62-3996
EL-KHALIL, AH Yusif, 1933- THE SOCIALIST PARTIES IN SYRIA AND LEBANON.
The American University, Ph.D., 1962 Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Copyright by
Ali Yusif El-Khalil
1962
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE SOCIALIST PARTIES IN SYRIA- AND LEBANON
by
Ali Yusif El-Khalil
Submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School
o f The American U niversity
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
In tern a tio n a l R elation s and Organization
Signaturess ofof^Committeq Committee; >.
Chairman
Graduate Dean: eys.
A . J i s Z ' i
Date: AMERICAN UNIVERSITY March 1962 \ • P ' » '•
MAY 1 1 1962 The American U niversity Washington, D. C. WASHINGTON, a a THE 3 \S Ig'oij-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. . . PREFACE
The purpose of this inquiry is to study the two socialist parties
in Syria and Lebanon, The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party (the Ba'th)
and the Progressive Socialist Party (the P.S.P.), to examine their
programs and accomplishments, determine their place in the Arab
socialist movement, and ascertain the distinguishing features of that
movement as w ell as the ro le i t p la y s.
A brief sketch of the historical background of and political condi
tions in Syria and Lebanon, the basic characteristics of their economy,
and the structural pattern of their society reveal the need for the
social and economic reforms manifested by the socialist parties under
study. Supplementing this background are a short survey of the contri
butions of the Islamic teachings and movements to Arab political thought
and a brief discussion of the reformist movements which acted as a
connecting link between social and socialist reforms. Together, they
lay the foundation upon which pur study is based.
The body of this work is devoted to the history, achievements,
structure, programs, and principles of the two parties with emphasis on
their ideological doctrines. A critical analysis of their teachings
shows that both parties advocate_a moderate kind of socialism but that
their programs are not exclusively socialist. They also embrace freedom
and democracy, embody nationalist aspirations, and champion the liberal
movements in th e ir area.
Arab socialism is still a vague concept. Its. objectives' have
not been elucidated, and its importance has not been fully realized. It
i i
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is the intention of this dissertation to cast more light on the Arab
socialist movement by clarifying its objectives, revealing its important
role, and disclosing its potential power.
Arab forms of socialism were created in response to the need for
social and economic reforms in Arab society and have distinguishing
features that differentiate them from communism, Western socialism, and
other socialist movements.
The Arab s o c ia lis t movement follow s a p o lic y of p o s itiv e neutralism
and nonalignment with either of the two power blocs in order to achieve
an ideological mean between democratic capitalism and authoritarian
communism and, as a practical policy, to lessen the tensions of the cold
war. It is one of the major movements in the struggle to end Western
imperialism in the Arab world and, at the same time, it is a powerful and
effective force against communist infiltration into the area.
As a popular movement, the Arab s o c ia lis t movement in i t s
organized form is mainly represented by the Ba'th party, the most wide
spread Arab socialist party and the only one having branches throughout
the Arab world.
In order to achieve a fuller understanding of the revolutionary
spirit that pervades the Arab world and of its ideological components--
n ationalism , so cia lism , and humanism—and to comprehend i t s p o te n tia l
power and speculate on its prospects for success, one has to understand
and analyze its machinery which is represented by the organized popular
movements in the Arab world spearheaded by the s o c ia lis t p a rties in
Syria and Lebanon. This work is intended to be a study to that effect
and a con trib ution in that d ir e c tio n .
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The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable help rendered him
by the chairman of his advisory committee, Dr. Abdul Aziz Said, and to
express his appreciation to the other members of the committee, Dr. Vi.
Wendell C leland, Dr; Edgar S. Robinson, Dr. Kerim Key and Dr. Charles
0. Lerche, for their indispensable advice and guidance. Others to
whom gratitude is due are those Ba’th and P.S.P. leaders and members
who made it possible for the author to obtain party documents and other
primary sources, and Miss Mary Betschler who read the first draft of the
manuscript and offered some useful suggestions. The author is also in
debted to the staffs of the Near East Section of the Library of Congress,
the Middle East Institute Library, and the American Friends of the Middle
East Library for their kind cooperation and assistance.
The opinions expressed in this study are solely those of the
author and do not reflect the views of the members of Ms advisory
committee.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER. _ PAGE
I . POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AMD SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN SYRIA AND
LEBANON ...... 1
Physical and Historical Features ...... 1
From Mandate Through Independence ...... 7
Economic Conditions ...... 18
Social Conditions ...... 31
I I . ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB SOCIALIST PARTIES...... U3
Socialist Tendencies in Islam ...... h8
Arab Reformist Schools of Thought 38
Arab S o c ia lis t Movements ...... 63
I I I . THE ARAN RESURRECTION SOCIALIST PARTY: IDEOLOGY AND_
STRUCTURE...... 76
Ideology ...... 77
The Ba'th Concept of Arab Nationalism ...... 77
The Concept of Unity ...... 80
The Concept of Liberty ...... 83
Ba'th Socialism ...... 86
The Concept of Revolution ...... 93
Secularism ...... 98
Positive Neutralism ...... 101
The Concept of Eternal M ission ...... 103
Structure ...... " 106
Membership ...... 106
Leadership ...... 107
v
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CHAPTER PAGE
Organization ...... 112
IV. THE ARAB RESURRECTION SOCIALIST PARTY: HISTOJiY AND ACHIEVE
MENTS 115
Early History (19hO-19U9) ...... 116
The Period of Military Dictatorships (±9k9-195k) 120
Attainment of Power and Achievement of Principles (195U-
1 9 5 9 ) ...... • • • 12U
The Ireak With N asser ...... 138
V. THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY...... lU9
I d e o l o g y ...... lli9
Progressive Socialism ...... Ili9
Foreign Policy ...... 158
Nationalism ...... 160
Structure ...’...... 160
M em b ersh ip ...... 160
L e a d e r s h ip ...... l o l
Organization ...... I 6h
History and Achievements ...... 165
Historical Background ...... 165
From the 1952 Coup d'Etat to the 1958 Revolution .... 168
The Aftermath ...... 175
VI. THE ARAB SOCIALIST MOVEMENT: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST .... 178
Communism and Arab S ocialism ...... 173
Ideological Differences ...... 178
Political wi(Terences ...... 185
Arab Socialism and V.estern Socialist Movements ...... 200
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CHAPTER PAGE
Arab Socialism and Asian Socialism ...... 203
V II. ANALYSIS AITD CONCLUSIONS ...... 208
Ea'th and P .S .P . Socialism : Haiure and S c o p e ...... 210
Critical Assessment . « ...... 216
Ideological Contrast: The Ea'th Vs. the P.S.P ...... 220
R oles and P r o s p e c ts ...... 22ii
POSTSCRIPT...... 232
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 239
APPENDIX A: THE C RSTITUTIOL OF THE ARAB RESoERECTION SOCIALIST
PARTY...... 260
APPENDIX B: THE PROGRAM OR TIL, PB.0(2t255IVE SOCIALIST PARTY .... 268
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
I . N ational Income D istrib u tio n in Syria and Lebanon ...... 26
II. Distribution of Religious Sects in Syria ...... 37
III. Distribution of Religious Sects in Lebanon „ ...... 38
IV. Syrian Land Reform ...... 138
\
v i i i
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC Aim SOCIAL CONDITIONS
IN SYRIA AND LEBANON
I . PHYSICAL AND HISTORICAL FEATURES
Syria and Lebanon occupy an area lying between the eastern coast
of the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Desert. Falling at the cross
roads of three continents, the area has acted as an intermediary between
V/3st and East throughout its history.^" Syria adjoins Iraq on the east,
Jordan on the south, Israel on the southwest, Lebanon and the Mediterranean
Sea on the w est, and Turkey on the north. Lebanon i s bounded on th e
north and east by Syria, on the south by Israel, and on the west by the
Mediterranean Sea.
Climatically, the Mediterranean rhythm of dry, hot summers and
rainy winters, with two intermediary seasons, prevails; structurally,
mountains, consisting of enormous upfolds of rocks, run parallel to the
narrow coastal strip on the west and the plains of the interior in the
sou th east.
Syria covers an area of about 72,000 square miles and has a popu-
lation numbering more than four and one-half million. Its population
was estimated at U,656,686 in 1959. More than one-third of the
-*• W.3. Fisher, The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional G eography,'3d. ed. (London! Methuen & Co., Ltd;"New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1956), p. 375.
2 U.A.R. Ministry of Planning, Statistical Abstract 1959, Twelfth Yearbook prepared by the Directorate of Statistics of the U.A.R. Syrian Region (Damascus: Government Press, i960), p. 22.
1
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country's land consists of mountains and deserts, and around an addi-
tioi al 30 per cent is pasture land. The cultivable area of about 2l|,000
square miles makes up slightly more than one-third of the total area.
Of this, only about 10,000 square miles is actually under cultivation.'5
The State of Lebanon has an area of U,0l5 square miles with more
than one and one-half million inhabitants. The latest population census
was taken in 1932, but, according to the estimate of the monthly bulletin
published by the Statistical Office of the United Nations, the population
of Lebanon was about 1,550,000 in 1958J* Just over one-half of the
country's area c o n sists o f mountains, d esert or swampland, and about 7
per cent of forests. Approximately 23 per cent of the area is under d cultivation but an additional 17 percent, given suitable conditions,
could be cultivable.
The Levant^ has experienced successive waves of Semitic
3 Europa Publications, Ltd., The Middle East; 1961, Eighth Edition (London: Etiropa Publications, Ltd., 1951), p. 1 i25*
k Ibid., p. 22iu
^ Ibid-, P. 221.
^ The term "Levant" refers to the 'states of Syria and Lebanon. It is derived from the French verb lever meaning to rise. Since the sun rises from the east, this termy alluding to the east, referred to the easuern Mediterranean, that is to the Syrian coast. It referred, thus, to geographic Syria stretching from the Arabian desert on the east to the Mediterranean Sea on the west, and from Sinai Peninsula on the south to the Taurus Mountains on the north. This area included Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon. After World War I, and with the introduction of the mandate system, the French called their m andatesp'Syria and Lebanon, "Les E tats du Levant," the Levant s ta te s . Since that time, the term "Levant" has referred to the two states of Syria and Lebanon.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. immigration from the dawn of civilization. Groups of people known as
Semites came, presumably from Arabia, in continuous migrations starting 7 in the beginning of the third millenium B.C. Amorites, the first major
Semitic group to settle in the area, probably roamed northward from O Afabia about 25>00 B.C. Canaanites, Phoenicians, and nomadic tribes
from the Arabian Peninsula infiltrated the area during the same period.
They were followed by Aramaeans and Hebrews in the second millenium B.C.
3efore Roman domination in the first century B.C., Egyptians, Babylonians,
Hittite's, Assyrians, Persians and Macedonian Greeks had a ll annexed the
area in turn and left their mark in one way or another. From the con
quest of Alexander around 331 B.C. until the battle of Yarmouk in 636
A.D. when the Arabs defeated the Byzantines, Greeks, Romans and Byzan
tines occupied the area.
— As the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the region
occupies a unique place in the annals of civilization. Along with its
religious contributions, it has conveyed the Arab cultural heritage.
Arabization and Islamization have been interconnected and
parallel at one time or another but have never been identical. Arab
tribes penetrated the Syrian coast for centuries before the rise of q Islam.-7 During that period, the area witnessed the rise and decline
7 George Haddad, F ifty Years o f Modern Syria and Lebanon (Beirut: Dar al-Hayat, 193o), p. 20.
® Philip K. H itti, Syria: A Short History (New York: The Macmillan Company, 195>9), p* 32. o George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: G.P Putnam’ s Sons, 19lj6), p. 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of three Arab states on its periphery: the Palmyrene in the north,
the Nabataean in the south, and the Ghassanid between."*-®- Follow ing
the Arab-Islamic conquests in the seventh century A.D., both Arabiza
tion and Islamization were firmly established.
The area was under Ottoman rule from l£ l6 until 1918. Being
mainly concerned with the collection of taxes and the maintenance of
order within their empire, the Ottomans depended upon local dynasties
and feudal lords to help them exercise their rule. This system made it
possible for local dynasties to enjoy some degree of autonomy, and thus, '
retain some power and continue the observance of customary law.
The most important of the local dynasties were the Ma'n dynasty,
which governed Lebanon throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
and the Shihabi dynasty in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Amir Fakhir al-Din al-Ma'ni, during the course of his ascendancy (lf>86-
1835), extended his control beyond Lebanon, reinforced the local
autonomy of the territories under his influence, and even attempted,
with the help of some European rulers, to overthrow the Sultan's
suzerainty. Amir Bashir al-Shihabi preserved this autonomy and
strengthened it during his domination (1789-I8U0).
After the disturbances of i 860 between the Druzes and the
Maronites in Mount Lebanon, Napoleon III sent an expedition, end as a
result of an agreement between the Great Powers, Lebanon became an
autonomous province with a Christian majority and a Christian
10 Hitti, 0 £. cit.j p. 375.
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governor*'1"1' The European powers, with the agreement of the Ottoman
Empire, drew up a sta tu te d efin in g th e autonomy o f Lebanon headed by a
Christian Mutasarrif (governor), with France virtually, designated as
protector of Latin Christianity in the Levant. This was not the first
association between the Levant and the French, however. France had
earlier been granted some privileges in the area when she became the
first state to obtain capitulations from the Ottoman Empire and to
establish consulates and trading outposts in Syria through a treaty con
cluded between Francis I and Sultan Suleiman I in 1535.
This was a treaty of friendship and collaboration . . . in which the French were granted many far-reaching rights and privileges. These privileges, called Capitulations . . ., extended to the French freedom of trade and navigation in Ottoman ports.~2
Capitulation privileges were renewed by the treaty of 17U0 and confirmed
by an agreement between Napoleon and the Sultan in 1802.
France furthered her interests and strengthened her ties of
friendship in the Levant by supporting the rule of Muhammad Ali and his
son, Ibrahim, over Syria in the 1830’s; by intervening in favor of the
Christians in Lebanon in i860; and by establishing missions and educa
tional institutions, such as the Jesuit University of Beirut, which
helped to introduce French cultural influence in the area. Thus, France
considered herself the rightful heir to and trustee of the Levant when
The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey, 3rd edition (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1958), p. U56.
12 George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World A ffa ir s, 2nd edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 5#
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1 ^ the p a r titio n in g o f th e Ottoman Empire became imminent. J
B eirut and Damascus were the centers o f the i n i t i a l organized
efforts to establish Arab nationalist secret societies. The first of
these societies was formed in Beirut in 1875. Other societies created
early in the twentieth oentury were al-Ilcha al-Arabi al'Uthmani (The
Ottoman Arab Fraternity), al-Qahtaniyah (derived from Qahtan, the name
of one of the legendary ancestors of the A r a b s),al-Muntada al-Arabi
(th e L iterary Arab Club) and Jan^iyat a lIArabiyah al-F a ta t (The Young
Arab Society). These societies, along with other minor ones, ultimately
aimed at lib e r a tin g Arab lands from Ottoman domination and planted the
seeds of the Arab nationalist movement.
During World War I, the Arabs, under the leadership of Sharif
Husayn, revolted against the Turks after being promised independence by
the B ritish in accordance w ith the Husayn-KacMahon Correspondence. They
fought on the side of the British and the French, expecting that the
pledges made to them for granting their independence.and for establishing
a unified Arab state would be fu lfilled .^ Contradictory to that
promise, the Sykes-Picot Agreement concluded on May 16, 1916 divided the
Fertile Crescent between France and Britain; and the Balfour Declaration
of November 2, 1917 promised the Jews a national home in Palestine.
Pence, the Peace Conference held in Paris in 1919 replaced Ottoman
13 Ibid., p. 267.
Antonius, op. cit., p. 110.
1*5 J Nabih Ameen Faris and Mohammed Tawfiq Husayn,The Crescent in Crisis (Lawrence: Universit3'- of Kansas Press, 1955), p. 88.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. occupation with French domination of Syria and Lebanon that lasted for
twenty-five years.
I I . FROM MANDATE THROUGH INDEPENDENCE
The French mandate over Syria and Lebanon was introduced on
April 28, 1920 at the San Remo meeting; its instrument was drawn up at
the London Conference on June 2k, 1922; and i t s p r in c ip le and machinery
were legalized and adopted in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations in September 1923. The mandate gave France control over
foreign relations, economic policy, the judiciary system, social welfare,
education and other fields. In other words, the mandatory power was in
complete domination over the two countries. Since France had a special
interest in the Levant, her policy during the mandatory period was
directed toward two ends:
Firstly, to opposing and weakening the growing tide of Arab nationalism, with its claim for independence; and secondly, to strengthening the traditionally or potentially Francophil elem ents, the C h ristian s, A law is, Kurds and other m in o r itie s, and position of Lebanon vis a vis the
The modern s ta te o f Lebanon was created in 1920 when the French
added the cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Saida, Tyre, Ba’albeck and the
surrounding areas to Mount Lebanon, forming the state of Greater Lebanon.
The constitution of the new state, promulgated in 1926, was suspended in
1932 and amended and repromulgated in 1937. Syria remained without a
^ A.H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 19U6), p. 167.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. constitution until 1930 when the High Commissioner suspended the draft
constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly elected in 1928, and
issued a new constitution; for the draft submitted by the Constituent
Assembly had given more powers to the Syrian government in foreign as
well as in judicial affairs, and it stated that Syria, Lebanon, Pales
tine and Transjordan formed a political unity. Constitutionally,
neither Syria nor Lebanon was a sovereign state. Their constitutions
gave France control over foreign affairs, public security and military
m atters.
The disorders that occurred in Syria early in 1936 and the
sympathy which the new Popular Front Government in France showed toward
Syrian aspirations led to the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian Treaty in
September 1936. "The basis for the agreement of March 1, 1936 was the
recognition of Syrian independence and unity in a treaty.This
treaty provided for the independence of Syria within a period of three
years, reserved for France some economic and military rights in the
country, and allowed the annexation of the districts of Latakia and
Jebel al-Druze to Syria. The Franco-Syrian treaty differed slightly
from the Franco-Lebanese treaty negotiated during the same year in that
the latter gave France more military privileges. However, the question
of Palestine, the crisis with Turkey over the Sanjak of Alexandretta,
the growth of the separatist movements in the provinces of Latakia,
Jazirah and Jebel al-Druze, in addition to French criticism of and
^ Haddad, op. c i t . , p . 83.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. internal opposition to the two treaties, induced the French to refuse
to ratify these treaties in 1938.
In 1939, the French, hoping to appease Turkey and win her support
in the face of German and Italian threats, annexed Alexandretta, a part
of Syria with a Turkish minority, to Turkey after giving it a separate
autonomous status and calling it Hatay. There was no legal or moral
justification for this action. "With considerable justification and
legality they ,/the SyriansJ declared that the terms of the mandate for- 1R bade France from any such action."
With the outbreak of war in 1939 the High Commissioner suspended
the constitution and dismissed the Cabinet and Parliament in Lebanon^
and he arrested some leaders and dissolved political organizations in
Syria. After a period of disturbances and unrest in Syria, the date for
the end of the mandate was officially announced "by the Proclamation 19 made by the Free French, and guaranteed by the British on 8 June 19Ul."
