DOCSLIB.ORG

Compulsory Voting Around the World

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Compulsory Voting Around the World EC Voting cover 7/6/06 20:22 Page 1 Research report, June 2006 Compulsory voting around the world We are an independent body that was set The Electoral Commission Trevelyan House up by the UK Parliament. Our mission is to Great Peter Street foster public confidence and participation London SW1P 2HW by promoting integrity, involvement and Tel 020 7271 0500 Fax 020 7271 0505 effectiveness in the democratic process. [email protected] www.electoralcommission.org.uk © The Electoral Commission 2006 Democracy matters ISBN: 1-904363-81-4 EC Voting cover 7/6/06 20:22 Page 2 Translations and other formats For information on obtaining this publication in another language or in a large-print or Braille version please contact the Electoral Commission: Tel: 020 7271 0500 Email: [email protected] The Electoral Commission We are an independent body that was set up by the UK Parliament. Our mission is to foster public confidence and participation by promoting integrity, involvement and effectiveness in the democratic process. Compulsory voting around the world Research report Copyright © The Electoral Commission 2006 ISBN: 1-904363-81-4 EC Voting text.qxp 7/6/06 20:24 Page 1 Contents Foreword 3 Executive summary 5 1 Background 9 2 Introducing compulsory voting 13 3 Compulsory voting systems 17 4 The impact of compulsory voting 27 5 Sources 37 Appendix 39 EC Voting text.qxp 7/6/06 20:24 Page 2 2 EC Voting text.qxp 7/6/06 20:24 Page 3 3 Foreword The Electoral Commission is As part of this process, we believe there is merit committed to increasing in opening up the question of compulsory voting for wider debate in the UK, as one of a participation in the democratic series of options which may facilitate higher process in the UK. Encouraging rates of electoral participation. International voting at elections is a central part experience is often referred to by both advocates and opponents of compulsory of this agenda. Since our reform in the UK. Yet until now there has been establishment in 2000, we have no single reference source analysing the actively promoted debate and international experience. This report has been research into the reasons why prepared by the Commission in the belief that access to objective and up-to-date information people choose to vote or not vote. about international experience of compulsory voting can only assist future debates in the UK. The principal aim of this research was to provide factual information about how compulsory voting operates in different countries. This report analyses the historical background to the introduction of compulsory voting in several countries across the world (and its abolition in others). We have also looked at current legislation and enforcement, sought to identify common features of compulsory voting systems and reviewed academic studies into the impact of compulsory voting on turnout and political engagement. Finally, two important caveats. This report does not consider the merits or otherwise of compulsory voting for the UK, and the Commission makes no recommendation in this regard. Additionally, this report is not an exhaustive global survey, but aims instead to take an analytical approach to understanding the issues involved. Compulsory voting around the world: foreword EC Voting text.qxp 7/6/06 20:24 Page 4 4 We hope that the information provided here will stimulate further debate. Sam Younger Chairman June 2006 Compulsory voting around the world: foreword EC Voting text.qxp 7/6/06 20:24 Page 5 5 Executive summary This research looks at compulsory Background to research voting systems around the world. Turnouts of 59.4% and 61.4% at the last two It analyses the historical UK Parliamentary general elections1 have prompted some discussion of compulsory background to the introduction voting. Although compulsory voting has of compulsory voting in several never been part of the UK electoral system, countries across the world (and its mandatory participation in elections is a feature in a diverse range of countries across the world abolition in others). We have also – in Western Europe, South East Asia, looked at current legislation and Australasia and Central and South America. enforcement, sought to identify The principal aim of this research was to common features of compulsory provide factual information about how voting systems and reviewed compulsory voting operates in different academic studies into the impact countries and, where possible, to assess the of compulsory voting on turnout efficacy of penalties for non-voting and the impact of compulsory voting on turnout rates. and political engagement. The research has drawn on evidence supplied to us by British embassies and electoral authorities in a range of countries across the world where there is, or has been, compulsory voting. We have also drawn on academic research and analysis, but this report does not represent an exhaustive survey of compulsory voting systems or the literature about them. Introducing compulsory voting Countries with very different types of political systems, from newly established democracies through to emerging democracies, have legislated to introduce compulsory voting. The reasons behind its introduction are more complex than might, at first, be assumed and are not simply concerned with a desire to boost participation rates. Country-specific political 1 Hereafter referred to as ‘general elections’. Compulsory voting around the world: executive summary EC Voting text.qxp 7/6/06 20:24 Page 6 6 and historical events and factors are product of such arrangements, it is clear from overwhelmingly the prompt for a move the available evidence that compulsory voting to compulsion. both increases aggregate turnout and reduces the variation in turnout rates among different Compulsory voting has been introduced for groups. Less clear