House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee
Progress on Carbon Budgets
Fifth Report of Session 2013–14
Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
Additional written evidence is contained in Volume II, available on the Committee website at www.parliament.uk/eacom
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 11 September 2013
HC 60 Published on 8 October 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £17.50
Environmental Audit Committee
The Environmental Audit Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to consider to what extent the policies and programmes of government departments and non-departmental public bodies contribute to environmental protection and sustainable development; to audit their performance against such targets as may be set for them by Her Majesty’s Ministers; and to report thereon to the House.
Current membership Joan Walley MP (Labour, Stoke-on-Trent North) (Chair) Peter Aldous MP (Conservative, Waveney) Richard Benyon MP (Conservative, Newbury) [ex-officio] Neil Carmichael MP (Conservative, Stroud) Martin Caton MP (Labour, Gower) Katy Clark MP (Labour, North Ayrshire and Arran) Chris Evans MP (Labour/Co-operative, Islwyn) Zac Goldsmith MP (Conservative, Richmond Park) Mark Lazarowicz MP (Labour/Co-operative, Edinburgh North and Leith) Caroline Lucas MP (Green, Brighton Pavilion) Caroline Nokes MP (Conservative, Romsey and Southampton North) Dr Matthew Offord MP (Conservative, Hendon) Mr Mark Spencer MP (Conservative, Sherwood) Paul Uppal MP (Conservative, Wolverhampton South West) Dr Alan Whitehead MP (Labour, Southampton, Test) Simon Wright MP (Liberal Democrat, Norwich South)
The following members were also members of the committee during the parliament: Ian Murray MP (Labour, Edinburgh South) Sheryll Murray MP (Conservative, South East Cornwall)
Powers The constitution and powers are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152A. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/eacom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.
The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume.
Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Simon Fiander (Clerk), Nicholas Beech (Second Clerk), Lee Nicholson (Committee Specialist), Andrew Wallace (Senior Committee Assistant), Anna Browning (Committee Assistant), Sayeda Begum (Committee Support Assistant) and Nicholas Davies (Media Officer).
Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Environmental Audit Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6150; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]
Progress on Carbon Budgets 1
Contents
Report Page
Summary 3
1 Introduction 5 Our latest inquiry 6
2 The carbon budgets 8 Developments in climate change science 8 Feedback effects 9 Climate sensitivity 11 European and international efforts 14 Review of the fourth carbon budget 16 Widening the budgets 21 Emissions from international aviation and shipping 21 Emissions embedded in imports 21
3 Management of carbon budgets 23 Progress to date 23 The need for new policies to meet the carbon budgets 25 Domestic energy efficiency 25 Electricity market reform 27 Fluorinated gases 30 The Government’s management of carbon budgets 30 Role of local authorities 34
Conclusions 37
Recommendations 39
Formal Minutes 41
Witnesses 42
List of printed written evidence 43
List of additional written evidence 43
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 44
Progress on Carbon Budgets 3
Summary
The Government is required to set a series of five-year carbon budgets to restrict greenhouse gas emissions so that the UK’s longer term statutory climate change targets are met. Four carbon budgets have been set covering the period up to 2027. In this report we explore the Government’s response to our 2011 report on carbon budgets and take stock of progress against them. Compared with 2011, the case for strong action to avoid dangerous climate change has strengthened. The world is currently on track to warm by 4°C. The Committee on Climate Change’s figures showed that in the UK emissions rose by 3.5% in 2012.
Climate models are not yet able to include some potentially significant feedback effects, but continue to be developed, improving our understanding. Since we last reported in 2011, there has been controversy about a mismatch between rising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and negligible global temperature increases since the late 1990s, giving the false impression to some that the risk of climate change has become overstated. While the range of likely climate sensitivity may have slightly narrowed, most climate models are still consistent with observations and therefore do not lessen the imperative to take action to avoid dangerous climate change.
The carbon budgets are each split into a ‘traded sector’, which is based on the UK’s share of the EU Emissions Trading System emissions limit and covers power and heavy industry, and a ‘non-traded sector’ covering road transport, agriculture and buildings. A lax EU ETS emissions limit may bring pressure to bear on the non-traded sector which will have to produce further emissions reductions to cover the gap left by the traded sector. But there are too many uncertainties at the moment to warrant reviewing and making any changes to the 2023–2027 fourth carbon budget. We concluded in 2011 that the fourth carbon budget as currently set represents the minimum needed to ensure that the emissions reduction target is met, and that loosening the budget following the planned review of that budget in 2014 would put achieving that target in jeopardy. That imperative has not diminished and the Government should commit to not loosening the fourth carbon budget, identify when it will come forward with key policies to bridge the required emissions cuts in the non-traded sector of the fourth carbon budget, and state how it plans to help strengthen the EU ETS.
The Carbon Plan—the Government’s plan for meeting the carbon budgets—is out of date and requires revision. Arrangements for managing and reporting progress against the carbon budgets have not been working as intended and improvements are needed to enhance transparency. The National Emissions Target Board, charged with coordinating action across government and ensuring departments are held to account for their share of emissions reductions, should convene regularly and take control of identifying the new policies and incentives needed in the next two years to get the UK on track to meet the third and fourth carbon budgets.
Local authorities have an important role to play in driving down emissions, particularly those from buildings, transport and waste. However, there is a significant risk of inaction because of authorities’ constrained fiscal position and the Government’s decision not to
4 Progress on Carbon Budgets
implement the Committee on Climate Change’s recommendation to place a statutory duty on local authorities to produce low-carbon plans. The Government should reconsider placing a statutory duty on local authorities to produce low-carbon plans for their area and work to ensure that all local authorities are measuring and reporting on their emissions.
The Committee on Climate Change found that on a consumption basis the UK’s carbon footprint had increased over the past two decades so that the UK now had one of the largest footprints in the world. In preparation for a global deal on climate change in 2015, inevitably couched in terms of the ‘production’ of emissions, the Government should re- examine with the Committee on Climate Change the possibility of introducing a supplementary target focused on emissions ‘consumption’ embedded in imports, and the potential implications of such a target for the industrial strategies recently published by BIS.
In the main body of this report, conclusions are printed in bold and recommendations are printed in bold italics.
Progress on Carbon Budgets 5
1 Introduction
1. The Government is required to set a series of five-year carbon budgets to restrict emissions so that the UK’s statutory targets set out in the Climate Change Act 2008, to cut carbon emissions by at least 34% by 2020 and by at least 80% by 2050 (against a 1990 baseline), are met. Under the Act, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) is charged with advising the Government on setting the level of these carbon budgets. The first three carbon budgets were set in May 2009 and the fourth set in June 2011 (Figure 1). Each carbon budget is split into a ‘traded sector’, which is based on the UK’s share of the EU Emissions Trading System emissions limit and covers power and heavy industry, and a ‘non-traded’ sector of road transport, agriculture, buildings, etc. The Act requires the Government to set out a plan to meet the carbon budgets and report progress against that plan.1 The Act also requires the Committee on Climate Change to report annually on progress in reducing emissions to meet the carbon budgets.
Figure 1: The carbon budgets
Budget 1 Budget 2 Budget 3 Budget 4 (2008–12) (2013–17) (2018–22) (2023–27)
2 Carbon Budgets (MtCO2e) 3018 2782 2544 1950
Reduction below 1990 levels 22% 28% 34% 50%
2. We published a report on the Carbon Budgets in October 2011.3 That report looked ahead to the December 2011 publication of the Government’s Carbon Plan that replaced the 2009 Low Carbon Transition Plan.4 We recommended that the Carbon Plan be improved by:
• including a quantification of the emissions reductions expected from the policies listed in the Plan;
• introducing accountability arrangements for government departments to replace the Departmental Carbon Budgeting regime; and
• setting out a role for local authorities in delivering emissions reductions.
To ensure that the UK was on the correct emissions reduction trajectory, we also recommended that the Government tighten the second and third carbon budgets to reflect a projected recession-driven out-performance and commit to not ‘banking’ out-
1 The Carbon Plan and the Annual Statement of Emissions meet this requirement. The Government also produces Updated Energy and Emissions Projections which update projected carbon emissions savings for each of the policies in the Carbon Plan. 2 Million tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent. 3 Environmental Audit Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2010-12, Carbon Budgets, HC 1080, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1080/1080.pdf]. 4 HM Government, The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan—National strategy for climate and energy, July 2009, [http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/other/9780108508394/9780108508394.pdf].
6 Progress on Carbon Budgets
performance against the first carbon budget to help meet subsequent budgets. We published the Government’s response to our report in December 2011.5
Our latest inquiry
3. Since we published our previous report there have been a number of developments. International agreement was reached in 2012 to draw up a binding UN global climate change deal by 2015 and to extend the Kyoto protocol until that deal comes into effect.6 The CCC has produced several reports with a bearing on the carbon budgets,7 including its latest annual progress report in June 2013.8 The science of climate change has continued to develop. The carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading System has plummeted from €10/tCO₂ in October 2011 to €4.5/tCO₂ in March 2013, reducing the incentive to decarbonise energy. The European Commission has launched reviews to reform the scheme and to examine Europe’s energy and climate change policies for 2030.9 The Government announced in 2011 that it will undertake a review in 2014 on whether the fourth carbon budget should be amended to reflect the EU’s emissions reduction trajectory,10 and in July 2013 the CCC launched a consultation on that review.11
4. This inquiry explores the Government’s response to our previous report and takes stock of progress against the carbon budgets. Our aim is to consider how the Government should respond in October to the CCC’s most recent (fifth) progress report.12 In Part 2 we look at whether the carbon budgets should be adjusted, and in Part 3 we look at how the Government manages delivery of emissions reductions against the carbon budgets.
5. We received 20 written submissions and took oral evidence from the Global Commons Institute, scientists (Professor James Hansen, Professor Mark Jaccard, Professor Andrew Shepherd and Professor Myles Allen), the Committee on Climate Change, the Met Office, and Rt Hon Greg Barker MP, Minister for Climate Change, and officials from the Department of Energy and Climate Change. We are also grateful to the National Audit
5 Environmental Audit Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2010-12, Carbon Budgets: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2010–12, HC 1720, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1720/1720.pdf]. 6 At the Durban Conference in 2011 consensus was reached on drawing up an agreement by 2015, that would include all developed and developing countries making some kind of commitment to reduce emissions, which would come into force from 2020. At the Doha conference in 2012 the Kyoto protocol was extended to 2020. 7 Internal Aviation and Shipping Review (April 2012), How local authorities can reduce emissions and manage climate risks (May 2012), Fourth progress report (June 2012), Energy prices and bills– the impacts of meeting carbon budgets (December 2012), Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risk (April 2013), and Next steps on Electricity Market Reform –securing the benefits of low-carbon investment (May 2013). Available from the Committee on Climate Change’s website: http://www.theccc.org.uk/publications/ 8 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CCC-Prog-Rep-Book_singles_web_1.pdf]. 9 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green_paper_2030_en.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/index_en.htm 10 HM Government, Implementing the Climate Change Act 2008: The Government’s proposal for setting the fourth carbon budget, May 2011, paragraph 17, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48081/1683-4th-carbon-budget- policy-statement.pdf]. 11 http://www.theccc.org.uk/call-for-evidence/ 12 The Government is required to respond to the Committee on Climate Change’s progress reports by 15 October each year.
Progress on Carbon Budgets 7
Office who provided us with a detailed briefing on the Government’s carbon budget management regime.13
13 National Audit Office, Carbon budget management, July 2013, [http://www.nao.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2013/07/Briefing-for-the-Environmental-Audit-Committee_Carbon-Budget-Management1.pdf].
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2 The carbon budgets
6. The carbon budgets are intended to reflect a UK share of the emissions reduction needed to help reduce the risk of dangerous climate change. In this Part we explore whether there is a case for changing the level of the carbon budgets in the light of developments in climate change science and in the international context for action on cutting emissions.
Developments in climate change science
7. The CCC recommended in 2008 that the UK’s objective should be to help keep the increase in average mean global temperature in 2100 “as close to 2°C above pre-industrial levels as possible”, and the probability of an increase exceeding 2–4°C as low as possible.14 In order to meet that climate objective, global emissions would have to peak by 2020 and then fall by 3–4% a year. Concentrations of greenhouse gases, measured in CO2-equivalent terms, “would peak at around 500 [parts per million (ppm)] by the end of the century before falling towards 450ppm”. The Climate Change Act targets, and their associated carbon budgets, were designed to reflect the UK’s contribution to that global climate change objective. 15
8. We noted in our 2011 report that the UK carbon budgets reflected around a 50% chance of globally exceeding 2°C.16 In this inquiry, Sandbag—an environmental NGO—argued that the UK’s climate change targets were a “disingenuous application” of the international commitment17 to limit global temperatures to below 2°C.18 In a similar vein, Professor Kevin Anderson of University of Manchester and colleagues believed that two budgets were emerging—one consistent with the UK’s position internationally (limiting the probability of exceeding 2°C to 10%) and the other consistent with domestic commitments (a 63% probability of exceeding 2°C)—each with radically different emission pathways.19 David Kennedy, Chief Executive of the CCC, told us that the distribution of possible temperature rises needed to avoid dangerous climate change was focused very closely around an increase of 2°C. He was more concerned about keeping the probability of a “catastrophic” 4°C temperature rise, that we are currently on track to experience, to “very low levels”.20 Prof Hansen told us that limiting warming to 2°C should be regarded as “an upper bound” of acceptable warming.21 Many countries advocate a 1.5°C target.22 We also
14 The Committee on Climate Change noted at that time that “it is no longer possible with certainty, or even with high probability, to avoid this danger zone” and that adaptation strategies should be adopted for temperature rises of above 2°C. 15 Committee on Climate Change, Building a low-carbon economy—the UK’s contribution to tackling climate change, December 2008 [http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws3/TSO-ClimateChange.pdf]; http://www.theccc.org.uk/tackling- climate-change/the-science-of-climate-change/setting-a-target-for-emission-reduction/ 16 Carbon budgets, op cit. 17 2009 Copenhagen Accord. 18 Ev w45; see also Ev w36, Ev w19 19 Ev w19 20 Q 86 21 Q1 22 Ev w36
Progress on Carbon Budgets 9
heard concerns that the carbon budgets had not been set on a globally equitable basis, and therefore that they were too generous for the UK and other developed countries.23 Friends of the Earth believed that, reflecting an “acceptable level of risk” (as well as an “equal per capita share” of remaining emissions), the UK should seek to reduce emissions by 80% by 2030 rather than by 2050.24
9. When the CCC provided its advice to the Government in 2008, it noted uncertainties in climate change science25 that could affect the level of the carbon budgets in future.26 Using evidence from the Met Office, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and others, the CCC reviews any new research in developing its advice on setting each new carbon budget.27 The Met Office is a major contributor to the IPCC’s seven-yearly Assessment Reports on climate science. The Met Office noted that the modelling used in the forthcoming IPCC Fifth Assessment report28 could be up to 10 years old, and it was therefore important that the latest modelling results and science were provided to Government “on a continuous basis”.29 The CCC is looking at changes in climate science as part of its review of the fourth carbon budget.30
10. There has recently been a heightened focus on two particular areas: climate ‘feedback’ effects and revised estimates of ‘climate sensitivity’, which we discuss below.
Feedback effects
11. Feedback processes31 will affect the extent and speed of future climate change.32 In its 2008 advice on the Climate Change Act and carbon budgets, the CCC stated that some feedback processes, such as the release of natural methane stores from northern wetlands or from the oceans, are “less certain and so are not currently incorporated” into climate models, including those of the Met Office.33 Aubrey Meyer from the Global Commons Institute was concerned that the Met Office had not included feedbacks in its climate modelling in 2008,34 which he believed had contributed to the Climate Change Act targets
23 Ev w45, Ev 64, Ev w36, Ev w19. We also heard views that the UK has the highest per capita historical responsibility for climate change: Ev w36; Q 18 [James Hansen]. 24 Ev w36 25 There were different projections of global warming due to a number of factors, including the natural variability of the climate system and uncertainties in emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and in feedback processes. Also, some ‘feedback processes’ were not yet incorporated into climate models because they were less certain (such as release of natural methane stores from northern wetlands or from oceans). 26 Building a low-carbon economy—the UK’s contribution to tackling climate change, op cit. 27 The UK’s carbon budgets must be set 12 years in advance. 28 Expected in October 2014. 29 Ev 62 30 Q 131 31 A climate feedback “happens when a change in our climate causes an impact which changes our climate further— a knock-on effect which feeds back into our climate”. A negative feedback offsets the prevailing change in climate— i.e. where there is a global warming trend, this would create a cooling effect. A positive feedback increases the change in the climate—i.e. it would add to global warming by creating further heating. See: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/guide/science/explained/feedbacks. 32 Ev w54, Ev w53 33 Building a low-carbon economy—the UK’s contribution to tackling climate change, op cit. 34 Ev 64; see also Ev w39
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being “inadequate, opaque, prescriptive and misleading”. He believed also that more recently some feedback effects had been omitted from the Met Office modelling, including emissions released from warming permafrost35, loss of albedo reflectivity from the Arctic and a “viral attack” on organisms that contribute to the ‘carbon sink’ effect of the ocean.36 To improve transparency, he advocated measuring and budgeting for ‘human’ emissions separately from ‘feedback’ emissions.37 He argued that the feedback effect from melting permafrost made it impossible to secure the eventual reduction in global emissions projected by the Met Office and the CCC.38 He was unable to put values on all feedbacks,39 but assessed that carbon budgets should be based on limiting greenhouse gases in the 40 41 atmosphere to 200ppm. This compared with CO2 levels already reaching 391ppm in 2011 and continuing to grow at 2ppm over the past decade.42 Earlier this year several monitoring stations measured concentrations of CO₂ at 400ppm.
12. Professor Julia Slingo, Chief Scientist at the Met Office, told us that the Met Office had fed a “full earth system model that includes feedbacks associated with the terrestrial carbon cycle” into the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment report. Careful judgements were needed about which feedbacks to include in climate models.43 The Met Office was “very cautious” about the risk of introducing feedbacks processes that “we know are either not well constrained by observation or where the science is not mature enough” or else risk “going into fairyland”.44 The Met Office had not included possible feedbacks from melting permafrost in its climate models, but work was underway to estimate the possible range of emissions from this source.45 As part of the CCC’s review of the fourth carbon budget (paragraph 31), it would carry out some modelling on emissions from permafrost melting,46 but it was too soon to assess whether the consequential impact on global temperatures would be significant.47
13. Aubrey Meyer also questioned the Met Office’s modelling of the impact of ‘carbon sinks’ (which remove carbon from the atmosphere). He believed that adverse feedback effects would be so significant that they would not allow carbon sinks eventually to reduce
35 Methane and carbon dioxide. 36 Aubrey Meyer also claims that the Met Office’s own disclosure of other feedback effects that “they had omitted only occurred after pressure was brought to bear” during the EAC’s 2009 inquiry on carbon budgets. Qq 21-22; Ev 64, Ev 105 37 Q 25 38 Ev 64 39 Qq 21–22 40 Q 28; Committee on Climate Change’s advise is predicated on emissions peaking at 500 parts per million by the end of the century before falling towards 450 parts per million. 41 40% higher than pre-industrial levels. 42 Several monitoring stations measured concentrations of CO₂ at 400ppm: http://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/news/documents/400ppm.final.pdf 43 Q 68 44 Q 68; For an overview of the feedback process that the Met Office believes are understood well, and those less so, see: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/guide/science/explained/feedbacks 45 Q 66 46 Q 133 47 HC Deb, 3 June 2013, Col 944W; Q 134 [David Kennedy], Q 67 [Professor Slingo].
Progress on Carbon Budgets 11
the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.48 In a similar vein, Dr Mayer Hillman told us that the consequences of rising temperatures and the clearing of rainforests raised concerns about the loss of “sink function”.49 Dr Jason Lowe from the Met Office told us, however, that a “whole range of earth system models of different complexities” demonstrated that when carbon emissions were reduced it was plausible that atmospheric CO2 concentrations would peak before anthropogenic emissions reached zero because of the action of carbon sinks.50 He told us:
As we start to reduce the emissions, we have changed the sinks from the present-day value, and we have changed them in such a way that they are able to take up sufficient carbon that the CO2 concentration is able to peak and come down the other side.51
The Met Office thought it was prudent, nevertheless, to repeat the assessment of the carbon budgets as new understanding of how the Earth system works becomes available and can be quantified.52
Climate sensitivity
14. In December 2012 the Met Office published its revised global decadal forecast,53 predicting a slower rate of warming in the next 5 years than it did in 2011: average temperatures were likely to be 0.43°C (rather than of 0.54°C) above the long-term average by 2017. Decadal forecasts provide essential information about ocean ‘weather’ and how it will evolve in the next few years in the context of a globally warming world. They do not tell us anything about long-term climate sensitivity. The Met Office highlighted that the Earth was “expected to maintain the record warmth that has been observed over the last decade and new record global temperatures may be reached in the next 5 years”.54 It also concluded that temperatures will remain well above the long-term average and we will continue to see temperatures like those which resulted in 2000-2009 being the warmest decade in the instrumental record dating back to 1850.55 The Committee on Climate Change has also commented on the surface temperature findings, noting that other lines of evidence continue to support the high end of the range for climate sensitivity.56 In March 2013, a comparison of global temperature observations and model simulations57 showed that increases in surface temperatures since 2005 had been at the low end of the range of projections derived from climate models.
48 Q 29 49 Ev w54 50 Ev 102 51 Q 69 52 Ev 102 53 The Met Office publish a revised decadal climate prediction for global temperature at the end of the year. 54 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/climate/seasonal-to-decadal/long-range/decadal-fc 55 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/news/releases/archive/2013/decadal-forecasts 56 http://www.theccc.org.uk/blog/climate-science-remains-robust-despite-claims-in-the-mail/ 57 Ed Hawkins, NCAS-Climate at the Department of Meteorology, University of Reading.
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15. Whilst the decadal forecasts are not an indication of climate sensitivity, and surface temperature is one of a several climate indicators (others include ocean heat, sea level, sea ice cover and mountain glaciers), some sections of the press used the publication of the revised decadal forecast to suggest that the sensitivity of the climate to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions had been exaggerated.58 Professor Slingo from the Met Office thought that the decadal forecast was “being misrepresented in the media to try to make a story—the decadal forecast “[tells] us much more about natural variability in the climate system” and “very little that relates to climate change per se”.59 Ed Hawkins, who produced the chart of observed global temperatures against climate model outputs, has said that it is incorrect to interpret the result as evidence that forecasts are wrong. Whilst the most sensitive simulations may be less likely, observations have remained within the predicted range and the underlying temperature trend is still rising.60 Professor Myles Allen of University of Oxford highlighted the high level of accuracy of one of the first forecasts based on climate models.61 He told us:
... the assertion that temperatures have not risen as fast as predicted is simply wrong ... In fact the temperatures of the past decade have been pretty much exactly as was predicted for the decade back in the 1990s ...62
Professor Slingo told us that, because the science was complex, the challenge for scientists was to “find ways to make that science accessible without diminishing both the integrity and the importance of the science message”.63
16. At the heart of the recent controversy is a perceived mismatch between rising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere—at 2 ppm per year over the past decade—and negligible temperature increases since 1998.64 This could be explained partly by the lack of a full understanding of ‘climate sensitivity’—how the climate responds to higher concentrations of carbon dioxide.65 The model used in 2008 to provide information for the carbon budgets66 had a climate sensitivity range of 2.4–5.4°C per trillion tonnes of 67 CO2 emissions. That model, along with others, was considered by the IPCC when it
58 “The crazy climate change obsession that’s made the Met Office a menace”, Mail online, 10 January 2013, [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2259942/The-crazy-climate-change-obsession-thats-Met-Office- menace.html#axzz2KD4IHrrE]; See also: “The Great Green Con no.1: The hard proof that finally shows global warming forecasts that are costing you billions were wrong all along”, Mail online, 16 March 2013, [http://www.mailonsunday.co.uk/news/article-2294560/The-great-green-1-The-hard-proof-finally-shows-global- warming-forecasts-costing-billions-WRONG-along.html]. 59 Q 62 60 http://www.climate-lab-book.ac.uk/2013/comparing-observations-and-simulations-again/ 61 Met Office’s HadCM2 model [Myles R. Allen, John F. B. Mitchell and Peter A. Stott, “Test of a decadal climate forecast”, Nature Geoscience, vol 6 (2013)]. 62 Q 33 63 Q 56 64 WMO press release: http://www.wmo.int/pages/mediacentre/news/documents/400ppm.final.pdf; Hadley Centre/ Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia; David R. Easterling and Michael F. Wehner, “Is the climate warming or cooling”, Geophysical Research Letters, vol 36 (2009), L08706, [http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/csi/images/GRL2009_ClimateWarming.pdf]. 65 Q 63. A short term measure of climate sensitivity, assessing the impact of increased emissions over the next 20 years is called Transient Climate Response (TCR). Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) is a longer term measure that includes longer term processes such as oceans absorbing heat from the atmosphere. TCR is more useful when looking for short term emissions projections and ECS when considering climate stabilisation. 66 First three carbon budgets. 67 Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity. Ev 105.
Progress on Carbon Budgets 13
produced its 2007 Assessment Report, which found climate sensitivity was likely to be in the range 2°C to 4.5°C per trillion tonnes of CO2 emissions, with a best estimate of 3°C. It was “very unlikely” to be less than 1.5°C, and values higher than 4.5°C were “not ruled out”.68 There has been some speculation that the IPCC’s next Assessment report might revise down its previous estimate of climate sensitivity,69 although David Kennedy told us that he did not expect this to happen because there has not been a fundamental shift in the science around climate sensitivity.70 Factors that might explain recent global temperature increases being at the lower end of the forecasts made by climate models include the role of aerosols (which reflect sunlight away), clouds and the oceans, and Sun activity.71
17. Professor Myles Allen told us that, while the climate models which predict sensitivity at the “extreme top of the range look less likely”, most models were still “consistent with the observations”.72 The Met Office stated that the sensitivity range in its models “falls inside” the range of the newer estimates. Crucially, there was “significant overlap” between those newer climate sensitivity estimates and the range used in the earlier carbon budget analyses.73 Similarly, Prof Allen did not see the slight revisions to the estimates of climate sensitivity as necessitating a change in the carbon budgets, nor did they “detract from the overall case for [carbon] mitigation”:
If we discover that ... we only get 1.5 degrees of warming per trillion tonnes instead of 2 degrees per trillion tonnes, then it means we have to reduce emissions on average by 1.5% per year instead of 2.5% ... But given that emissions are currently going up ... [at] the order of 2.5% per year, the difference between needing to reduce at 1.5% per year and needing to reduce at 2.5% per year is really neither here nor there as far as climate policy is concerned. They need to come down.74
David Kennedy from the CCC told us that there was “not any new evidence” that made the CCC “think differently about climate sensitivity”.75
18. The carbon budgets are intended to reflect the UK’s share of a global effort on emissions reduction with only around a 50% chance of global temperature rises not exceeding 2°C—the threshold widely accepted as a benchmark for dangerous climate change. We are, however, globally on course for temperature rises of 4°C. The default assumption should therefore be that the carbon budgets represent the minimum level of emissions reduction required by the climate change science. Climate models are not yet able to include some potentially significant feedback effects, but continue to be developed, improving our understanding. Since we last reported in 2011, there has been controversy about a mismatch between rising greenhouse gas concentrations in
68 Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity. IPCC, Fourth Assessment report-Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 2007, [http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf]. 69 “Sensitive information”, The Economist, 20 July 2013, [http://www.economist.com/news/science-and- technology/21581979-peek-inside-next-ipcc-assessment-sensitive-information]. 70 Q 131 71 Qq 4,6 [Professor Hansen] 72 Qq 33, 40 73 Q 63 74 Q 42 75 Q 131
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the atmosphere and negligible global temperature increases since the late 1990s, giving the false impression to some that the risk of climate change has been overstated. While the range of likely climate sensitivity may have slightly narrowed, most climate models are still consistent with observations and therefore do not lessen the imperative to take action to avoid dangerous climate change. The Committee on Climate Change should continue to keep the level of the carbon budgets under review to fully reflect the evolving climate change science, and the Government should be ready to tighten these budgets on advice from CCC.
19. The carbon budgets are, however, only in part a product of the climate science justification for emissions reduction by the UK. In practical terms, they are also inextricably linked to international agreement on the rate of emissions reduction needed globally and how that obligation will be shared between states, as we discuss below.
European and international efforts
20. The UK is seen as a world leader on climate change, having influenced other countries to take action.76 The Government believed that because the “UK contributes only around 1.2% of global emissions”, the UK “needs to encourage action from others”.77 Existing voluntary international emissions reduction commitments78 would produce a trajectory “probably resulting in a 3-4°C rise in the global average temperature by 2100”.79 The Committee on Climate Change believed that an “ambitious and comprehensive global deal” was therefore needed to drive the new policies required to limit the global temperature rise to 2°C.80 The Government told us that it was “continuing to press for increased action at the international level and considers that the best chance of securing that is through a legally binding global agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change”.81 At the Framework Convention conference in Durban in 2011, consensus was reached on drawing up a global emissions reduction agreement by 2015, which would come into force from 2020.82 In 2012, the existing Kyoto protocol was extended to 2020 as a stop-gap.83
21. Professor James Hansen believed, however, that a “UN-type” approach to securing global action on climate change did “not have a chance of being effective”. He favoured “limited and bilateral agreements” between groups of countries—such as the US and China—who had agreed to have a “working dialogue”. This, he believed, would lead to other countries then being drawn in.84 The Climate Change Minister thought that it was
76 Ev w29, Ev w36, Ev w45 77 Ev 57 78 Under the Copenhagen and Cancun processes. 79 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Second Report of Session 2012-13, The road to UNFCCC COP 18 and beyond, HC 88, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenergy/88/88.pdf]. 80 Committee on Climate Change, Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risk, April 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CF-C-Summary-Rep-web1.pdf]. 81 Ev 57 82 The United Nations Climate Change Conference, which included the 17thConference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 83 At the 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference. 84 Q 18
Progress on Carbon Budgets 15
“too early” to look at alternatives to the admittedly “imperfect” UN process to secure a global deal: there was “a glimmer of hope” in current negotiations, which meant that “making a Plan B at this stage would not be helpful”.85
22. The EU’s policy on emissions is set against the backdrop of wider UN work on climate change. It has a long-standing European target to cut emissions by 20% in 2020, relative to 1990.86 That is less than the effort needed to put the EU on the trajectory to deliver its longer-term objective of cutting emissions by 80-95% by 2050.87 The EU has agreed, therefore, to raise the 2020 target to 30%, which would be consistent with the reductions needed by 2050,88 if other developed countries and the more advanced developing nations committed to comparable emission reductions.89 Similarly, the Government has said that it will tighten the second (2013–2017) and third (2018–2022) carbon budgets as part of any collective European action.90 David Kennedy told us that such a tightening would address the risk that the Government “sailed along on a path that is not steep enough in terms of emissions cuts to meet the fourth carbon budget”.91
23. The European Commission is consulting on the development of climate and energy targets for 2030 and intends to publish proposals at the end of 2013.92 Friends of the Earth wanted the EU to set a target of an 80% reduction.93 The Government wants the EU to adopt a 50% reduction target for 2030 in the context of a global deal, or 40% without a deal.94 The Minister told us that the “UK continues to push for a greater ambition both in 2020 and 2030”, although he did not want an “unconditional raising” of targets before the completion of international negotiations.95 The CCC “strongly supported” the Government position because the proposed higher targets were “broadly in line with the ambition” it had suggested in its advice on setting the fourth carbon budget.96 The
85 Q 162 86 The Committee on Climate Change concluded that the UK’s ‘share’ of the EU 2020 target is reflected in the UK’s Climate Change Act target of a 34% cut by 2020. 87 Committee on Climate Change, Building a low-carbon economy—the UK’s contribution to tackling climate change, December 2008, page 110, [http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws3/TSO-ClimateChange.pdf]. 88 ibid. 89 European Commission, Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, March 2010, page 9, [http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/documents/related-document-type/index_en.htm]. 90 In its 2008 report, the CCC proposed an ‘intended’ carbon budgets (2008-2022) which corresponded to the UK share of an EU 30% 2020 target. 91 Qq 140, 141; Moving from the third intended budget to the fourth budget “would entail a feasible reduction of 13% over a five-year period”, but moving from the third Interim budget to the fourth budget would “require a much more challenging 23% reduction”: Committee on Climate Change, The Fourth Carbon Budget: Reducing emissions through the 2020s, December 2010, [http://downloads.theccc.org.uk.s3.amazonaws.com/4th%20Budget/CCC-4th-Budget-Book_with-hypers.pdf]. 92 “On 27 March 2013, the European Commission adopted a Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies. This document launched a public consultation lasting until 2 July, allowing Member States, other EU institutions and stakeholders to express their views ... Those views will feed into the Commission's on-going preparations for more concrete proposals for the 2030 framework which will be tabled by the end of 2013”: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green_paper_2030_en.htm 93 Ev w36 94 Q 162 [Greg Barker] 95 Qq 151, 159 -160; UN Climate Change conference in November 2013 [http://unfccc.int/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/meeting/7649.php] and run up to negotiations on a global deal. 96 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CCC-Prog-Rep-Book_singles_web_1.pdf].
16 Progress on Carbon Budgets
Government, however, did not support a proposal for a separate EU renewable energy target because that would compromise member states’ flexibility over how they secured a least-cost decarbonisation.97
24. We welcome the Government’s support for the European Commission’s proposal for a higher level of ambition on tackling climate change. The existing EU target of a 20% emissions reduction by 2020 needs to be tightened to 30% to put Europe on a trajectory more likely to avoid dangerous climate change. A 40% or 50% target for 2030 is essential for maintaining momentum across Europe. If the EU moves from a 20% to a 30% emissions reduction target for 2020, the Government must tighten its second and third carbon budgets to make them consistent with the Committee on Climate Change’s intended budget levels.
25. Such a tightening would require more policy effort to meet the third carbon budget, as we discuss in paragraph 45. But, as we also discuss below, standing in the way of tighter budgets is a more fundamental barrier caused by the current weakness of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the potential consequences of a Government review of the fourth carbon budget that was triggered by that ETS weakness.
Review of the fourth carbon budget
26. Whilst the EU as a whole was on course to meet the existing 20% emissions reduction target by 2020,98 a weak carbon price in the EU ETS was providing little incentive to reduce emissions.99 The European Commission is reforming the EU ETS in two ways—delaying the auction of emissions allowances (‘back-loading’) and consulting on longer term changes in 2014.100 The Government “strongly supported” urgent structural reform of the EU ETS101 (although it was unable to agree with our recommendation in January 2013 that the large ‘surplus’ ETS allowances that many energy intensive industries had accrued should be offset against any compensation they would get for the impact of the scheme).102
27. When in 2011 the Government decided to accept the CCC’s recommendation on the level of the fourth carbon budget—the “absolute minimum” level of ambition103—it also announced that there would be a review of that budget in 2014. This was “pragmatic”, the Government argued, because the precise size of the emissions cap within the EU ETS (which forms the ‘traded’ part of the budget) was not known at that time. The Government stated in 2011 that the level of the fourth carbon budget was “conditional” on the EU
97 HC Deb, 4 June 2013, Col 91WS. 98 Q 151 [Greg Barker] 99 The Committee on Climate Change note that a strong EU ETS carbon price will help incentivise emissions reductions and lesson the competitiveness impacts of the UK’s unilateral carbon price underpin. 100 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/index_en.htm 101 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209860/Joint_Statement_on_the_EU_ Emissions_Trading_System__2_.pdf 102 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Government Response to the Environmental Audit Committee’s Report on the Energy Intensive Industries Compensation Scheme, Cm 8618, May 2013, [http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/environmental-audit/GRenergyintensivescheme.pdf]. 103 Committee on Climate Change, The Fourth Carbon Budget: Reducing emissions through the 2020s, December 2010, [http://downloads.theccc.org.uk.s3.amazonaws.com/4th%20Budget/CCC-4th-Budget-Book_with-hypers.pdf].
Progress on Carbon Budgets 17
moving to a 30% emissions reduction target for 2020 and that the Government would “revise up” (i.e. loosen) the budget if that would be necessary to align it with the actual EU emissions reduction trajectory.104 If the UK achieved significant decarbonisation of the power sector, the emissions counted against the carbon budgets would not be the actual emissions but those consistent with the EU ETS cap, so the UK’s ability to meet its unilateral carbon budgets would be dependent on the ambition implicit in the EU ETS.105 The Government was concerned that a generous emissions cap would put pressure on the already challenging non-traded element of the budget. Similarly, Professor Anderson and colleagues believed that this would not be “economically efficient” because the non-traded sector was less carbon intensive.106
28. A laxer traded element of the carbon budget could make it necessary to find additional emissions reductions in the non-traded element of the budget, and the UK was already off- track to meet the non-traded element of the fourth carbon budget. David Kennedy contended that more policy effort was needed on energy efficiency improvement, renewable heat across all of the sectors, and transport.107 The Government’s projections of emissions in the December 2011 Carbon Plan show an expected shortfall of 205 MtCO₂e in the fourth carbon budget period, “indicating the amount of additional policy effort that would be required to meet the budget”, along with “scenarios for bridging an estimated 181 MtCO₂e of the shortfall”.108
29. The Minister told us that, because the fourth carbon budget period (2023–2027) was still a “fair time into the future”, the Government would not at this stage set out its detailed policies or technologies to address that gap.109 It was too early to predict how “two critical factors” might determine whether the targets are met—vehicle emissions and the uptake of low-carbon heat.110 The Government was not, however, “complacent about the challenge” in addressing the shortfall,111 and there was a “huge amount of policy work to do”.112 (In Part 3 we look in more detail at the need for new policies to meet the carbon budgets). DECC also noted that the fourth carbon budget period also lay beyond the current time- horizon of the EU ETS, with which the review would have to deal:
The power sector and industry are capped under the EU ETS and we simply take our share of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme cap as our traded section of the carbon budget. If the EU decides to loosen it or tighten it that will simply be enshrined as our share. We all agree across Government that we need to align the fourth carbon
104 HM Government, Implementing the Climate Change Act 2008: The Government’s proposal for setting the fourth carbon budget, May 2011, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48081/1683-4th-carbon-budget- policy-statement.pdf]. 105 Ev w13 106 Ev w19 107 Q 139 108 DECC, Updated energy and emissions projections 2012, October 2012, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65717/6660-updated-emissions- projections-october-2012.pdf]. 109 Q 182 110 Q 182 [Ravi Gurumurthy] 111 Q 151 [Greg Barker] 112 Q 182 [Ravi Gurumurthy]
18 Progress on Carbon Budgets
budget traded sector with whatever the EU ETS cap is. The question is when to do that—to do that before we know what the picture is post-2020 or after.113
30. The Climate Change Act was “very tightly drafted” to prevent changes to the carbon budgets on “short-term political whim”,114 thereby providing “certainty within which policies and technologies could develop”.115 The carbon budgets can only be amended if there have been “significant changes” affecting the basis on which the budgets have previously been set. Any proposed amendment requires advice from the CCC to be considered and for Parliament to approve it.116 The then Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change told us in 2011 that changes to the cap would “automatically” feed through into the carbon budgets and therefore not count as a “significant change” under the provisions of the Climate Change Act.117 To help bring some clarity, in our earlier report we recommended that the Government set out what sort of ‘changes’ could therefore sustain a lawfully compliant adjustment in the carbon budgets, but the Government failed to respond to that recommendation allowing confusion to persist.118
31. In this inquiry, David Kennedy told us that the EU moving to a 30% emissions reduction target for 2020 (paragraph 22) was “never a premise for the fourth carbon budget” and therefore the fact that it had not happened did not constitute a change in the basis upon which the fourth carbon budget was set.119 The Government appeared to disagree with the CCC’s view, having reached its own “internal position” on having a fourth carbon budget which took account of “European ambition” on emissions.120 The CCC’s review would consider, however, the EU’s path for emissions reduction in the 2020s because that was one of the factors it considered in its advice on the fourth carbon budget.121 David Kennedy told us that the “Climate Change Act is very clear”: the review “is for the Committee on Climate Change; it is not for the Government”. The CCC would advise the Government on “whether there is a reason or not to change the carbon budget and the Government has to make its deliberations”.122
32. Regardless of whether the decision on the fourth carbon budget was predicated on the EU increasing its ambition, it appears that the challenge of meeting the traded sector element of the carbon budgets has eased. The UK was not “bumping up against” constraints imposed by the EU ETS;123 rather the scheme was now too lax to drive adequate
113 Q 170 [Ravi Gurumurthy] 114 Q 125 115 The Fourth Carbon Budget: Reducing emissions through the 2020s, op cit. 116 Climate Change Act 2008, s21, s22 [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/section/21]. 117 Carbon budgets, paragraph 38. 118 Environmental Audit Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2010-2012, Carbon Budgets: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1720, page 2, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1720/1720.pdf]. 119 Qq 125, 127 120 Q 230 [Ravi Gurumurthy] 121 http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/4CB_Call_for_Evidence_letter_E-D_letter_1_July.pdf 122 Q 124 123 Q 176 [Greg Barker]
Progress on Carbon Budgets 19
decarbonisation (we look at the need for a UK decarbonisation target for the energy sector in paragraphs 54-59). Ravi Gurumurthy from DECC told us:
Since the last carbon budget was set, the context has changed quite a lot. In particular, given the economic slowdown in Europe, some of the targets have become easier to achieve .... When the CCC recommended [the traded sector component of the fourth carbon budget], that equated to a power sector decarbonisation level in 2030 of about 50 grams [per kilowatt hour]. When we set it, it equated to about 100 grams because already by then the economic slowdown had affected the emissions production. Now, that fourth carbon budget equates to about 200 grams emissions intensity, so ... achieving some of these carbon targets has become slightly easier.124
33. RWE npower believed that there were three options to address the issues related to the fourth carbon budget: strengthening the EU ETS cap, planning to deliver greater emissions in the non-traded sector, or moving energy use from the non-traded sector to the traded sector (for example through the electrification of heating and transport).125 The UK could also choose not to auction a part of its allocation of EU ETS allowances, or remove surplus allowances from the scheme by buying and cancelling them.126 Sandbag advocated new carbon accounting techniques to mitigate the impact of a weak EU ETS cap.127
34. The Government runs a number of risks in opening up the possibility of changing the already-set carbon budgets,128 including undermining the UK’s international negotiating position and working against efforts in Europe to agree an ambitious 2030 target (paragraph 22).129 David Kennedy told us, nevertheless, that a review of the carbon budgets was “sensible” and would allow new information to be considered.130 He thought that it was “helpful” to have the review as scheduled because it allowed the opportunity to take stock of what was happening under the auspices of the UN. The CCC will take stock of any knock-on implications for the other budgets of any global deal when it provides its advice on the fifth carbon budget in 2015.131 Sandbag argued that the review of the fourth carbon budget was premature, being scheduled to take place before decisions were taken at EU level relating to the period covered by that budget.132 The Government said that it was committed to a review in “early 2014” and it would “look at a full range of options, from preserving the existing budget to revising it”.133 The Minister argued that not going
124 Q 169 [Ravi Gurumurthy] 125 Ev w13 126 Ev w13, Ev w45 127 Ev w45 128 “The fourth carbon budget (as currently set) is regarded as an absolute minimum and any further acceleration in emissions reductions towards the end of the 2020s as a result of slackening the target would put the 2050 target at risk. Taking action later will cost much more than taking action now. Strong signal to investors provided by setting carbon budgets is undermined by the prospect of changes”. [Carbon budgets, op cit.] 129 Q 137 [David Kennedy]; See also Ev w4, Ev w36, Ev w19. The UK was seen as a leader in action on climate change, inspiring action in other countries. 130 Q 124 131 Q 138 132 Ev w45 133 Q 172 [Ravi Gurumurthy]
20 Progress on Carbon Budgets
through with the announced review would “undermine confidence in Government policy”.134
35. Whatever the timing of the review, DECC witnesses suggested that, if the fourth carbon budget were loosened, there would be no relaxation in the traded sector element of the budget because of the risk that that would entail for the prospects of meeting the longer- term decarbonisation targets:
The fourth carbon budget, if we revise it upwards, would allow us to recapitalise the power sector and build coal in the 2020s, because it would allow us to have up to 300 grams. That is not consistent with our other targets like the 2050 target. You are not going to be able to start a big, aggressive roll-out of renewables, stop and then start again. We are already on a path to over-achieve against the fourth carbon budget in the traded sector.135
... whether the EU ETS discussions go well or badly, we need to do even more than that to be on a sensible cost-effective trajectory to 2050 because, even in the existing fourth carbon budget, it would assume a plateauing of decarbonisation in the 2020s, which is not sensible.136
36. A low carbon price—the result of structural weaknesses in the EU Emissions Trading System and the economic downturn of recent years—means that the traded sector of the UK’s carbon budgets (power generation and heavy industry) will be met. But that may bring pressure to bear on the non-traded sector (road transport, agriculture, buildings, waste) which will have to produce further emissions reductions to cover the gap left by the traded sector. But there are too many uncertainties at the moment to justify reviewing and making any change to the 2023-2027 fourth carbon budget. The Government has yet to determine what emissions reductions may be possible from addressing policy initiatives in vehicle emissions, low-carbon heat and other key areas. And it is too soon to be confident about what EU ETS reforms might be possible beyond the scheme’s current 2020 horizon. It is also far from clear in what circumstances a ‘significant change’, required under the Climate Change Act to make a change to previously agreed carbon budgets, can be identified. We recommend that the Government abandon its review of the fourth carbon budget. However, if it is unwilling to take such a step, it should use its response to this report, or its response in October to the Committee on Climate Change’s fifth progress report, to (i) commit to not loosening the fourth carbon budget, (ii) identify when it will come forward with key policy initiatives to bridge the non-traded sector of the fourth carbon budget, (iii) state how it plans, through the discussions with the European Commission, to strengthen the EU ETS, and (iv) explain what would represent a ‘significant change’ to support an adjustment to the budgets under the provisions of the Climate Change Act.
134 Q 180 [Greg Barker] 135 Q 175 [Ravi Gurumurthy] 136 Q 180 [Ravi Gurumurthy]
Progress on Carbon Budgets 21
Widening the budgets
Emissions from international aviation and shipping
37. At the time the Climate Change Act was passed, uncertainties about how aviation and shipping emissions would be allocated, measured and monitored meant that only domestic emissions from these sectors were included within the Act’s targets. The Government was required to consider inclusion of international aviation and shipping emissions by December 2012, taking into account advice from the CCC.137 In that advice the CCC recommended loosening the budgets to allow the inclusion of these emissions. This, they argued, would provide certainty and a “more transparent, comprehensive and flexible accounting framework under the Act”.138 The Government deferred a decision on including these emissions, citing uncertainty over the international framework for reducing aviation emissions and particularly their treatment within the EU Emissions Trading System. The European Commission has suspended including this sector into the EU ETS for a year to allow for the possibility of a global system being developed.139
38. Although not formally included, the Government argued that the existing carbon budgets (up to 2027) left headroom for these emissions and that the UK was still on a trajectory where the 2050 target included international aviation and shipping emissions. David Kennedy thought that the deferral of the decision on aviation and shipping emissions was “sensible”. He said that the CCC would revisit this area when they advise on the fifth carbon budget in 2015.140
Emissions embedded in imports
39. The carbon budgets reflect emissions produced in the UK, and exclude emissions embedded in goods imported from abroad. In 2011 we called on the Government to review the scope for measuring emissions on such a consumption basis,141 and how that might be worked into the carbon budgets regime.142 Since then, the Energy and Climate Change Committee and the CCC have looked at this issue.143
137 Department of Energy and Climate Change, International aviation and shipping emissions and the UK’s carbon budgets and 2050 target, December 2012, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65686/7334-int-aviation-shipping- emissions-carb-budg.pdf]. 138 Committee on Climate Change, Scope of carbon budgets: statutory advice on inclusion of international aviation and shipping, April 2012, [http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws/IA&S/CCC_IAS_Core_ScopeOfBudgets_April2012.pdf]. 139 The Commission has said that progress must be made by September/October 2013 or the regulations will be applied in full [http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm]; Department of Energy and Climate Change, International aviation and shipping emissions and the UK’s carbon budgets and 2050 target, December 2012, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65686/7334-int-aviation- shipping-emissions-carb-budg.pdf]. 140 Q 142; http://www.theccc.org.uk/news-stories/ccc-statement-on-governments-latest-international-aviation-and- shipping-announcement/ 141 A consumption-based approach to measuring emissions includes emissions embedded in goods imported into the UK and exclude emissions embedded in goods exported from the UK. 142 Environmental Audit Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2010-12, Carbon Budgets, HC 1080, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1080/1080.pdf]. 143 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2010-12, Consumption-Based Emissions Reporting, HC 1646, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenergy/1646/1646.pdf].
22 Progress on Carbon Budgets
40. The CCC found that on a consumption basis the UK’s carbon footprint had increased over the past two decades so that the UK now had one of the largest footprints in the world. Growth in imported emissions outweighed reductions in emissions produced in the UK. As a result of low-carbon policies, there had been very little emissions reduction from manufacturing moving abroad (‘off-shoring’). Nonetheless, the CCC concluded that the size of the UK’s footprint was “worrying and will need to be diminished”, but continuing to measure emissions on a production only basis remained appropriate as a basis for a global deal and for the UK carbon budgets.144 David Kennedy told us that the UK had “limited levers” to reduce consumption emissions, and a global climate change deal was the only way of reducing them. He believed it would be difficult to set a ‘supplementary target’ on these because of difficulties in measuring them accurately and deciding on the level of any targets.145
41. The Minister told us, similarly, that it was a “bit premature” to set a supplementary target. Unless the “world changed the way it counted emissions” there “was a huge opportunity for confusion” about who is responsible for reducing consumption emissions. The Government intended to monitor consumption-based emissions and publish outturn data annually. He did not believe that policies for reducing consumption emissions were any different to the policies for reducing production emissions.146
42. The UK has one of the largest carbon footprints in the world and the recent increase in emissions embedded in imports has more than offset reductions in domestic emissions. We welcome the Government’s commitment to monitor the UK’s carbon consumption footprint. In preparation for a global deal on climate change in 2015, inevitably couched in terms of the ‘production’ of emissions, the Government should re- examine with the Committee on Climate Change the possibility of introducing a supplementary target focused on emissions ‘consumption’ embedded in imports, and the potential implications of such a target for the industrial strategies recently published by BIS.147
144 Committee on Climate Change, Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitiveness risks, April 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CF-C_Summary-Rep_Bookpdf.pdf]. 145 Qq 143 – 147 146 Qq 214 – 221. The first set of data was published in December 2012 relating to 2011. 147 https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/using-industrial-strategy-to-help-the-uk-economy-and-business-compete- and-grow
Progress on Carbon Budgets 23
3 Management of carbon budgets
43. In this Part we explore progress to date against the carbon budgets and how the Government manages the delivery of policies to meet those budgets.
Progress to date
44. In October 2012 the Government published updated energy and emissions projections covering the first four carbon budget periods, which suggest that the UK will meet the first three carbon budgets148 (Figure 2). David Kennedy told us that the first carbon budget would be “easily met”,149 as would the second carbon budget with “limited effort”, because of the recession and “not because we are on the right path in terms of implementing measures to reduce emissions over time”.150 While the Government has not ruled out carrying forward the expected out-performance against the first carbon budget to offset against subsequent budgets, factoring that into future plans was not Government policy.151 In its most recent progress report, the CCC argued that there was “no rationale” for carrying forward out-performance because it would “risk reducing incentives” to cut emissions. It planned to issue formal advice to the Government on this in early 2014, when final emissions statistics for 2012 are released.152
Figure 2: Performance against the carbon budgets
Budget 1 Budget 2 Budget 3 Budget 4
(2008–12) (2013–17) (2018–22) (2023–27)
Carbon Budgets—CC’s ‘intended’ 3018 2679 2245 1950 path (MtCO2e)
Carbon Budgets—as legislated 3018 2782 2544 1950 (MtCO2e)
Projected emissions (MtCO2e) 2928 2650 2473 2155
Projected out-performance/ or 90 132 71 (205) (shortfall) against legislated
budgets (MtCO2e)
3.0% 4.7% 2.8% (10.5%)
148 Projections were last published in October 2011: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65717/6660-updated-emissions- projections-october-2012.pdf 149 The Government is required to lay before Parliament a final statement for the first budgetary period by 31 May 2014. 150 Q 77 151 Environmental Audit Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2010-12, Carbon Budgets: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2010–12, HC 1720, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1720/1720.pdf]. 152 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CCC-Prog-Rep-Book_singles_web_1.pdf].
24 Progress on Carbon Budgets
45. The CCC believed that the UK was “not currently on track” to meet the third and fourth carbon budgets and “without a significant increase in the pace of emissions reduction, starting very soon, the costs and risks of moving to a low carbon economy in the 2020s and beyond will be increased”. The CCC found that emissions rose by 3.5% in 2012. That was the result of temporary factors,153 however, and once these are taken into account there was an underlying reduction of 1-1.5%. A reduction rate of 3% was needed to meet future carbon budgets.154 The CCC had consistently called for a “step-change” in the rate of emissions reductions (Figure 3), and David Kennedy told us that it was now approaching the time when that change should start to manifest itself.155 The Minister for Climate Change believed that emission projections showed a “changing pattern and a real quickening of the pace” and that “the public can be pretty assured that, despite the challenges the Government faces, we are on track”.156
Figure 3: Analysis of CCC’s progress reports
First progress report, “A major shift in the pace of UK carbon emissions reduction must be achieved”. October 2009 Emissions were falling at less than 1% per year, compared to 2% required to meet first carbon budget.157 Second progress report, “A step change in the pace of emissions reduction is needed”. June 2010 Emissions fell by 9%, driven by recession and not policies. Government should aim to outperform first budget and not to bank out-performance.158 Third progress report, “A step change in the pace of emissions reduction is still required”. June 2011 Emissions rose by 3%, but the level of emissions in 2010 was below the annual average for the first carbon budget, due to ongoing impacts of the recession.159 Fourth progress report, “When we first highlighted the need for a step change there was a lead-time of several years, this June 2012 has now elapsed. Therefore the step change is needed urgently if we are to remain on track to meeting future carbon budgets”.