The French recognized the sovereignty and independence of Syria in
September 19h l, and of Lebanon in November o f th e same year. The two
states became two independent republics having a cabinet form of govern
ment with the President of the Republic as the head of the executive
branch and the legislative power exercised by one house, the Chamber of
D eputies.
Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: A lfred A. Knop'f, 1959), p . Ul&.
Stephen Hems le y lon grigg, Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 317.
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The 19U3 elections resulted in nationalist domination in both
states. The Lebanese government came into conflict with French autho
rities in the fall of that year when it tried to amend the Lebanese
constitution by abolishing mandatory powers and confirming the indepen
dence of the state. This resulted in the arrest of the President of the
Republic and some cabinet members, the suspension of the constitution,
and the appointment of Emile Edde as head of the state on November 11,
19U3. These events, in turn, launched the Lebanese revolt which con- .
eluded in r esto ra tio n o f the le g a l government on November 22, 19U3 and
reco g n itio n o f the c o n stitu tio n as. amended.
In 19HH* the French claimed that, legally, the mandate was still
in effect and that it should be terminated by concluding a treaty. The
Levant states denied "the French assertions that the mandate was s till
in force, that it could only be extinguished after the conclusion of
treaties and that the declarations of independence had been conditioned 20 on such treaties."
Follow ing th e r io ts th a t led to the s h e llin g o f Damascus on May
29, 19h5f French troops evacuated Syria in Apri}. 19h6 and Lebanon in
December 19^6, which action brought about the fu ll independence of the
two countries. Their struggle for independence had been assisted by
the formation of the League of Arab States on March 22, 19hS and the
United Nations O rganization on June 26, 19U5>. S yria and Lebanon were
among the o r ig in a l members o f both o rgan ization s.
20 Eugenie E lie Abouchedid, T hirty Years o f Lebanon and Syria (1917-19^7) (Beirut: The Sader-Rihani Printing Co., 19U8), Part III, p . 3*
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Upon arriving at independence, Syria faced several internal and
external problems which caused political instability and led to a
series of coup d’etats. The Arab-Israeli war in Palestine (19U8-H9),
the revival of the Greater Syria and the Fertile Crescent schemes, the
deterioration of economic conditions and instability of the currency
because it was tied to the French franc which was then in the process
of devaluation, combined with internal corruption and personal ambition,
resulted in a coup d’etat by a group of army officers, headed by Colonel
Husni a l-Z a ’im, on March 30, 19U9.
Al-Za’im’s regime lasted only nineteen and a half weeks during
which he failed to carry out his promised reforms or fu lfill his pro
claimed intentions. "The show of discipline and power which had first
drawn the people to him slow ly degenerated in to love o f pomp and 21 personal aggrandizement." Another coup d’etat, engineered by Colonel
Sami al-IIinnawi, ended al-Za’im’s regime on August lU, 19h9.
Hinnawi’s regime adopted the Fertile Crescent scheme and favored
union with Iraq. Al-Kutlah al-Jumhuriyah (The Republican Bloc), estab
lished to fight this scheme, was supported by Adib al-Shishakli, chief
of staff of the army at that time. A third coup d’etat, organized by
Colonel Shishakli, brought down the Hinnawi regime on December 9, 1 9h9»
Although Shishakli was elected President of the Republic after
introducing his new constitution, which provided for a presidential
form of government, in July 1953, he had, in fact, held power since
^ A lford C arleton, "The Syrian Coups d ’Etat o f 19U9," The Middle East Journal, Vol. U, No. 1 (January, 1950), p. 9*
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December 19^9. Conditions improved very little under his regime, and
political and economic instability continued. The last economic link
with Lebanon was severed with the rupture of the common customs union
between the two neighboring countries in March 1950. The Chamber of
Deputies was dissolved on December 3, 1951, and m ilitary dictatorship
was established. The following year, “All political parties were
abolished . . . by Shishakli, who proceeded to form his own Arab Libera
tion Movement (Harakat al-Tahryr al-Arabi) as a means of organizing a 22 political following." Members of the former political parties, with
the exception of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, boycotted the
elections held in October 1953* The result was a decisive majority for
the Movement o f Arab L ib eration . The f o li c - ... ng month, 1 )|3 p o lit ic a l
leaders met at Damascus and formed the National Opposition Front which
aimed at saving the country from the Shishakli autocracy and restoring
democratic life . That purpose was fulfilled in February 195U following
the occurrence of political disturbances, strikes and demonstrations,
the imprisonment of twelve opposition leaders, and uprisings in Jabal
al-D ruze.
—— Subsequent to Shishakli's downfall, democratic life resumed. The
1950 constitution replaced the Shishakli constitution, and Hashim
al-Atasi was restored as president. In August 1955, the Chamber of
Deputies elected Shukri al-Quwatli President of the Republic. Al-Quwatli,
22 J.C. Hurewitz and Don Peretz, "Political Dynamics," The Republic of Syria, Raphael Patai, editor (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1956), Vol. 2, p. 683.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. who had left Syria for Egypt during al-Za'im's regime, returned to
accept his new position on September 6, 1955. After five years of
military dictatorship, Syria returned to civilian rule and constitu
tional authority was resumed.
From the time that democracy and constitutional law were restored
in 195H until the establishment of the United Arab Republic in February
1958, the liberal and nationalist elements controlled power in Syria:
But just as in the elections held under the French Mandate a minority of "extreme nationalists0 had often been able to dominate a Chamber composed of mainly disorganized moderates, so now the political tone was set by . . . the Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'th) Party **3
During that period Syria pursued a policy directed toward Arab
unity and liberation. On the international level, she followed a
policy of nonalignment and positive neutralism, and she rejected
foreign pacts. Syria attacked the Baghdad Pact formed in February 1955,
and entered a military pact with Egypt that same year and with Jordan
in 1956, at which time she also started buying arms from the Communist
Bloc. After the Suez crisis and the tripartite (British, French, and
Israeli) aggression on Egypt in the fall of 1956, Syria exploded the
Iraqi Petroleum Company’s pipe lines and severed diplomatic relations
with Britain and France. The Eisenhower Doctrine, introduced early in
1957, was rejected by Syria; and Mr. Richards, President Eisenhower's
messenger who was sent to the Middle East to explain the Doctrine, did
not v isit Damascus.
George Kirk, Contemporary Arab P olitics: A Concise History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 196l), p. 91.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. For two years Syria and Egypt had been considering the possibility
of unity between the two states, a step that was accomplished on
February 1, 193>8. "Thus, the first union in modern times between
formerly independent Arab States was born."^ President Jamal Abdul
Nasser headed the United Arab Republic assisted by four vice presidents.
The two vice presidents who came from Syria were Sabri Al-Asali (the
Prime Minister of Syria when unity occurred) and Akrara al-Hurani, one
of the leaders of the Arab Resurrection Socialist (Ba'th) Party which
had played a major role in bringing about unity. However, an army coup
took place on September 28, 1961 that led to the separation of Egypt
and Syria for reasons that w ill be fully explained in Chapter TV.
Since the attainment.of independence, Lebanon's policy has revolved
around the National Pact, a formula devised in 191:3 to establish a
working relationship between Christians and Muslims on the one hand and
between Lebanon and the rest of the Arab states on the other. Describ
ing this traditional policy, Philip Hitti said: •
With its neighbors two cardinal factors have conditioned its (Lebanon's) relationship, its Arabic language and large Muslim population which have made it gravitate into the Arab states' orbit, and its Western orientation and preponderant Christian element which dictated a cautious course that would retain the country's in d iv id u a lity and avoid the p o s s ib ilit y o f submer gence. ^
The National Pact presented by the Cabinet to the Chamber on
October 7, 19U3> stated:
^ Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab U nity: Hope and F u lfillm e n t (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 195$), p. 181.
^ Philip H itti, Lebanon in History (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1937), pp. h97-lt98.
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Lebanon is more needful of . . . international cooperation than any other country. Its geographical situation, its language, culture, history, and economic position impose upon it the duty of occupying itself, above all, with the question of its rela tions with the rest of the Arab world. The Government w ill establish these relations on solid bases which w ill ensure the respect by the different Arab states of Lebanon's independence, its full sovereignty, and the integrity of its present frontiers.
Lebanon is a country of Arab character which nevertheless seeks to profit by the best that Western civilization can give. Our brothers in the rest of the Arab world wish us everything that we wish ourselves. We do not wish Lebanon to be a foreign exploitation ground, and they do not want it to be a passage for imperialist conquerors. They, therefore, agree with us in wishing Lebanon to be a dignified, independent, sovereign and free country.2°
This pact, devised to meet certain conditions during a specific period
of tim e, has become ob so lete and unworkable due to changes in tim e and
circumstances and the growing consciousness of Arab awakening.
From May I 9I48 u n til March 19U9, Lebanon was engaged in the
Palestine war. In June 19h9, an armod coup d 'e ta t attempted by th e
Syrian Social Nationalist Party was easily suppressed by the govern
ment, and Antun Sa'adah, the party's leader, was executed the following
month.
Internal corruption along with political and economic unrest
brought about the resignation of President Bisharah al-Khuri and the
end of'his regime in September 1952 following a coup d'etat that was
not "the work o f an organized party but o f an im provised conglomerate
J.C. Hurewitz and Don P eretz, " P o litic a l Dynamics," The Republic of Lebanon, Raphael Patai, editor (New Haven: Human Rela tions Area Files, Inc., 1956), p. 568.
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which disintegrated as soon as the goal was r e a c h e d ."27 The f i r s t nine
years of independence under Bishar-ah al-Khuri and Riyad al-Suluh, who
fashioned the National Pact and signed it, had reduced the pact to,
. . . an agreement for the division of political patronage among their respective followings} created new iqta barons and strength ened older ones . . ., ramified the already existing confessionalism by making it a vested interest} enriched their entourage at the expense of the state} and suppressed whatever free press the country had and p r o stitu te d the r e s t . 28
Following the downfall of Bisharah al-Khuri, Kamil Sham'un, one
of the opposition leaders and a member of the National Socialist Front,
was elected President of the Republic. He played an important role in
provoking the civil war that erupted in 1958 prior to the expiration of
his term of office in September of that year. The foreign policies of
the government, its relations with the United Arab Republic and, to a
lesser extent, the attempts of Sham'un's supporters to amend the consti
tu tio n to allow Sham'un to run for a second term were the main causes
for the outbreak of violence in the country. Added to these causes
was the existence of "a deep rift which . . . was in many ways a
legacy of past years, when the Turks taught the Muslims to hate
Christians and the French taught the Christians both to fear and to
hate the Muslims."29 It is significant to point out, however, that
^C-eorge B ritt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution," The Middle E a st Journal., V ol. 7, No. 1 .(Winter, 1?53J, p. It. ------
28habih Min Faris,. "Report on Lebanon," The Middle East Report 1939, William Sands, editor (Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institu te, 19^9), P. 12.
29Emile Bustani, March A rabesaue (London: R o b ert Hale Limited, l ° 6l ) , p. 80. -
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personal matters and selfish motives on the part of certain leaders
from both groups had stirred up the civ il war which revolved mainly 10 around personalities.
After the Suez crisis and the tripartite aggression on;Egypt in
the fa ll of 1956, Lebanon announced its support for Egypt, but Sham’un
refused to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and France—a
course o f a ctio n which most Arab sta te s follow ed and which Arab
n a tio n a lis ts in Lebanon requested th e ir government to adopt. The gap
between the government and the opposition widened with the introduction
of the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957. President Eisenhower, in
his special message to Congress on January 5, 1957 declared that the
United States must make more evident "its willingness to support the
sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle
East against the predatory desires of 'international communism' i.e .,
the Soviet Union.The Lebanese government accepted this doctrine
under which Lebanon was to receive economic and military aid from the
United States in the amount of approximately $15 million during 1958.
This move on the part of the Lebanese government constituted a departure
from a cardinal principle in Lebanese foreign policy, namely, that
Lebanon cannot afford to take the side of a Western power against the
majority of the Arab states. Arab nationalists protested against the
Malcolm H. Kerr, "Lebanese Views on the 1958 Crisis," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring, 1961), 'p* 211.
John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 122.
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government’s pro-western policy and requested closer cooperation with
Syria and Egypt. The serious disturbances that ensued led to the
interference of the United Nations and the landing of the U.S. Marines
in July 1958 at the request of President Sham’un whose government had
not, even before the conflict, represented the views of a large portion
of the Lebanese public. William Yale speculates, “It is a puzzling
international question as to whether the United Nations should support
a government about which there may be some doubt as to whether it op represents the majority of its citizens.The revolution began to
calm down when the Chamber of Deputies, on July 31, 1958, elected
General Fuad Shihab, then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to serve as
President of the Republic. President Shihab succeeded Sham’un and has
been holding office since September 23, 1958. •
This brief political history of Syria and Lebanon, describing the
framework within which the two parties under study have operated, illu s
tr a te s the fa c t th at Arab nationalism i s more firm ly esta b lish ed in
Syria than in Lebanon—a difference that is reflected in the programs
and principles of the parties as well as in their functions and achieve
ments.
I I I . ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Socialism finds conditions conducive to its emergence and growth
in an economy that is mainly agricultural, relatively underdeveloped,
W illiam Y ale, The Near E ast; A Modern H istory (Ann Arbor; The University of Michigan Press, 1958),"p. Ii59.
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and industrially weak; and in a society where there exists an inequit
able distribution of wealth, with a few feudal landlords and business
men controlling the wealth of the community and many landless peasants
and needy people suffering from poverty and disease. These conditions
prevail in both Syria and Lebanon.
The Syrian economy is predominantly agricultural. More than 1*0
per cent of the national income is derived from agricultural products,
and about “three-fourths of the labor force depend upon agriculture for
their livelihood. 1,33 Wheat, barley and cotton are the major agricultural
p roducts.
Agricultural production was stimulated by food shortages during
and after World War II. The cultivated area* grew from 1.75 million to
2.3 million hectares over the period 1938-191*5, doubled during the
period 191*5-1957, and has continued to increase.^ The latest official
estimate of the total cultivated land in Syria, made in 1959, was
5,1*91,000 hectares.
The economic development program initiated by the UAR in i 960
aimed at doubling the national income over a ten-year period, thus
raising the average national income in Syria to LS 1*800 million upon
fulfillment of two five-year plans. Agriculture, being the backbone of
the Syrian economy, is the major sector of that development program.
33 Food and Agriculture Organization, FAQ Mediterranean Develop ment Project (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1959), p. 133.
3,4 Ib id .
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The orientation of investments is towards . . . agricuituralization in the case of Syria . . . a study of the sectorial distribution of investments in the two regions would reveal that 60% o f t o t a l investments in Syria is allocated to increase its agricultural potential and allied activities.35
The UAR Ministry of Planning estimated that agricultural income, which
was LS 728 m illion in 19^9, would rise to LS 1^275 million at the end
of the first five-year plan in 1963.3^
While th e economy o f Lebanon i s based predominantly on trade and
services, agriculture is an important s ector of that economy. Its sig
nificance is not attributed to the percentage of the national income
generated by the agricultural sector of the economy, but rather to the
number of people who depend upon agriculture as their main source of
income, and upon the large portion of the export item that agricul
tural products constitute. Although agriculture contributes less than
one-fifth of the national income, "at least between U0 and 30 percent
of the population depends on it as the main source of their livelihood
. . . and over 60 percent of total exports consist of agricultural
products."37
Future agricultural expansion is limited, due to the fact that
advanced techniques and methods have already improved soil and crops and
intensified cultivation to such an extent that only land of a marginal
nature remains uncultivated. Because it is scarce, oultivated land
Mohammad Diab, "The Economic System o f th e UAR: Where i s I t Going?" Middle East Forum, V ol. 37, No. 6 ( Ju ne,1961) , p. 19.
36 UAR Ministry of Planning, ojo. cit. , p. 21.
37 Food and Agriculture Organization, o£. cit. , p. iHl.
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averages about 0.2 hectares per person, only about one-sixth of the
average land holding in Syria.
In Lebanon and Syria, where more than half of the population
depend on the land for their livelihood, the existing economic, social
and p o lit ic a l stru ctu re i s based on the land tenure system . Under th is
system, complex ca teg o r ies -of lands based on Islam ic and Ottoman laws
are preserved, and certain backward practices are s till observed such as,
. . . the share of land-tenancy, the semi-collective ownership of the land of a village by its inhabitants, known as masha1, frag mentary land-holdings, the common charity and religious waqf institution, known as waqf khayri; and the descendants’ waqf, known as waqf dhurij
Share tenancy is among the most prevalent practices, being
e s p e c ia lly common in southern Lebanon and the Buka' D is tr ic t. The
landlord rents his land to the tenant in return for a certain percen
tage of the gross produce. Although tenancy is usually on yearly terms,
. . . the tenant has no definite lease on the land and is subject to eviction by the landlord at w ill. The insecurity of tenure tinder this system qnd the fact that the rent is paid as a fixed share of the produce, discourage the tenant from fertilizing the land or undertaking any long-term improvements, and make him more like a miner than a farmer. Socially the system destroys the in it ia t iv e and am bition of th e tenant and makes him almost a serf of his landlord.39
The land tenure system i s condemned not only on economic grounds,
but on social and political grounds as well. "By creating a class of
landless tenants working in more or less serflike conditions . . . it
38 Said Hiiaadah, "The Economic Set-up in the Arab Middle E ast," United Asia, Vol. 5, No. 9 (1953), p. 288.
39 ib id .
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constitutes a most serious problem which conditions the whole social and
political life of the region,"^0 The backwardness of this system,
characterized by the inequality of land ownership, reduces the efficiency
and income of the peasants and increases the misery of the rural popula
tion where disease, poor housing, bad sanitation and illiteracy are
widespread.
The shelcarah practice, which is similar to the work week in
feudal England and the corvee in France, is still resorted to in some
Syrian and, to a lesser extent, Lebanese villages. Under this system, a
tenant is expected to provide free labor for a period of time determined
by the landlord, and dependent upon the size of the landlord’s holdings
and his power, in return for the landlord's protection.
A system wherein the cultivator is owner seems to be the most
desirable solution to the existing tenure problem. F.A.O. and Middle
Eastern experts have agreed that a "family type" holdings system, where
cultivation rights coincide with ownership,
. . . provides security to the farmer, incentives for his productive efforts, status, dignity and it gives the best possible scope for government assistance in credit, extension, social services that are nee ’ ' - ’ ’ ' effective producer and to increase his income
An agrarian reform law, which incorporates these proposals, was promul
gated in Syria in September 1958.
Paul KMat, "Whither Land Tenure in the Arab World?" Middle East Economic Papers 1955 (Beirut: Economic Research Institute; AUB: Dar, al-Kitab, 1955), p. 56.
to F.A.O., Should Land Policy Promote Private Owner Cultivator- ship, Tenancy or Large Estates? (SaLahuddine: Iraq, October, 1955), Report R-l, p. 2.
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Industry in Syria and Lebanon is s till weak. It is handicapped
by inadequate capital, insufficient purchasing power, and too few markets.
The scarcity of raw materials, the shortage of technical and managerial
ability, and dearth of skilled laborers further complicate the problem.
The simple workshop industries existing before the First World
War were far from satisfying the desire for industralization and the
need for greater economic self-sufficiency. This desire was mainly in
stigated by the difficulties agricultural countries had experienced
during the war in their dependence upon industrial countries for imported
manufactured goods.
