión was eventually sold in May 2013, and with it a commitment to adjust its editorial line “toward the centre” (BBC 2013b). The dominance of private media in the communications sector and their

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negative narrative of Chávez resulted in the restriction of their operations in Venezuela. This, coupled with Chávez’s aggressive and divisive language towards the private media companies and those ideologically aligned with them, served to further polarise the Venezuelan polity. Chávez’s relationship with private media correlates with the pseudo- idealised influence leaderships that reflects a scapegoating approach and an “us versus them” mentality. The media restrictions also correspond with literature on competitive authoritarian regimes, whereby critics of the government, such as media outlets, can be progressively silenced through the manipulation of regulations and legislation.

Chávez also increasingly interfered with the independence of the judiciary, with the most notable case being the singling out of María Afiuni, a Caracas-based municipal judge. Chávez attracted criticism from opposition and international human rights groups due to the arrest of Afiuni, who was targeted for making a ruling that displeased the Chávez government. This ruling involved the release on bail, in accordance with the Venezuelan penal code and the position of the United Nations, of a businessman the government had accused of corruption (El Universal 2012). It was observed that Chávez attempted to influence and intimidate members of the judiciary into granting rulings that he favoured (BBC 2013a) due to his public labelling of Afiuni as a “bandit” and demand that she be sentenced to thirty years in jail (Human Rights Foundation 2013, 5). This example demonstrates the use of pseudo-idealised influence in Chávez’s inflammatory language against Afiuni, as well as a pseudo-contingent reinforcement approach as he publicly attempted to influence the TSJ in its management and sentencing of her case.

In addition to the case of Afiuni, the Human Rights Foundation (2013, 2), in an interview with a former Justice of the TSJ, Eladio Ramón Aponte Aponte, the influence that Chávez and his government exerted over the judiciary was revealed. For example, the various branches of government would meet with the justices to set “guidelines of the justice system”, and justices were expected to take personal calls from Chávez, ministers, and high- level officials regarding the outcome of cases. The erosion of the independence of the judiciary is a sign that the nature of the Venezuelan regime was gradually adopting a competitive authoritarian nature (Corrales 2015; Hidalgo 2009; Kornblith 2013; Mainwaring 2012) and again demonstrates Chávez’s use of pseudo-contingent reinforcement to manipulate institutional rules in an effort to protect his Revolution.

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Chávez Hides His Cancer Diagnosis and Ascends to Idol Status Chávez’s management of his cancer diagnosis in 2011 was a final defining moment for his leadership, as it demonstrated the lengths he would go to veil the true severity of his illness and win the 2012 presidential election. Chávez used his cancer diagnosis as a tool to assist his transformation into heroic myth for his chavista supporters (Blackmore 2014). This last section examines the defining moment in greater detail.

Very limited information was released about Chávez’s cancer diagnosis when it first became public knowledge in July 2011. His treatment had commenced the month prior to the diagnosis going public when he underwent emergency pelvic surgery in Cuba. During the next 18 months, Chávez had three more surgeries as well as chemotherapy and radiation treatment. Shortly after his diagnosis became public Chávez confirmed his intent to contend the 2012 presidential election and, just months later, he declared himself to be cancer-free (BBC 2011). The announcement of his cancer diagnosis reaffirmed the emotional attachment his supporters felt for him and improved Chávez’s popularity ratings to 60% in October 2011 (Phillips 2011).

Yet, is still unclear what type of cancer Chávez had. This is significant because, as Acosta- Alzuru (2017, 149) notes, “we will never know what … would have happened politically if Chávez had been more candid about his illness.” Chávez’s withholding of diagnostic information was in direct contradiction to Article 143 of the 1999 Constitution, which stated “Citizens have the right to be informed in a timely and truthful manner by public officers about the status of issues of their interest…” (Acosta-Alzuru 2017, 136; BGV 1999). In this regard, the concealment of information that could influence the voting public’s informed choice for president is a demonstration of a pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style.

Chávez’s 2012 election campaign demonstrated the use of pseudo-idealised influence and pseudo-intellectual stimulation as he sought to consolidate his status as a cultural and political idol through the use of emotional argument. During the 2012 presidential election campaign, Chávez used slogans such as “Todos somos Chávez” (We are all Chávez) and “Chávez es el pueblo” (Chávez is the people) (Block 2015; Carroll 2012). This was the final act in his attempt to merge with El Pueblo. The transition to this state had started at the very beginning of his presidency in 1999, however it intensified in 2009 following the removal of

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term limits for political office. Chávez (2012c) emphasised the importance of victory in the 2012 election, arguing that the opposition were the “candidacy of nothing” and declaring at his campaign’s launch in July of that year that “…independence, power, national power, all of that is at stake on October 7 [the election date] … in the next 100 days, the next 100 years in Venezuela are going to be decided…”

The Gran Polo Patriótico (GPP – Great Patriotic Pole), a coalition of parties headed up by the PSUV, supported Chávez’s candidacy, while Capriles continued to represent the Primero Justicia party and retained the support of the MUD. Capriles was presented as a young, healthy and energetic candidate, in contrast to Chávez’s older, cancer-stricken figure, and likened to former Brazilian president Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva on the political spectrum (Tinker Salas 2015, 205). There were two key factors that aided Chávez’s victory in this election. First was his cancer diagnosis, which generated a significant sympathy vote for him. Rafael Poleo (2012), the editor of the Venezuelan newspaper El Nuevo Pais at the time, wrote that the outlook of Capriles winning the election was “bleak”, due the fact that Venezuelans “vote emotionally and that everywhere the people vote for hope”. Second was the leak, in the weeks prior to the October election, of alleged plans by Capriles and the MUD that indicated that if they gained power they would implement neoliberal reforms reminiscent of the changes that Pérez had made in 1989 that had led to the Caracazo (Boothroyd 2012).

This generated fear that many of the misiones would be cut. In particular, misiones supporters were keen to benefit from a housing policy known as the Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela (GMVV - Great Venezuela Housing Mission). Over the course of 2011 and 2012 the misión built 375,000 homes for people who had been living in slums, with more than US$22 billion invested into the policy for that time period (Perry 2013). Capriles denied claims that he would cut the misiones and argued that his signature on the policy document was a forgery. However, the leak was enough to damage support for the MUD. When addressing supporters about the contents of the package and the alleged duplicity of Capriles, Chávez (cited in Boothroyd 2012) stated:

Behind his [opposition candidate, Capriles] democratic mask is the most horrendous thing in politics. Behind his deceptive message of progress and social welfare is the most savage neoliberal capitalist package that has been known in Venezuela and Latin America.

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In making such a statement, Chávez utilised pseudo-idealised influence and pseudo- inspirational motivation to capitalise on the leak and associate his opponent with the memory of the harsh neoliberal reforms of the 1980s as a method to delegitimate Capriles and the MUD. The loyalty generated by emotions about Chávez’s cancer diagnosis and fear that the misiones sociales would be cut helped Chávez win the election with 55% of the vote compared to Capriles’ 44% (CNE 2012). Despite his claims of good health, Chávez returned to Cuba within weeks of his electoral victory for what would be his final surgery. Following this surgery, Chávez’s health declined and he remained in Cuba for almost two months. This meant that he was unable to attend the presidential inauguration ceremony. Instead, in a culmination of Chávez and El Pueblo, the president of the AN, Diosdado Cabello, swore in the people who had attended a march to the Miraflores Presidential Palace in Chávez’s stead. In doing so, Cabello (cited in Block 2015, 220) argued, “the President will be the people, because the people are Chávez”.

Conclusion By the end of his life, Chávez had transformed his leadership from one that predominantly drew upon a mix of authentic and pseudo leadership styles, similar to that of his Punto Fijo predecessors, to one that solely utilised pseudo leadership styles. Block (2015, 206) notes that from 2007 – the year that Chávez lost the referendum to expand presidential term limits – he increasingly situated his presidency around a delegative decree role not unlike the Cesarismo Democrático of Gómez. Chávez’s transcendence to idol as one with El Pueblo served as an important legitimation tool for Maduro and his chavista government in the wake of Chávez’s death. In this regard, the memory of Chávez has been used in a similar way to the memory of Bolívar’s to provide coherence and connection to Maduro’s political project. The next chapter explores Maduro’s leadership and his use of Chávez’s memory to protect twenty-first century socialism and his own political survival.

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Chapter Eight: The Defining Moments of Maduro’s Leadership, 2013-Present

Introduction This final data chapter explores the leadership of Venezuela’s current President, Nicolás Maduro (2013-present). As Maduro’s rule of Venezuela is short compared to the other leaders examined in this thesis, and the longer-term impact of some policies is difficult to predict at this point in time, this chapter will focus on the defining moments of Maduro’s leadership as he has reacted to the economic and political crises that have plagued Venezuela under his leadership. First, however, this chapter will explore Maduro’s source of political legitimacy and his electoral mandate, as both have strongly influenced his management of the defining moments of his leadership throughout his time as President of Venezuela.

An Early Defining Moment: Maduro’s Designation as Chávez’s Heir A defining moment for Maduro’s legitimacy and leadership was his designation as Chávez’s heir. His election to the presidency was a request “from the heart” that Chávez (cited in Dobson 2013) made on live national television in December 2012, should he die following his fourth cancer surgery. Maduro joined the chavista movement in the 1990s as a supporter of Chávez during his time in jail. He also worked as a hardline trade union leader in Caracas before his election to the AN in 2000 (Ellner 2013; Tinker Salas 2015, 208). Maduro served as foreign minister from 2006-2012, where he was a strong proponent of Chávez’s visions of regional integration and a multipolar world (Angosto-Ferrández 2014). Yet, Maduro’s extensive travel as foreign minister for Venezuela meant that, in the immediate years prior to Chávez’s death, he did not have a strong domestic political presence among the general population (Corrales 2013, 57), although he was a powerful factional leader within the PSUV.

Despite Chávez’s blessing, Maduro’s electoral mandate was weak and cast doubt upon the durability of the chavista project in the absence of Chávez himself. Following Chávez’s death in March 2013, Maduro called a new presidential election for April 2013, as mandated by the 1999 Constitution that elections be triggered within 30 days of the sitting president’s death

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(BGV 1999, Article 233). Maduro, having never led a national campaign before, pushed a platform of continuity by promising to carry on Chávez’s vision for Venezuela. In launching his campaign in Chávez’s home state of Barinas, Maduro (cited in BBC 2013a) linked his leadership to Chávez: “We are here to make a commitment to the land where he was born: we will not let the people down and we will go to the very end to build socialism”. The memory of Chávez was integral to the success of Maduro’s campaign, as his loyalty to the former President convinced many voters to support him. Such was the importance of Chávez to supporters, that many voted for Maduro in order to honour his memory. A slogan that circulated during this period declared that “Chávez, te lo juro, mi voto es pa’ Maduro” (I swear, Chávez, my vote will be for Maduro) (Angosto-Ferrández 2014, 1). During the campaign, and in the weeks following, Maduro (cited in The Washington Post 2013a) identified himself as the “Son of Chávez”, and, in his closing address, declared that he would “[ensure] the legacy of my commander, Chávez, the eternal father”. In this regard, both Chávez and Maduro utilised a pseudo-intellectual stimulation leadership style to draw an emotional connection between Chávez, Maduro and the continuation of the Bolivarian project.

The political polarisation that flourished under Chávez continued with Maduro. The election campaign and result were characterised by insults, threats, and accusations of fraud from both sides. Both the PSUV and its main political rival, the MUD, rejected the political legitimacy of the other, maintaining a dynamic that prevented dialogue and compromise. Maduro’s main opponent was MUD candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski - Chávez’s opponent in the 2012 presidential elections. Insults were frequently traded between Maduro and Capriles to detract from the other’s legitimacy. Capriles argued that Maduro was incompetent (BBC 2013a) and a poor copy of Chávez (Reuters 2013a), that the PSUV was “sick by power”, that it had violated the 1999 Constitution by not appointing the leader of the AN at the time, Diosdado Cabello, as acting president (BBC 2013b), and he accused Maduro of being “the voice of lies” (cited in Reuters 2013b). Maduro, meanwhile, labelled Capriles a “fascist” (BBC 2013b), called him a homosexual in a derogatory manner (Cawthorne 2013), and often referenced Capriles as having the “disgusting face of the fascist” (Maduro cited in Reuters 2013b). Shortly before the election, Maduro accused Capriles of sanctioning mercenaries from El Salvador to sabotage the nation’s electricity grid, while Capriles had previously accused Maduro and the government of lying to the country by covering up Chávez’s death which he alleged had occurred weeks before 5 March (Ellner 2013, 46). On both sides of

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politics this indicates the use of pseudo-idealised influence and pseudo-intellectual stimulation as they tried to discredit the other through name-calling and lies.

The 2013 presidential election result was tight, with the difference in the winning vote margin between Chávez and Capriles in October 2012 and Maduro and Capriles in April 2013 used by the MUD as evidence that Maduro lacked electoral legitimacy (Lopez & Watts 2013). Although Chávez beat Capriles with a margin of 11% of the vote in 2012 (López Maya 2014, 68), just six months later the difference was only 1.49% in a high voter turnout of 79% of the eligible population (Tinker Salas 2015, 210). Such a narrow margin can be contrasted to Chávez’s previous electoral victories, in which he always won the vote with at least a 10% margin. The MUD immediately claimed fraud and refused to recognise Maduro’s victory. Capriles demanded both an audit and a recount and then subsequently filed an unsuccessful motion in the TSJ to invalidate the results (McCarthy & McCoy 2013). A reason for the MUD’s rejection of the results was due to its claim that Maduro’s regime was electoral-authoritarian in nature, that it “is a cheat; it plays foul; it does not respect the law”, and was thus illegitimate (Capriles Radonski 2013).

The tactic in question that is particular to electoral authoritarian regimes, and frequently used by Chávez and Maduro, was the government’s use of state resources, including state media and employees - to fund, promote, and run the PSUV’s electoral campaign (López Maya 2014, 68). Moreover, as Maduro was declared interim president following Chávez’s death, despite the 1999 Constitution allocating that role to the leader of the AN, Cabello, he was able to campaign as president and use “presidential authority to obligate television and radio coverage of presidential speeches (cadenas) and inaugurate public works” (McCarthy & McCoy 2013, 41). Finally, the official election campaign period only allowed the MUD to campaign for 10 days, while, following Chávez’s death, state media saturated the airwaves with footage of Chávez to remind voters of his legacy and his designated heir (Dobson 2013). This gave Maduro an advantage in the election campaign and contravened the requirements set out in the 1999 Constitution for the interim president (Corrales 2013, 57). The use of state resources in this regard is reflective of the pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style whereby the leader disregards institutional rules to achieve personal goals.

Maduro’s narrow win, well below Chávez’s electoral results, has had a significant impact on his leadership and the legitimacy attributed to his mandate. Following the narrow election

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result, Capriles (cited in The Carter Center 2013, 15) argued that Maduro “enjoys more illegitimacy” post-election. Maduro’s electoral mandate has subsequently set the scene for ongoing clashes with his opposition and has led Maduro to activate “the authoritarian components of the electoral-authoritarian regime” established by Chávez (Hidalgo & Álvarez 2016, 188) as he has striven to implement his agenda of continuing Chávez’s legacy. This agenda of continuity is also an integral source of legitimacy for Maduro, as his leadership within the PSUV is contingent on the support of hardline chavistas that would work to remove him from power should he stray from Chávez’s vision. Maduro’s narrow electoral mandate and narrow base of political legitimacy with his own supporters have been critical to the subsequent defining moments of his leadership, as they have contributed to an environment that has been conducive to the use of the pseudo-full-range leadership styles.

Maduro’s Defining Moments in Venezuela’s Political Crisis From 2013, Maduro’s strategy for managing opposition has continued Chávez’s use of electoral-authoritarian tactics such as the manipulation of the courts, state media and the constitution, as well as control of the electoral authority, to protect and promote the twenty- first century socialism project. He has also employed outright authoritarian tactics such as repression and intimidation of political opponents. The following sub-section looks at these tactics as defining moments of Maduro’s leadership so far.

Maduro has violently repressed public demonstrations against his government through the use of national security forces and pro-government civilian groups that have monitored, harassed, injured, arrested, and tortured opposition protestors. He has prevented key opposition leaders from holding public office by either jailing or disbarring them. From 2015, Maduro has used state of emergency decree powers to pass legislation and bypass the AN. He delayed gubernatorial elections in 2016 when polls indicated a crushing defeat awaited the PSUV. Most recently, in 2017, Maduro attempted, and reversed, what has been called a “self- coup” through the dissolution of the AN and the assumption of legislative powers by the TSJ, as well as decreeing the creation of an ANC, similar to the one introduced by Chávez in 1999 to transform the regime. These strategies have been implemented with one key goal in mind: to ensure Maduro’s political survival so as to continue Chávez’s vision of twenty-first century socialism. Consequently, these examples constitute defining moments for Maduro’s leadership due to the influence they have had on civil society, the separation of powers, and

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political and social stability. In each of these cases Maduro has utilised the pseudo-full-range leadership styles to respond to the challenges presented.

Maduro’s Management of the 2014 Protests The first key example of Maduro’s use of the pseudo leadership styles in defining moments was his response to the 2014 student demonstrations. This response demonstrated the use of pseudo-inspirational motivation as Maduro blamed the dissent on an imperialist conspiracy, the use of pseudo-intellectual stimulation as he utilised emotional insults against the dissenters, and the use of pseudo-contingent reinforcement to deter dissenters through fear for their physical safety.

The 2014 protests began in February 2014 as demonstrations against crime and insecurity on university campuses. However, the demonstrations snowballed into broader protests concerning food and basic goods shortages, working conditions, inflation, and Maduro’s continuing agenda of twenty-first century socialism. These issues were used as a justification for regime change, with immeditate calls for La Salida (The Exit) and demands for Maduro’s resignation or ousting led by radical opposition leader Leopoldo López, who advocated for continual civil disturbances until Maduro was no longer president (El Mundo 2014). The combination of these calls and Maduro’s heavy-handed response of arresting hundreds of students involved in the demonstrations encouraged other sectors in Venezuelan society to participate (García de la Torre 2014, 55). The protests became violent as Maduro (cited in New York Times 2014) dismissed the concerns of students, stating, “these aren’t students, they’re fascist vandals”. Instead, he blamed the USA of attempting a coup d’état and expelled three American diplomats from Venezuela (New York Times 2014). Government security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons to repel the protestors. The MUD accused security forces and pro-government civilian motorcycle gangs known as colectivos of shooting live rounds of ammunition into opposition crowds (BBC 2014a). The protestors, meanwhile, threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, damaged government buildings, and blocked streets with cars, rubbish, and furniture (BBC 2014a).