Emissions fell by 7% in 2011. Underlying rate of progress was less than 1% – a quarter of that required to meet future carbon budgets.160 Fifth progress report, June “The first carbon budget was met, largely due to the impact of the recession, which would also 2013 allow achievement of the second budget with limited effort ... However, we are not currently on track to meet the third and fourth carbon budgets. Without a significant increase in the pace of emissions reduction, starting very soon, the costs and risks of moving to a low carbon economy in the 2020s and beyond will be increased”.
The underlying rate of emissions reduction was 1-1.5% against the required rate of 3%.161
153 “The relatively cold winter months compared with 2011, which led to increased heating demand; and switching from use of gas to coal in power generation, which we can expect to be reversed as tighter environmental regulation to improve air quality takes effect”. 154 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets—2013 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CCC-Prog-Rep-Book_singles_web_1.pdf]. 155 Q 79 156 Qq 152–154, 187 157 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting carbon budgets—the need for a step change, October 2009, [http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws2/21667%20CCC%20Report%20AW%20WEB.pdf]. 158 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting carbon budgets—ensuring a low-carbon recovery, June 2010, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/meeting-carbon-budgets-ensuring-a-low-carbon-recovery-2nd-progress- report/]. 159 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting carbon budget—third progress report to Parliament, June 2011, [http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws/Progress%202011/CCC_Progress%20Report%202011%20Single%20Page%20no%2 0buttons_1.pdf]. 160 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting carbon budgets—2012 progress report to Parliament, June 2012, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CCC_Progress-Rep-2012_bookmarked_singles_2.pdf]. 161 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets—2013 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CCC-Prog-Rep-Book_singles_web_1.pdf].
Progress on Carbon Budgets 25
The need for new policies to meet the carbon budgets
46. David Kennedy told us that, although the Government had put the “foundations” in place, there “is still a lot” to do to make sure that the UK is on track to meet the carbon budgets;162 it “was necessary for the Government to develop and implement policy measures over the next two years”.163 The CCC’s latest progress report found there was “mixed” progress in 2012. “Good progress” had been made on the amount of new wind generation capacity added, insulation of lofts and cavity walls in residential buildings, the emissions of new cars and emissions from waste. Sustaining that progress would “require further development and implementation of policy”. But in other areas “very little had been done” because of a lack of policies and appropriate incentives. David Kennedy told us that new approaches were required to urgently accelerate progress.164
47. In the commercial and industrial sectors there was “no evidence” that a “big opportunity” to improve energy efficiency was being taken. There was a “multiplicity of policies” in these sectors that needed rationalising and stronger incentives were needed to drive take-up of measures. Although the emissions intensity of new vehicles was “coming down”, a framework to reduce emissions from vans and HGVs was needed, as was action to promote behaviour change in transport, such as rationalising car journeys. Introducing renewable heat technologies was “central” to meeting carbon budgets later on, but “very little progress” had been made so far—a 2% market penetration up to 2012 compared to the 12% envisaged by 2020 in the Government’s Renewable Energy Action Plan. There were significant barriers to greater uptake, which were not adequately addressed by the small scale grant programme currently in place. 165
48. The Government acknowledged that new policies are needed to meet the fourth carbon budget (paragraph 28).166 For the intervening budgets, the Minister told us that he did not see the need for “new policies”, but rather a “need to deliver the potential of the policies we have set in place ... [which] we need to put our shoulder behind”.167 Ben Golding from DECC told us that it was important to “make the distinction between the policies that are coming on stream and are not yet at full speed” and the CCC’s assessment of what will happen “if we just carry on at current trend rate”.168 We explore below the scope for change in three specific areas: domestic energy efficiency, electricity market reform and fluorinated gases.
Domestic energy efficiency
49. In the Carbon Plan, published in 2011, the Government stated that “we need to complete the cost-effective ‘easy wins’ in the buildings sector. This means maximising our energy efficiency efforts over the next decade”. The Green Deal and Energy Company
162 Q 82 163 Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 164 Q 77 [David Kennedy]; Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 165 Qq 77, 139 [David Kennedy]; Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 166 Ev 57 167 Qq 155, 194 168 Q 155 [Ben Golding]
26 Progress on Carbon Budgets
Obligation (ECO), at that time under development, were “likely to result in all practicable cavity walls and lofts having been insulated by 2020, together with up to 1.5 million solid walls also being insulated”.169 (Housing Standards and the Code for Sustainable Homes, on which we are carrying out a separate inquiry,170 could also have an important role in improving domestic energy efficiency.171)
50. The CCC noted in its most recent progress report that loft and cavity wall insulation rates increased in 2012 as “energy companies aimed to meet their targets in the final year of the supplier obligation schemes”.172 However, there was a “significant risk around future delivery” of loft and cavity wall insulation rates given “weaker incentives” under the Green Deal and ECO. ECO has shifted the focus of energy company insulation targets on to more expensive solid wall insulation and hard-to-treat cavity walls, which could lead to large energy bill increases.173 The CCC was also concerned that the incentives for take-up of both schemes relied on a market-based approach to address essentially non-financial barriers.174
51. Since the CCC’s progress report, data on the take-up of the Green Deal and ECO have been published.175 The majority of ECO measures installed have been for loft and cavity wall insulation.176 While 38,259 Green Deal assessments have been completed, only 41 households confirmed that they wished to proceed with a Green Deal and only 4 have signed a Green Deal.177 The Minister argued that the Green Deal scheme “was only just getting started” and “it will take time as this brand new market finds it legs”. He expected the number to start steadily rising.178 Some providers had faced technical issues and delays in getting their systems into place. That was “frustrating”, but the Minister was encouraged that “the majority” of people who have had assessments “were going to have or were contemplating measures” as a result of the assessments. He estimated one million households would install energy-efficiency measures by March 2015.179 Since we took evidence during our inquiry, revised uptake data have been published showing that the 180 first Green Deal went ‘live’ in July, with a further 132 households signed up to the
169 HM Government, The Carbon Plan: Delivering our low carbon future, December 2011, page 33, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/47613/3702-the-carbon-plan- delivering-our-low-carbon-future.pdf]. 170 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/environmental-audit- committee/inquiries/ 171 Ev w1 172 CERT (Carbon Emission Reduction Target) & CESP (Community Energy Saving Programme). 173 Qq 95, 116 174 Meeting Carbon Budgets—2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 175 Data on Green Deal is up to 16 June 2013 and between January and April 2013 for the ECO. 176 Loft insulation – 56% of all ECO measures, cavity wall insulation – 33%, and boiler upgrades - 10%: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209097/Statistical_Release_- _Green_Deal_and_Energy_Company_Obligation_in_Great_Britain_-_Mid-June_2013.pdf 177 In March 2013 the Minister predicted that 10,000 households would be signed up to the scheme by the end of the year. 178 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumertips/household-bills/10145604/Green-Deal-No-homes- benefit-six-months-after-launch.html 179 “Green Deal: No homes benefit six months after launch, The Telegraph, 27 June 2013, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumertips/household-bills/10145604/Green-Deal-No-homes- benefit-six-months-after-launch.html]. 180 Energy efficiency measures installed in the property and loan repayment information attached to the household’s energy bill.
Progress on Carbon Budgets 27
scheme. By the end of July 2013 the number of completed Green Deal assessments was 58,184.181
52. David Kennedy believed that the Government should consider fiscal incentives to improve take-up, or link building regulations to the Green Deal.182 The Minister said that the Government was looking at a “range of incentives” for the Green Deal, funded by “a significant amount of money” to be made available by the Treasury, although this would include the funding for an existing cash-back scheme. The Minister thought that “street- by-street” projects, which blended ECO finance and Green Deal finance were “the way to get this moving”, but a range of other alternatives were also being looked at. An announcement on incentives would be made in the Autumn.183 DECC was looking to reduce its Green Deal team as part of the 8% savings it is required to make in the 2013 Spending Review.184
53. The Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation are key policies for meeting the carbon budgets. Although it may be too soon to judge the schemes’ success, low take-up rates so far may indicate significant non-financial barriers as well as financial issues for homeowners. The Government should urgently review the barriers holding back take-up of the Green Deal and ECO schemes, including a survey of potential clients, in time to bring forward fiscal incentives in the Autumn Statement 2013 to bolster them before low take-up rates produce a widespread lack of confidence among both clients and the industry. While DECC has to find staffing reductions as a result of the recent Spending Review, the resources needed for the Green Deal and ECO review should be given priority.
Electricity market reform
54. Through the Government’s Electricity Market Reform programme, the CCC calculated that investment in low-carbon technologies through the 2020s could result in cost savings of £25–£45 billion, or up to £100 billion if gas and carbon prices were high.185 In its recent fifth progress report, however, the CCC identified “major challenges relating to design and implementation of the Electricity Market Reform”.186 Investments were being delayed until changes were finalised.187 The CCC urged the Government to provide longer term certainty by “setting out commercialisation strategies for less mature technologies”, to set a “carbon-intensity target for 2030” and to consider “extending funding under the levy control framework out to this date”.188 David Kennedy told us:
181 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/230138/Statistical_Release_- _Green_Deal_and_Energy_Company_Obligation_in_Great_Britain_-_20_August_2013.pdf 182 For example, a homeowner is required to insulate their loft and cavity walls when extending their home. 183 Qq 201,202 184 Oral evidence taken before the Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2 July 2013, HC 554-1, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenergy/uc554-i/uc554.pdf]. 185 Committee on Climate Change, Next steps on Electricity Market Reform – securing the benefits of low-carbon investment, May 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/1720_EMR_report_web.pdf]. 186 Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 187 Q 77; The Levy Control Framework is used by the Government to oversee and control costs of schemes funded by levies on consumers’ energy bills, such as the Renewables Obligation and Feed-In Tariffs. 188 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CCC-Prog-Rep-Book_singles_web_1.pdf].
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Three things need to happen for the Electricity Market Reforms to work ... first [getting] the set of projects now that are stuck waiting to go into construction and those need to proceed into construction ... second is we need new projects being developed so that they can sign contracts in the future. The third thing is we need supply chain investment, for example offshore wind supply chain investment.189
... you need a sense of medium-term, at least, direction of travel ... If I am a supply chain investor, I can’t just invest off the back of a market that exists to 2020 and not beyond, because I will not pay back my investment in that timeframe. Our main issues are giving visibility around what happens beyond the next several years ... and that is where the idea of the carbon intensity target comes in.190
55. The CCC calculated that the cost-effective path to meeting the 2050 emissions target in the Climate Change Act involved a power station carbon intensity of 200 gCO₂/kWh in 2020, and 50 gCO₂/kWh in 2050.191 However, emissions from the power sector increased by 8% in 2012 as a result of generators switching from gas to coal, driven by low coal prices and a low carbon price. The CCC believed that this increased use of coal would not be sustained in the “medium to longer term” as European legislation on power station emissions is applied and as the UK’s carbon price floor rises. David Kennedy did not expect any coal-fired stations to be operating by the 2020s.192 With the increased use of coal in 2012, the carbon intensity of the power generated increased to 531 gCO₂/kWh but the physically ‘achievable’ overall intensity of power stations on the grid fell by 6%, to 315 gCO₂/kWh.193
56. In our separate inquiry on green finance we are exploring the rationale for continuing investment in the extraction of fossil fuels that cannot be burnt without producing dangerous climate change.194 The Minister believed that there was not “necessarily a direct correlation” between fossil fuels in the ground and what will “end up being burnt commercially”. He saw the “big challenge” to be keeping coal in the ground, and believed that the possibility of “abundant cheap gas as an intermediate solution” offered “very great potential” for that scenario.195 Ambiguity over the future role of gas-powered electricity generation has heightened concern, however, about the pace of power sector decarbonisation. In Autumn Statement 2012 the Chancellor announced a Gas Generation Strategy, which included future gas-powered electricity generating scenarios that envisaged the equivalent of building 30 and 40 new gas power stations. David Kennedy at the time called the latter scenario “completely incompatible” with the CCC’s recommended decarbonisation trajectory and carbon budgets, and “not economically
189 Q 122 190 ibid 191 Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 192 Q 121; Meeting Carbon Budgets —2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 193 “If plant on the system were dispatched so as to minimise emissions while still maintaining security of supply (i.e. if gas-fired plant were dispatched before coal-fired plant whenever technically possible), carbon intensity would fall by 41% from 531 to 315 gCO2/ kWh, at minimal additional cost to the consumer”: Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 194 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/environmental-audit- committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/green-finance/ 195 Q 157
Progress on Carbon Budgets 29
sensible”.196 The Government had recently launched an Industrial Strategy for the oil and gas sector which sought to “maximise economic recovery of oil and gas from the UK Continental Shelf”.197
57. The Energy and Climate Change Committee, the Committee on Climate Change and others supported the introduction of a decarbonisation target for the power sector in the Energy Bill to help deal with that risk.198 The Bill enables the Secretary of State to set a decarbonisation target in 2016.199 (An amendment to the Bill to set a decarbonisation target in 2014 was defeated in June 2013.200) The Government argued against allowing a target to be set before 2016 because “a decision on whether to set a target can only be made when considering the trajectory of the whole economy towards our 2050 target”.201 The Minister thought that support for a decarbonisation target was based on a perception that this was needed to counter a need for large subsidies, when in fact “once we get through to the 2020s we must be driving towards the goal of zero subsidy, … we should be in a situation by then where we have low-carbon technologies that have reached ‘grid parity’ and can compete on an open market with other forms of generation ... at which point these targets fall away”.202
58. The CCC warned that setting a decarbonisation target as late as 2016 would maintain a “high degree of uncertainty” about energy sector development beyond 2020, which would adversely impact on supply chain investment decisions.203 David Kennedy told us that he could not see any circumstances where we would aim to move to a low- carbon power sector without having such a target.204
59. A decarbonisation target for the energy sector is needed to address political risk and provide medium term certainty to investors in renewable energy. We are dissatisfied that the Government is not willing to set such a target before 2016. In light of the evidence we have received in our inquiry, during the passage of the Energy Bill the Government should reconsider setting a decarbonisation target now for 2030, which would deliver the Committee on Climate Change’s recommended limit of 50g CO₂/kWh by 2050 (paragraph 55).
196 Environmental Audit Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2012–13, Energy Intensive Industries Compensation Scheme, HC 669, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenvaud/669/669.pdf]. 197 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/175480/bis-13-748-uk-oil-and-gas- industrial-strategy.pdf 198 Environmental Audit Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2012–13, Autumn Statement 2012: environmental issues, HC 328, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenvaud/328/328.pdf]. Ev w29 199 Energy Bill 2013-14 as introduced can be found here: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2013- 2014/0004/2014004.pdf 200 HC Deb, 4 June 2013, Col 1441. 201 HC Deb, 4 June 2013, Col 1403. 202 Q 213 203 http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Ed-Davey-February13.pdf 204 Q 123
30 Progress on Carbon Budgets
Fluorinated gases
60. Although only 3% of total greenhouse gases, fluorinated gases have a strong global warming potential.205 Used primarily in refrigeration, air conditioning and foam fire extinguishers, emissions of these gases have risen by 12% since 1990. The European Commission has recently proposed strengthening existing regulations on their use. The CCC noted, however, that some companies already appear to be voluntarily going further than the Commission’s proposals. It recommended that the Government support those proposals, but also consider pushing for a more ambitious agreement to phase out their use by 2020.206
The Government’s management of carbon budgets
61. The Government published its Carbon Plan in December 2011,207 setting out its decarbonisation policies over the first three carbon budget periods, the expected carbon reductions from those policies and ‘milestones’ that government departments should meet to deliver the policies. For the fourth budget period, the Carbon Plan set out a number of scenarios for how that budget could be met.208 The Government lays before Parliament an Annual Statement of Emissions,209 and Final Statements of emissions for each budgetary period (the final statement for the first budget period must be produced by 31 May 2014.)210 The Government also publishes Updated Energy and Emissions Projections each October, revising the projected emissions reductions expected from each policy listed in the Carbon Plan.211 The Committee on Climate Change provides a progress report to Parliament each year in June, to which the Government must respond in October. The Government considers these reporting arrangements as the primary mechanism for holding departments to account for performance against carbon budgets because producing them involves consultation across Whitehall and provides a public annual assessment of progress.212 In our earlier report we expressed concerns that Parliament was not sufficiently engaged with the urgency surrounding climate change and called for greater engagement by Parliament with the work of the Committee on Climate Change.
205 They are long lived and have between 140 and 23,900 times more greenhouse warming potential than CO₂: Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 206 Meeting Carbon Budgets—2013 Progress Report to Parliament op cit; Qq 111 – 113; Ev w41 207 Under the Climate Change Act 2008, the Government must publish a plan setting out proposals and policies for meeting the carbon budgets. 208 Qq 98, 100 209 Required by Section 16 of the Climate Change Act. Final UK-wide emissions data for the calendar year from two years previously is provided, alongside provisional data for the latest year. The most recent of which was published in March 2013 for the calendar year 2011: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/167920/annual_statement_of_emissio ns_2011.pdf 210 By 31 May in the second year following the end of the budgetary period. 211 The latest updated Annual Energy and Emissions Projections were published in October 2012. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65717/6660-updated-emissions- projections-october-2012.pdf. For the period 2012 to 2022, the projections show how the Government expects its “clearly defined suite of policies to reduce emissions to meet the first three carbon budgets” to perform. The projections for the period 2023 onwards provide the Government’s estimate of what would happen “in the absence of any additional policy effort i.e. no new policies or extensions to existing policies” — thus providing as assessment of the additional policy effort needed to meet the fourth carbon budget. 212 National Audit Office, Carbon budget management, July 2013, [http://www.nao.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2013/07/Briefing-for-the-Environmental-Audit-Committee_Carbon-Budget-Management1.pdf].
Progress on Carbon Budgets 31
When the Government provides its response to the CCC’s annual progress reports it should facilitate a debate on those responses in the House.
62. The Carbon Plan contains output-based milestones, such as publishing a particular report, implementing a framework or introducing a standard. Of the 125 milestones set, 90% are assigned to five key departments.213 The NAO told us that the Government has not updated the milestones in the Plan due to staffing constraints, nor aligned them with current departmental business plans. For some time, quarterly progress reports against milestones have not been prepared.214 DECC, who produce the Carbon Plan, told us that it had “not stopped using the Carbon Plan to track progress as such”, and was in the process of updating and aligning it with departmental business plans.215 Additional milestones would be included in a revised Carbon Plan, which was due “very soon”.216 The Government was also “reviewing its approach to the quarterly monitoring process, and planned to resume publication of a revised form of report in the coming months”.217
63. Nevertheless, because the Carbon Plan has not been updated since 2011, the impact on emissions reductions of changes in policies is not evident. For revised estimates, reference must be made to the Updated Energy and Emissions Projections. The CCC’s progress reports also provide an assessment of whether policies will deliver sufficient emissions reduction, but this does not follow the format of the Carbon Plan nor report systematically against all Carbon Plan policies in an easily identifiable way. Instead the CCC provides an assessment against its own “indicator framework” of policy outcomes.218 For example, the Carbon Plan does not specify a required take-up rate of energy efficient appliances, nor any explicit policies to drive that, whereas this is an indicator against which the CCC measure progress.219 Figure 4 illustrates the extent to which progress can be monitored through the various documents, using the Government’s Smart Metering policy as a case study.
213 DECC, Defra, DfT, CLG and BIS. Carbon budget management, op cit. 214 Of the 73 milestones for delivery at the end of third quarter of 2012, progress was only reported on 34. DECC had “not produced quarterly reports for the last quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013”: Carbon budget management, op cit. 215 Q 188 [Ben Golding] 216 Q 190 [Ben Golding] 217 Carbon budget management, op cit. 218 These include quantitative and qualitative headline and supporting indicators, and may not flow from, or be reflective of, policies or ambitions set out in the Carbon Plan. 219 One of the CCC’s indicators in the residential areas is “58% of the stock of wet appliances rated A+ or better and 45% of cold appliances rated A++ or better by 2022”.
32 Progress on Carbon Budgets
Figure 4: Documents used to measure progress against the carbon budgets
Annual Energy and Carbon Plan (2011) Emission Projections Policy - Smart Metering (2012 update) Rolled out to every home to help Emission reductions reduce electricity demand. Mass CCC’s Annual expected:CB period 1 – 0.0 rollout from 2014 to 2019. Net progress report (MtCO e) Present Value = £5.2 Billion. 2 (Fifth progress report CB period 2 – 1.5 – 2013) (MtCO e) Emission reductions expected: 2 - Roll out of smart CB period 3 – 3.5 e) meters is not one of CB period 1 – 0.1 (MtCO2 (MtCO2e) the CCC’s indicators CB period 2 – 2.1 (MtCO2e) CB period 4 – 4.9 i.e. the CCC is not CB period 3 – 5.0 (MtCO2e) (MtCO2e) monitoring whether
Milestones: 100% rollout is - “Subject to consultation, work Quarterly report on progress achieved.
with industry to confirm technical against Carbon Plan -CCC note that “roll-
specifications and begin roll-out of milestones out has been delayed Smart Meters across Britain” – (Q3 2012) by one year and will complete by July 2012. - First milestone reported as now begin in 2015 rather than 2014”. - “Work with partners in Europe to completed establish standards for smart grids - Progress against second and Smart Meters by the end of milestone not reported on 2012”.
64. There are also differences between the CCC’s indicators and the commitments made in the Carbon Plan, even when they cover similar initiatives. For example, the CCC’s indicator of “insulation of all lofts and cavity walls by 2015” is more stringent than the commitment in the Carbon Plan to do this by 2020 (paragraph 49).220 More fundamentally, there was disagreement between the CCC and the Government’s Plan on the number of lofts that require insulation—6 million and 200,000 respectively. The CCC appeared to be counting lofts not yet insulated and those without inadequate insulation, whereas the Government was only counting the former. The Minister believed that the “challenge now is not to pretend that there are lots more easy-to-treat lofts out there ... we have done extremely well and are close to declaring victory”. He saw “diminishing returns” after the “first six inches of loft insulation is installed.221 The CCC has commissioned work to resolve the difference in measurements and this would feed into a Cabinet Office- commissioned review of the Green Deal and ECO, due to report at the end of the year.222 The Minister did not see “a huge problem” with the CCC and Government measuring progress using different indicators: it was “just a difference of emphasis”. He saw the CCC’s report as “guidance and a critique” and “not the only way to achieve these objectives”. The Government would make its “full response” to the CCC’s fifth progress report “after proper analysis” in October.223
220 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2013 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2013, [http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CCC-Prog-Rep-Book_singles_web_1.pdf]. HM Government, The Carbon Plan: Delivering our low carbon future, December 2011, page 33, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/47613/3702-the-carbon-plan- delivering-our-low-carbon-future.pdf]. 221 Qq 184, 205, 207 222 Qq 114–116 223 Q 155
Progress on Carbon Budgets 33
65. Apart from a disconnection between the various planning and reporting documents, described above, there are also gaps in the governance arrangements for the carbon budgets. In our earlier report we criticised the Government for abandoning the previous Departmental Carbon Budgeting regime. Under that system, most departments were assigned a share of the carbon budgets based on the economic sectors within their sphere of influence to encourage them to come forward with sectoral policies to reduce emissions.224 In response the Government argued that that approach “lacked credibility across Whitehall” as “departments did not feel able to influence the sector emissions they were held accountable for”. Now “departments have the freedom to come forward and agree on future cost-effective abatement measures”.225 David Kennedy told us that one of the problems with holding departments to account was a reluctance “to commit to specific numbers for overall emissions reductions and within that for the key measures”. Unless there was a “strategy and governance framework that has clear objectives that are measurable”, it would be difficult to measure success or failure, and there would be a “risk of muddling through”.226
66. The cross-government National Emissions Target (NET) Board is the “principal governance mechanism for coordinating action across Government and ensuring that departments are accountable for their share of emissions reductions”.227 Chaired by the DECC Permanent Secretary, its membership included officials from five key departments228, together with the Treasury and the Cabinet Office. 229 The NAO told us that it met “irregularly and not as frequently as it intended”, meeting only seven times in the last three years, and with civil servants below Director General level typically in attendance. Minutes of board meetings “do not show evidence of the Board taking action to hold departments to account” for progress against individual policies in the Carbon Plan.230 Although the gap in policies to meet the fourth carbon budget (paragraph 28) has been identified for some time, the NET Board was only starting to undertake a programme of reviews to look at new policies.231 David Kennedy told us that he was unaware of what the NET Board did or how it operated. There was no communication between the NET Board and the CCC.232
67. The Minister told us that the work of the Board “revolves around the work to be done”. It escalated issues and resolved “disputes” between government departments, and if there were none then “there is no real need to meet”. Once the fourth carbon budget had been set “there was less work for them to do in terms of requiring new policy”. He expected
224 Environmental Audit Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2010-12, Carbon Budgets, HC 1080, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1080/1080.pdf]. 225 Ev 57 226 Q 98 227 Ev 57 228 DECC, Defra, DfT, CLG and BIS. 229 National Audit Office, Carbon budget management, July 2013, [http://www.nao.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2013/07/Briefing-for-the-Environmental-Audit-Committee_Carbon-Budget-Management1.pdf]. 230 There was also no evidence that the wider actions of government departments, outside of Carbon Plan, that might increase or decrease carbon emissions were considered. 231 Carbon budget management, op cit. 232 Qq 105–107
34 Progress on Carbon Budgets
more meetings of the Board in the run up to the review of the fourth carbon budget in 2014 (paragraph 27) and the setting of the fifth carbon budget in 2016.233
68. Arrangements for managing and reporting progress against the carbon budgets have not been working as intended and improvements are needed to enhance transparency. The Carbon Plan is out of date and requires revision to reflect the changes to policies and departmental business plans since 2011. The document appears to be intended to meet a legal requirement of the Climate Change Act rather than designed to play a meaningful role in managing the carbon budgets. The CCC and the Government use different indicators to measure progress, making it difficult to form an independent assessment of the sufficiency of policies to cut emissions. The National Emissions Target Board—the main oversight body—has met infrequently and there is limited evidence that it is holding departments to account for their progress. The recession-driven out-performance of early carbon budgets increases the risk that these deficiencies will continue unchecked. We recommend that:
• The Carbon Plan be updated on an annual basis, after the Government reflects on the Committee on Climate Change’s annual progress report.
• Changes to policies, and the impact on emissions abatement expected, be spelt out in the updated Carbon Plan. Revised estimates of emissions reductions from all policies should be included as an annex.
• The Government report progress on a quarterly basis against all milestones in the Carbon Plan. Any delays that might materially affect the UK meeting the carbon budgets should be explained.
• The National Emissions Target Board convene regularly. It should actively monitor performance of policies in reducing emissions, and take explicit account of the CCC’s progress reports. The Board must take control of identifying the new policies and incentives needed in the next two years to get the UK on track to meet the third and fourth carbon budget.
Role of local authorities
69. In our earlier report on carbon budgets we found that the Government’s voluntary approach to securing local emissions reductions was insufficient. We recommended that local authorities be required to set emission reduction targets, with progress against these being reported to Ministers each year.234 The Government disagreed, but commissioned the CCC to provide advice on how local authorities can be encouraged to show leadership and responsibility in reducing emissions and how their performance could be benchmarked.235
233 Qq 191, 193 234 Carbon Budgets, op cit, pages 25–27. 235 Environmental Audit Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2010–12, Carbon Budgets: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2010–12, HC 1720, page 9, [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1720/1720.pdf]; Committee on Climate Change, How local authorities can reduce emissions and manage climate risks, May 2012, [http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws/Local%20Authorites/1584_CCC_LA%20Report_bookmarked_1b.pdf].
Progress on Carbon Budgets 35
70. The CCC reported in May 2012 that local authorities planned only a “low level of action” to reduce emissions, even though there was “significant scope” for them to influence emissions reductions in buildings, transport and waste.236 The constrained fiscal situation and localism meant that “incentives” to act needed strengthening. The CCC did not think it appropriate for local authorities to be set binding targets because not all drivers of emissions were within their control. Instead, it recommended that a statutory duty be placed on them to draw up low-carbon plans which include a high level of ambition for emissions reductions237 and increased funding being made available.238
71. The Government thought it “unnecessary” to respond formally to the CCC’s recommendations as “the ball is in the court of the local authorities”. A statutory duty to develop and implement low carbon plans would be “prescriptive”. Instead, local authorities would be “empowered” to “take the initiative that is best for their areas”. The Government was working with the larger local authorities, particularly cities, to help them voluntarily develop their own low-carbon plans.239 Conversely, the Government has been prescriptive in its recent planning practice guidance on how local authorities should consider planning applications for onshore oil and gas activities, including ‘fracking’. It has set out what local planners should consider, explicitly stating that “demand for, or alternatives to, oil and gas activities” should not be considered.240
72. DECC asks local authorities to measure and report their emissions, allowing aggregated data to be published online,241 but not all authorities comply242 and the reporting methodology allows for “significant variation” on what emissions are included. This made assessing progress and making comparisons difficult.243 The Minister told us that the number of authorities reporting was “not proportionate to the overall percentage of emissions that they cover”.244 Such a claim is difficult to verify when not all local authorities report. The CCC planned to look in detail at this area as part of its progress report next year.245
73. Local authorities have an important role to play in driving down emissions, particularly those from buildings, transport and waste. However, there is a significant risk of inaction because of authorities’ constrained fiscal position and the Government’s decision not to implement the Committee on Climate Change’s recommendation to place a statutory duty on local authorities to produce low-carbon
236 Other opportunities include: promoting sustainable surface travel and facilitating take up of low-carbon vehicles, providing increased recycling and promoting waste to energy schemes, promote local carbon energy generation by granting planning approval to offshore wind projects, and reducing own estate emissions. 237 20% reduction across buildings, transport, and waste by 2020 relative to 2010 levels. 238 How local authorities can reduce emissions and manage climate risks, op cit. 239 Qq 223 – 226 [Greg Barker] 240 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224238/Planning_practice_guidance_f or_onshore_oil_and_gas.pdf 241 https://www.gov.uk/sharing-information-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-local-authority-own-estate-and- operations-previously-ni-185 242 Around 200 out of 353 local authorities reported emissions data in 2010–11. 243 Meeting Carbon Budgets—2013 Progress Report to Parliament, op cit. 244 Q 227 245 Q 149
36 Progress on Carbon Budgets
plans. The Government should reconsider placing a statutory duty on local authorities to produce low-carbon plans for their area and work to ensure that all local authorities are measuring and reporting on their emissions.
Progress on Carbon Budgets 37
Conclusions
The Carbon budgets
1. The carbon budgets are intended to reflect the UK’s share of a global effort on emissions reduction with only around a 50% chance of global temperature rises not exceeding 2oC—the threshold widely accepted as a benchmark for dangerous climate change. We are, however, globally on course for temperature rises of 4oC. The default assumption should therefore be that the carbon budgets represent the minimum level of emissions reduction required by the climate change science. Climate models are not yet able to include some potentially significant feedback effects, but continue to be developed, improving our understanding. Since we last reported in 2011, there has been controversy about a mismatch between rising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and negligible global temperature increases since the late 1990s, suggesting to some that the risk of climate change has been overstated. While the range of likely climate sensitivity may have slightly narrowed, most climate models are still consistent with observations and therefore do not lessen the imperative to take action to avoid dangerous climate change. (Paragraph 18)
2. We welcome the Government’s support for the European Commission’s proposal for a higher level of ambition on tackling climate change. The existing EU target of a 20% emissions reduction by 2020 needs to be tightened to 30% to put Europe on a trajectory more likely to avoid dangerous climate change. A 40% or 50% target for 2030 is essential for maintaining momentum across Europe. (Paragraph 24)
3. A low carbon price—the result of structural weaknesses in the EU Emissions Trading System and the economic downturn of recent years—means that the traded sector of the UK’s carbon budgets (power generation and heavy industry) will be met. But that may bring pressure to bear on the non-traded sector (road transport, agriculture, buildings, waste) which will have to produce further emissions reductions to cover the gap left by the traded sector. But there are too many uncertainties at the moment to justify reviewing and making any change to the 2023-2027 fourth carbon budget. The Government has yet to determine what emissions reductions may be possible from addressing policy initiatives in vehicle emissions, low-carbon heat and other key areas. And it is too soon to be confident about what EU ETS reforms might be possible beyond the scheme’s current 2020 horizon. It is also far from clear in what circumstances a ‘significant change’, required under the Climate Change Act to make a change to previously agreed carbon budgets, can be identified. (Paragraph 36)
4. The UK has one of the largest carbon footprints in the world and the recent increase in emissions embedded in imports has more than offset reductions in domestic emissions. We welcome the Government’s commitment to monitor the UK’s carbon consumption footprint. (Paragraph 42)
Management of carbon budgets
5. The Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation are key policies for meeting the carbon budgets. Although it may be too soon to judge the schemes’ success, low take-
38 Progress on Carbon Budgets
up rates so far may indicate significant non-financial barriers as well as financial issues for homeowners. (Paragraph 53)
6. A decarbonisation target for the energy sector is needed to address political risk and provide medium term certainty to investors in renewable energy. We are dissatisfied that the Government is not willing to set such a target before 2016. (Paragraph 59)
7. Arrangements for managing and reporting progress against the carbon budgets have not been working as intended and improvements are needed to enhance transparency. The Carbon Plan is out of date and requires revision to reflect the changes to policies and departmental business plans since 2011. The document appears to be intended to meet a legal requirement of the Climate Change Act rather than designed to play a meaningful role in managing the carbon budgets. The Committee on Climate Change and the Government use different indicators to measure progress, making it difficult to form an independent assessment of the sufficiency of policies to cut emissions. The National Emissions Target Board—the main oversight body—has met infrequently and there is limited evidence that it is holding departments to account for their progress. The recession-driven out- performance of early carbon budgets increases the risk that these deficiencies will continue unchecked. (Paragraph 68)
8. Local authorities have an important role to play in driving down emissions, particularly those from buildings, transport and waste. However, there is a significant risk of inaction because of authorities’ constrained fiscal position and the Government’s decision not to implement the Committee on Climate Change’s recommendation to place a statutory duty on local authorities to produce low- carbon plans. (Paragraph 73)
Progress on Carbon Budgets 39
Recommendations
9. The Committee on Climate Change should continue to keep the level of the carbon budgets under review to fully reflect the evolving climate change science, and the Government should be ready to tighten these budgets on advice from Committee on Climate Change. (Paragraph 18)
10. If the EU moves from a 20% to a 30% emissions reduction target for 2020, the Government must tighten its second and third carbon budgets to make them consistent with the Committee on Climate Change’s intended budget levels. (Paragraph 24)
11. We recommend that the Government abandon its review of the fourth carbon budget. However, if it is unwilling to take such a step, it should use its response to this report, or its response in October to the Committee on Climate Change’s fifth progress report, to (i) commit to not loosening the fourth carbon budget, (ii) identify when it will come forward with key policy initiatives to bridge the non-traded sector of the fourth carbon budget, (iii) state how it plans, through the discussions with the European Commission, to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System, and (iv) explain what would represent a ‘significant change’ to support an adjustment to the budgets under the provisions of the Climate Change Act. (Paragraph 36)
12. In preparation for a global deal on climate change in 2015, inevitably couched in terms of the ‘production’ of emissions, the Government should re-examine with the Committee on Climate Change the possibility of introducing a supplementary target focused on emissions ‘consumption’ embedded in imports, and the potential implications of such a target for the industrial strategies recently published by BIS. (Paragraph 42)
13. The Government should urgently review the barriers holding back take-up of the Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation schemes, including a survey of potential clients, in time to bring forward fiscal incentives in the Autumn Statement 2013 to bolster them before low take-up rates produce a widespread lack of confidence among both clients and the industry. While DECC has to find staffing reductions as a result of the recent Spending Review, the resources needed for the Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation review should be given priority. (Paragraph 53)
14. In light of the evidence we have received in our inquiry, during the passage of the Energy Bill the Government should reconsider setting a decarbonisation target now for 2030, which would deliver the Committee on Climate Change’s recommended limit of 50g CO₂/kWh by 2050. (Paragraph 59)
15. When the Government provides its response to the Committee on Climate Change’s annual progress reports it should facilitate a debate on those responses in the House (Paragraph 61)
40 Progress on Carbon Budgets
16. We recommend that:
• The Carbon Plan be updated on an annual basis, after the Government reflects on the Committee on Climate Change’s annual progress report.
• Changes to policies, and the impact on emissions abatement expected, be spelt out in the updated Carbon Plan. Revised estimates of emissions reductions from all policies should be included as an annex.
• The Government report progress on a quarterly basis against all milestones in the Carbon Plan. Any delays that might materially affect the UK meeting the carbon budgets should be explained.
• The National Emissions Target Board convene regularly. It should actively monitor performance of policies in reducing emissions, and take explicit account of the Committee on Climate Change’s progress reports. The Board must take control of identifying the new policies and incentives needed in the next two years to get the UK on track to meet the third and fourth carbon budget. (Paragraph 68)
17. The Government should reconsider placing a statutory duty on local authorities to produce low-carbon plans for their area and work to ensure that all local authorities are measuring and reporting on their emissions. (Paragraph 73)
Progress on Carbon Budgets 41
Formal Minutes
Wednesday 11 September 2013
Members present: Joan Walley, in the Chair
Peter Aldous Caroline Lucas Neil Carmichael Caroline Nokes Katy Clark Dr Alan Whitehead Mark Lazarowicz Simon Wright Dr Matthew Offord
Draft Report (Progress on carbon budgets), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. Ordered, That the Draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. Paragraphs 1 to 73 read and agreed to. Summary agreed to. Resolved, That the Report be the Fifth Report of the Committee to the House. Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report, in addition to that ordered to be reported for publishing on 17 April 2013 in the last session of Parliament, and 15 May, 5, 12, and 26 June, and 3 and 17 July 2013.
[Adjourned till tomorrow at 10.00 am
42 Progress on Carbon Budgets
Witnesses
Thursday 16 May 2013 Page
Professor James Hansen, Columbia University, and Professor Mark Jaccard, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. Ev 1
Wednesday 12 June 2013
Aubrey Meyer, Global Commons Institute. Ev 8
Professor Andrew Shepherd, University of Leeds, and Professor Myles Allen, University of Oxford. Ev 13
Professor Julia Slingo, Chief Scientist, Met Office, and Dr Jason Lowe, Head of Knowledge Integration and Mitigation Advice, Met Office. Ev 18
Wednesday 3 July 2013
David Kennedy, Chief Executive, Committee on Climate Change. Ev 25
Wednesday 10 July 2013
Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Minister of State for Climate Change, Department of Energy and Climate Change, Ravi Gurumurthy, Director of Strategy, Department of Energy and Climate Change, and Ben Golding, Deputy Director of Strategy, Department of Energy and Climate Change. Ev 41
Progress on Carbon Budgets 43
List of printed written evidence
1 The Government Ev 57 2 The Met Office Ev 62, Ev 102 3 Aubrey Meyer, Global Commons Institute Ev 64, Ev 105
List of additional written evidence
(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/eacom)
1 Daniel Scharf Ev w1 2 Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) Ev w3 3 WWF-UK Ev w4 4 RWE npower Ev w13 5 EDF energy Ev w14 6 Mineral Products Association Ev w18 7 Prof Kevin Anderson, Dr John Broderick, Dr Paul Gilbert, Mr Jaise Kuriakose, Dr Miriam Röder and Dr Alice Bows, Sustainable Consumption Institute, University of Manchester, and Prof Corinne Le Quéré and Dr Annela Anger-Kraavi, University of East Anglia Ev w19 8 Aldersgate Group Ev w29 9 Friends of the Earth Ev w36 10 Terry O’Connell Ev w39 11 Environmental Investigation Agency Ev w41 12 Andrew Montford Ev w44 13 Sandbag Ev w45 14 Dr Ulrich Loening, former Director of the Centre for Human Ecology, University of Edinburgh Ev w53 15 Dr Mayer Hillman, Senior Fellow Emeritus at Policy Studies Institute, University of Westminster Ev w54
44 Progress on Carbon Budgets
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament
The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.
Session 2013–14 First Report Embedding sustainable development: an update HC 202 (HC 633) Second Report Outcomes of the UN Rio+20 Earth Summit HC 200 (HC 633) Third Report Transport and accessibility to public services HC 201 (HC 632) Fourth Report Protecting the Arctic: The Government’s response HC 333
Session 2012–13 First Report The St Martin-in-the-Fields seminar on the Rio+20 HC 75 agenda Second Report Protecting the Arctic HC 171 (HC 858) Third Report Wildlife Crime HC 140 (HC 1061) Fourth Report Autumn Statement 2012: environmental issues HC 328 (HC 1087) Fifth Report Measuring well-being and sustainable development: HC 667 (HC 139) Sustainable Development Indicators Sixth Report Energy Intensive Industries Compensation Scheme HC 669 (Cm 8618) Seventh Report Pollinators and Pesticides HC 668 (HC 631)
Session 2010–12 First Report Embedding sustainable development across HC 504 (HC 877) Government, after the Secretary of State’s announcement on the future of the Sustainable Development Commission Second Report The Green Investment Bank HC 505 (HC 1437) Third Report Sustainable Development in the Localism Bill HC 799 (HC 1481) Fourth Report Embedding sustainable development: the HC 877 Government’s response Fifth Report The impact of UK overseas aid on environmental HC 710 (HC 1500) protection and climate change adaptation and mitigation Sixth Report Budget 2011 and environmental taxes HC 878 (HC 1527) Seventh Report Carbon Budgets HC 1080 (HC 1720) Eighth Report Preparations for the Rio +20 Summit HC 1026 (HC 1737) Ninth Report Air Quality a follow up Report HC 1024 (HC 1820) Tenth Report Solar Power Feed-in Tariffs (Joint with the Energy and HC 1605 (HC 1858) Climate Change Committee) Eleventh Report Sustainable Food HC 879 (HC 567) Twelfth Report A Green Economy HC 1025 (HC 568)
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Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 1
Oral evidence
Taken before the Environmental Audit Committee on Thursday 16 May 2013
Members present: Martin Caton (Chair)
Peter Aldous Dr Matthew Offord Zac Goldsmith Dr Alan Whitehead Mark Lazarowicz Simon Wright Caroline Lucas ______
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Professor James Hansen, Columbia University, and Professor Mark Jaccard, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, gave evidence.