Two main tendencies can be distinguished in the evolution of
industry after the war, namely: "the gradual disappearance of tradi
tional industries characterized by primitive methods of production, and
the growth of modern factory production."^ The inter-war period wit
nessed moderate development of industry until the 1930's when indus
trial expansion was greatly accelerated, possibly due to a general
tariff rate increase in 1926 followed by the introduction’of certain
protective duties.^3
In the ten years preceding the last world war industry in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine passed into an advanced stage of development. Many old industries previously using primitive
^2 George Hakim, "Industry," Economic O rganization o f S yria, S a 'id Himadah, E ditor (B eirut: The American P ress, 1939), p . 123.
^ Alfred Bonne, State and Economics in the Middle East: A Society in Transition (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Truber, & Co., Ltd., 19HS), p. 291.
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methods and tools, were converted into industries equipped with modern machinery and applying modern methods, such as the cotton spinning and weaving industries; and a variety of new industries were established, such as cement, textiles, and matches,Wt
Since 19k5, industrial development has taken three forms: (l) the
modernization of shops, (2) the expansion of existing industries, and
(3) the introduction of new industries,^
In addition to textiles and food processing, which are the largest
industries in Syria, there are such light industries as building, cement,
sugar, vegetable oil refining, soap, tanning, and glass. About l£ per
cent of the Syrian national income is derived from mining e-.nd manufac
turing, but, with the exception of chromium and asphalt, Syria possesses
no minerals of industrial value.
The government has encouraged industry by following a policy of
assistance and protection. Pressure for an increase in tariff rates to
permit more effective protection of industry brought about the termina
tion of the customs union with Lebanon. After the dissolution of
economic union between the two countries in March 195>0, import duties
were generally increased and in many cases almost doubled,^
Syria's exports are dependent on agricultural products, especially
wheat, barley, and cotton. These three products "account for one-half
^ Himadah, o£. c i t . , p. 289.
^ Longrigg, o£. cit., p. 2?U.
^ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Syria (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, i9^),"p.1o^
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of the country’s export earnings."^ Lebanon remains Syria's main
trading center, purchasing almost a quarter of Syria's exports and
accounting for around 10 per cent of her Import
Textiles, petroleum refining (the Iraq Petroleum Company in
Tripoli and ARAMCO in Saida), cement, food processing, wood products,
clothing and metals are the largest of Lebanon's industries. In addition
to iron and ignite, some deposits of bitumen are found in Lebanon.
Pining and manufacturing provj.de ill per cent of the national income, and
about 15 per cent of the total population depend on industry for their
1,0 livelihood. 7
The major proportion of the Lebanese national income is earned
from trade and services. Since 1950 Beirut has become an international
commercial center.The geographic location of the country has made
Beirut an intercontinental trade center with a free market and a free
zone area, which, in turn, activates trade, international transactions,
entrepot and transit traffic, transport, banking, insurance, and other
services, and the existence of these facilities helps to attract more
to u r is ts .
The following table compares the national income of the two coun
tries for 1958 by showing the percentage that each economic sector con-
^ Food and Agriculture Organization, 0£. cit., p. 133.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, o£. y P* 13.
Food and Agriculture Organisation, o£. cit. , p. i);1.
50 William Persen, "Lebanese Economic Development Since 1950," The Piddle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1958), p. 287.
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tributed to the economy of each country:
TABLE I
NATIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN SYRIA AND LEBANON (Percentage)
Economic Sector Syria Lebanon
Agriculture 32 17
Mining and Manufacturing 15 Hi
Construction k 3
Transportation and Communications 6 h
Trade 15 27
Public Administration and Defense 10 9
A ll oth ers 18 26
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook I960. 12th issue (New York: Statistical Office of the U.N.-Department of Economic and Social Affairs, i 960), pp. 1*62 and i;61j.
The reliability of the data from which estimates of the national
and per capita incomes of Syria and Lebanon have been made is question
able. However, available estimates give some idea of the standard of
livihg in the area.
While the national income of Syria is greater than that of
Lebanon, the per capita income in Lebanon is more than twice that in
Syria. According to the United Nations Statistical Yearbook i960, the
national income of Syria in 1957 was LS 2,285 million (about $61|0
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. m illio n ) and th a t of Lebanon was 503 LL million (about$500 m illio n ).
It can be deduced from these estimates that the per capita income was
about $lijO in Syria and 0310 in Lebanon. Other reliable sources of per
capita income support the validity of these estimates. A study of world
income published by the Center for International Studies of Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in November 1959 estimated the per capita income
in Syria anu Lebanon in 1957 to be $1$2 and 0308 respectively.^ Edmund
As fur calculated that the p.-r capita income in Syria "varied in the last
decade roughly between 0120 and $180, and that it rose in an uneven
fashion between these two limits."^5? R. P. Lebret, Director of IRFED, 53 Ft estimated the per capita income of Lebanon to be about 0300.'' The ICA
estimated the per capita GNP (Gross National Froduct) in Lebanon to be
$391 in 1959 and 0396' in 1960.^
Lebanon and, to a much lesser degree, Syria face an overpopulation
problem. Their population started to increase during the nineteenth
5^- Mikoto Usui and E. E. Hagen, World Income, 1957 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, 1959)> p. 2.
5^ Edmund Asfur, Syria: Development and Monetary Policy (Cambridge Harvard U n iversity P ress, 1959 ), p. lo .
55 Institut International de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Developpment Harmonise.
5k R. p. Lebret, "Le Liban Face a Son Development" (unpublished lecture delivered at Beirut, November 19, I960), p. 8.
55 International Cooperation Administration, "Lebanon's Gross National Product and Per Capita GNP" (unpublished letter from ICA to the Embassy of Lebanon in Washington, D. C., June 9, 1961).
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century after having decreased steadily for several generations. It i 56 reached a level of about two and one-half million in 191U. Due to the
decline in emigration and the improvement in living standards in the
areas of sanitation and medical services, the population has increased
more rapidly since the First World War. At the time of writing, the total
population exceeds six million (more than lj.,5 million in Syria and 1.5
million in Lebanon).
Lebanon has an average of about 387 persons per square mile com
pared with Syria’s average of about 63. The population distribution in
Syria, however, varies considerably, the population density being very
low in the desert and semi-desert areas and fairly high in some parts of
the country like Latakia and the Nusairiyah mountains. While the
average population per square mile is about 16 persons in the low density
areas, it is about 227 in most heavily populated regions. Areas sur
rounding the fertile plains of Huran, Horns, Hamah and Aleppo average 57 about 98 persons per square m ile.'
The concurrent increasing birth rate and declining death rate are
creating a serious economic and social problem, particularly in Lebanon.
The 1959 U.K. Statistical Yearbook estimates the annual rate of popula
tion increase at 3*9 per cent in Syria and 2.8 per cent in Lebanon, a
growth that w ill cause a depression in the already inferior standard of
living if it is not accompanied by the continuous improvement of
^ Hourani, o£. cit., p. 85.
^ Nicola A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 238.
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economic conditions.
In discussing the overpopulation problem in Egypt, Wendell Cleland
concluded that the solution lay along "two lines: (a) to increase steadily
the nation's- resources, and (b) to lim it the number of people."'’® Since
the latter suggestion is the more difficult to implement, the former
o ffe r s the more immediate so lu tio n .
The Syrian economy is basically stronger than that of Lebanon.
Efforts to expand the economy have been concentrated on agriculture as
it is the country's major source of wealth and income. Irrigation pro
jects, diversification of agricultural products and activities, expan
sion of cultivated areas, and improvement in methods of cultivation have
been undertaken. However, industrial development is needed to absorb
the labor supply and raise the standard of living of the increasing
population. Depending mainly on the home market, lacking raw materials,
and being relatively inefficient in its production and distribution,
Syrian industry is still limited. To assist industrial expansion,
selected industries should be established in addition to the existing
ones, and more capital and technical assistance should be invested to
improve efficiency of production and to lower production costs thus pro
viding the product with more markets.
Since the end of World War II, the Lebanese economy has grown
steadily. Goods and services as well as industrial production have been
eg Wendell Cleland, The Population Problem in Egypt: A Study of Population Trends and Conditions in Modern Egypt (Lancaster: Science Press P rin tin g Company, 1 9 3 0 > P» lOWi
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soil and the use of modern farming techniques have augmented agricul
tural production. According to United Nations statistics, during the
period 19E>0-195>6, "the national income of Lebanon rose by more than
3>0 per cent. Every sector of the Lebanese economy experienced commen
surate growth . "59
The principal weakness of the Lebanese economy is its reliance on
trade and services, which are somewhat precarious economic activities,
rather than on agriculture and industry, which are more stable economic
sources. Since agricultural development is limited, industrial develop
ment remains the major hope for developing the Lebanese economy.
With the limited possibilities of agricultural development, and the uncertain—though vitally important—prospects of trade and services in Lebanon, industrial expansion gains a privileged position, both as a possible means of alleviating the population pressure and at the same time in fu sin g the economy w ith a g rea ter element o f s t a b ilit y .
Unlike Syria, -Lebanon does not follow a policy of protecting its
industry by imposing high protective tariffs. The government does not
interfere to control or even to influence economic activity, Lebanese
economic policy is characterized mainly by "a minimum of government
interference in, or control of, economic activity. The Lebanese economy
is as close to the classical laissez-faire model as one can expect in
the modern world.A national policy should be instituted to encourage
59 Persen, o£. cit., p. 277.
Edmund Y. Asfur, "Industrial Development in Lebanon,” Middle East Economic Papers 1955, op. cit. , p. 3.
Food and Agriculture Organization, 0£. c it. , p. 1^2.
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expansion and development of the industrial sector of the Lebanese economy.
For industrialization is the economic destiny of Lebanon.
IV. SOCIAL CONDITIONS
Any discussion of the existing social order in Syria and Lebanon
requires an understanding of the social systems that give rise to conflict
in that order.
Arab culture and Islamic thought had molded a society that remained
essentially unchanged for hundreds of years until it came into contact
with western society in the nineteenth century.
It was a unified civilization, in which every sphere of life was regulated by a system of generally accepted principles, themselves drawn from religion and immemorial custom. This civilization may be called ’’Arab-Islamic", because its main characteristics were derived . . . from two main sources, themselves closely connected with one another: the Islamic religion and the life of the Arabian d esert. 3
Islam gave that society its moral code and spiritual doctrines, its
dominant religion and its social organization. Arabism gave it its
language and literature, its human grandeur characterized by emphasis on
heroism, courage and hospitality, its traditional loyalty to the family
and the tribe, and its reverence toward the customs and traditions of the
community.
The Ottomans, who ruled the Arabs for four hundred years, did not
contribute basically' to the Arab civilization. They rather preserved
Association of Lebanese Industrialists, Guide: Lebanon's Industries 19U9-195>0 (Beirut: Dar al-Ahad, 1950), p. (h).
^3 Hourani, o£. cit., p. 59.
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that civilization by isolating it from outside influences. “For four
centuries after the raids of the Crusaders, Mongols, and Tarters had been
succeeded by the Turkish conquest, the Arabs were living in a state of 6k cultural obscurity and stagnation."
Discussing the social interaction between the Ottomans and the
Arab provinces, Gibb and Bowen describe the situation that existed as,
. . . a government, generally apathetic, unprogressive, and careless of the welfare of its subjects, and often arbitrary and violent in its dealings with them, and a society upon whose institutions and activities such a government had little or no effect. . . . One group formed the governing class of soldiers and officials, the other the governed class of merchants, artisans and cultivators. Each was organized internally on independent lines, ajjd neither group interfered with the organization of the others 9
The Napoleonic invasion in 1798, the occupation of Syria by Ibrahim
Pasha—Muhammad Ali*s son, and the coming of the Western missionaries
introduced Western ideas and ways of life to the Levant. The challenge
of Western civilization, with its new process of thought and its
superiority in some ways over Arab civilization, has shaken the founda
tions of the social structure and has forced an adjustment between the
old and the new. Arab society is passing today "through a metamorphosis,
developing a new form in which many values are upset, many conditions
re-examined and many theories altered."
Muhammad Kamel Ayyad, "The Future'of Culture in Arab Society," The Middle East in Transition, Walter Z. Laqueur, editor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. U63.
6-* H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), Vol. I, Part I, p. 209. // Muhammad Naccache, "The Outside Lane," Middle East Forum, V ol. 36, No. 1 (-January i 960) , p. 7* -
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The Arabs, understandably proud of their cultural heritage and
traditions, are reluctant to give up their values and practices; yet the
n e c e s s itie s o f modern l i f e require th at they adopt the techniques and
modern thought of Western society so that they can cope with the changing
world order.
Since the end of the First World 'war, social interaction between
Arab and Western society has increased. Arab society has been exposed
to and influenced by many new forces, and has undergone rapid alteration,
especially during the last four decades. "The process reached unprece
dented intensity and comprehensiveness under the impact of tremendous
forces released or generated by World ’War 11."°^
It should be pointed out at this juncture that Lebanon has been
influenced by Western civilization more than the rest of the Eastern
A.rab states, including Syria. For Lebanon was exposed, at an earlier
stage than Syria and more frequently, to various modernizing influences
"from abroad—trade connections, Christian ties to European churches and
to emigrant colonies overseas, widespread contact with Western mission- 63 aries and administrators."
From medieval times, the Arabs inherited an archaic social system
that does not fit the intellectual, political, and economic revival of
°7 Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Tensions in the Middle East (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), p. 163.
Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Fress, 1958)> p. 1&9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the modern world. This system upholds social restrictions between “man
and woman, young and old , people w ith high p o s itio n s and th ose w ith low
positions, and rich and poor.1*^ Generally, the young people and the
new generation have adopted the new ways of life and have denounced the
traditional system as incompatible with progress and with the requirements
of modern life, but “the old, witnessing a sudden break with the past,
emptied the vials of its wrath upon those in authority for permitting
this change."^® The natural outcome of this discord w ill be that the
Arabs w ill adapt from Western culture what best fits the needs of their
society. ,rWhat is certain is that progress w ill defeat both reaction
and conservatism. . . . In the end society always chooses the best and
destroys the obstacles in its way.'1^
The family and the tribe are important social institutions in
Syria and Lebanon, and blood relationship is a strong tie. Most indivi
duals hold a great allegiance to their clan, which is a basic social
unit in Arab soeiety. This kinship loyalty strengthens the feudal land
lords and families, weakens the state, and hinders political and social
progress. In discussing the sociological question of loyalty, Nicola
^ Munif al-Razaz, Ma'alim al-Kayat al-Arabiyah al-Jadidah (Land mark of the New Arab Life), (Cairo: Dar Misr, 1953), p/ 226.
Majid Khadduri, "The Army Officer: His Role in Middle Eastern P olitics," Sidney Nettleton Fisher (ed.) Social Forces in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Pfess, 195$), p. 165.
Naccache, op. cit. , p. 8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ziadeh goes to the extreme of saying:
In Syria and Lebanon...a man's loyalty follows this course. First comes the family or the clan then comes the tribe, thirdly comes the religions gronp to which a man is affiliated, and there loyalty stops. So far men have not developed a deep constructive sense of loyalty towards a land, a people, a nation or a state.7-
The influence of the traditional feudal families and the financial and
political dominance have culminated in what might be termed "political
and economic feudalism." This state of affairs, more marked in Lebanon
than in Syria, limits opportunities for qualified people to serve the
country and slows down the progress of reforms. However, it is slowly
but steadily being cured with the growing influence of political parties.
Tribes form separate social units in which a patriarchal type of
social organization prevails. TJnder this system, the life and leadership
of the community are entrusted to a chosen old man, the Shaykh, who,
assisted by the elder members of the tribe, controls the power of the
community, "The chief (Shaykh) of the community has considerable personal
power, which is tempered only by precedent . . . and by the opinion of
old er members o f the t r ib e ."73
Throughout their history, the Bedouins have used the tribe as
their social, economic and political unit and have preserved their tribal
discipline and solidarity. "That nomads should be organized in clans and
tribes is only natural, since being virtually or completely independent
they must provide the political structure of their own society.
^ Ziadeh, o£. cit. , p. 281+.
^•3 W.3, Fisher, op. cit. , p. 111;.
Sydney Nettleton Fisher (ed.), Social Forces in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 2iu
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Civil authorities have given them a considerable degree of autonomy in
managing their civic life and have interfered chiefly to maintain peace
and order.
Nomadic Bedouins form a sm all p ortion o f th e population . As
C arleton S. Coon puts i t , "Nomads, lik e cowboys, are more glamorous than
numerous."75 Although there are some settled tribes in Lebanon, mainly
in the Hermel district in Bekaa, the number of Bedouins is insignificant
there. In Syria, according to the Ministry of Interior, the Bedouins
number about 150,000, some of whom are s e ttle d and engaged in a g ricu l
ture.^ Accurate statistics are not available but this estimate is
probably conservative.
To break up tribal organization, the Syrian government has
followed a Bedouin settlement policy based on the allotment of small
plots of land to settled Bedouins. Adopting the recommendations of the
IBRD missions to Syria in 1955, the Syrian government allocated on
August 28, 1955 th e amount o f LS 10 m illio n fo r Bedouin settlem en t.
Religion, an influential element in Arab society and culture, has
affected many areas of life and has contributed to the persistence of
certain social customs and habits. Sectarianism, which is responsible
for aggravating the problem of social segregation, has created a
critica l rpfroblem !.in Lebanese society.
In Syria, where most of the population are Muslims and the vast
75 Ibid., p. 23.
76 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, op. cit., P. 58. -----
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. majority of them are Sunni Muslims, the religious problem is not serious.
The following table shows the latest available figures for religious
sects in Syria:
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS SECTS IN SYRIA
C hristian s Muslims Jews Others
Greek Orthodox 172,733 Sunnis 2,702,531 31,899 3,095
Armenian Orthodox 111, 61+8 Alawites U09,5llf
Greek:Catholics 5 7 ,3UU Druzes 1 1 7 ,80U
Syrian Orthodox 51,758 Ismaili 38,106
Syrian Catholics 20,013 S h i’it e s 15,193
Armenian C atholics 19,889
Maronites 17,010
Protestants Hr, 393
Nestorians 11,570
Latins 6,880
Chaldeans 5,570
Source: Europa Publications Ltd., o£. cit. , p. U32.
Whereas there is a dominant religious sect in Syria, Lebanon is
composed of a number of minority sects. The following table shows the
religious denominations of the Lebanese population numbering l,U ll,U l6
persons in 1956.
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TABLE I I I
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS SECTS IN LEBANON
Christians Muslims Jews Others
Maronites 1*23,708 Sunnis 286,238
Greek Orthodox 11*8,927 S h i’i t e s 250,655
Greek Catholics 90,788 Druzes 88,131
Armenian Orthodox 63,679
Armenian C atholics 11*, 631
Protestants 11*, 365
Syrian Catholics 5,699
Syrian Orthodox 1*,798
L atins 1*, 1*1*6
Chaldeans 1,1*66
Source: Al-Nahar, April 2~6, 1955.
Sectarianism in Lebanon is based on convention and custom and is
incorporated in the Constitution. Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution
declares:
As a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and concord, the communities shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Cabinet, such measure, however, not to cause prejudice to the general welfare of the State.77
77 Helen Miller Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near Middle East, 2nd Ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1953)7 p. m.