Maduro acknowledged that human rights abuses - including torture, the unlawful use of force, arbitrary arrests, and the denial of access to a lawyer - were carried out by security forces against the protestors, yet denied that the incidences were “evidence of a broader pattern of abuse” (HRW 2014, 3) By contrast, Human Rights Watch (2014, 3-4) argues that

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these practices were systemic and had to have been condoned, or at the very least “tolerated”, by senior officials due to the scope of repeated abuses across different security forces, locations, such as military buildings, and states during a six-week period. The result was over 40 deaths (Velasco 2014, 14) and more than 2,300 protestors detained by government forces such as the Guardía Nacional and the colectivos (García de la Torre 2014, 56).

Maduro’s discourse at this time referred to the protestors as guarimbas (a term used to describe vandalism conducted by anarchistic groups) (Lugo-Ocando, Hernandez & Marchesi 2015). He accused the protestors of being “fascists” and part of a US-led plot to dismantle his regime (Peña 2015, 31). Maduro utilised threatening discourse, labelling the protestors as “Chuckys” (referring to the murderous doll from the horror film, “Chucky”) and “killers”, before warning, “If they don’t retreat, I’m going to liberate those spaces with the security forces. They have a few hours to go home … Chuckys, get ready, we’re coming for you” (cited in Reuters 2014). Maduro’s response to the demonstrations corresponds with the pseudo-contingent reinforcement and pseudo-inspirational motivation leadership styles to facilitate control over popular dissent and re-enforce an “us-versus-them” mentality in supporters and opposition.

Maduro’s Jailing of Opposition Leaders In the wake of his narrow electoral mandate and lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the opposition, Maduro has utilised leadership styles of pseudo-contingent reinforcement, intellectual stimulation, and individualised consideration to control dissent, scapegoat, and avoid genuine dialogue with Venezuela’s civil society. He has carried on Chávez’s practice of using imprisonment and legal proceedings against members of the opposition to either prevent or disqualify them from public office. During the 2014 protests, and in addition to the arrest of protestors themselves, hardline anti-chavista opposition leader Leopoldo López from the party Voluntad Popular (Popular Will) was charged with inciting violence and homicide. López is considered a hardline figure as he calls for a complete change in regime and leader, and is not opposed to using civil disturbance to achieve this. The Maduro government argued that the responsibility for protestor deaths in 2014 had to be shouldered by López for his call for people to demonstrate. López’s party, a more extreme faction of the MUD that believed civil disturbance could result in regime change, also attempted to capitalise on the protests and initiated La Salida to demand Maduro’s exit from politics. In response, Maduro declared that a “fascist coup plot”, led by the USA and right-wing political parties such as Voluntad

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Popular, was being attempted against his government (The Economist 2014). López was subsequently arrested and, in 2015, sentenced to 14 years and nine months imprisonment for his role in the protests (Brodzinsky 2015).

The use and threat of arrest is also a tactic that has been used by Maduro against city and state opposition leaders such as Antonio Ledezma, a former Caracas mayor who was labelled by Maduro as a “vampire” and imprisoned after accusations of plotting a coup d’état by the Maduro government (The Guardian 2015a). Both López and Ledezma are considered two of Maduro’s most hardline critics and were imprisoned in 2014 and 2015 respectively before being moved to home detention. In November 2017, Ledezma escaped from home detention and fled to Spain. López remains under house arrest (BBC 2017h). Other opposition leaders have been disqualified from holding public office. For instance, María Corina Machado, a former opposition AN member and fierce government critic, was expelled from the AN after accepting an invitation from the OAS to travel to Panama and speak about the student protests that had taken place earlier in 2014. Shortly after her expulsion, the government accused Machado of plotting to assassinate Maduro (BBC 2014b) before disqualifying her from running for office for one year (The Guardian 2015b). Meanwhile, in April 2017, Capriles, the governor for the state of Miranda and the opposition’s main contender for the presidency, was banned from holding public office for 15 years on allegations of “administrative irregularities” relating to contract laws and the mismanagement of donations from the British and Polish embassies for personal and political use (BBC Mundo 2017; Reuters 2017a; TeleSUR 2017a). These cases indicate the use of pseudo-inspirational motivation with a focus on "demonic plots and conspiracies” to justify electoral-authoritarian tactics.

Maduro’s Response to the MUD’s Win at the 2015 AN Elections Maduro’s dealings with the MUD-dominated AN from December 2015 can be considered a further defining moment of his leadership, as his manipulation of legal processes, control of the TSJ, and complete bypass of the AN have forced the conflict that is occurring as of April and May 2017. In this case, Maduro’s response to the MUD-dominated AN demonstrates the use of pseudo-contingent reinforcement, as he has consistently failed to respect institutional rules and instead has manipulated the constitution to enable him to continue to neutralise the influence of the opposition.

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In December 2015, amid worsening economic conditions such as inflation and chronic shortages of basic goods, the opposition won a two-thirds majority in the AN. This equated to the MUD controlling at least 112 out of the available 167 seats from a high voter turn-out of 74% (BBC 2015a). In his concession speech, Maduro (cited in Al Jazeera 2015) promised to accept the outcome, stating that, “we have come with our morals and our ethics to accept these adverse results, to accept them and say to our Venezuela that the constitution and democracy have triumphed.” Such an electoral victory was significant, as it was the first time the opposition had controlled the AN since its creation in 2000. Moreover, the opposition’s supermajority meant that it had the power to remove and appoint TSJ justices, amend the constitution (The Guardian 2015c), pass an amnesty law to free jailed opposition leaders (BBC 2015a), and hold plebiscites on important issues, such as repealing Maduro’s mandate (McCarthy 2017, 62). Although he initially accepted the results, Maduro’s tone of acceptance (cited in The Guardian 2015c) changed: “The bad guys won, like the bad guys always do, through lies and fraud … workers of the fatherland know that you have a president, a son of Chávez, who will protect you”. Supporters of Maduro, meanwhile, demonstrated outside the AN holding placards saying, “Chávez leads in heaven and Nicolás leads on earth” (Al Jazeera 2016), demonstrating the connection between the legitimacy of Maduro’s leadership among rank-and-file supporters and Chávez’s memory.

Maduro again employed a pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style to accuse four opposition candidates in the state of Amazonas of voter fraud to prevent the MUD from holding a supermajority in the AN. The TSJ subsequently launched an investigation into four candidates elected to the AN and suspended them from taking office. Two of the candidates were from the MUD, while another was a pro-opposition independent, and the final was pro- government (Boothroyd-Rojas & Mallett-Outtrim 2017). The MUD dismissed the investigation as a “judicial coup” and government farce to prevent it from holding a supermajority (Al Jazeera 2016). Despite the TSJ’s ruling, in January 2016, the MUD went ahead and swore in the three pro-opposition candidates. The TSJ reversed this, yet the MUD subsequently tried again in July 2016 (TeleSUR 2016a; Boothroyd-Rojas & Mallett-Outtrim 2017). This led the TSJ to rule that the AN was in “contempt of court” and formed part of the justification for its decision on 29 March 2017 to remove legislative powers from the AN (The Economist 2017a; Lansberg-Rodríguez 2017).

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Maduro’s Blocking of the 2016 Recall Referendum and Delay of Regional Elections Maduro’s rejection of the opposition’s recall referendum efforts constitutes an additional defining moment for his leadership, as it was the final constitutional channel open to the opposition to remove him from power prior to the 2018 elections. This move has created widespread social instability, as it forced the opposition to protest in the streets to voice its discontent, resulting in civil disturbance, confrontation with security forces causing injuries and deaths on both sides, and damage to public and private infrastructure. During these disturbances, Maduro utilised the pseudo-transactional leadership style of contingent reinforcement to abuse and manipulate institutional rules to make it difficult for the MUD to meet the legal requirements for the recall referendum. He also continued using the pseudo- inspirational motivation style to scapegoat the opposition and link its attempts to hold the recall referendum to accusations of coup plots.

The MUD began campaigning for a recall referendum at the end of 2015 in an attempt to pressure Maduro to call the vote before 10 January 2017. This was important to the opposition because it desired fresh elections. If the recall referendum was held before this date, new presidential elections would be triggered. However, if the recall referendum occurred after this date, the presidency would pass to the sitting vice-president, Tareck El Aissami, to finish the term. Similar to the recall referendum that Chávez’s presidency underwent in 2004, there were multiple conditions for the opposition to meet in order to trigger a recall referendum. First, Maduro had to pass the half-way point of his term. Second, the signatures of 1% of the voting population had to be collected and validated in support of the recall referendum. Once this was achieved, the signatures of 20% of the voting population had to be collected and validated. The final stage of the process – the recall referendum itself – required an equal or greater number of votes than the 7,587,579 votes that Maduro received in the 2013 election in order to remove him from the presidency (BBC 2016a).

The process was controversial due to the conflicting messaging of the MUD which impacted its case for the recall referendum, as well as the number of legal hoops, not set out in the 1999 Constitution, that were added by the CNE just prior to the first round collection of signatures in April 2016. The MUD was not united on the issue of the recall referendum. While Primero Justicia supported the recall referendum, other parties within the MUD coalition pushed their own agendas. For instance, La Causa R sought to modify the constitution to change the presidential term from six to four years, while Voluntad Popular

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wanted a Constituent Assembly to replace the legislature (Wyss 2016a). There were also reported irregularities during signature collection which allowed the PSUV to contest the MUD’s evidence for the recall referendum. For example, the CNE alleged that at least 30% of the 1,957,77 signatures collected in the first phase of the process were fraudulent, with over 10,000 signatures said to be of deceased persons (TeleSUR 2016c). The lack of unity within the MUD on the topic of the recall referendum, as well as the reported irregularities in the signature collection process, allowed the PSUV to present objections and delay the recall referendum process.

The changes to the requirements of signature collection also generated controversy. In particular, for the first stage of the process, the CNE created a new requirement that 1% of the voting population in each state, rather than 1% of the voting population in the country, must sign the recall petition. These signatures were then required to undergo a pre-validation check by the CNE before each individual who signed the recall petition was obligated to attend their local CNE office to personally validate their signature and fingerprint (El Universal 2016a). If they did not attend, their signature was invalidated. At the end of this process, the MUD reported that it had collected 1.85 million signatures, well above the minimum of 200,000 (El Universal 2016b).

Throughout May, widespread street demonstrations occurred as the MUD attempted to maintain pressure on the government to accept the recall signatures. These demonstrations again expanded to encompass a range of grievances against Maduro’s government, including anger at the long food lines, high inflation estimated to exceed 700%, and crime. In response to this, Maduro (cited in The Guardian 2016a) declared a state of emergency that allowed him to rule by decree for a period of 60 days in order “to stabilise our country, and confront all the national and international threats against our fatherland in this moment”. Maduro (cited in The Guardian 2016b) also warned that the opposition dominated AN would “disappear” when it refused to pass the state of emergency decree, and instead bypassed the AN to have the order approved by the pro-government legislative branch of the TSJ. In June 2016, Maduro (cited in TeleSUR 2016b) argued that “right-wing politicians” had submitted over 600,000 “fake, fraudulent, signatures” that required investigation. Yet, despite this investigation and the initiation of over 9,000 lawsuits by the CNE alleging voter fraud (Reuters 2016a), a schedule was announced in August 2016 for the remaining stages of the recall referendum.

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The second stage required the signatures of 20% of the electorate. Once these signatures were validated, the third stage – the actual recall vote on Maduro’s presidency – would take place, at the earliest, in February 2017 and beyond the period that would trigger fresh presidential elections. The second stage was scheduled by the CNE to take place from 26-28 October 2016. However, just days prior to this date, lower courts in five pro-government states ruled that mass voter fraud had occurred during the first stage of the petition. As a result, the CNE indefinitely “halted” the signature collection (CNN 2016). Following this decision, mass protests broke out, as removing the only institutional channel remaining for citizens to express discontent “[left] the streets as the only viable mechanism to effect change” (Grais- Targow, cited in The Guardian 2016c). A poll by Venebarómetro (2016) in September 2016 found that over 85% of respondents would vote to recall Maduro’s presidency. Within this same poll, over 75% believed that the socio-economic situation in the country was bad and humanitarian aid was required.

Maduro’s response to the protests was mixed. On the one hand, he offered to engage in dialogue, which the opposition initially dismissed as tokenistic due to the failure of the previous round of dialogue following the 2014 protests. The MUD eventually participated in the talks when the Vatican became involved, and a deal was reached to free some jailed activists and hold elections for the state of Amazonas, whose AN representatives had been unable to take of their post due to allegations of fraud (Reuters 2016b). On the other hand, Maduro (cited in Bloomberg 2016a) was aggressive, declaring that he would “use the iron fist granted to me by Chávez. Make no mistake about me. I am willing to do anything to defend the homeland, its sovereignty, and our people”. As at May 2017, the MUD was refusing to engage in further dialogue with Maduro, due to his failure to fulfil his commitments from the 2016 round of dialogue (Martin 2017).

Finally, in an environment of continuing opposition marches for a recall referendum, Maduro delayed the elections for governors originally scheduled for December 2016. The delay was justified by Maduro’s continuing claims (cited in El Tiempo 2016) of an economic emergency, stating that “the priority in Venezuela is economic recovery, it’s helping people”, yet other analysts suggest that the move was strategic due to Maduro’s approval rating in the polls, sitting at 20% (Gallup 2016; Reuters 2016c). In the December 2016 announcement of the election postponement, the CNE (2016) promised that elections would be carried out at “the end of the first half of 2017”. The MUD (2016) claimed that this was further evidence

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that Maduro’s regime was authoritarian, citing the move “illegal” and “unconstitutional”. On 15 October 2017 the elections were held and the PSUV won 18 of the 23 governorships despite predictions of a MUD victory. The MUD again declared the results fraudulent and the five opposition governors-elect initially refused to be sworn in by the ANC, citing the body as unconstitutional (Melimopoulos 2017a). However, Maduro threatened to call a new election for the five governorships held by the MUD if they boycotted the swearing-in ceremony. As a result, four of the MUD elected governors subsequently pledging loyalty to the ANC against the MUD’s official platform (Melimopoulos 2017b). Yet, this has caused one of the leaders of the MUD, Capriles, to quit the coalition in protest (BBC 2017e; BBC 2017f). The consequence of this is the fracturing of the MUD coalition – the strongest opposition force in Venezuela. The delay of the gubernatorial elections is another example of Maduro’s use of pseudo-contingent reinforcement, as he continued to flout institutional rules to seek benefit for his regime.

Maduro’s “Self-Coup” and the Creation of the ANC in 2017 Maduro’s relationship with the AN came to a head in the first half of 2017 with the AN initiating a “political trial” against Maduro for violating the constitutional order following the CNE’s suspension of the recall referendum process. Maduro had instead presented his 2017 budget to the TSJ for approval and delivered his 2017 annual address to the Court rather than the AN itself (Sonneland 2016). In September 2016, the TSJ ruled that every piece of legislation passed by the AN was “null and void”, as it viewed the AN in contempt of court for swearing in the Amazonas representatives being investigated for vote-buying. However, since the MUD representatives had assumed office in January 2016, Maduro has utilised the constitutional branch of the TSJ to approve his multiple declarations for state of emergency powers that allowed him to rule by decree (Sonneland 2016). This demonstrates Maduro’s continued use of pseudo-contingent reinforcement to break institutional rules to bypass the AN rather than attempting negotiation and compromise. At the same time, because the MUD- controlled AN rejected Chávez’s legacy and Maduro’s electoral mandate, Maduro was both unwilling and unable to negotiate with the AN unless he compromised his own political legitimacy with the PSUV.

The conflict between Maduro and the AN was what has been described as a “self-coup” attempt, whereby the TSJ’s ruling in March 2017 to remove legislative powers from the AN provoked both domestic and international outcry. The move was denounced by the OAS

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while a number of nations including Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, the US, and Canada, called on Maduro to hold new elections (The Guardian 2017a; Al Jazeera 2017a). An ally of Maduro’s, the country’s chief prosecutor Luisa Ortega (cited in BBC 2017a), expressed “great concern” over the move on live state television before her interview was abruptly cut, and she later labelled the TSJ’s decision “a rupture of the constitutional order”. Ortega subsequently fled Venezuela after being fired from the role of chief prosecutor by the newly elected ANC, which labelled her a “traitor” and accused her of corruption (BBC 2017g).

One reason for Maduro’s attempt to remove legislative powers from the AN was its refusal to pass a debt financing law essential to the country’s solvency. The apex of this standoff occurred in mid-March 2017, when the MUD urged the Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF - Development Bank of Latin America) to reject approval for almost US$440 million in new loans to Venezuela (Zerpa & Rosati 2017). The longstanding conflict led Maduro to threaten to bypass the AN and have the TSJ approve the new debt financing legislation. The MUD labelled the move as “illegal” and issued a warning to lending agencies that “any future governments would not be obligated to honour” loan repayments (Zerpa & Rosati 2017). This conflict caused CAF to reconsider Maduro’s requests for the loan, as the MUD’s head of the finance and social development committee in the AN, José Guerra, “[urged] CAF to respect Venezuela’s institutions and that any public credit operation must be covered under the debt law and approved by the National Assembly” (cited in Gray 2017). The potential loss of this loan, and at a minimum the delay in its receipt, posed significant issues for Maduro’s regime as it struggled economically to service its debt repayments and deal with crippling inflation and scarcity in food and medicines. At the same time, a loan from China (US$5 billion), as well as joint venture agreements between PDVSA and Russian oil company Rosneft, which would see the latter pay approximately US$1 billion for a stake in two of Venezuela’s heavy crude oil ventures, were also at risk of falling through due to the opposition’s refusal to pass the legislation (Rathbone & Schiapani 2017).

Although Maduro continued to use the legislative branch of the TSJ to approve his legislation, the main issue at play was the AN’s advocacy to international lenders and banks to stop loaning money to Maduro’s government. State media has labelled this advocacy as a clear example of the MUD’s “economic war” against Maduro and his regime (TeleSUR 2017b). These accusations of economic war continued when, in November 2017, Venezuela

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entered into “selective default” after failing to make US$200 million in repayments on its approximate US$140 billion foreign debt (BBC 2017i). Vice President Tareck El Aissami blamed strengthened US sanctions in its economic war on Venezuela for the Maduro government’s inability to make the repayments (BBC 2017i; TeleSUR 2017d; Ulmer & Lawder 2017). In the wake of the selective default, Venezuela has been able to restructure its US$3 billion debt to Russia to make minimal repayments over the next six years, while its repayment schedule with China remains the same (BBC 2017j).

Finally, following the failure of his “self-coup”, and in his continued attempts to bypass the hostile MUD-controlled AN, on 1 May 2017 Maduro issued a decree to hold a vote to elect, for the second time in Venezuela’s history, an ANC. This decree followed almost daily widespread political protests throughout April and May against Maduro’s leadership (Melimopoulos 2017a). Chávez first invoked an ANC following a referendum to re-write the 1961 Constitution. Unlike Chávez, Maduro did not hold a referendum to first determine whether the AN required dissolution but rather called on Article 347 of the Venezuelan Constitution (BGV 1999) to “…convene a National Constituent Assembly with the purpose of transforming the state, creating a new legal system and drafting a new constitution”.