Q1 Chair: Good morning. We are very grateful to a consensus that warming of 2°C or more would you for making time during your visit to come to certainly be dangerous. There is not disagreement speak to the Environmental Audit Committee, and you among the relevant scientific community. You can are very welcome. We are aware that you are under always find a few people who disagree, but in general considerable time constraints and need to get away by there is consensus on that. 11.20 am, so we will ensure that that happens. First, can I apologise on behalf of Joan Walley, our Q4 Chair: Thank you. Are there emerging areas of chairperson? Unfortunately she has a commitment that climate change science that could possibly alter our she absolutely has to attend in her constituency, but I climate change goals? know that she is very disappointed not to be here to Professor Hansen: Yes. I would say our listen to your evidence. understanding of the situation is improving as we get We are undertaking an inquiry looking at the UK’s more precise data on the system—for example, carbon budget regime, intermediate targets on the path beginning 10 years ago, with the satellite called to the UK’s statutory target to cut emissions by 80% GRACE that measures the gravitational field of the by 2050. That UK carbon budget regime is based on earth with very high precision, so you can measure the objective of limiting global temperature rises to the changes in the mass of the ice sheets on Greenland 2°C. Is that still the right objective? and Antarctica. It shows that these ice sheets are Professor Hansen: Well, 2°C is the limit. The shedding mass more and more rapidly, and that this community has agreed that 2°C is an upper boundary last summer was the most extreme mass loss from that we should avoid penetrating. I argue that the limit Greenland, which was more than 500 cubic should be lower than that. We know that the last time kilometres. That is averaged over the winter and the world was 2°C warmer was 120,000 years ago in summer. the Eemian Period, and things were rather different Of course, in the winter we see the ice sheet gets then. The sea level was at least six metres higher. heavier and then it loses mass in the melting season. From the earth’s history we know that, as the Integrated over the entire season, it lost mass at more temperature has changed, the sea level has gone along than 500 cubic kilometres per year. Antarctica is also with it, because ice melts when the planet gets losing mass. It is not as rapid, but it is an indication warmer, and so the eventual response to 2°C warming that our concern about the stability of these ice sheets is probably going to be a situation that is rather is well justified. In fact, it is a more rapid loss of unacceptable. There is no evidence that would mass than would have been predicted by any ice sheet indicate that that target is too ambitious. If anything, models. It is very difficult to model the disintegration it is too weak. of ice sheets. So that is one piece of evidence. Another fundamental piece of evidence—which, Q2 Chair: Would you agree with that, Professor again, is a recent measurement and a very valuable Jaccard? one—is that we can now measure the earth’s energy Professor Jaccard: My area is in energy policy imbalance. What we expect is, as you add a gas like economic analysis, so I will defer to Professor carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, it is like putting a Hansen. However, thank you for asking me. blanket on the planet, because it absorbs heat radiation and that reduces the heat radiation to space. Therefore Q3 Chair: To what extent is there consensus in the you get an imbalance, with more energy coming in scientific community as to what constitutes dangerous from the sun than going out in heat radiation. That is climate change? very clear; from the physical processes we expect that. Professor Hansen: If you ask an authoritative We can now measure that because different nations of scientific body—like our National Academy of the world co-operated in sending out more than 3,000 Sciences or your Royal Society, or any of the Argo floats, which are distributed around the world’s geophysical unions or meteorological unions—there is ocean. The floats dive down into the ocean to a depth cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:13] Job: 030704 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o001_michelle_HC 60-i CORRECTED 16.05.2013.xml
Ev 2 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
16 May 2013 Professor James Hansen and Professor Mark Jaccard of two kilometres, take measurements and then come the CO2 when we burn the coal and put it back in the back up to the surface and radio the information to a ground, then it was solvable because the conventional satellite. That enables us to measure how the heat oil and gas is finite. There was some hope that, with content of the ocean is changing, because that is international agreements, if we began to put a price where most of the excess energy must go. The on carbon, which would move the world toward atmosphere has a very small heat capacity but the alternative sources of electricity rather than coal, it ocean has a tremendous thermal inertia, a heat was a solvable problem. capacity, so that is where the energy goes. Here, however, in addition to these conventional fossil We can now measure that the ocean is gaining energy fuels, we have these unconventional oils—tar sands, at a rate of several tenths of a watt per metre squared, tar shale, fracking for gas—and the potential amount averaged over the planet’s surface. What that tells us of carbon in these unconventional oils is huge. If we is that there is almost as much warming that is in the introduce the tar shale and tar sands as a source and pipeline. Because if you have more energy coming in exploit those resources to a significant extent, then the than going out, then eventually you are going to warm problem becomes unsolvable. We know that you can up the planet further and we can now estimate how get conventional oil, which is available in places like much more warming there is in the pipeline. It tells Saudi Arabia and Russia, out of the ground for several us that that additional warming, plus the eight-tenths dollars a barrel. There is no way that we can tell Saudi of a degree that has already occurred, is getting us Arabia, “Don’t sell that oil”, or tell Russia, “You’re close to the boundaries of what we should allow if we not allowed to sell that oil”, so we know we are going want to avoid dangerous climate change. to get more out of these conventional sources. If we also introduce the unconventional ones then there is Q5 Caroline Lucas: Thank you. Yesterday there no solution other than geo-engineering, which is a were leaked papers—which I am sure you have terrible fate to will to our children. probably seen—which appear to show that the UK is So we cannot pretend that we don’t know the rejecting an EU proposal to classify oil from tar sands consequences of digging into these unconventional as highly polluting through the Fuel Quality Directive. fossil fuels that, frankly, I had always assumed the That suggests that the UK is happy to see European world would be smart enough to leave in the ground, countries import carbon-intensive tar sands oil from because they are more carbon-intensive. The amount Canada, essentially by creating a market for it here. of energy you get per unit of carbon is less, and you What are your views on that position, in terms of the get all these extra pollutants. It is a very dirty process extent to which it is compatible with a stated aim and getting those tar sands out of the ground. You are a legal requirement in the UK to keep temperature polluting that region tremendously. warming to below 2°C? All that has been asked for in this fuel standard is to Professor Hansen: I would like to make clear why at least label it and say that we are getting more this is extremely important. It is based on very carbon per unit of energy, and yet some countries are fundamental physics of the climate system, which afraid to do that. They are putting a burden on their there is absolutely no dispute about. We understand children and future generations for the sake of what, what we call the carbon cycle very well. When we slightly better relations with a particular party in burn fossil fuels and put the carbon dioxide into the Canada? It is absolutely crazy, the dynamics that are atmosphere, that carbon dioxide will stay in the going on here. It is hard to understand how we cannot surface climate system for millennia. That is the get countries to understand what the consequences of problem. that are and what they are trading off. We know, mainly from the history of the earth, how Professor Jaccard: Without dragging the answer to sensitive the climate system is to changes in the one question out too much, I wonder if I might make amount of carbon dioxide in the surface climate a short intervention on this question as well. system. We have records over hundreds of millions of Chair: Of course. years of how the climate has changed over time and Professor Jaccard: Thank you. I am an energy in response to changes in the boundary conditions, economy modeller and have worked with the which include the atmospheric composition and the intergovernmental panel on climate change, but also surface properties of the planet. That is our best with international groups of modellers. What they do measure of how sensitive the climate system is when with these models is look at the entire energy you give it time to respond. That is where we come economy system, so all the different resources in up with the limits on how much we can put into the different parts of the world, with some information on atmosphere without guaranteeing huge impacts. their likely costs of production and trade relationship When we look at how much carbon there is in the and demand. We take the information that the conventional fossil fuels—that means oil, gas and scientists give us as, say, a carbon budget, “Here is coal—we realise that we cannot burn all those fossil how much carbon pollution can go into the fuels without going way beyond what we have agreed atmosphere for a 1°C target or a 2°C target of is a dangerous limit. In fact, if we burned all fossil temperature change”. fuels, we would head the planet back to the ice-free The kind of modelling I do is more country-specific state, with sea levels 70 metres higher, 250 feet higher. to the United States and Canada. I work with these We realised that we cannot do that. teams especially in a process that is co-ordinated from When we dealt only with conventional fossil fuels, the Stanford University in the United States, called the problem was potentially solvable because, if we Energy Modelling Forum; you can look it up as EMF. would leave most of the coal in the ground, or capture They bring together the teams of energy economy cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:13] Job: 030704 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o001_michelle_HC 60-i CORRECTED 16.05.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 3
16 May 2013 Professor James Hansen and Professor Mark Jaccard modellers from around the world, and some of them of them is the sun. The sun goes through these cycles are from the UK as well. in approximately 11-year periods, which are The models that I have seen are run to meet the associated with the solar magnetic cycle, and the most constraints of the 2°C: how much carbon we could recent cycle is weaker than any of the prior three. still burn and put into the atmosphere and how much We began to make very precise measurements from is unburnable. I have not seen in any of these satellites in the 1970s. models—and I can give the references—where we The sun is contributing a bit to slowing down the exploited unconventional fuels to a great extent. Of warming because the sun’s brightness has been about course, it varies. It depends because we are not quite one-tenth of a watt less in the last decade than in the sure with unconventional natural gas where that will prior decades. Despite that solar, the increase in CO2 go in different regions of the world. However, if you over that decadal time period is contributing a forcing are trying to hit that 2°C limit, you don’t dramatically of a few tenths of a watt per metre squared, so it develop resources like Canada’s oil sands, tar sands, exceeds the reduction in solar irradiance. Therefore I or the heavy oil in Venezuela or in several other can say, with a reasonably high degree of confidence, jurisdictions. that over the next several years you will get warming The question then becomes the very difficult problem and, therefore, we will see still higher records. of whether we act globally on that. Ideally, we would The warmest year on record was 2010. There has been have a global Government and they would put a a lot of press recently about the fact that some people global carbon price, and then we would let the market say, “Oh, the warming has stopped over the last 15 take care of that. However, in this imperfect world, years”. They are comparing to 1998, 15 years ago, individual jurisdictions are implementing things, like when we had the El Niño of the century, which caused the Fuel Quality Directive—in California, you have global temperature to jump two standard deviations the Low-Carbon Fuel Standard—which try to reach above the trend line at that time. It is true that over beyond your own borders, which try to say, “If we are the last decade temperatures have been only trying to reduce our emissions in the UK and Europe comparable to that 1998 temperature. That is a tricky and California, it does little good if we are not looking statement because, if you take the 10-year running upstream at emissions that are caused elsewhere”. average, what you see is that the temperature is still I note that your Fuel Quality Directive is not just going up, but there is variability on that short a about tar sands; it is also about oil shale, coal to timescale. liquid, gas to liquid and other means of getting the To summarise, we can confidently say that the next gasoline and diesel that you might burn in your decade is going to be warmer than this decade. This vehicles in Europe. Therefore, I think it is important decade was warmer than the one before. That has been to hang on to policies like this, and to make sure they true now since 1970—each decade has been warmer, have some bite, as a way of signalling to the rest of and, because of the rapid emissions growth in CO2, the world as well what choices you need to make. that is going to continue to be the case until we slow They will be important. Thank you. down our emissions of fossil fuels. Chair: Thank you. That is very clear. Q7 Dr Offord: Thank you. As a result of the report Q6 Dr Offord: In January this year, the UK’s from the Meteorological Office, some of the press Meteorological Office published its decadal forecast. have picked up on this and decided that global change They predicted that in the next five years climate isn’t happening and we don’t need to continue in the change would be slowing, slower than they had fashion that I hope some of us are trying to achieve. predicted in 2011. What does your research show Some politicians are swayed by that kind of media about global climate change slowing down? reporting. How do you feel that we should disseminate Professor Hansen: Five-year forecasts for global some more of the research that you have been talking temperature are extremely speculative. What we can about—not among just politicians, but among the say about climate change in the five-year timescale public as a whole—to try to get across the conditions would be based mainly on the measurements I have that you describe? already mentioned, which are the earth’s energy Professor Hansen: That phenomenon with the media imbalance. We know there is more energy coming in and these overreactions is what Albert Einstein so, on a decadal timescale, we know the planet is referred to. He stopped communicating with the press going to get warmer. We can say it with a high degree because he said they made it sound like every year of confidence, not 100% certainty. We are not certain there is a revolution, like in these little Eastern that huge volcanoes will not go off in the next five European countries; in his day, there were revolutions years. That is unpredictable. If you had huge in these small Balkan countries that had global volcanoes that put aerosols in the stratosphere to implications. However, the science is not fluctuating reflect sunlight away, then they would change this crazily from year to year. There are fundamental facts planetary energy imbalance, and you may have less that override. energy coming in than going out. You cannot be Of course, there are interesting things that happen on certain, but we do know, from looking at hundreds of short timescales, and we like to understand those, but years, what the probability is that we get some forcing it doesn’t change our overall understanding that like that. humans have now become the dominant driving force We also know how the sun is changing. In addition for climate change on decadal timescales. So there is to human-made factors, there are natural factors that no reason to alter the goals and the requirement that influence global temperature on those timescales. One will bring the human-made forcing under control, or cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:13] Job: 030704 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o001_michelle_HC 60-i CORRECTED 16.05.2013.xml
Ev 4 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
16 May 2013 Professor James Hansen and Professor Mark Jaccard we will leave our children with a situation that is out Professor Hansen: Right, so we need the thoughtful of their control. conservatives to understand that now. We cannot wait Dr Offord: Thank you very much. for Mother Nature to make it obvious. There is some progress in that. For example, George Shultz, who Q8 Chair: Do you have anything that you would like was the Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan, has to add to that, Professor Jaccard? agreed to be a public spokesman for an approach of Professor Jaccard: No. dealing with this problem that would be acceptable to conservatives—and, frankly, would be more effective than what the liberals are offering—and that is a Q9 Zac Goldsmith: Just on the politics of that, revenue-neutral carbon tax. That means it is not really which I would be interested to know. There is a report a tax. It is a carbon fee that you collect from fossil in The Guardian today saying that according to an fuel companies at the source, at the domestic mine or assessment of all the scientific papers on climate the port of entry, and then you give the money to the change, where there is a verdict on whether we are public. In particular, he agrees with what I have been responsible or not, more than 99% seem to be of the recommending, which is to give an equal amount to firm view, which Professor Hansen takes, that we are every legal resident of the country so that the person very much the dominant force for the changes that we who does better than average in limiting his carbon are seeing. There is as close to a scientific consensus footprint will actually make money. With the present as science allows. It is hard to hope for or imagine a distribution of energy uses, 60% of the people would stronger consensus. get more in their dividend than they pay in increased Despite that, politically there seems to be a roll-back. prices. There are very many senior political figures, in this That is the kind of approach that conservatives can go country and elsewhere, who are reluctant to embark along with because it doesn’t allow the Government on any kind of policy journey that would adequately to get bigger. It is not using the money to make a address this issue. Professor Hansen, I am interested bigger Government; rather, it is having a programme to know how much dialogue you have had with that is designed in the long run to phase out the source climate-sceptical politicians, either in Europe or in the of the problem. That is, if that carbon price continues States, and also climate-sceptic scientists. How much to rise over time, it will allow other alternatives to exchange do you have with the people who take that replace fossil fuels. We have to do that in the long run. view? Professor Hansen: That is a good question because I think that that dialogue is really important. I can Q11 Zac Goldsmith: If you do not mind me asking specifically comment on the situation in the United how— States, but I think it is very analogous to the one in Chair: Last one, though, Zac. the United Kingdom. I have taken some initiative to Zac Goldsmith: Oh, I have to choose now. This is a speak with conservatives in the United States. A large supplementary question, but I am interested in how fraction of our members of the Republican Party, much traction that has achieved within the which is the more conservative party, have taken the conservative element of the States. position that this whole climate thing is a hoax, and, Professor Hansen: It is kind of new, but even the because of the huge amount of advertisement in the most extreme, like Grover Norquist—I don’t know if media, have even convinced a fraction of the public— you know him from American politics, but he has perhaps a quarter or a third—that this is all a hoax been very successful in getting all Republicans to dreamed up by scientists who want to get research agree not to have any tax increase. They signed a funding, which is, of course, silly. pledge, and those who then vote for any tax increase Conservatives historically in the United States have he then opposes and has been successful in getting been the party that has introduced extremely important them defeated—even he, in discussions, is thinking legislation for environmental protection and for this makes sense. So I think there is a good chance. It conservation of public lands, going all the way back is going to take more convincing. I wouldn’t say it is to Teddy Roosevelt a century ago. The thoughtful in any way a majority of conservatives yet, but I think conservatives know that of course this is not a hoax, it is the way we have to go if we are going to get and eventually it is going to be clear. If a party bipartisan agreement. continues to be anti-science and pretends that it is a hoax, once it becomes clear it was not a hoax, then Q12 Peter Aldous: Do you feel that climate the consequences are likely to be that the public feedbacks are adequately understood and factored into demands the Government solves the problem and then climate models? the Government takes over. That is the worst possible Professor Hansen: No. For example, one of the outcome from a conservative’s point of view. They feedbacks is that as the planet gets warmer you melt don’t want the Government taking over, so— ice. The Arctic sea ice is melting faster than the climate models indicated. The climate models often Q10 Zac Goldsmith: Could I just interrupt? I agree get criticised—and it is a valid criticism—that there with you, but, by the time that process happens, the is a lot of physics that we may not even have in the problem will have advanced considerably, so the models, and that which we do have in may be priority has to be now. inaccurate. Our understanding of climate sensitivity is cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:13] Job: 030704 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o001_michelle_HC 60-i CORRECTED 16.05.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 5
16 May 2013 Professor James Hansen and Professor Mark Jaccard based, first of all, on the history of the earth: how the Professor Hansen: CO2 is by far the most important earth responded in the past. That is really an empirical because the carbon stays in the surface system for way of assessing it. Despite those model deficiencies, millennia, and that is going to dominate in the long they don’t prevent us from having a pretty good run. These others are shorter-lived, so they are not understanding of how sensitive climate is. going to be dominant in the long run. Methane is very important because, as the amount of methane Q13 Peter Aldous: Are there any feedbacks you feel increases, so does the tropospheric ozone, and so does that we should be particularly concerned about or the stratospheric water vapour, for fairly simple which we need to know more about? chemical reasons. Professor Hansen: Yes, there are a number, but I Therefore, if you can reduce methane, you will reduce would say it is especially the ice sheets because we tropospheric ozone, which is damaging health-wise don’t know how rapidly they can change. The IPCC and it is also a greenhouse gas, and you would also had prior estimates. The last report was that sea level reduce stratospheric water vapour. Its effect has been this century would only go up a fraction of a metre. at least 40% as much as the CO2, so it does provide The new report is probably going to estimate more a sort of safety valve, but I would almost rather it be like a metre, but these are educated guesses. We don’t used that way rather than start with it. We really have have the ability to simulate that process, because the to start with the carbon problem or we will have an important processes occur on a scale that is much unsolvable problem for our children. smaller than the grid resolution of the models. The effect of black carbon is a little exaggerated in There is another one that might bear, and that is the some of the papers in the literature and in the public methane hydrates. We don’t know how rapidly the discussion. It is true that black carbon also causes methane, which is locked in this frozen methane in the warming. It is soot, which is the dark soot from tundra and on the continental shelf, can be released as burning the fossil fuels. It causes warming because it the planet gets warmer. We need to understand that. absorbs more sunlight. When you produce black soot, along with it you also produce aerosols that scatter Q14 Peter Aldous: That is helpful and it leads on to sunlight. They have a cooling effect that has partially a couple of other questions I have. This Committee masked the warming due to CO2. It is very hard to recently looked at climate change in the Arctic, where reduce the black soot without also reducing the other I think recent modelling from satellite measurements things and you should reduce the aerosols because shows that there has been a significant loss of volume they are very damaging from a health standpoint. and ice extent. How do you see the interaction However, it is not going to save us from warming to between Arctic climate change and global climate reduce the black soot because we will also reduce the change? cooling aerosols. Professor Hansen: Of course the Arctic is responding to global warming, but, in turn, that Arctic change feeds back on regional climate and the conditions on Q16 Dr Whitehead: Just briefly, on the feedback the land in the northern parts on the continents. One mechanisms, one of the important questions for the of the interesting issues is the impact of that ice loss UK is the effect of ocean currents on our climate, on the weather, especially the winter weather. The particularly the Gulf Stream, without which I think we long-wave patterns, the Rossby waves, are the things would have a climate similar to that of Newfoundland. that influence that. What evidence is there, in terms of the overall ocean The mass of atmosphere in the Arctic is of course warming that is going on, that this is seriously more or less fixed, so when the wind blows from the affecting the direction and intensity of ocean currents, north at one longitude, it has to blow from the south particularly those in the Atlantic? at another longitude, and, as those long-wave patterns Professor Hansen: I would say that as yet the effect shift, that changes where it is going to be unusually of human-made changes, to the atmosphere in the cold and where it is going to be warm. It so happens Gulf Stream and the transport of heat by the ocean, is that in the last couple of years they have shifted, such not clear. We can see that the North Atlantic now and that Greenland was nice and warm and Europe tended for the past few years has been unusually warm. The in some months to be quite cold. The relationship of water off the United States’ east coast was about 2°C that with the sea ice is not very well understood, but or 3°C warmer this past year. When the category 1 there are some papers in which they are trying to hurricane Sandy came up, it should have petered out understand how that works. Those weather before it got to New York, but, because the water was oscillations are very noisy, dynamical things, so it is so warm, it stayed a category 1 hurricane and then going to take a while, and to get empirical evidence combined with a frontal storm and moved inland. you are going to have to look at a number of years. Whether that warming was a consequence of a human effect is unclear. Q15 Peter Aldous: Thank you. Carbon dioxide has It is also unclear what the effect is going to be over been the main focus in climate change science. How the next several decades. It is a very interesting topic. important are other types of emissions, such as black I don’t know if we have time to get into this, but let carbon, aerosols, and methane, which you have just me just briefly say that I am working on a paper that mentioned, to global warming? Do you feel that concludes that, if we stay on the path we are on, the reducing these offers better prospects for action to ice mass loss from Greenland is going to reach a level actually tackle climate change? such that it cools the North Atlantic. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:13] Job: 030704 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o001_michelle_HC 60-i CORRECTED 16.05.2013.xml
Ev 6 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
16 May 2013 Professor James Hansen and Professor Mark Jaccard
This is a concept that Wally Broecker talked about a Europe has been trying that with the Fuel Quality lot 10 or 20 years ago, but then he was beaten into Directive, and California has been doing that with submission by other scientists who said, “Actually, the similar policies as well. CO2 is going to overwhelm that and you are going to get warming in the North Atlantic regardless”. Q18 Mark Lazarowicz: How serious do you see the However, they were not including rapid ice loss from international implications for the current difficulties Greenland, which I think is going to happen because facing the EU ETS and the collapse of the carbon we can see it starting. If it continues to accelerate the price? way it has been, then that mass loss will become fast Professor Jaccard: We may have different views on enough that the cold fresh water and icebergs coming that. As an economist, when you put in an emissions out from Greenland will likely cause this cooling of trading system, if you don’t have a floor price or even the North Atlantic, and then that is what I called “The a ceiling price for that system, you do understand that storms of my grandchildren” because you get cooling you may get price fluctuation, and some economists in the North Atlantic, warming in the tropics from the would argue that is a good thing. If your economy is continued CO2 increase, so the temperature gradient not growing rapidly so your emissions are going gets much stronger and it drives much stronger down, then the price would quite naturally fall for a storms. I have some evidence from the paleoclimate time. That creates a problem, though, for long-term that such phenomena have happened in the earth’s investment and price security, which is why history a long time ago. Anyway, this is a research economists would tend to prefer a carbon tax. If that is area so it is somewhat speculative. not possible politically, over time I would encourage people to revise your trading system and, if you stay Q17 Mark Lazarowicz: Because of the failure to get with that, to get some kind of floor price on it. I know comprehensive international agreements, there has jurisdictions have done that before. There are trading been quite a lot of focus on individual countries doing systems that have worked for acid emissions, local air their own thing as being the next best solution to the quality and so on, so there are design possibilities. fact there has not been a comprehensive agreement. Paul Joskow at MIT has written a fair bit on that, Do you—perhaps Professor Jaccard, rather than about how to get a price floor in. yourself—still think that international agreement is I tend to argue that you can do this with a lot of necessary and, if so, is it possible? It is possibly the different kinds of policies. It is going to be that design other way round: is it is possible or necessary? Do that really counts. Even with Mr Goldsmith’s point you think the country by country approach is any type earlier, there are fluctuations in public interest, but, of substitute for international agreement? from what the scientists are telling us, we know this Professor Jaccard: If I can just start. We obviously issue will keep coming back. In my own career, I have to get to an international effort. It is a global remember a peak in 1988 to 1989 in interest, in 1995 problem. We need the major emitters acting. Whether to 1997 leading up to the Kyoto Protocol, and then or not that comes about through a process of voluntary again in 2002 to 2008 until our recession. The discussions and negotiating a fairness arrangement important thing is to get policies in place and then between parties, which is more what we have been to try to sustain them in those periods when we are trying to do internationally with the Framework weathering the economic storms, as we are right now. Convention on Climate Change, or it happens because of key players, groups of countries reaching bilateral Professor Hansen: If I could just add a comment. or multilateral agreements to move forward, and then Given the urgency of getting global reductions in bringing the rest of the world with them, is a big carbon emissions, I think that the Kyoto type of debating point right now. There are scholars—David approach, the IPCC or the United Nations type of Victor’s book, Global Warming Gridlock—who are approach, doesn’t have a chance of being effective. talking about how successful international agreements We can see that emissions have accelerated globally. have been achieved in the past by clubs of countries. We are going to have to have more limited and For example, that would be Europe and the United bilateral agreements. We particularly need one States and perhaps China working together to try to between the United States and China, and I think that do something, or just the United States and China. is a real possibility—as you probably know, a few The point of that is we shouldn’t just be relying on an weeks ago Secretary of State Kerry went to China and international negotiating process that happens every they agreed to have a working dialogue on this—and few years, or even we try to make it happen every also if Europe would join an agreement. year through the annual climate conferences. Instead, What they need to discuss is a carbon price, not a cap- as individual entities, the United States, Europe, we and-trade system. A flat carbon price would need to should be trying to do things that extend the reach apply in China and in the United States, not of our policies. Bringing it back to the Fuel Quality necessarily at the same rate because the United States Directive, the point I made earlier, that is why I see is responsible for 26% of the excess CO2 in the that Europe saying, “We will reduce our emissions, atmosphere now and China for 10%, even though without thinking about upstream what is going on in China has many more people. Incidentally, on a per- the rest of world” would be a mistake. That is why I capita basis, the United Kingdom is number one in believe you do need to take an initiative to act in your responsibility because the industrial revolution began own jurisdiction, your own country, your own group here. If you integrate over time, the United States is of countries in Europe, if that is the case, but also number two, Germany is number three and China is always be looking to policies that have a further reach. way down. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:13] Job: 030704 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o001_michelle_HC 60-i CORRECTED 16.05.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 7
16 May 2013 Professor James Hansen and Professor Mark Jaccard
In any case, in order to solve this problem, we need Chair: Thank you, Professor Hansen. It is now 11.21 to put an honest price on carbon-based fuels, which am, so we will have to conclude. Can I thank you both begins to pay their cost to society. If both countries very much for your enormously helpful evidence to agree to have rising carbon fees, then we can begin to start the inquiry off? address the problem. Frankly, without that, I don’t think the measures are anywhere near what is needed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SE] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 8 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
Wednesday 12 June 2013
Members present: Joan Walley (Chair)
Martin Caton Dr Matthew Offord Katy Clark Mr Mark Spencer Mark Lazarowicz Dr Alan Whitehead Caroline Lucas Simon Wright ______
Examination of Witness
Witness: Aubrey Meyer, Global Commons Institute, gave evidence.
Q19 Chair: Aubrey, it is a great pleasure to welcome However, in respect of setting this exemplary you before this particular Environmental Audit Select contraction and convergence principle for the world at Committee. We know that there was a previous the UN, the problem is the approach that was taken in opportunity for you to give evidence to our the Climate Act, both in respect of contraction and predecessor Committee. It might be helpful to say at concentrations, which for me is the issue for today, the outset, both to you and possibly to future but also in respect of the second dimension, which is witnesses who will be giving evidence this afternoon, contraction and convergence—how you that we are aiming to allocate something like 35 internationally allocate a safe contraction and minutes to each different set of witnesses before us, concentration budget. For some reason, which is so it is going to be very tight for time. completely beyond me, they chose to prescribe that It is such a complicated area, such a complicated brief, the convergence year would be 2050. In that sense, to so if you can try to explain your answers in plain go to the UN to say to all our international partners it English it will make it easier for us, particularly those will be done thus and what the convergence rate in of us who have had the opportunity to have direct the Climate Act numbers will be by 2050, when to be presentations from you in the past. Our starting point honest the straight numbers show you 80% of the is your concept of contraction and convergence. The budget has been used up by 2050. So it is a little rich starting point for us in the current inquiry that we are to say to all the people who feel they are the innocent doing is whether or not you feel that the Climate parties with the hugest opportunity costs, “You get Change Act targets as we have them are set in equality at the end of term,” in spite of the fact, and accordance with the principles of contraction and this is crucial, that in July of 2009—the Act existed convergence. but we had not yet gone to COP-15—the Chinese Government published an extensive paper that quite Aubrey Meyer: As before, the answer is yes and no, explicitly said, “We accept the contraction and and people’s opinions vary. As you will remember, in convergence principle on the understanding that it the previous inquiry Adair Turner took a direct does not prescribe the rate of convergence and from question from you on this point and it is all on film, I our point of view it is quite capable of having instant am happy to say. His answer to your point was they convergence and trading away the difference between did not call it contraction and convergence in the permits and actual emissions, and we will start from Climate Act because, if I remember the phrase, it there.” The fact that we went to Copenhagen and became so “emotional”, whatever that meant. But prescribed 2050 and then came home and blamed the what did come out was that it was very strong support Chinese because they wrecked the negotiations was a for what GCI had said and done with C&C. little bit of a diplomatic faux pas. I am not sure So, in respect of the Act, is it C&C or not? In whether we have recovered from that yet. principle, yes. In practice, no, in the sense that the targets that are derived from the UK Climate Act are Q21 Dr Whitehead: In your submission you have insufficiently precautionary. We are being too raised a lot of concerns about the fact that a number generous with the amount of carbon we can assume of climate feedback effects are not included in the Met we can safely burn into the future, both nationally Office’s modelling that was used to determine both and internationally. the Climate Change Act and carbon budgets. Could you take us through what feedbacks you think are Q20 Chair: That leads me to my second question, missing? which is whether or not the current Act that we have Aubrey Meyer: Yes. As some of you will remember is sufficient in terms of the rate of change and the way from the previous inquiry, the subject of omitted in which the UK emissions are contracting. In your feedbacks came up yet again. I made a point of putting view, is the Climate Change Act that we have in the evidence that GCI had been making that point sufficient to meet the changes that we are seeing? from roughly 1996 onwards, so it is not as if we were Aubrey Meyer: I want to answer encouragingly new to the issue. The response from the modelling because in the UK there is a considerable effort community was, “Of course these feedback effects are involving DECC and other facets of Government to there, but they are so full of uncertainties and get something like a credible policy on climate going. complexities and difficulties about modelling them In that sense it is an effort worth recognising. that we do not really know how to do it yet, so we cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 9
12 June 2013 Aubrey Meyer will leave them out until we do.” That persisted all extensively on their website the extent of the the way through to 2008 when the Climate Change feedbacks that were omitted. So it is methane from Act was created and then—and this is the shocking Arctic melt and permafrost melt; CO2 from Arctic and bit—they have persisted all the way through until permafrost melt; it is water vapour that increases; it is now, in spite of what you will be told later on by loss of positive albedo; the gain of negative albedo as UKMO members present today and probably listening the ice melts. There are also some things that they right now, that they have made some progress on this. have left out, like the new terror, which is that as the I can assure you that the RCP scenarios that are now oceans warm the carbon-hungry organisms are subject in the IPCC AR5, due out in a year, still basically to some kind of viral attack now, which is apparently assert this mostly secondary feedback effect-free a major attack on the carbon sink in the ocean. If you prognosis of what is coming. are asking me to put values on this, no, I can’t. If you My generic point to the Committee is to me the most ask me, do I know somebody who has done this, the important point, which is why I put it up on page 1 of answer is, no, I don’t. All I know is it is more and the analysis. What we absolutely have to recognise is more talked about. that there is a distinction that needs to be made The point is for all the knowns that we know, we have between budget emissions, which we obviously, at a bunch of unknowns that we know we do not know, least theoretically, can control and feedback and then there is Caspar Weinberger saying there are emissions, which we obviously cannot. The difficulty all the unknown unknowns. This is not going away. is that, while we may be able to control human The one absolutely key thing that is the sum of all the emissions because we somehow do what is necessary emissions, both human and non-human, is the Mauna with carbon management, by the time you have Loa concentration curve, which is going up instigated a process of warming that leads to what is exponentially. The exponent is 2.1% per annum for already, for example, going on in the Arctic and in the extent of the increase—important point. That is a the contiguous area of permafrost around it, starting a very considerable rate of increase on this absolutely melting process that is causing methane and especially key, rock-solid piece of evidence, which has gone on carbon dioxide to be released in potentially vast for the best part of the last 40 years. That is the thing amounts, there is nothing on God’s earth that we can that we have to cause to come down if we want to do about that. control the temperature. To take up your question The coming on of this may be gradual and slow, and about consequential effects, if you want to stop that is what these curves, which I hope you all have feedback effects you have to slow the temperature. copies of, are designed to draw attention to. We are You can’t go straight to the feedback effects and say, not claiming any more certainty for this than what the “You should stop, we are dealing with the temperature UK Met Office is claiming for the certainty with these somewhere else.” The only thing we can do is to try enormous error bars on what is in the Climate Act. to keep the temperature down. Primarily, the only What we are saying is generically you must convincing thing we can do to keep the temperature distinguish between budget emissions, which are down is to keep our human budget emissions down policy emissions, and feedback emissions, which are because that may, if we are lucky, keep concentrations consequential emissions about which you can do coming down, and there is no other way to configure nothing, and because of that pursue a precautionary that. There is no kind of packed lunch in the form of route to policy development. Precautionary in this carbon sequestration waiting to come on in 2070 that context means not running risks we do not have to is suddenly going to gobble it all up. It ain’t going run, not incurring costs that we can avoid, and playing to happen. safe rather than sorry. Q23 Dr Whitehead: I appreciate that, but the issue Q22 Dr Whitehead: You make that generic in terms of what you might think about in terms of distinction, but nevertheless there will be at least some policy formation in relation to keeping the connection between the two in that the rate at which temperature down, not as a precautionary principle but feedback mechanisms start to bite is a function to within that, and what you do about acting on a some extent of the extent to which those budgets over precautionary principle, itself has a number of ranges which we have some control begin to slow the process of precaution within it, depending on what material while they are in play. you have at your hand to decide at what point and in Have you modelled in what you have put forward in what form and what way that precautionary principle these charts how that relationship might work? Or are should be adopted. As you say, there are known you assuming, contrary to what you state has been knowns, unknown knowns, and unknown unknowns deemed just an omission on the grounds of uncertainty in this process. What you are suggesting is that in of a number of feedback mechanisms, that these terms of, you might say, policy formation so far, mechanisms either happen or they do not, and if they unknown knowns and unknown unknowns are being do happen they are outside any effects that those excluded on the grounds that we did not quite know matters that are in our control might have on them? them all. That is a rather more complicated question than I hope Aubrey Meyer: That goes on, that is for sure. the answer will be. Dr Whitehead: Nevertheless that does not really help Aubrey Meyer: Firstly, in response to your point about anybody very much in terms of trying to put in a list of omitted feedback mechanisms, let me tell you place—on the basis, presumably, of best science and straight away, with appreciation to my colleagues in best likelihood estimation—what those represent. the Met Office, after the last inquiry they listed Indeed, that is what you have tried to do to some cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 10 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
12 June 2013 Aubrey Meyer considerable extent in these particular charts. Where the benefit of realising what it is like and what is does that leave us in terms of inclusion of at least possible as a result of being committed to that. It is known knowns and unknown knowns in the process not necessarily all bad news. It may mean that you and to what extent does that guide how one adopts the have to fly less. It does not necessarily mean you have precautionary principle? That can range from stop all to bath less. carbon emissions now to a slope much faster down But the key thing is, the UNFCCC objective is a the politically picked date of 2050, or indeed negative concentrations limit. They may not have put a value emissions post-2050 and so on, so even within a range on it, but it has a value and it is a value above which of guidance scenarios that might emerge from that. we do not go. It is a bit like a speed limit or an alcohol Aubrey Meyer: I hope I am going to respond to this limit. Limits are all over the place in our policy-rich because I understand the difficulty of describing it. environment. From there—an important point, this— The chains of causation are complex and uncertain. it is not just a concentration of CO2 or whatever it The basis of precautionary policy in any might be, which is a volumetric figure; it is a tonnage. circumstances is, do not run risks you do not have to Those concentrations convert to tonnes and they are run. The practical policy application of this, my dear the same tonnes that we are digging up and burning friends, after all these years, is to unambiguously and emitting and depositing in the atmosphere. You make the point that, whatever are the arguments for can do some fairly high-resolution measurements digging the carbon out of the ground and burning it between the tonnes of emissions and the tonnes of off to the atmosphere, the cheaper option is to leave concentrations. That is what the CBAT will do. You it in the ground and not do that and incur the long- can begin to get a much clearer fix, not only for term costs and consequence of doing that. That is the yourselves and your colleagues, but all our simple kind of brute, boy scout position on it all. international colleagues, on what it really takes to In terms of the management of all these unknowns, in come to terms beyond the uncertainties of the science a way C&C was conceived from the word go precisely and the waiting for evidence-based policy to emerge to overcome the difficulties of the UN, which was that over the next 50 years as to how serious the feedbacks people quickly retreated into camps of saying, “We might be when you might well find that in some are not to blame; it is you in the United States or in predictions the Arctic has already completely gone in Australia or in Britain. We have not had our turn yet. summer by the end of next year. The rate of collapse It is our turn now.” The US, as you will remember, is exponential. It has been pretty clearly demonstrated clearly took the position of saying, “This is not US now. The idea that we have to sit around and wait for warming; it is global warming and unless you are all the next 50 years to find out if that happened and if in there is no deal.” Basically, they are still saying that we could measure it is completely daft. and here we are 20 years later. So C&C basically said, “Here is everybody in. That is a safe contraction and Q24 Dr Whitehead: I do not think there is any concentration amount.” If you look at the back of this suggestion, or certainly I am not making any there is a model that gives you an online opportunity suggestion, that one sit around and wait for irrefutable to literally manipulate this online so you can see not evidence of a succession of feedbacks that may or only the size of budgets and concentrations, but “in may not be taking place to the extent that we think relation to our climate at—”. But to say to everybody, they are or may be taking place at a much accelerated “Let’s be a little Lincolneseque about this. Let’s, for rate. However, as you say, unless some kind of handle reasons of practicality, just split this down the middle at some stage is placed now on what those feedbacks and say we will meet on equality,” not because it is look like, whether or not we have perfect necessarily fair, but because it is rational and it is information— doable and it might overcome this perishingly stupid Aubrey Meyer: Yes. I completely agree with that. argument about blaming the other side—as you all Dr Whitehead: Then we will be in a position of probably may know, there has been a mixed take on saying we know those are happening but we can’t all of that. The Climate Act was supposedly one of quantify them with any degree of success and the more positive takes on that. therefore that is it, there is nothing we can do about But the real thing here is that once you have the it, so you do end up by default in the contrarians’ principle in play, you have to bring it to bear at rates camp. Alternatively, one says that we can deal with that achieve enough soon enough to make it worth it, the things we can deal with and we can’t deal with rather than, as your ex-member Colin Challen used to the things that we can’t deal with, so let’s hope the say, just achieving the heroic failure of doing too little things we are dealing with have an effect. too late when you might as well not have bothered to Aubrey Meyer: It is a wing and a prayer, isn’t it? do anything and you have sadly played into the hands Dr Whitehead: My central question is, how can we of all the contrarians who say you are trying to solve a get a relationship between those two processes, problem that does not exist. In other words, whatever bearing in mind operating the precautionary principle, happens, there is nothing you can do about it whether which does give us some kind of practical guidance you felt you should or not and we will all end up as to what policy then looks like? I think that is the going in this hand basket to wherever it is going next, central question. regardless of what anybody says or does. C&C, and Aubrey Meyer: Alan, that is perfect. That really is the therefore the Act, if it means anything, is aimed at question that hangs over this entire inquiry and effort, generating a model of co-operation that is and that is exactly why this carbon budget analysis precautionary and doing enough soon enough rather tool—this CBAT tool—exists. It is precisely to say, as than less than that, and critically then also enjoying Nicholas Stern, I was very interested to see, said a cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 11
12 June 2013 Aubrey Meyer month ago to the IMF, “Just because these feedback activity and so on in the soil. The issue about black effects that have been omitted are difficult to model carbon being there if it goes there would only serve does not mean you can put a value of zero in.” No to accelerate that process because it is in effect a sensible person is going to do that. They even got this negative albedo. So there is no good news there. message from UNEP at the end of last year. This is the UN telling itself at the highest level, supposedly. Q27 Dr Whitehead: You might say, for example, the precautionary principle is, do not sail ships across the Q25 Chair: I am going to interrupt. I would like to Arctic because they are the best possible thing you try to concentrate on the very essence of Dr can think of to deposit black carbon straight on the Whitehead’s question there, because I am very ice as quickly as possible. conscious of time. Aubrey Meyer: As a contrarian might argue. Aubrey Meyer: Okay. This is where I am disappointed Dr Whitehead: What I am trying to grasp at, in terms we can’t use the CBAT model1 on screen, but you of those feedback effects, is their relationship with will see straightaway the essential difference to note, anthropogenic warming in the first instance and their first of all, is the generic one. The way the UK further relationship with policy progression within Climate Act has dealt with feedbacks makes it that precautionary principle. impossible to distinguish between what are budget and Aubrey Meyer: I just want to be clear. Are you what are feedback emissions. This is a catastrophe. It arguing that the ships go in there emitting black creates a policy nightmare for anybody. The second carbon— thing is it wholly fails to recognise that feedback Chair: I do not think we want to concentrate on the emissions will accelerate. They will not decelerate. ships. They will accelerate in a way where we can do Dr Whitehead: I was just using that as an example. I nothing about them—the strongest possible reason for would personally think as a precautionary principle, arguing the precautionary case. do not send ships across the Arctic as the ice melts The CBAT model as an answer to how you integrate for the reason, among other things, of accelerating a these things is the best possible answer I have feedback effect that we know about already but may managed to come up with in 20 years of trying well be additionally accelerated by our own efforts at desperately hard to communicate precisely this point that point. That is what I am trying to establish in and to take it out of what you could call the black box terms of feedback of economic and climate policy modelling into some Aubrey Meyer: Alan, please, I invite you and your kind of transparent process where you can literally colleagues to be as radical as that on every single issue read as you manipulate the thing on screen what the that relates to a choice about whether you release consequences are of the budget choices that you make. carbon or not. We are in real difficulties. This is not something we can fine tune at this point. We know Q26 Dr Whitehead: I appreciate we do not have enough to act in a precautionary manner and that if enough time to do this particular knotty problem we do not we may well lose the day. justice at all, but perhaps I could just give you a very brief example—albedo effect. That is very much a by- Q28 Caroline Lucas: Following on from Alan, I product of anthropogenic warming activity and has a guess, and notwithstanding the known unknowns and feedback effect in a number of different ways, one of unknown unknowns, is it possible to put some figures which, for example, would be the extent to which, say, on the degree to which the current Climate Change we knowingly import large amounts of black carbon Act targets would need to be changed and the carbon into the Arctic area, which quite possibly increases budgets tightened in order to reflect the projections the albedo effect. That is an unknown known that may that you are making? I appreciate that within that there be a separate feedback effect from us, but nevertheless will be a balance of risks that may or may not be something that we are very much potentially doing a acceptable. If at the moment we have an 80% cut by lot to accelerate as a result of very possible decisions 2050 as a target, under your scenario what would that that we might make in the very near future. It is the begin to look like? What could it begin to look like? relationship between those two that I am particularly Aubrey Meyer: Half the size of the budget, not 395. interested in trying to establish. It was originally 480 but now what is left is 395, take Aubrey Meyer: Let’s be clear about this. The fact that it down to somewhere like 200. James Hansen already the ice, or some of it, is still there constitutes what told you, for example, at this very hearing, that the you might call a negative forcing in that it reflects Climate Act target of 2 degrees is not safe, 1.5. He heat back. If you lose the ice, you not only lose the argues for 350, in other words bringing concentrations positive albedo; you absorb a lot of heat and mask a down to the value they were when we began this lot of the heat in the melting of the ice, but as that process. In 1992 they were 353. happens two things then are knock-on consequences. On the point that you are raising, I struggled a lot with The first is you create a huge dark area of either ocean how to try to configure this in the policy language that or newly revealed permafrost landmass that have has come to exist as a result of the Climate Change negative albedo and in both instances the warming Act being created the way it was created. I finally that occurs accelerates the release of gas—in the case came to the technique, if you will, on pages 28 and of the ocean from clathrates, and in the case of the 26. You have the evidence and can look at those permafrost melted area from CO2 from biological graphics. What I was trying to do here was not just to 1 Note by witness: The CBAT model is at say GCI says it should be faster and so on, but to say http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf in relation to what is going on, and the way what is cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 12 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
12 June 2013 Aubrey Meyer going on has been argued, here is a way of coming in true answer is somewhere in the middle, called effect to the same conclusion that you came to with median. Do you really trust that? Especially when the Climate Act, only a way which you failed to lay they also concede that all these major feedback emphasis on. effects, including permafrost melt and all the rest of You can see it in the graphic at a stroke on page 26. it, are left out of the model and therefore have the Do not think of this as some horrific, repellent science value zero. I do not trust that. I do not know anybody graphic. This is a very simple piece of arithmetic. who does. I am aware of the very determined effort to What you see there basically is the Climate Act persist with this approach by the UKMO. I am very budget divided between the LDCs, the less-developed aware of the fact that they have cloned this all the countries, and DCs, the developed countries, with way through into IPCC AR5 drafts and we will be their convergence rate, the top line, by 2050. What landed with this for the next five or six years when you see above that is the full range of uncertainty the Arctic completely goes pop. If they want to do published by the UKMO and the Climate Change that, that is their choice. If you want to be guided by Committee between their so-called 90-percentile and that, that is your choice. If you do not, that is also 10-percentile concentration outcomes, which we your choice. But the key question is, why are they convert to a weight. We then take that weight—those doing this and who is telling them to do this? That is are stock weights; they accumulate from the the real question. atmosphere—back into flow equivalent weights around that budget. In other words the budget could be bigger or could be smaller. So you have that Q29 Caroline Lucas: Thank you. I have one more technique. very specific question, which is to do with the Met If you go to page 24, it is the same thing again. It is Office projection that carbon dioxide concentrations probably easier to grasp there. The way they set it up in the atmosphere will reduce after emissions peak. was that the median was most probable, that Aubrey Meyer: There has been so much heat about concentrations were going to fall at that rate. I do not this. To put it bluntly, just person to person, it is accept that, but I know that is what they have said and nonsense, but they insist that it is not. I think what is they are very determined to hold that position. So, an indication of the extent of uncertainty that attaches holding to that position, we recalibrate the budget to to the UKMO judgment relates to page 20 in this be the weight equivalent of all those risk levels in the evidence, and I think this is really important for this uncertainty on concentrations delivering that median inquiry. Unbeknownst to me, after the previous concentration outcome. On page 23 that gives you a engagement like this in 2009, the UKMO submitted a budget range that goes from the upper 473 Gt right memo to the Committee addressed to me. down to the lowest, which is 204 Gt. That hits zero Unfortunately nobody told me about it, so I only emissions by 2050, roughly speaking. That is exactly found out about it a month ago. What it said was, “Mr what we argued to you in the previous inquiry in 2009 Meyer is wrong. We did include the coupled carbon and that is exactly, or as near as dammit, what James cycle modelling into the runs from the Climate Act.” Hansen and Bill McKibben and all these people who I thought, “Well, that is news to me.” I challenged the take this issue of seriousness much more seriously issue of 100% sink efficiency by 2050 because I did than perhaps we do are saying as well, at least that. not think that was credible, but I did not know that To answer your question, should the Climate Act be bit. You then went to look and see what they actually used to deliver us more serious targets, if you do that did and that is what you can see on page 20. They kind of an analysis you can say to our dear colleagues split the difference, roughly, between the coupled and in the Met Office, “In fact you may not have realised uncoupled model. Okay, it is an uncertain area, but it, but you were saying this.” It is worth putting to the complete novelty that they introduced, them and pointing out to them also that at the median contradicting 20 years of reporting by the IPCC from case value where they asserted a full budget with that 1990 through to 2007, was the sudden introduction, one falling concentration path that you see, they because of this carbon fertilisation effect being extraordinarily—or was it the Climate Change included, of the fact that concentrations did not rise, Committee or was it both of them, as I am unclear as which is what the C4MIP group they quoted said they to who pecked whom in this order?—gave an only did. They magically—in fact, the model was called 44% likelihood of achieving this magical 2 degrees. That is not exactly a high confidence level even if you Magic—reduced, and there you can see it. In other have a high confidence in the goddamn model. words, the sinks absorbed more than we emit within So, Caroline, it is a good question. That is the best 40 years, if you follow that budget. way I could configure answering it. But it basically What I am saying to you now is that I do not believe puts the whole approach that the Climate Change Act that result for the simple reason that all the feedback represents on trial itself because the primary thing is effects they list as omitted themselves would that it makes no sense from a policy point of view to guarantee that that would not be the case. That is a mix up budget emissions and feedback emissions very mild way of stating what my real extent of when nobody has a clue which is which with a range anxiety is about all of this. So when Nicholas Stern of uncertainty—I kid you not, look on page 22—that rightly called for a new approach to the modelling, tells you that if you have the lowest concentration that is a primary area in which this new approach outcome, the entirety of that budget is returned to the needs to be developed and I hope you will really press sinks. If you have the highest concentration outcome, the Government with emboldened recommendations nearly 100% of it is retained in the atmosphere. The to respond on that point. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 13
12 June 2013 Aubrey Meyer
Q30 Simon Wright: I have a couple of questions Rights, which essentially says that it should all be about the international political context of your work. income based. This sounds a little daring, let’s say. As we know, we should have binding climate change C&C is not income based; it is entirely emissions targets agreed by 2015 for 2020 onwards. I wonder if based. It says—get your head around this one if you there are any thresholds or tipping points that you can; I can’t—that the US must accept negative would point to on the near horizon that would mean emissions entitlements by the year 2025, and that is an international agreement would be too late. the US and its friends. “This is better than C&C Aubrey Meyer: Good question. What can I say? I because it is fairer.” I said to them, “I have only one can’t give you an answer of a higher degree of question on this international sort of bonding exercise certainty about that really serious matter than anybody you are encouraging. Do you have any support on alive because the blunt fact is that none of us knows. Capitol Hill for this approach?” The answer quite There is the possibility that we have already traversed literally has been, “No, and we don’t need it because so many tipping points, invisibly—these are unseen they are aliens. Aliens inhabit the Senate at this time.” unknowns that you go over—that it may already be I take a deep breath and say, “Well, good luck”. too late and therefore all this prognosis of having an Chair: I think we want precise questions. We are international binding agreement by 2020 that running out of time. somehow causes all this to go away is a pipedream in which case, as I say, the contrarians have won. The Q31 Simon Wright: Very quickly, we are moving only way to respond to that situation is a bit like the towards an agreement that may or may not include way a parent would respond if their child had decided some of the feedback effects that you have referred to experiment with crossing the motorway, aged five. to. What do you think the effect would be of including You snatch it back and say, “Don’t go there. It is a uncertain feedbacks on the likelihood of an certainty that you will get run over.” A precautionary international agreement? Would including more approach is to realise the danger, to make an stringent targets alongside uncertain feedbacks make assessment of the likelihood of getting across to the international agreement less likely? other side without getting run over, realise the odds Aubrey Meyer: I know no analogy to give a are against you, and to play safe and stay on the comforting answer to this, but it is a bit like telling pavement. That is a simple, everyday kind of parental the doctor not to tell a patient how sick it is because guidance model. it will make it miserable or make it less likely that it In respect of the international agreement, the most will live cheerfully. It is a real headache. As far as the poisonous effect in all of this has been from the word IPCC is concerned, Bob Watson said in San Francisco go—God knows I have been there 25 years now—this as ex-chair last year, “We have made a point in the politics of blame, “It’s not me, your honour. It’s them IPCC of erring on the side of caution and what done it!” I can tell you, tragically in response to conservatism because if we didn’t we would be the UK Government and friends having fronted C&C shredded by the contrarians.” And you think you can’t at COP-15 in 2009 with the prescription of C&C play tactical games and footsie-footsie with 2050—it has been christened now C&C 2050, not for contrarians under the table about this. Just be candid my pains—the Chinese were so incensed about it, you and be honest about what you know and about what have seen a plethora of academic literature coming you do not know, and do not claim to have the God’s from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and so truth and the exclusive right to hold the microphone. on, saying, “Convergence, even immediate convergence is not enough. We want accumulated per Q32 Chair: I think that is the end of our allocated capita convergence. You had it all in the past. We must time. Obviously, it is a very complex issue. Thank have it all in the future. Just get out of the way.” This you for coming along this afternoon and also for the is not international consensus building, I tell you. The evidence that you submitted. international programme to accommodate this from Aubrey Meyer: Thank you for everything you have the radical side in the West is to develop a concept you done for the last at least 20 years. may have heard of called Greenhouse Development
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Professor Andrew Shepherd, University of Leeds, and Professor Myles Allen, University of Oxford, gave evidence.
Q33 Chair: I welcome you both to our session this to express our condolences there? Dr Offord is going afternoon. I think you realise that our time is limited to commence the questioning. and we are going to be constrained by votes in the Dr Offord: I would like to ask Professor Allen a House as well. question about global temperatures. Recently some Before we get into the detailed questioning from my people have dismissed climate change because of the colleague Dr Offord, may I say to you, Professor flatlining of global temperatures. Temperatures have not risen as fast as we previously predicted, or had Shepherd, we were very grateful for the evidence and been predicted by climate models, even though we help that we received with our Arctic report in respect know that emissions do continue to rise year on year. of your late colleague, Professor Laxon, and we wish cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 14 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
12 June 2013 Professor Andrew Shepherd and Professor Myles Allen
What do you make of such claims? pack that remained was in fact at the end of last Professor Allen: The assertion that temperatures have summer thicker than the previous year. So it is more not risen as fast as predicted is simply wrong. There complicated than people have believed. However, in is a range of predictions made, and in fact the the following winter—this last winter—there was a temperatures of the past decade have been pretty reduction in the sea ice thickness as well. We see that much exactly as was predicted for this decade back in from our latest results. That sets a different story for the 1990s. It was an astonishingly accurate prediction. this year because the sea ice pack going into this On the issue about what the latest data imply for the summer is thinner than it was at the beginning of last future, there have been a number of papers published year. So, all else being equal, we would expect to see recently that suggest that the highest responses of the another significant increase in the amount of sea ice current climate models—the models right at the melting this year. extreme top of the range of behaviour we are getting at the moment—look less likely, but the bulk of Q35 Martin Caton: Do we understand fully the models are still, within the range of uncertainty, reasons for the record Arctic melt? consistent with the observations. As I stressed in my Professor Shepherd: Of last year? It is a combination little information note that I provided you with, there of the long-term climatic changes that the Arctic is is no reason to see what is happening at the moment experiencing, and that is priming the sea ice pack to as a reason to abandon mitigation. be more vulnerable. The sea ice has been thinning for Chair: I have just realised that it was going to be a few decades as well—the satellite data show us Martin Caton who was going to ask this series of that—at least for the past 20 years. That makes it more questions. I do apologise. I will revert to Mr Caton. vulnerable to disintegration through melting, and that it is a fairly long-term process, but also to these Q34 Martin Caton: What I was going to ask about episodic storm activities. That is what happened last was the results of the CryoSat-2 research. Can you tell year. It was a combination of the thinning, which us something about that? primed the ice to be more prone to destruction, and Professor Shepherd: As you heard, the evidence that the actual event that destroyed it. All things being was submitted before was by my colleague Seymour equal, that could happen in the future. Laxon and my other colleague, Katharine Giles, both of whom died in accidents this year. We are grateful Q36 Martin Caton: When we conducted our Arctic for the work that they have done. I run the centre that inquiry last year, we asked several witnesses when they were part of. Our centre is an outfit that looks at they predicted that we would see ice-free summers in satellite observations, as you have said, and CryoSat the Arctic and we got a range of responses then from is the most recent mission we have. 2015 to about 2030. I notice Mr Meyer today has When Seymour talked last year, we only had two come to next year. Do you have an answer to that? years of data and so we did not have a great deal of Professor Shepherd: There are two ways to predict information to give you. Since then, we have changes in the future. One of them is to extrapolate published some studies using the data and we have the observations that we have right now. It is not a found that the instrument is working very well in the very sophisticated method. Those are the predictions way that we expected it to work. It is now detecting that remove the summertime ice pack in the coming 10 times as many sea ice floes as the previous mission. years. If you look at the climate models— The sea ice cover in the Arctic is not a single entity. notwithstanding the criticism they have just received, It is lots of different icebergs, if you like, and it is and I am sure that they will be defended in a important for us to be able to detect every single moment’s time—around half of them predict that the iceberg. What we see from the data, when we compare Arctic region will be sea ice free by 2060. It is fair to it to the previous missions, is that the sea ice in the say that there are omitted processes in those models Arctic has decreased in thickness as well as in area that lead the median or mean predictions of those over the past 10 or 20 years. The changes in thickness models to overestimate the extent of the sea ice pack. are just as important as the change in area, so the total So the observations still fall outside confidence limits reduction in volume of sea ice is somewhere between of those predictions and you might expect the Arctic 20 and 40 cubic kilometres per year over the past region to be sea ice free some time shorter than 2060. decade. Some of that is due to reduction in area and I would say within two decades would be a more some to thickness. realistic prediction. We also see some interesting things about the inter- annual variability, which leads us to believe that Q37 Martin Caton: Is your CryoSat data helping to looking at one year’s worth of data—and most climate harden up on that? scientists know this in any case—is not a good way to Professor Shepherd: Absolutely. Our centre works on analyse climatic variability because we have episodic collecting observations, but also incorporating or events, sometimes associated with weather, which developing new physics-based models of how the sea drive inter-annual variation. So the sea ice minimum ice pack interacts with the atmosphere and the ocean. from last year, for example, was largely driven by a The performance of those models needs to be very intense storm event that destroyed some of the evaluated first before you can build them into a sea ice pack. That is what most people understand to climate model, and we do that. Then we build them be the case. When we look at the CryoSat data, we into climate models and we have a very fruitful see that in fact that storm not only destroyed the sea collaboration with the Met Office to improve the ice pack; it compressed it together and the sea ice physics within those models. It is not a binary cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 15
12 June 2013 Professor Andrew Shepherd and Professor Myles Allen situation. It is a fluid situation. We are aware of the looking carefully at the most recent decade. In deficiencies, but we do strive to improve the models summary, what we are seeing is a 25% to 30% that we have. revision in the upper limit, with no change in the lower limit, of the so-called transient climate Q38 Martin Caton: From what you began by saying response. That is the warming we would expect at about annual variations—I suspect I might already about the time we reach double CO2. An even more know the answer to this—do you have any idea what useful number for this Committee is a new concept is the outlook for this year’s summer melt season? that some of you may recall my talking about the last Professor Shepherd: I am not a meteorologist. There time I spoke. I can’t remember who was there, but I are several meteorologists in the room. They perhaps talked about the total carbon budget in terms of what will not make intermediate climate predictions, but was underground before we started burning it and what we saw from last year is that the destruction of putting it in the atmosphere. It has emerged that there a significant part of the sea ice pack, as I have said, is a very simple relationship between the total amount was due to an anomalous weather event. It is true to of carbon we dump in the atmosphere and the say that its vulnerability was associated with how thin temperatures we get to. When we first pointed this out the ice was at that time. People have looked at the in 2009 we were giving 2 degrees per trillion tonnes state of conditions just from temperature changes— as a ballpark central estimate. More recent work has that is the heat exchange between the atmosphere and revised that down a bit. We would now say a range of the ocean—and they believe that last year would have central estimates would be 1 to 2 degrees per trillion been a record minimum in any event, even had the tonnes. Given that we had 4 trillion tonnes available, destruction of sea ice through weather not occurred that is plenty of carbon to take temperatures up to last year. When we look at the data that we have right whatever temperature you might wish to contemplate now, the sea ice is thinner at the start of the season or not wish to contemplate, as the case may be. So the than it was last year, so that would lead you to believe, idea that these revisions make mitigation unnecessary all things being equal, that the sea ice might be thinner is fanciful. even still at the end of this summer than it was last year. Q41 Dr Offord: Apart from climate sensitivity, are there any other factors that are affecting global Q39 Martin Caton: How do you see research on sea temperature rises? ice volume progressing? Professor Allen: Clearly, we have natural variability Professor Shepherd: Absolutely the key problem to going on in the record and probably contributing to be solved is the way that the sea ice interacts with the the discrepancy between the model simulations and ocean. We believe that the ocean delivers more heat observed temperatures over the past decade, along and causes more melting than climate models with a contribution from drivers of climate that may currently allow. That is well understood and people have been left out of these runs. You should bear in are working to try to improve their models in that mind that the runs that we are doing now for the regard. But also the way that the reduction in the sea Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change were in ice cover alters the ocean surface properties—for effect designed back in 2005, using projections of example, the drag on the atmosphere that in turn affect what, for example, atmospheric aerosol loadings atmospheric conditions and patterns of atmospheric might have been. And if those projections are different circulation that include weather changes—is from reality, and that will be affecting that something that is important for us to look at in the discrepancy. So other things are affecting climate, but future as well. So the way that the ice interacts with it is very important to understand that in the big the ocean and the atmosphere needs to be studied in picture what drives peak temperatures is cumulative more detail. You would think that this is something emissions of CO2, so this number of 1 to 2 degrees that is commonly known, but in fact a sea ice floe per trillion tonnes of carbon is firming up. It is might be something the size of this room and of interesting that when we published the paper saying it course you can’t expect to incorporate that into a was about 1 to 2 degrees per trillion tonnes of general circulation model that might have a resolution carbon—that is, recently, when we gave this update— of 25 kilometres. So we have to parameterise these a lot of the contrarians came out and said, “Well, this processes and we are moving forwards and improving is what we were saying all along.” If everybody can those parameterisations. agree on that, then we can perhaps move forward, Chair: Thank you. I will now turn to Dr Offord. I because that is a perfectly reasonable working number would also thank Professor Allen for the further piece to consider the budget and it does not, as I stress, of evidence that was submitted to our Committee imply that we can relax in mitigation efforts. today. Q42 Dr Offord: Would simpler climate change Q40 Dr Offord: Professor Allen, I understand that models, based particularly on temperature trends your work shows that the climate is less sensitive to rather than emissions, better reflect your observations? carbon emissions than some people have asserted. Professor Allen: It would always be foolish to Bearing that in mind, do you feel that there is any extrapolate. I don’t know what a climate model based case for a change in our emissions target? on a temperature trend would look like unless it was Professor Allen: The short answer is no. It is just fitting a straight line to 10 years of data, but I am important not to oversell the adjustments to the sure you would not want to fit a straight line to the climate system properties that have come out from last six months of data and say that we will be cooking cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 16 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
12 June 2013 Professor Andrew Shepherd and Professor Myles Allen by Christmas. It makes no sense to just extrapolate tighten them as necessary as the new science comes temperature trends. However, we should seize on in. A much more robust approach, we are suggesting, simple relationships where we can find them because would be a regulatory one where you essentially it is very easy to make this topic very complicated. In impose a regulation on the fossil fuel industry to begin the little information note, I did point out there is a to sequester carbon now, anticipating that they might really simple way of thinking about the budget in that have to up the rate at which they sequester carbon in, figure 1. If we want to keep the budget below a trillion say, 2030, when temperatures reach 1.5 degrees, if tonnes, and emissions are currently going up at they do reach 1.5 degrees by then, and we discover roughly the rate I am showing, a couple of per cent that we need to raise our game. So the bottom line I per year, then we need to decrease from now on, on am suggesting is that the short-term budget approach, average, by 2.5% per year. If we discover that the which we tend to be fixated on both within the UK response is slightly less high than previously thought, and internationally, is very difficult to adapt to so in fact if we only get 1.5 degrees of warming per emerging science. Although economists say trillion tonnes instead of 2 degrees of warming per regulatory approaches are less optimal, it might in fact trillion tonnes, then it means we have to reduce be much easier to adjust to the emerging science. emissions on average by 1.5%, or 1.4%, per year instead of 2.5% per year. But given that emissions are Q44 Caroline Lucas: What technical barriers might currently going up, depending on exactly which there be to doing that tomorrow or within a short period you choose, of the order of 2% per year, the time? difference between needing to reduce at 1.25% per Professor Allen: There are no insuperable immediate year and needing to reduce at 2.5% per year is really technical barriers. It is a bit like peak oil. We just do neither here nor there as far as climate policy is not know how much it is going to cost, and I do not concerned. They need to come down. That is the think we are going to find out how much it is going bottom line. to cost by offering to pay for it, which is essentially what we are doing at the moment by paying for Q43 Dr Offord: I also believe that you suggested a demonstrator plants. The only way you are going to new way of tackling emissions by using carbon find out what carbon capture and storage costs is by sequestration to ensure the safe limits on cumulative making it compulsory for industry to do it. They will emissions are not breached. Can you explain to me almost certainly then discover that it is a lot cheaper particularly what the pros and cons of that approach than they are claiming it is at the moment. are? Professor Allen: It is not a new technology or fix in Q45 Caroline Lucas: At the moment, other people that way. It is a new approach to climate policy and it are saying that the technology could be 15 to 20 is particularly motivated here by trying to make the years away. setting of climate policy less vulnerable to new Professor Allen: Let me give you an example. A few science. One of the things we have discovered to our years ago Chevron and others discovered a gas reserve cost as the scientists, in the reactions to this recent off Australia that was mixed with a very large amount paper about revising down the estimates of the of CO2. They were told by the Australian response, lots of people jump on this and say, “We’ve Government, “You can only pump that gas if you bury got another 10 years so we don’t need to worry about the CO2,” and as somebody within the industry put it this.” So it is any excuse to do nothing. If you are to me, “We thought about it for about five minutes setting climate policy entirely in terms of these short- and we said yes.” Mandatory sequestration works. It term budgets, then whenever you get a bit of good is easy. You just implement it. Anybody who sells news from the scientists it can be spun as, “Okay, we carbon should be required to be burying CO2.Itis don’t need to do anything for the next commitment very simple. period.” On the other hand, if you ever get a piece of bad news from the scientists, of course you can’t go Q46 Caroline Lucas: Is it happening there now? back and say we should have done more in the last Professor Allen: This plant is being built right now commitment period. So you end up, as Professor and as of next year will be the largest sequestration Meyer was suggesting, that it looks like the only plant in the world. It required no carbon price. It was sensible climate policy is the sort of extreme just they were told to do it and they did it. This precautionary one where you take the most pessimistic industry can do stuff. possible view in order to ensure that you never get anything other than good news coming in from the Q47 Dr Whitehead: Could I return to the vexed scientists. That, however, makes you vulnerable to the issue of feedbacks? We hear and we have heard, as fact that that outer limit on the response is the most you mentioned, the idea that when you roll in together uncertain part of our science. Trying to quantify all the known unknowns, unknowns and so on, take a those low-probability, high-impact events that precautionary principle at the bottom of that rolling Professor Meyer was talking about is the hardest part up and, as you say, then the only good news after that of our science. is good news. However, there are, I consider, a range So what I am suggesting is that a much more robust of different probabilities within that. There are some way of framing policy would be to explicitly set a absolutely catastrophic unlikely events, as you have policy in place that can be adjusted to the emerging mentioned. There are some feedback mechanisms that evidence. Short-term budgets are essentially assuming we do not know as much as we should know about, that future politicians will have extraordinary nerve to but nevertheless have a fair degree of understanding cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 17
12 June 2013 Professor Andrew Shepherd and Professor Myles Allen about, and there is also a fair degree of likelihood to millions of exhaust pipes. It does not make a lot of them. What sort of position is the research in terms of sense. Upstream is what works and the way a that sort of gradation of feedbacks? mandatory sequestration regime would work is that Professor Allen: There are clearly feedbacks that we you would make it a requirement that if you want to do not know about and feedbacks that we do know dig up fossil carbon and if you want to sell it, you about that are not included in the current climate have to prove that carbon dioxide is being buried at models. It is important to stress that, for example in the appropriate rate. It need not be the same carbon the latest IPCC assessments, a lot of these carbon dioxide, of course. You can pay somebody else to do cycle feedbacks that were discussed earlier may not it. But that would be the way forward. have been taken into account in the explicit RCP- The key point is that what this approach would mean driven simulations of the large climate models, but is that we would be capturing the cheap carbon now— they were taken into account in the sort of budget the stuff that would otherwise be burnt and vented to analysis that was done afterwards to try to work out the atmosphere in coal-fired power stations—rather what the implied carbon budget was for these different than venting it into the atmosphere and then capturing scenarios. Revealingly, when you take these feedbacks it much more expensively later. So, while CO2 is still into account, or when you take into account the very readily available, let’s just get on with it. feedbacks that we know about, many of these scenarios suggest that a 2 degree future requires Q51 Dr Whitehead: Isn’t there a missing third of significant negative anthropogenic emissions for much this? I fully appreciate what you are saying, that you of the second half of this century. Obviously negative institute a regulatory regime that has a regulatory gas anthropogenic emissions means capturing CO from 2 tap of 1 to 12 so that you could turn up the anti-gas the air by some mechanism and burying it tap, depending on the nature of the emerging science underground, or getting it out of the active carbon as that relates to feedbacks and refining of the level cycle somehow. of carbon emissions and so on. However, there is this element that I find difficult to quantify—and I don’t Q48 Dr Whitehead: So, geo-engineering, know the extent to which emerging science is doing effectively? that—and that is how human action deals one way or Professor Allen: That is a red flag for many people— another with the intensity of feedbacks once one Dr Whitehead: That is why I mentioned it. knows what the intensity of that feedback is likely to Professor Allen: If you call any negative emission be. I did give the example earlier of albedo effect and scenario a geo-engineering scenario, this would be a black carbon, and there is a whole range of other form of geo-engineering. It is the carbon dioxide examples that one can give in terms of mitigation of removal end of geo-engineering. particular effects feeding into the overall effect by particular policy instruments. Is that something that Q49 Dr Whitehead: If you are talking, for example, you— regulatory sequestration as a result of carbon Professor Allen: Yes. The key thing to focus on here production, then the logic of the next phase is regulatory capture without carbon production. is the fact that different effects operate on different Professor Allen: The key point is that if we are facing time scales and fast effects are relatively easy to a future where we might need substantial levels of respond to because you realise that it is having an negative emissions, we need to be developing the effect, you stop it, effect solved. The real challenge technology and the expertise and the experience now. we have are the cumulative effects, particularly CO2. Above all, we need the experience in which reservoirs You put a tonne of CO2 into the atmosphere and its are going to leak, because some of them will. We need impact will persist for millennia. So that is the to be building that experience up now. We can’t leave irreversible process and that is why we need to be it until the 2040s before we start to deploy large-scale readying ourselves for the possibility that by 2100 we carbon capture and we certainly can’t leave it until the may well be pumping CO2 back out of the 2060s, when we start to try to do it in a negative atmosphere. We need to be prepared for that emissions mode where it is all too little too late, it is eventuality. I am not suggesting that it is necessarily fantastically expensive and it is also the most going to happen, but that is one of the eventualities dangerous way of doing it. we need to be working towards. Carbon capture is such an obvious part of the century time scale view Q50 Dr Whitehead: But what that scenario means, of this whole phenomenon and it bemuses me why it even what we talk about in terms of individual carbon is not a higher priority—I am not a carbon capture backpacks under conversion scenarios, for example, is specialist at all; I am just a climate modeller, but I that those must continue reducing over a considerable step back and I look at the problem as a whole and period of time after the magic date of 2050 and it see all this carbon sitting underground, most of it in needs to be modelled, presumably. India and China, and everybody having every Professor Allen: On how you would implement this, intention of using it. Without this technology it is we would argue that the right point to manage the going to end up in the atmosphere, so why are we not carbon budget is as the carbon comes out of the going all out to make sure that technology is available ground. We have the rather curious arrangement that to our children when they need it? carbon comes into Europe through a handful of pipes and holes in the ground and yet we try to regulate the Q52 Dr Whitehead: Or don’t use it in the first carbon budget of Europe through millions and place, presumably? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 18 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
12 June 2013 Professor Andrew Shepherd and Professor Myles Allen
Professor Allen: If this Committee is confident that undermining of that, in my view at least, by the media. we can ensure that India’s coal is not used by the My question is, from your perspective, what is the citizens of India in 2080— best way to try to close that chasm? Dr Whitehead: Technically. Professor Allen: I know—as I commented in an Professor Allen: I take your point. earlier article, David Rose is a neighbour of mine and we frequently have conversations about this—there Q53 Dr Whitehead: Yes, any more than we are are certain people who see climate change as an evil likely to be confident that all that use of coal will then plot by the European Commission to take over their be sequestered at the same time. lives and therefore reject it regardless of the science. Professor Allen: I would place greater confidence in For the record, I would not necessarily put David our ability and the ability of the fossil fuel industry as Rose into that category, but I suspect many of his a whole to address the problem than I would in our readers would probably fit into the category. I think ability to tie the hands of the Indians of 2080 and tell the problem is the way that the whole issue has been them not to touch their coal. That is a relative framed to people. If you tell people that the only statement. solution to this problem is a wholesale reinvention of their lifestyle, then people who do not necessarily Q54 Caroline Lucas: We have been talking a lot want their lifestyle reinvented for them find they have about the science of climate change and I wanted to no option but just to reject the whole issue entirely. talk more about the politics and the psychology of it, If it was seen as bickering over the level of regulation in a sense. We have the extraordinary situation that, as in a large and not particularly popular industry, we the seriousness of climate change becomes ever more could be in a different place to the place we are in evident, we also have the growth of climate scepticism now. We could be arguing about how much carbon or whatever we want to call it. The media clearly is Shell should be sequestering next year. I put it to you not playing a helpful role. Professor Allen, you had a that if that was the argument, people’s views on it really interesting article in the Mail on Sunday a would be very different from what they are now and couple of weeks ago. I do not know if you saw how we would be well on our way to solving the actual it was presented, but there was a nice big strapline problem. So that is why I am putting it to you. I have across the top saying something like “Green Eco Con” to make this pitch really hard because I know a lot of and the sense of what you were saying was utterly economists say regulation is wrong—it is distorted by everything else that was around that economically suboptimal—but if this conversation double-page spread, it seemed to me at least, in the was simply about the level of regulation of a particular Mail on Sunday. industry, an industry that is the most profitable Professor Allen: I hope the members of this industry in history ever, and that would include illegal Committee will appreciate that I wrote the words not industries as well, it would be a very different the layout. conversation. So I think the difficulty is the way we have allowed the problem to be framed as essentially Q55 Caroline Lucas: I was not for a second a lifestyle discussion rather than essentially a technical suggesting that you were responsible for the way in problem about how one particular industry deals with which it was presented, but that to me encapsulates its waste. what I am trying to talk about, which is that on one Caroline Lucas: I would love us to have more time, hand I want scientists to speak out more because there but I am sure that we do not, so thank you. is this chasm between what is the scientific consensus, Chair: Professor Shepherd and Professor Allen, thank largely, and public perception. But then when you both for your time this afternoon. Thank you very scientists do try to speak out more, like your article, much indeed. with which I was in agreement, you then have the
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Professor Julia Slingo, Chief Scientist, Met Office, and Dr Jason Lowe, Head of Knowledge Integration and Mitigation Advice, Met Office, gave evidence.