is the effect compulsory a number of reasons and often at times of voting has on political engagement more constitutional and political change, but the generally, encompassing political interest, desire to maximise turnout among all sections knowledge and participation. The available of society seems to have been a common evidence does suggest that compulsion is less objective. It has often been implemented as a effective in promoting better public knowledge result of wider political reform such as a change of politics or in increasing political engagement. in a country’s political system, as in Chile, or alongside the introduction of universal suffrage, We have been mindful that, while there is much as in Belgium and Luxembourg. to be gained from international comparisons, the compulsory voting systems currently in Compulsory voting systems place across the world reflect the unique Our research has found considerable diversity political and electoral systems and cultures in the different compulsory voting systems of the individual countries involved. The across the world. Some are perhaps better practicability of effective imposition of described as compulsory attendance systems compulsory voting also depends significantly since they do not require electors to actually on the extent to which registration is mandatory cast a vote; some are underpinned by (and is enforced) or automatic. compulsory registration, others are not; while some systems are strictly enforced by the The only obvious example where an authorities and some utilise significant established democracy appears to have sanctions (see Table 1 on the next page for a introduced compulsory voting solely in summary of compulsory voting systems and response to low voter turnouts is Australia. their sanctions). By contrast, in some countries However, the academic Lisa Hill argues that the it appears that the existence of compulsory greatest obstacles to the introduction of an voting in law is enough to ensure public Australian-style system of compulsory voting elsewhere may be ‘psychological, or at least, compliance, even without the application 2 of sanctions. cultural’. Impact of compulsory voting on political engagement 2 Cited in L. Hill, ‘Democratic assistance: A compulsory While higher turnouts in countries with some voting template’, paper presented to the Jubilee form of compulsory voting are not solely the conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Canberra (2002). Compulsory voting around the world: executive summary EC Voting text.qxp 7/6/06 20:24 Page 7 7 In those countries in Western Europe where (International IDEA) suggests that it is probably compulsory voting has been introduced, this due to the long history of compulsory voting in typically followed the introduction of universal some Western European democracies that it is suffrage in the early twentieth century, still practised – this history has helped to make sometimes combined with the introduction of the practice a more ‘commonly accepted or proportional representation. The International tolerated’ tradition than it would otherwise be if Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance introduced today. Table 1: Summary of compulsory voting systems and their sanctions Level of Brief description of sanctions against non-voters enforcement/ country Very strict Brazil Sanctions include a fine corresponding to a small percentage of the minimum wage of the region where the individual was registered to vote. The non-voter is banned from taking professional exams, or from obtaining a loan or a passport. Failure to vote in three consecutive elections, non-payment of fines or failure to justify absence within six months can lead to registration being cancelled. Australia Inability to provide a sufficient reason for non-attendance triggers a $20 fine. In the event of court proceedings being required, the fine can be increased to $50 and the non-voter is liable for court costs. On some occasions, if the fine is still not paid, defaulters have been imprisoned as being in contempt of court. Singapore The names of absent voters are removed from the register of electors. Those who failed to vote without sufficient reason have to make a payment of S$5 to the Registration Officer for their names to be reinstated on the register.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • AC Compulsory Voting
    Cy-Fair HS Novice Affirmative Case Sept.-Oct 2013- Compulsory Voting “The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men because they are different from other men.” Because I agree with these words of former President Lyndon B. Johnson, I stand firmly Resolved: In a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ought is defined as implying obligation or advisability. Compulsory voting is defined as a system in which electors are obliged to vote in elections or attend a polling place on voting day. If an eligible voter does not attend a polling place, he or she may be subJect to punitive measures.. The value that the affirmative defends is governmental legitimacy. Since a legitimate government must fulfill its obligations to it’s people, a legitimate democracy must strive to be consistent with its core ideals. Thus, the criteria is being consistent with the fundamental characteristics of democracy. As defined in his book Democracy and It’s Critics, Robert Dahl explains that in addition to the concept of “one-person-one-vote”, democracies have four distinguishing characteristics: 1. Effective participation 2. Enlightened understanding of issues 3. Control of the political agenda 4. Inclusiveness Whichever debater’s position is most consistent with these characteristics is being most consistent with democratic legitimacy and should win the debate. 1 Cy-Fair HS Novice Affirmative Case Sept.-Oct 2013- Compulsory Voting My single contention is that compulsory voting is most consistent with the fundamental characteristics of democracy.