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This acknowledges the sectarian pattern and formalizes it. In accordance
with the confessional system, the President of the Republic is a Christian
Maronite, the Prime Minister is a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the House
is a Shi'ite Muslim, and the Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Speaker are
Greek Orthodox. Parliamentary seats are alloted proportionally, the
present ratio being six Christian representatives to every five Muslim
representatives. This ratio has been preserved since 19H35 causing the
number of seats in Parliament to be always divisible by eleven. In
cabinet appointments and any kind of government appointments, the sectarian
balance is always observed and the same ratio is maintained.
Such a system creates political and administrative instability in
the country. "So long as the government continues to be organized on a
sectarian basis, the relations between the communities are certain to be
strained.Confessionalism hinders administrative efficiency, furthers
community rivalries, and retards social reform. It has become an under
standable and acceptable system to the public and probably a comfortable
one to most politicians. However, the enlightened public and the
ideological political parties are fighting it.
With the exception of the radical Christian and Muslim newspapers, the press'of Eeirut wages an almost constant campaign for the end o f con fession alism . The party movement has a lso contributed to a lessening of publicly expressed confessionalist ideas. In parti cular, the newly formed political parties formally disavow confessionalism and attempt to recruit their membership from among a l l s e c ts .
A lbert H. Hourani, M inorities in the Arab World (London: Oxford University Press, 19U7)} p. 117. 70 ,y Clyde G. Hess, Jr. and Herbert L. Bodman, Jr., "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1 (W inter, 19$k), p. 25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the field of education, Lebanon is more advanced than Syria,
"For while illiteracy is about 50-60 per cent in Syria, Lebanon has
reduced it to 20-30 percent."®® Lebanon has three universities: The
American University of Beirut (1866), the Saint Joseph University (1881)
and the Lebanese University (1951 ); and three colleges: Beirut College
for Women, Academie Libanaise and Centre d'Etudes Superior Francais de
Beyrouth. In the academic year 1958-59, there were 1,000 public and 939
Q - i private elementary schools. The Syrian University, founded in 192i| in
Damascus, is the only university in Syria which has more than ten
colleges. In the academic year 1958-59, there were 3,083 elementary
schools and 305 secondary schools.®^ Foreign schools, which numbered
127 elementary and 30 secondary schools in 19kk-h5, have decreased in
number.
In addition to public education, the French and the Anglo-Saxon
systems are widespread in Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, in Syria.
Ke'nce, students grow up in flu en ced , to a degree, by d iffe r e n t cu ltu res,
values, and intellectual inclinations.
In spite of the fact that Syria introduced free and compulsory
primary education in 1958 and Lebanon initiated free primary education in
i960, little educational progress has been realized in rural areas, where
illiteracy and ignorance are among the most serious problems facing the
8® Ziadeh, o£. cit. , p. 250. 0*1 Europa Publications, Ltd., ojo. cit., p. 228, Qp U.A.R. Ministry of Planning, o£. cit. , p. 59.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. peasants. Landlords do not try to increase school facilities or educa
tional opportunities for they fear that educated enlightened tenants would
not live under existing conditions. The problem of educating the peasants
is further complicated by their economic and social conditions. For it
would be unlikely, even if schools were available, that poverty-stricken
workers and peasants would send their children to school instead of
sending them to work. ■
The position of women in Syria and Lebanon is continuously improving
with the awakening of the Arab woman, with her social and educational
progress, and with the growth of her consciousness of responsibility
as a citizen, especially since the achievement of independence. The par
ticipation of women in public life and their social freedom demonstrate
the extent of the social change which has taken place in their status in
society. Women exercised their new-found influence in the field of
journalism as early as 1893 in Lebanon when Hind Naufal founded the first 83 women’s newspaper. J Al-Faiha society, formed in Syria in 1913, pub
lish e d a women’s magazine o f th e same name.
Women's societies and organizations began to thrive in the early
1920’s, although Lebanese women’s societies were formed as early as
1880.®^ in 1922 the Union of Arab Women was established in Beirut and
the Goutte de Lalt (Drop of Milk) in Damascus. Since that time women’s
0*3 Hans Kohn, A H istory o f N ationalism in the East (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, V)2§), p. 271. Oj Ruth Woodsmall, Study of the Role of Women in Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria: 195H-195>iT~(New York: The International Federa tion of Business and Professional Women, 1936), p. 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. societies have grown steadily. It is beyond the scope of this work to
enumerate these societies and to account for their history and functions.
In general, women's associations undertake activities pertaining to
medicine, welfare, guidance, education, art and similar social areas.
They include organizations affiliated with international bodies like the
League of Red Cross Societies, International Alliance of Women, World
Bureau of Girl Guides Association, International Union for Child Welfare,
International Medical Women's Association and similar organizations, and
they represent a well-established force for social advancement.
The v e i l i s becoming more and more o b so lete. I t s use has d is
appeared from the upper class and has diminished .considerably in the
middle class. While in small towns many women are still veiled, in
villages the veil has not been in use, "In rural areas, the Arab
Muslim woman has not been veiled and has shared in participating with
man in the different fields of activities." In towns and some parts
of the cities where the veil is still popular, there has been a steady
and notable decline in the number of veiled women.
The civ il status of women has achieved remarkable advancement.
Although no legal changes have been introduced, modern society has
restricted some social customs. Polygamy, which is s till practiced on
a diminishing scale, is permitted in Islam. But its practice among
educated people and people of the upper and middle classes has almost
Muhammad A. Darwazah, Mashakel al-Alam al-Arabi al-I.-j tima'iyah wa al-Iqtisadiyah wa al-Syassiyah (Social, Economic and P olitical Prob lems of the Arab World), (Damascus: Jadidah Press, 1953), p. 91*
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vanished.
Women were given partial political rights in Syria in 19U9. How
ever, they were not eligible to hold public office, and their suffrage
required primary education. In Lebanon, fu ll political rights were granted
to women in 195>3. But if women have acquired their political rights as
citizens, they have not yet acquired their fu ll rights as human beings,
and they have not attained the freedom women in progressive advanced
societies should enjoy.
The standards of living in urban and rural areas are widely dis
parate. Wealthy merchants and absentee landlords, representing the
surviving economic and political feudalism, reside in the cities and
maintain economic and political control over rural areas. Except in
Mount Lebanon where villages are far advanced, there are few sim ilarities
between such cities as Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo and rural communities,
lying only a few miles away, where people live in abject poverty. Some
of these people, who have been exploited by landlords'and whose conditions
have been ignored by the governments, have lost their sense of belonging
to a larger polity.
The problem of the rural areas, however, is not merely that they have been neglected by governments and exploited by city dwellers, but also they are unable to develop themselves if left unassisted. Fatalism, suspicion of authority, inability to adopt any positive measures, ignorance and ill health all are interwoven into a pattern^, of lethargy which keeps those areas in a state of perpetual poverty.8
Attracted by more opportunities for work and better living
86 Albert Y. Badre, "The Economy of the Contemporary Arab World," Middle East Economic Papers 1953, op. cit. , pp. 22-23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. conditions, the rural population is migrating to large cities, especially
to Beirut. In R. P. Lebret’s words, this circumstance creates "an
extremely grave sociological and economic phenomenon; for the cost of
living w ill beoome exorbitant, and marginal classes of the population
w ill grow. . . . This situation poses serious social problems."®^
The in eq u ita b le d istr ib u tio n o f income remains a problem, and
extremes of wealth and poverty persist. Despite the fact that the middle
class is growing stronger and larger, particularly in the cities, poverty
is one of the basic socio-economic problems in the area. It promotes
a vicious cycle of illiteracy and illness that weakens the forces of
production which in turn, leads to continuing poverty. In discussing
the edonomic factors underlying social problems in the Arab Middle East,
S a 'id Himadah said :
If the poverty of the working classes is not treated in an efficient way, it w ill create a dangerous social situation during the coming twenty to thirty years. The Arab peasant has begun to lose his faith in fate and to realize the causes of the difficulties that confront him. The proof of the degree of his resentment of the conditions which he is in, and his eagerness to be liberated from poverty and serfdom is his recruitment in societies and organiza tions that promise him a change in the social systems.88
Lebret, ojo. cit. , p. 12.
S a’id Himadah, "Al-Awamil al-Iq tisad iyah al-Musabibah l i a l- Amashakel al-Ujtima'dyah Fi al-Sharq al-Awsat" (Economic Factors Under lying Social Problems in the Middle East), Al-Abhath, Vol. 1, (January, 19k9), p. U03.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I I
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB SOCIALIST PARTIES
The Arab s o c ia lis t movement, lik e other s o c ia l is t movements, has
emerged in response to the need for reforms in its society. Its develop
ment during the first half of the twentieth century was mainly motivated
by discontent with existing social and economic conditions. It assumes
that the introduction of social and economic reforms presupposes the
initiation of all-embracing reforms, and that the struggle for the attain
ment of socialism is a part of the national struggle undertaken to serve
the Arab society. Consequently, Arab socialist thought presumes that
unless the Arab world develops a dominant ideology, there cannot be a
consistent dominant response. It believes that economic, social and
p o lit ic a l reforms can b est be attain ed when th e Arab world becomes one
n ation al u n it, and when Arab so c ie ty i s ordered by cer ta in common norma
tive ideological principles.
The Arab socialist movement has its origins in Western socialist
thought as well as Arab legacy in which Islam played an influential role.
Socialism aspires tc social justice and social security through
the instrumentality of an organized society wherein the means of produc
tion are publicly owned, controlled, and directed for the welfare of the
whole community. It believes that all members of society can attain
equal opportunities and equal rights and privileges without class distinc
tion through social exploitation of wealth and its equitable distribution.
Socialism endeavors to increase the wealth of society by accelerating pro
duction and by following a system of planned economy. In order to
h$
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. realize its ideals, socialism advocates the nationalization of basic and
majbr industries and the limitation, but not necessarily the abolition,
of private property and inheritance.
Socialist thinking is as old as the history of political thought.
It was foreshadowed "in the Mosaic Law, in the indignation of the prophets,
in the speculations of the Greek philosophers, and in the teaching of the
early church."^ Socialism was advocated by Plato when he envisaged common
wives and common property by guardians in his Republic. Socialist ideals
were manifested in literary portrayals of fictitious utopian society.
The Utopia of Sir Thomas More, written in 15>l6, organizes life on a
communal basis. "It is, of course, a communist island, where private
property has ceased to exist,"2 Other early depictions of the utopian
ideal are Campanella's Civitas Solis (The City of the Sun), written in
1623; James H arrington's Commonwealth o f Oceana (l6 $ 6 ); and Les Adven
tures de Telemaque, written by Fenelon in 1699.
The socialist teachings of Saint-Simon, Robert Owen, Charles
Fourier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Louis Blanc and other philosophers
popularized socialist thought during the second half of the eighteenth
and first half of the nineteenth centuries. With the introduction of
Marxian teachings in the mid-nineteenth century, a schism developed and
two separate socialist movements emerged, one influenced by the teachings
of the former group advocating liberal or utopian socialism and the other
1 Alexander Gray, The Socialist Tradition; Moses to Lenin (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 19i|i6), p« 2.
Ibid., p. 6U.
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by Marxism or the alleged scientific socialism. After the first Marxist
socialist revolution in Soviet Russia in 1917 and the Third International
in 1919, during which the foundations of the Communist Party were laid,
the gap between democratic or liberal socialism and Marxian socialism
widened. The Communist Party disregarded human valu es and freedoms and
established the dictatorship of the party. "The dictatorbhip of the
proletariat had become the dictatorship of the party over the proletariat.
Marx called his socialism "Scientific Socialism" because he
believed that it would inevitably result after the passage of certain
definite stages in society. He assumed that a stage would be reached at
which the methods of production would change but the social, political
and other institutions of society would remain the same. This would
create an imbalance in society. In a capitalist society, while the tech
nological processes of production would become collectivized and
socialised, the ownership of the means of production would remain in the
hands o f a few c a p it a lis t s whose number would decrease and w ealth
increase at the expense of the proletariat and "t/lis working classes which
would become larger in number and more m iserab le. The exten sive use o f
machinery, reducing the need for workers, added to the employers’ desire
for greater profits would lower the laborers' wages and increase unemploy
ment. These conditions would motivate the working classes to defend
their rights and interests. As a result they would organize and succeed
in seizing political power and bringing about the stage of the
3 Alex Josey, Socialism in Asia (Singapore: Donald Moore, The Straits Times Press Ltd., 1957), p. 23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dictatorship of the proletariat. In Marx's words, "Let the sections of
the International Working Men's Association in every country stir the
working classes to action,"^- to induce the domination of the proletariat.
Hence, capitalism would inevitably bring on its own destruction.
Believing in the just cause of socialism, liberal or utopian
socialists hold that the transition from capitalism to socialism should
be made by peaceful means. For they trust that man w ill adopt socialism
by con viction and because i t i s a more ju s t order o f th in g s . M arxists,
assuming that rationality and morality are ineffective without force behind
them, believe that revolution and force are necessary elements of the
class struggle that w ill inevitably bring about socialism.
The two parties under study, advocating democratic socialism and
refuting the Marxian theory of the inevitability of socialism, as we
w ill see later on in this study, belong to the former group.
I . SOCIALIST TENDENCIF.S IN ISLAM
Islam, the religion adopted by a vast majority of the Arabs, has
had a profound influence on Arab political and social development. Among
its precepts are found some principles which are in conformity with
socialist thought; and while it cannot be considered an ideological form
of socialism, Islam has helped to create a climate favorable to the
growth of Arab reformist and socialist movements.
Having its genesis in Arabia, Islam, throughout its early history,
^ Karl Marx, The C iv il War in France (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 19H8), pp. Ii5-li6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. shaped Arab political institutions and thought and strengthened political
solidarity and unity among the Arabs. The birth of Islam was a signifi
cant factor in the revival of Arab civilization,"’ For Muhammad was not
only a prophet, he was a political leader and statesman who aimed at the
political as well as the religious unification of Arabia.
Mohammed continued his preaching, supported by m ilitary campaigns, and by the time of his death in 632 he had succeeded in converting all the tribes of Arabia, and uniting them under his authority. . . . Arabia was now united for the first time in history and fired with great z e a l fo r th e Moslem f a it h . The Arabs . . . now p resented a united front to the outer world and were inspired by a belief in their mission to spread Islam.
The Caliphs were the temporal and spiritual rulers of the Islamic
Empire. From the rise of Islam early in the seventh century until the
Abbasid Caliphate was overthrown by the Mongols in 1258, the Islamic
Empire of which the Arab world was a part, provided the Arabs with an
administrative system based on Islamic ideas and teachings. At the same
time, Islamic teachings, derived from the practices of the Prophet and
the Caliphs, were influenced by Arab life and culture. With the spread
of the Islamic faith in Arabia, Islamic teachings became interwoven with
Arab thought and formed an e s s e n tia l in gredien t o f Arab c u ltu r a l and
political evolution. Joseph Schacht has expressed it succinctly: "Without
the Arabs, Islam would not be the Islam we know but without Islam, too,
^ Costi Zurayq, "Al-Hadarah al-Arabiyah (Arab C ivilization)," Al-Abhath, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March,19h9), p. 5.
^ Walter N. Birks, A. Short History of Islamic Egypt (Cairo: S.O.P. Press, 1951), pp.
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the Arabs would not be th e Arabs we know."^
However, Islamization and Arabization have always maintained their
separate identities.
The two processes, islamisation and arabisation, were now at work together, but, although intimately interconnected, were by no means identical. Nor did they halt at the same frontiers. . . . Broadly speaking, every country which became permanently arabised. became also permanently islamised. But the converse is not true.
The everyday conduct of Muslim communities has departed somewhat
from the spirit and ideology of Islam, but the significant role that
Islamic teachings and movements have played in shaping and directing the
present temper of mind of the Arab people.is a permanent contribution.
Thus, the socialist tendency inherent in some of the Islamic economic
and social traditions is an important link in the chain of events leading
to the development of modern Arab socialist thought.
Islamic ideology considers ownership of private property and
inheritance to be rights; yet it limits their scope. It is postulated in
the Quran th a t "Whatever i s in Heavens and in the Earth i s God’s . ..."
(2:2810.'' This verse implies common ownership of wealth by the Islamic
community and su g g ests th at whoever owns property p o ssesses i t as a
7 Joseph F. Schacht, "The Islamic Background of the Idea of an Arab N ation ," The Arab N ation: Paths and O bstacles to F u lfillm e n t, William Sand, editor (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p. 23. O Antonius, o£. cit., p. 16.
9 Throughout this study, the author uses J. M. Rodwell’s transla tio n o f the Quran published by J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. in London and E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. in New York. The number preceding the colon mark refers to the Quranic sura, and the number following it indicates the verse in the sura.
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trusteesbip for the common good of the community. Prophet Muhammad
taught that water, fire, and pasture should be shared by all people.
The musha* and the waqf are systems of collective ownership s till
in use in Syria and Lebanon. In the musha' system, mentioned in the
previous chapter, every person in the community has the right to use the
land but not the right of individual ownership. The waqf practice, also
known as hubus, appeared at the time of the Islamic conquests when the
caliphs donated some of their vast conquered domains to charity. Waqf
khayri (charitable waqf), as distinguished from waqf dhurri (family waqf),
is a system wherein a property is freely disposed of by an institution
or an individual as a pious endowment. Its profits are used for charit
able purposes such as the care of the poor, the building of orphanages
and mosques, and the establishment of hospitals and schools for Muslims.
"The income which accrues is devoted to a pious foundation . . . and the
property passes . . . to God, which means that the property becomes
ownerless."^ Under the waqf dhurri system, the income of the waqif
(owner) is passed on to his descendants.However, the two kinds of
waqf could be combined by determining at the outset the ratio of benefits
to be allocated to each group.
Islam recognizes the right of qualified ownership of unclaimed
land by the person who cultivates it and puts his labor into it. However,
10 Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Muslim Institutions, translated by John P. Macgregor (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1950), pp. llr3-lUu
11 Henry Cattan, "The Law of Waqf," ed. Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny, Law' in the Middle East, Vol. I (Washington, B.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955), Po 20.
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the people of the community can reclaim the land if they decide that it
has not been as productive as it should be due to abuse or neglect by the
owner. 32
Here the individual must continue his irrigation of the ground for a space of three years after he has put his hand to it. If he does not, then his right of possession lapses, because the purpose of irrigating waste land is to ensure general prosperity through its full employment. Three years is a sufficient test of the ability of any man who puts his hand to the task; if such ability has not then shown itself, the land reverts to the community and no indivi dual can sequestrate it .^3
Preaching that work is the source of wealth and that capital
should not produce c a p ita l, Islam condemns usury. The Quran puts the
prohibition of usury in the clearest terms: "0 believers! fear God and
abandon your remaining usury, if ye are indeed believers.” (2:278).
Abu Dhurr al-Ghafari, a contemporary of the Prophet, preached that
a Muslim should not possess more than his diet for the day unless what
ever else he owns is used to fu lfill God's w ill.-^
The institution of Bait al-Mal (The Treasury House), the public
purse of Islam, provided social security for the poor because its wealth,
which belonged to the whole Islamic community, was intended to be spent
on Muslims in need and to provide them with the minimum necessities of
K h alifa Abdul Hakim, Islam and Communism, 2nd Ed. (Lahore: The Institute of Islamic Culture, 1953 ), p. 211.