Q56 Chair: I start by welcoming you back to our does the public understand this issue, given the Committee, Professor Slingo, and also thanking Dr conversions of scientific evidence altogether? Lowe for coming along as well. I think that you sat Professor Slingo: I think this is at the heart of a lot in on the previous two sessions. I am sure there will of the difficulties we have. The science is incredibly be an opportunity for you to respond to some of the complex. We have to find ways to make that science comments that have been made. Without going there accessible without diminishing both the integrity of that science and the importance of the science at this stage, I want to take up where Caroline Lucas message. I think what we have learned is that it is left off with our previous witness and ask about public easy to dumb this down, and I think that a lot of that perceptions and the way in which there is a sort of has come perhaps from the way in which climate mismatch between accurate reports and inaccurate change has been couched over the last 20 years in reporting and what the Met Office has done to put that terms of global temperature values, so we are still right. But, then, isn’t there a deeper issue about how cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 19
12 June 2013 Professor Julia Slingo and Dr Jason Lowe talking about a 2-degree target and of course most effort on. Perhaps Jason would like to comment on people don’t understand what that means. It does not this. sound terribly challenging for them. I think what we Dr Lowe: On the general point of trying to need to talk about is what that means at the regional communicate climate science, we found in the AVOID and even local level, and it is this dangerous for programme we did not just address the climate science whom, when and where. So a lot of what I think we but we also looked at the impacts and at the have to do now is to personalise the message. We have technology associated with mitigation, for instance. to use the science that we know and understand to Certainly in my experience, what people are tending help personalise that message. Often I think we get to respond to is what the future will be like for them, scared about putting complex science out. My of which what the weather will be like is one experience has always been, since coming to the Met component, an important component, but it is about Office, that the more that we put our science out, describing the entire lifestyle. albeit in language that the non-specialist can The other thing I would add is, from the perspective understand, the greater the appreciation of what our of a working scientist, almost by our very approach job as scientists is in this whole debate, but also it is we try to be impartial and we are trying to take on a question of an educational role. board new evidence as it comes. It can be quite I also think very strongly that we need to put it into challenging sometimes if, for instance, we are dealing context. We should not be talking about the science with a very polarised view from either climate so much in abstract terms. Last week, we launched advocates or climate sceptics. the Climate Service UK with Ed Davey, the Secretary of State, and that is about making the science relevant, Q59 Chair: Just going back to what you were saying seeing how science can be used to the benefit of about communicating the science, in terms of your society to tackle what undoubtedly will be challenges own work, how frequently do you review what is as we go forward. It is a process, a dialogue, that we happening and how do you report that to the need to set up between us, the generators of the Committee on Climate Change, to Government science and the evidence, and the users of that Ministers? Is that reporting procedure you have of the evidence and that science who are making decisions work that you do an opportunity as well for you to get about their private lives, about their businesses, about the message across about what is happening? Government policy. I see the establishment of the Professor Slingo: Yes. There is no doubt that we Climate Service UK as pretty much of a landmark know that climate science moves forward and often at thing that the UK has done to help create a space in pace. Of course, the Met Office Hadley Centre which that dialogue can develop and, I hope, thrive. provides almost continual updates to our major stakeholders, DECC and DEFRA, and of course to the Government Chief Scientist, on policy-relevant Q57 Chair: You talked in your opening remarks advances in climate science. about the integrity of the science. I think that there is a sense that there is not the same integrity in terms of Q60 Chair: How frequent is that? the press reporting. Do you see that just as a natural Professor Slingo: It can be weekly, and often if a new response, a natural scepticism, or do you think there paper comes out in the literature, which they have is anything more deep-seated that is causing this seen, they will ask us to comment on it. For the cynicism to be there? Climate Change Committee itself, we certainly Professor Slingo: That is a difficult question. It is a engage in the process of updating the carbon budgets value judgment. I think that in some areas of the press and our evidence is sought as a formal part of that. there are undoubtedly opinions—I will not call it We are just beginning that process again to update our vested interests—that are formed not on the basis of best understanding—not just of the science we the best science, but because they believe that produce in the Met Office Hadley Centre, but of all presumably it will sell more papers, which ultimately the international science, all the evidence that is of course is a driver for many parts of the media. available from modelling and observations—to frame what we would consider to be the best scientific Q58 Chair: There is consensus among the scientists, advice we can provide. isn’t there? Professor Slingo: Absolutely, and yet I think we all Q61 Chair: How does that relate to the IPCC? see that balance is not given fairly between the Professor Slingo: That process occurs every two scientific evidence, the weight of the evidence, and years and of course we are a major player in the IPCC. the consensus among the scientific community, and At the fifth assessment report we have a large number indeed many people who are not climate scientists but of contributing authors and we have probably appreciate the scientific arguments, and the few who contributed more model simulations than virtually any would seek to deny that evidence. I think it comes other group in the world, so we take the IPCC process back always for us to how we communicate that very seriously. That being said, it is in a sense a science clearly, make it relevant, put it in context. It consensus view of the world scientific community and is very challenging. I can’t think of a science where because of that it can only happen every six or seven that challenge is any greater because virtually years because of the nature of the demands and of everybody knows about climate change and course taking account of the pace of the science. I everybody is concerned about it. It is perhaps think it is really important that between those something that we really do have to spend much more assessments we provide updated evidence. The cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 20 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
12 June 2013 Professor Julia Slingo and Dr Jason Lowe science is continually moving on and I think Professor Q63 Dr Offord: I am sure that we all agree there are Allen made the point that the simulations that we a number of factors that affect global temperature produced for the fifth assessment report were set in rises, particularly in response to issues such as motion eight years ago, the model development for greenhouse gases, including climate sensitivity. How that maybe a decade ago, so it is really important that much do we know about climate sensitivity and is this we communicate the latest modelling results and included in climactic models? science to Government on a continuous basis. Professor Slingo: As we have already heard from Dr Lowe: Can I add to that on the Committee on Professor Allen, we can use observations to assess Climate Change? If we take the dates of the fourth climate sensitivity. As far as the climate models are assessment of 2007, we worked very closely with the concerned it is an emergent property, not the climate Committee on Climate Change in 2008, going into model. It is a result from all the complex interactions 2009, and what we were doing there were the actual of the physical processes that go on in the climate simulations that had been well documented, but also system, from very fine scales to very large scales, reviewing the wider literature with them. We worked from short time scales to long time scales. It is, as with them again very closely and formally ahead of I say, an emergent property. It is really important to the fourth budget period and provided a understand that in no way are we putting in the answer for what we think the climate sensitivity is. It is also comprehensive review of our understanding of climate important that we do use observations in some ways to impacts and also thresholds and feedbacks in the check whether our climate models are within sensible climate system. We have started very recently—this bounds. Even with the latest updates to what we think month—an assessment of the climate budgets based the transient climate response is or the equilibrium on the new science that we have seen over the last climate sensitivity, using the last decade of one or two years. The time scale of that is designed observations, certainly the model we use and many of so it will deliver after the fifth assessment comes out the leading models around the world are still within so we can also take that view into account. In between the range of those estimates. those we have regular informal contacts with members of the secretariat. Q64 Dr Offord: Thank you. Professor Hansen told us back in May that the greenhouse gas effect meant Q62 Dr Offord: Your recent decadal forecast that more energy is entering the atmosphere than is predicts lower global temperature rises than you leaving it and he said that was creating a pipeline of previously thought. What prompted that change? stored-up warming. He warned that once the pipeline Professor Slingo: I think we need to be clear what is added to existing warming we would be getting the decadal forecast is trying to do. It is what we call a close to the boundaries of dangerous climate change, climate prediction from the current state of the climate even if emissions are stopped now. Do you agree with system. It is telling us much more about natural his assessment on that? variability in the climate system and very little that Professor Slingo: Yes. The lifetime of carbon dioxide relates to climate change per se. I think the one you is so long in the atmosphere and it is really important are alluding to is the one we published as part of our that we look at this as a cumulative problem. We research outputs to DECC and DEFRA at the end of should not look at what our emissions are in any last year in which we suggested that in the next five particular year. We know that the accumulation of years we were not expecting a very significant rise in carbon in the atmosphere and the response of various global temperatures. That forecast was made from the parts of the climate system, particularly the oceans, current state of the oceans and atmosphere at the end are quite slow. Therefore, even if we stopped emitting of last year, so it is really looking at the variability in today, we are committed to a certain level of warming the climate system—things like El Nino, things like out for the next century or so. Those changes are slow the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, and how they and the way in which the system comes back into will play out in the next five years. That forecast was equilibrium from the perturbed state that Jim Hansen very clear that the current state of particularly, the describes takes so long that we will end up at a different equilibrium state that will be warmer than oceans would continue to control global temperatures where we started, all other things being equal. Jason, over the next five years in this particular way. It says do you want to add to that? virtually nothing about climate change. I think again Dr Lowe: If I could say on the first bit, yes, we agree that was an example of the work being misrepresented with Professor Hansen’s view that there is a top of the in the media to try to make a story out of something atmosphere imbalance, for the reasons that Professor that we believe is a very important part of the science Slingo said. There are two other relevant points to that we need to do. I did produce a science report that mention. One of them is associated with this idea of explained the whole process of decadal prediction and climate sensitivity and just what processes are how we should interpret these forecasts. We took it as included. When I have consulted the literature that an opportunity to put our science out there and to Professor Hansen has published, he highlights that, on show the various elements that come into play when top of what we have traditionally talked of here as the you look at near-term climate change. It is this climate sensitivity, these very vast processes, there is intersection between anthropogenic global warming an additional set of earth system processes that may and natural climate variability in the system that lead to a higher value of sensitivity but on very long makes predicting the next five or 10 years or so really millennia time scales—for instance, associated with very challenging. changes in the ice sheets. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 21
12 June 2013 Professor Julia Slingo and Dr Jason Lowe
The other thing I would add is in terms of the target additional warming that you would get from those long-term goal that different people advocate. I think emissions would lie between 0.08 and 0.36 degrees C. from the Met Office point of view we would recognise That at least is now beginning to give us a bound, so that the science can provide guidance on the level of for him to say that we don’t think about these things— impacts, give or take uncertainty, as the climate we do. changes. We would probably also agree that we are learning more about potential thresholds and Q67 Chair: Wasn’t he saying all feedbacks? Wasn’t additional earth system feedbacks, but I don’t think that the issue? we would advocate one particular target such as 1.5, Professor Slingo: Yes, and I think we also know that. as Professor Hansen often puts forward.2 The one he did not mention is wetlands. We know wetlands are a massive natural source of methane in Q65 Dr Offord: My final question, perhaps slightly the current climate and we are looking at that. None cheekily, is, are you saying that now your forecasts of us would deny that some of these feedbacks are are saying that we won’t have any hot summers in the potentially large, and our overall view is that together next 10 years or so? they represent a positive feedback on the system. In Professor Slingo: Have our forecasts said that? I don’t other words, they will lead to additional burdens of believe they have. carbon in the atmosphere. We are trying, as knowledge develops and as observations improve, Q66 Martin Caton: Aubrey Meyer said that the Met working across the range of science disciplines that Office claimed to include all feedback effects in its you have to engage with, but we need to find ways to projections on global emissions when it had not. at least set the lower and upper bounds of what we Would you like to respond to that assertion? think will be the likely scale of these feedbacks, and Professor Slingo: Yes. It is absolutely untrue. We that is what we have done with the permafrost. have, as I think has already been made clear for the I should also say that we are just starting a major fifth assessment report, entered the fifth assessment programme of research and development with the with a full earth system model that includes feedbacks Natural Environment Research Council to build the associated with the terrestrial carbon cycle. It includes UK’s earth system model for the future, which we dynamic vegetation, so this is the long-term changes hope will enter the sixth assessment report. That is an in forests and shrub land and so on, ocean bio- activity that is going to draw on the best science that geochemistry and interactive atmospheric chemistry. exists among our terrestrial ecologists, our So, to say that we don’t include them is absolutely oceanographers, our ocean bio-geochemists. We are wrong. going to work with people who deal with the What we are very cautious about is not to introduce cryosphere, the ice and so forth. That is the way we processes—feedbacks that we know are either not can move forward and gradually develop an well constrained by observation so that we can understanding at least of what the range of risks we evaluate what is coming out or where the science is face are. We are a long way from being quantitative, not mature enough to be able to put something in. but I think we know far more about the potential Again, I come back to the integrity of the science. We bounds of some of these feedbacks than Mr Meyer could put an awful lot of these known unknowns into suggested. the model, but how would we know that the results Dr Lowe: Just to add something very specific here we were getting out were trustworthy? That doesn’t to do with how we have provided information to the mean we don’t look at them, and I think he raised the Committee over time. We have seen what we provide question of permafrost. It is correct that at the moment is a package of information that consists of we do not have a model of permafrost included in the quantitative information from model simulations, but earth system model and that is because we know that also information on our interpretation of the literature. there are still massive uncertainties in basically That goes from what we also provide to a whole range defining the depth of carbon concentrations that are in of stakeholders including DECC and DEFRA. What permafrost and those sorts of thing. we are seeing over time is more of those things that Nevertheless, we have worked with the international we were just starting to understand in the literature community to see what the range of likely outcomes perhaps in 2007 and 2008. We are getting to the point would be, and the example I will give is by the end now where we can start to make the first quantitative of the century under a high emissions scenario. That estimates. That is what the new model, the HadGEM2 is the RCP8.5. We can estimate it is somewhere ES model, is letting us do. What we are doing in the between 50 and 270 petagrams of carbon could be most recent piece of work specifically with the released and between 2 and, I think it is, 59 teragrams Committee on Climate Change, that I mentioned of methane. From that you can show that the earlier, is to ask the question, “Given the newer 2 The Met Office notes that Professor Hansen has discussed a quantitative understanding, what does that specifically range of global average climate targets in journal mean for the global carbon budgets?” I think it is publications. His recent paper (Hansen et al 2013, Environ. important to recognise that it is this whole package of Res. Lett. 8 011006 doi:10.1088/1748–9326/8/1/011006) includes information on the warming for the earlier information. It is about understanding the literature as “Alternative Scenario” by Hansen and Sato, noting that with well as building it, as understanding improves, into a climate sensitivity of 3°C, the peak warming is estimated the model. to be around 1.5°C for this scenario. This paper also discusses the potential need for lower temperature limits such as 1°C and an initial atmospheric CO2 concentration target Q68 Martin Caton: Is the objective to reach a stage of 350ppm. at some point where you can quantify all these cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 22 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
12 June 2013 Professor Julia Slingo and Dr Jason Lowe different feedback effects in your climate models, or supplementary evidence later, but the literature backs is that unrealistic? this up from a whole range of different model Professor Slingo: I think it is, what do you mean by structures. “all”? One of the other things that as scientists we have to make a judgment on is what the priorities are, Q70 Martin Caton: Given the direction of debate in because when you start to do the thought processes of some circles creating an alleged dichotomy between all the potential feedbacks that can go on in the system growth and tackling climate change, is there any and include those all in a model it would make it pressure on you as Met Office scientists to be more massively complex. Part of our job, and with our cautious than you would otherwise be on what is scientific colleagues, is to say, “What are the big needed to avoid dangerous climate change? things we absolutely have to cover off?” Professor Slingo: Certainly not. Our role in the Met For example, we have had a good look at the carbon Office is to provide the best underpinning science, cycle. We know where there are gaps in knowledge, honestly, transparently, openly. We place very highly but I think we have a bit of an understanding about the peer review process. Last year, for example, the the carbon cycle and its time scales of adjustment, but Hadley Centre published 149 papers in the leading then you say one of the limitations on the carbon cycle journals, with seven in Nature. For us it has to be will surely be the nitrogen cycle. We don’t include the absolutely about the integrity of the science. If we nitrogen cycle, but we have assessed potentially what don’t do that, I think I am failing as a scientist. This those limitations would be and in our view they are is deeply rooted in the way we do research and we big enough that we have to include the nitrogen cycle sometimes do have to say things that perhaps people going forward. don’t want to hear. But at the end of the day it is all It is an evolutionary process, but it is one where I about the truth and our best understanding of what the believe very strongly that we have to do it in a very science is telling us—not just our science, but structured way. We have to prioritise it in terms of obviously our peers around the world. what we believe are the magnitudes. We also have to prioritise them in the sense of the level of knowledge Q71 Dr Whitehead: Do you consider legal action that we currently have, and in the sophistication of the from the point of view of the Met Office? If you are observations and the comprehensiveness of the described as “the crazy climate change obsession that observations. If we can’t constrain the model and has made the Met Office a menace”, that appears to evaluate the model against observations, I think we be libellous, does it not? are going into fairyland, and I am very reluctant that Professor Slingo: It is a very difficult area for us, and we ever go into fairyland. It has to be strongly rooted. of course I get personal attacks that for many people would be considered libellous. In a sense, what would Q69 Martin Caton: Another criticism that Aubrey be gained by it, is my view? At the end of the day, Meyer made was that you overestimated how fast CO2 we have to carry on doing the job that we have been in the atmosphere will reduce, because he says carbon asked to do, which is to provide the best scientific sinks will not absorb as much as you predicted. Would evidence to support what decisions Government have you like to comment on that? to make, and increasingly what wider society will Professor Slingo: I will let Jason talk on that one. have to make. My job as Chief Scientist is just to Dr Lowe: I believe what is being referred to here is if ensure the integrity of that process. If people want to we look at a time series of the median output of the throw bricks at me then, yes, it makes me angry. It atmospheric CO2 concentration, what we will see in actually makes me very, very sad because science is the scenarios such as the 2016-R-4L is that the CO2 about the search for truth and it is about being honest, concentration is peaking partway through the century. and these people are not being honest. I don’t think It is actually peaking mid-century and then after the that it would further the cause of putting out the truth peak it is declining quite slowly. The temperature does of the research we do to take legal action. That is not decline, it is levelling out. The point of argument where I am. Jason, did you want to comment? You HadGEM2 ES—certainly my understanding of it—is are obviously the butt of this sort of thing too. that the peaking of CO2 and the decline begins before Dr Lowe: Personally, it makes me more determined the emissions have fallen to zero, the man-made to be impartial in the science that I do. I know that emissions. So, we are still putting man-made when I sit down and do a piece of research I am as emissions into the atmosphere, but we appear to be in impartial as I possibly can be. The same goes for the a situation where the CO2 concentration is falling. scientists around me who work in my team. In some You see that in a whole range of earth system models ways it is disappointing that not everyone is impartial, of different complexities from different groups. What but that is the world we live in, isn’t it? is happening is that during the period you increase the concentration—the period we are going through in Q72 Dr Whitehead: I think I probably agree with reality today and will go through over the near-term you, but I thought maybe I should ask. When you decades—the concentration of CO2 in the changing came to see us recently you talked about the Arctic climate actually alters the sinks. As we start to reduce and how climate change is affecting the Arctic. In the emissions, we have changed the sinks from the terms of emerging science, has there been any process present-day value, and we have changed them in such of looking at the view that you expressed when you a way that they are able to take up sufficient carbon came to see us previously and has your view changed that the CO2 concentration is able to peak and come at all—for example, in terms of the likely date for an down the other side. We could provide this as ice-free Arctic sea in the summer? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 23
12 June 2013 Professor Julia Slingo and Dr Jason Lowe
Professor Slingo: I came and spoke to you just over some very detailed budget analysis in the fully a year ago, I believe, on that. At that time, I said coupled model to understand the role of both bottom we were waiting for the CryoSat-2 data to confirm melt, because the ocean is gradually warming up as it particularly the volume loss, because very much the acquires more heat from the fact that we lose ice in critical aspect of what is happening in the Arctic is summer, and the way in which the winds and the the thickness of the ice and what that means for the atmosphere are driving the top surface melt or ice cover loss. We have heard from Professor disintegration of the ice. Shepherd today there are fantastic results coming out What we are seeing from CryoSat, and as was of CryoSat-2. It is an important landmark. What I said emphasised by Professor Shepherd, is that it is a very at the time—that I did not believe that the Arctic fine-scale, complex system and, as modellers, we are would be ice-free next year—still stands from all the still trying to model this, and we have to because of scientific evidence that we have seen. I think that the the computational constraints of relatively coarse best evidence coming out now from the fifth resolutions. One of the things that has been a real push assessment report, using all the streams of evidence, for us in the last few years is to develop prototype not just the model simulations, is that the most likely much higher resolution models to try to understand date is around 2030, which is what I believe I said where the gaps are in our lower resolution models that last year. we have to use for long-term prediction. That whole There is no doubt that as each year goes by we see process of using observations model theory is how we increasing evidence of the fragility of the system, and have to go forward. It is not one thing alone that therefore it is really important that we draw together drives progress in this field. all the best scientists to work on this problem, and that is very much what I have been working on in the Q74 Mark Lazarowicz: Some scientists have found last few weeks. Indeed, certainly going through in the that increased ice loss has occurred because of a next few months, we need to pull together the polar persistent change of early summer Arctic wind science community, particularly after the loss of patterns. Is this evidence of a tipping point having Seymour Laxon and Katharine Giles, which is been reached? devastating to the community. I do not think overall a Professor Slingo: No. I think that is probably a fair radical change in the science, but of course I was clear comment. There is no doubt that in the last few years then that this is a very complex system. It involves we have had some quite perturbed wind patterns the ocean, the atmosphere, the sea ice, natural around the northern hemisphere that may be variability, and, increasingly, weather variability and associated with a very persistent cold phase of the how the winds blow across the Arctic in summer. That equatorial Pacific, the so-called La Nina-type setup. hasn’t changed, and again our push is to understand We don’t know whether that is unusual, and certainly that system as best we possibly can and improve the the Arctic cyclone last summer that broke up so much processes in our models. of the ice was unusual, but not unprecedented. I think One of the very exciting developments for us in the what we are seeing is a system that is gradually Met Office is that we have made some very significant becoming more fragile. As the ice thins—and I have advances in our seasonal forecasting model and we talked about it can be forced from the top and warmed are now using that to forecast the progress of the from below as well—it is more susceptible to varying Arctic through the seasons. It is a research tool, but wind patterns. I think that is what is going on, rather what it does is allow you to immediately confront the than that the winds themselves have changed. model with observations of what is actually happening and what you are actually trying to forecast. That is Q75 Mark Lazarowicz: I will move on to another proving to be a very powerful way in which we can question that again raises the issue of whether there unpick the processes and gaps in our model versus are longer-term conclusions that can be reached or the observations. So I think we can make significant whether it is simply an event that we will just see process in this in the next few years and I am how things go in the longer term. The melting of the confident that we will be able to be more certain about Greenland ice sheet last year set new records. Have the future fate of the Arctic in the next two or three you drawn any conclusions from that, particularly in years. terms of supporting trends or in relation to your assessment of the risk to sea levels? Q73 Dr Whitehead: In terms of the CryoSat-2 Professor Slingo: You have to be very careful there results, are you incorporating that in terms of what because that was about the appearance of summer we have been talking about this afternoon: positive melt pools across the surface of Greenland. feedback particularly relating to albedo and the Throughout the seasonal cycle we have to look at the suggestion that, as you have mentioned, the persistent complete budget of the Greenland ice sheet. In terms change in early summer wind patterns and the extent of sea level, there has just been a major paper led by to which that raises a question of whether a tipping a colleague from Reading University on the various point has already been reached for those sort of contributions to sea level rise over the last century. effects? Looking through that, the conflicting evidence for the Professor Slingo: Yes, absolutely. These are the big contribution from Greenland just tells you where we issues there. The CryoSat-2 data have given us a are, which is this is really hard. One reconstruction benchmark around the ice thickness that helps us to shows a mass loss that is equivalent to 0.2 mm per see where the issues are in our sea ice model. We also annum rise in sea level and another one says that there know that the Arctic Ocean is warming up and we do is a mass gain equivalent to -0.3 mm per annum. This cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o002_steve_HC 60-ii CORRECTED 12.06.13.xml
Ev 24 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
12 June 2013 Professor Julia Slingo and Dr Jason Lowe is where we are, and we have to look at the system extreme weather. There are some papers that purport throughout the seasonal cycle, both through the winter to detect a change in northern hemisphere waves, the gain and the summer loss. Jason, I don’t know big gyrations, the blocking weather patterns that we whether you want to comment on this. saw recently when we had a bit of fine weather— Dr Lowe: In some ways you probably had the perfect whether they are becoming more locked and person to ask in one of your previous people. For stationary, stuck in a particular place, or whether instance, work published by Professor Shepherd trying larger amplitude. The whole notion that climate to reconcile the estimates of ice sheet mass balance change could manifest itself quite subtly through what has certainly been a step forward and tells us a lot we call climate disruption is something that we need more about the contributions from the different ice to spend more time looking at. In other words, it is sheet sources over the past couple of decades, but taking us from the global down to the regional. There even when we look to the latest generation of climate is a lot we still do not understand about what might models and climate projections, one of the weaknesses be the impact of the warming Arctic on our weather. is it is still very difficult to model the ice sheets at a Recent work that we have done at the Met Office high enough spatial resolution and include all those suggests that it certainly contributes to the likelihood processes such as how ice moves in outlet glaciers and of having a colder winter, but we have not yet found the feedbacks associated with the termination point of any detectable signal for summer. That does not mean those outlet glaciers. When we look at projections of that there is nothing there yet, but I think we do need sea level rise from the Greenland component, and to come together and say, “How much do we know? other components as well, we can still expect to see Where are the gaps? How do we detect that there is a quite wide error bars or uncertainty ranges for this change in our northern hemisphere weather patterns, IPCC assessment at least, I would expect. and if we can detect a change what do we attribute it to?” There are lots of factors, but the Arctic could Q76 Mark Lazarowicz: Finally, on a different point, be one of them and we need to be getting to grips I understand the Met Office is convening experts from with that. around the world to discuss the rate of summer Chair: Thank you very much indeed. We will be very melting in the Arctic at some stage in the near future. interested in any outcomes you get from that meeting Is that the case and can you tell us anything about of experts to look at that. It has been a lengthier that initiative? session than usual, so I thank you and the previous Professor Slingo: One of the things that is getting witnesses and the members of the Committee for this increasingly prominent in the media and debate lengthy session on this most important issue of carbon around scientific circles is whether the changes going budgets. Thank you very much indeed for your on in the Arctic are influencing northern hemisphere attendance this afternoon. weather patterns and producing essentially more cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 25
Wednesday 3 July 2013
Members present: Joan Walley (Chair)
Peter Aldous Caroline Lucas Neil Carmichael Dr Matthew Offord Martin Caton Mr Mark Spencer Zac Goldsmith Dr Alan Whitehead Mark Lazarowicz Simon Wright ______
Examination of Witness
Witness: David Kennedy, Chief Executive, Committee on Climate Change, gave evidence.
Q77 Chair: Can I give you a warm welcome to our Electricity Market Reform, and again that creates a session this afternoon, Mr Kennedy? Thank you for whole lot of risk. We think it is the right thing to do, coming along. It gives Parliament a good opportunity but at the moment there is a very high degree of to look in some detail at the work that you and your investor uncertainty and that has to be resolved if we colleagues have been doing. Could we start off with are to be successful moving to a low-carbon power the fifth annual report and the progress that you have sector, which is at the heart of the low-carbon been looking at in 2012? Could you set out for us the economy. So, there is the good news, but even in those parameters in terms of an end of school report; what areas we are worried about whether we can continue has been done well, what could have been done better with that rate of progress going forward. and what are the issues where more progress is There are other important areas where we have done needed? very little. An example is solid-wall insulation, where David Kennedy: Good afternoon, everybody. Let me that industry is not developed in this country at the give you a very short overview of a quite long report moment. If you look at energy efficiency improvement and then I am sure we can come back to specific in both the commercial and industrial sectors there is points as we discuss later on. really no evidence that that is happening, but there is The first thing to say is that there is some good news a big opportunity, so we need to do better there. If in the report that we published a few weeks ago. There you look at consumer behaviour change in transport, are some key measures that we have identified over as I said, new vehicle emissions are coming down, but the years where we did very well in 2012, and I will are we rationalising car journeys, are we reducing car give you a few examples of those. There were very miles? I think the answer is no, not really, so again high rates of loft and cavity wall insulation achieved we have to do better there. There is very little progress in 2012. It was a record year for adding wind power on renewable heat, which is again a central thing as generation to the system. As we have done in other we get further out in time to meet carbon budgets, years, new car emissions continued to come down particularly with heat pumps. Probably nobody here very significantly, so people are buying more fuel- has—or very few people here have—a heat pump in efficient cars. That is the good news. In those areas their house. That has to be a major part of the story we ask: can we expect to continue to progress as we in the future, and we have made very little progress. did in 2012 as we look into the future? The answer is So, there are some areas where we need to do a lot we are a bit worried about that. We are a bit worried better. The reason we are not doing well in those areas because we had a very effective policy called CERT is because we do not have policies and appropriate for low-cost energy efficiency measures in place until incentives that are encouraging people to pick those the end of 2012. We have replaced it with a light- things up. touch, market-based Green Deal where we think we If you look across the economy and build a picture as can’t have a lot of confidence—and the early data whole, what you can say is emissions in 2012 backs this up—that we will continue to succeed with increased by about 3.5%. In itself the fact that they these low-cost and very important measures like loft went up is not overly alarming, and you can explain and cavity walls. that in terms of two temporary factors. One is the Then if you move to the electricity sector, it was a weather. It was a relatively cold year in 2012, there record year in 2012 for wind generation coming on were more heating days and the average temperatures to the system. Those projects and investments were in the winter of 2012 were lower than the year before. developed many years ago in a different context where You can also explain it in terms of what we think is a there was a sense that we had a renewable energy temporary switch from coal to gas-fired generation in target that we were very committed to meeting, and the power sector. If you strip those two things out also funding was not seen as an issue several years what you find is there is something like a 1% annual ago. It has become a big issue. The levy control emissions reduction across the economy as a whole. framework is what everybody talks about now. They Then you say: is that enough to meet carbon budgets? were not doing that several years ago when these We think, based on the preliminary data, that we have projects were moving through the pipeline so they easily met the first carbon budget, covering the period could become operational in 2012. We are replacing 2008 to 2012, but before we say, “Oh, great,” we have the Renewables Obligation, the old system, with the easily met it and outperformed it largely because of cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Ev 26 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
3 July 2013 David Kennedy the recession that reduced energy consumption and Why haven’t we achieved the step change? Why have emissions. we not now achieved a 3% annual emissions reduction Again, because of the recession not because we are in 2012? I think you can argue there is a lead time for on the right path in terms of implementing measures policies to be developed and implemented. There is a to reduce emissions over time, it is likely that we will lead time for industry to respond, for supply chains to meet the second carbon budget with limited effort, so be built, for consumers to change their behaviour, and that is the period 2013 to 2017. If you look beyond so you would not expect overnight to make a step that at the third and fourth carbon budgets, if we don’t change, but it is getting to the point where the lead do anything to accelerate the rate of progress, then we time has been long enough that we should start to see would not meet those budgets. I have said that we those bigger emissions cuts over the next year and have something like an underlying 1% emissions two years. reduction across the economy. We need a 3% annual emissions reduction from now over the next 15 years Q80 Chair: You say we are getting to the stage to meet the fourth carbon budget, so clearly there is where the step change needs to come in. Who is still a lot more to do in terms of accelerating the rate responsible for doing that, and who are you most of progress. frustrated with for it not happening? David Kennedy: The key department to drive Q78 Chair: Would you say that more progress is emissions reductions is obviously the Department of needed in the areas where Government and policies Energy. The Department for Transport is another key are looking at how to plan now and put in place for partner for us in working with the Government. the long term? David Kennedy: I think it is twofold. We have made Q81 Chair: Have you broached this with them? Have progress in certain areas. We need to make more you asked them about this? progress in those areas. As I say, the risk is that we David Kennedy: Sure. We have ongoing discussions stop insulating cavity walls and the evidence says that about all of the areas that we have identified as being we have stopped insulating cavity walls in the first important to meet carbon budgets. Defra has an half of this year under the new policy. The risk is that important role to play, particularly on agricultural we do not get the low-carbon investments continuing emissions and waste emissions reductions. The to move forward in the power sector. The policies Treasury obviously has a central role because they hold the purse strings and if they are not on board— have to be right there to even keep up the rate of progress that we have achieved in those key areas, but there are other areas, and I have given you those Q82 Chair: In the discussions that you have had with examples, where we need policies with stronger each of those departments, are you confident that this step change is going to happen from them, both incentives to go from a situation where we are individually and in a joined-up way? achieving very little in renewable heat, in energy David Kennedy: Our view is that the foundations are efficiency improvement in the commercial and there, and that is what we set out in the progress report industrial sectors, to one where we are addressing the back in June. There is something to build on. It is very significant opportunities that we have identified not that we have achieved nothing; it is not that the there. Government has not moved forward in any direction. There are key policy developments and I think the Q79 Chair: The way you present it, it sounds as most important one is the Electricity Market Reform, though it is all okay, it is all running smoothly, a little but there is a lot for DECC to get right there. There bit of cold weather last year perhaps affected things, is a lot of risk still associated with where we are on and yet at the same time you have reported that we the Electricity Market Reform. There is a lot to do on really need to have this step change in respect of the Green Deal and on renewable heat policy. So, policy and behaviour change. First of all, is that step across each of the areas our view is we should not be change there? If it is not there, how is it going to complacent. There is a lot for the Government to do, come about? and it is not the case that energy policy is finished for David Kennedy: We framed that step change idea this Parliament, which is the view of some people. back in 2009. It was our first report to Parliament. The There is still a lot for this Government to do in order way we got to that was we looked at the emissions in to make sure we are on track to meet carbon budgets. the five years prior to that report and what the data said was before the recession emissions were not Q83 Mr Spencer: Could you give us a flavour of going up or down; they were pretty much flat. If you how high on your agenda is energy security and compare flat emissions in the future with what we continuity of supply? Do you consider that at all in needed, which was something like a 3% emissions your thinking? reduction to achieve carbon budgets, then clearly you David Kennedy: Absolutely, yes. It is high on our need a step change in the pace of what you are doing. agenda. You could not be a credible contributor to You might argue that we have started to make the step debates to advise the Government on energy policy if change, so we have gone from broadly flat emissions you did not take security of supply very seriously, and to a 1% emissions reduction in 2012 because of the actually we are required to do that. If you look at the implementation of those measures I have talked about, Climate Change Act, there is a set of things we have the insulation and the renewable power generation. to think about, to assess and analyse when we advise So, we have started to do that. the Government on carbon budgets, and security of cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 27
3 July 2013 David Kennedy supply is one of them. In the Electricity Market we are dealing here with incredibly high risks of Reform report that we published in May this year we potentially setting in place catastrophic climate went through the security of supply arguments, and change. Would you agree? there are two of them. One is: as we move to a low- David Kennedy: I agree. As a world at the moment if carbon power system, can we still keep the lights on we carry on the way we are going, we are exposed with intermittent power generation? The answer is not to risks of 2 degrees with 50:50 probability or yes, from a technical perspective, an intermittent thereabouts. We are exposed to risks of an expected system can be managed to keep the lights on. Then temperature change of 4 degrees or more, so clearly you ask if it is too expensive, and the answer is no, as as the world we need to do something. The carbon long as you have the range of flexibility options. budgets are the UK’s contribution to those global Then you can look at the positive arguments around emissions reductions that we all need to make security of supply. If you are building a low-carbon together. If we can do that, then we have a reasonable energy system, if you are reducing energy demand, chance of getting to 2 degrees or thereabouts. then you are less reliant on imports from places where Caroline Lucas: I suppose we can debate what we there is potential geopolitical risk, and you are mean by a reasonable chance, but I will leave it there. insulating yourself from volatile and potentially very David Kennedy: When you say it is 50:50 or 60:40, high prices in the future. There are some very positive the distribution of temperatures around that 2 degrees arguments around meeting carbon budgets for security is pretty focused on the 2, so it is pretty much 2 of supply, and there are not any negative arguments degrees whether you are talking about 60:40 or 70:30. against meeting carbon budgets because that would The thing that we are more concerned about and that undermine security of supply. we brought to this debate was let’s be really concerned about 4 degrees, because that is what we are on track Q84 Caroline Lucas: I feel that in the presentation for at the moment, and let’s make sure the probability that you have given so far there is a risk that people of 4 degrees, which would be catastrophic, is kept to could read it as an excuse for some complacency. I very low levels. am surprised that you are not sitting there and sounding more alarmed, because personally I am very Q87 Zac Goldsmith: Just a quick question about the alarmed. Later in our questions we will cover things committee; as I understand it, your committee’s job like consumption emissions, aviation and shipping initially is to set the budget, to set the targets, the emissions, but even on what you have told us so far, EMR, we have no decarbonisation target, we have a framework, and it is to assess the policies and the dash for gas, the Green Deal so far has had entirely likelihood of Government policies achieving those perverse impacts. So, the policies don’t look great. targets. Is it part of your remit to put forward policy The real question I wanted to ask you right now is ideas or is that out of bounds for the committee? It could you remind the Committee what level of risk the might help with some of the questions coming up. carbon budgets anticipate in terms of the likelihood of David Kennedy: As the Climate Change Bill was being able to remain below 2 degrees? going through Parliament, there was a lot of debate David Kennedy: In that broader sense, the carbon about the extent to which we would get involved in budgets are on a path to meet an 80% emissions policy, and it is something we have discussed over the reduction target in 2050. That comes from an years. We can’t talk about emissions reduction without assumption of a 50% reduction in global emissions in getting into policy, because we are not credible if we 2050. If you could achieve that, I think the balance of don’t do that. In particular we are not credible if we probabilities around 2 degrees is slightly above 50% just say, “Here is an opportunity.” We have to then but you would be 2 degrees slightly below— say are we likely to address that opportunity under the current policies, and if not and we are going to bank Q85 Caroline Lucas: The figure that I remember is that opportunity in the carbon budgets, we have to say 63%; that it is only giving us a 63% chance of how could you make that a realistic opportunity when remaining below 2 degrees. This whole edifice on we would not expect to deliver it now. So, that is our which the Climate Change Act and the committee is approach to policy. We draw a line, and we don’t get working is based on— into the very detailed aspects of policy. The Electricity David Kennedy: No, it is slightly less than a 50% Market Reform is a good example. We have said that chance of 2 degrees. first of all we need the Electricity Market Reform. We then recommended it should be on the basis of the Q86 Caroline Lucas: I think it would be helpful to contracts for difference. We have talked about the have it established. need for a carbon intensity target, but those are all David Kennedy: Yes. high-level things. We have not got into the very Caroline Lucas: Either way, if you were told that you detailed debates about the payment mechanisms for had a less than 50% chance of falling out of an the CfDs, for example, and the risk allocations. aeroplane if it was going somewhere, you probably would not feel all that comfortable about it. I am just Q88 Zac Goldsmith: If it is your view that saying that the levels of risk that we are accepting— collectively the reforms will not enable us to meet the and people seem to forget this in debates about targets, both in terms of emissions and energy climate change; not yourself, obviously. But in the security, your job is to blow the whistle on that, to general discourse there is a kind of assumption that if explain why. Your job is not to come up with an we do this then that outcome happens whereas in fact alternative policy. Is that right? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Ev 28 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
3 July 2013 David Kennedy
David Kennedy: The way we have worked is to say, reflected in their reports. You can debate and discuss “We don’t think this is going to deliver so here is a how far it goes beyond that Committee. set of things that we think the Government should consider in putting in place arrangements that will Q92 Neil Carmichael: In terms of accountability as deliver.” We quite often go for, “Here is a set of well? options that the Government should consider,” rather David Kennedy: In terms of accountability to than be overly prescriptive. Parliament? Neil Carmichael: Yes. Q89 Chair: Just before we move on to some of the David Kennedy: Again, I think that is the main body detail of all of this, one issue that has always that we are held accountable by. concerned me is the Climate Change Committee is set up under the Climate Change Act, reporting to Q93 Chair: But presumably it would be helpful for Parliament. It is not just the advice that you give to you if your annual report almost became an Government; it is the role of Parliament in all of this. institutional arrangement inside Parliament with at Given the level of frustration, at least in some least an understanding that MPs would attend and quarters, about the lack of a step change, how do you would be personally issued and want to find out more feel Parliament itself is able to put pressure on or about what is in your reporting? influence or direct or make sure there is informed David Kennedy: Absolutely, yes. If MPs would debate about all of this? Is Parliament sufficiently attend, if there were to be a debate, for example, geared up to take on board the responsibilities it has around the progress report to Parliament, I think that to receive reports from you as well and to deal with would be a good thing in terms of getting evidence- them subsequently? based views into the mainstream discussions in David Kennedy: I would say there is a small number Parliament. Often they are not evidence-based of people in Parliament who have a very good discussions. understanding of the issues that we are talking about in climate and energy policy. They are probably Q94 Peter Aldous: I will just draw attention at the around this table and in the Energy and Climate outset to my interests in the family farms where Change Committee and a few others. I think beyond renewable energy projects are being pursued. But I am that it has been difficult to engage MPs and to get going to concentrate on the demand side. Mr an evidence-based discussion going on things like the Kennedy, your report noted that there was a 12% carbon intensity target, like the Green Deal and the increase last year in domestic emissions. How legislation around that. I would be very happy if we important do you think the Green Deal and the ECO could achieve a broader dissemination of ideas. The are to reducing these emissions to meet the carbon problem is managing to get MPs and Lords to come budgets? along and discuss. David Kennedy: There are two big opportunities to reduce energy consumption in the residential sector. Q90 Chair: You know it is a hobbyhorse of mine that One is through building fabric measures like loft and your first report was not even presented in Parliament. cavity wall insulation and solid wall insulation, and Given the need to engage with parliamentarians, do the other, which people don’t talk about, is through you think there is a need for some detailed process in the purchase and use of more efficient appliances— dishwashers, washing machines, fridges and order that Parliament understood and was better able freezers—and that is a bigger opportunity than the to deal with the relationship that it has with the buildings fabric. If we go back to the buildings fabric Climate Change Committee? though, which is what the Green Deal and the Energy David Kennedy: I think you are right. We are a Company Obligation are about, there is a very parliamentary body; our progress report is to significant opportunity to reduce energy consumption Parliament. The intention as far as we are concerned and reduce emissions there. It is important for two is that it would have wide dissemination and reasons. It is important to meet carbon budgets, at understanding and be the basis of discussion in least further out in time where the alternative to doing Parliament. I am not sure that is where we are at the low-cost measures, like loft and cavity wall insulation, moment, so anything we can do to leverage the is doing something more expensive and the cost can interest we have and get a wider interest would be run into hundreds of millions and billions of pounds. very welcome. The second reason is that loft and cavity insulation have an important contribution to make in easing Q91 Neil Carmichael: Which committee or structure affordability constraints, and we know affordability is do you funnel through in Parliament? an issue not just for the fuel poor. Most households in David Kennedy: The committee that we have been to the country at the moment are very worried about their most is the Energy and Climate Change Committee. energy bill, and particularly they were worried in the We have been there many times to discuss the Green winter when energy consumption was very high. So, Deal, the current Energy Bill that is going through the Green Deal and the Energy Company Obligation Parliament, aviation and shipping emissions in carbon are very important. budgets, bio-energy—pretty much everything we have What we have said in the report is we have gone from published has been discussed by the Energy and a system where the energy companies had an Climate Change Committee. I think we are well obligation to deliver those low-cost measures, the loft understood by that Committee; what we say is well and cavity wall insulation. We have seen that they cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 29
3 July 2013 David Kennedy were successful in delivering those measures, and that Q97 Chair: Which information was it previously is the high levels of delivery under CERT in 2012. publishing? The way that they did that was they proactively David Kennedy: It published information about, approached people, quite often pensioners, and within the purchase of fridges, who was buying the offered them subsidised insulation. What we have most efficient, what percentage of people were doing moved to from that is a system where for those low- that, what percentage were buying an A-rated, B-rated cost measures we have a very light touch approach and whatever. That information is no longer available, where people now have to step up and say, “Will you and as I say, that means that we cannot assess whether come and look at my house and give me a Green Deal the policy that is in place is successful or not. The assessment and then, rather than you pay me, policy that is in place is the labelling scheme that subsidise me to have those things, I will take a loan comes under the European legislation. Whether you out and pay for them?” For us, given the whole set of would want to go beyond that, whether you would both financial and non-financial barriers, which are want to have fiscal incentives, as they do in some very well known and have been known for a long countries, for more efficient appliances, whether you time, we question very strongly whether this light- would want to have the demand side being a major touch approach will deliver. What we thought was part of the Electricity Market Reform—I know the needed was something that built on CERT, that kept Government has moved at least in part towards having those very strong incentives for the energy companies, the demand side there—there may be an opportunity that brought in other partners like local authorities, for somebody to bundle together a load of people commercial companies and whatever, and moved buying the most efficient appliances and sell that into from house-by-house to area-based approaches, but the Electricity Market Reform rather than investing in we would not expect that to happen under this light- low-carbon power generation. It would be a lot touch approach. cheaper to do that. But we can’t say whether the policy is working at the moment or not, because we don’t have the data to say that. It is a major gap in the Q95 Peter Aldous: Are you saying that the Green evidence base. Deal is fundamentally flawed, or can some amendments and changes be made so that it does fulfil Q98 Mr Spencer: the purposes that you think it needs to? If we can look at managing the delivery of carbon budgets, could you give us a David Kennedy: For those two measures in particular, flavour as to how well you think the Government is we have said we think there is a very high degree of performing? I suppose you could break that down into risk about whether we will continue to progress, and three areas. It is identifying the reductions that are if we don’t continue to progress, there is a problem. required and have they got that right, setting the There is a problem spending money under the Energy policies to deliver those reductions, and then Company Obligation on very expensive things like monitoring how well those policies are performing in solid wall insulation before you have done the cheap achieving that. stuff. It is more sensible to do the cheap stuff. There David Kennedy: It is hard for me from the outside to is a problem from an emissions perspective that if you talk in detail about their governance, but if you use don’t do those things, then you have a more expensive that way of breaking down the problem that they have way to meet carbon budgets, and there is a problem to solve, if you look at the Carbon Plan, that broadly from an affordability perspective. So, there is a very reflects the things that we have identified to meet high degree of risk. What could you do about that? carbon budgets. It has the energy efficiency You could open the Energy Company Obligation up improvements, the investments in low-carbon power to those low-cost measures and provide flexibility for generation, the more fuel-efficient cars. We think they the energy companies to meet their obligations. We have identified the right measures. They have broadly think that is a sensible thing to do. The other thing you the right high-level ambition in the Carbon Plan. can look at is strengthening incentives, strengthening When I say ambition, they have scenarios that include demand for energy efficiency improvement, and the ambition without them stating that this is their most obvious ways to do that are through the fiscal ambition. Then you move on and ask if they have the incentives that you could provide through linking right policies in place. I have said I think the energy efficiency performance of houses and flats with Electricity Market Reform is the right policy but there either council tax or stamp duty. is a lot to do to make it work. We have talked about the Green Deal that we think has a very high degree of Q96 Peter Aldous: As well as looking at the delivery risk associated with it. You have to question structure of dwellings, you also talked about whether we have the right policy in place for appliances. Is that something that you think has been renewable heat, particularly in the residential sector. overlooked? It is very small-scale and has not really achieved David Kennedy: It is very hard to say what is going anything up to now. The policies in the commercial on with appliances. The Government has now stopped and industrial sectors are not driving energy efficiency publishing data on who is buying what in terms of improvement, so are they the right ones? You would energy-efficient appliances. We don’t know if the think probably they need to be strengthened. We have current policy is working. As I say, it is very important a very light-touch approach to agriculture where there and there is a big opportunity there, and so, first of is an important challenge to reduce emissions over all, we need better information. time. We don’t really have any crunchy policies there. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Ev 30 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