    [Show full text]
  • ¿Quién Vota? Compulsory Voting and the Persistence of Class Bias In
    ¿Quien´ Vota? Compulsory Voting and the Persistence of Class Bias in Latin America Yanilda Gonzalez´ Steven A. Snell Harvard Kennedy School Duke University yanilda [email protected] [email protected] August 31, 2015 Abstract Universal suffrage does not guarantee universal participation. Scholars diagnose the dis- parity in turnout between rich and poor as an important democratic deficit and propose com- pulsory voting as a key institutional remedy. While countries with compulsory have higher turnout rates, it is unclear whether compulsory voting meaningfully alleviates inequality in turnout. The present work examines the extent to which compulsory voting mitigates the class bias common to voter turnout. We draw on evidence from Latin America, a region character- ized by widespread compulsory voting laws and high economic inequality. We demonstrate that compulsory voting results in higher turnout only when enforced and that the gains in turnout are primarily among the poor. We also find, however, that unequal turnout persists even under strict compulsory voting systems. We further demonstrate that disadvantaged cit- izens are less likely to vote in countries with strict enforcement of compulsory voting rules due to structural barriers that disproportionately affect the poor, such as a voter identification requirement, as opposed to political disinterest. 1 Universal suffrage does not guarantee universal participation. For almost a century, political observers have shown that enfranchised citizens occasionally or even routinely abstain from voting. The earliest explorations of abstention (e.g., Arneson 1925; Merriam & Gosnell 1924) highlight that certain groups of citizens are more likely than others to abstain, thereby rendering election outcomes potentially unrepresentative of the citizenry.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Knowledge and the Paradox of Voting
    Political Knowledge and the Paradox of Voting Edited by Sofia Magdalena Olofsson We have long known that Americans pay local elections less attention than they do elections for the Presidency and Congress. A recent Portland State University study showed that voter turnout in ten of America’s 30 largest cities sits on average at less than 15% of eligible voters. Just pause and think about this. The 55% of voting age citizens who cast a ballot in last year’s presidential election – already a two-decade low and a significant drop from the longer-term average of 65-80% – still eclipses by far the voter turnout at recent mayoral elections in Dallas (6%), Fort Worth (6%), and Las Vegas (9%). What is more, data tells us that local voter turnout is only getting worse. Look at America’s largest city: New York. Since the 1953 New York election, when 93% of residents voted, the city’s mayoral contests saw a steady decline, with a mere 14% of the city’s residents voting in the last election. Though few might want to admit it, these trends suggest that an unspoken hierarchy exists when it comes to elections. Atop this electoral hierarchy are national elections, elections that are widely considered the most politically, economically, and culturally significant. Extensively covered by the media, they are viewed as high-stakes moral contests that naturally attract the greatest public interest. Next, come state elections: though still important compared to national elections, their political prominence, media coverage, and voter turnout is already waning. At the bottom of this electoral hierarchy are local elections that, as data tells us, a vast majority of Americans now choose not to vote in.