Maduro emphasised that the ANC would be made up of citizens, rather than of “political parties and elites”, in order to “defeat the fascist coup” being attempted against his government and “transform the State” to remove the “rotten National Assembly” and create a new constitution and legal system (cited in MINCI 2017a). In defending this decision, Maduro (cited in MINCI 2017b) declared

I am a democrat, I come from the deep debates of student assemblies, trade unions, neighborhoods. We are children of the greatest democrat of the country: Hugo Chávez, the great founder of democracy; we are a generation of men and women forged in the debate of ideas, in the struggle of streets, we have faced everything and we do not want a civil war, now it is in your hands ... I give you the power Chávez gave me, I give them to you; they [the constituent assembly] will win the battle for peace, the sovereignty of the country.

The vote for the ANC was held on 30 July 2017 and it elected 537 representatives (CNE 2017). Of these representatives, 181 were elected from pre-determined sectors of the population that were key supporters of Maduro’s government, such as PSUV-associated trade unions, indigenous groups, and consejos comunales. The opposition, similar to the events of

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2005, refused to participate in the elections and thus the ANC constitutes government supporters. The ANC was tasked with creating a new constitution for Venezuela within the next two years, but it also took over legislative functions from the MUD-controlled AN and asserted its power over all other political institutions in the country. Maduro maintained that this was necessary for “reconciliation and peace” (cited in BBC 2017c). So far, the ANC has voted to establish a truth commission to investigate the anti-government protests held from March-June of 2017, fired Maduro critic Luisa Ortega as the country’s chief prosecutor, voted to put opposition leaders on trial for treason, and brought forward the gubernatorial elections scheduled for December to October (BBC 2017d). The creation of the ANC was justified by a liberal invocation of Article 348 of the 1999 Constitution (BGV 1999), whereby Maduro bypassed the required two-thirds majority approval from the AN to initiate proceedings for the ANC. Moreover, unlike Chávez who held a public vote on whether to initiate the ANC in the first place, Maduro gave the public no choice and only allowed it to indicate their preference of candidates at the 30 July vote. Opposition claimed that Maduro had manipulated institutional rules in his favour to neutralise the MUD-dominated and progress his vision for a socialist state (Melimopoulos 2017c).

Maduro’s Use of Ley Habilitante Powers to Circumvent the MUD-Controlled AN A final defining moment for Maduro’s leadership in dealing with Venezuela’s political crisis and challenges to his legitimacy has been his use of ley habilitante powers to push his legislative agenda, continue Chávez’s vision, and protect his political survival. The use of the ley habilitante power is not unique to Maduro’s leadership. It was a common practice in the nation’s Punto Fijo period, when “presidents with majority support were delegated authority for the longest time and with the widest scope of activity” (Crisp 1998, 29; Crisp 2000). For Maduro, the defining moment has been his continual declaration of a “state of emergency” since 2016 in order to bypass the MUD’s legislative decision-making in the AN. This reflects the use of the pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style, and it has contributed to the escalating conflict with the opposition, whose only response has been to protest on the streets and create further instability.

Maduro was granted widespread powers by the then PSUV-controlled AN until December 2015 when the MUD won its majority. When the MUD won control of the AN in December 2015, however, Maduro could no longer rely on delegated decree-making authority from the AN, and instead began declaring states of emergency. The state of emergency authority falls

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under the umbrella of the ley habilitante powers. However, its duration is limited to 30 days, with the possibility of an extension for another 30 days with approval from the AN. The AN also has the power to revoke the state of emergency (BGV 1999, Articles 338 & 339). In the interim period between the MUD’s win and the newly elected representatives taking office, the “lame-duck” AN approved the appointment of 13 new TSJ justices sympathetic to Maduro (Bloomberg 2015). This proved essential for Maduro’s legislative agenda throughout 2016 and 2017, as Maduro, utilising a style of pseudo-contingent reinforcement, broke institutional rules by using the legislative branch of the TSJ to approve his requests for state of emergency renewal.

Just before the MUD candidates took office, and following the expiration of his delegated decree authority by the chavista AN at the end of December 2015, Maduro declared a “state of economic emergency” for 60 days due to inflation reaching over 140% (The Guardian 2016f). Days after its expiry in March, the TSJ issued an extension for a further 60 days (Worley 2016). This was once again renewed for the remainder of 2016, with the added provision of a vague “state of exception” that allowed Maduro to completely bypass the AN and do whatever he deemed necessary to “protect the country” (Avendaño 2016). This state of emergency continued to be extended by the TSJ, culminating in its most recent iteration, issued on 13 January 2017, with the justification that the nation’s “extraordinary circumstances” necessitated the need for the president to be able to take “urgent, forceful, exceptional and necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment of rights of the people, to preserve internal order and timely access to goods, services, food, medicines and other essential products for life” (Decree of State of Emergency and Economic Emergency No. 2,667, cited in La Patilla 2017).

With these extended powers, Maduro issued a decree to grant his Vice President, Tareck El Aissami - a hardline chavista and currently sanctioned by the United States Treasury Department for allegedly heading up an international drug trafficking syndicate (Casey & Herrero 2017) - his own economic decree powers in the areas of ministry budgets, expropriation, taxation, and foreign currency exchange allowances. No such vice president in Venezuela’s history, other than Maduro himself when Chávez returned to Cuba for what would be his final cancer surgery, has had such powers (Rosati 2017). Moreover, the use of decree powers via the ley habilitante mechanism to continually bypass the legislative input of elected representatives is a further example of both electoral authoritarian tactics and the

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pseudo-transactional leadership styles of contingent reinforcement (manipulation of institutional rules), intellectual stimulation (intolerance of a difference of opinion), inspirational motivation (seeking blind obedience), and individualised consideration (seeking control).

Maduro’s Defining Moments in Venezuela’s Economic Crisis Maduro’s responses to the persistent economic crisis in Venezuela can be a judged as a series of defining moments due to the influence his leadership has had on the nation’s economic policy and the citizens’ quality of life. His decisions regarding economic policy are motivated by his goal of continuing Chávez’s legacy. Yet, in order to achieve this goal, Maduro must hold on to power. This has necessitated the use of a range of pseudo leadership styles to shift blame for the economic crisis to a vague “economic war” against his government and maintain support from key domestic groups such as the military and the PSUV. Maduro has attempted to rely on the remnants of Chávez’s grand social misiones to generate legitimacy and popularity (López Maya 2014, 73). Yet, in the absence of high oil revenue to effectively maintain the misiones, a general theme of an “economic war” being waged against his leadership by the USA and right-wing domestic interests has been the prevailing response to economic upheaval and political contestation.

As the foundations of Maduro’s legitimacy with both the PSUV and his supporters has rested on his anointment as Chávez’s chosen successor, his ability and desire to stray from Chávez’s economic policy is limited. Smilde (2015, 51) contends that the “history and charismatic ideology” of Chávez “make it almost impossible for Chavista leaders to explain devaluations, budget cuts, and price increases to their followers.” This dependence presents a reform obstacle to Maduro, as some of the key economic policies from the Chávez era, such as the currency controls, have contributed to Venezuela’s present crisis. To maintain support for his leadership, Maduro has courted the military by providing it with key governmental positions, funding, and privileges. The defining moment of Maduro’s response to Venezuela’s economic troubles has been his shifting of blame to “economic war” rather than reviewing economic policy, as well as his subsequent preference for strengthening military patronage ties instead of addressing the emerging humanitarian crisis in the country as millions of people have been unable to access and afford food and medicines.

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Maduro’s Management of Venezuela’s Economic Crisis Venezuela has experienced an economic crisis brought on by a drastic drop in the global oil price in mid-2014, from US$120 per barrel to US$30 per barrel by the end of 2015 (Hellinger & Spanakos 2017, 6), as well as the results of economic mismanagement inherited from the Chávez era. As of November 2017, the price of crude oil per barrel had increased to approximately US$57.83 (Bloomberg 2017a). The low global oil price has posed a significant hurdle to Maduro’s plans for the nation, as the country derives over 95% of its export revenue from oil (Bloomberg 2017d). Venezuela has been in recession since 2014, with its economy contracting over 20% during this time, while it is projected to decline another 4.6% in 2017 (World Bank 2017b, 125). Although the Maduro regime stopped reporting inflation figures in early 2016, estimates in late 2016 by the IMF sat anywhere from 274% to 525% (Reuters 2017d), to 702% by Bloomberg (2017b), or 800% by The Economist (2017c), while in 2018 the IMF has predicted the inflation rate to increase to 2,300% (Laya & Saraiva 2017). Whichever the most accurate figure, Maduro raised the minimum wage by 454% in 2016 to “offset inflation” (Reuters 2017d), indicating that the country was experiencing extremely high levels of inflation.

Venezuela’s currency controls, introduced under Chávez in 2003, contributed to the economic crisis by triggering a fall in domestic productivity and a rise in inflation. Rather than addressing budgetary issues to deal with the decline in revenue from the low global oil price, Maduro’s response was to print more money (Smilde 2015, 50). Since his election, money supply has increased by 200% (Reuters 2017d), and new bank notes have been issued in denominations ranging from bolívar fuerte 500 to bolívar fuerte 20,000 (US$50- US$1,995: official rate as at 17 January 2017) (BBC 2017b). However, because Venezuela’s foreign currency reserves have dwindled to approximately US$11 billion, the lowest since the banking crisis under Caldera in 1995 (Martín 2017), the values of both the official currency bolívar fuerte and the black market bolívar have also declined as more domestic currency circulates. Maduro’s response (cited in The Economist 2017b) has been to dismiss claims that the currency controls and increased domestic money supply have contributed to Venezuela’s goods shortage and hyperinflation, and instead has blamed “the domestic and foreign mafias that attack our currency”.

Low foreign currency reserves combined with the numerous controls on foreign exchange have created a situation where domestic producers were unable to purchase the foreign

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currency needed to import raw materials. One of the most striking cases in recent times has been that of Empresas Polar S.A., Venezuela’s largest domestic manufacturer of food products and the largest corporation in the country after PDVSA (Martin 2015). In 2016, Polar announced that it was reducing its beer production, as it could not access the required foreign currency to import barley (Financial Times 2017). Maduro’s response (cited in Bloomberg 2013; Reuters 2016d) was to consistently accuse Polar of economic war and sabotage of the nation’s food supply, with its alleged goal “to create shortages of products, to launch uncontrollable inflation, to keep us from getting international and national credit for the country”. Polar has had an acrimonious relationship with both the Chávez and Maduro governments, with Maduro labelling the company’s CEO as a “thief” and a “traitor”, and the Polar CEO arguing that the country’s economic policy is hostile to business and requires reform (Bloomberg 2016b). The Guardía Nacional has intercepted transportation trucks owned by Polar and confiscated food products to be re-distributed through the state subsidised supermarkets (Martin 2016). Shortages of staple goods such as flour and sugar has meant that Polar’s productivity declined by 30% in 2016 alone (Pestano 2016). Such an environment creates difficulty for businesses to continue to operate, which in turn reduces domestic productivity and ultimately, in periods of economic decline, the nation’s sustainability. Maduro’s interactions with companies such as Polar demonstrate both pseudo- intellectual stimulation and pseudo-inspirational motivation styles by relying on unsupported allegations of conspiracies against Maduro’s government and the use of emotional language to create division.

The Cost of Protecting Chávez’s Vision: Declining Productivity & Increased Debt State control over foreign currency exchange was not the only government policy impacting on domestic productivity. In 2014, Maduro introduced a 30% limit to business profits, as well as price controls on staple foods (United Press International 2014). Frequent inspections of businesses were also introduced and fines imposed if the business was found to be using too much of a staple ingredient in its product. A key example of the state’s strict control over production and prices was Maduro’s recent ruling that 90% of a bakery’s flour must be used in the production of bread loaves, while the remaining 10% was allowed for pastries (The Guardian 2017c). On top of this, price controls on bread as a staple food have meant that it was being sold under its production cost, thus impacting threatening the solvency of the producer. Fevipan, the bakers union in Venezuela, argues that the bakeries “cannot make ends meet without selling higher-priced products” (The Guardian 2017c). The issue came to

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a head in 2017 and was dubbed the “bread wars” due to the arrest of four bakers in Caracas for making brownies and croissants with out-of-date wheat (Reuters 2017e).

Such controls have created a hostile business environment for private enterprise, and Maduro has continued to expropriate companies deemed to be engaging in economic war. Business owners have been arrested, including the owner of the domestic pharmaceutical chain Farmatodo and the managing director of a supermarket franchise Día al Día (Martin 2015). In December 2015, Maduro (cited in BBC 2015b) ordered the arrest of a number of shop owners he accused of engaging in economic war by purposefully not placing enough employees at cash registers in order to create artificially long lines to “annoy the Venezuelan people”. Other chains, such as the Venezuelan electronics franchise Daka, were occupied by the army and forced to sell products at vastly discounted rates (Reuters 2013c). A more recent example of the nation’s hostile business environment occurred in April 2017 when representatives of the Maduro government occupied a General Motors car factory and the company’s assets in Venezuela were frozen (TeleSUR 2017c; Bloomberg 2017d). Following this move, GM announced that it was ceasing production in Venezuela. These cases indicate the use of the pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership style to induce private sector compliance by creating a business environment of uncertainty and generating fear of expropriation and the confiscation of goods. Such an environment is politically useful to ensure that businesses are compliant to the government’s policy agenda and ideology, while those that are not are forced out of business. Economically, it has led to declining productivity, lack of business investment, and market failure.

Declining productivity has not only affected Venezuela’s private sector. State infrastructure has degenerated. Electricity shortages, in part brought on by a drought but also by the government’s failure to maintain the electricity grid and invest in energy sources other than hydropower, have reduced energy production and created rolling power blackouts across the nation. This impacted adversely on the ability of private industry, the public service, hospitals, and schools to function efficiently and effectively (Batiz 2013). Maduro’s response was to advise women to avoid the use of hairdryers (Dearden 2016), accuse the opposition of sabotaging energy grids (Martin, J. 2016), and reduce the working week of the overstaffed public service to just two days (The Washington Post 2016). Crude oil production also declined, in part due to weak finances and the failure of both Chávez and Maduro to reinvest PDVSA profits into new oil wells and update infrastructure (Market Watch 2017). The

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technical and organisational knowledge of PDVSA never truly recovered from the mass firing of skilled workers and managers by Chávez in 2002. Consequently, PDVSA has relied on contracting other companies in order to operate. However, service companies started moving elsewhere due to the hostile business environment and the inability of Maduro’s government to pay them. For example, Schlumberger Ltd., an international technology and project management company in the oil and gas industry, “reduced its activity” with PDVSA in 2016 citing insufficient payments for its services (Schlumberger Ltd. 2016). In 2017, oil production hit a 23-year low, yet oil shipments to China were expected to increase by 55% in an effort to service its debts to that country (Reuters 2017b).

Maduro has borrowed extensively from China as a way to combat the hole in the budget left by reduced revenue from oil exports. This was an arrangement instituted under Chávez in 2007 that allowed the country to borrow up to US$5 billion a year (Chang 2016). It was continued and expanded under Maduro. According to McCarthy (2017, 63), Maduro had accrued US$50 billion in loans from China by 2015, yet Venezuela’s economic and infrastructure problems in extracting oil forced China to “[offer] flexibility on terms of repayment”. This flexibility has meant that China has accepted less oil in servicing the repayments than what the original arrangement required, as well as accepting repayments in the devalued bolívar fuerte rather than in US dollars (Chang 2016).

In November 2016, China was in talks with Maduro for a US$2.2 billion investment to improve PDVSA’s oil extraction infrastructure by “increasing production at three joint ventures, rehabilitating oil wells in Venezuela and building a refinery in China” (Shi 2016). In return, Venezuela would increase the number of barrels of oil it sends to China daily from 550,000 to 800,000 (Shi 2016). Whether PDVSA has the capacity to meet this increased export volume is another question. Despite consistent media reporting that Venezuela is on the verge of collapse, Maduro has managed to meet the country’s debt repayments. For example, on 12 April 2017, the government repaid US$2.6 billion. It was assisted in this by using PDVSA bonds as collateral for financing from US-based lenders, and it also received help from the Russian oil company Rosneft (Reuters 2017f). Declining domestic productivity and increased foreign debt have contributed greatly to Venezuela’s economic crisis. However, Maduro’s response has been to adopt a pseudo-inspirational motivation leadership style to deflect blame onto the opposition with accusations of sabotage, and to increase Venezuela’s foreign debt to address the problem. The symptoms of Venezuela’s economic

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crisis – extremely high inflation, poor domestic productivity, declining infrastructure, and large foreign debt – have produced a humanitarian crisis as citizens struggle to afford and find food, receive adequate medical care, obtain work, and protect themselves from increased crime and violence. This has been the ultimate defining moment of Maduro’s leadership, as millions of people suffer due to his pursuit of unrealistic goals and poor decisions.

Maduro’s Management of Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis constituted a defining moment for Maduro’s leadership due to the widespread harm to the population. Although there are no official government poverty figures, one human rights organisation in Venezuela, PROVEA (El Programa Venezolano de Educación Acción en Derechos Humanos – The Venezuelan Program for Education and Action in Human Rights) (2016a), in partnership with three Venezuelan universities, released a report investigating the living conditions of Venezuelans, titled La Encuesta sobre Condiciones de Vida en Venezuela (Encovi – The Survey on Living Conditions in Venezuela). The report revealed that just over 74% of respondents had lost, on average, 8.7 kilograms in the last year due to food shortages and affordability, with 9.6 million Venezuelans eating two meals or less a day (PROVEA 2016a). From its survey, PROVEA (2016a) estimated that over 51% of the population was living in extreme poverty, with an additional 30% of the population living in general poverty. The weight loss experienced by many Venezuelans has been referred to as “la dieta de Maduro” (the Maduro diet). The phrase was made popular by Maduro himself, when he joked (cited in El Mundo 2016) that the weight loss was beneficial as “la dieta de Maduro te pone duro, sin necesidad de Viagra” (the Maduro diet makes you hard without Viagra).

Food shortages have resulted in hours-long queues outside supermarkets for food, with no guarantee of what, if any, food will be on the shelves. In 2014, Maduro introduced a measure that dictated the day on which people could queue for food. This was allocated by the number on a food ID card, with the rationale that “by keeping a record of what is purchased and limiting shopping trips, the electronic card [will] curb hoarding and prevent speculative shoppers from buying to resell at a profit” (The Guardian 2014). In 2014, an environment of food scarcity and subsidised prices of staple foods had encouraged people to hoard food or purchase food in excess and sell it across the border in Colombia for 10 times the original purchase price. Maduro’s government claimed that up to 40% of all subsidised goods and

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fuel were smuggled across the Colombian border until it deployed 17,000 troops (BBC 2014c). Food scarcity also generated food riots and the looting of supermarkets (Reuters 2016e). The Observatorio de Venezolano de Violencia (OVV - Venezuelan Observatory of Violence) (2016) reported that the military was escorting food truck deliveries, due to the high risk of hijacking.