3-3 Sayed Kotb, Social Justice in Islam, translated by John B. Hardie (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, I n c ., 1953), p . 111.
Muhammad D. P. El-Rayes, Al-Nazariyat al-Siyassiyah Fi al-Islam (Political Theories in Islam), 2nd ed. (Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Book Shop, 1957), p . U3«
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. life. Theoretically, it was financed from three sources of income: "(i)
Fay', or trib u te from lands conquered by Muslims; ( i i ) Ghanima, th e lo o t
of battle; and (iii) Saaaqa, alms-tax.”^ Bait al-Mal derived additional
revenue from zakat; kharaj, the tax levied on the productive lands
belonging to th e dhimmis (non-Muslim p rotected people liv in g in Muslim
territory); ushr (tithe), the tax levied on the produce of the land; and
other sources, if needed. When the money collected in Bait al-Mal was not
enough to provide every member o f the Muslim community w ith a cer ta in
minimum standard of living, the caliph was empowered to raise the needed
money from the rich even after they had paid their tax dues.^
Zakat, a religious tax amounting to 2.5 per cent of a person's
17 capital per year ‘ and one of the five pillars of Islam, was a device
used to provide an equitable distribution of wealth by taking from the
rich and giving to the poor. The Quran states: "Take alms of their sub
stance, that thou mayst cleanse and purify them thereby, and pray for
them; fo r thy prayers s h a ll assure th e ir minds: and God Heareth, Knoweth."
(9:10q ).
Islam advocates equality and considers all Muslims equal regardless
of color, race, or nationality. "0 men] verily, we have created you of a
male and a female; and we have divided you into peoples and tribes that
Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge: The American Press, 1957), p. 30$.
Mirza Mohammad Hussain, Islam and Socialism (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf), p. 153*
17 Rom Landau, Islam and the Arabs (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), p . 3U«
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ye might have knowledge one of another,1' says the Quran. "Truly, the
most worthy of honour in the sight of God is he who feareth Him most.
Verily, God is Knowing, Cognisant." (H9:13)
It has been attributed to the Prophet that he supported the prin
ciple of equality by declaring in one of his ahadyth that geneologies do
not exist in Islam. Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, applied this principle
by apportioning the spoils of war equally among all people whether male
or female, old or young, free or slave.
Islam taught an enlightened view of slavery at a time when it was
a common practice. Both the Quran and the Hadyth, the main sources of
legislation in Islam, encourage the abolition of slavery by making it a
meritorious act. According to the precepts of Islam, a freeborn man
cannot become a slave. Islam confines slavery to captives of war and
born slaves, and establishes ways to emancipate slaves. The prophet
advocated a twofold solution to this social problem:
1. Teachings for the betterment of the condition 01 the existing slaves and measures for their gradual emancipation. *i O 2. Steps for the permanent abolition of slavery.
He preached that a master should offer his slaves the same food he eats
and the same clothes he wears. He should not ask them to perform duties
beyond their power. Although the master might marry his slaves to persons
of his own choosing, he cannot separate their marriage. In addition to
good treatment, a master is expected to take steps to liberate his
Mirza Bashir-Ahmad, Islam and Slavery (Qadian Punjab: Book Department Talif-q-Isha’at, 1935), p. 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. slaves, and the Prophet taught that such an act is highly appreciated by
God and could be considered an expiation for certain sins. The Prophet
further admonished that any person who behaved il l toward slaves would
not go to paradise.
Islamic socialist thought has been propagated by various Islamic
movements. In 8l 6, during the Abbasid Caliphate, Babik founded a move
ment calling for land reform, "the taking of the vast areas of land from
its owners, who had previously taken them from the peasants or from the
state, and their free distribution among the farmers."^
Sufism, representing mysticism and asceticism in Islam, emerged as
an organized movement in the ninth century, but Muslims assert that its
origin can be traced to Prophet Muhammad who practiced such ascetic
exercises as fasting and prayer and who was "the recipient of a two-fold
revelation, the one embodied in the contents of bhe Quran, the other 20 within his heart." Sufists formed monastic orders or brotherhoods and
lived a ncn-matsrialistic existence similar to Christian monasticism0
By th e tw elfth century, aufism had bebome a w e ll-e sta b lish e d s o c ia l
institution. Among its famous orders were the Qadirites, founded in
Baghdad by Abd-al-Qadir a l- J ila n i (d. 1166), and the Mawlawis (known as
whirling dervishes), founded by Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (d. 1273) in Persia.
Branches of a fraternity established in Egypt by Ahmad al-Badawi (d. 1276)
Bandaly Jawzi, Min Tarikh al-Harakat al-Fikriyah Fi al-Islam (From the H istory o f I n te lle c tu a l Movements in Islam ), (B eiru t: Dar al-Rawa1i, 1928), p. 69.
20 John A. Subhan, Sufism: Its Saints and Shrines (Lahore: Lucknow P u blish ing House, 1938 )> p .~E l2.
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still exist in Tanta.
The Israa’ilia grew out of a schism in the Shi’a sect following
the death of the sixth Imam in 760. A minority of the Shi’ites became
followers of Isma'il, a son of the Imam, and the influence of the movement
spread. The Fatimid dynasty, established in Tunis in 910 and extending
to Egypt late in the tenth century where it lasted for two centuries,
was founded by the Ism a'ilis. The Isma’ilia was considered a revolutionary
movement ou tsid e the Fatimid empire, and i t s fo llo w ers were su bject to
persecution. While keeping the five pillars of Islam, Isma'ilia empha
sized philosophical contemplation, especially fasting, pilgrimage, and
prayer. Its. program included equality between men and women and the
equitable distribution of land ownership.
The Qarmatiyah cult, a branch of the Isma’ilia,w as founded by
Abdullah Ibn Maymun and perpetuated by his successor, Hamadan Qarmat,
during the second half of the ninth century. Qarmat taught that the
surplus wealth of the rich should be distributed among the poor. In
890, he established a community on the Iraqi-Persian border known as the
House of Emigration where he introduced a communist system in the essen- p l tials of life*' He levied a one-fifth property tax and raised alms to
support the House nd "for partaking o f a communion m eal*"^ The
Qarmatiyah vanished early in the eleventh century but Qarmat’s teachings
continued to influence the Islamic world for nearly another century.
21 A.S. Tritton, Islam: Belief and Practices (London: Hutchison's University Library, 1951), p. 79.
22 Ib id .
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The turm oil caused by the Qarmatiyah was in te n s ifie d by th e Zanj
(Negroes) rebellion (870-883) led by Ali Ibn Muhammad, a descendent of
Ali and Fatima. In the neighborhood of Basra were a great number of Zanj
who had come mostly from the east coast of Africa to work the soil belong
ing to rich entrepreneurs of the city of Basra. Ali, realizing the poten
tia l power of these slaves, assumed their leadership, not by appealing to
the divine right of the family, but by adopting the Kharijites doctrine
which recognized "the equal right of all Muslims, even if they were
A byssinian s la v e s , to become the ru ler o f Muslims.This uprising is
significant because it was "a war of a classical type, a regular social
war." 2*4
The Sanusiyah, established in the early nineteenth century, propa
gated its faith from the zawiyah, a settlement used as a center of educa
tion and religious practice. Founding his first zawiyah in Mecca in 1837,
Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Sanusi (1791-1859) spread his order throughout the
Arabian peninsula and North Africa. His mission was carried on by his
successory Muhammad al-Mahdi, and members of the Sanusiyah brotherhood.
The zawaya (plural of zawiyah) became important religious, social,
and economic centers, functioning as theocracies and practicing a 25 socialist way of life. ^ Travelers, guests, merchants, students and others
found free accommodations and hospitality awaiting them at the zawaya.
23 M. Mazheruddin Siddiqi, Development of Islamic State and Society (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1956), p. ll*5.
2k L. Massignon, "Zandj," The Encyclopedia of Islam, edited by M.T. Houtsma & oth ers (Leyden and London: Luzac & C o., 193U), IV, p .l2 1 J ,
2% Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 19li9), p. kl57
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Sanusi brothers cultivated the land with the voluntary help of the
tribe on whose land the zawiyah was built and, living on the produce of
the land, made the zawiyah into a self-sufficient economic unit. A por-
tion of the proceeds from business and commerce was used to support the
zawiyah, while the remaining share was allocated to the order as a whole,
that is, to the Sanusi society.
The Sanusi dynasty has been the governing dynasty in Libya since
the founding of the Sanusiyah. While the zawiyah practice still exists
in that area, the Sanusi dynasty is far from being a socialist govern
ment.
I I . ARAB REFORMIST SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
Socialist parties began to emerge in the Arab world in the early
twentieth century in response to the needs of the Arab people for
reform s.
While some reform ist movements sought to improve Arab s o c ie ty
through a return to the traditional Islamic legacy and others through
adoption of radical Westernization, there arose an intermediate school
which suggested that the means for achieving social reform could be
found in both legacy and Westernization.
If we were to classify Arab socialists as belonging to one of the
three schools, we would include them in the intermediate school. For
Muhammad F. Shukri, Al-Sanusiyah; Din wa Dawlah (The Sanusiyah: A R eligion and a S ta te ), (Cairo: Dar a l-F ik r al-A rab i, 191+8), pp. 1+8- 1+9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. they seek to reform Arab society by introducing modern and scientific
measures, by adopting Western methods that fit the needs of Arab society,
and by preserving those parts of the Arab legacy and heritage that offer
p o s itiv e con trib u tion s to th e development and progress o f modern Arab
s o c ie ty .
The Ottoman Empire placed emphasis on th e power o f the sta te and 97 the strength of its army while ignoring the welfare of its subjects. ' 1
The absence of social reforms during Ottoman domination encouraged the
development of reformist movements within the classical framework of
r e lig io n . The Wahhabi movement came in to e x isten ce in the middle o f the
eighteenth century in response to this call.
I t was a r e v iv a lis t movement in sp ired by the teach in gs o f a student
of theology, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who sought reforms by returning
to the purest form of Quranic teachings, believing that the decay of
Islamic society could be checked by turning to the living faith of
unitarianism.
He was a reformer hat in the sense that he desired a change in the doctrines of Islam or even a new interpretation of its tenets, but in the sense that he felt it his mission to denounce innovations and accretions, and preach a return to Islam's former purity. ”
Wahhabism introduced some administrative reforms in Central Arabia
and initiated the formation of an independent state, Saudi Arabia, by
integrating a multiplicity of tribes and enforcing law and order. The
^■7 George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen & Co., L td ., 19$!?), p . £8.
Antonius, o£. cit., p. 22.
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resulting state of affairs was certainly an improvement over the more arbi
trary Ottoman ad m in istration .
The traditional answer to the need for social reform continued to find
expression in such movements as al-Sanusiyah, and al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin
The Sanusi order, discussed earlier in this chapter, aspired to
regenerate Islamic society by returning to the original purity and simplicity
of the Islamic faith.
The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), established by Hasan
al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, calls for the achievement of Islamic solidarity
and the re-establishment of a theocracy with the Quran as its constitution.
It believes that social reforms can be attained through strict observance of
the Quranic laws. As summarized by one of its prominent leaders, Said
Ramadan, th e movement aims prim arily at making th e Muslim brother,
. . . a living symbol of Islam, as it has been propagated by the Prophet and cleansed of the aberrations alien to Islam’s liberal and forthright simplicity. It concentrates attention first and foremost upon the moulding of the individual Muslim with a view to the adoption of the Quran as his constitutional guide in his personal, family, and social l i f e . 29
Before their dissolution soon after the Palestine war in 19U8, the
Ikhwan were well organized in Egypt. They had about 2,000 branches with
meeting places for religious and social instruction, and their several pub
lications included three daily newspapers and a monthly periodical. Kassan
al-Banna was the leader of the movement until his assassination in Cairo in
19U9• He was replaced by Hassan Hudeiby.
29 "Muslim Brotherhood Leader Explains I t s Aims and A c tiv itie s ," Middle East Report, Vol. 6, No. 3 (October 2, 1953), p. 1.
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The European challenge brought about the development of a different
school of thought which turned to the west to learn how to reform Arab
society. Napoleon's conquest of Egypt in 1798 brought the Arabs into
direct contact with the West. Among other things, Arabic press was intro
duced into Egypt, an academy of literature was established with a library,
and intellectual progress was awakened. Missionary institutions and French
and American educational activities helped to spread Western culture and
thought. In addition to the many schools they opened, the Americans and
French established higher institutions of learning such as the American
University of Beirut and the French Jesuit University, known as L'Uni-
versite Saint Joseph.
Muhammad Ali introduced western reforms Into Egypt in the first -
half of the nineteenth century. Among the important elements of his
administration in Egypt were "the economic exploitation, the military
reorganization, the introduction of European technical experts. . . .30
He was able to break with Islamic traditionalism and to introduce his
reforms through westernization. As Henry Dodwell puts it, "he was
capable . . . of development, of absorbing new ideas, of adapting them ^1 to new and different circumstances."" The impact of westernization on
Egypt wasiofrtfious, especially in the constitutional processes of govern
ment and in the political field, 32 In 1866 Khedive Isma'il established
30 Gibb and Bowen, o£. c i t . , p. 231.
3^- Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt (London: Cambridge University Press, 1931), p. 37.
32 Jacob M. Landa”Parliaments and Parties in Egypt (New York: Frederickck A. Praeger, 1 , p. 1,
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a consultative elected Assembly modeled after Western Parliament.
The principles of equality, fraternity, liberty and self-determina
tion established by the French and American revolutions were imported by
the Arabs and influenced Muslim reformers. Some of these reformers went
to the extreme of believing in the existence of an intellectual and
ideological affinity between Islamic traditions and beliefs and the prin
ciples of the French.r evolution, especially those pertaining to freedom
and democracy.33
Most of the Arab reformers and intellectuals belong to the "middle
of the road" school; They have tried to take the best of the other two
schools and the most su ita b le to Arab s o c ie ty .
Jamalluddin al-Afghani, an Arab of Afghani origin and one of the
leaders of Pan-Islamism during the second half of the 19th century, preached
the revival of Islamic society through a rational interpretation of Islam
based on reason. He founded "the modern Pan-Islam ic movement combining
a nationalist interpretation of Islam with modernism and reformism."3k
He advocated agricultural reforms, the awakening of farmers, the improve
ment of the conditions of the people and the introduction of a consulta
tive system of government based on democratic principles. Al-Afghani, a
political leader and an enlightened thicker as well as a religious
reformer, was the founder of al-Urwat al-Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Bond),
33 Ra1 if Khury, Al-Fikr al-Arabi wa al-Thawrah al-Faransiyah (Arab Thought and the French Revolution), (Beirut: Manshurat Bar al-Makshuf, 19U3 ), p. 153.
3^ Hazem Zaki Nuseibeb, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 120.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. an Arabic periodical published in Paris with the intent of awakening and
enlightening the Muslims by making them face the progress of the ^e.
Muhammad Abduh, a l-A fgh an i1s d is c ip le and fr ie n d , led the Arabic
Islamic revival in the second half of the nineteenth eentury and aimed
at producing reforms by modernizing Islam and combining the best of western
civilization and Islam. He was an admirer of Western civilization who
visualized !,a modern Egypt resting on a firm and broad basis of the best
in the Arab heritage enriched and fertilized by assimilation of the best
in European thought and achievement.His reforms were directed mainly
at Islam, political institutions, and the Arabic language. As a teacher
at three important educational centers (Dar al-Ulum, al-Azhar and the
School of Languages), he was able to recruit devoted disciples who preached
his reform program and the tenets of his school of thought.
Another Pan-Islamist who belonged to this school was Khayr al-Bin
Pasha al-Tunisi (1810-1879)• Acting as the Prime Minister of Tunis under
Abdul Hamid, he endeavored to achieve reform and progress by adopting
whatever was suitable from the West and by introducing a consultative
form of government based on freedom and justice.
Abd al'-Rahman al-Kawaklbi was another influential reformer who
stood midway between Islam and th e West. Toward th e end o f th e n in eteen th
century, he wrote some original works about the causes of the degeneration
of Islam. He wrote two important books: Ibn al-Qura (Tho Mother of Towns,
referring to Mecca) dealing with Islamic revival and criticizing the
ocf J N ajla Izzeddin, The Arab World: P a st, Present and Future (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 19^3), p. 85*
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Islamic peoples, and Tabai1 al-Istibdad (Attributes of Tyranny) which
demonstrates that Islam advocates a liberal, democratic and consultative
form of government, and which criticizes the existing Muslim governments.
Social reform and justice are best attained, according to some
Islamic thinkers, by reviving the true spirit of Islam which advocates
socialism . Khalid Muhammad Khalid, in his book Min Huna Nabda1 (From ' •
Here We Start) in which he praises the religion of Islam as a social
source of productive life and attacks the priesthood of Islam as a destruc
tive element of human society and an enemy of reason and right, fihds the
answer to the call for social reforms in socialism. For him, socialism
enhances the mission of religion and fu lfills its aims. Priestcraft,
he believes, encourages people to live in darkness and to be chained by
superstitions, poverty, ignorance and disease. It distorts the true
religion of Islam which preaches, among other things, love, liberty and
social equality. Believing that social justice is an essential element
in life, desired and sought by peoples and governments, and assuming
that socialism is the best system that can bring about social justice,
Khalid M. Khalid reaches the conclusion that "the regime which has
realized that purpose in the present age of man is socialism, and nothing
e lse .* * ^
Reform and progress were sought by the intellectuals who fled
Syria and Lebanon late in the nineteenth century and settled in Cairo
where they carried the torch of Arab nationalism. Among this group were
Khalid Muhammad Khalid, Min Huna Nabda* (From Here we S ta r t), translated by Isma’il el-Faruqi (Cairo: Dar al-Nil Li al-Taba’ah, 195>0), p. 96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. graduates of the American University of Beirut like Jurji Zaydan, an
authority on Islamic history and the founder of al-H ilal magazine;
Ya'qub Sarruf, who established al-Muqtataf magazine; and Dr. Shibly
Shumayel, an early Arab. socialist who expounded the theory of Darwin. By
enlightening the Arabs and preaching nationalism, these thinkers contri
buted to the progress of reform. For Arab nationalism was seeking, among
other aims, social and economic reforms.
After demonstrating the ideas and writings of the most prominent
Arab reformers and intellectuals, Ra'if Khury concluded in his book,
A l-Fikr al-A rabi al-Hadyth (Modern Arab Thought), th at modem Arab
nationalism was born in a democratic atmosphere. It advocates free
education, equal rights for women, agricultural and industrial develop
ment, and improvement of the peasants' and workers' conditions,'?
I I I . ARAB SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS
While the various Islamic reform movements initiated the breakdown
of Islamic complacency, they did not succeed in adequately harmonizing
the new aspirations and the old values in the Arab world. Their reformist
measures were carried out hesitantly, inconsistently and superficially,
if at all. In fairness, however, it must be pointed out that the attitudes
that govern a people's behavior are less easily revised thgn are the in sti
tutions which do so outwardly and the ideas which a people would believe
themselves to be governed with. These reformist movements, existing
3? R a 'if Khury, A l-Fikr al-A rabi al-Hadyth (Modern Arab Thought), (Beirut: Dar al-Makshuf, 19k3), pp. 288-289.
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before the creation of the socialist parties, provided an adjustment
entailing a minimum cultural exchange but which was sufficiently revita
lizing to lead to both a political and a cultural resurgence, resulting
in the emergence of Arab socialist parties.