    [Show full text]
  • "I Voted": Examining the Impact of Compulsory Voting on Voter Turnout Nina A
    Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship 2016 "I Voted": Examining the Impact of Compulsory Voting on Voter Turnout Nina A. Kamath Claremont McKenna College Recommended Citation Kamath, Nina A., ""I Voted": Examining the Impact of Compulsory Voting on Voter Turnout" (2016). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 1286. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1286 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE “I VOTED”: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF COMPULSORY VOTING ON VOTER TURNOUT SUBMITTED TO Professor Manfred Keil AND Professor Eric Helland AND Dean Peter Uvin By Nina Kamath For Senior Thesis Fall 2015 November 30, 2015 Department of Economics ii iii Abstract Over the past few decades, falling voter turnout rates have induced governments to adopt compulsory voting laws, in order to mitigate issues such as the socioeconomic voter gap and to bring a broader spectrum of voters into the fold. This paper presents evidence that the introduction of mandatory voting laws increases voter turnout rates by 13 points within a particular country through an entity- and time-fixed effect panel model. Moreover, it includes a discussion of the implications of adopting mandatory voting policies within the United States, finding that compelling citizens to vote would have increased participation rates to over 90 percent in the past four presidential elections. iv Acknowledgements First, I want to thank my parents for their unconditional love, support, and encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor Manfred Keil, Associate Professor of Economics at Claremont McKenna College, for his valuable guidance and support in completing this senior thesis.
    [Show full text]
  • Compulsory Voting and Political Participation: Empirical Evidence from Austria
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Gaebler, Stefanie; Potrafke, Niklas; Rösel, Felix Working Paper Compulsory voting and political participation: Empirical evidence from Austria ifo Working Paper, No. 315 Provided in Cooperation with: Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Suggested Citation: Gaebler, Stefanie; Potrafke, Niklas; Rösel, Felix (2019) : Compulsory voting and political participation: Empirical evidence from Austria, ifo Working Paper, No. 315, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/213592 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have
    [Show full text]
  • Voter Turnout Trends Around the World
    Voter Turnout Trends around the World Voter Turnout Trends around the World Voter Turnout Trends around the World Abdurashid Solijonov © 2016 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance International IDEA Strömsborg SE-103 34 Stockholm Sweden Tel: +46 8 698 37 00, fax: +46 8 20 24 22 Email: [email protected], website: www.idea.int The electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribute-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the publication as well as to remix and adapt it provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, that you appropriately attribute the publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence. For more information on this licence see: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/>. International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, or those of its Boards or Council members. Cover photograph: ‘Voting queue in Addis Ababa’ (© BBC World Service/Uduak Amimo) made available on Flickr under the terms of a Creative Commons licence (CC-BY-NC 2.0) Graphic design by Turbo Design, Ramallah ISBN: 978-91-7671-083-8 Contents Acronyms and abbreviations ............................................................................................................ 7 Preface ..........................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Should Voting Be Mandatory?
    Should Voting Be Mandatory? By Stephanie Kraus, Lisa Hill, JASON BRENNAN A voter casts a vote at a ballot box. In the United States, about 40% of eligible voters do not vote in presidential elections. More than 30 countries, including Belgium, Brazil and Australia, have some form of mandatory voting. In 1924, Australia started issuing fines to citizens who didn’t show up to vote. Turnout increased from 47% of eligible voters to over 95%. On top of that, perhaps because more people are involved in choosing their representatives, Australians report high levels of trust in government and satisfaction with the way democracy works. By comparison, a recent poll by the Pew Research Center found that just 24 percent of Americans trust the federal government. Supporters of mandatory voting say a true democracy needs to hear from all citizens. Democracy doesn’t work if a large portion of the population doesn’t participate. Mandatory voting is the best way to encourage politicians to focus their attention on all Americans, not just the middle and upper classes. A study by Pew Research Center found that the eligible voters most likely to avoid the polls are younger, poorer, less educated, and more racially diverse. This means those groups are less likely to have their voices heard. Because wealthier Americans are more likely to vote, government policies are disproportionately geared toward their interests. If voting were mandatory in the U.S., people would he inspired to pay more attention to campaigns—and current events. Compulsory voting would also allow candidates to spend less time and money on getting voters to the polls, and more on explaining where they stand on key issues.