To counter food shortages, Maduro created a state-run organisation known as Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP – Local Committee for Supply and Production) to distribute food imported by the government. The CLAPs were introduced in April 2016 and involved a process of door-to-door food distribution via groups connected to the communal councils. Opposition to the CLAPs claim that it was a way for Maduro’s government to discriminate against those who opposed his regime, while the lack of institutional oversight allowed for clientelism and corruption to flourish (PROVEA 2016b). If this is accurate, it indicates the use of pseudo-contingent reinforcement to promote clientelism as well pseudo- inspirational motivation by failing to challenge followers with high standards of conduct. It could also indicate laissez-faire leadership by ignoring the issue. In addition, in July 2016 Maduro decreed that control of food monitoring and distribution by the military would continue to counter the “economic war” being waged against Venezuela (BBC 2016b). Within this same decree, Maduro established the Gran Misión de Abastecimiento Seguro y Soberano (Great Mission of Secure and Sovereign Supply), headed by the defence minister, General Vladimir Padrino López (TeleSUR 2016d). This gave the military control over a number of ports, as well as powers to regulate the purchase, sale, and distribution of food, medicine, household, and hygiene products, as well as compel private companies to sell their products to the state (Reuters 2016g).

In addition to food scarcity, Venezuela began to experience a health care crisis. Hospitals have been feeling the effects of the electricity cuts and a medicines shortage, with Maduro (cited in Al Jazeera 2017b) “[asking] for support from the UN to help treat economic and social injuries that have hit our people caused by the economic war and the sharp fall in petroleum prices”. Prior to this, Maduro had consistently rejected the possibility of receiving international aid for food and medicine shortages, as he believed foreign interests would use the opportunity to destabilise his government (Amnesty International 2016; New York Times 2016; Martín 2017). The state of the country’s healthcare system has been likened to that of a warzone (The Guardian 2016d), with the Observatorio Venezolano de la Salud (OVS -

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Venezuelan Health Observatory), based in the UCV in Caracas, releasing a report in 2016 that found 76% of hospitals experienced a scarcity of medicines, 81% a lack of surgical materials, and 70% intermittent water supply. Less than 10% had fully operational emergency rooms, operating theatres, and intensive care units (OVS 2016). A report by Human Rights Watch (2016, 11) found that patients had to source their own medical supplies, yet 85% of medicines “that should be available in private pharmacies were unavailable or difficult to obtain”. Citizens unable to source or afford their own antibiotics, surgical supplies, and vaccines, were forced to do without (HRW 2016, 29-30).

Finally, Venezuela’s economic crisis triggered a rise in crime, violence, and migration. In 2016, Venezuela had the second highest homicide rate in the world behind El Salvador, with 91.8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, or 28,479 violent deaths in that year (OVV 2016). The OVV (2016) attributed these deaths to economic and social conflict regarding food shortages and subsequent looting, as well as heightened political conflict. Moreover, the rise of civilian justice gangs resulted in the lynching of suspected criminals every three days in 2016, indicating a breakdown in civilian trust of security forces to administer justice (OVV 2017; Reuters 2016h). The resulting violence, food shortages, and political conflict generated a mass migration from the country, both legal and illegal. A “brain drain” of the middle and upper classes has occurred, where university educated workers have moved to countries such as Chile and Colombia (Woody 2016). Between 1999 and 2013, 3.5% of the 30 million population left the country (Seijas 2013). HRW (2017) estimated that, since 2014, over 12,000 Venezuelans had sought asylum in Brazil, while in 2016 alone over 7,000 people temporarily crossed the border searching for food, medicine, and short-term work. Brazilian authorities estimate that approximately 10,000 Venezuelans enter the country each month searching for food and medicine (Lopes & Miroff 2017). Meanwhile, political asylum applications from Venezuela constitute the USA’s second largest requests by nationality behind China (The Guardian 2016e).

Maduro’s Practice of Military Patronage and Nepotism Straddling the political and economic realities of present-day Venezuela is Maduro’s patronage network into the nation’s military. In return for political loyalty, Maduro has utilised transactional leadership to provide the military with economic benefits in the face of the country’s humanitarian crisis and the opposition’s calls for regime change. Consequently, the military has returned as a key-power wielder and has a vested interest in maintaining

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Maduro in power. Since his election, Maduro has moved to ensure that his support within the military is maintained. He has done this by giving the military its own television station and bank, as well as “increasing the military’s profile in the government” (Smilde 2015, 51). As at August 2016, 12 cabinet positions were held by either active or retired military officers (Wyss 2016b). A report by the Venezuelan civil society organization Convite A.C. (2015, 14) also found that 105 active military officers held high-level positions within various ministries, including the Ministry of Interior Relations, Justice and Peace; the Ministry of Food; the Ministry of Water and Air Transport; and the Ministry for Industries and Trade. This is despite the 1999 Constitution (BGV 1999, Articles 328 & 330) stating that the Venezuelan armed forces are apolitical and unable to hold elected office or serve a political party.

Maduro has promoted the largest number of generals in Venezuela’s history. Compared to Chávez’s promotion of less than 10 generals a year during his rule, in July 2014 alone Maduro appointed 229 officers to the rank of general or admiral, as well as creating two more tiers of rank to incorporate the influx (Corrales & Penfold 2015, 175). In July 2016, 563 military officers had received promotions to the rank of general since 2013 (El Nacional 2016). Meanwhile, the Fort Tiuna military base provided military officers with fully stocked supermarkets, sporting facilities, and apartments, while the Banco de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (BANFANB – Bank of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces) provided members with low interest rate housing loans and 100% financing for new and used cars (Bloomberg 2014).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, military corruption has flourished. An investigation by Associated Press in December 2016 brought to light a food trafficking system run by the military through the ports it controlled. Retired Venezuelan General Antonio Rivero (cited in Al Jazeera 2017c), in exile in Miami, observed that, “By putting the military in charge of food, Maduro is trying to prevent soldiers from going hungry and being tempted to participate in an uprising”. Rather than distributing all the food imported into the nation through the CLAPs, the military personnel at the ports sell food at exorbitant prices in a black market. According to the AP report (Dreier & Goodman 2016), business owners must bribe the military to protect and transport cargo, as well as purchase ingredients such as flour and sugar that cannot be found and purchased legally elsewhere. In addition, in 2016, Maduro institutionalised the military’s participation in Venezuela’s economy by creating a division

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within PDVSA for a military maintenance company. Named Camimpeg (Compañía Anónima Militar de Industrias Mineras, Petrolíferas y de Gas – Anonymous Military Company of Mining, Oil, and Gas Industries), the company is engaged in a commercial partnership with PDVSA and provides drilling, security, and maintenance services (Reuters 2016f). Other industry analysts suggest that it is a vehicle to transfer PDVSA assets in the event of PDVSA’s possible loan default (Crooks 2016). The move has expanded the military’s influence in oil and mining in the country, the country’s largest export revenue generators.

Corruption and nepotism at a higher level was also occurring. Government contracts for importing food were often written up at twice the market value, with those involved in the contracting pocketing the difference (Dreier & Goodman 2016). Meanwhile, government licenses to access a cheaper exchange rate for US dollars, US$10 to bolívar fuerte 1 rather than US$3,000 to bolívar fuerte 1 (as at December 2016), have allegedly been given to friends and family of officials, or shell companies, with no history or actual practice of importing food. When this was reported to Maduro in 2014, he accused the whistle-blower of corruption and the whistle-blower went into exile (Dreier & Goodman 2016). Nepotism has also been widespread. A report by Convite A.C. (2015) reviewed the level of nepotism in the country’s public administration system for the period 2014-2015. It found that

… in the studied period, 26 family ties were found between … relevant members of the ruling party. Of these 32 links, 6 had to do with the General Comptroller of the Republic, Manuel Enrique Galindo Ballesteros, 5 with the former President of the National Assembly and currently First Lady, Cilia Flores. Another 3 were related to the deputy and former President of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, the same number as the late President Hugo Chávez Frías (Convite A.C. 2015, 5).

In 2013, Maduro’s son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra, was appointed at the age of 20 to head the specially created Cuerpo de Inspectores Especiales de la Presidencia (Special Inspectors Corps of the Presidency). This body was part of Maduro’s plan to address corruption in bureaucracy and was tasked with the responsibility of conducting surprise inspections of government organisations across the country to ensure they were operating in accordance with the government’s plan. For this appointment, Maduro was accused of nepotism due to his son’s lack of qualifications for such a role (Lozano 2013). Maduro’s maintenance of the military patronage network and his engagement in nepotism aligns with the pseudo style of contingent reinforcement. In this regard, Maduro utilises transactional leadership in order to

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“buy” support to ensure his political survival and therefore his goal of continuing Chávez’s legacy.

Conclusion Venezuela has witnessed widespread political demonstrations with over 100 deaths between March and October in 2017 (Melimopoulos 2017a). In the midst of Venezuela’s crises, Maduro (cited in Pestano 2017) has continued to assert that he is “clinging to peace, to love, to dialogue and to fight every day for the motherland”, while labelling opposition protestors as “fascists”. Whatever the outcome of current events in Venezuela, Maduro’s defining moments, as seen in his policy decisions and discourse during the country’s political and economic crises, have had major adverse impacts on the health and productivity of the nation. This chapter has demonstrated that Maduro has consistently used pseudo-full-range leadership styles and electoral authoritarian tactics to ensure his political survival and continue Chávez’s project of twenty-first century socialism. The following chapter will provide an analysis of all leaders reviewed in this thesis in order to identify commonalities and differences in the patterns of leadership across time and regime type in Venezuela.

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Chapter Nine: Understanding the Use of Leadership Styles in Venezuela

Introduction This chapter provides an analysis of the application of the full-range leadership model to presidential leadership in Venezuela across time and regime type. A key aim outlined in Chapter One was to return the concepts of transformational and transactional leadership – the core components of Bass’ full-range leadership model – to the field of political science. Their usage by Burns in 1978 to analyse political leadership was the first instance of these concepts being applied to the field. While the subsequent development of the full-range leadership model within the business and management disciplines has been useful in generating empirical evidence and scholarly acceptance of its validity in the study of leadership, a systematic application of this model to political leadership is lacking. This thesis has sought to address the absence of a systematic analysis of political leadership by applying the full- range leadership model in combination with the concept of defining moments.

The chapter first presents a synthesis of the data chapters in tabular format of the corresponding regime type, defining moment, and leadership style(s) for each of the examined Venezuelan presidents (see Table 9.1). The chapter is then organised according to three thematic contributions to the political leadership literature. These contributions include the defining moments lens to assist in the collection and focus of data, a hybrid full-range leadership model, and the influence of environment on a leader’s choice of leadership style. It concludes by offering an alternative base of analysis for the nature of political leadership, focusing on the outcomes of leadership styles rather than the ethical aspects of the styles.

Synthesis of the Analytical Framework Table 9.1 provides a summary of the essential outcomes of the data chapters and provides the basis for the subsequent analysis in this chapter. Specifically, the table is structured according to the linkages between regime type, president, defining moments, and leadership style(s). Two key findings shown in the tabular summary are important to note as the chapter progresses. These important analytical insights are the presence of multiple leadership styles

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Table 9.1: Regime Type, Defining Moment, and Leadership Style(s) of Selected Venezuelan Presidents

Regime type President Defining moment Leadership style (see key below) Authoritarian Bolívar Cartagena Manifesto A.I.S; A.I.M; A.C.R War to the death P.C.R; P.I.C 1811-1830 Jamaica Letter A.I.S; A.I.M; A.C.R Unification of Caudillos A.C.R; P.C.R; P.I.C Angostura Address A.I.I; A.I.S Gran Colombia A.I.S; A.C.R Constitution of Bolivia A.I.S; P.I.S Ocaña Convention P.C.R; P.I.S Dictatorship P.C.R; P.I.C Authoritarian Gómez Promise of democracy P.I.I; P.I.M Management of oil wealth P.C.R 1908-1935 Patronage networks P.I.I; P.C.R; Electoral manipulation P.I.C; P.C.R Cesarismo Democrático P.I.S; P.I.M Political repression P.I.S; P.R.C; P.I.C Authoritarian Pérez Jiménez Seizure of power P.C.R; P.I.M Electoral manipulation P.C.R; P.I.C; P.I.M 1948-1958 Modernisation plan P.I.I; P.C.R Political repression P.I.S; P.R.C; P.I.C Democratic Betancourt Fast-paced change P.I.S; A.I.I; P.C.R Use of oil wealth A.C.R; P.C.R 1945-1947 Puntofijismo A.C.R; A.I.I; A.I.M & 1961 Constitution A.C.R; A.I.I; A.I.M 1959-1964 Commitment to institutional integrity A.C.R; A.I.I Exclusion P.C.R; P.I.S; A.C.R Conciliation of key power wielders A.C.R; A.I.M Democratic Pérez Electoral domination A.I.M; P.I.I Modernisation plan P.I.I; P.C.R 1974-1979 Management of oil wealth & corruption P.C.R; P.I.C & 1989 election & El Caracazo P.C.R; P.I.S 1989-1993 1992 coup d’états P.I.M; P.C.R Democratic Caldera Shunning of coalition governance P.I.C; P.I.I Pacification A.I.I; A.I.S; A.C.R 1969-1974 Exclusion P.I.S; P.C.R & Critique of Puntofijismo A.I.M; A.I.I 1994-1999 Management of economic crisis P.C.R; A.C.R Hybrid Chávez 1992 coup attempt & jailing A.I.C; P.C.R 1999 Constitution A.I.S; A.I.M; A.I.I 1999-2013 Creation of the ANC A.I.M; P.C.R Military patronage P.C.R; P.I.C Reclaiming PDVSA P.I.I; P.C.R; A.C.R Response to 2002 coup P.I.I; P.I.C Response to 2002-2003 oil lockout P.I.S Creation of misiones sociales A.I.M; P.C.R Win at recall referendum P.C.R; P.I.C; P.I.S Maisanta L.F; P.C.R (indirect) Electoral dominance P.C.R; P.I.C; P.I.I Twenty-first century socialism P.I.S; P.I.M; P.I.I Power over media & opposition P.C.R; P.I.I; P.I.C Cancer diagnosis & idol status P.C.R; P.I.I Hybrid/authoritarian Maduro Anointment as Chávez’s successor P.I.M; P.I.S 2013 election win P.I.C; P.I.M 2013-current 2014 protests P.C.R; P.I.C; P.I.M Jailing of opposition P.C.R; P.I.M 2015 AN elections P.C.R; P.I.M; P.I.I 2016 recall referendum P.I.I; P.C.R 2017 “self-coup” & ANC P.C.R; P.I.I; P.I.M; P.I.S Use of ley habilitante powers P.C.R; P.I.M Management of economic crisis P.I.M; P.I.I; P.I.S Management of humanitarian crisis P.C.R; P.I.S; P.I.I Use of the CLAPs P.C.R (indirect), L.F Military patronage P.C.R; P.I.C

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Key: Table 9.1 A.I.S - Authentic Intellectual Stimulation P.I.S - Pseudo Intellectual Stimulation A.I.C - Authentic Individualised Consideration P.I.C - Pseudo Individualised Consideration A.I.M - Authentic Inspirational Motivation P.I.M - Pseudo Inspirational Motivation A.I.I - Authentic Idealised Influence P.I.I - Pseudo Idealised Influence A.C.R - Authentic Contingent Reinforcement P.C.R - Pseudo Contingent Reinforcement L.F – Laissez Faire

within the one defining moment, as well as the mix of pseudo and authentic leadership styles that many presidents display, despite the regime type in which they operate.

A Defining Moments Lens As outlined in this thesis’s analytical framework, a defining moments lens was applied to the collection of data on the leaderships of the selected Venezuelan presidents examined in this thesis. This was useful to the researcher because it enabled a focused examination of the “moments” of each president’s leadership journey where the use of leadership styles was clearest. Despite Bass and Steidlmeier (1999, 184) contending that defining moments reveal whether a leader is predominantly authentic or pseudo, development of this argument is lacking in their work. Of the available works on defining moments (Badaracco 1997; Bennis & Thomas 2007; Morris 2015; Redington 2013), the concept has been considered for managers and business leaders and deemed to be decisions and events that had a significant impact on the leader’s life and therefore his or her leadership journey and values system. Within the political leadership literature in general, the concept has not been well developed and the application of defining moments to the study political leadership has not been attempted until this research, although it has often been indirectly addressed through the review of key events of a political leader’s leadership in biographical works.

As explained in Chapter Two, defining moments in the context of political leadership are considered to be key events, policies, decisions, speeches, and writings that are either created by the leader or responded to by the leader, and which have significant, lived outcomes for the constituency the leader serves. This lens helps the analyst to identify whether the leader is utilising pseudo or authentic leadership styles as he or she acts in response to the defining moment. This, in turn, can assist in a broader analysis of both change in a political leader’s leadership styles and the relationship of leadership to regimes.

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The following sub-sections examine the specific formats of defining moments as they were set out in the data presented in this research. In particular, the data demonstrated that defining moments are not necessarily isolated events, but instead can form “chains” that establish the conditions for the next defining moment. These chains can either strengthen or erode a president’s legitimacy and thus affect his political survival. The data also showed what I have termed “cross-leader” defining moments. These are moments in which a defining moment of one leader established the conditions for the defining moment of another leader, often serving as a legitimation tool for a change in leadership and policy or governance arrangements.

A Chain of Defining Moments Each president has experienced his own clear defining moments, as evidenced in Table 9.1. Yet, what is novel about this case study is that it demonstrates how one defining moment for a president can establish the conditions for another defining moment – thereby creating a “chain” of defining moments that lead to either the strengthening of his legitimacy or the end of his political career.

For instance, Bolívar’s publication of the Cartagena Manifesto founded his reputation as a man of vision, intellect, and charisma. This reputation established the conditions for a second defining moment by aiding his request from the Colombian government for troops. When Bolívar demonstrated his military command capabilities through successful small military campaigns against the Spanish, this led to the granting of more troops and the undertaking of the Admirable Campaign (Lynch 1983a). It was this campaign that cemented Bolívar’s credibility as a revolutionary leader. In the twentieth century, the discovery of oil was a defining moment for Gómez as control of this new and valuable economic resource allowed him to deepen his patronage networks and, in a second defining moment, consolidate his long reign as president of Venezuela through control over the country’s political institutions (Ewell 1984). Meanwhile, Pérez Jiménez’s defining moment of exclusive patronage of high- level military officers and his targeting of officers with the SN, led to a second defining moment whereby various factions of the military supported a coup d’état to remove him from power (Levine 1973; Koeneke 1983).

In Venezuela’s democratic period, Betancourt’s urgent implementation of AD’s policies during the trienio generated two subsequent defining moments for his leadership. The first defining moment threatened the power and security of key societal groups wary of

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democratic transition, which ultimately saw an end to AD’s brief rule in 1948 (Burggraaff 1972, 80; Coronil 1997, 136). The second defining moment occurred a decade later in Betancourt’s bid for the presidency. His policy agenda and commitment to democratic institutions during his provisional presidency gave his candidacy greater credibility with the population during the elections. Pérez’s creation of the grandiose development project, La Gran Venezuela, was a defining moment facilitated by historically high oil revenues in combination with AD’s electoral dominance (Romero 2010), while Caldera’s critique of Puntofijismo aided his re-election to the presidency in 1994 (Caldera 1989, cited in Gott 2011, 68-9; Crisp 2000, 38, 180).