Socialist parties were not formed during the period when the need
for social and economic reforms was most urgent. This delay can be
attributed neither to the unwillingness--of ths Arabs to adopt socialist
reforms nor to an absence of socialist principles and western thought
from Arab knowledge, but, rather, to the Arab people's preoccupation with
achieving liberty and independence.
In addition, political advancement had surpassed cultural enlighten
ment, and self-consciousness had not kept pace with political emancipation.
For these reasons, Arab socialist parties started to emerge only after
some of the Arab states had achieved independence, and their programs are
nationalist as well as socialist. With the attainment of independence,
there was a greater opportunity to concentrate on achieving the needed
reforms, and to have organized parties dedicated for that purpose.
Insofar as there is a growing consciousness towards, and a cry for, social justice among reformers and writers of young generation, it is likely that Socialists stand a chance of winning additional followers. Parties which combine socialism with Arab nationalism . . . are more likely to spread among the more enlightened groups of people in urban and semi-urban areas.3°
Early in the twentieth century, some of the movements bearing the
seeds of Arab socialism began to appear among other movements calling
for social reforms. Shibli Shumayel (1860-1917), a Lebanese doctor
Ziadeh, o jd. cit. , pp. 106-107,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. influenced by Darwin’s theory of evolution expounded socialism in his
writings in the Muqtataf (Digest) and Mustaqbal (Future) magazines. He
believed that socialism is a logical consequence of the natural order of
progress and evolution, that it develops as human society progresses and
that it is inevitable. Believing that revolution is the exception and
evolution is the rule, he stressed the idea that socialism should be
attained by evolution and through an organized political party. Although
Shumayel was a Marxist in the sense that he believed in the inevitability
of socialism and in the necessity of the formation of a political party,
he differed with Marx in prescribing evolutionary rather than revolutionary
means. For him, socialism is not merely a philosophical and social doc
trine but a necessary outcome of certain fixed prerequisites#^9 Shumayel
looked at socialism not as a means for equal distribution of wealth, but
as a means for a just distribution of profit between labor and capital,
as a system which prevents the exploitation of labor by capital and pre
serves human rights.
In 1908, Al-Hizb al-Ishtiraki al-Kubarak (The Blessed Socialist
Party) was founded in Egypt by Muhammad Jamaleddine who started to preach
socialist teachings upon his return from Paris. His party__®nphasized
improvement of the farmers’ conditions. The party neglected the national
cause in its efforts to r aise the standard of living of the peasants
which caused its clash with the National Party, headed by Mustafa Kamel,
and brought about its disintegration in spite of the support it received
39 Naji A liush, Al-Thawrawi al-Arabi al-Mu'asir (Contemporary Arab R e v o lu tio n ist ), (B eiru t: Dar a l- T a li’ah, i 960) , p. 97.
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from certain sectors of the urban areas.^ In 1910 Salamah Mussa,
influenced by the Fabian Society in Great Britain,^- started preaching a
moderate form of democratic socialism in Egypt similar to the Fabian kind
of socialism.
U n til the F ir s t World War, the Arab s o c ia l is t movement was not
organized. There were some sporadic mentions of it by social reformers,
and some minor movements called for its adoption. The first Arab socialist
study was made by Nicola Haddad in 1920 and was published by "Dar al-Hilal"
in a book entitled "Socialism.11 Haddad believed that all means of pro
duction should be owned by the state. He supported the theory that
property values should vanish by taxation, and he rejected the idea of
property confiscation. Believing that democracy is a prerequisite for
socialism, he states that whereas authoritarianism is a system based on
the exploitation of the people by a few individuals, socialism is a
system based on the enjoyment of equal rights and the prevention of ex
ploitation.^
The success of the Russian revolution in 1917 encouraged the
communists to organize their movement. Their activities during the
1920's m aterialized in the founding o f the Communist Party of Syria and
Lebanon in 1930. However, Armenian communists had established cells in
^ C lovis Maqsud, Nahwa Ish tirak iyah Arabiyah (Towards Arab Socialism ) 2nd ed. (B eirut: Dar Minayminah Li al-T ib a'ah , 1938), p . 73.
k1 I^id.
^ Allush, o£. cit., p. 202.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 ^ 1*3 Beirut as early as 192y-1925. r Khalid Bakdash, Nicola Shawi, Fuad
Qazan and Mustafa a l-'A r is represented the leadership o f th e party a t
that time. In 19Ut, the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon split into
two parties—one in each country. The following year, the combined mem
bership of the two parties was about 25,000.^ However, their influence
was curbed when they were outlawed by both governments in 19U7. The
Communist Party was organized before the socialist parties in Syria and
Lebanon, an event which, to a certain extent, could be attributed to the
influence of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. This revolution, which
laid the foundation of the Communist Party, generated a strong wave of
enthusiasm that attracted socialists all over the world and enhanced the
position of Marxism. nA new era of hope, fruitful struggle and concrete
achievement of the actual realization of the dreams and predictions of
Marx and Engels seemed to have dawned."^
Symptoms of non-Marxist organization appeared in 1920 when a group
of college students in Cairo engaged in a fund raising campaign tp estab
lish publicly owned industries. These efforts were regularized by the
formation of a political party known as Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) in
1933 under the leadership of Ahmad Husayn. This party aimed at liberat
ing Egypt from foreign influence, eradicating feudalism, and raising the
^3 Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1955), p. 327.
^ Angus Sinclair, Communism in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 195>l), p. 115".
^ Josey, op.cit., p. 23.
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standard, of living of the peasants.
The fellah should be the object of special care, as he is the "crown of Egypt" and the mainstay o f the economic l i f e of the country. He should be educated in order to overcome his illiteracv and ignorance; his standard of life should be improved.^6 The party’s several thousand inembers were mainly students and young men,
and it did not succeed in winning popularity.
The narty changed its name to al-Hizb al-V.'atani al-Islami
(Nationalist Islamic Party) in 19U0, and to al-Hizb al-Ishtiraki al-
Demoqrati (Socialist Democratic Party) in 19 U6. In the 195>0 elections,
Ibrahim Shukri, vice president of the party, won a seat in Parliament.
Due to h is attacks on the Faruq regime, he was deprived of h is immunities
and olaced on trial. Thus, the voice of the party was silenced in
Parliament and all that remained was its paper, al-Ishtirakiyah (Socialism),
which was censored several times because of its continuous attacks on
the regime.
Tne president of the narty, Ahmad Husayn, was accused of being a
fascist during the Second World War, and he served a three-year term in
a concentration camo on that charge. In a pamphlet he wrote in New York
in March 19U7, he defended himself against the charge by citing attacks
he had made on fascism and Nazism on sev era l o cca sio n s. The I ta lia n
Government p rotested to the Egyptian Government in 193U when Husayn wrote,
"fascism i s lik e an empty drum, f u ll of a ir but makes a lo t of n o ise . . .
it was knit to Mussolini as long as he was alive, but it will die as soon
) 7 as he dies." Tne pamphlet goes on to state that he wrote an open letter
James Heyworth-Dunne, R eligiou s and P o lit ic a l Trends in Modem Egypt (Washington, D. C.: McGregor 1 Werner, Inc., 19!?0), p. 103.
) 7 Ahmad Husayn, Egypt1s 'War Effort (Hew York, March, 19U7), p. 23.
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to Hitler in June 1939 warning him "that his fate w ill be utter annihila
tion for himself and for Germany . . . if he did not give up his insane
ambition to dominate the whole world."'4®
Several members of the party, including Husayn, were among the
people accused of causing the famous burning of foreign property in Cairo
on January 26, 1932. Although their guilt was not proved Ahmad Husayn
was imprisoned on charges of inciting the incident by his articles in
al-Ishtirakiyah.^ He was released from prison following the July 1932
revolution.
The party believed in democratic socialism. It sought to achieve
economic democracy by replacing the feudal and the capitalist systems
with a socialist system in which the interests of the community would have
priority over individual interests and all individuals would be guaranteed
equal opportunities and a fair share of production according to the
individuals efforts and needs. The party believed that all citizens
should enjoy the following basic rights:
1. The right of elementary and secondary education for all and of higher education for those interested.
2. The right of work for all citizens.
3. The right of rest and recreation after work.
U. The r ig h t o f fr e e medical treatm ent.
3. The right of economic and social security for all c itiz e n s unable to work because of old age, disability, and unemployment.
Ibid., p. 26. b9 Jean and Simonne Lacouisure, Egypt in Transition (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1938), p. 120.
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6. The right to secure happy life for children.
7. The right to live in a modern healthy home.-^
These rights could be realized by organizing production according to a
studied plan whereby all citizens would participate to the extent of their
capabilities. The plan would be carried out under a free and enlightened
democratic regime in which the majority of the people would decide upon
the extent of the nationalization of the means of production.
The party considered private ownership of land an essential basis
for agricultural development but stipulated that no land holding should
exceed fifty dunums ^ and that the owner should work the land himself.
Its program provided for supervision of small-scale crafts by the state,
but specified that the state should not control them. The program also
called for encouragement and support of labor unions and cooperative
institutions,
The Socialist Democratic Party, together with other political
parties in Egypt, was dissolved by the government of the revolution on
January 16, 195>3. This party was a minor one with only limited political
power. Hence, its influence on the people was not significant.
Organized socialist activities in Iraq were launched by graduates
of American and British universities and the Baghdad School of Law. The
most distinguished of these graduates were Muhammad Hadid and Abd al-Fattah
^ Program of the Socialist Democratic Party.
One dunum equals 0,6 acre.
^ A1 Abba*, No. 2 l£ (September 9, 1955), p. 3»
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Tbraliim who formed the Ahali (People) Group in 1931* This group leaned
toward socialism and advocated liberty and social reforms.
Under the influence of Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim and Muhammad Hadid, the group adopted socialism as its first article of faith. Abd al-Fattah had become a socialist, it seems, in 1930 as a result of his reading on the Soviet Union while a graduate at Columbia University. Hadid was a graduate o f th e London School of Economics and P o lit ic a l Science and was much impressed by its outspoken socialist tenden c i e s . 53
The following year, they started a paper, Sawt al-Ahali (Voice of the
People), which has become the official organ of Al-Hizb al-Watani al-
Demoqrati (The National Democratic Party),
Kamil al-Chadirchi, the leader of the National Democratic Party
and a former member of the Ikha (Brotherhood) Party, joined the Ahali
group in 193U. Following the October 1936 coup d’etat, al-Chadirchi was
appointed Minister of Economics and Public Works in Bakr Sidqi’s cabinet
where he became the spokesman for the reformist faction. The influence
of the Ahali group and, to a lesser extent, the formation of other Arab
s o c ia lis t p a r tie s , a l-B a 1th (The Arab R esurrection S o c ia lis t Party) in
Syria and the Socialist Democratic Party in Egypt, motivated al-Chadirchi
to form the National Democratic Party in 191*6 following a declaration by
the government of Tawfiq Suwaydi in February 191*6 of the freedom of poli
tical parties to form.
Of the five parties that were officially formed in Iraq on April
20, 191*6, three professed socialism. Besides the National Democratic
Party there were Hizb It.t.ihad al-Watan (The National Union Party), led by
Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq: 1932-1958, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, I960), p. 70.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, and Iiizb al-Sha'b (The People’s Party), led by
Aziz Sharif. The programs of the three parties were similar for their
leaders were all former Ahali members. All advocated land reforms and
the nationalization of public utilities. All were leftist, although the
National Union and the People's Parties were further to the left.
The National Democratic Party, the most influential of the three
and the only one th at has survived, numbers around ten thousand members
according to Husayn Jamil, a prominent member of the party. He informed
the writer that these members are drawn mainly from the laboring class,
the peasants, small shopkeepers, and intellectuals.
In 193>0, the party's executive committee, acting on a resolution
submitted by Kamil al-Chadirchi in August 19U7, adopted democratic
socialism as its basic ideology.^ Tne party advocates Arab unity, the
liberation and independence of the Arab states that are s till under some
type of foreign control, the establishment of a parliamentary form of
government, and the freedoms of speech, press, belief, and association.
It considers poverty to be a basic disease that should be abolished in
order that the nation night lead a better life and every individual
might have a minimum income s u ffic ie n t to p rotect him from need and
worry. The party believes that the only way to fight poverty is to
in crease production and d istr ib u te the wealth in a more eq u itab le way.
To attain these objectives, the party advances several measures,
among which are the establishment of cooperative companies, the capital
5k C lovis Maqsud, "Al-Ahzab a l-Ish tira k iy a h f i al-Ira q (S o c ia lis t Parties in Iraq): 19^6-1956," Al-Thaqafah al-Arabiyah (The Arab Culture) (February, 1961), p. 10.
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to be shared by the state and the people; the introduction of a new
arrangement for land ownership by distributing state lands among
peasants, the limiting of large land holdings to a fair and reasonable
amount; formation of cooperative societies to help small farmers culti
vate their lands; and organization of workers in unions and guilds for
the improvement of their conditions and status. ^
The party considers the existence of great economic differences in the Iraqi society a violation of social justice. Therefore, it strives to lessen these economic differences by imposing direct and progressive ta xes on a l l kinds o f income and on in h erita n c e, and by using the greatest possible portion of the budget of the state for social services such as health, unemployment, and old age insurance, ' and for similar services that aim at improving the people’s condi t i o n s .^
Believing that liberation^? and unity should go hand in hand with
Arab socialism, Kamil al-Chadirchi explained the relationship between
Arab nationalism and Arab socialism in Rose el-Youssef magazine, on
■ April 16, 1?56, by saying,
I believe that Arab nationalism should go side by side with socialism. If Arab nationalism is supposed to liberate the Arab nation from imperialism, this requires its liberation first from exploitation, need, sickness, and ignorance, and its making a human personality respected and effective in society. Therefore, I believe that most citizens cannot be freed unless they establish a socialist regime in their country to increase their production, assure a fair distri bution of their products, and save themselves from social diseases.
Thus, faith in Arab unity should be accompanied by a strong faith in a sound democratic regime aiming at achieving socialism.58
55 Program of the National Democratic Party (Baghdad: Matba’at al-Rabitah, n.d.), pp. 57-61.
Ibid., p. 6l.
57 The terms "liberation" and "Arab liberation" are used through out the dissertation In the context in which they are used by the Arab socialist parties under study, as explained in this work.
56 Rose el-Youssef (April 16, 1956), p. 3«
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THE ARAB RESURRECTION SOCIALIST PARTY
IDEOLOGY AND STRUCTURE
The avowed ultimate objective of the Arab Resurrection Socialist
P arty, known as the Ba1bh, i s th e establishm ent o f a b e tte r Arab s o c ie ty ,
an objective that is claimed by most, if not all, political parties in
their respective societies.
In dependent countries that are under foreign domination, the
struggle of political parties is usually concentrated on national libera
tion and independence and on founding their nation states. In this stage,
the nature of the struggle is more negative than positive. In countries
that have passed that construction stage, the struggle of political
parties, as well as their function, usually takes a positive form. Their
efforts are channeled into building up their state and improving the
different aspects of life in their society. The Ba'th, in trying to
liberate and unite the Arab world as well as to establish a democratic
and socialist society, combines the negative and positive roles of poli
tical parties.
I t i s im portant to remember th at the Ba’th Party was the f i r s t in the Arab world to really understand the nature of Arab problems, and to work out solutions to them using a contemporary and universal approach on the same level of thought as political parties in other co u n tries.
The party derives its principles from the existing conditions in
"Forum In terview s M ichel A fla q ," Middle East Forum, V ol. 33, No. 2 (February, 1958), p. 9.
76
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Arab society and uses revolutionary means to achieve its aims. Its con
stitution (the translation of which is set out in detail in Appendix A)
begins with the following definition: "The Arab Resurrection Socialist
Party is a national, populist, revolutionary movement striving to achieve
unity, liberty, and socialism."
I . IDEOLOGY
The B a'th Concept o f Arab Nationalism
Arab nation alism i s a movement rep resenting th e n ation al asp ira
tions of the Arab people; a manifestation of their w ill for independence,
liberation, unity, reform, and progress; and a force driving them toward
the achievement of these goals.
While this broad definition represents the most prevalent concept
of Arab nationalism, it should be remembered that there is no single
kind of Arab nationalism. Arab nationalist movements differ in their
outlook and, thus, in their emphasis. They all advocate reform and
progress, although some movements do not stress this aspect as much as
they should and others do not define its scope.
What distinguishes the Ba'th from other Arab nationalist parties
and movements i s i t s in c lu siv e system atic program th a t makes nationalism
a way of life, defines its purposes and goals, and draws up ways and
means to a tta in and m aintain i t s o b je c tiv e s.
Arab nationalism is the core of the Ba'th ideology. It embodies
the goals and aspirations of the Arab people throughout their history.
Its principles are inspired by the Arab national interest, and its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. measures proceed from the existing conditions in the Arab world. "Our
nationalism derives from onr living reality in the Arab world,” said
Michel Aflaq. "We in the Ba’th believe that we have found the true
meaning of nationalism.”*^ It has evolved to find basic and complete solu
tio n s for th e Arab problems on the b a sis th at the Arab world forms one
unit and that the Arab people compose one nation. For the Ba'thists,
Arab nationalism serves not only the Arab society, but the whole human
society. The Arab national interest is an end in itself; at the same
time, it is a means for establishing a better world society, which is
the ultimate end. Therefore, the Ba'th equates nationalism with humani-
tarianism and believes that nationalism is not a transitory stage. It
has a permanent national, humanitarian, and universal function. Article
3 of the Party Constitution states:
The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party is nationalist. It believes that nationalism has a living and permanent existence, and that the national conscience which firmly binds the individual to his nation is a sacred feeling, imbued with creative power, longing for sacri fice, reawakening the sense of responsibility, and striving to channel the individual personality usefully and efficiently.
The nationalist idea that the party preaches is the w ill of the Arab people to be liberated and united, to be given the opportunity to realize the Arab character in history, and to cooperate with other nations in assuring for humanity its direct progress toward good ness and p rosp erity.
To thd Ba'th, positive nationalism is an integral part of univer-
salism. The Ba'thists believe that the revival of the Arab nation is
of universal as well as national service because it shares in the
o "Forum Interview s Michel A fla q ,” Middle East Forum, op. c i t .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. progress of all humanity.^ Explaining this concept, Aflaq stated:
Nationalism is a part of universalism. It is its incarnation vrLthin the boundaries of any one people. We do not believe that our nationalism w ill become aggressive as some Western nationalisms have done. We have tried in our teachings to integrate Arab nationalist feeling with the concept of the Arab as a part of the • world having a duty to contribute to the solution of world problems. We have also combined nationalist feeling with social revolution, thus giving both an impetus they could not have had alone.^
The fact that nations develop distinguishing characteristics does
not create conflict among nations. The Ba'th maintains that, on the
contrary, positive nationalism encourages constructive national competi
tion and that healthy competition among mature nations furthers inter im national understanding and cooperation.^
Arab nationalism, as interpreted by the Ba'th, has three objectives
unity, liberty, and socialism. These are the three pillars of the- party
ideology. They are equally important and are complementary to one
another. However, while the party works to attain all three objectives,
it places more emphasis on unity at the present time.^ For it believes
that liberty and socialism can be more fully realized in a united Arab
nation. The liberty practiced by each Arab state as a separate unit
3 Shareh Destur Hizb al-Ba'th al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki (Explanation of the Constitution of the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party) (Damascus, u .d .) , p. 5 .
h "Forum Interview s Michel A flaq," Middle East Forum, op. c i t . , pp. 9-10. 5 M ichel A flaq, Al-Qawmiyah Haqiqah Haiyah Dhat Madmun Insani Ijabi (Nationalism is a living Reality Having a Positive and Humanitarian Context), a speech delivered in the North African Club (Cairo-, March 22, 1957). ^ Michel Aflaq, Ma'rakat al-Hasir al-Wahid (The Struggle for Common Destiny) (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1958), pp. 18-20.