    [Show full text]
  • A New Local Government Electoral Act: Review of the Local Government Electoral System (Excluding BCC)
    LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF QUEENSLAND LAW, JUSTICE AND SAFETY COMMITTEE A new Local Government Electoral Act: Review of the local government electoral system (excluding BCC) NOVEMBER 2010 REPORT NO. 78 LAW, JUSTICE AND SAFETY COMMITTEE 53RD PARLIAMENT COMMITTEE Chair Ms Barbara Stone MP, Member for Springwood Deputy Chair Mr Andrew Cripps MP, Member for Hinchinbrook Members Mr Jarrod Bleijie MP, Member for Kawana Mr Steve Kilburn MP, Member for Chatsworth Mr Ray Stevens MP, Member for Mermaid Beach Mr Murray Watt MP, Member for Everton Hon. Dean Wells MP, Member for Murrumba SECRETARIAT Acting Research Director Ms Renee Easten Principal Research Officer1 Ms Amanda Honeyman Executive Assistant Mrs Gail Easton Copies of this report and other Committee publications are available on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.qld.gov.au/jjsc Law, Justice and Safety Committee Parliament House George Street Brisbane Qld 4000 Telephone: (07) 3406 7307 Facsimile: (07) 3406 7070 Email: [email protected] 1 The Committee thanks Ms Simone Gregory for her research assistance with this report. CHAIR’S FOREWORD Local Government is often described as the level of government that is closest to the people. With this closeness comes an expectation from communities that their elected representatives will be responsive to their needs, will strive in their best interests, and will be accountable to them. The most consistent message the Committee heard across Queensland is that people want representation. They want to know who their local representatives are and to be able to contact their councillors when they need them. They want their local councillors to understand the needs of their particular area, to provide effective representation of the community’s needs and to be held accountable in fulfilling their duties as an elected representative.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case for Compulsory Voting in the United States
    NOTES THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY VOTING IN THE UNITED STATES Voter turnout in the United States is much lower than in other de- mocracies.1 In European nations, voter turnout regularly tops 80%,2 while turnout in American elections has not approached this number for at least the past century.3 Even in the U.S. presidential election of 2004, with the nation bogged down in an unpopular war and with a very tight campaign that left no front-runner, voter turnout was only about 60%.4 Although many may disparage the American electorate for being forgetful or lazy,5 low voter turnout does not necessarily mean that something is drastically wrong with American voters. The decision not to vote can be a rational one. Democratic government is a classic public good, and like any public good it is subject to a free-rider prob- lem.6 One can enjoy the benefits of living in a free, democratic society whether one incurs the costs of voting — time spent traveling to polls and waiting in line, information costs of choosing whom to vote for — or not. Even potential voters who have a strong preference for one candidate over another are likely to have a rational basis for not vot- ing since the likelihood of any single vote influencing the outcome of an election is negligible. This gives rise to what scholars call the “paradox of voting”7: the fact that some people do vote even though a ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 DEREK BOK, THE STATE OF THE NATION 325 (1996). 2 Id. 3 Less is known about earlier American history, in part because of problems with the avail- able data.