During Venezuela’s hybrid period, Chávez’s re-nationalisation of PDVSA for state control set off a chain of defining moments that ultimately led to a strengthening of his electoral appeal and moral authority to implement twenty-first century socialism. These defining moments included the 2002 coup d’état attempt, the 2002-2003 oil lockout, and the 2004 recall referendum (Corrales & Penfold 2007; Daguerre 2011; Tinker Salas 2015; Wilpert 2007a). Finally, Maduro’s reaction to the MUD winning control over the AN in 2015 was a defining moment of his leadership, as it clearly demonstrated the nature of his regime to his opponents. This subsequently morphed into other defining moments, such as Maduro’s use of the chavista TSJ to bypass the AN for legislative approval of emergency powers and budgets, as well as his use of the TSJ to invalidate legislation passed by the AN (The Economist 2017a; Lansberg-Rodríguez 2017). These moments were indicative of an abuse of powers, which was justified by associating the MUD with “fascists” linked with the imperialist USA (Peña 2015, 31). His utilisation of solely pseudo leadership styles in these defining moments accelerated Venezuela’s descent into authoritarianism.

Cross-Leader Defining Moments The data also showed that a defining moment for one leader can set the scene for a defining moment for another leader, even if the second defining moment occurs years later. These cross-leader defining moments demonstrate the crucial role that history, environment, and leadership culture and practice play in generating defining moments. For example, Gómez’s decision to persecute the Generación de ’28 was a defining moment for his leadership as it demonstrated a clear style of pseudo-contingent reinforcement and pseudo-intellectual stimulation in the suppression of political dissent. Yet, it also engendered a defining moment for Betancourt, whose participation in the protests led to his exile but which ultimately

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contributed to his political development as an advocate for democracy (Alexander 1982; Ellner 1995).

Betancourt’s urgent implementation of democracy from 1945-1948 and his party’s capture of popular support during the trienio threatened many powerful societal actors such as the Catholic Church, the economic elite, and the military (Alexander 1982; Coronil 1997; Ewell 1984). In part, this contributed to the military coup d’état of 1948, led by future dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez, whose participation in the coup d’état was a defining moment for his leadership as it preceded his rise to power and Venezuela’s return to dictatorship for another decade. Moreover, Betancourt’s exclusion of the PCV from the Pact of Punto Fijo and therefore Venezuela’s governance program inspired a guerrilla insurgency that later provided a defining moment for Caldera when he achieved peace through the offering of amnesty to the guerrillas (Ewell 1984; Tarver & Frederick 2006).

A further example of cross-leader defining moments is that of Pérez’s La Gran Venezuela. The decision to implement this program in a “politics without limits” fashion created a severe economic crisis that steered the nation to El Caracazo and the rise of Chávez (Karl 1997; Romero 1997; Tarver 2004). Pérez’s second presidency led Caldera to critique Puntofijismo and campaign for and win the presidency at the age of 79 (Painter 2009). Yet, Caldera’s backtracking on his promise to not institute austerity measures demonstrated his similarity to Pérez (Levine & Crisp 1999). In addition, his family’s involvement in the banking bailout scandal also associated him with the prevailing corruption of the Punto Fijo regime (Tinker Salas 2015, 129). These cross-leader defining moments again aided the rise of Chávez as the population sought a candidate free of the traditional establishment. Finally, Chávez’s transformation of the Punto Fijo regime into one that, at the time of his death, was considered electoral authoritarian in nature (Corrales 2015), established the regime structure that facilitated Maduro’s use of pseudo leadership styles in his goal to protect and advance Chávez’s project of twenty-first century socialism. Both presidents had the goal of defending the project against the opposition’s resistance, yet in the process changed the nature of the regime.

The study of defining moments in the data demonstrates that this lens not only helps the analyst to more succinctly identify and understand political leader behaviour, but it also assists in recognising patterns and connections in the events and leadership styles that

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influence the rise and decline of legitimacy of political leaders. The next section moves on to examine the presence of multiple leadership styles within defining moments. It proposes a hybrid full-range leadership model whereby the political leader is able to utilise both authentic and pseudo styles in the one defining moment as a method to appeal to a range of audiences in order to garner legitimacy for the pursuit of his or her goals.

A Hybrid Full-Range Leadership Model The data synthesis in Table 9.1 shows that there are multiple leadership styles present in the majority of defining moments for each of the examined presidents. Moreover, the table also demonstrates that both authentic and pseudo leadership styles can be present at the same defining moment. The following section examines these findings in more depth and ultimately proposes that the ethical nature of the authentic and pseudo-full-range leadership styles, as emphasised by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999), is not the primary consideration in the political leader’s selection and use of styles, as the literature assumes. Instead, the perceived utility of, and need for, the leadership styles to achieve the leader’s goal(s) generates a hybrid application of the leadership styles at defining moments. This finding provides greater explanatory power for political leadership trajectories in different regime types.

Leadership Style Utility This research into Venezuelan presidents across time and regime type has demonstrated that the ethical nature of the leadership styles is most often not the primary consideration of political leaders when they utilise a style. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999, 190), referring to work of Martin and Sims (1956) and Bass (1968), contend that political leaders find it difficult to utilise solely authentic leadership styles due to the nature of the political game, whereby, because of their

… efforts to accent the positive, to make inspiring appeals, to maintain the enthusiasm and morale of followers … they withhold the release of information. Or they time its release for when it will do the most good. They give the appearance of confidence even when they are unsure about what they are doing and what they are telling followers to do. They initiate projects which they personally oppose and delay implementing them so that the projects never are completed. They publicly support but privately oppose proposals. They openly compromise but privately divert the implementation of the compromise. They may have the public image of a saint but privately are deceptive devils.

Legitimacy gained through electoral politics in whatever form requires the leader to present a policy agenda to his or her constituency. As the achievement of that agenda is often integral

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to legitimacy and continuing electoral support, the political leader chooses leadership styles that enable pursuit of the agenda above other considerations. Moreover, the political leader’s primary goal is to remain in power so as to continue to implement his or her agenda. As a consequence, the political leader does not primarily judge the leadership styles by their ethical nature but instead by their utility for goal achievement and fulfilment of follower expectations. In this regard, the authentic and pseudo leadership styles form part of a political leader’s broad “tool-box” of styles to choose from and tailor to their situation.

This is best demonstrated in the data by the widespread usage of pseudo leadership styles, irrespective of regime type, by the selected Venezuelan presidents. For example, presidents such as Bolívar, Pérez Jiménez, and Pérez acknowledged that the path taken to their goal achievement was not ethically sound or in accordance with democratic principles. Democratic principles were instead cherry-picked and used as a legitimating agent and discursive strategy, whereby a democratic institutional façade was implemented to grant greater authority to the leader’s political projects. To justify the use of pseudo leadership styles, these leaders argued that either the urgency of the goal required such an approach, or that other options or dissenting opinions were illegitimate. For instance, although Bolívar espoused democratic principles such as freedom of choice in government, he also contended that the Latin American people required strong and centralised governance due to their inexperience in electoral politics and civic spirit (Bolívar 1815; 1819). Gómez capitalised on this same justification by arguing that dissenting opinions were illegitimate, as the Venezuelan people were conceptualised as existing in an infantile state by Cesarismo Democrático and thus required the protection and guidance of the gendarme necesario (see Morón 1964; Vera 1983, 51-52). This approach complemented his goal of political survival in order to facilitate the running of the country as if it were one of his ranches, thereby benefiting his patronage network.

A sense of urgency was also evident in Pérez Jiménez’s leadership. For him, the façade of elections was a strategy to buffer domestic and international criticism of his regime in order to facilitate rapid modernisation, as he “knew that within this period of time [his presidency] it would be possible to accomplish a sum of works which would have been impossible to achieve in twenty-five years of democracy” (cited in Blanco 1983, 187 in Coronil 1997, 164). The ethical considerations of his leadership styles were secondary to his goal of accelerated modernisation in Venezuela. In this regard, Pérez Jiménez assigned greater legitimacy to his

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modernisation plan, expecting the citizenry to “unite unquestioningly” (Erlich 1974, 29) behind his leadership to implement it and forego political expression and activity in return for the material rewards of development.

During the country’s democratic period, Betancourt dismissed the participation of the PCV in governance as he viewed its policy agenda to be “not compatible with the development of Venezuela” (Betancourt 1959, cited in Tinker Salas 2015, 94). Betancourt was attempting to ensure the stability of the country’s democratic project but used pseudo leadership styles to exclude the PCV, as, in his view, it posed a threat to the achievement of one of his goals. In the 1970s, Pérez defended his “politics without limits” approach to La Gran Venezuela by arguing that the urgency of reform meant that the lack of careful consideration and planning of its projects was justified, as he and his government had to capitalise on the opportunity presented by the influx of oil revenue (Ellner 2008; Karl 1997; Martz 1977; Wilpert 2007a). This approach would allow Venezuela to emerge from underdevelopment, even if it meant that democratic institutional norms and processes were bypassed or manipulated. Chávez, on the other hand, denied the input and legitimacy of certain sectors of society he associated with Puntofijismo in the country’s development plans (Chávez 2003b; Chávez, cited in Boothroyd 2012; Hawkins 2010a). Maduro has adopted this same approach, dismissing opposition as “fascists” (Peña 2015, 31), “killers” (Reuters 2014), and “bad guys” (Al Jazeera 2016) in order to delegitimise their concerns and interests. In this regard, Bolívar, Gómez, Betancourt, Pérez, Chávez, and Maduro were not concerned with the ethical considerations of inclusive processes but rather with what actions were necessary to achieve their visions or defend their positions.

Betancourt’s leadership, in comparison to the defining moments of the other presidents examined in this thesis, can be considered predominantly authentic. This may be because his ultimate goal was to institutionalise independent and impartial processes to ensure democratic consolidation, therefore shunning a grandiose vision of the future as favoured by other presidents. This required that he demonstrate a respect for presidential terms and for a clear division of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. Betancourt’s leadership- by-example was crucial to the success of this goal. Yet, although Betancourt predominantly led by authentic leadership styles, he did utilise pseudo leadership styles as well. The key example of this was his exclusion of the PCV from Venezuela’s democracy (Betancourt 1959, cited in Tinker Salas 2015, 94). In this situation, if Betancourt had been an entirely

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authentic leader, he would have utilised the authentic idealised influence leadership style by conveying an agenda of peace and universal brotherhood. Instead, his use of pseudo-idealised influence deepened division in Venezuela yet won him the support of the military and economic elite as they united against a perceived common enemy (Alexander 1982). The use of the pseudo style in this defining moment thus served two purposes for Betancourt. First, it helped him to protect a fledgling democracy and assert his own agenda, and second, it gained him the support of the military and economic elite by providing a reason for them to cooperate, thus demonstrating that the choice of leadership style is contingent upon its goal utility.

This sub-section has highlighted the ways in which the examined presidents have prioritised goal utility over attempts to align their leadership style with the ethical nature of their regimes. The only president to have predominantly aligned his leadership styles to the regime type was Betancourt, as these styles complemented his political goal of establishing democracy. Analysis of the data confirms Bass & Steidlmeier’s (1999) observation that it is difficult for political leaders to be purely authentic, due to the nature of the political game and the range of constituent and follower expectations. The data has shown that this is a key reason for the prevalence of both authentic and pseudo leadership styles in the one defining moment, as evidenced in the data synthesis in Table 9.1. The next sub-section addresses this finding and looks to the explanatory power of leadership culture in Venezuela as a tool to understand the usage of leadership style hybridity.

Leadership Style Hybridity In addition to the importance of goal utility in the choice of leadership styles by political leaders, the case study of Venezuela indicates that more than one style can be present within the same defining moment. In this regard, “multiple” and “hybrid” modes of leadership style are possible. The term “multiple” refers to the presence of more than one leadership style of the same type (authentic or pseudo) within the same defining moment. The term “hybrid” denotes the presence of both authentic and pseudo leadership styles within the same defining moment. To date, the full-range leadership literature only acknowledges the presence of a single leadership style in a defining moment at any one time.

Bolívar’s political writings reflected his employment of multiple authentic transformational and transactional styles to persuade readers of the merits of his cause, provide a plan of action

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to achieve that cause, and offer incentives for participation. For example, his (Bolívar 1812; 1815) Cartagena Manifesto and Jamaica Letter contained rallying cries for freedom for Latin America that demonstrated the use of authentic intellectual stimulation and authentic inspirational motivation leadership styles as well as outlined the transactional, economic benefits of what that freedom would bring to regional neighbours and the broader world. Bolívar’s (1819; 1826) Angostura Address and Constitution of Bolivia detailed his vision for governance in Latin America and established a clear intellectual justification and associated benefits for adopting such arrangements. In contrast, his participation at the Ocaña Convention reflected the use of pseudo-contingent reinforcement and pseudo-intellectual stimulation by withdrawing from the convention in order to block a vote for a federalist governance structure for Gran Colombia (Lynch 2006).

In his defining moments, Gómez did not utilise an authentic style. However, he did employ the full-range of pseudo styles, with multiple styles present at the one defining moment. For instance, Gómez’s use of Cesarismo Democrático signalled the use of pseudo-intellectual stimulation and pseudo-inspirational motivation through the manipulation of follower ignorance and the creation, through this theory, of a dependent relationship with the Venezuelan citizenry by situating himself as the gendarme necesario (Morón 1964; Vera 1983, 51-52). Pérez Jiménez, like Gómez, used multiple pseudo-leadership styles within the one defining moment. His repression of political parties such as AD, the PCV, and COPEI during his decade of rule (Alexander 1964, 47; Kantor 1959, 245; Levine & Crisp 1999) demonstrated the use of pseudo-intellectual stimulation, pseudo-contingent reinforcement, and pseudo-individualised consideration through practices such as an intolerance of differing opinions; the use of coercion, torture, fear, and imprisonment; a system of clientelism; his expectation of blind obedience; and the practice of favouritism within his inner circle.

Betancourt’s commitment to institutional integrity through his respect of presidential term limits and the separation of powers (Alexander 1964, 22) reflected solely authentic styles such as inspirational motivation and idealised influence as he set a high standard for followers to abide by, demonstrated an appealing vision of the future, and emphasised the importance of democracy to human rights and development. In contrast, his exclusion of the PCV from Venezuela’s governance process (Betancourt 1959, cited in Tinker Salas 2015, 94) was manifested in the pseudo-contingent reinforcement and pseudo-intellectual stimulation styles through his intolerance of differing opinions in the country’s development and his

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disregard of democratic institutional principles of pluralism in favour of what he believed necessary to consolidate democracy. Pérez, despite being a president in what was lauded at the time as Latin America’s strongest democracy (Alexander 1982, 554), primarily used multiple pseudo styles during both his terms. In particular, he favoured a combination of grandiose vision (pseudo-idealised influence), and clientelism, corruption, and a lax approach to institutional rules (pseudo-contingent reinforcement). Caldera also used multiple authentic or pseudo styles. His response to the student protests in his first administration (Ewell 1984, 172) reflected the use of pseudo-intellectual stimulation and pseudo-contingent reinforcement, while his critique of the Punto Fijo system (Caldera 1989, cited in Gott 2011, 68-9; Caldera 1993, cited in Painter 2009) demonstrated authentic inspirational motivation and authentic idealised influence.

During Venezuela’s hybrid-electoral authoritarian regime period, Chávez utilised multiple authentic styles to consult on and construct the 1999 Constitution (Chávez 1998; Chávez 1998, cited in McCaughan 2005, 40; Chávez cited in Guevara 2005, 34). These styles included authentic intellectual stimulation, authentic inspirational motivation, and authentic idealised influence. They manifested in the 1999 Constitution’s innovation relating to its explicit concern for human rights and the state’s responsibility to protect and provide for those rights, Chávez’s encouragement of new ideas and problem-solving during the consultation process, and his focus on addressing the problems of inequality in Venezuela (Chávez cited in McCoy & Neuman 2001, 80). Yet, Chávez would later frequently display multiple pseudo styles such as pseudo-contingent reinforcement, pseudo-idealised influence and pseudo-individualised consideration within the one defining moment. In particular, his expanded control over the country’s media and judiciary through the use of threats against the editors of private newspapers (Chávez cited in Nelson 2009, 74; Corrales 2010, 34), the imprisonment of judges who had made decisions which contravened his agenda (El Universal 2012), his use of regulatory power to make it difficult, and at times impossible, for private media to operate in Venezuela (Committee to Protect Journalists 2012; Freedom House 2008; Human Rights Watch 2012; Reporters Without Borders 2008; Romero 2007b), and his disregard of the separation of powers through his influence over the judiciary by stacking it with chavista supporters (McCaughan 2005, 91; Webb-Vidal 2004) are all examples of the use of these styles.

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Finally, Maduro has continued this trend by using multiple pseudo styles within the same defining moment. Throughout numerous defining moments such as the 2014 protests (García de la Torre 2014), the jailing of opponents (The Guardian 2015a), the 2015 AN elections (BBC 2015a), the 2017 “self-coup” (The Guardian 2017a; Al Jazeera 2017a), and his continual use of rule by decree (Avendaño 2016; The Guardian 2016a), Maduro has primarily engaged in pseudo-intellectual motivation and pseudo-contingent reinforcement by focusing on demonic plots and conspiracies to shift the blame from his government and Chávez’s legacy. In regard to pseudo-contingent reinforcement, Maduro has used coercion and fear to control opposition through the use of force by the Guardía Nacional against protestors (García de la Torre 2014; HRW 2014), including jailing and torture, as well as through the deepening of clientelistic networks within the military and with hardline chavista supporters through the CLAPs (Dreier & Goodman 2016).

In addition to the use of multiple leadership styles from either the authentic or pseudo categorisations, Table 9.1 shows that political leaders can utilise multiple leadership styles across the two categories, referred to in this thesis as hybrid full-range leadership. Within this case study, Bolívar’s unification of the caudillos in 1819 demonstrated the hybrid use of leadership styles. This defining moment revealed an authentic contingent reinforcement approach in Bolívar’s attempts to establish a united military through clarifying the objectives, tasks, and responsibilities of the caudillos during the Independence Wars. Yet, this same defining moment also showed the use of both pseudo-contingent reinforcement and pseudo- individualised consideration through Bolívar’s establishment of a patronage network amongst the caudillos for the distribution of loot captured from the Spanish and the bestowment of formal military titles to leaders (Lynch 1983a, 6; Lynch 2006, 176). In return, Bolívar expected complete obedience from the caudillos and their troops and any disobedience was met with death, such as in the case of Manuel Píar (Lynch 2006, 225).