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would not be as mature, inclusive, and positive as it would be if the
Arab world were to function as one political unit. The implementation
of socialism would be partial and limited within the separate states, but
truly effective under one economic unit.
The Concept of Unity
The idea of Arab unity is not an innovation of the Ba'th party.
Movements aiming a t achieving Arab u n ity had e x iste d before the Ba'th
movement was born. According to th e B a'th, the Arab world i s a nation
in being whose progress has been interrupted and whose entity has been
dismembered by foreign domination and control and by internal corruption.
It holds that the Arab world is "one nation and that its present political,
divisions are artificial," and avows that, "The party is organized to
bring about this union. . . .
However, the Ba'th has given Arab unity a new concept. Unity,
according to the party's ideology, evolves from revolutionary thought and
revolutionary action. "Arab unity, in our opinion, is the result of the
spiritual revolution in Arab society. It is, at the same time, one of g the factors causing this revolution." The Ba'th concept of unity is
revolutionary because its attainment requires the liberation of the Arab
people frcm existing conditions and the introduction of fundamental
changes in the stru ctu re o f modern Arab s o c ie ty . B elievin g th at
7 Gibran Majdalani, "The Arab Socialist Movement," Laqueur, editor, The Middle East in Transition, op. c it., p. 337.
® Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'th (For the Resurrection), (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1959), p. 17&.
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the Arab people are one nation, the party advocates the formation of an
indivisible political-econoraic-cultural unit, and it holds that the
struggles of the revolutionary forces throughout the Arab world for
liberty and reforms w ill draw them progressively toward this goal.
As the Ba'th is a populist movement, it teaches that the achieve
ment of Arab unity depends upon popular struggle and upon the expression
of popular yearnings and desires. Any victory that the Arab people score
in any part of the Arab world in their struggle toward liberation and
progress is considered a positive step toward unity, for the feeling of
unity in struggle contributes to the feeling of Arab unity. Although
unity may not be attainable at the present time, it should be the u lti
mate objective of all the struggles in the different parts of the Arab
worlql. These parts need to feel at all times that they are parts of a
logical whole and that they are striving to complete that whole.
Believing that the unity of the Arab world requires the unity of
revolutionary forces that have a popular base, the party does not trust
the traditional nationalists who are holding power in most of the Arab
states to unify the Arab world. This attitude has caused criticism of
the Ba’th by other Arab nationalists. The party "supports Arab unity,
but the stress is not on Arab sentiment but on class solidarity against
the traditional ruling circles," said Walid Khalidi critically, "Tacti
cally, its followers adopt a fastidious and carping tone and set them- 9 selves up as arbitrators of true nationalism."'
9 Walid Khalidi, "Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent," Laqueur, editor, The Middle East in Transition, op. c it., p. 125.
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The party supports the concept o f Arab u n ity on sev era l grounds,
the most important of which are language, history and culture, common
feelings and aspirations, economics, geography, self-defense, and
community of interests.'*-® Race and religion, which some authorities
consider to be among the elements constituting Arab nationalism and unity,
have been discarded by the Ba’thists.
The geographical area o f the Arab world forms one u n it. The Arab
homeland stretches over the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, the
Nile Valley and North Africa. It lies between the Atlantic Ocean, the
Mediterranean Sea, the Sahara Desert, the Ethiopian Mountains, the Arabian
Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Taurus Mountains. The party maintains
that the people living within this area have the right to live in a free
and united nation-state and to utilize its wealth and direct its poten
tialities. Simple natural barriers and climatic differences are insig
nificant, for the Arab people are not only the people who live on Arab
land, they are also the people who speak a common language, share a
common h isto ry and cu ltu re, and pay a lleg ia n ce to th e Arab nation fe e lin g
that they belong to it and aspiring to live within it.
The Arabic language, used by all the Arabs in all their states,
unites the Arabs in feeling, thought, and culture. Costi Zurayq, in his
book, al-Wa’iy al-Qawmi (The N ational C onsciousness), d iscu sses the
superiority of the Arabic language and its importance as a unifying
element, and urges every nationally conscious Arab to study his language,
'*'® Shareh Destur Hizb al-Ba’th al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki, op. cit.. pp. 7-1Q.
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to ponder its -vitality, and to discover its unique powers in building
the Arabs' present and future.
Common historical experiences and cultural values create an identity
o f future a sp ira tio n s and hopes. The movement o f Prophet Muhammad, the
renaissance of the Umayyads, the civilization of the Abbasides, and, in
recent history, the struggle against Ottoman and Western domination, are
the deeds of the fathers and forefathers of all the Arabs. This contri
butes to the realization that they are descendants of one nation.
The common desire to protect the Arab national, interest and to
unite in self-defense further the process of unity.
The party believes that economic unity is an important element of
political unity. Arab historians tend to support the view that throughout
Arab histoey, the attainment of economic and political, unity has been
directly proportional and closely related.
During the Abbasid period, the Muslim world, of which the Arab world was a part, comprised one economic unit. . . . That economic unity was to some extent the result of the then prevailing political unity of the empire, the marked progress of its industries, and the exis tence therein of some kinds of specialization in production, as well as the flourishing condition of its agriculture and trade. Simul taneously, that economic unity was one of the factors working for industrial progress, commercial prosperity and political unity i t s e l f . 11
The Concept of Liberty
The Ba’th concept of liberty is a moral concept. Its basis is the
liberation of the individual from political, social, economic, intellec
tual and other restrictions, and the emancipation of his w ill, thus giving
Nabih A. Faris and Muhammad T. Husayn, ojo. c it. . p. 1*2.
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him an opportunity to r e a liz e h is p o te n tia l and to lead a b etter and more
productive life.
Liberty cannot be fully attained as long as internal corrupt condi
tions persist and colonialism is present. The Arab people must struggle
for liberation from within and without. They must free themselves from
foreign domination and control, corrupt rule and feudal family influence,
ignorance and superstition, poverty and illness. The dominated and sup
pressed people have to play a negative role in order to begin a positive
one in society. Michel Allaa, in a speech delivered at "The Struggle
A gainst Imperialism" convention held in Athens between November 1 and 5,
1957, said:
I believe that this negative aim for the achievement of which we meet—namely, the struggle against imperialism—w ill not be really fruitful and w ill not be persistent and powerful, if it does not bear from now the seeds of the positive end which should follow the struggle against imperialism, and which the peoples and the whole world aspire to accomplish. This end aims at progress, peace, and power to fu lfill the human m ission.
The constitution and teachings of the party call for liberty on
the individual, national and international levels. Holding that indivi
dual freedom is a sacred right, the party believes that the freedoms of
speech, belief, association, and art should not be limited] that absolute
equality before the law should be granted to all citizens, and that equal
opportunities should be guaranteed.
Individual freedom does not lead to anarchy and chaosj on the
contrary, it furthers collective freedom and preserves both individual
12 Michel Aflaq, a speech delivered at "The Struggle Against Imperialism Convention," (Athens, November 1, 1957).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and common interests. John Stuart Mill in his famous essay, "On Liberty,"
said, "From this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within
the same lim its, of combination among individuals. . . .n^-3 Liberty within
the lim its of the law—a law that represents the popular w ill—promotes the
common interest which is an aggregate of individual interests. It
encourages reform, progress, justice and virtue; and restrains evil, cor
ruption, vice, and selfishness.^
The Ba'thists do not go to Rousseau's extreme of forcing men into
freedom by having all people legislate their own laws, which is ideally
perfect but practically impossible. Nor do they go to Hegel's opposite
extreme of believing that men become free by obeying law. This theory
holds true only in actual democratic societies where men legislate their
own laws through their elected representatives. They are closer to
Laski's concept of liberty which maintains that liberty is "the absence
of restraint upon the existence of those social conditions which, in
modern civiliaation, are the necessary guarantees of individual,
happiness."^
The Ba'th party believes that the Arab people w ill find their
liberty through democracy. Since the people are the source of power,
sovereignty should belong to the people. Popular sovereignty can be best
^ John Stuart M ill, On Liberty (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 187k), p. 28.
^ Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'th, op. cit. , p. 9.
Harold J. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State (New York: The Viking Press, 19k9), p. 33.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. expressed in a democratic representative form of government, for if laws
are legislated by the elected representatives of the people, the liberties
of the people w ill be guaranteed. Article lU of the party constitution
states: "The system of government in the Arab state should be a represen
tative and constitutional system. The executive authority must be respon
sible to the legislative authority, which should be directly elected by
the people."
Liberty implies equality, for man cannot be truly free unless he is
equal to his fellow man. Absolute equality is impossible; but equality
of opportunity and equality before the law are essential elements of a
liberal, democratic society. The absence of equal opportunities indicates
the presence of privileges to some members of society. Like Aristotle,
the Ba’th believes that the struggle for equality is one of the basic
causes of revolution. The Ba’th sees equality as the connecting link
between liberty and socialism because socialism creates equal economic
opportunities and distributes wealth equitably, thus providing more
equality in society which, in turn, assures more liberty.
Ba’th Socialism
The Arab concept of socialism is more that of a cause than a philo
sophy. It has not been theorized by any philosopher but has emerged out
of the Arab individual's awareness of corrupt existing conditions and his
desire to cure the social and economic illness of his society. It has
evolved to liberate the Arab individual from exploitation— the laborer
from the domination of capital and machine, and the peasant from the
slavery and tyranny of the feudal landlord.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. While socialists agree on the ultimate objectives of the socialist
spirit and principles'—the liberation of man from exploitation, the
elevation of his dignity and value, and the provision of social security
and equality of opportunity—their methods and their kind of socialism
should differ in accordance with the existing differences in their respec
tive societies. Humanitarian socialism does not necessarily imply that
the same kind of socialism should be applied in the different parts of
the world; it rather means that the spirit of socialism should be main
tained and adapted to the various environments.
Ba'th socialism is humanitarian as well as nationalist. When the
Ba'thists speak of Ai*ab socialism, they do not refer to a new theory of
socialism nor do they cite an innovation that disputes other socialist
thought in purpose or application, for they acknowledge- that socialism
has a common humanitarian heritage.^ They simply mean that these
common principles and aims should be adapted in the Arab society and in
its social and economic institutions in a way which suits the existing
conditions in the Arab society and helps the process of its development
and progress. Ba'th socialism is nationalist because its degree and
application are determined by the Arab interest and the Arab needs.
Michel Aflaq says:
We do not disagree ^with the socialists^ on the principle of socialism but on its means, and on the position it should occupy
^ Jamal al-Atasi, "Al-Ishtirakiyah Taharrur bi al-Nidal," (Socialism is Liberation through Strife), Michel Aflaq and others, Dirasht Fi al-Ishtirakiyah (Studies in Socialism), (Beirut: Dar al-Taliah, I960), pp. 103-10U.
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in our life. We do not accept our nationalism as a transitory and temporary stage of the stages of economic evolution. . . . We want our socialism to serve our national cause. . . .17
The ex ten t and degree o f Arab so cia lism should continuously evolve
to meet the changing needs and interests of Arab society. In this respect,
the Ba'th outlook compares with Jean Jacque Rousseau's philosophy on
socialism. Rousseau viewed property as a social right that can be used
according to the w ill of society. If the interests of society require
that private property should be abolished and that property should be
owned in common, this should be done. An individual "gives himself to
(the community) with all the resources at his command, including the
goods he possesses,"!® when the interest of the community so demands.
Rousseau recognized the essential basis of socialism when he wrote,
. . . my thought is not to destroy absolutely private property, because this is impossible, but to restrict it to the closest limits, to give it . . . a bridle which reins it, which directs it, which subjects it, and keeps it always subordinate to the general w i l l . 1?
Ba'th socialism is democratic. Ba'thists believe that socialism,
which is the economic aspect of democracy, is the means to free the indi
vidual and to establish a democratic society. They maintain that their
socialism—by freeing the Arab individual from need, want, and exploita
tion, and by securing for him a decent standard of living—lays the
!7 Aflaq, Fi_ Sabil al-Ba'th, op. cit., p. 98.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Social Contract (Chicago: The Univer sity of Chicago Bookstore, 19l|0), p. 19*
!? "Socialism," Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. lli (New York, 193U), p. 192.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. foundations of democratic society. In his introduction to Aflaq1s book,
Fi Sabil al-Ba’th, Sa'dun Himadah mentions that Ba’th socialism can be
accomplished through economic planning drawn up by the state which repre- on sents the will of the people. u
Like the Fabian Society in Great Britain, the Ba’th movement binds
democracy with socialism. In the Fabian essays, published in 1889 and being
the most important source of British socialist thought, Sidney Webb linked
socialism with democracy. "So long, however, as democracy in political
administration continues to be the dominant principle, socialism may be
quite safely predicted as its economic obverse."21 The Fabian Society,
organized in 1881;, aimed at reorganizing s o c ie ty "by the emancipation o f
land and industrial capital from individual and class ownership, and the
v estin g o f them in the community fo r the general b e n e f it ."22 Under the
leadership of Bernard Shaw, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, H. G. Wells, Harold
Laski, and G.D.H. Cole, it attempted to convert the governing classes to
socialism by the democratic process. Like the Fabians, the Ba’thists
aim at capturing the state not by violence but by the power of the people,
through democratic and parliamentary means.
To attain its objectives, Ba’th socialism advocates the increase
of production and wealth; the equitable, but not necessarily equal,
distribution of wealth; and the guarantee of a minimum standard of
20 Aflaq, Fi_ Sabil al-Ba'th, op. c it., p. 9c
21 Bernard Shaw, Sidney Webb and others, Fabian Essays in Socialism (New York: The Humboldt Publishing Co., 1891), p. Ii3.
22 Ib id . , p. ix .
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living for laborers and peasants through the institution of a social
security system*
In order to obtain a fairer distribution of income, the party
resorts to nationalization, limitation of industrial and land ownership
and real estate, and application of a system of progressive taxation.
Believing that the wealth of the nation belongs to the people, and
th at the n ation should manage and channel th at w ealth in the b est in te r e s ts
o f th e p eop le, the party recommends n a tio n a liza tio n o f the major means
of production and all public u tilities. Nationalization is a significant
socialist measure, because it enlarges the public sector of the economy
and reduces the private sector by transferring the means of production
from private to public ownership. This is the basis of a socialist
system. As Pigou described it, "A socialized system is one the main part
of whose productive resources are engaged in socialized industries.
Expressing more or less the same idea, William Ebenstein said that in a
socialized society, basic economic planning should be decided upon by the
"community, not by private owners of the means of production; the basic
industries, at least, w ill therefore have to be directly avmed and
controlled by the community.
The Ba'th party rejects the idea that total nationalization is the
only available alternative to the system of private enterprise. It does
23 A.G. Pigou, Socialism Versus Capitalism (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1937 ), p. 2.
William Ebenstein, Great P olitical Thinkers, 2nd ed. (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1956), p. 721.
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not adhere to the"theory that all the means of production, distribution,
and exchange should be nationalized. Even the British Labor Party, which
adopted that formula in its 1918 platform has since introduced drastic
changes reducing the sector of the economy to be nationalized.. In 195>1,
the Socialist International, representing more than thirty socialist
parties from different countries, "specifically rejected the older doctrine
of total nationalization," and agreed that "socialist planning is compat
ible with private ownership in agriculture, handicrafts, retail trade and 25 small and medium-sized industries." Needless uo say, the economic
conditions prevalent in a given society play a primary role in the extent
of nationalization.
To increase national production ana wealth, the state should
develop industry and agriculture, maintain a balance between imports and
exports, encourage foreign trade, and protect national production and the
interests of the producer and the consumer. The state should, therefore,
take into consideration the following principles in drawing up its
economic policy:
a. Consider that the sources of wealth should be owned by the n ation .
b. Prevent the exploitation of the efforts of others.
c. Forbid projects that allow exploitation, such as large-scale industries and feudal ownership.
d. Emphasize the necessity for the state to interfere to uirect and increase production, and to organize its fair distribution among the citizens.
^ E’illiam Ebenstein, Today1s Isms, 2nd ed. (Englewood C liffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1958), pp. 226-227.
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e. Guaranteeing state interference to secure the needs of the society and to bring happiness to all by finding work for all, getting rid of unemployment,and providing old-age pensions and se c u r ity for th e d isa b led .
By limiting land ownership and distributing land to peasants, the
party hopes to end the e:xploitation of the peasants by feudal landlords
and create incentive among the farmers that w ill result in an increase in
the area of cultivable land and greater productivity. To implement land
reform, the state can set a maximum on the amount of land that can be
owned by an individual and nationalize the surplus land for distribution
to peasants and needy farmers.
The party program aims at the same objectives in industry. It
states that industrial ownership should be limited depending upon the
interests of the public and the citizens' prevailing economic standards
of living, and that workers should become shareholders. Following the
same principle, it advocates limitation of real estate ownership by the
state. Like Proudhon (1809-1865), who believed that only labor gives
right to property, the Ba’th party proposes that an Industrial and Agri
cultural Bank be established by the state for the purpose of making loans
to workers without interest.
Considering that private property is a natural and sacred right,
the party believes that private ownership and inheritance should be
allowed within lim its. Their restriction should be defined by the people
Shareh Destur Hizb al-Ba'th al-Ishtiraki, op. cit. , pp. 38** 39.
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in accordance with the national interest. Believing in individual liberty,
Ba'th socialism recognizes the individual’s right to earn the worth of his
efforts and qualifications in production and his prerogative to dispose
o f i t in any way he deems f i t . 27
The Ba'th places great emphasis on the laboring classes. It
considers laborers and intellectuals to be its two main sources of sup
port. "Arab resurrection cannot achieve anything significant ’without the
sin cere and clo se cooperation o f these two classes.Like other social
ist movements, the party works to improve labor conditions. Presuming
that labor is the source of production and that, unlike capital or
machinery, it has a social function which contributes to the establish
ment and management of in du stry, the party preaches th at laborers should
share in the ownership and management o f th e ir in d u str ia l en terp rises and
should receive a share of the profits in addition to their wages. The
party believes that the state should protect the workers by enacting
labor laws that assure them a decent minimum wage, leave with pay, compen
sation for accidents occurring on the job, and similar guarantees.
The Ba'th encourages the establishment of laborers' and farmers'
cooperatives and guilds as they are useful instruments for protecting
workers' rights, raising their standard of living, and promoting their
cooperative spirit. The party sees organized labor as a major force for
27 Wahib Gharim, "A l-Ishtirakiyah wa al-H uriyah a l-In sa n iy a h ," (Socialism and Human Liberty), Aflaq and others, Lirasat Pi al-Ishtirakivah, op. cit., p. 155. 28 Michel Aflaq, "Al-Ommal wa al-Muthaqafun Da'mat al-Nidal al- Ishtiraki," (Laborers and Intellectuals are the Two Pillars of Socialist Strife), Dirasat Pi al-Ishtirakiyah, op. cit., p. 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the establishment of a democratic and socialist society. The democratic
structure of guilds affords a significant group of citizens the opportunity
to practice democracy within the framework of their organizations which
develops their sense of responsibility and their awareness of their power
to influence policy .^9 Translating this awareness into national action,
guild members can influence their system of government and its policies.