    [Show full text]
  • House of Asembly Elections.Pub
    ELECTORAL SYSTEM HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY Tasmania has had compulsory voting ELECTIONS since the 1930s, and since 1978 this has applied to everyone over 18 years of The Tasmanian House of Assembly is age. Each voter is required to indicate a elected under a form of proportional minimum of five candidate preferences representation (PR) in five multi-member in order to cast a formal or valid vote. electorates using the single-transferable To stop before five or make an error vote (STV). This is known locally as the (e.g. two No 4 votes) renders the vote Hare-Clark system partly because it informal. Should voters express choices stems from the ideas of the Englishman beyond five this is also valid but if they Thomas Hare (1806-91). The other half stop at No. 15 or make an error with, of the hyphenated name refers to the say, two No. 21s, their vote becomes Tasmanian Attorney-General, Andrew 'exhausted' at either No. 15 or No. 20. Inglis Clark (1848-1907) who changed Once exhausted a ballot paper is of no and added to Hare's method. Clark's use even if a higher number exists, i.e. and other changes make the Hare-Clark Nos 22, 23, or 24 cannot be correct if system unique, not, as is often thought, No. 21 is repeated. an exact match with the Irish or the Maltese PR systems. From 1907 to 1941 candidates' names were listed ungrouped in alphabetical Tasmania adopted Hare-Clark on a trial order on the ballot paper. After 1941 basis in 1896 for Hobart and candidates were grouped by party or Launceston, but it was abolished in other group but the party was not named 1901.
    [Show full text]
  • Notes Compulsory Voting in America
    NOTES COMPULSORY VOTING IN AMERICA SEAN MATSLER* I. INTRODUCTION “This . is dedicated . to the American voter. In the future, may there be more of them . .” –Ruy A. Teixeira1 Persistently low voter turnout in the United States continues to disappoint lovers of democracy. When scarcely half of the population of eligible voters turns out for a presidential election once every four years—to say nothing of midterm congressional elections or local elections—it becomes difficult to defend American democracy as truly representative.2 Instead, the will of the active voters, who constitute a stark minority of the eligible voting population, ultimately determines the electoral outcome. This regrettable situation is not the essence of a participatory democracy. Although low turnout might easily be blamed on an American ele ctoral lethargy, it could also be understood as a failure of the American electoral structure to motivate voter turnout. Accepting that premise as fact, it becomes possible to treat declining voter turnout as an opportunity * Class of 2003, University of Southern California Law School; B.A. 1999, University of California at Berkeley. The author would like to thank his parents, Mike and Lou, for their constant love and encouragement. He would also like to thank Glen and Abbe Rabenn for their guidance, Kate Dilligan for all she has done, and his grandmother, Mildred Kim, for her invaluable support. 1. See Dedication to RUY A. TEIXEIRA, W HY A MERICANS D ON’T VOTE (1987). 2. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, VOTER REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BY YEAR: 1960–1992, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/tonote.htm (last visited Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Negative Vote Buying and the Secret Ballot"
    Negative Vote Buying and the Secret Ballot John Morgan Haas School of Business and Department of Economics University of California, Berkeley Felix Várdyy International Monetary Fund Washington, DC June 2008 Abstract We o¤er a model of “negative vote buying”—paying voters to abstain. While negative vote buying is feasible under the open ballot, it is never opti- mal. In contrast, a combination of positive and negative vote buying is optimal under the secret ballot: Lukewarm supporters are paid to show up at the polls, while lukewarm opponents are paid to stay home. Surprisingly, the imposition of the secret ballot increases the amount of vote buying— a greater fraction of the electorate votes insincerely than under the open ballot. Moreover, the secret ballot may reduce the costs of buying an election. JEL #s: D71, D72, D78. Keywords: Negative vote buying, lobbying, abstention, secret ballot, elec- tions. The …rst author thanks the International Monetary Fund Institute for its generous hospitality and inspiration during the …rst draft of this paper. Morgan also gratefully acknowledges the …nancial support of the National Science Foundation. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Board, or its Management. yCorresponding author. Email: [email protected] 1 1 Introduction The use of voting to make collective decisions inevitably brings with it the possibility of vote buying. Thus, a crucial aspect of designing voting procedures is to ensure that election outcomes re‡ect the will of the electorate, rather than the wallets of interest groups.
    [Show full text]