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Mediation in Africa Report Full Study Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes Mediation Support Project CSS ETH Zurich © Mediation Support Project (MSP), CSS, and swisspeace 2008 Center for Security Studies (CSS) Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, ETH Zurich Seilergraben 45-49 - SEI CH - 8092 Zürich Tel.: +41-44-632 40 25 Fax: +41-44-632 19 41 [email protected] www.css.ethz.ch swisspeace Sonnenbergstrasse 17 P.O. Box CH - 3000 Bern 7 Tel.: +41-31-330 12 12 Fax: +41-31-330 12 13 [email protected] www.swisspeace.ch/mediation The summary and the full report with references can be accessed at: <www.css.ethz.ch> and <www.swisspeace.ch/mediation> Coordinator: Simon J A Mason Authors: Annika Åberg, Sabina Laederach, David Lanz, Jonathan Litscher, Simon J A Mason, Damiano Sguaitamatti (alphabetical order) Acknowledgements: We are greatly indebted to Murezi Michael of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) for initiating and supporting this study project. Without his enthusiasm and perseverance, this study would not have reached such a happy end. Many thanks also to helpful input from Julian Thomas Hottinger, Carol Mottet, and Alain Sigg (Swiss FDFA), Matthias Siegfried (MSP, swisspeace), Mario Giro (St. Egidio) and Katia Papagianni (HD). Thanks also to Christopher Findlay for English proofreading and Marion Ronca (CSS) for layouting. Initiation and Support: Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) Disclaimer: Any opinions expressed in this article present the views of the authors alone, and not those of the CSS, swisspeace, or the Swiss FDFA. Front cover photo: Sudan’s First Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha (L) and Sudan People’s Liberation Move- ment (SPLM) leader John Garang (R) at the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the 9 January 2005, ending a 21-year-old conflict in the south that has killed an estimated two million people mainly through famine and disease. Pictures of the Year Reuters/Antony Njuguna. Table of Content Foreword..................................................................................................................................... 5 Mediation in African Peace Processes: Carefully Comparing Apples and Oranges ...................... 7 Burundi, Arusha Peace Process .................................................................................................. 21 Central African Republic, Inclusive Political Dialog (Pre-talks only) ......................................... 28 Côte d’Ivoire, Ouagadougou Agreement.................................................................................... 34 D. R. Congo/Kivu, Conference on Peace, Security and Development 2008 .............................. 41 Kenya, The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008........................................................ 47 North-Mali and North-Niger, Libya Engagement .................................................................... 54 Northern Uganda, Juba Talks.................................................................................................... 60 Somalia, Khartoum talks 2006 .................................................................................................. 66 Sudan, North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement ............................................................. 72 Sudan/Darfur, Abuja Negotiations and the DPA...................................................................... 78 Western Sahara, The Baker Plans .............................................................................................. 85 Acronyms .................................................................................................................................. 91 3 4 Foreword People call me the midwife of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and South Sudan. When did I learn to be a peace midwife? I started my career in the army, and was head of staff of the Kenyan army for some years. So it was by default I came to peace ne- gotiations. My path was unconventional, but as the 11 cases in this study show, this is typical for most chief mediators in African peace processes. The study also shows that there is no single path to a peace agreement. The way is stormy and stony. In June 2003, for example, we drafted a document, and I was told to “soak it, drink it and go to hell.” I refused; and said I am bound for heaven. So I continued with the document. I developed high blood pressure, but we also found an answer. We got SPLM/A leader, the late John Garang, and the Sudanese vice president, Ali Osman Taha, to negotiate directly with each other. It is essential to have negotiators with real power, who act in the name of the parties, who are in a position to implement any agreement. The essence of negotiations is for the parties to work together to solve a problem. For nego- tiators, this means they must focus on an objective, look to the future, rather than to the past. For mediators, it is essential to establish one's ethics, and keep them. One does not compromise ones' ethics. People have said I am “straight as an arrow”. A mediator's integrity and humility is essential in the muddle of negotiations. There is the idea that we need African chief mediators for African conflicts, we have first hand experience, and a keen sense of the African political, cultural and military realities at hand. This is correct, but I am also convinced that any African chief mediator needs the best possible experts in his mediation team, irrespective of their nationality. I welcomed anyone on my team who could help. We had a Swiss mediator on our team, and experts from Nor- way and many other countries supporting us. A key challenge for the chief mediator is to be a gate-keeper between the actual process, and the many observers, special envoys, regional and global states that want to have a say. I often battled with the diplomats to protect the Sudan negotiations from being manipulated too much by external pressure. For a military man, one cannot let an operation take place with- out guidelines on the how, when, what, and who of implementation. The international community tried to push us to sign an agreement even if we had not yet negotiated the im- plementation modalities. We refused, because implementation modalities are essential! This study examines various peace processes, giving some indicators on why some were suc- cessful, while on the other hand others were failures. My personal view is that in the end, it is not who facilitates that is responsible for success or failure, but it is who negotiates. It is the negotiators that matter, not the mediators - but in some cases we can help. “Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation” is a useful collection of 11 cases of mediation work with diverse conflicts, parties and mediators. It provides the future mediators in African con- flicts with various approaches that would help them succeed. What clearly comes out is that unless enough time is accorded to any process, with background support from whatever source, so that some consensus may be achieved that leads to an agreement, the results would not be guaranteed. Lt. General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, Chief Mediator of the IGAD led process between SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan (2002-2005) 5 6 “If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner.” Nelson Mandela Mediation in African Peace Processes: Carefully Comparing Apples and Oranges By Simon J A Mason, Mediation Support Project, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Introduction Mediation is a mystery. Some peace processes are processes is surrounded by a certain mysterious successful, some are dismal failures, and most are aura. Simple answers are out of place, and it is not a bit of both. The transition of a society from helpful to examine mediation as a purely technical war to peace is extremely complex and difficult. or academic topic. Nevertheless, it is also wrong to Conflict parties use military means to reach their endow mediation with excessive mystification, aims, sometimes killing thousands or tens of thus placing it beyond the bounds of systematic thousands of people in the process. During a research and learning. peace process, conflict parties may slowly realize Aim and rationale: The aim of this study is to that they can gain more from negotiating than partially “unpack” the mystery of mediation, in from fighting. This takes time, however. It also order to learn about the use of mediation in Afri- takes people who talk to the conflict parties to can peace processes during the last decade. Ulti- try and understand their motives and intentions, mately, the goal is to provide better support for and why they have chosen arms as their means of ongoing and future mediation efforts in such settling issues. peace processes. The study was mandated by the There is no ethical reason for refusing to talk Political Division IV of the Swiss Federal Depart- even to the world’s worst human rights violators ment of Foreign Affairs as preparation for their if thereby lives can be saved, and if this helps to 2008 conference on “Mediation in Africa”. How- transform a war-torn society into a society mov- ever, it also springs from a longer-term interest in ing towards peace, justice, and democracy. On Africa as the continent with the most peace the contrary, there are good ethical reasons for agreements signed world-wide.2 talking to such people, even if the task is a deli- Comparative approach: In order to avoid stereo- cate and very difficult one. The
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