3 July 2013 David Kennedy
We think there is a lot to do on policies across all of with the Department? Can you give us a flavour as to the different sectors of the economy. how that relationship works? Then you think how about the cross-Whitehall David Kennedy: We meet members of the governance arrangements and is there enough Government at different levels. At the level of my accountability there; are Departments on the hook? I chairman, Lord Deben and myself have regular think the problem is that the Government and the meetings with the Secretary of State in DECC, so we Departments within the Government have been very meet regularly with Ed Davey, before that with Chris reluctant to commit to specific numbers for overall Huhne, before that with Ed Miliband. We meet less emissions reductions and within that for the key regularly but still on a reasonably frequent basis with measures. Even if you look at the Department of the Cabinet Secretaries in the relevant Departments, Energy, you won’t find them saying, “We want to Transport for example; we meet with the Chancellor. insulate 6 million lofts over the next five years or 6 We have met once with the Prime Minister since we million cavity walls or add 20 gigawatts of low- had the new chairman in place. We also work on a carbon power generation.” They are very reluctant to more ongoing basis with officials. My secretariat, my step up and say that. Unless you have a strategy and team of analysts, work with Government analysts to a governance framework that has clear objectives that make sure that we are on the same page in terms of are measurable, against which success can be the evidence base and that we have shared evidence. measured, then it is very hard to have an effective overall approach to this. If you don’t know whether Q102 Mr Spencer: Do they approach you and say, you are succeeding or failing because you have not “We’ve got this policy idea. Do you think this will said what it means to succeed or fail then I think you work?” or do you approach them and say, “We’ve got can probably go along, muddle through for a number a policy idea. What do you think of this?” of years and possibly, as Caroline said, be a little bit Chair: Or neither. complacent looking at emissions reductions that David Kennedy: actually came because of the recession but have put It has happened in both ways at us in a benign position, at least temporarily. I think different times. They will come to us and say, “What that is the danger. do you think about this?” We will say that, “We think there is a risk in the way that you are proceeding and we are developing this idea,” and then we make it into Q99 Mr Spencer: In identifying the reductions our formal advice. required, you put quite a lot of emphasis there on the Carbon Plan. Am I right in saying that that is a pretty important part of this? I suppose if I was being Q103 Chair: Could you give us an example of one critical, in your fifth report you only mention the where that did happen, where the Government came Carbon Plan once. How important is that plan? to you and said, “We’ve got a good idea. What do you David Kennedy: We mention it once in the sense we think of this?” have assessed that before. It came out in I think 2010. David Kennedy: The Government has come and asked We looked at it in our report last year and there we us over the years, “What do you think about the said the plan is targeting the right areas, but the plan carbon price underpin?” before it was introduced, is the entrée into this area. It says at a high level this “What do you think about the way that we are is what we are broadly aiming for and then you move proceeding with the Electricity Market Reforms?” A on and you say we have to put the policies in place, lot of these things are actually back and forward. The we have to have the mechanisms to hold the different Electricity Market Reforms has been a process where Departments’ feet to the fire across Whitehall. That is we said there is a need for reform and the Government what we are focused on now, because we have drawn then said, “Well, what about these ideas?” and then a line and said the plan is okay. we narrowed it down into contracts for differences. I wouldn’t say it is one-way traffic, either way from us Q100 Mr Spencer: So, you would stick with it? You to them or them to us. wouldn’t say a new approach is required? David Kennedy: A new cross-Whitehall approach? Q104 Mr Spencer: When we look at monitoring the Mr Spencer: Yes. progress that is being made, the overview of that is David Kennedy: Again, using your categorisation, I done by the National Emissions Target Board. How don’t think they need a new Carbon Plan. That has are they performing? Are they effective? the right measures in it. What they need is stronger David Kennedy: From the outside that is something I policies across most of the key areas. Whether they can’t say. I don’t attend that board. I don’t know what have the right governance arrangements in terms of they discuss there. the cross-Whitehall boards that discuss these issues from the outside it is hard to tell, although you would Q105 Mr Spencer: I am trying to work out whether have to question are those arrangements going to be you think they are doing a good job or a bad job. Can effective unless they have quantitative targets against you assess that? which success can be judged. David Kennedy: I just can’t tell because I don’t know what they are doing. Q101 Mr Spencer: You mentioned that you are mostly engaged with the DECC Select Committee. Q106 Mr Spencer: So, they don’t liaise with you at Could you give us a flavour as to how you work with all? the rest of Government? How often are you meeting David Kennedy: No. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 31
3 July 2013 David Kennedy
Q107 Mr Spencer: You don’t get to see what Q111 Caroline Lucas: There is. May I ask about one recommendations or messages they are sending back specific area where there is lots more to do, which is to Government at any stage? on F-gases. In your 2013 progress report you David Kennedy: No, I don’t. I work with and talk to recommended that the Government should at a the individual people who sit on that board, but I am minimum fully support the proposals from the EU to not party to the discussions that the board as a whole reduce emissions of F-gases by 70% in 2030, but you have. go further saying that you think that the Government should increase the speed of phase-out of some of Q108 Mr Spencer: So, you would not be in a these gases such that these emissions are zero or minimal by 2020. In the light of the European position to say what they should be focusing on or Parliament vote just a couple of weeks ago that also how they should be conducting their business? seemed to be going in the same direction, can you David Kennedy: We are in a position to say, “This give an indication of what more practically speaking is what we are doing well,” we as a country, as a you think the Government could be doing on that? Government, because we can tell that. We can look at David Kennedy: The concern we had was that the the emissions data and the data on implementation of Government was going to push back on the European measures and we can make a judgment: are we proposal, first of all, and we certainly didn’t think that succeeding or aren’t we? We are in a position to say was appropriate because clearly commercial that if we are not doing well, what it is that we might companies are deploying low-carbon alternatives for do differently. You don’t need to be at the cross- refrigeration to the use of F-gases. If that is the case, Whitehall officials board to be able to say what are it tells you that there are cost-effective opportunities the appropriate directions of travel for policy out there. We didn’t think it was appropriate that the development. Whether they are effective in their Government would push back on the proposal from discussions—as I say, I don’t know what they the Commission. discuss there. Q112 Caroline Lucas: But Defra certainly seems to Q109 Mr Spencer: Are there any areas in your be. Well, they are not being particularly receptive on progress reports that you feel the Government has this issue. failed to grapple with or it has not taken your findings David Kennedy: I think you would have to ask them on board? what their position is. It is something we have David Kennedy: In each of the areas we have talked discussed with them. My sense is that they are not about, in the Electricity Market Reforms, a lot of that going to push back on the European proposal, first of does come from us so the Government has listened all, and they are looking at opportunities to strengthen there. But there is something we have advised on very the European proposal and go further than has been strongly, which is the need for a carbon intensity proposed, which is what we have said in the report. target in 2030 to give a clear signal to investors who We do not have any specific, “You should phase out are looking to develop projects and put money into use in this particular area by 2020,” going beyond the supply chain now, where the Government in a what the proposal currently is, because we have not sense has listened in that they have taken a provision done that very detailed analysis you would need to do. in the Energy Bill that they will set a target or could We have put it back to them to say, “You need to go set a target in the next Parliament but we think that is away and look very carefully at this because we think needed sooner. We have said to the Government the opportunities may be there and, having looked through the development of the Green Deal policy that carefully, come to a sensible position and push that.” As I say, I think there was a constructive response we think there is a very significant risk. They listened when we spoke with Defra on that, and it is something to an extent and they changed the design to an extent, they are looking at at the moment. This proposal still but we still think there is a significant risk. has some way to go as it moves through the European Parliament and the council and comes to a final piece Q110 Mr Spencer: Do you expect Government to of legislation. take on board everything that you ask for, and if they did, would you feel that you were not asking for Q113 Caroline Lucas: To try to summarise, do you enough? Do you start from the position of, “We will think that they will at least go as far as the EU and ask for as much as we can and see what they deliver,” maybe even take your advice, which is to look at and try to push the agenda, or do you try to deliver going further? realistic targets? David Kennedy: It is not for me to speak for the David Kennedy: We don’t get into tactics like that. Government, but my understanding is that they are We simply identify what we think is needed to meet doing both of those things, that they will go at least the carbon budgets; and if that is in place, we say as far as the EU and that they are looking at good, and if it is not in place, we say it is not in place opportunities to go beyond what is currently proposed. and we need to do something different if we are serious about meeting carbon budgets. We say that in Q114 Dr Whitehead: Can I check back on a piece a balanced way, so if I don’t look very anxious sat of shared evidence? You mentioned it is very here, if I am too relaxed—we present the facts, and important to get shared evidence across Government. I the facts are pretty clear. However I say them, the asked the Secretary of State yesterday about the risible facts are pretty clear that there is a lot more to do. number of loft insulations that have been carried out cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Ev 32 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
3 July 2013 David Kennedy this year compared with last year. You mentioned over £1 billion every year that could potentially be there were a record number last year, I think 46,000, spent on loft and cavity wall insulation, as it was and it is now 1,200 in April 2013. The Secretary of under the CERT scheme, but the way it has been State said that that was not a big issue because we had designed it has to be spent on solid wall insulation, insulated pretty much most of the lofts that we could which is much more expensive. So, one thing you can find and that there are only a few hundred thousand do is say, “We’ve got that pot of money. Let’s spend outstanding and therefore the concentration would be it on the cheapest rather than the most expensive on other matters. Is that your shared evidence on this? thing first.” David Kennedy: You have picked up one of the areas where there is not a shared evidence base between the Q118 Zac Goldsmith: I am not saying you should Government, and not just us, I think all of the other not do that, but if you did that, that would have an people who are looking at this issue outside the immediate impact on the Green Deal, because Government. presumably you would be offering the same service that is offered through the Green Deal but without any Q115 Dr Whitehead: Everybody, more or less? of the financial complications attached to it. You are David Kennedy: Our evidence is that maybe there is creating a better alternative, effectively, but with about 6 million lofts left, not virgin lofts that don’t limited funds as opposed to relying on the market, have any insulation but which were insulated decades which is what the Green Deal does. ago when insulation was thin and now it can be a lot David Kennedy: If you believe that the Green Deal thicker and it is cost-effective and sensible to put that will deliver loft and cavity wall insulation, then to new and thicker insulation in. If you focus on those, put them into the Energy Company Obligation would as I said there are about 6 million-plus lofts. We want change the playing field such that it would not be done to get to the bottom of this, because we can’t keep under the Green Deal any more. What we are saying saying our analysis says this and then the Government is there is a high degree of risk. We find it hard to says their analysis says there is only a few hundred believe that there will be significant loft and cavity thousand, and so we are commissioning a piece of wall insulation under the Green Deal. If you believe work now to get to the bottom of why the Government that, then to bring this into the Energy Company thinks there are so few and everybody else thinks Obligation your counterfactual is lofts and cavity there are still a lot to do, and we will conclude that in walls will remain not insulated. There is something the next months. that involves the Treasury, which is the fiscal incentives that could be put in place here, but there is Q116 Dr Whitehead: What will you do with that? a third way, which is to look at building regulations. David Kennedy: That will feed back into our advice That was proposed, and there was an idea that if you on the Green Deal. The Cabinet Office has asked for were going to have an extension, you might also at a review of the Green Deal and the Energy Company the same time insulate your loft or your cavity wall. Obligation at the end of this year. We think that is an There was a more radical proposal that said if you important review and it is an opportunity to go back replace your boiler, which half the households in the and revisit some of these questions about how many country will do over the next 10 years, then you would lofts are there and is the current policy well designed also have to have loft and cavity wall insulation, but to address those lofts. It is the same for cavity walls. I think politically it was decided that that was not Solid-wall insulation is very expensive and although acceptable. we should be aiming to do that, I think the concern is that, having that as the sole focus of the Energy Q119 Zac Goldsmith: There was also a suggestion Company Obligation, the costs could be very high, that one of the incentives might involve providing which would feed through into significant bill impacts some kind of stamp duty rebate for people who pass that we should try to avoid. So, there is a whole set their homes on, and if the buyer is the person who of questions around that policy. That policy is not pays stamp duty you would have to adjust it, on the gone; it is not finished. It is a radical departure, understanding that the only time it really is not something we need to look at very closely, and we disruptive to have your home upgraded is when you have to keep the flexibility to strengthen it and we are not living in it, but that would require a call on think it will need to be strengthened. the Chancellor. Is that something that you have explored as a committee? Q117 Zac Goldsmith: On the Green Deal, are there David Kennedy: It is something we have suggested at any measures that you can think of or that have been a high level. I think it is in the minds of everybody brought to your attention that could make the Green who works in this area that fiscal incentives could well Deal work in the way that it was intended to work be the way to go in terms of strengthening demand but without drawing on the Treasury? I suppose the for energy efficiency improvement. I don’t know how question I am asking is: is it down to DECC or the receptive the Chancellor is to that. It is certainly not Treasury? The kind of measures that most people are on the cards at the moment for immediate introduction talking about for boosting the Green Deal seem to but it is something if we do a review of the Green require agreement by the Chancellor and not by the Deal—the delivery figures have not been very good at Secretary of State for the Department of Energy and the moment and what it has been successful at is Climate Change. giving cash back to people to replace their boilers, David Kennedy: Not necessarily. The Energy which was not really the aim of this. People replace Company Obligation is a pot of money that is well their boilers anyway because they conk out at the end cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 33
3 July 2013 David Kennedy of their lives and you have to replace them. This is a result of the carbon price underpin—and we don’t just a nice subsidy for doing what you would do see anybody seriously looking at that now. anyway. When we review this, I think we will see that The important thing is to say that we need to move the delivery figures have not been great and we need from the system we have, which would be gas-based to find some way to strengthen incentives and that is if not coal-based, and make that a low-carbon system. the obvious thing to look at. That is the sensible thing to do from an economic perspective, and that is what the Electricity Market Q120 Chair: You have just referred to building Reform is all about, or at least it should be. regulations, and I am thinking about the pending consultation on the Code for Sustainable Homes. Q122 Dr Whitehead: Yes, except in your progress Going back to what you were saying about report you did state, “There are major challenges Government sometimes came to you to ask you what relating to the design of Electricity Market Reform.” you thought about certain ideas, can I establish Are you any happier now in terms of the challenges whether or not you have been involved in any of the as the legislation has gone through the House or do pre-discussions about the consultation that is about to you continue to worry about those major challenges? go out on the Code for Sustainable Homes? Would you like to set out what you think those are? David Kennedy: We have not done that. We pick up David Kennedy: Three things need to happen for the in the progress report that there is an important issue Electricity Market Reforms to work. The first is that here, that we have to be building sustainable homes there is a set of projects now that are stuck waiting to now, given that they will be significant in number over go into construction and those need to proceed into time and that they will be there in the future as we try construction. The second is we need new projects to meet our emissions targets and the 80% cut and being developed so that they can sign contracts in the that we have to have these standards right. We have future. The third thing is we need supply chain not gone into the detail at the moment. They have not investment, for example offshore wind supply chain come and asked us about the detail. We will look very investment that is central to the story. There is a carefully at the consultation, and we will respond to political argument that if we are spending a lot of that as appropriate. money under the levy control framework, it has to be on a supply chain in this country, but there is also an Q121 Dr Whitehead: Last year when we looked at economic argument that we need that supply chain emissions from the power sector there was a 12% rise, and we need the competition to drive innovation and mainly because of the switch from gas to coal over the cost reduction without which it is hard to justify ongoing investment in low-carbon technology. So, we winter period. However, that means that the permitted need all of those things to happen. The contracts for running hours under the large plant directive are being differences are a necessary but not sufficient part of consumed at a greater rate. How temporary in your the solution. They can pull through the projects that view will that effect be and is there perhaps a longer are already there; they can make those bankable. For term issue in the relative cheapness of gas versus coal, example, we can move forward with the 1.5 gigawatts and how that then plays out over the next period as of offshore wind projects that are waiting to go into far as emissions are concerned in the power sector? construction now, but they need some confidence that David Kennedy: We think it is temporary, and there they will paid under the contract. are a number of reasons for that. The first one you But that is only a small part of the solution. What you have said. We have the European legislation, the also need is a sense of medium-term at least direction Large Combustion Plant Directive under which a lot of travel, and when I say medium-term I am talking of the plant we have on the system now will not be about 2030. You need that in order that people can on the system in a couple of years’ time. Following develop projects thinking there will be a market in this that we have the Industrial Emissions Directive under country in the 2020s. If I am a developer of projects, I which beyond the early 2020s most of the rest of the need to know there will be a market in the 2020s, plant is likely to come off the system. The second because the projects I am developing will be coming thing that reinforces that is the carbon price underpin, on to the system in the 2020s. If I am a supply chain which makes using our old inefficient coal plant in investor, I can’t just invest off the back of a market this country uneconomic over time, so although the that exists to 2020 and not beyond, because I will not carbon price at the moment is very low, as you start to pay back my investment in that timeframe. Our main get to a carbon price of £30 a tonne and that increases issues are giving visibility around what happens through the 2020s you can’t really justify continuing beyond the next several years to visibility not just to to operate coal plant. 2020 in terms of the contracts that will be offered and The third reason is that there is an incentive on offer the prices paid but through the 2020s, and that is from the Government to convert that coal plant to where the idea of the carbon intensity target comes in. biomass and give it extra life beyond the early 2020s, and a lot of companies now are looking at that. We Q123 Dr Whitehead: You have already mentioned would not expect, as you get into the 2020s, to have the need for a carbon intensity target and that the much if any coal-fired plant left on the system. Then Government had gone some way by putting you say are we worried about people building new amendments into the Energy Bill, saying that there coal plants. I don’t think anybody is planning to build could be a carbon intensity target. What might be the new coal plants in this country. We had the Kingsnorth circumstances where it could be decided that there proposal, and that has gone—I think it went largely as should not be a carbon intensity target? The Bill does cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Ev 34 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
3 July 2013 David Kennedy provide for the Secretary of State simply not to take a The second thing is the review is for the Committee decision, doesn’t it? on Climate Change; it is not for the Government, and David Kennedy: Given that we are strong proponents the Climate Change Act is very clear. We advise the of having a carbon intensity target—we think it is a Government on whether there is there a reason or not very sensible thing to do—we can’t see any to change the carbon budget and then the Government circumstances where you would not have one and has to make its deliberations, but it is not that we are where you would not aim to move to a low-carbon out of the picture and the Government can somehow power sector. We are very clear in our Electricity go and change the budget without coming to us. We Market Reform report where we say that if the world are the owners of the review, if you like. gives up on its efforts to reduce emissions and accepts very dangerous climate change risks then there is an Q125 Dr Whitehead: It appears that is not quite argument we shouldn’t be the only country in the what this particular passage says. world to move to a low-carbon power sector, but we David Kennedy: You wouldn’t think so reading that, are not in that situation. There is action in other but maybe whoever wrote that had not read the countries: China and America are acting, Korea, Climate Change Act. If you read the Climate Change Mexico, Brazil, and all sorts of countries. We are just Act, it is very clear and it is reflected in our letter playing our part alongside a lot of international and about the carbon budget review. global action, and as long as the world is serious in The other thing is the Climate Change Act is very limiting risks of dangerous climate change then it will tightly drafted. You can’t change the carbon budget always be sensible to have a low-carbon power system on a short-term political whim. The wording is sooner rather than later and it will always be sensible something like it can only be changed if there has to commit to that to give a signal to industry and to been a significant change in the circumstances upon make it happen. It is the signalling; it is the which the budget was set. The circumstances upon commitment that makes it happen. It is the which we set the budget are we looked at the climate investments that follow the commitment that give us science. We looked at the international context and the assets on the system that drive the costs down and asked what is happening in terms of the UN process unlock all of the economic benefits for us. and action in individual countries. We looked at the economics of the different technologies and a whole Q124 Dr Whitehead: You could argue that the set of things. We looked at security of supply; we Government has given some certainty in some areas looked at fuel poverty. There is a confusion that has of the energy generation market by, for example, crept into the Government’s Gas Generation Strategy grandfathering emission levels from gas-fired power that somehow the fourth budget was premised on the stations to 2045 if they are building power stations EU changing the ambition in its 2020 greenhouse gas over the next period. Further, in the Gas Generation emissions reduction target and increasing that Strategy the Government has this to say about review ambition from a 20% reduction to a 30% reduction on of the fourth carbon budget, “We will review our 1990 levels. That was never a premise for the fourth progress in early 2014, and if at that point our carbon budget. If you look through the fourth carbon domestic commitments place us on a different budget advice that we gave, you can’t find any link trajectory from the one agreed by our partners in the between that budget and whether the EU was at a 20% EU under the EU ETS, we will revise up our budget or a 30% target. to align it with the actual EU trajectory.” What is your Given that the Government accepted our advice, that view of that? advice determines the circumstances upon which the David Kennedy: It is a very timely question, because budget was set, and then if you are asking if those we launched the fourth carbon budget review circumstances have changed, given that it does not yesterday. For anyone who is interested, it is on our form any of the circumstances, you could not change website. We published a letter that we sent to Ed the fourth carbon budget because the EU has not Davey and alongside that we have a call for evidence changed its target from 20% to 30%. I am not sure around the questions we need to answer as part of the that is well understood across all of Government, or review. What we say is the first thing is not to be outside Government as well, but we make it very clear alarmed. The Climate Change Act envisages from in the letter to Ed Davey, which is in the public time to time that you would go back and look at domain, that is not part of the review, that is not what carbon budgets, and that is a sensible thing to do we are going to look at. We are going to revisit, for because we learn new information all the time and, example, the climate science and these debates that based on new information and new facts, you say, “Is are not so much within the scientific community but it still sensible to do what we thought it was sensible they are within the political debates around climate to do several years ago?” We always envisaged that science such as is there a radical change in climate there would be a review and we recommended at the sensitivity estimates in the last two years. The short time to the Government, as they were discussing their answer to that is no, but that is the kind of thing we position on the fourth budget, that there should be a will look at. review, so it is no surprise that there is a review. It was announced by the Government at the time that Q126 Dr Whitehead: When was your letter to Ed they set the budget, but the idea that it should be Davey? reviewed to take account of the information did come David Kennedy: It was yesterday. That is why I say from us. it was very timely. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 35
3 July 2013 David Kennedy
Q127 Dr Whitehead: Would you conclude from this 10% through the purchase of credits, subject to there that technically that particular passage appears to be being a global deal with appropriate ambition, is about illegal in terms of how the legislation stands, or might the right ambition as far as we are concerned. That that be pushing it a little too far? is compatible with our analysis of global emissions David Kennedy: I am not a lawyer, so I can’t get into reductions to meet the climate objective that we talked saying it is illegal or not. I think that it misunderstands about before. You get that right, and then you can start the way that the Climate Change Act is drafted. It to say: what is the supporting set of mechanisms at misunderstands the way that our advice was given to the European level? For example, how much do you the Government, but the Government at the end of the want to bind all of the countries into low-carbon day accepted our advice, so they are stuck with it. I power generation targets, if not renewable generation would say that they are stuck with something targets? What about the new car emission standard economically sensible, because we did a lot of that goes beyond 2020? I think we can move on to analysis to get to that advice. But as I say, that is the those, having agreed the high-level aspects of this. budget and unless there has been a significant change In terms of not being an island, as we move forward in things that are not anything to do with the EU 2020 with the building of a low-carbon economy, we think target then the budget would stay the same. I also have a lot about and we analyse a lot what are the to say we are open-minded. We are an analytical body. opportunities for interconnection in order to limit the We are not wedded to the budget come what may. We costs of particularly power sector decarbonisation. All will look again with an open mind across all of the of our analysis and modelling says we need to aim to relevant things. We could recommend a loosening of be a lot more interconnected than we are currently, the budget. We could also recommend it should be and if we are not a lot more interconnected, then the tightened, and there are reasons why it might sensibly costs of having a low-carbon power sector become a be tightened, but let’s work through that over the next lot higher than we have talked about. We have months. We are going to report back to the commissioned a report that is being done at the Government in December, and then the Government moment on infrastructure to support power sector will have a decision to make in the new year. decarbonisation and within that there is a very important role for interconnection, and so that is Q128 Dr Whitehead: So, there is a central to our story. misunderstanding? David Kennedy: The other thing that does not come Q130 Caroline Lucas: I am just picking up where across clearly there is it is not a decision for the you were more or less leaving off with Alan Government in the sense that if they were to decide Whitehead. You were talking about how, for example, to do something silly, they would have to take it to recent developments in climate science or the politics Parliament and there would have to be a vote in around climate science and modelling get factored Parliament on that as well, so there is an extra stage. into the carbon budget. Could you say a little bit more I would not have thought it would ever come to that about how that process works? If new things are because this is an evidence-based process, the facts discovered or if our understanding of climate science will be pretty clear, the law is pretty tightly drafted, changes, how does that feed into the budget-setting and I hope that we end up in a sensible position early process? next year and then we draw a line under this and move on. David Kennedy: We keep a very close eye on the Chair: In terms of moving on, I am conscious that climate science. We have a number of scientists on we do have to move on to some other questions. I our committee. One of them is among the most know that Neil Carmichael wants to come in very eminent climate scientists in the country, and that is briefly. Sir Brian Hoskins. Within the secretariat we have a very good climate scientist with a PhD in atmospheric Q129 Neil Carmichael: I do. Thank you. I was physics, and he is our route into the scientific listening to your comments in response to Alan’s community. Part of his job is to network among all of questions about the European Union. One thing that the people in this country and other countries so that bothers me is that one or two nation states are we know exactly what is going on. So, we keep basically nationalising their own energy policy. I am abreast of the latest science. It is something that we not talking about nationalisation versus privatisation are always discussing among ourselves and then it but as opposed to internationalisation, and you could feeds into the design of the carbon budget. Each time really put us into that category as well. Does your we design a carbon budget we have a deep dive again committee give some thought to the absence of true and say has the climate science— competitiveness in energy and connectivity? Both of those things are linked essentially to how we can Q131 Caroline Lucas: You won’t effectively change manage climate change. an existing budget, though? David Kennedy: We do. You have to get first things David Kennedy: The fourth carbon budget review is first and the important thing now is to agree an overall set in legislation. It was set partly on an assessment and ambitious 2030 objective for greenhouse gas of the climate science; in doing a review of that fourth emissions reductions in the EU. We think, and we carbon budget we have to look at all of the have said in the progress report, that the UK position circumstances, including the science. If it was true to support a 40% emissions reduction in 2030 on 1990 that climate sensitivity estimates are now half what levels through domestic abatement with an additional they were two years ago, that would raise a question. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Ev 36 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
3 July 2013 David Kennedy
Is it still appropriate to be on this path, or should we estimate. It largely reflects the uncertainty over those take our foot off the pedal? different feedbacks, and particularly clouds. On that specific issue I can tell you there is not any There is one that is less commonly, if at all, modelled, new evidence that makes us think differently about and that is the permafrost release of methane. That is climate sensitivity. Some people would have you think something that we are aware of. We think it is that is the case, but if you look at the science, there is potentially important. It works in the other direction, not a fundamental shift on that important issue of so to anyone who says climate sensitivity is a bit climate sensitivity, and I would not expect the IPCC, lower, this is an effect that takes you in the opposition when it reports in October, to say the range for climate direction and says we are more exposed to climate sensitivity has shifted significantly. Let’s see what change risk than we have been factoring in. As part they say. I would not expect them to say it has shifted. of the fourth carbon budget review, we are going to That is one of the things that will feed into our review, try to put some numbers on this, so we are going to so we will be looking at the IPCC report before we do some modelling that also includes that particular do a report on the science and the international context feedback that you have talked about, the permafrost in November. Our call for evidence asks the specific release of methane. As I say, I am not sure that has question: is anything different, particularly on climate been done before, but we want to do it because we sensitivity as well as some of the other key things? think it is important. So, anybody who has views on this can come forward in the call for evidence, we will be having workshops Q134 Caroline Lucas: Would you say that the in July for selected people, and we will pull together current model is inadequate because it does not what is the latest evidence and what are the properly account for the potential impact of implications. permafrost? David Kennedy: I would not say it is inadequate; there Q132 Caroline Lucas: In some of the evidence we is always room to improve your models, and this is a have taken so far, it was suggested that climate direction that people should be looking at to improve feedbacks could potentially dwarf the human-induced the model. Will it make a significant difference? Will emissions over the next century, and there was a big it change what we think in terms of risks of dangerous climate change? I think it will change it a bit probably, debate—and you can probably imagine some of the but we need to find out, understand that, and then participants in the debate—between people who are again ask the question. saying that the current climate model does not sufficiently take into account or does not take into Q135 Caroline Lucas: account at all the feedback mechanisms and then I am coming back to it because we did receive some very heartfelt evidence lobbyists said, “Yes, it does.” There was a big heated to suggest that the current climate change budgets— debate with the Met Office saying that we can’t go inadequate is probably was one of the milder words into fairyland, on the other side very strong evidence that might have been used in terms of not properly saying that the way the UK Climate Act has dealt with incorporating some of these feedbacks. I am just feedbacks makes it impossible to distinguish what are trying to probe a bit more. It sounds to me as if you budget and what are feedback emissions, “This is a are saying, “Well, they are pretty good, and this is catastrophe; it creates a policy nightmare.” another issue we will spend a bit of time looking at Where do you stand on that, given that the science and we will modify it slightly, but essentially it isn’t around feedback is not entirely clear; it is uncertain? going to be a game changer,” whereas some of the How do you factor that into the budget? Just leaving evidence that we have received would suggest that it it out because it is too complicated seems to be the is a massive game changer to the extent that neither wrong approach. the Met Office nor the Climate Change Act had David Kennedy: We don’t leave it out. Climate properly incorporated it; they were inadequate, to say sensitivity is all about the feedbacks and the climate— the least. I won’t call them sceptics—deniers say all the David Kennedy: All you can say is that to the extent feedbacks cancel out so they do not make any the models do not include methane release from difference. You are talking there about ice reflecting permafrost and they underestimate the risk of the sun and the associated heat so it does not end up dangerous climate change— in the atmosphere. You are talking about water vapour Caroline Lucas: Significantly. and you are talking about clouds. All of those are David Kennedy: Well, you can’t say that, because we modelled, for example, in the Met model. They are don’t know whether it is significant or not. We don’t modelled and taken into account in our modelling, and know if it is— that is why there is a big range for climate sensitivity that we work with, because these things are all Q136 Chair: But is it significant enough in your uncertain. mind for you to want to see further research to give some further indication urgently? Q133 Caroline Lucas: What about something like David Kennedy: Yes, obviously. As good researchers permafrost? you say if something is missing from the model, then David Kennedy: That is a slightly separate thing. We we would like to fill that gap. That is the scientific look across the range of uncertainty for all of those process working through, and that is what we will turn feedbacks, and that is why the climate sensitivity is a to over the next month or two. So, we will have an range of 2 degrees to 4 degrees rather than a point answer to the question: is it significant, does it change cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 37
3 July 2013 David Kennedy the way we think about these things, and does it make deal, and does that have any implications for the fifth us think that we should have tighter targets and carbon carbon budget and possibly knock-on implications for budgets? I will be able to answer that question, which the other budgets as well? I think is an important question, so don’t take me as Again, we have to keep coming back to these things. saying it is not important. I think it is important, and We learn new information all the time, and we have that is why we are trying to answer it, but we will to take that on board and ask ourselves: does this still come back with an answer in the next few months. make sense? The opportunity to do that around the global deal will be the fifth carbon budget, which, as Q137 Martin Caton: Continuing briefly on the I say, we advise on at the end of 2015. review of the fourth carbon budget, the Government said it wants to see the UK going no faster or slower Q139 Mark Lazarowicz: On the fourth carbon than the rest of the EU on emissions reductions. How budget, I think you have previously said, or the do you think the rest of Europe will react if we revise committee has said, that the UK is not yet on a down our fourth carbon budget? trajectory to reach the targets of the fourth carbon David Kennedy: Let’s see if we came to that point budget, primarily because of contributions from a anyway. As I say, we have a review to do, there is non-traded sector, and you indicated that we might very— need to set some priorities for the UK to reach to that. Chair: But hypothetically. First of all, how far can you do that if the fourth David Kennedy: It is not really the role of my carbon budget may be changed? Assuming that the organisation to start to speculate how that would be trajectory is still roughly in the same direction, what seen. Anybody around this table could say if we have would you say would be the priority to bring this into set a very ambitious and pioneering carbon budget compliance with the target for the fourth carbon through the 2020s and we change the ambition as budget period? there is an ongoing European negotiation, that David Kennedy: You have talked about the non-traded probably would not be helpful in terms of getting sector and said we are off track there, and clearly we Europe to agree an ambitious 2030 target. need to do better. I have said several times it has to I should say as well that our analysis says the kind of be residential energy efficiency improvement, it has to targets being talked about and proposed by the UK at be non-residential to commercial and industrial energy the European level, the kind of trajectories for the EU efficiency improvement, and there has to be much Emissions Trading Scheme are broadly comparable more progress on renewable heat across all of the with the fourth carbon budget as currently legislated. sectors, including the residential sector. It has to be in So, if all goes well in Europe, if what is being the transport sector. The one thing we have done well proposed is accepted, and who knows what will be the over the last few years in a sustained way is new car outcome. I think there is a positive event that occurred emissions have come down, but that needs to carry today. It is symbolic that whereas the backending on. We need to build on that and see the same story proposal in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme was in vans and HGVs, and we need behaviour change in voted down previously in the European Parliament, it transport. It is all of those things together. It is not was voted through today. So, there is a bit of a change where you can say there is a silver bullet, if you can in Europe there in terms of mood music. It is all to do that, you would meet the budget. It is a game of play for in Europe, but, as I say, the proposal on the many different measures across different sectors. table at the moment is compatible with the fourth But also we are not on track in the traded sector. We carbon budget, more or less. are not on track with both power sector and energy- intensive sector decarbonisation. There is a lot more Q138 Martin Caton: The timing of the review of the to do in both of those. fourth carbon budget comes before a global agreement on climate change, which we hope will be reached in Q140 Mark Lazarowicz: I am going to move on, as 2015. Does that make a case for pushing back the time is running out. On the second and third carbon fourth carbon budget review to after 2015? budgets I think you have advocated they should be David Kennedy: I think it is helpful to have the review tightened even if they are unlikely to be met, largely now. There are a lot of debates at the moment, for because of economic downturn. I would say that is the example around the climate science. Is it really the way the system should work; why should you tighten case that the climate science was a house of cards and up the budgets when we are going to reach them it has all fallen down? It is an opportunity to revisit anyway? If we don’t reach them, the system comes that. into play. There are lot of people who say internationally David Kennedy: We made that recommendation at the nothing is happening in this UN context when there is time of the fourth carbon budget, and we said in order a lot happening. Again, it gives us an opportunity to to be able to meet that fourth carbon budget you look at the evidence on these things where a lot of would need to outperform the third carbon budget. ideological and rhetorical argument has crept in over The Government is aiming to outperform the third the last couple of years. So, I think it is useful. I don’t carbon budget, so if you look at their emissions think it will be the end-game, not necessarily for the projections, they assume that all their policies will fourth carbon budget, but we will at the end of 2015 work and if that were the case, they would outperform advise the Government on the fifth carbon budget, the third carbon budget. which covers the period 2027 to 2032. We will be able It is a question of incentives. If you are aiming to to take stock of: where did we get to with the global outperform the third carbon budget, why don’t you cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Ev 38 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
3 July 2013 David Kennedy commit to that by tightening the budget rather than target would exclude aviation and shipping, which just saying you are going to aim to outperform it? So, means there would be more space for the rest of the there is clearly a stronger incentive for a Government economy. For us, if everyone else acted in the same to act, having tightened the budget, rather than an way, we would be exposed to more climate change aspiration to outperform it. That was the basis for our risks than we assumed when we recommended the recommendation. The Government said they were not 80% target. So, it was very important for the prepared to tighten the third carbon budget. That Government to confirm that aviation and shipping creates an additional risk, I think, for meeting the emissions are still in the 2050 target in their view, and fourth carbon budget. It gives them the opportunity to they did that. That was a very positive thing for us. sail along on a path that is not steep enough in terms Changing the budget and adding a number in that of emissions cuts to meet the fourth carbon budget, so reflects the EU ETS for aviation we can’t do at the we would rather avoid that. But the important thing is moment because of the changes that there were in the just to put in place the policies so that we are on track EU ETS. I think that will happen. The question is to meet that fourth carbon budget. when it will happen, and hopefully we will progress towards a global deal on aviation emissions, at which Q141 Mark Lazarowicz: So, it does not matter point we can formally change the carbon budgets to whether the second or third carbon budgets are easy reflect that. to do, or is this a bonus? What I am getting at is we are always told it is important to have long-term Q143 Caroline Lucas: Can I just ask a confidence in the trajectory. If you can change the supplementary on that? I will be very quick. On the trajectory downwards when you can do it quite easily, same sort of basis of things that are left in or left out, doesn’t it make it easier to argue to revise budgets measuring emissions on consumption rather than just to be more accommodating would make it difficult production is something that you have said should to reach? happen, but I don’t think you have advocated David Kennedy: I don’t think so. There was a one-off changing the focus of the carbon budgets to reflect change that was unprecedented, not envisaged, and that. So, firstly, why would you not amend the carbon that was the recession that cut emissions by 10%. budgets to reflect it; and, secondly, if you are not There are very good arguments suggesting that we going to do that then would you be thinking it would should factor this in and reflect it in the carbon be useful for the Government to set itself a budgets on the basis that there is a set of things we supplementary target for consumption emissions so at should be doing in terms of implementation of they are visible, explicit and on the record? measures, and that does not change because of the David Kennedy: What we said in our report on the recession. We should still be trying to do that same carbon footprint was, you are right, that while set of things, and if we do that set of things, then production emissions have fallen by about 25% over together with the impact of the recession, emissions the last couple of decades consumption, so our carbon will be lower than we projected at the time the budgets footprint, has increased slightly, by about 5% I think. were set. Why not reflect that in carbon budgets and then commit to do the same set of things you were People jump from that and say, “Have we wasted our going to do anyway? time over the last 20 years?” The answer is no, Is it essential to change the second and third carbon because our carbon footprint would have gone up budget? It is not essential, so we are not going to say significantly more if we had not reduced emissions at that you could not meet the fourth carbon budget home. People also say, “Is all that is happening is we unless you tighten these. It just would give more are driving our industry abroad, so we are reducing confidence that you are on track to meet the fourth emissions here but not reducing our carbon footprint?” carbon budget. The answer to that is no, there is no evidence that we have been driving industry abroad because of our Q142 Mark Lazarowicz: Finally, one brief but carbon policies. So, it is important to recognise those important one; you had formally recommended that two things. Clearly in a world where we achieved the international aviation shipping emissions should be climate objective it cannot just be our production included in the carbon budgets. The Government emissions that go down; it has to be our carbon rejected that, obviously, because their view has been footprint, so we set out broad trajectories and that they are included de facto anyway in the way the scenarios for reduction of the UK’s carbon footprint budgets are reached. Is that not a reasonable position, over time. particularly if we are going in the right direction Driving down our carbon footprint takes two things. anyway, for the second and third budgets? It is reducing emissions here, which is what we are David Kennedy: We did go back to the Government focused on, and it is reducing imported emissions. We and update our advice and say that given what have limited levers to control our imported emissions. happened with the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in You can look at things like border tariff adjustments, particular for aviation it was premature to change the but short of that it is hard to see how we can carbon budgets to reflect those. The really important transform, given the levers that we have available to thing for us was when the Climate Change Act went change the energy systems of other countries like through it was very clear that the 80% target included China. That for us will take a global deal. aviation and shipping emissions. There was a debate in Whitehall about whether that Q144 Caroline Lucas: But measuring them and was the case, and there was a possibility that the 80% making them implicit and so forth is— cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 39
3 July 2013 David Kennedy
David Kennedy: I agree with you. While we should them. We think they should be there as part of the not change the accounting approach to carbon accounting and we should look at them closely. budgets, I think we were very clear that we should be Chair: I am just conscious of time. understanding our carbon footprint, which is what our report was all about. We wanted to understand it and Q148 Caroline Lucas: I know, so let us just go to we should be ensuring that there are mechanisms in the local authorities. You recommended that local place to drive down our carbon footprint, including authorities should be given a statutory duty to draw imported emissions, and to the extent that is not up their own carbon plans to reduce emissions in their happening we should be doing something about it. area. Could you say how the Government has responded to that proposal? Have you seen much Q145 Caroline Lucas: I am trying to get at what movement from local authorities? mechanism. At the moment we have the carbon David Kennedy: We said two things. Either a statutory budgets and we know where to find them, where to duty or funding so that local authorities could play look at them and there they are. Should there be a supplementary column, if you like, that is available their role, which is a very important role, on things and just as soon as anybody presents a carbon budget like delivering the Green Deal, on smarter choices they should also present the consumption emissions programmes for rationalising car journeys and so that it is factored in? At the moment you will find whatever. We have not had a formal response from Ministers any day of the week telling you that we are the Government. What we have seen them do is, first doing terribly well because they are not factoring in of all, they did make some money available for local consumption emissions. Most people are not even authorities to support the launch of the Green Deal. aware of consumption emissions. So, unless there is a The problem is that that money was time-bound, and real push to make them explicit and visible, then I feel I don’t think it is available any more. So, the funding it is just going to be brushed under the carpet. question is partially addressed, but there is not an David Kennedy: We think the only way really to deal ongoing solution to it. with imported emissions in the UK’s carbon footprint is to get global emissions down through a global deal, Q149 Chair: How much money was available? Was and it is hard to see how you can do it otherwise. So, it from DECC to local authorities? we should be focused on getting a global deal. When David Kennedy: Yes, off the top of my head. It is in we have a global deal we will have a sense of how the progress report. As I say, I think the key thing global emissions should be reduced. We can work there is that it is gone. While it might have been from that to talk about how we can sensibly then helpful, if you are going to have a team in a local reduce our imported emissions or how much we authority that is working on the Green Deal, you can’t should see those going down. just have funding for a start-up period. You need ongoing funding. Q146 Caroline Lucas: It comes down to The second thing is the Government talks about the responsibility, doesn’t it? I take your point that a Home Energy Conservation Act in the reports that global deal will make it a lot easier, but if our starting local authorities have to write around their plan for point is that the Government or the country that is improving energy efficiency of the building stock. The responsible for the importing has some responsibility problem for us, and we talked about this in the local for the emissions related, then it seems to me that we authority report, is the plans can be nothing more than need to be doing more than simply saying, “Well, we good intentions, they can be a desk exercise, and will just worry about domestic emissions until there a unless local authorities are prioritising funding in this global agreement”. area then we can’t be confident about that they will David Kennedy: Yes, it is not clear to us what you act. can do about imported emissions, short of having a global agreement that then gives all countries and the The third thing you can look at as well is are there countries that we import from— any local authorities stepping up and pushing the Green Deal? There are some obvious examples like Q147 Caroline Lucas: You can put them on your Birmingham and Manchester. But even now I think I own balance sheet. You can make them much more have read something in the last week or two that the visible on your balance sheet for a start. experience in Birmingham is very disappointing and David Kennedy: I don’t disagree with that: we have not all local authorities, by any means, are following said we should be monitoring what those emissions the Birmingham example. That is an exemplar, but are. Should we set targets for them? It is very hard to there are many local authorities not acting. set a target, partly because it is very hard to measure So, again, we want to come back and look at this in the UK’s carbon footprint, and it is also hard to say detail, and we will do that in next year’s progress how it should come down. Even for a given global report, which is different to all our other progress emissions reduction, there is so much analysis that reports. It is a deep dive, a retrospective of the first you have to go through and so many assumptions that carbon budget and an assessment of how has this you make to derive a reduction in imported emissions Government has done. One of the things I want to for the UK. It is just a different ballgame to setting come back and look at is local authorities where I targets for emissions here. We have a good sense of think the concern is still there that there is an what those are. So, there are a lot of practical important role but they are not funded to play that role difficulties but that is not to say we should ignore at the moment. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_o003_michelle_HC 60-iii CORRECTED 03.07.2013.xml
Ev 40 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
3 July 2013 David Kennedy
Q150 Chair: I think we have run out of time, committee to continue to exist and now they are going although we did just want to try to push you a little to look at some detailed governance aspects, which, if bit on the triennial review of your committee. Could they make some positive recommendations about how you say in one sentence how you think that is going; we can improve, will be very welcome. But it has literally one sentence? gone well. David Kennedy: I think it has gone fine. There are Chair: Thank you for that. On that note I shall bring two stages. They have completed the first stage. They our proceedings to an end. Thank you very much think there is a very compelling rationale for the indeed. It has been a wide-ranging discussion. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 41
Oral evidence
Taken before the Environmental Audit Committee on Wednesday 10 July 2013
Members present: Joan Walley (Chair)
Martin Caton Dr Matthew Offord Caroline Lucas Mr Mark Spencer Caroline Nokes Simon Wright ______
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Minister of State for Climate Change, Department of Energy and Climate Change, Ravi Gurumurthy, Director of Strategy, Department of Energy and Climate Change, and Ben Golding, Deputy Director of Strategy, Department of Energy and Climate Change, gave evidence.