Another example of the hybrid use of the leadership styles is reflected in the urgent pace of change that occurred under Betancourt during the trienio. Within this defining moment of the provisional presidency, the leadership styles of authentic idealised influence and pseudo- contingent reinforcement were utilised to further Betancourt’s goal of transitioning Venezuela to a democracy. The authentic idealised influence style manifested in Betancourt’s commitment to his goal, his vision of creating a more egalitarian Venezuela, and his explanation of the ethical consequences of democratic change. Yet, in the pursuit of

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strengthening egalitarianism in the country, a clientelistic network of supporters was established through Betancourt’s agrarian reform policy (Ewell 1984; Powell 1971). This latter element was significant for Betancourt’s leadership and the viability of democracy in Venezuela at that time, as it led to accusations that Betancourt and AD were capturing support by buying voters (Powell 1971, 75).

Pérez’s leadership also contained both pseudo and authentic leadership styles. On the one hand, he led a charismatic election campaign (Coronel 2008; Karl 1997, 116) that promised a grandiose vision in La Gran Venezuela (pseudo-idealised influence). Also, he legitimately won the presidency by abiding by the rules of the democratic Punto Fijo electoral institutions (authentic contingent reinforcement). His nationalisation of the oil industry (Romero 2010) is considered authentic idealised influence, as it reflected an ethical belief that further state control over the profits from oil exports would benefit the economic sovereignty of Venezuela. However, the use of the profits to facilitate a “politics without limits” strategy and implement a grandiose vision, as well as his engagement with bribery, corruption, and clientelism (Karl 1997; Rey 1998, 117; Tinker Salas 2015, 110), reflect both the pseudo- idealised influence and pseudo-contingent reinforcement leadership styles.

Caldera’s defining moments show a mix of multiple authentic and pseudo leadership styles as well as some use of hybrid leadership styles. For instance, his defining moment in eschewing Punto Fijo coalition governance during his first presidency (Crisp 1997, 185) contains elements of pseudo-inspirational motivation and pseudo-contingent reinforcement. In using these styles, Caldera sought to concentrate all cabinet power in COPEI. However, this strategy had political repercussions for COPEI as AD used its majority in the legislature to block the minority COPEI from promoting its interests in key policy areas such as the selection of judges and oil taxation. This resulted in a chaotic congress until COPEI and AD reached an informal coalition agreement (Kelley 1977). However, the damage had been done to the Punto Fijo power sharing agreement and set a precedent for AD to follow. While Caldera’s pacification of the leftist guerrillas (Tarver & Frederick 2006, 120) demonstrates the use of authentic idealised influence by promoting inclusiveness and forgiveness, his heavy-handed response to university protests and the closure of the Central University of Venezuela for two years (Ewell 1984) indicates the practice of pseudo-contingent reinforcement and pseudo-intellectual stimulation. These styles manifest in the use of

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coercion and fear to control dissent and an intolerance of the differing opinions of a particular sector of the population, that being, in Caldera’s case, students and academics.

In his second presidency, Caldera’s critique of the Punto Fijo system and his creation of a new political coalition to offer an alternative to the decaying AD and COPEI (Coppedge 1994) demonstrate the utilisation of authentic inspirational motivation and authentic idealised influence, as he expressed an appealing vision of the future under his leadership by offering an alternative to AD and COPEI. He challenged the AD and COPEI politicians with high standards and demonstrated his conviction to reform the democratic regime by weaving a narrative of self-sacrifice and devotion into the future of democracy. Like Pérez, a core election campaign of Caldera’s was the promise not to implement neoliberal austerity measures. However, a year after assuming office and in the wake of a banking crisis, Caldera backtracked on this promise and began an IMF-approved structural adjustment program (Coronil 1997, 381). In addition, Caldera was accused of nepotism and corruption due to high-level roles his children held in government and his son-in-law’s involvement in the scandal that saw most of his government’s US$57 billion bail-out of the banking sector laundered overseas by banking executives (Tinker Salas 2015, 129). In this defining moment, Caldera’s leadership reflects the use of pseudo-contingent reinforcement. Despite Caldera being considered “the last honest politician” (Karl 1997, 184), throughout both of his presidencies he consistently used a mix of authentic and pseudo leadership styles, displaying an almost 50-50 split in the use of the styles in Table 9.1.

Chávez’s leadership is also a clear example of the usage of hybrid leadership styles. Until his victory in the 2004 recall referendum, Chávez consistently used a hybrid approach to manage challenges to his leadership and implement the Bolivarian Revolution. His leadership prior to 2004 predominantly reflected authentic transformational leadership styles through the demonstration of conviction, the emphasis of a new ethical leadership to establish a point of difference between himself and his Punto Fijo opposition to increase his legitimacy, the promotion of egalitarian goals for Venezuelan society, and questioning old assumptions about methods of governance. In regard to the pseudo styles during this period, Chávez focused on the establishment of new clientelistic networks to neutralise the interests of those associated with Puntofijismo. This included the expansion of the Círculos Bolívarianos and the creation of the misiones sociales (Hawkins 2010b, 39; Hawkins, Rosas & Johnson 2011, 191; Howard-Hassman 2015, 1028; Raby 2006, 173). As he met increasing challenges to his rule,

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Chávez was frequently divisive in his language, adopting an “us versus them” discourse and increasingly intolerant of differences of opinion or agenda. The pseudo-intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and idealised influence leadership styles became standard practice when Chávez’s moral authority was strengthened following his win at the 2004 recall referendum (Daguerre 2011). This increased moral authority was demonstrated by his popularity in the polls and, in turn, affirmed the utility of the styles to goal achievement.

Chávez’s case shows that the political leader can adapt his or her preference of styles to accommodate changed environmental conditions. For Chávez, significant factors in his environment that influenced an evolution of his use of leadership styles included the changing global oil price and the opposition he faced in the implementation of his policy agenda. Between 1999 and 2004, Chávez faced three significant attempts to remove him from power. Of these attempts, the first two were via undemocratic means. These were the coup d’état attempt and the oil lockout to force poor economic conditions on the country. The third was pursued via mechanisms laid out in the 1999 Constitution (BGV 1999; Cannon 2004; Nelson 2009; Raby 2006). These attempts prompted a change in Chávez’s use of leadership styles and confirmed his belief that powerful external forces such as the US, as well as a capitalist domestic and international oligarchy, rooted in a history of economic control of Venezuela through oil, were trying to prevent the “good” his leadership could deliver to Venezuela. Similar to the past presidents examined in this thesis, including those of the democratic era, Chávez responded to dissent by repressing political opposition and creating an environment that made it difficult for dissenters to operate (Corrales & Penfold 2007). Venezuela’s gradual transformation to an electoral authoritarian regime was driven by the leadership styles Chávez chose to utilise in order to protect his vision of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Consequently, Chávez’s transformation of the Venezuelan regime was undertaken through the selection of leadership styles that offered the most effective protection of the Bolivarian project rather than an outright and devious plan on his part to personalise power - at least initially. Chávez’s discourse gradually changed following the 2002 coup attempt and placed emphasis on his increasing role as the “people’s instrument” (Chávez 2002c). In this regard, Chávez’s goal was to situate his leadership in the image of Bolívar, not only for the legitimacy it granted but also to transform himself into a cultural hero (McCarthy-Jones &

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Greig 2011). The pinnacle of this was the 2012 election campaign when, faced with his cancer diagnosis, Chávez promoted the slogan, “Todos somos Chávez” (we are all Chávez) to encapsulate his transcendence to the growing myth that he was at one with el Pueblo (the People) (Block 2015; Carroll 2012).

In contrast to Chávez, the defining moments of Gómez, Pérez Jiménez and Maduro did not contain hybrid authentic and pseudo leadership styles. Instead, their defining moments reflect the sole utilisation of pseudo styles. Yet, their leaderships show us that more than one pseudo style is often used within the same defining moment. This contests an assumption in the full- range leadership literature that only one style is present within a leadership event or decision.

This finding raises the question of why leaders of authoritarian regimes only use pseudo leadership styles. This research suggests that this is due to the overt authoritarian nature of the regimes and the leader’s narrow base of legitimacy, whereby legitimacy and loyalty is secured through a small inner circle of supporters who are granted extensive concessions and the freedom to distribute these concessions as they wish. In the case of Venezuela, the presidents from the authoritarian regime period did not have to, nor choose to, utilise leadership styles that appealed to a wider array of interests. Gómez’s stacking of government with his children and other family members ensured loyalty (McBeth 2008; Trinkunas 2005b). Pérez Jiménez established a patronage system within an inner-circle of approximately 20 high level military officers who then ensured his rule in order to guarantee their own privileged positions (Alexander 1982, 391). Similarly, Maduro has courted the military, awarding ministries and control over food distribution, as well as control over elements of PDVSA, to it (Dreier & Goodman 2016; Reuters 2016f). As Maduro’s regime has become more overtly authoritarian, his legitimacy is increasingly reliant on the military and the hardline chavistas.

Bolívar is the exception to the preferencing by Venezuela’s authoritarian leaders of the sole use of pseudo leadership styles. During the years 1811-1828, he adopted a strategy of hybrid leadership styles to appeal to a wide support base in order to ensure the success of the Independence movement. This not only meant the development of a policy agenda that transactionally appealed to an array of societal groups including landowners and slaves, but it also required him to appeal to the hearts and minds of followers and motivate them to risk their lives for the vision of independence (Bolívar 1812; 1815). Following the expulsion of

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the Spanish from Gran Colombia, Bolívar still required a wide support base in order to ensure a sustainable independence. This manifested in a benevolent dictatorship driven by a strong belief in the necessity of establishing a maintainable and ethical (for the times) system of government. Caudillo patronage networks to secure stability and loyalty supported this, as did quasi-elections to validate Bolívar’s claims to legitimacy as Supreme Commander of Gran Colombia (Lynch 1983a; O’Leary 1970).

Bolívar’s use of quasi-elections was a charismatic strategy documented by Bolívar himself as well as his chief aide-de-camp, General Daniel Florencio O’Leary (1970, 101), to generate backing for his leadership through loud calls by supporters during his speeches. A vote by show-of-hands of the Congress representatives would then be called to demonstrate their wish for Bolívar to remain as Supreme Commander (O’Leary 1970, 273). However, these quasi-elections ceased during 1828-1830, when Bolívar ruled by outright dictatorship as he faced strengthened resistance to his vision. It was during this time that his leadership, within an overtly authoritarian regime, predominantly utilised pseudo leadership styles. This again suggests that within an overtly authoritarian regime structure, such as in the cases of Gómez, Pérez Jiménez, and Maduro, a hybrid full-range leadership strategy is considered less effective for goal achievement compared to the sole use of the pseudo leadership styles. In contrast, the data indicated that the democratic and hybrid regime presidents’ legitimacy was contingent upon regular and (perceived) fair elections. In this regard, the source of legitimacy is a key influence in the styles that are used. A narrow source of legitimacy, such as in the case of authoritarian regimes, facilitates the almost exclusive use of the pseudo styles, while a broader source of legitimacy, such as through popular elections, necessitates a hybrid leadership style approach.

Leadership Culture A key research question identified in Chapter One asked whether there was a pattern of presidential leadership in Venezuela that transcended regime type and time. Chapter Four highlighted Simón Bolívar as a key foundational leader in Venezuela. His importance as a hero, as El Libertador, established an ideal type of leader in Venezuela that embodied qualities including charisma, vision, and unshakeable commitment to a cause. Yet, it was also Bolívar’s leadership that established a specific leadership culture that has transcended regime type and time. This is where a leader can utilise the styles of both a caudillo and a statesman, as identified by Masur (1969, 179). Bolívar’s leadership set a culturally acceptable practice of

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using leadership styles according to their utility to the leader’s goal rather than in line with the foundational ethics of those styles. In this way, Bolívar was not only important as a heroic figure that freed Venezuela from Spanish oppression, but as an “ideal type” of Venezuelan leader and a legitimate model for emulation.

Bolívar as the Precedent for Venezuelan Leadership Bolívar’s use of leadership styles combined both authentic and pseudo styles depending on what he believed the situation demanded. Often, his actions reflected a pseudo style approach, yet his political discourse aligned with the authentic styles. In this sense, Bolívar’s leadership is regarded as a “hybrid” leadership style approach to presidential governance. For instance, Bolívar’s (1812) liberal discourse emphasised the necessity of the Venezuelan, and more broadly the Latin American, people to break free of the “yoke” of colonialism and decide their own destiny. He provided an alluring vision of a free Venezuela, where the welfare of citizens was of primary concern to the government (Bolívar 1815; 1819). He promised an end to slavery in Venezuela, yet in the end only partially upheld this promise. Haiti’s President Petión had extracted this promise in exchange for Haitian troops to fight in the Independence War (Arana 2014, 179). But Bolívar also required the domestic elites’ support in building a sustainable governance structure for Gran Colombia. The elites resisted the end to slavery, as their wealth was reliant upon the free labour from the slaves (Arana 2014). Moreover, Bolívar was unable to enforce the elites’ obedience to the law that freed the slaves born after 1821, given the geographical difficulties of its enforcement, which would have required constant inspections of far-flung haciendas.

A further example of Bolívar’s hybrid use of leadership styles is evident in his political writings. For instance, in the Cartagena Manifesto Bolívar (1812, 6) claimed that governance structures in Venezuela had to be customised to the “context of the times, men, and circumstances in which it [the regime] operates”. Consequently, if the country desired a sustainable governance system that would deliver true democracy and development to the Venezuelan people, it could not solely replicate Britain’s constitutional monarchy or the USA’s federalist system. This reflects an authentic intellectual stimulation style where Bolívar attempts to challenge the status quo and generate innovation in the creation of a new governance system. It also reflects an authentic inspirational motivation style where Bolívar seeks to provide an appealing vision of the future for an independent region. Bolívar builds on these ideas in the Jamaica Letter. However, he also adopted the position that the

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Venezuelan people were not yet ready to govern themselves due to the centuries of control by the Spanish. Consequently, he argued, the people existed in a “kind of permanent infancy with respect to public affairs” (Bolívar 1815, 19). Until experience was acquired the people needed a strong yet benevolent hand to guide and educate them in the art of civics. While this position may have been prudent for the revolutionary context and times in which he operated, Bolívar did not establish criteria to judge when the people would be considered experienced or educated enough to select their own leaders. Because of this, a leadership style of pseudo- inspirational motivation is evident as Bolívar sought to create governance structures that retained the dependency of his constituency on his leadership. The result of this was that Bolívar’s leadership example, which emphasised a liberal discourse of freedom and equality yet which was coupled with centralised decision-making, allowed subsequent leaders to claim that they were carrying on Bolívar’s mission of guiding the Venezuelan people to an undefined level of enlightenment. The next sub-section explores this in more detail.

The Appropriation of Bolívar’s Memory Bolívar’s image as a hero set a standard for multiple leaders to either aspire to or claim that they embodied. Successive leaders have appropriated and referred back to the memory of Bolívar and his political writings as a way to further their political goals. The “cult of Bolívar” and its appropriation has been documented by scholars, such as Carrera Damas (1983) and McCarthy-Jones and Greig (2011), and extends not just to other Venezuelan leaders, but also to leaders throughout Latin America and North America. Within Venezuela, Bolívar’s leadership was used as an ideal type in Gómez’s Cesarismo Democrático (Vera 1983). This theory identified the dual nature of Bolívar’s leadership – the use of authentic and pseudo styles - as the ideal form of leadership for Venezuela. In particular, Cesarismo Democrático conceptualised and legitimated a caudillo “strongman” approach to managing an infantile citizenry. It adopted a paternalistic approach to governance, in which a centralised leadership would deliver to the country a high level of development and, somewhat paradoxically, a utopian-like democracy. This centralised leadership, referred to by Gómez as the gendarme necessario (the “necessary policeman”), knew better than the collective citizenry as to what the country needed for its development. According to the theory (Vera 1983), the nation would dissolve into anarchy and development would not be achieved without such a leader. In conceptualising Bolívar’s leadership in this manner, Gómez was able to paint himself in Bolívar’s image and justify his choice of regime and leadership style. Bolívar’s rule of Venezuela, though benevolent in many ways, was

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nonetheless always a dictatorship in which all power was vested in him. Since Bolívar was considered both a national and continental hero, Gómez appropriated Bolívar’s credibility by claiming to adopt his leadership approach. However, not all presidents focused on Bolívar’s memory for legitimacy. For example, Pérez Jiménez’s political discourse focused on governmental performance and modernity, as he drew legitimacy from these elements rather than the appropriation of Bolívar’s memory.

Aside from Gómez, Chávez was the next leader to widely use the memory of Bolívar to further his political goals, reflecting Corrales’ (2008) contemporary interpretation of neocaudillismo outlined in the literature review. The most immediate example is Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution project and the re-founding of the country as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BGV 1999). Chávez’s invocation of a revolution against the elites of the Punto Fijo era and North American imperialism is reminiscent of Bolívar’s statement that “a government of a country in revolution must follow routes very different from the ordinary” (Bolívar 1813, cited in Lynch 2006, 79). In modelling the Bolivarian Revolution on Bolívar’s writings and arousing a symbolic revolution against modern-day oppressors, Chávez gained legitimacy for his vision and his complete dismissal of Punto Fijo institutions such as the 1961 Constitution, the traditional political parties, and the judicial courts. He likened his anti- establishment approach and the corrupt and oppressive nature of Venezuela’s elite to Bolívar’s resistance to the imperial interests of the Spanish empire, thus creating parallels between his Bolivarian revolution and the Independence Wars led by Bolívar (McCarthy- Jones & Greig 2011).

This section has provided evidence from the case study that demonstrates the prioritisation of political goals over the ethical considerations in choices of leadership styles. It has also provided evidence for the multiple and hybrid application of leadership styles in defining moments. In the case of Venezuela, the influence of Bolívar as an ideal leader provided a legitimate justification for the hybrid use of the leadership styles to several presidents. Consequently, Bolívar’s leadership example as a benevolent dictator has lived on, with the hybrid leadership styles adapted to meet claims to a democratic regime framework. The analysis in this section has implications for the full-range leadership model, as it indicates that the concept of full-range can be further expanded for the political leader to accommodate the interpretive nature of politics and ideal leader types. The next section explores the influence of environmental context on each president’s choice of leadership styles,

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particularly looking at the effect of regime type and the characteristics of environments that appear conducive to the choice of pseudo leadership styles.

The Relationship Between Regime Type and the Use of Leadership Styles The third research question in Chapter One asked whether political regime type systematically influenced a leader’s choice of leadership style in defining moments. The case study of Venezuelan presidents demonstrates that the democratic and hybrid regime types have a partial influence over the use of leadership style, in that the full spectrum of the leadership style can be constrained by the regime’s institutions. In this regard, the leadership style may be mediated by a dispersion of power among the regime’s institutions that forces the leader to utilise the more subtle forms of the style rather than its overt forms. An example of this is evident in the pseudo-contingent reinforcement style where the practice of bribery or nepotism was more common than overt violent repression. A reason that the democratic and hybrid regime types have a partial influence is because they form part of a broader environment in which the leader has limited control. In contrast, leaders of authoritarian regimes possess the power to control institutional rules and, by extension, have greater influence over their external environment. This section examines the political leader’s broader environment, of which the regime forms just one part. In particular, it questions the preferential use of pseudo leadership styles by Venezuela’s presidents and looks to the explanatory power of a conducive environment, including rentier statism, as an answer.