Q151 Chair: Minister, may I say how grateful we are continues to push for a greater ambition both in 2020 to you for returning once again to this Committee, of and 2030. This will be an important part of framing which you were once a member. We believe the the negotiations ahead of a COP, in Warsaw and current inquiry we are doing on Progress on Carbon beyond that, in the run-up to a global deal, hopefully Budgets is an important and timely one, given the fifth in 2015. I don’t think we would accept there is a progress report we have just had on the preparations problem. We would accept there is further work to do for the review of the fourth carbon budget. We very as we go further into the future, but overall we are much look forward to the evidence session this achieving our carbon budgets, over-achieving them in afternoon with you and your two colleagues. We do fact, and we have a robust set of policies in place to understand maybe one of them may have to leave ensure that continues. early. Can I ask you this firstly, just to get us off the ground? One thing that has been put to us in evidence Q152 Chair: That is all very helpful. I did not in any is we need to have a quickening in the pace of way intend to suggest there was not a commitment to emissions reduction and there is a sense that the meeting the Climate Change Act requirements. My Government has not delivered the step change we question was more related to the report we have just need to have if, in the long term, we are going to had from the Climate Change Committee where, if I reach our final destination. I wondered what your view am right, they identified the need for a quickening in on that is. the pace of emissions reduction and a sense that some Gregory Barker: Good afternoon Chair and good of the reductions we have had have been more linked afternoon Committee. May I introduce my officials: to austerity and the economy than to actual measures Ravi Gurumurthy, Director of Strategy, and Ben put in place. What I wanted to get from you is this Golding, the Deputy Director of Strategy. I would step change in the pace of emissions reduction and dispute your central suggestion that there has been whether or not you feel they have a point there. It some sort of slackening off of ambition. The Coalition is not a criticism but I am just trying to understand is absolutely committed to meeting our carbon the situation. budgets and the objectives of the underlying Gregory Barker: Clearly there does have to be a legislation set out in the Climate Change Act. By our quickening of the pace. Clearly there does need to be own central projections we will overachieve by 90, a driving forward of ambition, and as you get closer 132 and 71 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in each to decarbonising the economy it gets harder. The low of the first three budgets. I do not think there is any hanging fruit gets taken. doubt in that. There is—and I think this has been brought up—a gap to fill in the fourth carbon budget Q153 Chair: Would you accept that there is a need period, but we have made that clear in our own carbon for a step change at this stage? plan. That simply reflects the reality that 2023Ð27 is Gregory Barker: Yes, but the important thing to say still a fair time into the future and we have not set out is we are planning for that step change and we have a detailed policy that far ahead to date. I do not think in process the policy drivers that will deliver that step that is unreasonable but, at the same time, it does not change, not least our electricity market reforms. The mean in any way that we are complacent about that decarbonisation of electricity and the roll-out of challenge. renewables in conjunction with the retrofit of homes We have announced that we will review the fourth and businesses to increase energy efficiency in that carbon budget in early 2014 and this reflects period is going to be a very key driver. uncertainty at the time the budget was set around what Ravi Gurumurthy: Just to add to that, if you take the the EU’s trajectory will be over the 2020s, something levy control framework that we announced, that goes that is a matter of live debate currently within Europe. from £2.4 billion today to £7.6 billion in 2020. About The EU as a whole is on course towards its target of 11% of our electricity is currently renewable and that 20% emissions reduction by 2020, but the UK will go to over 30%. For the first time we can say we cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Ev 42 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding have a budget to sign the deals we are planning to do Ravi Gurumurthy: As a matter of fact, our projections through the EMR framework. As Greg said, that are based on our existing policies and they show that upward curve is very much planned in. You would say we should achieve carbon budget 3 but there is a gap the same thing about car emissions. If you look at how in carbon budget 4. There is uncertainty and a risk car emissions each year are coming down faster than there, because we have to get the implementation projected towards the 95 grams that was the right, but I don’t think now is the time to invent new provisional benchmark set for 2020, that shows that policies. All we have to do is implement EMR we are going to see deepening progress towards the effectively. back end of this decade. Q156 Chair: We will come on to carbon budget 4 Q154 Chair: You do not see the need for a step shortly. But I hear what you say about considering in change? due course the response to the Climate Change Gregory Barker: No, there is a need for a step change. Committee’s report. I just thought that if you are What we are saying is we have that step change in going to be looking at new policies, now would be the hand. It is part of a plan. This is quite a complex area time to start looking at what those new policies may and there is no single silver bullet, as we know. What be. I know some of the ones they suggested are in I have brought along, if I might share with the relation to the Green Deal or commercial energy Committee, is a summary of our policies that efficiency. Are those areas where you are having contribute to our carbon savings in carbon budgets 1, policy discussions in preparation for that response to 2, 3 and 4. You can see from this table the differing the Climate Change Committee report? profile and the impact of policies on different Gregory Barker: In terms of the Green Deal— things.1 As Ravi said, by the time you get to carbon Chair: I do not want to get into the details of what budget 4, the impact in the reduction of emissions you are doing. I just want to know whether or not you delivered by EU CO2 emissions targets on new cars are preparing for a strategically— goes from practically nothing in the first carbon Gregory Barker: We are not preparing for any U-turn budget, and just 7.5 megatons in the second budget, or major deviation in policy. What we are preparing to 58 in the fourth carbon budget. If you look at these for is to deliver the policy we have in place; things projections you will see the changing pattern and a like the Green Deal, the ECO, our proposals for real quickening of the pace that you are seeking to energy efficiency driven in the new capacity market understand. under EMR, the whole array of the decarbonisation elements of the EMR Bill. These are things that will Q155 Chair: I am sure this chart will be helpful in require implementation. We have the policy, we identifying where you have accelerated the progress believe. Nothing is perfect. I am quite sure we will you are making. But, bearing in mind the report of the look to iterate policy to improve it, but we are not Climate Change Committee and the comments they expecting to have radical departures from what we made that new policies are needed in the next two think is a core, robust policy. years to get us onto the trajectory for the third and fourth carbon budgets, for those two five-year periods, Q157 Caroline Lucas: One issue is what new do you accept that prognosis from the Climate Change policies you might be designing and you have Committee and, if so, what are you doing to look at explained it is better to keep on with what you are the new policies they suggested? doing and make sure that you put those into place. Gregory Barker: We will make our full response to What about some of the concerns about other policies the Committee's report in detail in October, and that can undermine what you are doing? The kind of obviously this is an important document. We are thing I am thinking about is the analysis in the Carbon taking it very seriously and it needs proper analysis, Tracker report that suggested we can only safely burn and we have only had it a couple of weeks. about 20% of known proven fossil fuel resources. At Ben Golding: It is probably worth adding that the the same time, for example, yesterday we were talking Committee’s report does not say as such that the to the Foreign Office Minister about exploitation of policies we have coming on stream and things like the Arctic and so on. What worries me is that what EMR will not have a substantial impact on emissions you described might sound a fair enough— into the future. What it says is simply that the Gregory Barker: Are you talking about globally or underlying trend rate of emissions in 2012 was about nationally? 1% to 1.5%, and if that trend rate continued every Caroline Lucas: Both, but what I want to get from year from now to the third carbon budget we would you is your view on something like the Carbon not be on track. It is probably important to make the Tracker report. It talks about globally but it also has a distinction between the policies that are coming on very specific UK focus. The report says that at the stream and are not yet at full speed, as the Minister same time many of our companies and other and Ravi have brought out, and the Committee’s companies are trying to find more fossil fuels to assessment of if we just carry on at current trend rate, exploit. In fact, if we are to keep below 2¡ warming, we can only safely burn 20% of known reserves. Why what will happen. are we going off trying to find many more? Gregory Barker: What we have is not the need for Gregory Barker: I worked in the oil and gas industry new policy. What we have is a need to deliver the before I came into politics, so I know all about the potential of the policies we have set in place. nebulous nature of reserves, including proven 1 See Appendix A reserves, and how greatly their value is discounted, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 43
10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding and how difficult it is to take oil and gas, particularly Do you see any prospect of that target being put up to from far-flung regions, and get it to market where it that extent before a UN climate change deal in 2015? can be commercially exploited. I don’t think there is Gregory Barker: Sorry, do I? necessarily a direct correlation between oil and gas Martin Caton: Do you think there is any likelihood that is in the ground, and coal, come to that, and what they will put the target up to 30% before the UN— will end up being burnt commercially. Gregory Barker: What we would like is not an I would say as a more general point that the debate unconditional raising of the target, but we would want around gas is often misplaced. As far as I am it to be raised as a result of a successful negotiation concerned, the big challenge for the climate agenda is within the UNFCCC. We definitely want Europe to how we keep coal in the ground. How do we skip past make that offer. coal? That is not just an issue for China and developing economies. It is also an issue even for Q160 Martin Caton: To make an offer but then see Europe. We have seen an increased level of coal if the UN will go along— burning, and the possibility of abundant cheap gas as Gregory Barker: We want the EU to play a leading an intermediate solution offers very great potential. In negotiating role in there, and to have a higher level of the longer term we obviously have to go to a world ambition as part of our offer. where carbon capture is freely available and where there is a much greater level of renewables. But in the Q161 Martin Caton: We have already heard in this medium-term, particularly in the period that is under inquiry that some people are not particularly hopeful discussion here, through the 2020s, I think the of getting a good deal out of the UN climate change increased supply of gas with the potential to keep coal negotiations. James Hanson, for instance, told us in in the ground and work well in conjunction with May that he did not have much faith that a global deal intermittent renewables is a positive thing, particularly will be reached, and he therefore advocated groups of if it can keep coal in the ground in places like India key countries agreeing to take action. He mentioned and China. that he felt the US and China could draw in other At the moment we have a sub-optimal situation where countries. Would you think about the UK joining such some markets have access to cheap gas and that is a group as a fallback position, unilaterally, without displacing coal into other markets. While America's acting in concert with the rest of the EU, if you emissions are lower, and it is very welcome, it is not thought that was the way forward globally? a great help to the planet if it is simply displacing Gregory Barker: Sorry, what group? dirty coal into other markets. But if we can encourage those other markets to not take cheap coal but to burn Q162 Martin Caton: It is not an existing group. their own gas, we could see a step change in the same What he was suggesting was that because he is not way that the UK saw a step change in the 1990s when hopeful of a global deal, key nations would try to we switched from burning coal to burning gas. That come to an agreement to move forward— is one of the biggest drivers of why we are able to be Gregory Barker: It is too early for that. The UNFCCC overachieving our 1990 benchmarked climate is certainly imperfect but it is the only show in town, reductions, our emissions reductions. and we remain committed to pursuing, however challenging it may be, a global deal. The prospects of a global deal are a little more encouraging now than Q158 Chair: This is such a complex subject to try to they were 12 months ago. In particular, the get round in our session this afternoon, and we will commitment by the US President and the Chinese come to some more of these detailed points. You just President to meet for a leaders’ meeting in the margins talked about overachieving and, given the fact that we of the UN in New York in September 2014 means have—with minimum effort is the wrong phrase to that the atmospherics are improving: President Obama use—achieved the results in this first budget, do you intends to drive climate change policy with a greater feel that we should be not resting on our laurels but level of ambition in his second term, the noises we going out to do everything we can to hasten the arrival are hearing from China, and obviously we have the of the next phase that we need to see? EU. We are pushing for the EU to adopt a target of Gregory Barker: Absolutely. Certainly we are, as we 50% reduction by 2030 in the context of a global deal. said in our opening remarks, set not just to over- Ideally we would like a 40% reduction even without achieve our first but second and third budgets as well. a global deal, but the fact that the EU is prepared to But we are very much taking your point, and that is go to such a high level of ambition if we are able to why we are pressing for a higher level of ambition in secure a global deal, we hope will further push us Europe. It is important for Europe to achieve the least- towards the deal. But I think making a plan B at this cost pathway towards decarbonisation and gain a stage would not be helpful, just when we are starting commercial lead in the low carbon technologies of the to see a glimmer of hope. future, but also to enable us to play a leadership role in the global talks within the UNFCCC. Q163 Chair: Can I just press you on that a little bit Chair: That is exactly what Martin Caton is going to before Mr Caton continues? I can understand what follow through. you are saying about not wanting in any way to undermine negotiations that are going to be so Q159 Martin Caton: Minister, you are committed to precious, and which are taking place at the moment, tightening the second and third carbon budgets if you and therefore not wishing to have a plan B situation. move to a 30% emissions reduction target for 2020. Is it not the case that there are certain individual cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Ev 44 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding examples of different countries—for example, China, that within the EU your position would be to say that Mexico and other countries—who have unilaterally ought to be offered, but doing it would be conditional adopted climate change legislation? The more they do on there being a global deal? that, increasingly there is a greater opportunity for Gregory Barker: We are pushing now for a 30% informal pressure to be bubbling up that, in itself, may reduction. put greater pressure on the international COP talks that are ongoing. Q167 Caroline Lucas: Irrespective of what everyone Gregory Barker: Absolutely, and we have a very else is doing? Perfect, good. strong bilateral programme with a number of Gregory Barker: Yes. We are pushing that. That is important states within the UNFCCC, both small and contingent on a global deal and is a 2030 target that, large states. Ravi, perhaps you might talk about the as we were saying, could be 50% versus 40% in 2030. work we have been doing internationally on population and so on. Q168 Caroline Lucas: Yes, I just wanted to clarify Ravi Gurumurthy: Yes. Firstly, we are acting that, thank you. Talking about the review of the fourth unilaterally through the Climate Change Act. We do carbon budget, when we had David Kennedy here a act through a number of different fora; G8, G20, week or so back he was saying that the Climate major emitters. We have been doing that for the last Change Committee will report to you in December. 20 years, but we are also doing a lot bilaterally, so let Can you say a little bit more about the timing of when me give you an example of the 2050 calculator. We you think the decision on the fourth carbon budget have been working with the Chinese Government— will be taken, and also what other evidence you will Gregory Barker: In a good way. be looking at in terms of making a decision? Ravi Gurumurthy: In a good way, to try to help them Gregory Barker: We will be reviewing the fourth think through the practical implication of emissions reduction. Let us not have an abstract conversation carbon budget pretty early in 2014. I do not have a about 2¡. Let us say, as we have done, “How many specific date yet but I would certainly expect that we power stations, how many homes, how many cars do would come to a view in the first half of 2014. you have to change to get different types of emissions reduction?” That technical work to try to get to the Q169 Caroline Lucas: Do you know what other energy ministries of each of those countries to inputs there will be to your decision beyond the understand the implications is exactly what we are information coming from the Climate Change doing. Committee? Gregory Barker: Obviously it will be what happens Q164 Martin Caton: Continuing with this, whether in Europe. We hope that there will be a White Paper we act unilaterally or in partnership with other published by the Commission indicating the level of nations, if it ends up that an unambitious global deal ambition and action on the part of fellow EU on climate change is secured in 2015, would the member states. Government look to slacken the UK carbon budgets Ravi Gurumurthy: Since the last carbon budget was so that they were consistent with the wider set, the context has changed quite a lot. In particular, international community? given the economic slowdown in Europe, some of the Gregory Barker: We have a legally binding targets have become easier to achieve. To give you commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 80% by one example, in the traded sector of the fourth carbon 2050. That is the law of the land. budget, when the CCC recommended 690 megatons, that equated to a power sector decarbonisation level Q165 Martin Caton: That is good. As you know, the in 2030 of about 50 grams. When we set it, it equated European Commission is now consulting on Europe's to about 100 grams because already by then the energy and climate change target for 2030. Is what economic slowdown had affected the emissions you are looking to see come out of that something productions. Now, that fourth carbon budget equates equivalent to the UK’s fourth carbon budget? to about 200 grams emissions intensity, so the Gregory Barker: We would certainly want something numbers have changed quite a lot and achieving some that was consistent with meeting our own ambitions of these carbon targets has become slightly easier. on carbon. The exact numbers play differently for Those are the sort of factors we are going to be doing different countries, but we would want the level of analysis on, particularly around the decarbonisation of ambition to be commensurate with what we are taking the power sector. That will feed into this review. in the UK and across the EU. Ben Golding: The way we have done the provisions Q170 Caroline Lucas: I think Lord Deben has has not been by reference to the domestic targets. The written to the Secretary of State saying that the fourth calculations are on what we think the EU would have carbon budget cannot be amended simply because the to do to be consistent with this trajectory to 2¡. The Commission has not moved to a 30% emissions negotiating position the Minister set out, 40% reduction target. Is that something that you are happy unilateral, 50% in the event of a global deal, is with? I think that is a real concern, isn’t it, that the focused on that 2¡ pathway. fourth carbon budget will be watered down? There will be massive pressure from the Treasury and they Q166 Caroline Lucas: Can I just finish off one last might well use the fact that the Commission has not bit on that about the issue of the EU moving to a 30% moved to the 30% emissions reduction target as a emissions reduction target for 2020? Were you saying reason to weaken the fourth carbon budget? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence Ev 45
10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding
Ravi Gurumurthy: It is probably worth explaining Gregory Barker: Yes, but what I am talking about is some facts about how carbon budgeting works, what we are likely to achieve rather than what is the because it is quite complicated. The power sector and notional budget. What is the practical likelihood of us industry are capped under the EU ETS and we simply achieving reductions? take our share of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Ravi Gurumurthy: As I said earlier, because the cap as our traded section of the carbon budget. If the context has changed so much the fourth carbon budget EU decides to loosen it or tighten it that will simply is not the binding constraint on how much action we be enshrined as our share. We all agree across take on decarbonising the power sector. We are Government that we need to align the fourth carbon committed to try to get the least-cost routes to an 80% budget traded sector with whatever the EU ETS cap reduction in 2050. is. The question is when to do that—to do that before we know what the picture is post-2020 or after. But Q175 Chair: I do not understand what it is, in the the fact is we are going to align with EU ETS. context that you are saying, has changed that would justify a departure from the fourth carbon budget. Q171 Caroline Lucas: There are two things there, Ravi Gurumurthy: As I said earlier, when the fourth are there not? One of my next questions, in fact, was carbon budget was set it felt much tighter than it does exactly to say that, given that the Commission is now because the European economy has really slowed likely to be still working on improving the ETS in down. Let me just go back to the power sector again. 2014, why not delay the review until after they have Because of the renewables target we are going to go done that? Let me put that to you first. from 450 grams per megawatt hour today to 200 Ravi Gurumurthy: That is one of the factors we are grams. The fourth carbon budget, if we revise it going to consider. Do you want to revise the cap upwards, would allow us to recapitalise the power twice, because no doubt we will not get the exact cap sector and build coal in the 2020s, because it would right if we revise it in advance, or do you want to allow us to have up to 300 grams. That is not revise it just once? That is one of the decisions we consistent with our other targets like the 2050 target. will have to make. You are not going to be able to start a big, aggressive roll-out of renewables, stop and then start again. We Q172 Caroline Lucas: Could it then be, rather than are already on a path to overachieve against the fourth a decision being made in the early part of 2014—as carbon budget in the traded sector. If you look at our the Minister was just suggesting—that a decision is projections, we are looking to be under the 690 cap taken not to announce anything until towards the end of 2014, after the ETS negotiation has happened? that exists at the moment, let alone a revised carbon cap. Ravi Gurumurthy: We are committed to a review in early 2014. We will have to look at a whole range of evidence, scientific, economic, the power sector story Q176 Caroline Lucas: There are two things there. that I talked about earlier, and we will look at a full One is that you may feel wonderfully concentrated by range of options, from preserving the existing budget that 80% by 2050. I am not convinced that the to revising it. Treasury feels that same degree of concentration. They might be slightly more concentrated by the Q173 Caroline Lucas: But one of your options carbon budget process, which is more visible, more might be to announce that you might postpone the immediate and more explicit. We know obviously, it decision until after the ETS discussions have is in the public domain, that it was the Treasury that happened. You are saying on the one hand you have lobbied for this review. They must have wanted the said you are going to review it in early 2014. If in the review to be able to have the capacity to revise it process of that early review in early 2014 you decide down. that it makes a lot more sense to wait until after you Gregory Barker: The Treasury are concerned about know what is happening in ETS— the real impact on the real economy, rather than Ravi Gurumurthy: It is a hypothetical question. A notional budgets or notional trajectory. The thing the review can come to all sorts of conclusions. It can Treasury will take the greatest comfort from is exactly come to a conclusion to look at it again, to change, to this point that Ravi has been making. I can understand stay, but we do not know. the concern the Treasury would have hypothetically: Caroline Lucas: Let me try you on another question. with the rest of Europe reducing their level of Gregory Barker: It is worth pointing out, though, that ambition, would the domestic unilateral budgets in the regardless of what happens to the carbon budget, we UK act as a constraint on growth? That is what it is are still set to over-achieve. Do you want to just about. What Ravi is explaining is that while that might explain that, Ravi? Setting a budget does not actually have been something we were worried about two alter what we are on track to achieve. years back, the change in economic context means Ravi Gurumurthy: In some ways this is a— that we are not in reality simply bumping up against those constraints. Theoretically, standing back without Q174 Chair: Sorry, but the staging posts between looking at it closely, I can understand why the now and 2050 are each of the five-year carbon budget Treasury may feel that they do not want to be periods. Therefore the fourth carbon budget is constrained if the rest of Europe is slacking off absolutely critical in getting you to your final ambition. The reality, when we look at the figures and destination. the trajectory, is that is not going to be a constraint. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Ev 46 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding
Q177 Caroline Lucas: That is very comforting, so Ravi Gurumurthy: We are not. As Greg said earlier, why can we not make an announcement now to say we have not set our policies and budgets for 2023 to that in this review there is no circumstance in which 2027. We have not set out our EU regulations on the budgets will be made larger? In other words, the product standards, so there is a huge amount of policy targets would be made— work to do. What we said in the Carbon Plan was that Gregory Barker: That would not be a review then, there are two critical swing factors that will determine would it? We are committed to the review and we will whether we achieve our targets. Firstly, vehicle do that. emissions and whether they go down from the 95 grams that we want in 2020 towards 50 to 70 grams Q178 Caroline Lucas: Yes, but you will know that in 2030—that was the rough trajectory—and low the review is causing concern to a lot of industry and carbon heat where we think we need to get between many others. You will also know that there are 20% and 45% of heating being low carbon in 2030. reputable people like John Ashton just the other day— In the 2020s we are going to have to accelerate very very reputable—your former climate change hard on low carbon heating and electric cars. We can’t ambassador, saying, “Just scrap the review. The determine that now. What we can do is get those review is deeply unhelpful”. If you are also agreeing, industries off to a good start and get electric vehicles in a sense, that there is not much likelihood, as far as deploying and get the renewable heat programme you can see, that the review would lead to bigger going. Later on we will rely on bigger levers like the budgets and therefore less ambition, then why not just EU vehicle emission standards to drive the say that and give comfort to industry now? deployment. Gregory Barker: I have huge respect for John Ashton Gregory Barker: I think you want to have a degree of and others, and I do appreciate the point that you flexibility in order to ensure that we go down the make. But in government we do not make policy on least-cost pathway because there is technological a daily basis, and we try— uncertainty in terms of which of these options are going to deliver best value for money. Q179 Caroline Lucas: Yes, you do. You do it all Q183 Mr Spencer: the time. I just wondered how easy it is for someone to get a snapshot of where we are at, just Gregory Barker: It seems like it sometimes. to look at how the Government is managing delivery of emission reductions to meet the carbon budgets. Q180 Chair: We are here on the basis you are Gregory Barker: Well, I certainly agree it can be a making policy. slightly bewildering and complex business Gregory Barker: But we try to set out a roadmap and understanding the very many factors that make up the then stick to it. We announced two days ago that we carbon reduction agenda, but we have four key reports would have this review in 2014 and that is what we that we publish each year to ensure accountability, not will do. I think the thing that undermines investor least to this Committee, and monitor progress against certainty, the thing that undermines confidence in the carbon budgets. Those are the Annual Statement Government policy, however tempting it is, is when of Emissions; the Committee of Climate Change’s we do exactly that; when we announce a review and Annual Progress Report, obviously; the Government’s then things change a bit and we do not have a review Response to CCC’s Annual Progress Report, which we or we announce a review and then a year ahead we will be publishing in October; and the Updated pre-announce what we are going to look at in that Energy Emissions Projections. For the convenience of review. I appreciate the logic of what you are saying, the Committee, I have brought along copies of the but if we want to give certainty the important thing is most recent of each of those documents. we do as we say and we say as we do. Ravi Gurumurthy: Can I have one more go at this? Q184 Mr Spencer: If we could look at the Because of the way the Climate Change Act is Committee on Climate Change, obviously they have framed, we have to have the same emissions as the their own indicators that they work to and an example EU ETS cap. So it is going to change no matter what. of that would be where they want to see all lofts Our view is that, whether the EU ETS discussions go insulated by 2015. In the Carbon Plan, you are saying well or badly, we need to do even more than that to be we should try and do that by 2020. So we are working on a sensible cost-effective trajectory to 2050 because, to different targets. I just wonder if there is a even in the existing fourth carbon budget, it would disconnect there somehow. assume a plateauing of decarbonisation in the 2020s, Gregory Barker: The important thing about lofts is which is not sensible. to understand the differential between no lagging and optimum lagging. The fact of the matter is we have Q181 Caroline Lucas: But you are not talking about made huge progress in the last 18 months on the non-traded sector at all, are you? effectively lagging all of the easy-to-treat lofts and Ravi Gurumurthy: The review is explicitly about the easy-to-treat cavity wall spaces in the UK. There are traded sector. It was explicitly about that. very few left. There is not a big programme of untreated lofts out there to be done. A lot of people Q182 Chair: That is precisely the question that we have asked why we have stopped treating lofts under want to have a look at, whether or not the Government previous programmes. The reason is because we have is on track to meet the fourth carbon budget in respect done extremely well and are close to declaring victory. of the non-traded sector. What we do need to do is go back and visit either the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
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10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding hard-to-treat lofts, which are in difficult out-of-the- emissions savings from exactly that. It is the total way places or scrappy and difficult to access, or those emissions savings you will see across the economy where there is insufficient insulation either in the loft and that is the basis of the table that the Minister or in the cavity wall. Now, obviously the incremental handed round earlier. benefit from doing that is a lot less than putting lagging into a virgin loft. That is a programme of Q187 Mr Spencer: How important is it not only that work that does need to be done, but you are not going you make these targets and you reduce emissions but to get the same returns in terms of carbon savings that also that people can see that you are achieving those you get from lagging a virgin loft and the virgin lofts goals and they feel part of the plan to do that and they agenda is pretty much there. can contribute to it? Gregory Barker: Very important, but I don’t think Q185 Mr Spencer: But if one of the criteria of the people want to get that much interested in the nitty- Climate Change Committee is to try to do that by gritty. I have presented the Committee with a table 2015 and the Government is trying to achieve that by with relatively few indicators on it and I think that is 2020, by its very nature you are going to fail one of baffling enough for professionals let alone for those criteria. members of the public. I think what the public want Gregory Barker: I do not have the number off the top to be reassured of is that there is a plan, that it is of my head but I think the differential in terms of sensibly costed, that we are committed to it and we carbon saved between doing it in 2015 and 2020, are on target to deliver it. The key benchmark of given the marginal savings that come from doing success is: are we hitting our carbon budgets? As we hard-to-treat rather than virgin lofts, does not present have said, we have over-achieved carbon budget 1; we such a huge problem. It is just a difference of are set to over-achieve 2; over-achieve 3; and the emphasis. The thing about the CCC report is that it fourth in the mid-2020s, we need to fill in more of the should be seen as guidance and a critique. It is not the blanks to ensure that we achieve on that as well. But, only way to achieve these objectives. I don’t think in terms of the overall direction of travel, I think the anyone thinks that it should be Stalinist one-solution public can be pretty assured that, despite the proposition. challenges the Government faces, we are on track. Ravi Gurumurthy: It is also worth saying we take a reasonably conservative approach to this issue Q188 Caroline Nokes: I just wanted to ask a bit because we just do not know how many of these lofts about how the Government is managing its carbon are treatable. Rather than assuming that they all are budgets. The National Audit Office has indicated that and therefore doing less in other sectors, we have said, Government has stopped using the Carbon Plan to “Let’s take a slightly more cautious approach to the track its progress. Are there any plans to update the sector”. Carbon Plan and to reinstate it? Gregory Barker: Those hard-to-treat lofts are, by Ben Golding: The Government has not stopped using definition, hard to treat and they can be hard to treat the Carbon Plan to track progress as such. The for a number of reasons. You can’t get access, not just National Audit Office said that we have not published the fact that it is difficult from a building point of view; but there are a number of reasons that make the last couple of quarterly reports in quite a long them harder to treat. time. The reason for that is essentially that since the Carbon Plan was published a lot of the indicators and the milestones in the annex to the Carbon Plan are Q186 Mr Spencer: The Government must be keen taken from Departments’ business plans. They are the to demonstrate that it is responding to the Climate Change Committee’s findings and its report. If you things that individual Government Departments have were to introduce a new policy or change direction, said they will do on climate change. Since the Carbon how could the normal person measure or see what that Plan, Government Departments have updated those. would mean for emissions reductions? They produced new business plans and we are just in Gregory Barker: We are going to come back with our the process of updating and aligning the Carbon Plan response to the CCC’s report in the autumn, once we milestones so that we are consistently reporting have had an opportunity to analyse and take on board against the same things. We are taking the opportunity what they have had to say. As I say, I don’t anticipate just to look at all of the additional milestones that any dramatic policy shifts, but they have come up were not in Department business plans and making with some good ideas and where we can iterate policy sure that they are up to date, as clear as possible and, and improve it we will take on board what they have where possible, that we are adding further in. One of to say. the other points the NAO made was there are fewer Ben Golding: Just in terms of specific policies, detailed milestones later in the Parliament and it obviously we do publish an impact assessment for any seems an appropriate opportunity to think about things new policy that sets out emissions projections that have just moved on a bit and where we can add associated with this, so how much we expect to save. more detail and get better reports. On the way in which that final report talks about the updated emissions projections as calculated, it takes Q189 Caroline Nokes: Who has responsibility for all of the cumulative impacts of the impact assessment deciding if things have just moved on a bit and to we have done for every policy, including any new make sure that things are implemented and the process ones, works out the total impact of those, feeds them is working effectively? through our models and then you work out the Chair: When will they do it by, as well? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Ev 48 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding
Ben Golding: Hopefully they will do it very shortly. The ideal scenario is that Ministers do not have to get The Carbon Budget Steering Group co-ordinates the involved because we deliver. process, which is my team. Obviously the actual Ben Golding: It is probably also worth just harking milestones of business plans are agreed at ministerial back to those annual published reports. Things like the level and they are published by the Cabinet Office and Government’s Response to the Committee of Climate by Departments. Change’s Report are obviously agreed at ministerial level and they are agreed at Cabinet Committee level Q190 Caroline Nokes: What does “very shortly” before publication. So there is quite high-level mean? ministerial engagement in holding Departments to Gregory Barker: A very good question. account through that route. Caroline Nokes: Minister. Ben Golding: The first half of this year. Q194 Dr Offord: David Kennedy told us last week that there are four main areas of progress that he wants Q191 Caroline Nokes: The National Emissions to see if the Government is to achieve its carbon Target Board has met less frequently than was budgets. I will briefly run through the four areas and originally planned and with lower ranking officials. perhaps you would like to give your opinion whether There seems to be no evidence that Departments are you think changes should be made or provide some justification. The first area he identified was the being held to account against the policies in the insulation of solid walls. The second was energy Carbon Plan. Can you explain why the board has not efficiency in the industrial and commercial sectors. been working as it was originally intended? Thirdly, he spoke about vans and electric vehicles and Gregory Barker: It is fair to say that the work of the the fourth area was renewable heat. Do you agree that board revolves around the work to be done. There was new policies and incentives are needed in these four a flurry of meetings back in 2011 in the run up to the areas and, if not, why not? setting of the fourth carbon budget. Once that budget Gregory Barker: Overall, I don’t think we need new period had been set there was less work for them to policy. That is not to say that we might need tweaking do in terms of requiring new policy. It was a question or further incentives or streamlining where it is too of understanding that that work was in train and so bureaucratic. What we need is to put our shoulder the board met less often, but I would now expect more behind these and deliver. A number of the policy areas meetings of the board in the run up to the review of that you referred to, Dr Offord, are very early in the fourth carbon budget in 2014 and the setting of their life. the fifth carbon budget in 2016. I think it ebbs and flows and we are going to be ramping up the number Q195 Dr Offord: Which ones in particular? of meetings in the coming months. Gregory Barker: For example, the rollout of solid wall through ECO and the Green Deal is very early Q192 Caroline Nokes: When it is flowing and not indeed. Now, we need to see a scaling up of that, but ebbing do you attend the meetings? what we have put in place now is the framework to Gregory Barker: No, I don’t. It is chaired by the deliver that; particularly the ECO programme, which Permanent Secretary—the new Permanent Secretary is going to be the primary driver of solid wall at DECC is Stephen Lovegrove—and it is headed by insulation. The reason for that is solid wall is still a director levels from DCLG, HMT, Cabinet Office, relatively expensive measure that is unlikely to meet BIS, Defra and DfT. the golden rule of Green Deal finance. Most people putting in solid wall at the moment will require either Q193 Caroline Nokes: If you don’t attend, how do partial or full subsidy from ECO to install that. The they report back to you? early signs are that the solid wall market is growing, Gregory Barker: I think they report to the Secretary but we are going to have to keep that under very close of State through the Permanent Secretary. watch because this is a very nascent market. We want Ravi Gurumurthy: We basically escalate issues when to make sure that we deliver cost effectively. they need to be escalated. The whole point is it Our brokerage of ECO means that we are now resolves disputes between Government Departments. delivering ECO very much in line with the impact If they do not exist there is no real need to meet. If assessment estimates of around £1.3 billion to £1.4 we can’t resolve it at the NET Board then we will billion per annum, but we want to make sure that an often have a bilateral between different Ministers. increasing amount of that is delivering solid wall. We Gregory Barker: I certainly have not been shy of hope, as we scale up the delivery of solid wall, that getting involved in, not specifically these issues, but the cost of solid wall will come down with the similar issues; for example, when I chaired the pan- economies of scale from production and the learning Government GHG reduction target taskforce in that comes for installation. We will be growing with 2010Ð2011. Again, the meetings of that group the industry and watching. So it is not that new policy depended on the progress we were making. There was is there, because we have the policy for solid wall in a flurry of meetings at the outset to task everyone with place, but we do need to make sure that we keep on their appropriate reductions. Once that was agreed and track and are not afraid to iterate that policy going they were in train they then slackened until there were forward. one or two that we needed to chase up towards the end, but where there is a need for ministerial Q196 Dr Offord: That is understandable but when involvement there is not a shortage of political will. you look at something like electric vehicles, which cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
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10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding was the third point I mentioned, the framework may Chair: Sorry, before we move on I think Mr be in place but the infrastructure is not. One of the Gurumurthy wanted to come in. questions I have asked the DCLG is how they are Ravi Gurumurthy: No, I was going to turn heat. working with local authorities particularly to Dr Offord: Can we come back to that? introduce charging points, for example. What work Ravi Gurumurthy: Yes. have you done with the DCLG and, in turn, local authorities to increase the number of charging points Q199 Dr Offord: For SMEs, I have a small business. across the country for public access? How can you help me? Gregory Barker: Obviously that is a DfT/DCLG lead. Gregory Barker: The Green Deal is for you. It could I personally have not been involved in that policy. I even be the Domestic Green Deal rather than the don’t know if you can shed any light on it, Ravi? Commercial Green Deal. The big problem for many Ravi Gurumurthy: Yes. We second one person from SMEs is that they do not own the building that they my team on to the Office of Low Emission Vehicles operate out of and, traditionally, there has not been an precisely to look at the interaction between incentive for landlords to improve the building infrastructure and grid infrastructure and EV rollout. because they pay out and all the benefit goes to their The strategy that they published initially depended on tenants. The rent does not go up, at least not in the private sector infrastructure and lots of innovation at short term, so why would you? Also there have been an early stage rather than regulating and mandating it a couple of snagging problems with the interpretation right from the start, but the two things go hand in of the law that we are putting right on the rented hand. Because actual sales of EVs have been a bit sector. Under the Green Deal what will happen is that slow, and slower than imagined, it is harder to put in landlords will be able to put in the measures to the infrastructure. improve the long-term energy efficiency of the building but the savings will help offset the financing Q197 Dr Offord: But it is chicken and egg, isn’t it? of that. So there will not be a financial barrier to SMEs Ravi Gurumurthy: It is and it isn’t in that most of doing that and that will either work because the the evidence about EVs and how they are deployed landlord wants to improve the building or, more often suggests they do not need huge amounts of public I think, because the SME makes that request of the landlord. It will take a while to take off and I think it infrastructure and that most people charge at home. will be next year before we start to see the Most people have that range anxiety before they Commercial Green Deal motoring. It is very purchase but once they buy the vehicle they find that promising. This is a 20-year market we are talking they do not necessarily need charging points. That is about, but there are rich pickings in the SME market why there has been some reluctance to do a big rollout for energy efficiency. before the technology has been taken up by consumers. Q200 Dr Offord: Mr Gurumurthy, you just wanted to mention renewable heat? Q198 Dr Offord: What about the area of energy Ravi Gurumurthy: Yes. We have seen a slow efficiency in the industrial and commercial sectors? deployment of renewable heat, but it is not even Gregory Barker: There we are seeing some very across the different technologies. We have seen good interesting developments that have yet to make deployment of medium biomass and some small themselves felt in the economy. The Green Investment biomass but not enough on large-scale biomass and Bank, one of our real achievements I think, have now on air and ground-source heat pumps. That is why we invested over £690 million in their first few months are changing the tariffs. We had the tariffs set to low of operation—created out of something in the region before, but we are changing them quite substantially. of £1.6 billion, a leverage of around one to three— I think that is a good example of not new policy but and established in that a new specific subgroup on amending, adapting and improving our existing ones. industrial energy efficiency. It is still very early days Gregory Barker: It is important to also point out, in but they are demonstrating that they are able to scale respect to heat—we learned from the experience of up the size of projects that can be funded and dealt other countries and particularly Germany on the tariffs with. The problem with energy efficiency projects to set for renewable electricity—there is no comparable date is that you have typically dealt with projects that tariff system anywhere in the world for renewable have been valued in millions or tens of millions at heat, so we are pioneering a global first. best rather than hundreds of millions or even billions Dr Offord: Thank you. That is very useful. compared to other projects within the energy sector. That is now changing. It will also mean that they are Q201 Simon Wright: A few questions on domestic in better shape to respond to the opportunities that we energy efficiency. First of all, I wonder if you accept are creating through EMR in the capacity market that the analysis of the Climate Change Committee will allow for energy efficiency projects to compete regarding their belief that new incentives are needed for investment alongside more traditional power to help improve take up of the Green Deal. For projects. Then obviously we have the Commercial example, are you looking at fiscal incentives or Green Deal that is just beginning, which will be a big linking the Green Deal to building regulations? boon for SMEs. Gregory Barker: Yes. Dr Offord: The way you have approached it is totally Chair: That is very clear. correct, I believe, but what about smaller SMEs or Gregory Barker: We are looking at new incentives. I SMEs generally? can’t comment on which particular incentives but, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Ev 50 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding thanks to the Chancellor, we have a significant amount Deal Finance Company estimates that something in of money to fund a range of incentives. We already the region of 50 companies will have come to the have our cash-back scheme out, but that will not take market and substantially more the year after. It is very all of it. We are looking at street-by-street projects. I early days and I think the real driver of this is not think the street-by-street model for the rollout of the going to be the Big 6, interestingly. It is going to be Green Deal is the way to get this moving, blending the SMEs. That does mean that some of the ECO finance and Green Deal finance, but we are distribution in the early days is going to be more looking at a range of other alternatives. I see what patchy because those SMEs will not have national they say about stamp duty. Stamp duty in a market coverage, necessarily, but I think what you are where housing sales are relatively depressed is not gradually going to see over the next year or two is necessarily particularly effective, but we are looking beacons of success and that will fan out over the at it and we are actively considering these things in country as a whole. I am certainly planning SME DECC at the moment. roadshows in the autumn, at the start of the traditional heating season, when a number of new entrants are Q202 Simon Wright: Can you give an indication of also planning to launch their commercial offer rather when you might be ready to say more on that? than during August when we are all at the beach. Gregory Barker: Certainly I would expect us to say more in the autumn. Q204 Caroline Lucas: Yes, it was that image of the beacons fanning out, but the question was about the Q203 Simon Wright: Very good. In light of the data finance, as ever. Given that the numbers of people that was published at the end of July, what are your getting the assessments is quite high but then, at the latest projections on take up over the next few years moment—and some of us think it will continue—there and are you still confident that you will be able to are significantly fewer who translate that into getting meet the commitment in the Carbon Plan to have all the finance from the Green Deal, will you be capturing lofts and cavity walls insulated by 2020? in some way the people who do get a Green Deal Gregory Barker: Yes. I think it is important to look assessment but then choose to get finance either by at the numbers of plans that were written in the first extending their mortgage or doing something that six months of the year in context. Everyone looked at might well be cheaper at the moment than taking the that in the sense that only 250 plans have been written Green Deal finance? Will you have those numbers in and it has been going since 28 January. The reality is some way? that reflected a couple of weeks of plans being able to Gregory Barker: I hope so. We don’t have the ability be written because, while the scheme was launched, at the moment to do that exactly, but I want to be all of the things that the Government committed to do clear. For me, Green Deal finance is a means to an were in place for 28 January. The individual private end. It is not the end in itself. companies took longer to complete what the Green Caroline Lucas: Sure. That is why I wanted to know Deal Finance Company call the on-boarding process what the numbers are. than was anticipated. They identified glitches with Gregory Barker: One of the things I did not mention their software. Each wanted individual legal advice was that several thousand people have had a Green and slightly different legal agreements around Deal assessment and decided to take all of the savings consumer finance. The software had to be themselves and self-finance. synchronised and there was learning on the Green Caroline Lucas: Exactly. Deal Finance Company’s part as well. Gregory Barker: I think if you are giving independent As a result, it was only some two or three weeks in advice to somebody, if you have the money, if you the case of British Gas, I think, that they had been have the savings, it is actually a very sensible thing to offering the ability to sign a plan when the cut-off date do not to take any form of finance, whether it is a was reached, and on the part of the other two or three lower interest rate that you can get from Tesco or a companies it was almost a matter of days. There had mortgage or Green Deal finance or any other. Do it not been a sustained period when the customer had yourself. Take all of the savings and clearly a number been able to get a Green Deal plan signed. That is of people are choosing to do that. We know that frustrating for us but what is encouraging is the fact because they have taken the Green Deal cash back. that 38,000 people have had assessments and the Certainly I will want to know that. We don’t yet have majority of those people indicated that they either had, it, for technical reasons, as part of our figures but we were going to have or were contemplating measures will certainly want to know and track the overall take- as a result of those assessments, which is a much up of Green Deal measures, however they are better level of take up than I was hoping for. So that financed, whether that is through ECO, whether that is encouraging, but what we have to get is the finance is through Green Deal finance or whether that is moving. Because it is a new market and because through self-paying. consumer finance does have a relatively heavy level of regulation attached to it, I guess we should not be Q205 Simon Wright: David Kennedy argued that the so surprised that these companies that are coming to ECO as currently designed will not focus on the quick this for the first time are a little bit more cautious than and cheap wins, loft insulation and cavity walls. I maybe we believe they need to be. wonder whether you are considering relaxing the rules But the big driver, I think, is the fact when we for ECO to allow for this. announced the level of plans to June, four companies Gregory Barker: No. On the contrary, it is almost the had just come to the market. By Christmas the Green opposite. The big challenge is solid wall insulation. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
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10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding
As I outlined earlier, the easy wins of treatable lofts Gregory Barker: Yes. I would really like to get to the and treatable cavities, and the statistics that—do you bottom of this because it is frustrating for me as I am know when we are publishing the next round of sure it is for you. I think we are all aligned in what we statistics? are wanting to achieve and, while we are all entitled to Ravi Gurumurthy: No. our own opinions, we do not want a situation where Ben Golding: No. we are all using our own facts. So I think it would be Gregory Barker: We are publishing soon, shortly. really helpful—maybe with this Committee—if we try That will demonstrate just how much progress was to agree at least what the absolute agreed position is made in the last 18 months. Part of that progress was and had some way of reconciling our different ways because we—or rather I—changed the rules of CERT. of accounting things. You may remember that under the last Government you had the nonsense of millions of light bulbs being Q209 Chair: Would that be something that you sent unsolicited through the post and then stuck in would consider would be a matter for your people’s cupboards and no real demonstrable savings Department or for the National Audit Office to do? accruing as a result. We got rid of all that nonsense. Gregory Barker: I would have to take advice on that We have made it much more focused on the easy-to- but I would certainly like to get to a point where we treat cavities and lofts and, as a result, we have a very could all at least agree what the numbers are even if high level of penetration of that market. The challenge we do not agree on the priorities. now is not to pretend that there are lots more easy-to- treat lofts out there, or easy-to-treat cavities, but to Q210 Chair: It would be helpful if you could revisit the hard-to-treat and, more importantly, begin perhaps let us know how that might be achieved. to scale up the solid wall insulation market. That is Gregory Barker: When we release the next set of the big challenge, particularly for off-gas grid figures perhaps we might have an informal session customers who face very high bills, particularly in with the Committee to run through how we arrived at rural areas. it and maybe invite the Committee on Climate Change as well. Q206 Caroline Lucas: I know we have talked about Chair: That would be helpful. it before in terms of the difference between what the Climate Change Committee says in terms of the lofts Q211 Martin Caton: Basically it is not the EAC remaining to be done and your version because some disagreeing with the Government, it is your Climate have minimal loft insulation versus none. I was just Change Committee that are pretending that there are looking back to the figures. They are so different. easy-to-treat cavity walls and easy-to-treat lofts. From When you have the Committee saying that there are my memory of Mr Kennedy’s evidence—and I do not 6 million lofts that require insulating versus, I think, have it in front of me—he does believe that the 200,000 that is coming from Government, that figure science is on his side or the fact that— seems massively— Gregory Barker: We have access to— Gregory Barker: But what type? Is that secondary Martin Caton: Some of them have a very pathetic insulation or primary insulation? Because this is the amount of insulation. difference, we are talking virgin lofts versus lofts that Gregory Barker: Yes. I think that is the point that Ms require a further visit, and obviously the incremental Lucas was making: it is all relative. I think what we improvement either in terms of efficiency or lowering need to do is bring greater clarity of what we mean your heating bills or in carbon-save for a revisit is and make sure we are using the same terminology but much, much lower. I think there will be an opportunity, when we publish the next set of complete figures. Let’s make an effort Q207 Caroline Lucas: But it depends, though, to try to get on this page because it is a slightly boring doesn’t it? It will certainly be lower but it just feels argument for everybody else who is trying to to me that there is such discrepancy between those understand this. two figures— Gregory Barker: Not if it is between untreated and Q212 Martin Caton: So it may be that the Climate treated. Change Committee is not pretending— Caroline Lucas:—in the sense of trying to understand Gregory Barker: I would not accuse the Committee that some might have such basic insulation that it is on Climate Change of pretending. Those would not be not providing very much help at all and some might my words. be pretty good but still having room for improvement. Martin Caton: You did use those words. That is what Gregory Barker: But it is diminishing returns. I am saying. Obviously you want the optimum amount of Gregory Barker: No, I didn’t say they were insulation in—don’t get me wrong—but it is pretending, I— diminishing returns. You will never get the savings Martin Caton: You said, “It’s no good pretending like the first six inches of loft insulation that you put there are easy-to-treat cavity walls and lofts”. The in and it will be diminishing returns thereafter. only reason we are raising this question is because it was raised with us by the Climate Change Committee Q208 Caroline Lucas: Is there a process whereby so if anybody is pretending it is the Climate Change somehow those figures will be reconciled? Will you Committee. be going back to the Climate Change Committee and Gregory Barker: Yes, but we have an understanding asking them? of what the new set of figures that will be released cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
Ev 52 Environmental Audit Committee: Evidence
10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding soon will show. We have access to that data and that becomes just another source of reliable, sustainable, informs our view of what is happening out there. That clean energy. data needs to be audited properly and go through a Do you want to add something to that, Ravi? process before it is released. We are basing our Ravi Gurumurthy: The only thing I would add is that assumptions and our view of the sector on very up to in order to meet the climate change targets, it is more date data. I do take these points that the Committee cost-effective to do energy efficiency and electricity makes on board and I would like to get to a situation first then transport and heating later. So that makes a where we can at least all agree on definition and strong argument for doing a lot in the 2020s because terminology. one thing that the Government is absolutely committed to is the least costs pathway to 2050. Q213 Simon Wright: A final question: it is on EMR. The second thing is that if you are going to have to The CCC are calling for greater long-term certainty build maybe 100% more electricity capacity in 2050, to 2030 and beyond. Can you tell us anything about because you have electrified heating and transport, adjustments you might be planning to make to EMR then you really need to have to do a lot in the 2020s to produce that certainty that they are looking for? because the build rates will have to be very aggressive Gregory Barker: I think the key people we need to if you delayed action. I think we do need to give some listen to most of all on this are the manufacturers like greater clarity to industry that the 2020s will be a time Siemens because there is no question that we are not for continued deployment of low carbon technologies. going to get the level of developer support to meet However, we cannot say, we cannot lock in our very ambitious off-shore wind goals, for example, deployment of particular technologies in the 2020s or other technologies. because we have to keep the pressure on industry to The question is really around the decarbonisation cut costs. If they do not cut costs then they are not target, which I think you are alluding to, and it is going to be able to compete with the lowest cost low about whether or not there is certainty for the long- carbon technologies. term market that will bring in the OEMs to ensure that Gregory Barker: If you could tell me the cost of off- we have a higher level of UK content in off-shore shore wind versus biomass versus CCS in 2024 then wind, on-shore wind and the other renewables we could give you a bit—it becomes very difficult technologies that we need to see deployed here. until you get into the 2020s. What we have I had proper discussions, as have officials and the underpinning all of this, of course, is the absolutely Secretary of State, with the Chief Executive of copper-bottomed certainty of the Climate Change Act. Siemens Europe, for example, and they are very clear This is where it all rests and we are absolutely that the main driver of them making substantial committed to meeting that, as I expect successive investments in a UK supply chain in off-shore wind Governments to be. is industrial support rather than a target beyond 2020. 2020 is a pretty good certainty, there is nowhere else Q214 Caroline Lucas: Going back to the areas in Europe that not only has a target but also has a where emissions are exceeding, for example, the non- funded subsidy regime all the way through to 2020. traded sector, we were just saying was increasing at Germany does not have that; France does not have 3.1% last year in terms of its emissions. Then if you that. The level of certainty, transparency and longevity look at consumption emissions or imported emissions that you now have both in financing and policy, and a then the Climate Change Committee was saying that clear trajectory, is evident to see. that had more than offset reductions in emissions Last Thursday I was with the Prime Minister at the inauguration of the London Array, the largest off- produced in the UK. So focusing specifically on those shore wind farm in the world, and he made it very consumption emissions, notwithstanding the difficulty clear that he saw this as the beginning of a roll-out, of measuring them, is the Government looking to and it certainly was not going to be a roll-out that was monitor them in any fashion or form? going to fall off a cliff edge in 2020. Interestingly, the Gregory Barker: Yes, we are. That was the Chief Executive of E.ON also made clear that the recommendation of the April 2013 report of the long-term future of off-shore wind that is going to be Climate Change Committee and we agree with that so deployed through the 2020s had to be on a basis where we certainly think that you need to balance your it was comparable in price terms with other forms of effective reporting of territorial-based emissions with generation. a context and understanding of consumption. We think I think what people mean when they say they need a that unless the entire world changes there is a huge decarbonisation target beyond 2020 is, “Well, we need opportunity for confusion there and for the foreseeable a target because there’s going to be a requirement for future, I think quite rightly, territorial emissions large subsidy of these technologies”. In actual fact, remain the most effective way of tracking local once we get through to the 2020s we must be driving progress and we play our part in that. towards the goal of zero subsidy so the issue of The most effective way of getting a solution is to needing big subsidies and targets to pull that subsidy secure a global deal, although it is interesting to watch through hopefully will abate because we should be in the way that patterns of emissions are changing with a situation by then where we have low carbon the on-shoring—certainly into North America but we technologies that have reached grid parity or are starting to see it here in the UK—of thereabouts and can compete on an open market with manufacturing- and energy-intensive industries that other forms of generation. That is where we aim to have in part—not wholly of course because that’s get to, at which point these targets fall away and it partly due to consumer goods—played a role in cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
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10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding reducing emissions if manufacturing has been sent to waiting for a global regulation. Would you ever think the Far East and that is changing. about having some kind of target to go alongside Ravi Gurumurthy: I think it is just worth consumption emissions, even if that would be kept remembering certain facts about emissions since separate from domestic emissions because they are 1990. Since 1990 transport emissions have stayed different? As well as monitoring them so we know static despite 7 million more cars on the road; what they are—clearly we want to go down not up— emissions from heating buildings have gone down by would some kind of target be helpful? 9% despite about 4 million more homes being built; Gregory Barker: I am not clear that the policies for and emissions from electricity have gone down by reducing consumption emissions are any different to over a quarter despite 19 gigawatts more electricity the policies for reducing territorial emissions. What is capacity. Even in industry, industry has grown on it you have in mind that would be different? average by about 1% a year since 1990 but emissions Caroline Lucas: Well, for example, re-localising the are far down, partly because of off-shoring but also food supply might mean that if you were growing and because our industrial base has shifted and we have eating more of your food at home, if that was an gone to more value-added— explicit climate policy rather than maybe an agricultural policy, that would mean that you would Q215 Caroline Lucas: You are not suggesting that, not be involving so many emissions in the although presumably efficiency has had a huge transportation of whatever you are importing— amount to play and new technologies and so forth in chicken from Thailand or whatever it might be. developing that result, it would be possible to Gregory Barker: That is a very good point. We are decouple completely growth from emissions? keen, for reasons of food security as well as for Gregory Barker: We have to be able to decouple emissions reasons, to encourage greater productivity growth from emissions. The key, and the most at home. Again, I think that in itself will also deliver difficult sector, is heavy industry and that depends on absolute carbon emission reductions as well as technologies like electrification, carbon capture and consumption emissions. Being very honest we do not storage and radical resource efficiency. If we can’t do have any plans that I am aware of to introduce a new that we will not meet our climate change targets. suite of policies aimed specifically at consumption but it is something that we are increasingly aware of and Q216 Caroline Lucas: Just to finish on that. I know I think need to make sure that there aren’t unintended it is a slight diversion but it is the debate that we consequences, or perverse consequences, from were having not very long ago with the thinking of territorial emission-based policies that inflate Professor Tim Jackson, talking about the fact that unnecessarily consumption issues. there is no example on earth where we have managed to get such efficiency gains so that we have been able Q219 Caroline Lucas: So are they being measured to have that decoupling, which therefore brings you in some way now? into some of the debates about growth, which we will Gregory Barker: We are. We are committed to doing not go into now. that. I do not know if you can say? Ravi Gurumurthy: It is impossible to say to the Ben Golding: Yes. We actually are already publishing billions of new Indian and Chinese middle classes that data on consumption-based emissions so the you are not going to have the goods and services that Government publishes data on the carbon footprint we take for granted now so— basis every December. The last set came out in December 2012 for 2011. We will have another set Q217 Caroline Lucas: Precisely, which is why we, out this December. in the richer countries, might have to say to ourselves, “Well, perhaps we can’t go on flying forever, Q220 Caroline Lucas: Is that the first time? whenever we want to” because the impact that we Ben Golding: I think it was, yes. As I say, we will would therefore have in our production consumption have a set covering the 2012 emissions released in patterns would be using up the kind of space that December 2013. people in India and China and elsewhere, quite rightly and legitimately, expect to be theirs on a more Q221 Caroline Lucas: Just going back to the issue equitable basis. of a target, do you think a target is useful or too Ravi Gurumurthy: But the emerging market trends premature? will far outweigh any savings we can make, so the Gregory Barker: I think it is a bit premature. I think critical thing is: can we make heavy industry low I have a slight scepticism that the more targets you carbon? I think there are technologies there that are have the greater the chance of missing some of them. credible and we have to invest in them. I think overall, on the climate agenda, there are too many points of intervention leading to a thicket of Q218 Caroline Lucas: Going back to consumption policy targets and what I want is very clear, robust emissions, can you give any indication of the kinds of targets that everyone is aligned upon. That way we policies you might be looking at that would reduce stand the greatest possibility of achieving. consumption emissions? You have talked a little bit about the already Q222 Caroline Lucas: One very quick thing, which happening trend of a bit more on-shoring and stuff is more to do with liaison with your counterparts in coming back to Britain whereby I guess you could Defra; I wanted to ask you a very quick question about then subject them to our own regulations rather than F-gases, which I know is a Defra lead, not your own. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
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10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding
But given that F-gases have such a strong climate Q225 Chair: But wasn’t the recommendation of the impact, can you just let me know, are vigorous CCC that the Government should look at a statutory discussions going on in Defra? For example, because duty being placed on local authorities—which might you have the Climate Change Committee saying that not in itself necessarily be prescriptive—saying how they think that the Government should move to more it should be done but nonetheless to have that rapid phase-out of some of the gases, even more rapid statutory duty, which largely arose out of the failure than is currently being suggested by the EU, could of so many local authorities to grasp this agenda? give any reassurance that that is on your— Gregory Barker: Well, we are not supporting that at Gregory Barker: I know that we have a lot of the moment. We think that the best possible way is to sympathy for that but I am not aware of any— empower local authorities to do this. As you will Ravi Gurumurthy: The main lever that we have is the know, Chair, one of the key themes of this EU product standards, which Defra own. We do Government has been localism and it— engage quite heavily with Defra on trying to influence those EU discussions and it is something that is a Q226 Chair: But isn’t the localism at variance with live issue. the level of ambition in respect of the Climate Change Act? Q223 Chair: We are almost at the end of the session. Gregory Barker: Well it depends on your belief in I just wanted to ask about local authorities because, local politics. I am perhaps more optimistic. Minister, you will remember that our 2011 report was Ravi Gurumurthy: Could I just add two things we are quite critical of the Government for, if you like, doing with local authorities? First of all many of them adopting a voluntary approach towards local have set their own very ambitious targets, like authorities. We had reservations about the way in Manchester and Birmingham, but they do not actually which local authorities would, if you like, implement have a good way of understanding what is their climate change measures. I am just interested to know, responsibility in local government and what is in view of the further work that I believe you very national Government’s responsibility. We have kindly commissioned following on from that worked with Birmingham and Manchester to try to recommendation of this Committee and the work that help them create their own version of a carbon plan the Climate Change Committee then did to give focused on the things they can affect. So they have a advice to local authorities and the recommendations big effect on public transport, on housing stock, on that they have made to Government, whether or not it heat networks and we wanted to focus their activity is your intention to respond and, indeed, implement there rather than the things we are sometimes doing the recommendations of the Climate Change on the national electricity supply. Committee in respect of local government? We are helping them with the analytics and then there Gregory Barker: Well, we are not going to be are two particular funds we have been working with prescriptive and introduce—at least not for the them on: one around Green Deal and Go Early where moment—a statutory duty to develop and implement we have supplied funding and the second is around low carbon plans. What we do want to do is empower heat networks where we really feel cities, in particular, local authorities to take the initiative that is best for and city regions can play a big role. their areas. That said, I have stated that we intend to enforce the Home Energy Conservation Act much more rigorously and we took measures in the Energy Q227 Chair: Just on that, although 200 local Bill that introduced the Green Deal to do that. authorities have reported in terms of what they are I have just had back now the reports that each local doing, that was out of a total of 353 so there are 153 authority have prepared and we are in the final stages who are not engaging with this agenda at all. of analysing those reports from each individual local Gregory Barker: Yes, you are absolutely right, Chair, authority in the Department. There are still a few that and we are chasing them. I think we are sceptical of have not yet completed and we are chasing those up. a one-size-fits-all approach and the number of local It is not our intention to respond formally to the CCC authorities is not proportionate to the overall guidance for local authorities. percentage of commissions that they cover. DECC commissioned the CCC to provide guidance As Ravi said, we are working with core cities who are for local authorities and what they can do. I was there best placed to deliver the largest reductions in actually for the publication of that report; it was a very emissions by focusing with them on a bespoke range good report. We had an event with the LGA who are of measures, particularly district heating, Go Early, supportive of that. I pushed the CCC to bring that Green Deal, ambitious street-by-street roll-outs, a report out sooner rather than later and they responded whole range of measures. We think that a more very positively to that. nuanced approach, recognising that there are local authorities that have both a greater appetite and also Q224 Chair: But you will not be responding ability and resource to effect change, is better than formally to the CCC on that report? trying to drag everyone at the same speed and Gregory Barker: It is the local authorities. I think it uniformity and squander our resources. I think one will be unnecessary for us to respond. We support the willing volunteer local authority is worth several report, the piece of work that was done; we have dragged kicking and screaming. launched it with local authorities. The LGA is I am very pleased to say to the Committee that by and endorsing it and now the ball is in the court of the large the response from our largest local authorities— local authorities. the big metropolitan areas; some of our second tier cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
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10 July 2013 Rt Hon Gregory Barker MP, Ravi Gurumurthy and Ben Golding cities as well—is very positive as indeed are some of Government’s position in relation to the letter that the the counties like West Sussex, for example. chairman of the Climate Change Committee, I believe, sent to Government? Could you just clarify, yes or no, Q228 Chair: You could easily require them to whether or not you agree with the contents of one of produce a carbon plan, couldn’t you? the paragraphs in that letter, which I will read, Gregory Barker: Well, we have asked them to have a “However, the budget was not premised on the EU programme for delivering the Green Deal and over increasing ambition in its 2020 emissions reduction 80% of authorities have now responded to that. What target from 20% to 30% on 1990 levels. The fact that we want to do is take the best learning from those this has not happened does not constitute a change in who are real pioneers and then cascade that down the basis upon which the fourth carbon budget was through the rest of the local authorities rather than set. It is therefore not relevant to the review and could have a sort of one-size-fits-all approach for the whole not be the basis for changing the budget.” country. Ultimately we have got to spread it across the Could I just ask, Minister, whether or not you would whole country but it hasn’t all got to be done this year. agree with that summary of the position so that it would not be relevant to the review, or indeed Mr Q229 Martin Caton: I think there is something very Gurumurthy? helpful in that—and I hear what you are saying about Ravi Gurumurthy: It is true to say that when they Birmingham and Manchester—but if you get more recommended to us the level of the fourth carbon local authorities prepared to be the willing volunteers, budget they did not predicate it on a shift from 20% are they going to get the same level of support in to 30% in 2020. That is as read. When, however, the moving forward to develop their own carbon plans Government responded to the CCC and made its own or whatever? internal decisions, European ambition was right at the Gregory Barker: Honest answer, no. Those that sign centre of those discussions so we certainly factored up early will get the early mover advantage and will that into our discussions. The change of circumstances get the additional funds because they would be the is something that is a matter for interpretation but ones who will be pioneering the learning, providing certainly, on our side within Government, that EU the beacons, potentially having to make mistakes and ambition was a really core part of the decision then correct them because no one has done it before. making. We are recognising that and there are Go Early funds Chair: Okay. At that stage I will bring the session to specifically to encourage innovation and early movers. a close. Logically it makes sense for local authorities to grasp Can I thank each of you for your contribution this this agenda sooner rather than later because they can afternoon and say to you, Minister, that we do look be more certain that they will get funding. forward to following up some of the points that we have covered. We have had an example of that kind Q230 Chair: I will bring this to a close before 4pm of informal working previously. We hope our report but can I just go back to our questions earlier on about will be influential in taking this whole agenda further the fourth carbon budget and try to understand the forward. Thank you very much indeed.
APPENDIX A
POLICIES CONTRIBUTING TO CARBON BUDGET SAVINGS (TOP TEN TRADED AND NON- TRADED) Carbon Carbon Carbon Carbon Budget 1 Budget 2 Budget 3 Budget 4 Emissions Reduction Policies (savings in MtCO2e) 2008–2012 2013–2017 2018–2022 2023–2027 Building Regulations Part L (2002 & 2005/6) 18.8 30.6 36.1 29.2 EU new car CO2 emissions targets (135 gCO2/km 0.3 7.5 28.9 58.4 by 2015 and 95 gCO2/km by 2020) and complementary measures Supplier Obligation (prior to LCTP) 19.0 27.4 27.0 22.7 Supplier Obligation (in LCTP) 2.7 20.3 19.9 16.0 Renewable Heat Incentive 0.1 4.9 17.3 19.3 Agriculture Action Plan — 2.1 14.9 17.0 Building Regulations 2010 Part L 0.4 7.0 14.0 18.8 Renewable Heat Incentive 0.1 3.3 10.9 12.1 Biofuels Policies (8% by energy in 2020) — 5.4 9.8 — Building Regulations Part L (2002 & 2005/6) 5.1 7.0 7.5 6.1 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030704 Unit: PG04 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/030704/030704_w001_steve_written_appendix.xml
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Carbon Carbon Carbon Carbon Budget 1 Budget 2 Budget 3 Budget 4 Emissions Reduction Policies (savings in MtCO2e) 2008–2012 2013–2017 2018–2022 2023–2027 Industrial Emissions Directive, extended 4.7 129.8 300.6 373.4 Renewables Obligation, Early Stage Carbon Capture & Storage and the Carbon Price Floor. EU Products policy (Tranche 1, Legislated) 4.1 21.2 29.9 26.2 Electricity Market Reform (CfD and Capacity — — 24.0 49.8 Mechanism) EU Products policy (Tranche 2, Proposed) 0.4 6.3 14.0 15.8 EU Products policy (Tranche 1, Legislated) 1.6 8.0 11.6 10.3 EU Products policy (Tranche 2, Proposed) 0.2 4.4 11.2 12.9 ECO and Domestic Green Deal — 4.1 10.1 10.7 Supplier Obligation (prior to LCTP—EEC1, EEC2, 16.2 18.2 9.3 5.1 original CERT) Building Regulations Part L (2010) 0.2 3.5 7.2 9.3 Renewable Heat Incentive 0.0 2.3 6.3 6.9
The tables are taken from the most recent (October 2012) Updated Energy and Emissions Projections and show the emissions savings from each policy measure (in millions of tonnes of CO2 equivalent) in each of the first four carbon budget periods. The two tables show policies in the non-traded sector (top table) and the traded sector (bottom table), and each shows the ten policies which have the highest impact in terms of emissions savings. There is of course a much longer list of policies with lower savings not included in this table, and this can be found in the published Updated Energy and Emissions Projections. The reason for some duplication between the tables is that some policies have an impact in both the traded sector (that is, the part of the economy covered by the EU Emissions Trading System—broadly speaking the power and industry sectors) and the non-traded sector. The Renewable Heat Incentive, for instance, appears in both tables, and twice in the non-traded sector table, because it is applicable to all of the domestic, commercial and industrial sectors, and the Updated Energy and Emissions Projections split policies by sector in a way consistent with the UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory. There is also a degree of overlap between policies so that individual policy’s impacts are not fully additive, ie if you remove a policy then some of the slack may be taken up by another policy. Source: 2012 energy and emissions projections, October 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 2012-energy-and-emissions-projections cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [SO] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Written evidence
Written evidence submitted by the Government Summary — The Government welcomes this opportunity to respond to the Environmental Audit Committee’s follow-up inquiry into progress on carbon budgets. — The Government believes that the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act are still an appropriate UK contribution to a global effort to avoid dangerous climate change. — The Government believes that a legally binding global deal would provide the best opportunity of keeping the global temperature increase below 2°C. The challenge and complexity of climate negotiations and the need for a shift of political conditions makes it vitally important that the UK is able to influence and encourage others to take action. The Climate Change Act in its current form enables us to do this. — The Act also provides a robust framework of interim milestones through carbon budgets and an effective system of legal accountability. The Committee on Climate Change report annually on the Government’s progress against carbon budgets and updated annual projections provide a forward look of sector-specific emissions savings. — Meeting the carbon budgets is a cross-Government endeavour, reliant on the actions of all Departments, but in particular six key Departments which lead on the majority of policies that affect emissions.1 The National Emissions Target (NET) Board is the principal governance mechanism for co-coordinating action across Government and ensuring that departments are accountable for their share of emissions reductions. — We maintain that it was the right decision to abandon Departmental Carbon Budgets (DCBs). The DCBs pilot revealed that departments did not feel able to influence the sector emissions they were held accountable for, and as a result the approach lacked credibility across Whitehall. This is in contrast to the collaborative approach underpinning the current carbon budget management framework which gives departments the freedom to come forward and agree on future cost-effective abatement measures. — We are unable to comment on the Government’s likely response to the CCC’s June 2013 assessment of emissions reduction performance assessment. As a body independent of Government, the CCC is not obliged to share its report before publication.
Inquiry foci In the light of current climate change assessments, whether the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act (which underpin the UK Carbon Budgets) are still valid as an appropriate UK contribution to avoiding dangerous global climate change; and if not, whether the Act and/or the Carbon Budgets should be revised 1. Global average surface temperatures have risen by approximately 0.8°C since around 1900, with most of that warming happening in the last 50 years. This long-term rise in temperature is continuing, though more slowly over recent years; 2001 to 2010 was by far the warmest ten year period in the instrumental record, going back to 1850. 2. To avoid the worst effects of climate change, we need to keep global temperature rises to below 2°C. In order to achieve this, urgent action is required to cut global emissions further. At best, the current emissions reductions that have been pledged will only deliver us half the required action to achieve this goal. 3. The 2012 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap report makes clear that meeting this objective is still technically achievable. While acknowledging that existing levels of global mitigation ambition are not enough to put us on a cost-effective 2°C trajectory, it indicates that there is still more than enough global emissions reduction potential to reduce emissions levels by 2020 that would be consistent with 2°C. However, realising this potential will require the political will across all countries to step up action. 4. The global 2°C goal was agreed at the UN Conference of the Parties in Cancun in 2010. The emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act reflect the Committee on Climate Change’s (CCC) views of an appropriate UK contribution to global mitigation action. To remain in line with the effort the UK might be expected to make, the Government accepted the advice received from the CCC on 1 December 2008, and made a statutory commitment to reduce emissions by at least 80% by 2050 relative to a 1990 baseline. 5. The Climate Act gives the UK a solid base on which to push for increased ambition internationally; leveraging greater impact than we would achieve alone. 1 The Departments of Energy and Climate Change; Communities and Local Government; Business, Innovation and Skills; Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Transport and HM Treasury cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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6. The 80% target in the Climate Change Act demonstrates the UK’s commitment to tackling climate change and taking responsibility for its share of emissions, which will help to maintain our leadership and influence in the international climate change negotiating process. The UK contributes only around 1.2%2 of global emissions, so we need to encourage action from others. The Climate Change Act and the Carbon Plan show UK leadership, making us a credible negotiator, and provides a compelling example to other countries, some of whom are taking forward their own climate legislation based on the UK’s experience. 7. The Climate Change Act is structured to provide a degree of flexibility, setting a framework to motivate and enable policy action without being too prescriptive about how the framework should be applied. This is required to address the inherent unpredictability around future emissions projections and to ensure that mitigation is not unnecessarily costly. In this vein, the Climate Change Act allows for a carbon budget level to be amended if it appears to Government that there have been significant changes affecting the basis on which the previous decision was made. 8. We are committed to reviewing the fourth carbon budget in 2014 to ascertain whether the basis on which the budget was calculated has significantly changed. If at that point our domestic commitments place us on a different emissions trajectory than the EU ETS trajectory agreed by the EU, we will, as appropriate, revise up our budget to align it with the actual EU trajectory. In line with the Coalition Agreement, Government will continue to argue for the EU move to a 30% emissions reduction target for 2020.
The operation and management of the Carbon Budgets, including: the accountability and governance arrangements, and the extent to which the EAC’s previous concerns and recommendations have been addressed; the effectiveness of the overall management system, including for meeting carbon budgets by sector; and the current status, operation and impact of the National Emissions Target Board 9. The Climate Change Act provides for an effective system of legal accountability. Each year in June the independent Committee on Climate Change publishes a report in which it scrutinises Government’s progress on meeting carbon budgets. The Government has to lay before Parliament by 15 October each year a response to the points raised by the Committee. The Climate Change Act also requires the government to publish an annual statement of emissions and to produce a report on policies after a new budget has been set. The annual statement of emissions for 2011 was published on 25 March 2013.3 10. The Climate Change Act requires that carbon budgets are set by certain specified deadlines. The first, second, third and fourth carbon budgets have been set. The Carbon Plan sets out progress and policies in place to meet our first three carbon budgets and scenarios for meeting the fourth carbon budget. It articulates the Government’s vision to 2050 to achieve the 80% reduction target and outlines shorter-term actions the Government commits to undertake and key milestones to keep us on track to delivering our climate change goals. It includes a detailed carbon budgets annex which sets out the emissions savings expected from climate and energy policies. The Carbon Plan also included details of specific actions and milestones that would be undertaken by individual Government Departments. 11. Sector specific policy emissions savings are published annually each October in the energy and emissions projections. These projections take into account the estimated impact of government policies and proposals announced to date. They suggest that the UK will meet its first three legislated carbon budgets but that existing policies will not be sufficient to deliver the savings required by the fourth carbon budget.4 The Government expects to reduce emissions to below the first three budgets by 90, 132, and 71 MtCO2e respectively on central forecasts.5 The projections are an important tool for guiding our efforts to ensure the carbon budgets are met. As a result, the government is working hard to develop policy options and bridge the projected shortfall over the fourth carbon budget. The Carbon Plan set out scenarios for what action might be required to do this, recognising that Government did not yet have detailed policies agreed for a period that far in the future. 12. Our ability to meet the carbon budgets relies on actions from the whole of Government, but in particular the six Departments that lead on reducing emissions.6 We have a robust carbon management (CBM) framework in place to ensure that all policies and enabling actions are sufficiently ambitious and that government departments are held to account. This is primarily delivered through collaborative discussion and analysis with other government departments. Estimated policy emissions savings provided by departments enable progress to be tracked and risks to be monitored. The Government also reports on progress against the actions in the Carbon Plan on a quarterly basis via the No.10 website. 13. The principal governance mechanism of the CBM framework is the National Emissions Target (NET) Board. The Board provides senior oversight of carbon budgets and national climate change policy. Chaired by 2 2010 figures from EDGAR database, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-statement-of-emissions-for-2011 4 The latest projections suggest the UK is on track to meet its first three budgets with current planned policies. The Government expects to reduce emissions to below the first three budgets by 90, 132, and 71 MtCO2e respectively on central forecasts. Based on current planned policies there is an expected shortfall of 205 MtCO2e over the fourth budget reflecting the fact that detailed policy mechanisms have yet to be developed so far into the future. 5 GHG national statistics release 2011 6 These are: the Cabinet Office, HM Treasury, the Department of Energy and Climate Change, the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Transport and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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the SRO for carbon budgets within DECC, membership includes the Directors General for the six key Departments and the Cabinet Office (the Departmental SROs). Specifically, the Board aims to: — Provide senior level oversight of carbon budget management across Whitehall including ensuring legislative requirements are met; — Monitor cross-Government performance against carbon budgets; — Ensure policies to deliver carbon budgets are identified and delivered, and to challenge policies that could potentially make budgets harder to meet; — Consider broader policy on carbon budgets eg cost-effectiveness of meeting budgets, balance of policy tools, setting of future budgets, tackling aviation and shipping, financial penalties; — Be closely plugged into the decision-making process and being an ambassador for Government action on climate change. It also considers implications of carbon budget policy on other Government priority issues and provides a connection to discussions on international climate change and energy. The Board meets on a biannual basis. 14. The NET Board provides a forum for discussion at a senior level enabling action to be collectively agreed and ensuring an appropriate level of oversight. The NET Board takes a particularly active role at key decision points, and for example provided cross-Government scrutiny and sign-off of the analysis and scenarios that underpinned the Carbon Plan, following their development by the working level Carbon Budgets Analysts Group, which brings together the analytical community across Government Departments. Given the expected difficulties in meeting carbon budget four, recent NET Board discussions have focused on identifying and reviewing the main risks to meeting the fourth carbon budget, in particular in buildings (heat), transport, power and industry. At its last meeting, in April 2013, the NET Board considered a “deep dive” analysis of the buildings sector, which examined the scale of action required, what would be delivered by existing policy, and the main barriers to additional deployment of relevant measures. 15. A biannual carbon scorecard is used by NET Board to manage performance. This shows progress against the carbon budgets and key sectoral trends in historical and projected emissions. Where possible, the scorecard also shows progress made in key policy areas against targeted levels and scenarios put forward in the Carbon Plan, and progress and trajectories for deployment of significant technologies. 16. We maintain that it was the right decision to abandon Departmental Carbon Budgets (DCBs). The DCBs pilot revealed that departments did not feel able to influence the sector emissions they were held accountable for, and as a result the approach lacked credibility across Whitehall. This is in contrast to the collaborative approach underpinning the current CBM framework which gives departments the freedom to come forward and agree on future cost-effective abatement measures. 17. The Government has made progress in addressing the EAC’s previous concerns and recommendations.7 We have updated our response in regard to the following recommendations: Recommendation 5. The Government’s proposed review of the carbon budgets in 2014 may ease the carbon budgets if the EU Emissions Trading System puts too much pressure for emissions reductions on the “non-traded sector”. In the meantime, the developing science and international dialogue is building the case for seeking more ambitious emissions reductions, not less. The latest projections suggest the UK is on track to meet its first three budgets with current planned policies. The Government expects to reduce emissions to below the first three budgets by 90, 132, 8 and 71 MtCO2e respectively on central forecasts. Under the Climate Change Act, emissions reductions by the UK’s industrial and power sectors are determined by the UK’s share of the EU Emissions Trading System cap. That protects the UK industrial and power sectors from exceeding EU requirements. However, if the EU ETS cap is insufficiently ambitious, disproportionate strain could be placed on sectors outside the EU ETS such as transport. To overcome that problem and to provide clearer signals for businesses and investors, the Government will review progress towards the EU emissions goal in early 2014. If at that point our domestic commitments place us on a different trajectory from the one agreed by our partners in the EU under the EU ETS, we will revise up our budget as appropriate to align it with the actual EU trajectory. There is strong scientific evidence that the Earth’s climate is changing—global average temperatures continue to rise decade-on-decade. This consistent picture comes from several independent datasets. The scientific evidence for recent global warming is robust and continues to strengthen each year, and it is likely that most of this warming is largely a result of greenhouse gas emissions due to human activity; and without action, there is a high risk of global warming well beyond a 2°C increase over pre-industrial temperatures, with significant adverse impacts on human society and the natural world. 7 See: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenvaud/1720/1720.pdf 8 GHG national statistics release 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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We are already seeing the global, regional, and local impacts of rising temperatures and we now know from attribution studies that the chances of certain extreme weather events have already increased because of human greenhouse gas emissions. For example, research by UK scientists has shown it is very likely that human influence has more than doubled the probability of an extreme European hot summer like that of 2003, which caused up to 35,000 excess deaths,9 and that such events are very likely to become commonplace in as little as 40 years.10 Likewise, recent attribution work into the devastating UK floods in autumn 2000, which cost the UK insurance industry £1.3 billion,11 has indicated that 20th century anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions significantly increased England and Wales flood risk, roughly doubling the chance of that extreme event happening now compared to a century ago.12 Taking sufficient action globally to bring us back on track to meeting the 2°C goal to avoid the worst effects of climate change becomes more difficult and costly every year we delay action. Emissions need to peak as soon as possible—almost certainly before 2020—and decline steeply thereafter in order to meet this goal. Current global emission reduction pledges at best get us less than halfway to this goal, so there is an urgent need for significant additional action. The UK is continuing to press for increased action at the international level and considers that the best chance of securing that is through a legally binding global agreement under the UNFCCC. Recommendation 6. To improve transparency, in future carbon budget-setting rounds the Government should systematically respond to each recommendation made by the Committee on Climate Change, including any which address other actions needed to deliver the budgets. There have been no further carbon-budget setting rounds since the previous EAC inquiry. The next carbon-budget setting round will be in 2016 to agree the level of the fifth carbon budget. Government will take into account the advice of the CCC at the time of taking final decisions. Recommendation 10. We do not share the Secretary of State’s reluctance for monitoring consumption emissions. Monitoring UK emissions on a consumption basis would facilitate a more rigorous approach to controlling our contribution The Government should request the Committee on Climate Change to review the scope for measuring emissions on such a basis and how that might be worked into the carbon budgets regime, if necessary to complement the continuing production-based reporting needed internationally. Since the last EAC inquiry, the Government has taken steps to increase the transparency of the emissions reporting process and published, on 18 October 2012, new guidance (“Alternative approaches to reporting UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions”) on the Department of Energy and Climate Change’s website. This guidance explains why the Government uses different approaches for reporting greenhouse gas estimates and details a comparison of the different methodologies used. The Government is also working closely with the Committee on Climate Change to determine how we might, in the future, take better account of consumption-based emissions in the policy making process. In December 2012, the Government commissioned the Committee on Climate Change to provide analysis of: — Estimates of past and current consumption emissions; — Possible pathways for UK consumption emissions towards 2050; — Data/methodological issues around establishing consumption emissions; — Priority technologies/products in terms of UK consumption emissions; — The merits of a two stage approach for monitoring consumption based emissions—in which input-output data is supplemented with life cycle analysis data for specific priority product groups; and — Implications of current and future consumption emission trends on the design of existing and future policies, but not including the framework of carbon budgets, which we believe should remain as set out in the Climate Change Act 2008. The CCC published the results of their analysis on 24 April 2013 in Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitive risks.13 In this report, the CCC recommended that we retain a territorial basis for emission reductions, stating that “it remains appropriate to account for carbon budgets on the basis of production emissions given accounting conventions and available policy levers. However, consumption emissions should be monitored to check whether these are falling in line with global action required to achieve the climate objective, or whether further action is required”. The CCC further noted the importance of securing a global deal as the most effective way of reducing imported emissions: “there is a need for a global deal to substantially cut global 9 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent: World Disasters Report www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2004/chapter2.asp 10 Stott, P A et al. Nature 432, 610–614 (2004) 11 Association of British Insurers, Flooding: A Partnership Approach to Protecting People, Page 2 http://www.abi.org.uk/Publications/Flooding_A_Partnership_Approach_to_Protecting_People1.aspx 12 P, Aina, T, Stone, D A, Stott P A, Nozawa, T, Hilbert, A G J, Lohmann, D, Allen, M R. Anthropogenic greenhouse gas contribution to flood risk in England and Wales in autumn 2000. Nature, doi:10.1038/nature09762, 2011. 13 http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CF-C-Summary-Rep-web1.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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emissions over the next decades and achieve the climate objective, as a consequence of which the UK’s carbon footprint would fall”. The Government agrees with this position. Recommendation 16. We welcome the commitment to set out an approach for monitoring emissions reductions at a local level, reflecting local circumstances and potential for emission reductions. A voluntary approach will not be enough, however, to ensure that all local authorities make a full contribution to emissions reduction. Local authorities should be required to set emission reductions targets. The Government should task the Committee on Climate Change with supporting local authorities in setting such targets, and the Committee should be charged with monitoring progress against those targets. The Government does not agree that local authorities should be required to set mandatory emission reduction targets, for example local carbon budgets. This would be against the Coalition policy of removing burdens and top-down targets on local authorities. There are also significant data and burden issues which would make them difficult to calculate and impose at present. Many local authorities are enthusiastic about playing their part in meeting our carbon mitigation targets and have already set in place stretching ambitions and policies for emissions reductions in their areas. Local authorities that wish to self-impose their own targets (or “budgets”) are free to do so. Under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between DECC and the Local Government Association (LGA) in March 2011, local authorities are encouraged to set themselves targets for emissions reductions under a new Climate Local initiative launched in June 2012. This initiative succeeds the Nottingham Declaration. The MoU is currently being reviewed by DECC and the LGA, and an updated version will be published shortly. In response to a request from Government the Committee on Climate Change published guidance in May 2012 on what local authorities can do to reduce carbon emissions in their areas. In this report the Committee said it would not be appropriate for local authorities to set (or be set) binding carbon budgets given the multiple drivers of emissions, many of which are beyond their control. There are a number of other initiatives to encourage local authorities to take action to tackle carbon emission in their areas. These include: — Local Carbon Frameworks pilot—a £2.5 million programme in 2010–11 involving 30 local authorities with the aim of growing capacity. An evaluation and toolkit for the benefit of all local authorities was published on the Energy Saving Trust website in 2011; — Home Energy Conservation Act 199—see paragraph 17 below. Publishing data on local authority area emissions as National Statistics. Recommendation 17. An annual review of performance by local authorities should be submitted to Parliament by Ministers, to present as full a picture as possible of emissions reduction performance. The Government has no plans to impose mandatory reporting of performance on local authorities, for the reasons given above. However, the Government has revitalised the Home Energy Conservation Act (HECA) 1995 in England by way of new guidance published in July 2012 requiring LAs to report to the Secretary of State by 31 March 2013 and recommending that their reports explain: (i) their local energy efficiency ambitions and priorities; (ii) the measures proposed to result in significant energy efficiency improvements in all residential accommodation in their area; (iii) the measures proposed to deliver energy efficiency improvements on an area based/street by street roll out; and (iv) the timeframe for delivery and the national and local partners they are working with. To provide transparency and accountability LAs are required to publish their HECA reports on their websites. In addition, as stated above, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change signed a MoU with the Local Government Association in March 2011, which sets out how DECC and local government can work together to reduce emissions and help with renewable energy deployment. Under the MoU, councils are invited to declare their energy and climate change ambitions. The new Climate Local initiative (which succeeds the Nottingham Declaration), where local authorities can declare their support for action on climate change and set self-imposed carbon reduction targets, will support councils to make even further inroads into reducing carbon emissions. Recommendation 18. In order to aid transparency and illustrate the contributions that businesses are making, and need to make, to help tackle climate change, we recommend that the Government should introduce mandatory reporting [of emissions] by businesses at the earliest opportunity. Section 85 of the Climate Change Act required the UK Government to introduce regulations requiring the mandatory reporting of GHG emissions information under the Companies Act 2006 by 6 April 2012, or lay a report explaining why this has not happened. Defra laid a report to Parliament in March 2012 explaining that no decision to make regulations had been reached because Ministers cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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were still considering extensive evidence and required some additional time to consider this evidence before coming to a decision. Currently, it is the intention to introduce regulations for all UK quoted companies to report their GHG emissions information in their annual reports, as announced by the Deputy Prime Minister at the Rio+20 Summit in June 2012. It is planned that the regulations will come into force on 1 October 2013 and that the regulations will be laid before Parliament, and guidance for quoted companies to assist with complying will be published, in May. Recommendation 19. When setting carbon budgets the Government needs to be mindful that strong action on climate change may result in some production and jobs moving abroad to countries with less stringent policies or carbon-related taxes. Without care, this could harm UK industry and could increase global emissions. A lack of transparency and hard information on the risks to energy intensive industries, and how these should be tackled, need to be resolved to allay fears of lobbying dictating policy. We recognise the importance of policy measures to help energy intensive industries, but before any are introduced a comprehensive and robust assessment of the actual risk to each sector affected, on a case by case basis, should be made. Recommendation 20. Any measures the Government introduce to help energy intensive industries should be fair and tailored to each sector affected, on a case by case basis, reflecting hard evidence on the scale and likelihood of the risk of carbon leakage. Measures should focus on providing incentives to invest in lower carbon infrastructure and should keep a strong incentive to reduce emissions. We appreciate the importance of ensuring any compensation is targeted precisely on those most at risk of carbon leakage; our response to the Committee’s report on the Energy Intensive Industries Compensation Scheme14 sets out what we are doing to do this. In the recently published report Reducing the UK’s carbon footprint and managing competitive risks,15 the CCC note that, “our analysis suggests that policies already announced by the Government should be sufficient to address competitiveness risks for energy-intensive industries to 2020. These would continue to be manageable beyond 2020 in a carbon-constrained world where other countries commit to and deliver the emissions cuts required to achieve the climate objective”.
What the Government’s response should be to the Committee on Climate Change’s June 2013 assessment of emissions reduction performance, and whether the Carbon Budgets should be tightened or relaxed 18. The CCC is independent of Government and is not obliged to share its report before the date of publication. We are unable to comment on the Government’s likely response to the CCC’s assessment until this time. 16 May 2013
Written evidence submitted by the Met Office 1. The UK Approach to Carbon Budgets The general approach to setting carbon budgets for the United Kingdom involves several stages. The first is to select a climate target based on an assessment of the consequences of different levels of future climate change. The Committee on Climate Change has focused on an approximately 50% chance of a global average near surface temperature increase of 2ºC above pre-industrial levels, and a much higher probability, >90%, of limiting warming to less than 4ºC above pre-industrial levels. Based on this climate constraint a set of global emissions pathways were then derived. These typically show a peak in CO2 equivalent emissions in the next decade followed by a long-term decline. The Committee then estimates an equitable share of emission reductions for the UK in the long-term and a transition pathway for the UK towards this long-term emission target.
2. Previous Contributions to the Work of the Committee on Climate Change The Met Office Hadley Centre has provided evidence to inform various aspects of the Committee on Climate Change’s mitigation targets. Ahead of the first budget period it provided probabilistic simulations of global average near surface temperature change for a range of emissions scenarios provided by the Committee and by the Office of Climate Change.
The Committee on Climate Change’s 2016:4%low scenario corresponds to an equivalent CO2 global emission reduction of around 50% on 1990 levels by 2050. The Met Office Hadley Centre calculated this corresponds to a median warming of a little over 2ºC, with a probability of around 50% of exceeding 2ºC. Additionally, several members of the AVOID consortium (http://www.avoid.uk.net/) provided advice to the Committee on Climate Change ahead of the fourth budget period on the science of large-scale climate system change and climate impacts. This concluded that whilst understanding of these issues had increased in several ways the evidence for setting a climate target based on the regional and system specific consequences of a 2ºC 14 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenvaud/669/66902.htm 15 http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CF-C-Summary-Rep-web1.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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and a 4ºC global average rise above pre-industrial levels was still valid. However, a big regional spread in consequences was noted.
3. Met Office View on needs for Climate Science Updates The original simulations performed by the Met Office for the first budget periods included uncertainties in the relationship between radiative forcing and temperature response, including the heat taken up by the ocean, along with uncertainty in the climate-carbon cycle feedback. The science involved in modelling global emission scenarios of multiple gases to provide temperature projections is complex but new understanding of key processes and interactions mean climate models continue to become more physically realistic. For instance, a current version of the Met Office Hadley Centre Earth system model provides a three dimensional representation of the climate and carbon cycle, including simulating vegetation changes, atmospheric chemistry and a wider range of aerosol species, which are important for both climate change issues and air quality. The latest simulations using this model reinforce the Met Office’s confidence in the earlier simple climate model simulations performed for the Committee on Climate Change. They indicate a reduction in emissions of the order of 50% on 1990 levels by 2050 corresponding to a global average warming of just over 2ºC during the 21st century, falling back below 2ºC by 2100. Even with the improvements in modelling many uncertainties in future projected warming and climate change still remain. These include uncertainty in the precise magnitude of the response of clouds to a warming climate, uncertainty in the response of vegetation to CO2 increases in combination with climate change, and uncertainty on how climate change will alter the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Some processes, such as loss of carbon from melting permafrost, is not yet included even in the latest complex climate models. We recommend that the science of climate change and variability, and its impacts is periodically reviewed and at more frequent intervals then the usual IPCC timetable. Such a review should take account of the latest literature on the consequences of continued climate change, the relationship between emissions of climate forcing agents and the eventual climate response, and on additional earth system feedbacks as the science matures to a level at which they can be credibly included in the calculation of global carbon budgets. We also note that current climate targets focus on average warming on the global scale. However, as the underpinning science develops, understanding grows and model resolution and complexity increase there is, and will be, increasing benefit from focusing at the regional level—particularly when considering changes in severity and incidence of extreme weather, and rapid changes in key systems such as the Arctic.
3.1 Specific issues of recent relevance Climate sensitivity (sometimes referred to as equilibrium climate response) is relevant to studies that focus on very long-term change and, in particular, long-term stabilisation. The precise value of climate sensitivity is not known, but a probability distribution can be estimated using a variety of methods including: the recent energy balance of the planet, complex climate models, complex climate models constrained by observations, paleo observations. However, different methodologies lead to a range of probability distributions and it would be useful to take stock of the implications of these. It is fair to say that the most likely value has changed little over the last few years. Transient climate response provides a better constraint on warming over the coming decades, and is particularly relevant to scenarios with increasing forcing. A number of recent estimates of the uncertainty in transient climate response have been made and these should be considered alongside the equilibrium climate sensitivity estimates above. The effect of the slowdown in recent global average near surface temperature change has been noted by many commentators, although other aspects of climate continue to change in a manner consistent with our understanding of a warming world. Furthermore, there is evidence from both observations of the past and from climate models that temporary periods with less global average near surface warming than the long-term trend have happened before and are expected again in the future. Recent research has started to examine how the most recent period influences our view of parameters such as equilibrium climate sensitivity and transient climate response and it would be useful to consider implications of this for carbon budgets. The interaction between climate change and the carbon cycle was factored into the first assessment of budgets. However, understanding of additional Earth system feedbacks, including from melting permafrost, was not sufficient to include in the first budget assessment. Whilst it is still limited there is a growing understanding that could now be considered. The Met Office Hadley Centre is already doing this in a number of projects. A recommendation is to consider the implications of the latest understanding on climate-carbon cycle interaction and additional earth system feedbacks. Results from the AVOID programme have shown that whilst a 2°C global warming limit (with 50% probability) does appear still feasible, delays in global action make it more difficult to achieve. Whilst attention cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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continues to focus on this target, the global role that might be played by permanent removal of CO2 from the atmosphere, referred to as negative emissions, merits further study.
This is particularly true when considering the impacts of geo-engineering options on a local or regional scale on the global and total Earth system. In addition, some geo-engineering options may prove to have irreversible effects in the long term and, even when considering short term options, may act only to mask, rather than reverse, the warming climate. For example, the use of aerosols in solar radiation management would act to cool the earth while CO2 is still being emitted.
Finally, the local consequences of climate change, which are likely to affect people, infrastructure and natural systems should be periodically reviewed. Newer models with higher spatial resolution and a greater vertical extent are providing improved skill at simulating many aspects of the dynamic behaviour of the atmosphere and oceans and offer advantages for looking at future climate variability and change. Additionally, the ability to simulate some impacts within climate models is opening up the prospect of improved assessments of quantities relevant to impacts.
4. Conclusion
There are some new developments in climate science that are appropriate to take into account when considering carbon budgets. Such developments are a normal part of the scientific progress.
As the science and understanding of the Earth’s physical, chemical and ecosystem processes continue to develop and mature, carbon and climate change policies generally should be flexible enough to accommodate breakthroughs in both modelling and in the underlying science. Consideration of how science developments in one area impact on another are also important. 5 June 2013
Written evidence submitted by Aubrey Meyer, Global Commons Institute “The inquiry will examine whether the emissions reduction targets in the Climate Change Act (which underpin the UK carbon budgets) are still valid as an appropriate UK contribution to avoiding dangerous global climate change. The Committee will explore recent climate change science developments and what these mean for the UK’s Carbon Budget regime.”
“‘Rapidly Inter Acting Feedback Effects’ [RIAFE]. New Approach needed to meet dangers of doing too little too late.” “As the planet warms, a steady rate of feedback acceleration in the years ahead makes it possible to contemplate a scenario where positive feedback is driving the system as a whole from a point after which ‘human-budget-emission-control’ becomes irrelevant.” “To continue, after 20 years, to ignore this anywhere, let-alone in ‘climate-science-policy modeling’ community is another form of ‘climate-denial’.” “Doing this unintentionally provides assistance to ‘climate-deniers’ against whom James Hansen has already and rightly leveled the charge of crimes against humanity for willing dangerous rates of climate- change upon the future.” “For UNFCCC-compliance, the struggle is now between control & a loss of control. To deal with this we need a new approach that will be precautionary, prevention-based and strategically goal-focused. It will distinguish between ‘budget-emissions’ which we can control and ‘feedback emissions’ and effects which we can’t. The approach will quantify as best we can, the runaway potential of rates of change that result from ‘Rapidly Inter Acting Feedback Effects’ [RIAFE] and the dangers of doing too little too late.”
Carbon Budget Climate Change Policy for UNFCC-Compliance
The battle of the Rates is about the potential for RIAFE or curves Keeping Control versus those Losing Control.
The UK Climate Act “...asthePlanet warms....”
Budget-Emissions we can control while...accelerating Feedback-Emissions from RIAFE we cannot. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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UKMO Feedback Omissions—EAC Enquiry; The Validity of Carbon Budgets in Climate Act GCI welcomes this new EAC enquiry into the adequacy of the carbon-budgets in the UK Climate Act. In the previous enquiry in 2009, the UKMO gave misleading information to the EAC claiming that all relevant feedback effects were in the climate-model underpinning the Climate Act. They were not. From the outset, GCI has constantly warned of feedback effects being omitted from climate-models. Starting in 1989, GCI proposed the thesis of “Equity & Survival” to the UN 1990–92. Through 1993–94 we countered its “economic” antithesis of “Efficiency with No-Regrets” as the “Economics of Genocide”. In a document requested of GCI by IPCC in 1993 for the Second Assessment Report [SAR], GCI warned about the possibility and the dangers of positive feedback effects: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Nairob3b_.pdf
The “Constant Airborne Fraction” (CAF)
“During the period 1860 to 1990 a constant fraction of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere in the order of 50% remained ‘airborne’. However, given the possibility of enhanced positive feedback in the future, the cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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fraction may not remain constant. In the face of continued industrial emissions and declining terrestrial sink-capacity, it will probably increase.” At the 2nd “Conference of Parties” [COP-2] to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 1996, GCI tabled the Contraction and Convergence (C&C) model for achieving UNFCCC-compliance. At COP-2, GCI defended C&C at rates consistent with a 350 ppmv atmospheric stabilisation target. Again, we warned about the possibility of positive feedback: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/ZEW_CONTRACTION_&_CONVERGENCE.pdf
Which Contraction Budget? Which Convergence Date? “These are the two main questions that arise once the twin-policy approach is accepted in principle. We will address ‘which budget?’ first, as the imperative of convergence only arises as a derivative of the imperative of contraction even if in turn, contraction is only practically achievable once global convergence has been accepted, agreed and configured. Also, most known feedback mechanisms are not modelled into these runs. And while their interactive effects on climate forcing are still too complex to simulate in the models, the feedback signs are predominantly assumed positive—ie giving increased warming.” The Paper was presented to the ZEW conference in Mannheim Germany in June 1997. We continued the defence of 350 ppmv and the paper was ultimately published by ZEW through Springer Verlag in an updated form but where this defence was edited out: http://www.gci.org.uk/papers/zew.pdf From 1995 onwards GCI has advocated the synthesis of ‘Contraction & Convergence’ [C&C] at the UN, continuously making the case for realistic feedback-averse rates of C&C to be adopted: http://www.gci.org.uk/rates.html Since that time C&C has become the most widely internationally recognized, cited and arguably the most widely supported methodology in the process: http://www.gci.org.uk/news.html http://www.gci.org.uk/endorsements.html C&C has also had considerable cross-party political support in the UK: http://www.gci.org.uk/Full_House.html A campaign summary is here: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Campaign_Summary_.pdf In 2008, Adair Turner, Chairman of the UK Climate Change Committee, recognized C&C as the basis of the UK Climate Act: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1ampI1XAzs “In the UK Climate Act we have endorsed the C&C principle. It is pretty strong support for what Aubrey Meyer has said.” However, throughout and concomitant with all this, the UKMO has routinely excluded these feedback effects from the Climate Model underpinning the UK Climate Act. Indeed, in the EAC Enquiry in 2004, the UKMO made these inaccurate and misleading remarks about C&C and the Brazilian Proposal in their evidence about “Responsibility for mitigation”: “The Brazilian proposal and other similar mechanisms provide frameworks that could be used to assign future responsibility for mitigation to those with greatest responsibility for past climate change. The Hadley Centre and other scientists around the world are working together to come up with a robust methodology to quantitatively estimate how future emissions reductions might be divided between nations in an equitable way, should such approaches be adopted by the international community. This information will underpin negotiations post Kyoto, and inform negotiations on contraction and convergence.” The problem with this as a statement about C&C was that from a policy perspective, there is no meaningful feedback measurement in the Brazilian Proposal whatsoever. When IA for that reason, GCI lodged a complaint about these remarks, the EAC chair accepted GCI’s C&C definition statement and the UKMO told us to “get a trademark”. We did and two years later they agreed to respect it. On 23 June 2009, UKMO claimed to the EAC Enquiry that all relevant feedbacks were in the climate modelling behind the UK Climate Act: “The models will take into account all the feedbacks we are aware of that we think are important.” This was and remains an ambiguous and misleading statement and the carbon budget in the UK Climate Act is a product of it. In November 2010 the UKMO put an admission of this on its website: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/guide/science/explained/feedbacks At that time, UKMO claimed in the EAC 2009 Enquiry to have included coupled-carbon cycling [as in IPCC AR4] in the model used for the Act. However, what they actually introduced in the carbon-cycle was cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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the first projection of negative—not positive—feedback in the twenty year history of climate-modelling in the IPCC’s record. This claimed more than 100% “Carbon-Sink-Efficiency” by 2050 in the carbon “Contraction:Concentrations” budget [2016 4% Low] in the UK Climate Act. The UKMO ignored challenge on this but especially in the light of feedback omission, this projection remains and untrustworthy basis for policy development. This is analysed in some detail in this evidence. Overall, the “science/policy-hybrid” created by the UKMO and the CCC renders the Act itself opaque and falsely reassuring. Moreover, the problem remains as the UKMO are still omitting feedback effects from their model, having aligned it with the RCP projections in IPCC AR5, despite comments from other eminent sources. As UNEP said in “Policy Implications of Warming Permafrost” [2012]: “All climate projections in the IPCC 5th Assessment, due for release in 2013–14, are likely to be biased on the low side relative to global temperature because the models did not include Permafrost carbon feedback. So targets based on these projections would be biased high.” Nicholas Stern told the IMF last month, “Feedbacks and tipping points such as Permafrost melt are omitted in the scientific models. We need a new approach.” Because of RIAFE, dealing with this “modelling challenge” is intractable, but in this evidence, GCI also offers a draft suggestion of what this new approach needs and might begin to look like: http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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The EAC Enquiry is into Global, International and UK Carbon Budgets as defined by the UK Climate Act [UKCA]. The Act consists of the:
(a) Global CO2 Emissions “Contraction & Concentrations” scenario [“2016 4% Low” 2000–2100] which came from the UK Meteorological Office [UKMO] and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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(b) UK share of this using the “Contraction & Convergence” [C&C] methodology which came from the UK Climate Change Committee [CCC]. 1. The Act needs revision. As it stands, as it is inadequate, opaque, prescriptive and misleading because of the: (a) UKMO’s omission of major feedback effects from calculation of “Contraction & Concentrations” scenario & CCC giving only 44% odds for success avoiding more than a 2° temperature rise. (b) Emissions “Contraction” should be complete globally by 2050 if, once “feedback effects” are included, we are to give better than 50:50 odds for keeping within the 2° rise. (c) CCC also prescribing 2050 as the International “Convergence” year, foregoing the need for any international negotiation of this date. 2. Together, these UKMO-CCC components present an opaque “science-policy” hybrid where the: (a) Climate-model is an opaque “black-box” obscuring the error of feedback-omission; and (b) Economic-model comes from a suite of opaque “black box” models based on this, which in turn conceals incomplete, contestable and misleading economic computations of “price and tax- signals” and also contains no damage function at all. 3. On the science side of the hybrid, the UKMO: (a) Omitted major feedback effects from “2016 4% Low”. Even now this is still not corrected and also appears likely to inform IPCC AR5 Working Group One due this year or next; (b) Gave retained airborne fraction of anthropogenic emissions greater than 100% by 2050. In the light omitted feedbacks. In the light of “a”, this is an untrustworthy result; (c) This was ignored when pointed out by GCI to UKMO in the EAC Enquiry 2009: http://www.gci.org.uk/Document/GCI_EAC.pdf (d) UKMO/CCC gave a 56% probability for failing to keep UNFCCC-compliance as temperature rose to and then beyond 2° Celsius; (e) A UKMO spokesman has implied since then that the figures and values were actually for “illustrative purposes only”. 4. On the policy side, the Climate Change Committee: (a) Uncritically accepted the UKMO’s feedback-free Contraction:Concentration projections; (b) Super-imposed on that international budgets derived from a prescription for a convergence date of 2050 [C&C 2050] and with this prescribed rate, helped to cause a major international incident at COP-15 in December 2009, over the perceived unfairness of this rate of Convergence by 2050 and its prescription; (c) This issue was pointed out to UKMO/CCC in EAC’s Enquiry in 2009 well before COP-15. (d) The Chinese Government had offered to negotiate from immediate convergence: http://www.gci.org.uk/UNFCCC_Submission.html (e) However, this rate of “C&C-2050” supported by other Europeans is now prominent in IPCC AR5 Working Group Three. At present C&C 2050 is written into the Summary for Policy Makers in WGIII which persistently and wrongly attributes this convergence rate to GCI, misquoting the source literature cited. 5. The misleading effect of this “science-policy hybrid” is to project the idea that: (a) We only face only the inconvenience of “control-curves”—or deceleration curves—when feedbacks mean what we face is the potentially catastrophic consequences of “loss-of-control- curves”—or acceleration curves. (b) An opaque and feedback-omitting climate-science model is a sufficient basis on which to reliably predict future rates of climate change and UNFCCC-compliance. (c) The UK share of this model using convergence as described by the Climate Change Committee [CCC]:—http://www.climateconsent.org/flash2/turner.html is a fair and sufficient basis upon which to prescribe the year 2050 for the future convergence to equal per capita sharing arrangements for UNFCCC-compliance. (d) This in turn is a sufficient basis on which to use opaque and contestable economic models to estimate the “price of carbon” or rates of “carbon-tax” as a function of that procedure. It would be extremely foolish to continue to deceive ourselves about these matters. To recover, we must be precautionary and not run risks we cannot afford to run. The rates of CO2 emissions and concentrations contemplated in this study, recognize that a steady rate of feedback acceleration in the years ahead makes it possible to contemplate a scenario where positive feedback is driving the system as a whole from a point after which “human-budget-emission-control” becomes irrelevant. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Consequently, there are two simple messages here. We need to: (1) Leave fossil carbon [oil coal & gas] in the ground, all things considered it is “cheaper”; (2) Get on with the C&C organised control of “human-budget-emissions” as quickly as possible. 6. So we urge EAC to recommend to the Government the need to: (a) “Understand the need for education to the scale of the challenge for the whole of the planet;” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1ampl1XAzs [Turner Walley EAC 2009]; (b) Be strategically goal-focused on the absolute priority of UNFCCC-compliance [safe and stable GHG concentrations]; (c) Be seen to be committed to solving the problem faster than we are creating it; (d) Recognize that the UK’s transition to a net-zero-carbon future must be accelerated; (e) Represent and include all feedback effects and the potential for RIAFE in climate models; (f) However difficult, these feedbacks can no longer credibly be modelled as “zero”; (g) Separately, measure rates of feedback-emissions as distinct from budget-emissions; (h) Integrate these measurements into future science-policy models for UNFCCC-compliance noting, while the former accelerate and are uncontrollable, only the latter are controllable and that the former have a growing potential to overwhelm efforts to control the latter the longer we delay that control; (i) Develop, from that safe and stable ppmv value, an inclusive, transparent & precautionary C& C-based policy strategy at rates consistent with UNFCCC-compliance; (j) Transparently negotiate and not prescribe an accelerated rate of international convergence to a year that is “agreed-by-the-majority-to-be-fair” within that C&C scenario; (k) Move beyond models of “carbon-pricing” in a “Carbon-Market-Based Framework” where global climate is simply seconded to being a derivative of the global economy. (l) Make all “tax-rating” and “carbon-pricing” a function of that “Precautionary-Framework-Based- Market”, in other words... (m) Make efforts towards “green growth” and “ecological recovery”, “C&C-led” not “price-led”; (n) Leave fossil carbon [oil coal & gas] in the ground as it is both safe and cheaper; (o) Get on with the control of “human-carbon-budget-emissions” and the conversion to non-carbon alternatives as quickly as possible.
The UKMO Admit Feedbacks are Omitted from their Model In June 23 2009 Professor Mitchell of the UKMO claimed to the EAC Enquiry that all relevant feedbacks were in the climate models behind the UK Climate Act: “The models will take into account all the feedbacks we are aware of that we think are important, then we can quantify that we understand, and to that extent the Climate Change Committee has obviously done that. Science being science, we uncover new feedbacks and there is a delay in being able to incorporate those in the complex models. One can use simple models to get, if you like, a fast-track estimate of what the effect would be, but one would have to refer to the more complex models to make sure that when you add that additional feedback you are actually taking into account all the processes that are important.” This was an incorrect and misleading statement. The UK Climate Act is a product of this and in November 2010 the UKMO put the following admission on its website: http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/guide/science/explained/feedbacks
Are there feedbacks that aren’t included in the models? “There are some feedbacks we have recognised but remain big uncertainties. We don’t know enough about them to include their effects in climate models. However, they are potentially very serious so there is still a lot of work going on to try to understand them and get them into our projections.”
Methane hydrates (positive feedback) “These are potentially a very big deal which could change our whole understanding of climate change, but it’s very uncertain. There are very large stores of methane locked away at depth in the ocean. We know the stability of these stores is dependent on temperature. As the oceans get warmer it’s possible this balance could be upset and the stores released—which would be very serious. Methane is more than 20 times as potent as CO2 as a greenhouse gas. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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There’s some evidence to suggest that going back over a very long historical period (more than millions of years), the release of these methane stores may have played a big role in abrupt and severe changes to past climate. How close we are to any possible threshold is very much an open question.”
Permafrost methane (positive feedback) “This is a big question mark but also potentially a very big deal. There are very organic rich soils in certain parts of the world. At higher latitudes, these are frozen over by permafrost, and those greenhouse gases are effectively locked away. When the soil thaws due to rising temperatures, these gases could become unlocked and be released as CO2 or methane. At the moment we don’t know how much of the CO2 is stored away or to what extent it would be released when the soil thaws. These are two key questions, and we need to figure out how to resolve them on a global scale in a climate model before this effect can be included in our projections. Within the next five years we hope to know enough about this process to start including its effects.”
Could there be other feedbacks that you don’t yet know about? “Yes, we assume there are hidden feedbacks in the system, but as long as we keep climate change relatively small we can be confident these unknown issues won’t come in to play. However, as we move further away from the present climate, we are exposing ourselves to more risk about these unknowns. Even only taking into account the climate feedbacks we are aware of now, they pose a great incentive for us to quickly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions to keep global temperature rises to a minimum.” Last Updated: 29 November 2010 Aligning itself with the RCP scenarios apparently now the base of IPCC AR5, UKMO published the “Advance Paper” in 2010 last updated 29/04/2013: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/advance.pdf The climate-modelling in this paper continues to omit the feedbacks listed on page 18 of the “Advance” document, as do the RCP scenarios with which UKMO aligned itself: “We will continue to improve the representation of processes included in our model. There are also a number of processes not currently included that could potentially have a major impact on the degree of warming for a given emissions scenario, quite apart from their impact on local and regional climate. Some of these processes have been discussed here and we are actively working on including them in the model: — The impact of ozone on plants reduces their ability to take up carbon. Given their major implications for international technology and economic development, policy decisions on climate change must be underpinned by the best possible evidence. — The deposition of black carbon on snow changes the reflectivity of the surface leading to more warming at high latitudes. Other processes are less well understood but are actively being researched with a view to including them in future models. — The ability of plants to take up carbon may be limited by the supply of nitrogen available naturally, but may be enhanced by man-made sources of nitrogen. Climate change itself may also increase available nitrogen and stimulate plant growth. — The thawing of permafrost may lead to large amounts of carbon release, but these processes are not well understood. — Dynamic ice processes could speed up freshwater supply from glaciers into the ocean. — The processes that affect methane in the Arctic Ocean could lead to increased methane release (the science is poorly understood so may take longer to include in models). The international science community is working hard to understand and narrow the uncertainties in future climate projections—and it is doing this primarily through model inter-comparison projects, comparison with observations, and the synthesis of results by the next IPCC report. Understanding the interactions within the Earth system is critical.” “All climate projections in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, due for release in 2013–14, are likely to be biased on the low side relative to global temperature because the models did not include the permafrost carbon feedback.” In 2012, UNEP published “The Policy Implications of Warming Permafrost.” In the executive summary it made the following statements about IPCC AR5 and the omission of carbon feedback in the climate models that under-pin AR5. “All climate projections in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, due for release in 2013–14, are likely to be biased on the low side relative to global temperature because the models did not include the permafrost carbon feedback. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Consequently, targets for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions based on these climate projections would be biased high. The treaty in negotiation sets a global target warming of 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures by 2100.
If anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions targets do not account for CO2 and methane emissions from thawing permafrost, the world may overshoot this target.” UNEP [2012] “Policy Implications of Warming Permafrost.” http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/permafrost.pdf
As things stand, this message from UNEP confirms the danger, indeed the likelihood that IPCC AR-5 will continue the pattern established over the past 20 years of under-estimating and under-representing the real risks we face. Sir Robert Watson [a former Chairman of the IPCC at the time of the IPCC Third Assessment Report] said in a public session in San Francisco in December 2012: “We were careful and conservative. If we had a strong statement subsequently proved wrong, we would lose all credibility as a scientific community. I thought we should always be slightly on the side of conservative. Otherwise we were going to get ripped apart by climate-deniers even for the simplest mistake.” This is not just erring towards “conservatism”. That suggests we face merely the inconvenience of “control- curves”—or deceleration curves. Feedbacks mean what we face is the potentially catastrophic consequences of “loss-of-control-curves”—or acceleration curves. James Hansen has already warned the Environmental Audit Committee that the 2 degree target in the UK Climate Act is not safe and that it should be 1.5 degrees. This is why we make the assertion that omitting feedbacks from the models: “... unintentionally provides assistance to ‘climate-deniers’ against whom James Hansen has already and rightly levelled the charge of crimes against humanity for willing dangerous rates of climate- change upon the future.” Nicholas Stern, author of the 2006 Stern Report, made a presentation in DAVOS in January this year saying: “I got it so wrong on climate change, its far, far worse.” http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/jan/27/nicholas-stern-climate-change-davos Who advised him at the time of the original report? Who advises him now when tells the IMF: “The scientific models mostly leave out dangerous feedbacks/tipping points. We need new generation of models.” In May 2013, the IMF published slides from a presentation there by Nicholas Stern. On slide 9 and 10 Stern also points to the omission of melting Permafrost feedbacks and tipping points: “The scientific models mostly leave out dangerous feedbacks/tipping points. At 6°, 5°, 4° C or below, the probability of passing some tipping points, such as melting of permafrost, may be high. If modellers cannot capture or model effects ‘sufficiently clearly’ they are omitted. But best guess surely not zero. The models are not built in a way that help us describe the impacts on people: At sea level (SL) 2m higher a few hundred million might have to move (Nicholls, et al., 2011); At 3–4–5°C may see radical monsoon changes in India and substantial changes in flows of major rivers off the Himalayas (a billion plus people depend on them). Desertification of southern Europe? Models should focus on understanding probabilities of events with severe consequences for people rather than on those bits which (on narrow assumptions) seem more tractable, such as change in agricultural output, relative to those effects that can be modelled more easily. We need new generation of models.” Nicholas Stern to IMF May 2013 http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Stern_IMF.pdf
What follows is an assessment of the “Feedback-Free” Contraction:Concentrations Budget—or the opaque science/policy hybrid—that is the UK Climate Act
1. Opposite is an image showing the primary features of the Global “CO2-carbon-emissions-contraction- budget” in the UK Climate Act which: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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— Is called “2016 4% Low”. — Flows from 2010 to 2110. — Peaks in 2016 at 11.8 Gigatonnes Carbon [Gt C]. — Declines on average thereafter at 4% per annum. — Until by 2110 it has reached an output value of 0.3 Gt C per annum. — Weighs a total of 395 Gt C between 2010 and 2110.