As established in Chapter Two’s literature review, a political regime is the set of rules that dictates how government and society operate and interact (Steinberg & Malhotra 2014, 493). It therefore forms part of the core environment in which the political leader functions. A general assumption of the regime literature is that leaders of authoritarian regimes are “bad” while leaders of democratic regimes are “good”. If this assumption is applied to full-range leadership, then “good” leadership equates to the authentic transformational and transactional styles, while “bad” leadership reflects the pseudo-transformational and transactional styles. Yet, the findings of this thesis demonstrate that Venezuelan presidents, no matter the time or regime type in which they operated, predominantly used multiple pseudo styles and some hybrid authentic/pseudo styles. While this finding may confirm assumptions that presidents of authoritarian regimes utilise pseudo leadership styles, it also indicates that presidents during the country’s democratic period did not necessarily adjust their leadership styles to complement the democratic regime type in ways that might have been anticipated. As shown

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by the data synthesis in Table 9.1, a democratic regime does not automatically entail that the leader will utilise authentic leadership styles, simply because the ethical foundations of democracy and authentic full-range leadership align.

Instead, causation may even move in the opposite direction to that anticipated, with the data suggesting that the relationship between leadership styles and regime type is reciprocal and dynamic as environmental forces, the leader, and the regime type interact with each other to constrain or enable leadership styles. Each president’s choice of leadership style across the different regime types influenced the nature of the regime, either by creating a new regime (Bolívar; Betancourt), maintaining or strengthening the current regime (Gómez; Pérez Jiménez; Caldera; Maduro), inadvertently contributing to regime decay (Pérez; Caldera), or transforming the regime (Chávez). As such, a leader’s preferencing of the authentic or pseudo leadership styles has the power to change the nature of the regime through setting a political culture that either embraces good governance practice or eschews it, as well as altering institutional arrangements and the power of political actors. Democratic and hybrid regime types may exert a partial influence on the full expression of leadership styles as the leader seeks to operate within institutionally legitimate ways. Yet, as the environment is constantly changing, so too may the leader’s choice of styles in response. Consequently, the relationship between regime and leadership is complex, and leadership styles cannot be seen as independent from the environment, or the environment independent from the leadership styles.

The Preferencing of Pseudo Styles As can be seen in the data synthesis in Table 9.1, Venezuelan presidents across all three regime types commonly used pseudo leadership styles. This suggests that regime type does not have as strong an influence over leadership style selection as previously assumed, otherwise the democratic regime type would have had a clearer moderating effect over leader choices of leadership styles. In democracies, institutionalised norms and values, executive checks and balances, and a separation of powers serve to constrain leadership in an attempt to ensure cooperative relations between society and government. Within authoritarian or hybrid regimes, executive checks and balances and a separation of powers are either non-existent or weak. The authoritarian regime type enables the easier usage of pseudo leadership styles. Yet, what explains the preferencing of pseudo leadership styles in Venezuela during its democratic period?

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In part, this can be illustrated by the leadership culture set by Bolívar’s example as the ideal leader, as discussed in the previous section. The practice of style-hybridity was normalised and it was not uncommon for Venezuelan leaders to employ liberal discourse and authoritarian practice, whereby:

Ever since the struggle for independence, liberalism had been the public language of the Venezuelan political elite; identified with the very origins of the nation, this language seemed untouchable. It was associated not only with the origins of the nation but with Bolívar’s project of social emancipation and republicanism under the criollo elite’s leadership. Thus, it had become an essential component in the legitimization of criollo rule since independence (Coronil 1997, 85).

Yet, another explanation is the mechanism of the enabling law, included in the 1961 Constitution and continued in the 1999 Constitution. This mechanism provided an authoritarian outlet for Venezuela’s presidents during the Punto Fijo period in that it enabled fast, centralised decision-making that required no consultation. Consequently, in the case of Venezuela, the regime type was irrelevant because there was an in-built mechanism that enabled presidents to legitimately bypass democratic institutional rules and norms. Each of the presidents examined in the case study from the Punto Fijo period, and including some that were not, utilised the enabling law power to respond to challenges in their defining moments. Such a practice enabled Punto Fijo presidents to simulate leadership similar to that of Bolívar, whereby they combined liberal democratic discourse with a governance practice that was authoritarian in nature. For instance, Betancourt employed enabling law powers to suspend constitutional rights such as freedom of expression and organisation, as well as economic freedoms (Crisp 1998), while Caldera was granted the powers to close the Central Caracas University for two years following student protests (Ewell 1984). Other than Chávez and Maduro from Venezuela’s hybrid period, Pérez employed the widest use of the enabling law powers (Crisp 1998; Garcia-Serra 2001). Though AD tried to constrain his use of the powers by implementing an oversight committee, Pérez ignored the committee and continued the urgent implementation of La Gran Venezuela (Crisp 1998). Although Pérez’s intention had been to fast track Venezuelan development, he ultimately contributed to the decay of democracy in the country. Consequently, Pérez’s leadership styles, tailored to his goal rather than the regime type, changed the nature of the Venezuelan regime and established the economic conditions and ideological backlash for democracy’s further decline under Chávez and Maduro.

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Conducive Environments and Followers A further explanation for the persistence of pseudo leadership styles among Venezuelan presidents is the concept of conducive environments and followers. Studies by Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007) and Padilla (2013) examined the environments of leaders who produce constructive and destructive outcomes as a result of changes in policy, socio-economic development, and politics, as well as the “susceptibility” of followers to enable such leadership. This research adopts the definition of outcomes as put forth by Padilla (2013, 14). An outcome is the result of a situation over which the leader has influence, whether direct or indirect. Padilla (2013, 16) categorises outcomes into three specific categories: constructive, destructive, and derailment. He contends that

There is a continuum of results, ranging from really great to really terrible. Most leadership situations are somewhere in the middle; the good ones tend toward the positive end of the spectrum and the abysmal ones toward the negative end. However, even in cases acknowledged to have had generally constructive outcomes, some bad things have also occurred. Individuals considered to be “good” leaders who were associated with mainly positive, constructive outcomes have also made some mistakes or had negative results … Similarly, widely acknowledged toxic leaders who have led their groups to destructive outcomes have done some good things. The larger conclusion applicable to this discussion is that no one is perfect and no leadership episode is, either (Padilla 2013, 14).

Within this research, outcomes of defining moments are considered as a key focus from which to analyse the political leader and the nature of his or her leadership. Conducive environments that facilitate pseudo leadership styles to produce destructive outcomes are characterised by instability (the less a government’s rules are clearly and consistently applied over time, the greater likelihood of instability), the followers’ perceived threat (desperate social and economic situations; feelings of mistreatment), and cultural values that emphasise the avoidance of uncertainty (the society’s preference for strong leaders to provide hope in ambiguous situations), collectivism (in the form of in-group/out-group dynamics and group loyalty), and high power distance manifested in large wealth and education inequalities (Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser 2007, 185-86).

Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007) and Padilla (2013) also argue that susceptible followers are an essential element of conducive environments and the facilitation of pseudo-full-range leadership. The researchers categorise followers into two categories: colluders and conformers. In general, both types of followers have unmet basic needs, such as a lack of

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food, education, healthcare, and social mobility, as well as low self-esteem related to in- group/out-group dynamics such as racism and social isolation. One other relevant factor these followers have in common is a “low locus of control”, whereby the followers are attracted to a leader who appears assertive, powerful, and willing to care for them (Padilla, Hogan & Kaiser 2007, 183). Colluders are further characterised as possessing a similar worldview to that of the leader, anti-social values such as greed and selfishness, and a desire for power. Conformers, on the other hand, “passively allow bad leaders to assume power” because they possess a psychological immaturity linked to poor self-esteem and a fragile identity, causing them to “identify with cultural heroes and to internalise their values” (Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser 2007, 183-84).

The data in this research demonstrate that conducive environments in Venezuela facilitate pseudo leadership styles that transcend time and regime type. An unstable environment has prevailed over much of Venezuela’s history. The Independence Wars from 1810-1821, a civil war from 1858-1865, and turbulent caudillo rule under the country’s authoritarian rulers for the first half of the twentieth century generated uncertainty regarding governance (Tarver & Frederick 2006). This uncertainty manifested in other areas of Venezuelan society, including large wealth inequalities, weak labour protection, poor education and health care, and political repression. The economic instability of the last three decades due to the boom and bust cycle of the global oil price has generated, at various points, civil disturbances including protests (El Caracazo) and coup attempts (1992) and resulted in a lack of public trust in Punto Fijo institutions and development programs, as well as high unemployment, poverty, and poor health and education conditions (Buxton 1999; Coppedge 1992; Hellinger 2011). Moreover, the ley habilitante power as an “authoritarian outlet” formed part of a conducive environment that facilitated the use of pseudo leadership styles during democratic and hybrid regime periods. The combination of these factors, including the persistent uncertainty regarding the ability of governments to sustainably fulfil the majority of the population’s basic needs, contributed to the population’s preference for a leader who promised certainty through leadership styles that exhibited strength, direction, and vision.

Cultural leadership values, as highlighted by Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007) also contribute to a conducive environment that produces constructive or destructive outcomes. As previously discussed, Bolívar’s example is a strong cultural influence on the ideal type of leadership in Venezuela. Yet, in addition to this, House et al.’s (2004) GLOBE study of

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culture, leadership, and organisations across 62 societies revealed that Venezuela was likely to prefer strong leaders who had derived power from groups such as patronage networks. These networks were built on an identity from a certain region or class, and leaders within these groups were able to provide certainty in an unstable environment. These preferences transcended regime type, as the followers looked to what the president would promise rather than how he ethically aligned his leadership styles with the regime type. In turn, the regime was then shaped by how the president selected and used leadership styles to achieve his goals and meet follower expectations. These findings suggest that, within the context of the case study, the regime structure is therefore pliant to the goals of the president due to Venezuela’s conducive environment, susceptible citizenry and leadership culture which preferences a leader that promises a compelling vision and can persuade people of his or her ability to achieve it.

The Influence of Rentier Statism The practice of rentier statism is another important element of the conducive environment in Venezuela that facilitates the use of pseudo leadership styles. Its impact is one that has been tangentially explored by other scholars (Karl 1997; Coronil 1997). From the twentieth century, rentier statism has been a persistent element of the Venezuelan regime – no matter whether authoritarian, democratic or hybrid. As a feature of the regime, it is characterised by the state’s overreliance on the export revenue generated from the exploitation of an abundant natural resource (Losman 2010, 427; Mahdavy 1970, 428). In terms of its impact on leadership, rentier statism has facilitated the use of pseudo leadership styles due to its ability to absorb the effects of poor decision-making in times of resource price boom. In Venezuela, it has enabled a leadership culture of grandiose vision, short-sightedness and recklessness in spending public monies, as well as reduced accountability to voters, as the leader is either buoyed by the short-term success of the project or protected by the vast flows of wealth upholding the project. Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso (cited in The Economist 2003), Betancourt’s oil minister during both the trienio and his constitutional presidency, in 1975 labelled oil as “the devil’s excrement” due to its corrosive influence on Venezuelan public administration, politics, and leadership.

The two prime examples of rentier statist leadership are Pérez and Chávez. Pérez’s reputation as “the man with energy” and “the man who really walks” (Coronil 1997, 374) can be likened to observations made about Chávez’s “permanent campaign mode” style of leadership (Block

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2015). In this regard, Coronil’s comment (1997, 374) on Pérez’s leadership can also be applied to Chávez: “Speed made it possible for Pérez to deny mistakes by leaving them behind, frenetically advancing from one spectacular undertaking to another and keeping the expectant collectivity open to the marvels of his power.” Chávez took this urgency one-step further than Pérez, however, through the near-complete dismantlement of Punto Fijo institutions. His belief that such action was required to ensure a more egalitarian existence for Venezuela’s citizens contrasts with Pérez’s maintenance of the status quo under Punto Fijo democracy, despite his commitment to pulling Venezuela out of underdevelopment. This difference is perhaps due to ideology: Chávez blamed neoliberalism for Venezuela’s ills while Pérez operated within it. Chávez’s urgency in deepening the Bolivarian project was intensified following the series of attempts to remove him from power between 2002 and 2004.

Another similarity between the leaderships of Pérez and Chávez is that of the economic crises that occurred during their implementation of grandiose visions for Venezuela. This is not to say that the basic ideals behind those visions were illegitimate, but rather that the projects were not implemented in ways that could be sustained after the global oil price boom subsided. In this regard, the grandiose project and the associated level of spending under both leaders were short-sighted and reckless. Pérez’s La Gran Venezuela, financed at the time by the greatest global oil price boom the country had ever experienced, plunged Venezuela into economic crisis less than half a decade later (Coppedge 1992; Karl 1997). “Ethical slackness” within public administration accompanied Pérez’s first presidency as the cost of corruption within government was absorbed by the vast flows of petroleum revenue (Rey 1998, 117). Pérez was accused by his own party of corruption and was eventually impeached for it in 1993 (Coronil 1997, 380).

Likewise, Chávez’s misiones sociales, again financed by a global oil price boom comparable to the boom experienced under Pérez in the 1970s (García U 2017), also contributed to the economic crisis Venezuela is currently facing. Chávez’s treatment of PDVSA as a virtually bottomless piggy bank is similar to Pérez’s approach of “politics without limits” (Karl 1997). A lack of transparency in revenue received by PDVSA and distributed via social welfare allowed corruption to flourish. This was particularly evident in Chávez’s appointment of the military to manage development projects such as Plan Bolívar 2000 and the subsequent loss of tens of millions of dollars to corruption (Coronel 2006). Changes to the economy under

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Chávez’s twenty-first century socialism project, introduced by enabling law powers to fast- track the transformation of the Venezuelan polity, have subsequently distorted the country’s foreign currency exchange rate system and created a parallel currency black market that today is part of a complicated hyperinflation problem (Smilde 2015). The collapse of the global oil price in 2014 saw Maduro’s government unable to carry out many of its policy commitment (López Maya 2014). The economic situation, created by Chávez’s economic policies and his grandiose vision, has generated a situation in present-day Venezuela where there is not enough affordable or accessible food and medical supplies, electricity, or work (Al Jazeera 2017; HRW 2016; PROVEA 2016a).

The political projects of both Pérez and Chávez resulted in the decay of the Venezuelan regime at the time. Pérez’s leadership damaged the public’s faith in the Punto Fijo institutions to carry out their parts as envisaged in the democratic social contract, while Chávez’s leadership enabled conditions for poor transparency of the distribution of oil revenue and re-introduced the military into Venezuelan politics and development. In turn, this has allowed Venezuela to slide from hybrid electoral authoritarianism to almost outright authoritarianism under Maduro.

In contrast, Gómez did not have a populist, grandiose vision that appealed to the vast majority of Venezuela’s population, as, due to the outright authoritarian nature of his rule, he did not need it. He did, however, have a vision of Venezuela operating smoothly like one of his haciendas (Morón 1964; Erlich 1974). As the main beneficiary of the country’s emergent oil industry, Gómez created an environment that attracted the business of international oil companies. This required the repression of competing political organisations and the provision of extensive tax breaks and concessions to foreign oil companies (Levine 1973). In return, Gómez received a steady flow of wealth that he could feed on to his patronage network and use to develop the country in order to facilitate further business and industrialisation. In particular, extensive highways, built through the labour of political prisoners (Burggraaff 1972, 24; Morón 1964, 193; Trinkunas 2010, 240), were constructed to facilitate the transport of goods and produce, while foreign oil companies were virtually given the opportunity to write oil legislation that provided them with many benefits (Bucheli & Aguilera 2010, 365; Kozloff 2006, 285). While there was no economic crisis following Gómez’s rule, there was under-development in many areas of the country because the

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majority of the government’s revenue had gone to Gómez’s patronage network and repaying the national debt.

Similar to Gómez, Pérez Jiménez, having also ruled Venezuela at a time when global oil prices were high (though not booming as they did for Pérez and Chávez), did not adopt an urgent pace to the attainment of his political goals but rather decided that an authoritarian regime, masked as a democratic regime, would be the fastest and most efficient method to achieving his grandiose vision of modernity. In reflecting on this method, Pérez Jiménez argued that his government completed “a sum of works which would have been impossible to achieve in twenty-five years of democracy” (cited in Blanco 1983, 187; Coronil 1997, 164). The high global oil prices enabled Pérez Jiménez to facilitate his vision of high-rise buildings, vast highway networks throughout the country, and lavish hotels and sporting venues (Ewell 1984; Tinker Salas 2015, 88). These modern public works, however, generated US$1.4 billion in public debt. This was due to the works’ funding through credit as the profits of the oil were absorbed by Pérez Jiménez’s patronage network (Ewell 1984, 110, 124).

Even Betancourt’s provisional presidency can be characterised by this rentier statist leadership. Upon assuming power, the revenue of the provisional government increased by 240% due to changes to oil policy made by Medina Angarita in 1943 (Coronil 1997, 136-37). This allowed Betancourt to adopt a number of large-scale populist policies to fast track development in Venezuela. However, during the trienio, Betancourt implemented these policies with a level of urgency and scale that ultimately alienated key societal groups such as the economic elite, the Catholic Church, and the military. In contrast, Betancourt’s leadership during his constitutional presidency was more constrained as Venezuela was in a rentier statist bust cycle due to the poor economic situation inherited from Pérez Jiménez (Coronil 1997, 201). This environment was combined with Betancourt’s desire to institutionalise democratic principles, which in turn required his leadership-by-example and an avoidance of leadership styles that threatened a democratic political culture. Like Betancourt’s constitutional presidency, Caldera was more moderated in his vision for Venezuela, as he did not rule during an oil price boom cycle like Pérez (Karl 1997, 125). In his second presidency, Caldera’s primary aim was to repair Venezuela’s economy as it was still experiencing the impacts of Pérez’s economic mismanagement of the 1970s, the resultant economic crisis, and persistent low global oil price throughout the 1990s. However, like Pérez, Caldera still turned

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to strict neoliberal austerity measures to manage Venezuela’s economic crisis, thereby eroding public satisfaction with his leadership (Karl 1997, 185).

Maduro is an exception as he still maintains a grandiose vision despite the economic and humanitarian crisis enveloping Venezuela. Maduro has experienced a collapse in the global oil price during his presidency, with no price recovery at the time of writing. This has not prevented Maduro, however, from continuing Chávez’s Bolivarian project and twenty-first century socialism. In fact, he has sought to deepen twenty-first century socialism through a greater application of a socialist communal state. This may be because his legitimacy with his in-group supporter base, the chavistas and the military, is dependent upon his ability to carry out Chávez’s vision and deliver resources to the clientelistic networks that have emerged. Yet, in addition, Maduro’s regime is supported by loans from the Chinese and Russian governments, as each country seeks to subvert the USA’s global power.