This is identical to the CBAT Medium Carbon-Emissions-Budget: http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat- domains/Domains.swf
The image also shows the range of atmospheric CO2 concentration values calculated by UKMO as in the UK Climate Act.
They are measured in: — Parts Per Million by Volume [PPMV]. — And also as Weight in Gigatonnes Carbon [Gt C].
This ranges through: — 10%-ile [the lowest]; — To 90%-ile [the highest]; — With the “Median” case in between; — Median is what UKMO call, “the most probable”; — UKMO calculate that Median concentrations; — peak at 445 PPMV or 949.38 Gt C in 2050 and; — fall to 426 PPMV or 910.24 Gt C by 2100; — this means that with the Median case, 19 PPMV or 39.14 Gt C; — was removed from the atmosphere 2050–2110 [equivalent to negative feedback]; — this also means that in total over the period 2010–2110; — while the human budget emissions in 2016 4% Low totalled 395.95 Gt C; — with Median only a net total of 35.35 Gt C was added to the atmosphere.
This result is very questionable, even without feedback fully integrated in UKMO’s model.
When feedbacks omitted are added, UKMO’s Median result is wholly implausible. — In 2009, UKMO claimed to EAC that all relevant feedback effects were in their model. — UKMO admitted in 2010 various feedback effects had been left out of their model. — Saying in 2010 that they were committed to including them in. — However, nothing substantive has been done until now [2013]. — As the planet warms the net effect of these will be positive [not negative] feedback. — If feedback effects are added to the model—which they urgently need to be—UKMO’s concentrations results are seen as under-estimates and misleading. — It would be appropriate for the EAC to cross-examine UKMO closely on this.
These results are not the same as the CBAT Medium Carbon-Concentration-Profiles, as CBAT begins to lay out the basis for adding feedback effects in a measured and structured way.
However, CBAT enables users to switch-on and super-impose the UK Climate Act Emissions Budget & Atmospheric Concentrations on output from the CBAT methodology for the purposes of comparison see pages 39–43 and here: http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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2. Here are two images detailing how UKMO stated in a supplement to the EAC Enquiry in 2009 [“answering GCI”] to have incorporated the Coupled-Carbon-Cycle modelling in IPCC AR4 from the C4MIP programme, into the global “CO2-carbon-emissions-contraction-budget” on which the UK Climate Act is based. This is what UKMO stated in the memo: “The models used by the Committee on Climate Change did include a coupling between climate and the carbon cycle & took full account of the ‘coupled’ model research presented in the AR4 WG1 report, the C4MIP study and related research.” UKMO/Hadley’s “Uncoupled Carbon Budget” for 450 PPMV published in IPCC SAR and TAR: — Starting in 2010 at over 11.2 Gt C. — It peaks at around 13 Gt C around 2020. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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— Shrinks on average by ~ 3% a year by 2110. — When it has reached an output value of ~ 1.5 Gt C per annum. — Between 2010 and 2100 it weighed around 520 Gt C.
— Giving an outcome value for CO2 concentrations of ~450PPMV or 960 Gt C. This is similar to the SRES range of Carbon-Emissions-Budgets for 450PPMV in SAR % TAR: UKMO/Hadley’s “Coupled Carbon Budget” for 450 PPMV published in IPCC SAR and TAR: — Starting in 2010 at around 9 Gt C; — It peaks at around 10 Gt C around 2020; — Shrinks on average by over 4% year; — And by 2070 has gone to nearly zero emissions; — Which is continued into the 22nd Century; — Between 2010 and 2100 it weighed around 295 Gt C [a reduction of over 50%] but;
— Giving an outcome value for CO2 concentrations of ~450PPMV or 960 Gt C.
Median CO2 concentration value calculated by UKMO in the UK Climate Act measured in: — Parts Per Million by Volume [PPMV] and as Weight in Gigatonnes Carbon [Gt C]. The UKMO memo stating how the Carbon Budget modelling in the UK Climate Act reflected “Coupled”, compiled a Carbon Budget: — That starts in 2010 at 10.9 Gt C; — Peaks in 2016 just under 12 Gt C; — Shrinks on average by 4% a year; — Reaching an output value of 0.3 Gt C by 2100; — Weighing 395 Gt C 2010–2100;
— Giving a peak value for CO2 concentrations of PPMV as 445.72 or 949 Gt C in 2050; — With an outcome value lowered to 427 PPMV or 910 Gt C in 2100. GCI’s answer to this “memo” is to point out that to, “take full account of the Coupling” [in their words] in the UKCA Carbon Budget, what the UKMO did was: — To add over 114 Gt C or 25% to their “Coupled Budget” but also... — To subtract nearly 60 Gt C from their atmospheric concentration outcome [!] This concentration result is negative feedback. It misled everyone. It was a result that contradicts all the models in the C4MIP study reported in the IPCC AR4, even before addressing the other positive feedback effects. While they subsequently admitted the omission of these, no attention was drawn to the negative feedback UKMO were now claiming for coupled carbon cycling, a totally opposite result. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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3. UKMO claims that by 2050 atmosphere concentrations of CO2 are falling as “most probable”. This is because they claimed that CO2 sinks are removing more than 100% of human source emissions from 2050. With feedbacks omitted this is “most improbable”.
Here, the “Stock” array of atmosphere concentrations of CO2 is converted to weight so it can more easily be compared with the annual “Flow” of CO2 emissions in the “carbon-budget”. This way we can easily assess a 13-step range for the changing “Airborne Fraction of Emissions” in the different concentration pathways from: — The 10%-ile, the lowest concentration returning to 390 PPMV, adding 4 steps to the — Median—UKMO’s “most probable” pathway to 427 PPMV, with a further 7 steps to — The highest concentration, the 90%-ile rising to 516 PPMV.
With UKMO’s “Median” case, the model states that by 2050, concentrations are falling as sinks are re- absorbing more than the sources of human emissions coming from the Climate Act’s “carbon-budget” from 2050. With feedbacks omitted this is “most improbable”.
We have chosen to call this result, “greater than 100% sink-efficiency by 2050”. The UKMO are welcome to disagree with this term and to call it whatever they choose. However, changing the name won’t change what is revealed in the numerical analysis of what they published in the UK Climate Act—ie that sinks are absorbing more than sources by 2050.
The carbon-budget is primarily fossil-carbon. Once burned it has to go somewhere. What doesn’t stay in the atmosphere [the fraction retained] goes into the biological sinks on land and in the ocean [fraction returned]. In reality, that is true only to the extent these sinks hold up and can absorb this huge and sudden addition of carbon. With various feedbacks omitted from UKMO’s model, this result is unrealistic and untrustworthy as a basis for strategic and precautionary global climate policy. Moreover, the UK Climate Act CO2 “Sink Function” from 10%-ile to 90%-ile covers the extreme range of: — 0%–70% Fractions-Retained; or — 100%–30% Fractions-Returned.
Depending on the position selected, the whole budget is re-absorbed [returned in position 1] through to three quarters of it remaining in the atmosphere [retained in position 13]. This is not a small range of possibilities [uncertainties] it is huge. In policy terms it’s like saying the car-speed-limit is somewhere between plus and minus 50 mile an hour. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Moreover, GCI is of the view that UKMO climate-modellers have overestimated the capacity of the terrestrial and oceanic sinks to absorb the emissions consequences of burning huge amounts of fossil carbon [oil, coal and gas] that were not in the biological carbon-cycle until they were minded, burned and sent as greenhouse- flue-gas to the atmosphere. All the extra carbon being dumped in the ocean, as a result of UKMO’s Median “sink-efficiency” would raise CO2 concentration in the oceans, instead of in the atmosphere, lowering pH. UKMO says this will not lower pH as the “biological pump” will remove it as the build-up accelerates. This is unsound as the pump operates on a timescale of Decades to Centuries and not the Years to Decades necessary to achieve what UKMO claim.
At this point it is also worth noting that the CO2 from Permafrost melt is not fossil carbon. However, until the Permafrost melts it is not in the biological carbon-cycle either. As it is released due to melting, it is biological and this is augmented by the soils themselves becoming biologically active and generating more yet more CO2 from this as well. Estimates in AAAS Science for the scale of just this CO2 are in the region of an extra 1.9 trillion tonnes of carbon [1.5 Tt C]—see Arctic Bomb AAAS permafrost melt chart.
4. Based on the “Median” case as in UKCA “2016 4% Low”, here is the “carbon-budget” adjusted to the array of concentration pathways—either up or down—so the budget levels are adjusted always to return Median Concentrations whichever of the 13 levels of “probability” is chosen. So if the Median concentration pathway is not as-stated the “most probable”, UKMO’s huge range creates a policy maker’s nightmare. UKMO’s approach is perhaps at best “illustrative” as it is certainly not precise or precautionary.
With the “Stock” of atmosphere concentrations of CO2 converted to a weight array, these are easily compared with the annual “Flow” of CO2 emissions in the “carbon-budget”. Like this we can also adjust the carbon budget for the 13-step array of the changing “Airborne Fraction of Emissions” in the different concentration pathways in UKCA: — From 10%-ile, cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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— Through Median, — To the 90%-ile.
Since the commitment at COP-15 was not to exceed 2 degrees, which of UKMO’s Contraction:Concentrations pathway should we trust? Based on UKMO’s “Median” being the “most probable” being in their words, values that give us just a “44% chance” of keeping to 2 degrees, we can set these values as the reference-concentrations-case, and adjust UKMO’s Carbon-Budget for all 13 positions so that these “Median” PPMV values are always the outcome. The range of values is huge. As the chart shows, while a: — “10%-ile adjusted budget” could be increased from 395 Gt C to 473 Gt C, a — “90%-ile adjusted budget” needs to be decreased from 395 Gt C to just 204 Gt C — Here is the full set of budget-integrals for adjustments against the array given. In reality, we need to fix the safe and stable concentration level and be transparent about the precautionary— and the likely—need to accelerate emissions-contraction to achieve it. 1 10%-ile 473 Gt C 2 453 Gt C 3 434 Gt C 4 415 Gt C 5 Median 395 Gt C 6 371 Gt C 7 348 Gt C 8 324 Gt C 9 300 Gt C 10 276 Gt C 11 252 Gt C 12 228 Gt C 13 90%-ile 204 Gt C As is the UK Climate Act does the reverse. It fixes the budget and presents a huge array of possible concentration outcomes. Moreover, this it should be remembered is before a full ensemble of feedbacks has been included in the climate models. So, even in the absence of these major feedback effects in the UKMO’s model, from a policy-makers viewpoint, UKMO’s huge range of variation on PPMV outcomes renders their approach an implausible basis on which to develop and then internationally negotiate the sharing of a precautionary carbon-budget with a policy framework aimed at the imperative of UNFCCC-compliance. Once again, UKMO’s incomplete approach “illustrative” as it is not “precautionary”. Perhaps seeing it more as “aspirational” than “rational” is the best that can be said for it. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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5. Using the UKMO’s “2016 4% Low scenario” the Climate Change Committee prescribed “2050” as the year for completing international Convergence to equal per capita budget sharing globally. “It wasn’t just inadequate, it was unfair.” While the principle of distributing the Contraction-Event with the Convergence procedure to equal per capita sharing globally is widely now accepted, prescribing the date—let-alone that date [2050]—of Convergence is not. HMG were repeatedly advised by MPs, Select Committees, GCI and others from 2000 onwards to negotiate and not to prescribe the convergence date. The urgency that arises when the feedback omissions are addressed, shows [as addressed in the previous chart] that a “90%-ile version of the 2016 4% Low Carbon Budget” needs to be shrunk from 395 Gt C to half that size at 204 Gt C*, ie achieving less than zero emissions globally after 2060. In the light of this, offering to negotiate a convergence date by 2040, or 2030 or even by 2020 would have been a more politically realistic way, and a more propitious way, to engage at COP-15 with Less Developed Countries [LDCs], whose per capita emissions are still on average, much lower than those of the Developed Countries [DCs] like the UK and the US. The Chinese Government proposed this prior to COP-15 and there is diverse and considerable support for this approach: http://www.gci.org.uk/UNFCCC_Submission_Co- Signatories.html cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Authors of the UK Climate Act know the prescription of 2050 had a disastrous effect at COP-15. With the “carbon-budget” adjusted to the concentration array so the budget always returns the Median path, the CCC’s prescription of Convergence by 2050 was doubly provocative—it was inadequate and it was unfair. As Adair Turner agreed to Colin Challen in the DECC Committee enquiry in 2009, “if the rate of contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, the rate of convergence must be accelerated for reasons of equity.”
James Hansen observes a higher level of Climate Sensitivity than UKMO [Hadley] This is why Hansen advocates a level of human emissions-control that would return us to 350 PPMV and told the EAC that the 2 degree target in the UK Climate Act and agreed at COP-15 is not safe. As presented in GCI’s evidence to EAC in 2009, he argues for a carbon-budget between 124 and 320 Gt C http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Hansen.pdf & this is nearer the range advocated by GCI [see pages 25/6 & 41]. He calculates this as necessary, arguing that we are dealing with a considerably higher level of climate- sensitivity than the level used by UKMO, as in this “Climate Sensitivity-Progression” [after D Wasdell] shows: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Climate Dynamics2.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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6. “Bulge and Trend”—UKMO’s opaque and arbitrary array of “feedback-emissions”.
In August 2012, the UKMO-led AVOID programme published a paper titled “Emissions Pathways to Limit Climate Change”: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/avoid6_flyer.pdf
CO2 budget-emissions and temperature paths were shown as similar to the Climate Act. However, both CO2 concentration imagery and data were omitted from the paper. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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The Director of the AVOID programme was asked to supply that data. He declined saying that there was too much data [“several tens of thousands of pathways”] and that the data had not been retained. He was finally forced to provide it under an FOI request where he said that the emissions, concentrations and temperature images were only for “illustrative purposes”. However, the same feedback-free modelling picture emerged from this.
Moreover, analysis of his paper in Nature [02 2013], “A global assessment of the effects of climate policy on the impacts of climate change” reveals once again, the same “greater than 100% sink-efficiency by 2050” between emissions and concentrations [see pp. 33/34] and: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/UKMO_ Nature_Climate.pdf
The Director strongly resisted the suggestion that the UKMO’s modelling results in the UK Climate Act were just for “illustrative purposes”. But on the evidence, perhaps that’s all that can be said for UKMO’s approach generally. As-is it means the UK Climate Legislation is just, “for illustrative purposes only”—and as-is, these “purposes” mislead.
UKMO’s approach misleads because it implies we only face the “control-curves”—in other words, deceleration curves. Feedbacks mean what we may face is “loss-of-control-curves”—acceleration curves.
Growth of the Annually Averaged Increments of PPMV CO2 “increase” 1980–2012 & projected to the year 2060 is @ 2.1% a year. If feedback emissions are already happening, this trend curve will include these. However, it will not suddenly “bulge” upwards as the UKMO curves show. The growth of these feedback emissions and their effect on, concentrations will be gradual & progressive, as the planet warms over the 21st Century.
Consequently, the 90%-ile, Median [& slightly the 10%-ile] “bulge” over that trend-curve, starting in 2010, is unrealistic. The trend average of the “growth increments” has been at 2.1% per annum. At the outset, UKMO’s curves for Median & 90%-ile upwardly violate this trend. This too makes UKMO’s concentration curves arbitrary and unrealistic.
The growth of feedback emissions will not [as shown here] suddenly “balloon up” and then stop and reverse further increase, holding in line with the “Median adjusted Budget”.
The way the UKMO have treated feedbacks they regarded as relevant, is to have created this quite arbitrary “bulge” above the CO2 concentrations growth trend, in order to then portray that the curves slow & come down sharply.
This means that UKMO’s curves are “control-curves”. These imply we will keep control of concentrations overall. However, feedback-effects and particularly feedback-emissions, imply that what we face is not-so- much “control-curves”, as “loss-of-control-curves”.
The point being that feedback emissions and their knock-on effect on concentrations—as in the case of CO2 emissions from Permafrost melt for example—are non-human, accelerate, start gradually [see page 24] but once under way the rate of increase is uncontrollable.
Unless these feedbacks are “in the model” and leading to precautionary policy consequences, UKMO’s results are implausible and irresponsible, rendering their present approach as generically misleading & an inappropriate basis upon which to develop precautionary climate policy for UNFCCC-compliance. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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What we face is not so much the inconvenience of “control-curves” as the potentially catastrophic consequences of “loss-of-control-curves”. In the face of this UKMO continues to model growing “Sink- Efficiency” [see “Advance” paper; 2010].
As with the UK Climate Act, in UKMO’s “Advance” Paper, the atmosphere CO2 Concentrations trend accelerates upwards but then accelerates downwards. In “Advance” CO2 Concentrations & CO2 Emissions- Budget show the Fraction of the Carbon Emissions-Budget returned to the sinks by 2050 [or “sink-efficiency”] is greater than 100% after that year. But RCPs in UKMO & probably IPCC AR5 “are careful & conservative.” [Bob Watson]
In the Advance paper, UKMO formally aligned itself with the RCP scenarios in 2010. These show the same feedback omissions are in the “Representative Concentration Pathway” [RCP] scenarios where CO2 Concentrations & CO2 Emissions-Budget show the Fraction of the Carbon Emissions-Budget returned to the sinks by 2050 [or “sink-efficiency”] is greater than 100% after that year. It is understood that these RCP cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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scenarios are being made the basis of the drafts of the forthcoming IPCC AR5 [due 2014–15]. If so, it suggests that these feedback omissions are likely to inform AR5 on publication. So, after 20 years of IPCC Assessments, the danger is that the Fifth Assessment will again fail to address the issue of feedback effects being omitted from the climate models. If that happens, as the Advance paper suggests, they will have been assisted to that outcome by the UKMO and the blinkered climate-modelling underpinning the UK Climate Act. Sir Robert Watson [a former Chairman of the IPCC at the time of the IPCC Third Assessment Report] said in a public session in San Francisco in December 2012: “We were careful and conservative. If we had a strong statement subsequently proved wrong, we would lose all credibility as a scientific community. I thought we should always be slightly on the side of conservative. Otherwise we were going to get ripped apart by climate-deniers even for the simplest mistake.”
IPCC’s credibility problem is due to this “conservatism” In fact it is not just erring towards “conservatism”. That suggests we face merely the inconvenience of “control-curves”—or deceleration curves. Feedbacks mean what we face is the potentially catastrophic consequences of “loss-of-control-curves”—or acceleration curves. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Image Wasdell—“Feedback Dynamics, Sensitivity & Runaway Conditions”: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Climate_Dynamics2.pdf
In “ADVANCE”, UKMO’s comment on feedback omission reads: We will continue to improve the representation of processes included in our model. There are also a number of processes not currently included that could potentially have a major impact on the degree of warming for a given emissions scenario, quite apart from their impact on local and regional climate. Some of these processes have been discussed here and we are actively working on including them in the model: — The impact of ozone on plants reduces their ability to take up carbon. Given their major implications for international technology and economic development, policy decisions on climate change must be underpinned by the best possible evidence. — The deposition of black carbon on snow changes the reflectivity of the surface leading to more warming at high latitudes. Other processes are less well understood but are actively being researched with a view to including them in future models. — The ability of plants to take up carbon may be limited by the supply of nitrogen available naturally, but may be enhanced by man-made sources of nitrogen. Climate change itself may also increase available nitrogen and stimulate plant growth. — The thawing of permafrost may lead to large amounts of carbon release, but these processes are not well understood. — Dynamic ice processes could speed up freshwater supply from glaciers into the ocean. — The processes that affect methane in the Arctic Ocean could lead to increased methane release (the science is poorly understood so may take longer to include in models). The international science community is working hard to understand and narrow the uncertainties in future climate projections—and it is doing this primarily through model inter-comparison projects, comparison with observations, and the synthesis of results by the next IPCC report. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Understanding the interactions within the Earth system is critical. Yet, aligning itself with the RCP scenarios now at the base of IPCC AR5, UKMO again publishes negative feedback in the “Advance Paper” of 2010. The paper set out the alignment of UKMO HADGEM2-ES with the RCP scenarios that have replaced the SRES scenarios in previous IPCC Assessment Reports. An analysis of the RCP 8.5 & 2.6 scenarios for airborne fractions of emissions shows the same rate of reabsorption as increasing to more than 100% of the budget by 2050 in the case of RCP 2.6 and decreasing to around 20% of the CO2 budget by 2100 for RCP 8.5. This is therefore true of the HADGEM2-ES runs as well and that the projections continue to be made on the basis of the continuing omission of major feedback effects in RCPs, currently drafted to inform IPCC AR5. It was updated by UKMO 29 April 2013: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/advance.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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UKMO’s Feedback Omissions are in “NATURE CLIMATE”, February 2013 “A global assessment of the effects of climate policy on the impacts of climate change”
By UKMO’s J. A. Lowe and other authors from the UKMO-led AVOID project, a global carbon budget weighing around 90 Gt C [or about twice the weight of the budget in the UK Climate Act] projects carbon emission, concentrations and temperature from 200 to 2100.
While temperature is projected to rise throughout to approaching 3 degrees above pre-industrial, and emissions fall in this case from 2030 onwards, CO2 concentrations peak at 600 PPMV and then fall from 2050 onwards to around 550 PPMV by 2100.
This projects yet again that according to the UKMO, CO2 sinks are greater than Budget CO2 sources [or more than 100% “sink-efficiency” is projected] by 2050. This is yet further evidence of the fact that UKMO continues to use a climate-model that omits major feedback effects.
The conclusion that has to be drawn from all this is that use of this model as it is, results in unrealistic and misleading results.
Malte Meinshausen, a principal author of the RCP scenarios now likely to be the basis of the IPCC Fifth Assessment [AR5], co-authored a paper “Probabilistic cost estimates for climate change mitigation”, published in Nature [January 2013]: http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/Nature_Meinshausen_et_al.pdf
The paper argued that a “carbon-tax” of $100/Tonne now would help to avoid the $1,000/Tonne that would be necessary later if the delay in emissions-control continues.
A range of 27 CO2-emissions-contraction-events for the period 2000–2100 were published.
The contraction-events continued over the period 2100–2200 were omitted as were the atmospheric concentrations outcomes of these over two Centuries.
When concentrations are added and values for 2100–2200 are added, the range of CO2 budget-integrals, CO2 concentration-outcomes go from lowest to highest with the nominally associated Tax-Rates are shown in the following table of values: cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Emissions Atmospheric Atmospheric Contraction- Concentration Concentration Budget Integrals Outcomes Outcomes Position [Gt C] [PPMV] [Gt C]] Tax Rate 1 711 Gt C 493 1,051 Gt C $100 2 745 Gt C 497 1,058 Gt C $135 3 779 Gt C 506 1,078 Gt C $169 4 812 Gt C 516 1,099 Gt C $204 5 844 Gt C 526 1,121 Gt C $238 6 874 Gt C 537 1,145 Gt C $273 7 904 Gt C 549 1,169 Gt C $308 8 935 Gt C 561 1,195 Gt C $342 9 967 Gt C 574 1,223 Gt C $377 10 1,016 Gt C 591 1,259 Gt C $412 11 1,074 Gt C 611 1,301 Gt C $446 12 1,132 Gt C 632 1,346 Gt C $481 13 1,194 Gt C 656 1,397 Gt C $515 14 1,254 Gt C 681 1,450 Gt C $550 15 1,311 Gt C 707 1,506 Gt C $585 16 1,375 Gt C 737 1,570 Gt C $619 17 1,451 Gt C 772 1,644 Gt C $654 18 1,554 Gt C 817 1,741 Gt C $688 19 1,676 Gt C 872 1,857 Gt C $723 20 1,831 Gt C 943 2,010 Gt C $758 21 1,993 Gt C 1024 2,180 Gt C $792 22 2,162 Gt C 1115 2,376 Gt C $827 23 2,344 Gt C 1220 2,599 Gt C $862 24 2,514 Gt C 1327 2,827 Gt C $896 25 2,677 Gt C 1439 3,065 Gt C $931 26 2,855 Gt C 1565 3,334 Gt C $965 27 3,008 Gt C 1642 3,497 Gt C $1,000
As positions 1–27 go progressively towards a climate catastrophe, which no amount of carbon-tax could obviate or avoid, nothing more clearly shows the cul-de-sac of carbon- price-led climate-policy formulation. This is an “ideological-selection-bias” that we do not need. It misleads in favour of being led by “price- signals” and calls the whole process of peer-reviewed articles on climate-economics in supposedly eminent journals into disrepute. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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“Ticking Arctic Carbon Bomb May Be Bigger Than Thought.” Science 7th 12, 2012: http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2012/12/ticking-arctic-carbon-bomb-may-b.html
AAA’s article in Science [07 12 2012] argues the melt and CO2 release has already begun. The next image portrays the effect on the atmosphere of releasing the extra 1.9 Trillion Tonnes Carbon from CO2 from Perma Frost melt in a defendably calculated time-frame. It is now estimated that another 1.9 trillion tonnes of carbon is stored in the “perma-frost”. In 2009, the estimate was at 1.4. This permafrost has already started slowly melting due to enhanced global warming. Simply weighed on a scale of Billions of Tonnes of Carbon [Giga Tonnes or Gt C] it is easy to calculate the effect on CO2 concentrations. It is a potential release. Once under way, it is impossible to stop. So, if we are to prevent this, the potential rate of release of this extra CO2 to the atmosphere is on a time-frame that needs— however difficult—to be calculated. The weight reaches the top of this yellow shape at around 3 trillion tonnes of atmospheric carbon, or 1400 ppmv carbon [only]. IPCC estimates 1000 CO2-e is equal to a temperature rise of 4–8°. So the worst-case of perma-frost melt alone, dwarfs human emissions control and presage a climate holocaust.
Atmospheric CO2 concentrations could increase within the rate range suggested here. What is important to note is that this rate of growth is initially slower than the 90%-ile rate which was given as top rate of concentration build-up in the UK Climate Act. Moreover, it now also appears increasingly unlikely, due to the lack of fossil-source-emissions-control, that the Carbon Budget “2016 4% Low”, cited in the UK Climate Act, will actually be adhered to.
Consequently, if CO2 emissions, from Perma Frost melt, became part of this 90-ile rate—the highest rate above the Carbon Budget “2016 4% Low” (or higher) on which the UKCA is based, we are looking at the potential for a catastrophic runaway process of climate-change. UKMO already specified that temperature will increase for the next 100 years. UKCA had just 44% odds for holding to a two degree temperature rise, even if the “median case” for CO2 concentration rise were to evolve. Since, omitting feedback from melting permafrost, Climate Act authors is acknowledged the lined “grey” areas in “Emissions” and “Concentrations” shown here are from CBAT. These mathematically relate the former to the latter in 40 theoretical steps downward & upwards from “the budget” with concentrations at CAF 50-% cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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for Budget + “feedback” in each of the steps. So these are showing the hypothetically possible rates of negative & positive feedback covering the process of carbon-cycling—including permafrost melt—as a whole. In the cause of UNFCCC-compliance, the world might theoretically hold to the “2016 4% Low” Carbon Emissions Budget [as in the UKCA]. However, positive feedback in the carbon cycle may release more CO2 than sinks can absorb, forcing atmosphere concentrations up.
Consequently the rates of CO2 emissions:concentrations calculated in “2016 4% Low” suggest a rate of acceleration across the Century ahead is possible where by mid-Century a scenario with the consequences of positive feedback is driving the system as a whole to a point after which “human-budget-emission-control” becomes completely futile and irrelevant. There are two simple messages—we need to: 3. Leave fossil carbon [oil coal & gas] in the ground. 4. Get on with the control of “human-budget-emissions” as quickly as possible. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Carbon Budget Analysis Tool [CBAT] A Heuristic Device in “Four inter-active Domains” [draft only] A draft and incomplete version of this user-inter-active model is already on-line at: http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf Domain One “Contraction and Concentrations” governs the commitment to UNFCCC-compliance. In this sense, the C-BAT analysis isn’t simply “outcome-based” it is “outcome-driven” by that goal. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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C-BAT is an analysis tool. It is also a policy-planning model. This may seem deterministic, but proceeding this way is deliberate. Faced with the possibility of runaway rates of climate change taking hold, there is no point in achieving “outcomes” that are “inadvertently” the result of doing too little too late. We are in danger of doing this by simply continuing an inadequate “climate-policy” discussion that has so far depended on the combination of opaque and inadequate climate models, ideologically confused and contestable policy models and risk-obtuse economic models that are dense with highly contestable economic assumptions and computations. We must face this challenge of being UNFCCC-compliant on the basis of organising so that we are globally determined to do enough, soon enough to be UNFCCC-compliant. This means goal-focused C&C or being in- tune and in-time together, determined to be UNFCCC-compliant. The detail of this work is still in progress. However, the calculating sequence goes from One to Four through FOUR DOMAINS starting with and crucially governed by:
DOMAIN ONE: Contraction and Concentrations This domain is “global” and deals with the “Common Good”. It directly addresses the “objective” of the UNFCCC [the reason why the UNFCCC exists]. Here, the spread of changing concentration possibilities on any given future carbon-budget is mathematized in the light of certainly changing [and probably lessening] future sink-performance. The primary numeraire in Domains One Two Three and Four is one tonne of carbon. The carbon in one part per million atmospheric CO2 by volume [ppmv] equals 2,130,000,000 tonnes carbon or 2.13 Gigatonnes Carbon [ie Gt C or 2.13 Billion Tonnes Carbon]. Conversely, 1 tonne carbon equals 0.00000000046948357 ppmv atmospheric CO2. Using this numeraire for both CO2 emissions & concentrations makes Carbon-Budget Analysis easily doable. In Domains Three and Four the *the dollar-numeraire is governed by CBAT’s carbon-numeraire.* Overall, there are three Budgets in all [High, Medium & Low] though any weight/rate/date budget can be introduced as a new xml data sheet and the model will respond accordingly. As things stand with CBAT model development so far, 400 different carbon-path-integrals have been computed using this numeraire. These are being animated in a user-friendly way with all these derived details that have been quantified and this makes risk analysis of all the future rates of change much easier to visualize, compare and evaluate. There are two ways of measuring feedbacks in Domain One. These are Integrated [as in UKCA] & Segregated [as now proposed by GCI]. The difference between accelerating and decelerating curvature can easily be seen and the “runaway-climate” inferences easily drawn. An on/off switch enables all results to be compared with the Contraction:Concentrations Budget in UK Climate Act [2016 4% Low]. The animated version of this gives users “Budget Control” with the drag up/ down slider on the right-hand side. This takes the carbon-emissions budget and concentrations above the budget and concentrations @ CAF-50% in 40 steps up [positive feedback] and below the budget and concentrations @ CAF-50% in 40 steps down [negative feedback].
Concentrations, temperature, sea-level rise and ocean CO2 deposition/acidification are visible “consequences” of this “Budget Control” and all values [sourced] for these are shown on clocks that will move in synch with the slide use for “Budget Control”. 5 levels of “climate-sensitivity” are programmed in against these budgets and users can select each of these levels to see the results from low to high. Domains two, three and four are governed by user choices made in domain one and these Domains will exchange with the centre-stage of position [here of Domain one] when their icons on the left are touched. Then the Slider over the years becomes active eg selecting and measuring and weighing the convergence-rates/ weights/dates for the contraction rate chosen from Domain one. Domain “icons” on the left are mouse-sensitive and will come centre-stage when “mouse-touched”, moving the Domain at the centre to the left where it remains inter-active. Users can select the Domain One path- integral they feel is relevant to achieving UNFCCC-compliance and to hold this choice as they then progress through Domains two, three and four. As twenty years of negotiations at the UNFCCC now clearly show, not proceeding in a manner governed by this sequence generates an increasingly chaotic process that is less and less governed by the demands of UNFCCC-compliance.
DOMAIN TWO: Contraction and Convergence This domain is international. It addresses the “Common but Differentiated Good” of negotiating to share what is left in the future global carbon budget in a rational manner. For all the contraction rates in Domain One, all convergence rates are being computed and animated as between consumers above and below the global per capita average arising. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Population growth rates and the effect of a population base-year in the C&C accounts are addressed here. Also convergence procedures derived from C&C such as Common but Differentiated Convergence, Cap and Dividend, Cap and Share and Greenhouse Development Rights are compared with C&C. Users are invited to select the convergence-rate they feel relates to the path-integral already chosen in Domain One and so successfully achieving UNFCCC-compliance and hold this choice through Domains three and four.
DOMAIN THREE: Contraction and Conversion This domain is technological and economic and will explore the options for sustaining or not sustaining present levels of production and consumption. It is in essence the position where C&C without “Green Growth” of some kind is useless, but “Green Growth” without C&C is dangerous. Users can evaluate in this Domain subject to the choices already made in Domains One and Two.
DOMAIN FOUR: Damages and Growth Domain Four is really where economics is relevant. It is the domain of climate-damages versus conventional “growth”, based on forward projecting Munich Re trends as recorded over the last forty years. All rates shown are functions of results and choices made in Domain One. So users can see whether their efforts have passed the crucial test of doing enough soon enough to achieve UNFCCC-compliance. If not they can go back and re-run their analysis based on different choices being made in Domains One Two and Three. The overall animation in still in preparation but a taster is here [load and re-load this file]: http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf CBAT is an elaboration of: http://www.gci.org.uk/Animations/BENN_C&C_Animation.swf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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CBAT Domain One Contraction and Concentrations—Low Budget Feedbacks Integrated and Segregated http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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CBAT Domain One Contraction and Concentrations—Medium Budget Feedbacks Integrated and Segregated http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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CBAT Domain One Contraction and Concentrations—High Budget Feedbacks Integrated and Segregated http://www.gci.org.uk/CBAT/cbat-domains/Domains.swf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Past Emissions & Climate Act Budget in Relation to Hansen and other Budgets
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Supplementary written evidence submitted by the Met Office Supplementary Evidence on Carbon Uptake in Future Climate Scenarios During the evidence session of 12 June 2013, Dr Jason Lowe offered to provide a more detailed explanation of what may happen to the future atmospheric CO2 burden following a peak in anthropogenic emissions and subsequent rapid decline.
Summary — Climate models coupled to carbon cycle models are used to study the uptake of carbon by the atmosphere, ocean and land surface for potential response to future emissions scenarios. They include both climate and CO2 concentration feedbacks on to the carbon cycle. — A range of different models show that when carbon emissions are reduced rapidly following a peak in the near future, it is plausible that atmospheric CO2 concentrations will peak before the anthropogenic emissions have reached zero. — The latest complex earth system model results from CMIP5 reinforce the findings from a simpler (traceable) climate model set up and used in 2008, which also showed this behaviour. — However, the Met Office also considers it prudent to repeat the assessment of budgets as new understanding of how the earth system works becomes available and can be quantified.
Idealised Case of Zeroing Emissions 1. Climate model experiments using idealised emission or concentration pathways are useful to better understand complex changes in the earth system, and to bound a range of future responses before more credible and policy relevant pathways are considered. Several studies have performed an experiment in which anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide are instantaneously set to zero—the so called “zero emission commitment” experiment. This provides useful understanding of the manner in which carbon sinks evolve, and global temperatures respond, following a rapid reduction in anthropogenic emissions. The results from three different models are reported in Matthews and Weaver (2010), who conclude that “in response to an abrupt elimination of carbon dioxide emissions, global temperatures either remain approximately constant, or cool slightly as natural carbon sinks gradually draw anthropogenic carbon out of the atmosphere”. 2. In the study of Lowe et al. (2009) the evolution of simulated carbon sinks were examined in detail. Following cessation of emission, the atmospheric CO2 concentration declined at a rate of between around 20 and 75ppm%ury. The relative contributions to the reduction of atmospheric CO2 from land and ocean sinks, and from different parts of the land sinks, varied depending on the timing of the emission reduction and the level of atmospheric CO2 when emissions were reduced. These studies highlight that carbon sinks can continue to take up carbon at significant rates after the magnitude of the emissions has been reduced, and that the uptake is affected by the state of the carbon cycle components prior to the cessation of emissions. In turn, this depends on the pathway of earlier emissions. 3. This is not surprising and is entirely consistent with our understanding of fundamental carbon cycle processes which can continue to respond to past changes or emissions for many years and are not purely determined by emissions from a single year. Rapid reduction in emissions can lead to periods of time where significant natural sinks exceed emissions and lead to CO2 reductions even while anthropogenic emissions are still positive.
The Policy Relevant Scenarios Used in the Recent IPCC Assessments 4. Numerous studies have produced scenarios or emissions pathways that peak carbon dioxide emissions early in the 21st century and have rapid declines following the peak. These studies then use a variety of climate models and carbon cycle models to understand the evolution of atmospheric CO2 and global temperatures. We present these to demonstrate the credibility of the situation where atmospheric CO2 concentration is no longer rising, or is even declining slowly, despite non-zero anthropogenic emissions. 5. Plattner et al. (2008) examined the climate and carbon cycle response for eight models and a number of stabilisation scenarios. One of those models is the BERN2.5CC model, which clearly simulates a number of cases where CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere level off or even peak but anthropogenic emissions remain above zero (see their Figure 11). Furthermore the authors state that “allowable emissions for stabilization at 450 ppm (SP450 and OSP450) remain above zero throughout the simulation in all of the EMICs”, where EMICs refers to the models considered. 6. The most recent climate model inter-comparison exercises have tended to use the, so called, Representative Concentration Profiles (RCPs; Moss et al., 2010) as input. These provide another opportunity to examine the response of the climate-system when atmospheric CO2 is declining slowly following a peak. We focus on RCP2.6, which is the most similar case to the global pathway considered by the Committee on Climate Change that gives approximately a 50% chance of limiting global average near-surface warming to 2°C. RCP2.6 was produced using the IMAGE model (eg van Vuuren et al. 2011) and shows a peak CO2 concentration occurring cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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in 2050 followed by a decline. The emissions of CO2 in 2050 and 2060 (a decade after CO2 concentrations started to decline) were 3.4 GtC/yr and 2GtC/yr respectively, compared to a 1990 value of 7.5GtC/yr. 7. Using the CMIP5 ensemble of more complex earth system models, a recent study by Jones et al. (2013) examined the relationship between atmospheric CO2 concentrations, carbon sinks and implied anthropogenic emissions in more detail. The study found that when models were constrained to follow the concentrations of the RCP2.6 pathway the implied anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2050 (the time of atmospheric CO2 concentration peak) were still positive and had reduced from 1990 levels by between 14 to 96% depending on the model. A decade later the emissions were also clearly still above zero in the majority of the models. The requirement for negative emissions to achieve this CO2 decline is mixed—for some models emissions stayed positive for the whole of the 21st century.
Figure COMPATIBLE FOSSIL FUEL EMISSIONS FOR THE PEAK-AND-DECLINE RCP2.6 SCENARIO PLOTTED WITH 10-YEAR SMOOTHING FROM MULTIPLE CMIP5 GCMS. HISTORICAL FOSSIL FUEL EMISSIONS FOR THE 1990S ARE SHOWN BY THE BLACK AND YELLOW BAR
8. In terms of carbon storage, the land carbon store increased throughout the 21st century in RCP2.6 in the majority of models, with the amount of increase varying with model. Uptake by the ocean also continued during the 21st century simulations in all of the models, but with a decreasing rate during the 21st century. The cumulative airborne fractions evaluated for the model ensemble between 2006 and 2100 were less than the values estimated for the 1990s for the same models for RCP2.6.
The Simple Model Calculations used for the First Carbon Budget Calculations 9. The modelling philosophy applied for the global scenarios used to inform the first carbon budget calculations is well documented16 and the model outputs are available on the website of the Committee on Climate Change. The ability of the model to credibly emulate the C4MIP simulations is included in the documentation. When this modelling approach is applied to the 2016R4L pathway, which peaks CO2 emissions in 2016 and has a long-term decline rate of 4% per year, a range of atmospheric CO2 concentrations can be simulated depending on the choice of key model parameters within the chosen uncertainty ranges. The median simulated atmospheric CO2 concentration shows a peak in the mid-21st century (peaking at around 445ppm in 2050) followed by a small decline (of around 15ppm over 50 years) later in the 21st century during a period 16 http://archive.theccc.org.uk/aws2/docs/Ch1%20technical%20appendix%20v1.1%20- %20projecting%20global%20emissions,%20concentrations%20and%20temperatures.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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when the anthropogenic emissions have declined significantly, but are still above zero. This is consistent with the behaviour of more recent and complex models reported above. It is important to note that during this (2050 to 2100) period the median temperature response does not show a decline, with the reduction in forcing being buffered by the top of the atmosphere energy imbalance built up during the earlier part of the experiment when atmospheric CO2 concentrations and forcing were increasing. It is also important to note that the precise behaviour of the climate system and the carbon cycle remain uncertain. Narrowing this uncertainty is a key challenge of climate science.
Supplementary Evidence on Climate Sensitivity Summary — Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) and Transient Climate Response (TCR) are two measures of the sensitivity of the climate to changes in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, such as CO2. — Precise values of ECS and TCR are not known but ranges of certainty can be estimated. — There are many different ways to estimate ranges of ECS and TCR, each with different advantages and disadvantages. — The HadGEM2-ES model is at the higher end of complex climate model estimates of ECS and TCR but within the range estimates from a number of different approaches. — Climate policy advice from the Met Office draws on a range of models and on observations. It is tailored to address relevant issues.
Background 10. The Met Office Hadley Centre has used a number of climate models over the period 2008 to present, in order to provide evidence to inform policy and decision making. These include the HadCM3, HadGEM1 and HadGEM2-ES models. Additionally, traceable simple climate models have been used for some purposes. Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) and Transient Climate Response (TCR) are two measures of the sensitivity of the climate to changes in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, such as CO2. The ECS and TCR of several complex Met Office GCMs are: GCM ECS °C TCR °C HadCM3 3.3 2.0 HadGEM1 4.4 1.9 HadGEM2 4.6 2.5
11. The simple climate model used to provide information for the original carbon budgets in 2008 used a distribution of ECS based on Murphy et al. (2004) which had a 5th to 95th percentile range of 2.4 to 5.4°C. This distribution was considered in the IPCC 4th assessment. The overall “likely”17 range presented by the IPCC 4th assessment for ECS was 2 to 4.5°C, with a best estimate of 3°C and a note that values substantially higher than 4.5°C cannot be excluded. TCR was concluded to be “very likely” to be greater than 1°C and “very unlikely” to be greater than 3°C. 12. Recent research shows that we still can not yet estimate a single precise value of ECS, but improved uncertainty ranges can be estimated using a variety of techniques. These techniques include: using the recent measurements of temperature, ocean heat uptake and estimated radiative forcing, using palaeo climate measurements, using complex models, and using a combination of models and observations. No single method can be identified as being the best approach and there are pros and cons for each approach. Within a particular class of approach, such as using the recent measurements of temperature, ocean heat uptake and estimated radiative forcing, there are still methodological issues of debate, such as the type of assumed priors18. 13. There have been a number of recently published estimates of ECS and TCR based on measurements of temperature, ocean heat uptake and estimated radiative forcing. These typically focus on the energy balance of the earth. The study by Otto et al. (2013) presented a number of estimated ranges based on considering various recent periods. When only the 2000 to 2009 period was used to represent near present day conditions the 5th to 95th percentile ranges of ECS and TCR were 1.2 to 3.9°C and 0.9 to 2.0°C, respectively. However, the article highlights that whilst there are advantages of using the most recent period because it is somewhat better observed than earlier periods, there are limitations to using a single decade too. The authors state that “caution is required in interpreting any short period, especially a recent one for which details of forcing and energy storage inventories are still relatively unsettled: both could make significant changes to the energy budget. The estimates of the effective radiative forcing by aerosols in particular vary strongly between model-based studies and satellite data. The satellite data are still subject to biases and provide only relatively weak constraints”. The numerical values in the article also clearly demonstrate the variability in ECS and TCR estimates when 17 IPCC 4th assessment uses “likely” to mean >66% probability, “very likely” to be >90% probability and “very unlikely” to be <10% probability. 18 Bayesian approaches can be used to refine prior estimates of climate sensitivity but typically contain a subjective element. There is continued debate about the appropriate choice of prior information, such as whether it should be informative or uninformative. See for instance Efron, 2013. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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using a single decade. When the longer 1970 to 2009 was used (which includes data from the most recent decade alongside earlier data) in the calculation, their 5th to 95th percentile estimates for ECS and TCR were 0.9 to 5.0°C and 0.7 to 2.5°C respectively. 14. Forster et al., 2013 calculates that for the CMIP5 set of models (the recent models used in the forthcoming IPCC 5th assessment) there is a range of ECS from 2.1 to 4.7°C. TCR varies in the range 1.1 to 2.5°C. A recent comprehensive estimate using the palaeo climate approach (Palaeosense, 2013) estimates a likely range for ECS to be 2.2 to 4.8°C (noting that this covers a probability range of 68%). A recent estimate by the MOHC (Harris et al., 2012) using a combination of climate model results and observational constraints together gives a 5th to 95th percentile range of 2.4 to 4.3°C. 15. Thus, we conclude the HadGEM2-ES model is at the upper end of the range from current models for both ECS and TCR. However, we also conclude that it falls inside the ECS and TCR 5th to 95th percentile ranges estimated by a number of different approaches—including from a method that includes the recent observations. The climate sensitivity uncertainty distribution used by the Met Office in earlier carbon budget analyses within a simple climate model framework also has a significant overlap with many newer estimates. 16. Finally, we highlight that when considering the utility and skill of climate models it is prudent to consider more than their global average temperature response to atmospheric CO2 concentration changes. The spatial behaviour of complex climate models, such as HadGEM2-ES, are rigorously evaluated against observations for numerous variables. Natural variability and long-term response to external forcings of different types are considered. The HadGEM2-ES model provides one of the most comprehensive platforms for studying a wide range of earth system processes. We have also combined HadGEM2-ES with observational constraints to estimate ranges of future climate change for particular pathways of future greenhouse gas concentration increase.
References Jones et al. J Climate, 2013. Lowe et al, Env Res Lett, 2009. Matthews and Weaver, Nature Geoscience 3, doi:10.1038/ngeo813, 2010. Moss et al., Nature, 2010. Plattner et al, J Climate, 21, 2008 . Van Vuuren et al. Climatic Change, 109, 2011. Elfron, Science, 380, 2013. Forster et al., JGR- atmos, 2013. Harris et al., J Clim, 2013. Murphy et al, Nature, 2004. Otto et al., Nature GeoSci, 2013. Palaeosens project members, Nature, 2013. 26 June 2013
Further written evidence submitted by Aubrey Meyer, GCI The previous memo from GCI to EAC stands. With a view to strengthening what has already been written and said by GCI to the EAC 2013 Enquiry, the following information is added:
1. A corrective point on the exchange between EAC and Juliet Slingo on 12 June 2013: (a) First point—Martin Caton’s question to Juliet Slingo: “Aubrey Meyer said that the Met Office claimed to include all feedback effects in its projections on global emissions when it had not. Would you like to respond to that assertion?” This is simply wrong. GCI said no such thing. However, GCI’s evidence to EAC 2013 did point at two specific things: 1. GCI pointed out that the UKMO—without disclosing this to the EAC Enquiry 2009— completely reversed their own stated meaning of “coupled-carbon-cycle” modelling from a positive to a negative feedback [see major point two below]; 2. GCI also pointed out that UKMO’s own disclosure of other feedback effects they had omitted only occurred after pressure was brought to bear in the EAC Enquiry 2009. UKMO’s disclosure did admit that they had indeed left out major feedback effects from their climate-modelling [which they described as potentially “a big deal”] and it is also now true that they continue to cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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omit these to this day [all the way into IPCC AR5] preparation due to “uncertainties” and “complexity”. To this GCI adds now two more points: 3. Given what is already now years of delay in doing this including these other feedback effects— ie accomplishing the task of effectively and comprehensively modelling rates of global climate change on this global scale in the face of these omissions due to uncertainties and complexities—it is possibly [and some would say even probably—see statements below] in fact an insurmountable task. 4. And therefore that in these circumstances, it is at the very least misleading to the policy community, to continue to hold out the hope that this comprehensive “climate-modelling” may yet emerge and will be accomplished in any meaningful time-frame in any useful way, when there is an even likelihood that it will not. b. UKMO’s [Julia Slingo’s] reply to Martin Caton’s question is meaningless: “Yes, it is absolutely untrue. To say that we don’t include them is absolutely wrong.” Her reply: 1. Avoids again the UKMO’s own admission of the omitted feedback effects. 2. Restates what UKMO did with coupled-carbon feedbacks, but again with no reference to having turned what was a positive feedback into a negative feedback between IPCC AR4 [2007] and UK Climate Act [2008]! 3. Confirms that UKMO has now put this package as stated above into the IPCC AR5 preparations: “We have, as I think has already been made clear for the fifth assessment report, entered the fifth assessment with a full earth system model that includes feedbacks associated with the terrestrial carbon cycle. It includes dynamic vegetation, so this is the long-term changes in forests and shrub land and so on, ocean bio-geochemistry and interactive atmospheric chemistry.” To which she conspicuously adds: “we have probably contributed more model simulations than virtually any other group in the world, so we take the IPCC process very seriously.” To all this GCI now adds two more obvious points which one would expect were obvious even to the UKMO: 4. Modelling negative feedback into the coupled carbon cycle is only theoretically plausible as long as UKMO’s “climate-modelling” continues to omit all the other larger scale feedback effects [as they have already admitted], and 5. Actually doing this, would probably recognize a degree of increased concentrations and temperature rise that would make it even theoretically implausible for that coupled carbon cycle positive feedback to have been turned into a negative feedback effect as they now have modelled into the coupled carbon-cycle, in the first place.
2. Some further points clarifying the what is the iterative but undisclosed about-face on “coupled-carbon- cycle” modelling performed by the UKMO in a trail that goes through the following sequence: (a) After some years of development through the C4MIP programme led by Betts Cox et al, results of the UKMO/C4MIP work was published in IPCC AR4 [2007] where UKMO’s “coupled-carbon- cycling” showed that concentrations would be significantly higher and rising than with “uncoupled- carbon-cycling”. (b) The reverse of this was then made into law in the UKCA [2008] where UKMO’s “coupled-carbon- cycling” showed that concentrations would be significantly lower and falling than with “uncoupled- carbon-cycling” [as was shown in IPCC AR4]. (c) If this was “true” [realistic accurate] it is something to which the UKMO would have been conspicuously drawing attention, as in terms of UNFCC-compliance [achieving safe and stable atmospheric concentrations of GHG] it was “good news” in the sense that “the problem was not as bad as we thought”. (d) However, when the matter was then addressed by UKMO in the EAC Enquiry [2009] and on this very point, Jason Lowe reported that concentrations would be significantly higher and rising than with “uncoupled-carbon-cycling”—see the evidence given. (e) Consequently, in doing this, GCI consider that it is not inaccurate to say that the UKMO were concealing in the EAC Enquiry [2009] this very point [in other words specifically not reporting] the “good news” that concentrations were portrayed in the UK Climate Act as significantly lower and falling than with “uncoupled-carbon-cycling” then http://www.gci.org.uk/images/Volta_Face_ UKMO_.pdf cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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(f) Finally, two years after the Climate Act became law and three months after UKMO/Lowe had given this evidence to the EAC Enquiry 2009, UKMO [Lowe Betts et al] were presenting their work at a conference in Oxford in September 2009. In this presentation UKMO again contradicting the coupled carbon cycle modelling in the UK Climate Act that clearly modelled negative feedback, they presented a truly massive positive feedback effect in the coupled carbon cycle modelling shown [from forest die-back] as this summary graphic unambiguously indicates. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [03-10-2013 11:14] Job: 030809 Unit: PG01
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Mr Richard Betts, a civil servant at the UKMO, seems to have led the UKMO’s whole programme on coupled carbon cycle modelling through C4MIP to the results published in IPCC AR4 [2007]. When all these example of their work and the dates of its presentation were put to him, he explained the UKMO’s contradictions away publicly [and on a well-known “climate-contrarian website”— Bishop’s Hill] in the following manner. For simply pointing out these discrepancies, omissions and contradictions in the UKMO’s output, this civil servant mounted the UKMO’s defence of it all by stating there simply that GCI: [a] was a “well-known alarmist scare-monger”; [b] “did not understand climate-science”; and [c] “failed to recognize that these were all different models” [!]. Moreover, he: [d] refused to recognize any discrepancies in the UKMO performance; [e] and refused to discuss the matter further. (g) All-in-all, the UKMO’s performance in this matter is remarkable. For the contrarians it now all represents evidence of UKMO coming round to their way of thinking. For the record it is evidence of an extraordinary attitude and deterioration in the UKMO’s noticeably unreliable and even erratic performance standards.
3. As a living demonstration of the fact that CH4 release from the already melting permafrost and is combustible, this video from a year or two ago is a striking demonstration of a present reality: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YegdEOSQotE
A statement from Dr Ulrich Loening about this matter (see separate submission) 4. A statement from Dr Mayer Hillman about this matter (see separate submission) Others have been asked for their views and in due course I expect there to be more statements. 10 July 2013
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