Constructive and Destructive Outcomes Instead of Ethics In light of these research findings, this thesis proposes that leadership styles in the full-range leadership model are better interpreted according to the truest sense of the term. That is, full- range leadership should not only refer to authentic style but also include the pseudo leadership styles as part and parcel of the practice of leadership, rather than as a distinct category that condemns the leader who uses them as “bad”. Instead, a more useful lens through which to analyse the leader is in the consequential outcomes that his or her choice of style produces. This research draws upon the concept of constructive and destructive outcomes as presented by Padilla (2013) and Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007, 178) who note, “it is possible for ‘good’ leaders to produce bad outcomes, and ‘bad’ leaders to produce desirable outcomes”. This acknowledges that no leader is predominantly authentic or pseudo, but rather that multiple and hybrid forms of leadership styles can simultaneously co-exist, depending on the context and whether the audience is follower or opposition. In this regard, the ethical component of the leadership styles is helpful only to the extent that it establishes an ideal type of leader, but in terms of analytical pragmatism it provides a misguided focus. Consequently, a benchmark of outcomes, whereby constructive outcomes align with the health and stability of society while destructive outcomes correspond with harm to society, bypasses the nature of leadership debate and focuses on the real-world experience of the political leader and the citizenry.

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The leadership of Chávez is a useful contemporary example of the influence that constructive and destructive outcomes of leadership styles in defining moments have on the nature of the regime. To date, debate regarding the nature of Chávez’s leadership polarises scholars and the layperson alike. When Chávez ascended to the presidency, Punto Fijo institutions, already decayed by the corruption, economic mismanagement, and elitism of the Fourth Republic, were easily dismantled as he adjusted his leadership styles to counter the challenges to his legitimacy and his goal of implementing the Bolivarian Revolution. This was particularly evident following the 2002 coup d’état attempt, as Chávez’s leadership styles when dealing with opposition became predominantly pseudo.

While there are many analyses available on the nature of Chávez’s leadership and whether he was a masked dictator from the beginning of his first presidency, the constructive and destructive outcomes of his leadership provide a clearer way to analyse his leadership. In this regard, there were short-term consequences of his leadership that produced constructive results. For instance, a redistribution of political power and the mobilisation of previously marginalised classes of people are some of the well-researched benefits of Chávez’s authentic transformational leadership (Fernandes 2010; Hawkins 2010a). In terms of destructive outcomes, his use of pseudo leadership styles has resulted in long-term economic mismanagement and corruption (Al Jazeera 2016; Coronel 2006), the reduction of free speech and press (Corrales & Penfold 2007; Corrales 2015), and government hostility towards private business and media (HRW 2012), are just some of the factors that contributed to the creation of an electoral authoritarian regime and the situation that faces present-day Venezuela under the presidency of Maduro and the slide to outright authoritarianism.

Conclusion This chapter has provided an analysis of the data presented in Chapters 4-8 of this thesis. It established the contributions of the data to the study of full-range leadership in a political science case study at the presidential level. Its first finding argued for the use of defining moments as a lens through which to examine the leadership styles of political leaders, due to these moments’ ability to reveal leadership styles at their clearest. Two forms of defining moments were also identified: a chain of defining moments for a singular leader, as well as cross-leader defining moments whereby a defining moment for one leader could establish the conditions or motivations for the defining moment for another leader. Both of these defining moment categories were not restricted temporally. The second finding was that it was goal

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utility, not ethical considerations as determined by regime type, which was the primary consideration of the selected Venezuelan presidents in their choice of leadership style(s). The presence of multiple styles within the one defining moment, as well as authentic/pseudo leadership style hybridity, was then explored within the context of Venezuelan leadership culture. The third finding revealed that it was not regime type that influenced the president’s choice of leadership style(s) but rather a broader conducive environment that included leadership culture and rentier statism. Finally, the chapter suggested that examining the defining moments of leaders in the context of constructive or destructive outcomes, instead of the ethical nature of the leadership styles, was a more useful analytical lens for political leadership.

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Chapter Ten: Conclusion

How can the full-range leadership model help us to understand political leadership? This was the key question that drove the research strategy of this thesis and its quest to return the full- range leadership model to the political science discipline. Some areas of leadership, such as organisational leadership, receive much greater attention from evidence-based research than others. The study of political leadership is one area that would benefit from more evidence- based research and it is surprising that, given the vital importance of political leadership to the fabric and future of society, this field has not been further developed. The lack of a comprehensive model to guide systematic analysis is in spite of the extensive interest, discussion and analysis of political leadership, as evidenced in the thousands of journal articles, books, newspaper reports, and websites on the topic. The result is a fragmented field of study that offers no analytical consistency from which to begin to build a deeper or systematic understanding political leadership, leader behaviours, and the environmental conditions that influence it.

This thesis has sought to address this gap in the study of political leadership by applying the full-range leadership model – developed within the management discipline and supported by a vast array of empirical studies – to a political science case study. The full-range leadership model focuses on the ability of the leader to adapt his or her styles (behaviours) to the demands of the situation. As detailed in Chapter Two, this model is predominantly conceptualised as consisting of seven styles ranging from transformational to transactional. Each style also has a range of attached sub-behaviours and leader qualities, resulting in a spectrum of behaviours for a leader to choose from and tailor to his or her situation. The comprehensive nature of the model allows for an in-depth analysis of the political leader. Moreover, because the model emphasises leader adaptability to circumstance, it enables an analysis of leader and environment to occur and is an essential element in the consideration of the behavioural choices of political leaders.

Consequently, this thesis makes a significant contribution towards the call for more cooperation between the management and political science disciplines on the topic of leadership. Specifically, this research achieves this through the adaptation and systematic

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application of the full-range leadership model to analyse political leaders of differing regime types and time. This is significant as the full-range leadership model – an amalgamation of the transformational and transactional leadership theories as proposed by the political scientist James MacGregor Burns (1978) – has undergone further development and empirical validation within the management discipline. To test the utility of the framework, this research selected the political science case study of Venezuela for two reasons, as outlined in Chapter Three’s methodology. First, Venezuela is a country that has experienced, within a relatively short period of time, the three main political regime types that this thesis addresses. Second, as the full-range leadership model has been developed within the West, Venezuela offers the opportunity to apply the model to a cross-cultural case study. The selected presidents within the case study were chosen due to the length of their rule, with each president ruling for at least five years. An exception is made for Venezuela’s current president, Nicolás Maduro, who, at the time of writing, had been in power for four years yet he had overseen significant political and economic turbulence.

Chapter Two’s literature review examined the range of theories used to understand leaders and concluded that the full-range leadership model offered the most comprehensive and flexible framework for the analysis of political leaders. This was due to the range of leader behaviour and qualities the model incorporates while taking into account the leader’s broader environment. This is integral to the study of political leaders due the impetus upon them to respond to ever-changing interactions between external environmental forces, sources of legitimacy, and the attraction and maintenance of support for their visions and agendas. Chapter Two builds a conceptual framework to adapt the full-range leadership model to a political science case study. Its development was guided by three research aims:

In building a conceptual framework to address these aims, this thesis has asked what needs to be added to the full-range leadership model in order to adequately transfer its basis of analysis from management to politics? The conceptual model that eventuated was Chapter

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Two’s Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model (see Figure 2.1) that incorporates Bass and Steidlmeier’s (1999) authentic and pseudo transformational and transactional leadership styles to form part of a comprehensive “tool box” through which to undertake the analysis of political leaders. The expansion of the full-range leadership model’s styles took into account the observation by Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007, 178) that, via the leadership styles they employ, “it is possible for ‘good’ leaders to produce bad outcomes, and ‘bad’ leaders to produce desirable outcomes”. Without the addition of the pseudo styles the model represents an, often unachievable, ideal type of leader. The Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model instead recognises the wide variation in human behaviour and allows for analysis of a greater range of leader actions. This follows scholars such as Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) and Padilla (2013) who argue that a leader is never purely authentic or pseudo but rather utilises a mix of the styles.

The second aim of this thesis was to explore whether the regime type in which the political leader operates has an impact on their choice of leadership style(s). The empirical evidence of this research has found that there is some influence within democratic and hybrid regimes. These regimes’ institutions can constrain the full spectrum of the style, either genuinely via institutional strength of these regimes or for appearances’ sake. For example, the spectrum of action in the pseudo contingent reinforcement leadership style can range from the concealment of information at one end, to the use of coercion and fear at the other end. The leader’s choice of action within the style is influenced by their source of legitimacy, which may depend on democratic or hybrid regime conditions such as electoral politics or political pluralism. In contrast, the authoritarian regime type allows for the leader to utilise the full spectrum of the style without significant consequence as long as the leader is able to continue to maintain support via pseudo-transactional means such as patronage networks and physical force.

However, this research found that the leader is able to influence and change the nature of the regime through his or her choice of leadership style in the pursuit or defence of goals. As a consequence, there is not a one-way relationship between regime type and leadership style, but rather a constant, reciprocal dynamic of influence. The case of Venezuelan presidents within democratic or hybrid regimes demonstrated that often, in defining moments, the leaders did not adapt their leadership styles to ethical considerations of the regime but instead chose styles according to whatever would help achieve or defend goals in the fastest and most

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effective manner possible. Only when the ethical dimension of the style corresponded with the leaders’ goals did regime type and ethics align.

The third aim of this thesis was to explore whether there is an identifiable pattern of leadership style(s) among presidents in Venezuela. The empirical research as set out in Table 9.1 found two distinct patterns of leadership style(s). First, the presence of what I have term “multiple” leadership styles was evident in every defining moment for a president, regardless of time or regime type. This term reflects the presence of more than one style from the authentic or pseudo leadership style toolboxes. Presidents from Venezuela’s authoritarian era predominantly used multiple pseudo leadership styles within the one defining moment. Presidents from Venezuela’s democratic and hybrid eras also demonstrated a small usage of multiple authentic full-range leadership styles. However, this was not as prevalent as the use of multiple pseudo leadership styles by authoritarian presidents. Instead, a second pattern of leadership style emerged.

This second pattern reflected what I have termed “hybrid” full-range leadership styles in that Venezuelan presidents of democratic and hybrid regimes used multiple authentic and pseudo leadership styles within the one defining moment to advance or protect their political goals. This pattern demonstrates that it cannot be assumed that leaders of democratic regimes will predominantly utilise ethical leadership styles. In Venezuela, the key factors that instead appear to influence the choice of leadership style are the strength of regime institutions, the extent to which the leadership style aligns with the leader’s goal, and the way in which the leader derives legitimacy from the constituency he speaks to.

The first two aims of this thesis were reflected in and answered by the first two research questions regarding the influence of regime type on choice of leadership style and the exploration of a pattern of leadership style in Venezuela. The third research question sought to explore the implications for the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model for the study of political leadership. It asked: how does the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model help us to understand and explain leadership styles within a political context and across time and regime type in a non-Western country? In this regard, the establishment of Bolívar as an ideal leader in Venezuela can help researchers to understand the presence of pseudo leadership styles. This understanding also reflects the practice of neocaudillismo, and a possible next step in the application of the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model is to conduct another

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longitudinal study of national leaders in a different country in order to identify whether the same usage of hybrid and multiple leadership styles is present within defining moments.

In order to pursue the research aims and questions the thesis employed some methodological innovations to familiar research questions and techniques. This included a qualitative research strategy utilising an embedded single case study design with multiple units of analysis (Yin 2014) to facilitate the exploration of the leaderships of eight presidents within Venezuela. Document and archival analysis constituted the most effective form of data collection for this research project, due to all but one of the selected presidents being deceased. Consequently, a range of historical and contemporary secondary and tertiary sources in English and Spanish were accessed while, where possible, speeches, interviews, policy documents and quotes from the selected presidents were also included in the data.

An additional, methodological data collection element was added to the Integrated Full- Range Leadership Model’s conceptual framework in order to facilitate its application to a political science case study. This was the adaptation of a defining moments lens to assist in data collection and focus the analysis. A political leader’s leadership journey often covers many years. The scope of a research project may not be able to adequately cover every single event, policy, speech, or decision that a leader makes. The defining moment lens helps the researcher to focus on the most significant elements of the leader’s journey and complements the argument by Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) that is it in a leader’s defining moments that his or her choice of leadership style is clearest. In this regard, the margin of error in interpreting the nature of the leadership style is reduced.

The empirical data collected in the process of this research was organised into five chapters covering the different regime types. The first data chapter, Chapter Four, presented the defining moments of the presidents in Venezuela’s authoritarian period (1811-1958): Simón Bolívar (1811-1830), Juan Vicente Goméz (1907-1935) and Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1948- 1958). It found that the Bolívar utilised a hybrid full-range leadership approach until his supporters challenged his vision for the Latin American region. In 1828, unable to stave off these challenges, Bolívar declared an outright dictatorship in order to protect his goal for regional integration. During this time, he utilised multiple pseudo leadership styles. This indicated that the promotion and protection of political goals had some influence on the choice of leadership styles in defining moments. Gómez and Pérez Jiménez both utilised

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multiple pseudo styles rather than the hybrid leadership styles throughout their rule. In contrast to Bolívar’s early years of rule, their need for a wide support base was minimal, and as a consequence they chose the pseudo leadership styles as the most efficient styles for achieving their visions of political survival and modernisation.

Chapter Five focused on Venezuela’s democratic period of 1958-1998. Within this chapter, the leaderships of three presidents were explored: Rómulo Betancourt (1945-1947, 1959- 1964), Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979, 1989-1993) and Rafael Caldera (1969-1974, 1994- 1998). Similar to the presidents featured in Chapter Four, the defining moments of the above- mentioned presidents’ leaderships demonstrated a preference for a hybrid full-range leadership style approach whereby the defining moments contained both authentic and pseudo styles. Defining moments of physical conflict or challenges to their legitimacy revealed the use of the pseudo leadership styles to control critics. Venezuela’s democratic institutions such as the Pact of Punto Fijo played a mediating role in preventing leaders in this era from using the more extreme end of the pseudo leadership spectrum. Instead, the pseudo leadership styles manifested in more subtle forms. This included nepotism and corruption which were a product of a lax approach to politics ushered in by Pérez as a result of rentier statist oil wealth.

Chapters Six and Seven cover the leadership of Hugo Chávez. Significant attention was devoted to Chávez due to the major impact his leadership has had on the Venezuelan polity for over two decades. This impact has included vast changes to the nation’s economic, foreign, and social policies, its governance philosophy, and the nature of the political debate. Four years after his death, the ramifications of his leadership still impact greatly on Venezuela. Chapter Six examines the events of the 1992 coup d’état and Chávez’s presidency from 1999-2004. The chapter shows that Chávez’s defining moments initially demonstrated the use of multiple authentic leadership styles. However, as his opposition went to greater lengths to resist his political vision, his preference of leadership styles transitioned to a mix of hybrid and multiple pseudo styles as he sought to protect the Bolivarian Revolution. Chapter Seven covers Chávez’s leadership from 2004 to his death in 2013, tracking the nation’s slide to electoral authoritarianism as Chávez’s use of multiple pseudo leadership styles and opposition attempts to remove him continued to escalate. In this regard, Chapter Eight demonstrates that the dynamic between Chávez and his opposition established the regime

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conditions and leadership precedent for Maduro to come to power and consolidate Venezuela’s turn to a hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime.

Chapter Eight concludes the empirical research of this thesis with an exploration of the leadership of Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s current president. His sole use of multiple pseudo leadership styles is examined within the context of widespread political turbulence amidst an economic and humanitarian crisis. In the face of electricity, food, and medicine shortages, and violent protests, the chapter explores the way in which Maduro has neutralised opposition and retained support for his leadership via patronage networks within the military and financial support from international allies, especially China and Russia.

The implications of this research to the study of political leadership that have emerged out of Chapter Nine’s analysis are fourfold. First, it answers the call issued by Peele (2005) and others for a greater cooperation between the management and political science disciplines to develop a theory relevant to the systematic analysis of political leaders. Second, this research expands the concept of full-range leadership by adding to the range of leader actions. It challenges the assumption that political leaders will base their choice of leadership style on ethics and instead demonstrates that the goal utility of the leadership style is of more relevance. Given this finding, it is suggested that researchers of political leadership instead explore the constructive or destructive outcomes of the use of leadership styles in order to generate greater understanding.

Third, this research contributes to methodological approaches to leadership studies by further refining the concept of defining moments as a lens to focus data collection and analysis. In particular, the longitudinal study of selected Venezuelan presidents provides a deeper understanding of the interconnectedness of defining moments not only within the leadership of one leader but also between the leaderships of different leaders. In this regard, a defining moment can form a chain of moments within a single-leader or cross-leader context. In the case study of Venezuela, this had important implications for legitimacy that led to particular leaders, such as Betancourt, Caldera and Chávez, being able to use past defining moments to add credibility to their political goals. Fourth, this research proposes a focus on the outcomes of leadership styles rather than the ethics of the leadership styles themselves. As demonstrated in the exploration of presidents in Venezuela, the ethical variable of leadership is secondary to the perceived utility of the style for goal achievement and the resultant

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constructive or destructive outcome of that style. Exploring the outcomes of a leader’s defining moments through his or her choice of leadership style also provides a more flexible structure for a cross-cultural application of the model where different ethical values are placed upon differing ideals of leadership.

To condense the above considerations into a pragmatic framework for analysis, this research thus suggests a process of holistic questioning in the application of the Integrated Full-Range Leadership Model to political leaders. This process is not primarily focused on the ethical nature of the leadership styles but instead suggests a series of questions to uncover a rounded understanding of the leader and his or her leadership:

1. What is the history of leadership in the leader’s country? 2. What are the relevant and important economic, social, cultural, and historical factors to consider? 3. What are the origins and political socialisation of the leader? 4. What are the defining moments of the leader in his or her leadership journey? 5. What are the leadership styles utilised in response to the defining moments? 6. Is there a chain of single-leader defining moments or cross-leader defining moments? 7. Was the outcome of the defining moment constructive or destructive?

This line of questioning builds a greater understanding of the conducive environments and leadership culture for examined leaders and can assist in the identification, and perhaps eventual generalisation, of conditions that facilitate destructive outcomes, thereby contributing to a more robust knowledge of political leadership.

This thesis has clearly demonstrated that the systematic analysis of political leaders requires a comprehensive conceptual framework and focused methodological approach. Its contributions to model building in the adaptation and application of the full-range leadership model to political leaders assists in systematic analysis, while the defining moments approach focuses data collection and facilitates longitudinal qualitative studies of political leaders. The case study of Venezuela has expanded the understanding of how leaders use leadership styles in a political context and has highlighted the dynamic interaction between leadership styles, defining moments, leader/goal legitimacy, and regime type. Finally, this thesis answers the call for cooperation between the management and political science disciplines to generate a

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model for the analysis of political leaders. Such cooperation is vital, given the vast impact that political leaders have on the constituencies they serve.

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