The Ba'th party has consistently called upon the laborers to unite and to
organize so that they can serve their just cause and that of their country.
Workers should be nationally conscious. They should realize their rights and know that they constitute the largest class of this nation. They cannot improve their conditions if they remain separated from each other and divided into conflicting groups. . . . Workers should realize that they form one group, that their interdst is the same, and that they constitute a powerful and huge force—a historical force—which can influence the trend of Arab history and save the Arab n a tio n .30
The party believes that labor should be organized on a populist
basis that is independent of but cooperative with the government. This
type of organization is in the interest of the national economy in
general and the laborers in particular. To maintain smooth relation
ships, the party recommends the formation of special labor tribunals to
negotiate disputes arising among management, state, and labor.
The Ba'th concept of socialism includes many areas of life other
than the economic. Health, education, and social security are all
^ Eliya Abu al-Huss, "Dawr al-Tanzim a Naqabi- fi Bina'al-Ishtira- kiyah'*(The Role of Guild Organization in Achieving Socialism), Aflaq and others, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiyah, op. cit., p. 177.
Michel A flaq, "Al-Omnal wa al-Muthaqafun Da'amat al-N id al al-Ishtiraki," op. cit;, p. 21.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. concerns of the Ba'th program. While Ba'thists believe that it is the
duty o f every capable in d iv id u a l to work, they recommend th a t a s o c ia l
security system be operated by the state to insure workers against unem
ployment due to old age, disability, or a shortage of jobs. The state
should assure the livelihood of the aged, the unemployed, the disabled,
and the retired. The state should also provide free hospitalization and
medical care for all of its citizens. The party places particular emphasis
on the availability of free education at all stages and compulsory educa
tion at the elementary and secondary levels.
The party works to dissolve class distinctions and privileges, for
it believes that only when class barriers disappear w ill equal opportu
nities be open, social justice prevail, human potentxal be realized, and
class struggles cease.
The Concept of Revolution
The Ba'th advocates a social revolution that w ill pave the way for
unity, democracy, and socialism. It adopts revolutionary rather than
evolutionary means believing that only a fundamental change in the struc
ture of Arab society w ill allow the introduction of the basic reforms that
are necessary for the reestablishment of that society on a sound basis.
3asic reforms can be achieved only by changing the whole structure of Arab
society, not by introducing partial reforms and minor changes. "The basis
of the social system . . . changes by revolution .... History, then
teaches us that our emancipation must be sought in revolution."31
31 Socialist Party of Great Britain, Socialism (London: S.P.G.B., Ruby Chambers, 1933 ), pp* UO-lil.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The role of revolution in the ideology of the party is defined in Article
6 of its constitution:
The Arab R esurrection S o c ia lis t Party i s rev o lu tio n a ry . I t believes that its principal goals of reawakening Arab nationalism and bringing about socialism cannot be achieved except through revo lution and strife, and that the dependence upon the slow march of evolution and the contentment with partial and superficial reforms threaten these goals with failure and loss. Therefore, the party decided to:
(a) struggle against foreign imperialism to attain absolute and complete liberation of the Arab homeland;
(b) struggle to unite all the Arabs in a single independent s ta te ; and
(c) revolt against existing evils touching all the intellectual, economic, social and political aspects of life.
Ba'thists follow democratic popular methods to implement their
principles as opposed to the autocratic and absolute methods employed by
the Communists. Unlike the Communist party, the Ba'th party is not a
revolutionary machinery for overthrowing governments by violence or armed
revolt. Rather, it aims at revolutionizing the Arab citizens to intro
duce basic and revolutionary changes*
Revolution, as interpreted by the Ba'th, is the renaissance of the
Arab spirit, the reawakening of the Arab people, and the revival of the
national consciousness. This revolution prior to being a social and
political movement, is first and foremost a moving spirit and a feeling
of responsibility that urge the individual on to action.
The party is the machinery of revolutionary action and popular
organization. Like Lenin, the Ba’thists believe that a revolutionary
theory needs an organism to translate it into action. "Lenin was clear
from the outset that to make the revolution it was necessary to make a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 32 party." To reach this stage, revolutionary leaders must form the core
of popular organization and mobilize the revolutionary spirit of the
people. Thus, the Ba’th concept of revolution is a positive one. Unlike
the conservative and negative concept of revolution before the end of the
eighteenth century, "revolutions have been conceived dynamically as
instruments of positive change—as midwives of a new and more satisfactory
fu tu r e ."33
Having arisen from the need for a basic change in the existing
conditions in Arab society, the first objective of this revolution is to
replace the governing class and those rulers who preserve the status quo
and who believe that a superficial change in political conditions w ill
solve the Arab problems. For the governing class is distinguished by
three characteristics that conflict with the true Arab interest and oppose
its revolutionary goals.
It is distinguished, first, by its authoritarian mentality. It tries to use power to guard its existence and interests. That is the reason it resists any movement which may enable the people to seize power. It is distinguished, secondly, by having an exploitive interest and bad financial inclinations. This class confronts the people with all that delays their economic and social liberation and their revolution. It is, thirdly, characterized by its preference for a policy of cooperation with and acquiescence to imperialism.3h
For these reasons, the party calls for popular struggle and rejects the
32 Edward H. Carr, Studies in Revolution (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 1U9.
33 John D. Lewis, "Marxism, R evolution, and Democracy: 18H8-19W3," The Journal of Politics, Vol. XI (August, 19h9), p. 319.
3H Al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyah Fi Suriya (Political Parties in Syria), (Damascus: Dar al-Rawad, 195U), pp. 233-236.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. leadership of the feudal class which still holds power.
The revolution in the Arab world should be continuous, for a revo
lution is not complete on the basis of a specific realization or a limited
success. Continuous revolution is the dynamo of the resurrection of the
Arab nation and the mechanism o f i t s etern a l m ission.
Secularism
The Ba’th movement is a secular movement. It believes in the sepa
ration of church and state and in the establishment of religious freedom.
The state should not adopt or encourage any religion or faith or belief,
nor should it differentiate among citizens on the basis of their religious
s e c t s .
By preaching secularism the Ba’th does not reject spiritual values
in favor of material ones. Its secularism does not seek human improvement
and progress by material means, nor is it non-spiritual or non-religious.
The Ba'th movement has moral values in common w ith C h r istia n ity and Islam ,
the two prevalent religions in the area, and belieies that religion is an
essential element in human society, and that its principles are the basis
of good life.
Nevertheless, as social r eformers, Ba’thists have an obligation to
point out the deterioration in the practice of religion and the deviation
from it and, sometimes, its exploitation by certain religious leaders.
On that ground, the party has been attacked as being anti-religious.
These attacks are not objective and are usually founded on political
expediency, and, thus expressed in an emotional way. The following
excerpts, taken from a statement made by the Prime Minister of Libya on
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August 12, 1961 while attacking the Ba'th underground activities in Libya,
are typical illustrationsr
We belong to our family which is Arabism and Islam in our religion. The Ba'th party (resurrection) is a subversive one and it started in Libya a few years ago. I was shocked when I learned that Libyan young men receive orders from such a subversive party as the Ba'th party which tries to undermine, and destroy our religion and beliefs. . . .
The Libyan public opinion is very much concerned with the secret party that was discovered by security forces in the country. This secret organization aims to create trouble and endanger the peace and security of the country for no reason whatsoever except for the sake of chaos and disorder. . . .
I have never believed that our faithful religious young men w ill be over attracted to such a subversive godless party. I believe that the Libyan people are as one family and subversive ideas w ill never live in our religious sincere atmosphere. 35
To such charges the party replies, "Those who do not realize that
there is a battle to be fought . . . and those who do not see in religion
today a weapon used by exploiters . . . are the real enemies of r e l i g i o n . "36
The Ba'th party is joined in its liberal viewpoint by most modern Arab-
thinkers and intellectuals, and this view appeals to the average Arab 37 citizen. An indication of the trend can be seen in a comparison of
public reaction in Egypt to the books of Ali Abd al-Raziq and Khalid
Muhammad Khalid, both sheikhs at al-Azhar who advocated the separation
between religion and state and criticized the exploitation of religion
by th e p riesth ood . When a l-R a ziq 's book, "'A l-Islam wa Usui al-Hukum
(Islam and the Sources of Power), appeared in 1925, public opinion,
35 Tripoli Mirror, Vol. 2, No. 125 (August 13, 1961), pp. 1 and 3.
36 Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba'th, op. cit., p. 205.
37 Joseph M ughaizel, "Secularism and Arab N ationalism ," Middle East Form, Vol. XXVI, No. 10 (December, i960), p. li*.
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aroused by th e Ulama o f al-A zhar, caused h is expulsion from the Ulama
College and from uia job as a Shari*ah judge, in 19^0, when K halid's
book, Min Huna Nabda* (From Here We Start), was published, it was wel
comed by the Arab m asses, and th e court r e je c te d th e req uest o f the Ulama
of al-Azhar to have the book banned.
Although the party does not consider religion to be one of the
basic elements of nationalism, it believes that Arab thought is indebted
to Islamic teachings and that Islam, especially during its early period,
contributed a great deal to the Arab national movement. Islam has made
not only national and intellectual contributions to Arabism; it has
enhanced the spiritual, moral, and humanitarian values of the Arabs as
well. The Arab legacy could not be understood without understanding the
Islamic legacy which is an integral part of Arab culture.
Prophet Muhammad was the architect of the Arab state and the
promoter of unity among the Arabs. In that early stage, the religious
bond was stronger than the national bond; thus, Islam was a more powerful
force than Arabism. But was that not true in the Christian world in the
Middle Ages? In his book, The National Consciousness, Costi Zurayq con
firms this point by saying that at that time, religion was predominant
over nationalism both in the Christian West and in the Muslim East. But
with the development of Islam, the Arab national movement took an inde
pendent course. As Ahmad Baka' al-Din points out Islam has played an
essential role in preserving Arab nationalism and in its promotion and
maintenance, but th at does not mean th a t Islam i s Arabism and Arabism
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i s I s la m .^
The party, while recognizing the contribution of Islam to the
establishment and progress of the Arab national movement, maintains that
Arab nationalism i s a secu lar movement and preaches separation between
religion and state in the interest of building a better Arab society.
Positive Neutralism
Inspired by the Arab national interest, the party advocates foreign
policy aimed at the liberation of all nations, freedom and self-determina
tion for all peoples, maintenance of international peace and order, and
promotion of human progress and civilization. These objectives can be
attained by abolishing imperialism and foreign occupation and instituting
cooperation among nations.
At this stage of world history, with the presence of a loose bi
polar system, the party proposes that the Arab governments adopt a policy
of positive neutralism and. non-alignment. Positive neutralism implies
cooperation with both camps following the Arab national interest. It does
not mean isolation and withdrawal. However, this cooperation should not
lead to commitment to or alignment w ith eith er s id e . The Ba’th movement
realizes that the collapse of either of the two camps at the present
stage of history is not in the interest of the Arabs.
The collapse of the communist camp means the victory of the capitalist and imperialist camp and the expansion of its exploitative control over our [k rsh j wealth and its infringement on our sovereignty. At the same time, the defeat of the capitalist camp means the sweeping
Ahmad Baha' al-Din, "Al-qawmiyah al-Arabiyah wa al-D in," (Arab N ationalism and R e lig io n ), Rose E l-Y oussef, No. 1612 (May U, 195>9), p . 3.
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domination of the world by Communism and its refutation of nationalism and freedom* Thus, our interest lies in the development and change of the two camps: the capitalist camp moving toward socialism and the abandonment of colonialism, and the communist camp moving toward liberty within the Soviet Union and the recognition of the freedom of other nationalities to choose their own way of achieving socialism. To make that evolutionary progress possible on both sides, war should be prevented.39
The neutralist policy adopted by the Ba'th is advocated by most
Asian socialists as serving their best interests. Taking into considera
tion the special values, the distinct conditions, and the unique problems
of their respective societies, A.sian socialists have "refused to become
slaves to either totalitarian communism or capitalist democracies of the
West."^0
The propaganda slogan, "peaceful coexistence," used by the Comunists,
especially during periods of tension in the cold war, is meaningless with
out the presence of a third force. Article 37 of the program of the
Socialist Party of India states, . .Two systems, mutually contradictory,
hostile and suspicious, cannot co-exist unless a third new system and
integration begins to gather strength and forces the two to co-exist in
peace.The theory of peaceful coexistence is workable only with the fi existence of a powerful neutral bloc.
The mere fact that the neutralist bloc has attracted a sizable
39 Ba'th Publication, Fi al-Hiyad al-Ijabi (Concerning Positive Neutralism), (Cairo, 1997), p. 1.
^ Saul Rose, Socialism in Southern Asia (London: R .I.I.A ., Oxford University Fress, 1959), p. 2h.
^ S o c ia lis t Party, Statement of P rin cip le s and Programmes (Hyderabad: Socialist Central Office, 1956), p. 12.
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portion of the nations and peoples of the wo rid is indicative that neither
camp is absolutely right in the current world conflict. On the contrary,
it means that both camps are wrong in one way or another, although not
necessarily equally wrong. The "Third Force" aspires to something higher
than the avoidance of war. Its policy of positive neutralism in the con
duct of international relations is based on humanitarian rather than
material considerations to maintain international peace and order and to
establish a better world society.
The Concept of Eternal Mission
There have been many inquiries about the meaning of the term
"eternal mission" which the Ba’th ideology refers to. What is the nature
of the mission? How can it be eternal? To what extent is that ideal
mission practical?
The Ba’thists answer that the Arab nation has a mission to serve
the whole human society as well as’ the Arab society. In their pursuit of
peace, prosperity, and justice, the Arab people seek to cooperate-with
other nations to bring about continuous improvement in the welfare of
humanity. They are aware that they are a part of the struggle of all
peoples to realize a common goal, and they support these struggles. The
third principle of the party constitution embodies this idea:
The Arab nation has an eternal mission manifesting itself in new and complete form s throughout the stages of history, and leading to the reformation of human values, the advancement of human progress and the development and enhancement o f harmony and cooperation among n a tio n s.
Therefore, the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party declares that:
1. Colonialism, and everything related to it, is an evil which w ill be fought by the Arabs with every possible means. They w ill make
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continuous efforts, within their material and moral capacity, to help all peoples who are struggling for their freedom.
2. Humanity is a whole, unified in the pursuit of its common welfare, and mutually responsible for its value and civilization. The Arabs draw upon w orld c iv iliz a t io n and, a t th e same tim e, they make th e ir contribution to it. They extend a brotherly hand to other nations and cooperate with them in bringing about the rule of just laws providing prosperity, peace, and moral and spiritual elevation for all peoples.
Realizing that there is a wide gap between the corrupt and backward
conditions existing in the Arab world and the ideal conditions under which
the Arab people might fu lfill their mission, the party maintains that the
Arab people must reform their own society by rebuilding its foundations on
unity, liberty, and socialism to be able to bring about the conditions
they aspire to attain.
The battle to reform Arab society is a battle among the Arabs
themselves. It is a battle between those who would maintain the status
quo and those who seek to uncover and develop the Arabs’ hidden potential.
Its outcome depends upon the Arabs who must accept the responsibility for
corruption and backwardness in their society. In a speech delivered on
April 17, 1955 commemorating the withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria,
Michel Aflaq touched upon this point: "It is high time for the Arabs to
stop blaming their failures on imperialism. When they study their prob
lems in perspective, they realize that they are the only people responsible
for their own destiny.Colonialism was an outcome of their lack of
responsibility rather than its cause.
^ Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Ba’th, op. cit., p. 77.
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Since th e aim o f th e Arab m ission i s human progress and reform,
its function is not limited to specific achievements or restricted to a
certein period of time. Its role is continuous and permanent as long as
humanity exists. It evolves according to the needs of humanity, but its
ultimate objective, the common welfare of the human society, remains the
same. Therefore, the Ba'thists look upon the Arab mission as eternal.
They aver that the Arab nation, which contributed to world civilization
and human progress earlier in its history, can play an important role in
current struggles and future achievements. This nation, whose construc
tive mission has been interrupted by internal corruption and foreign
domination, has the potentialities that qualify her to resume her share of
the responsibility for the welfare of mankind.
To the Ba'th, the eternal mission is not an ideal theory. It is a
practical reality. The party presumes that this mission began with the
Arab nation's past contributions to world civilization, and is continuing
with the new generation's realization of the need for a complete revolu
tion—social, economic, and political. Thus, the Arab mission is not a
future project; it is being accomplished nowj1? The attempt to deal with
problems in a responsible and serious way, the feeling that drastic action
should be taken, and the struggle to bring about better conditions are all
indications of the functioning of this mission.
In its present phase, the Arab mission is the resurrection of the
Arab nation. This is the Arabs' best possible contribution to humanity
^3 Ib id . , p. 109.
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at the present time, for human values can develop best in a sound, strong
nation. Only from a position of strength can a nation be a major influ
ence for progress in the community of nations that make up the whole
human s o c ie ty .
I I . STRUCTURE
Membership
Nationalists, socialists, and liberals are attracted to the Ba'th
movement. Its members and supporters are drawn mainly from the intellec
tuals, students and professional people, and the working classes and
peasants. Its power is concentrated in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the
Arabian Peninsula, and to a lesser extent, in North Africa and Egypt.
Liberal and revolutionary as it is, the Ba'th is the only party that has
been able to infiltrate the interior of the Arabian Peninsula and has
spread in the Arabian sheikhdoms and principalities.
The Ba’th party has branches in all of the Arab states as well as
in the non-independent parts of the Arab world. At the time of writing,
the party is either banned or not licensed in most Arab countries. Sin ce
it must operate underground in some Arab states, the number of party
members is not divulged. This secrecy about the party's numerical strength
is necessitated by the fact that every member is active and is strictly
attached to party orders.
The party places great emphasis on the quality of its members.
Eelieving that the leading elite and the dedicated few can more efficiently
lead the Arab masses, the party has set certain restrictions on membership.
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The Ba'thists should set "the perfect example of the Arab individual
struggling along with the Arab people . . . in all. aspects of life in
accordance with the principles of the party.
The party does not encourage every believer in the Ba’th principles
to become a party member. I t f e e ls th at certa in supporters and sympa
thizers can better serve the party if they are not formally affiliated
with it. For this reason, the ratio of party members to supporters is
approximately one to ten.
Most candidates for membership are required to undergo a two-year
probation. The probationary period can be shortened at the discretion of
the party. During that time, applicants are tested and observed, especially
by the members who recommended them. Once accepted, a candidate must
take the party oath which pledges him to be faithful to party principles,
to uphold the party’s policies, to abide by its regulations, and to
execute i t s orders. As a member, he has to lead a new l i f e . He i s
expected "to mix with party life, preserve its unity, abide strictly and
faithfully by its orders . . ., struggle always to promote its goals and
surmount obstacles blocking its way.”
The quality of party leadership determines a party's cohesion and
success. Successful party leadership, said V.O. Key, Jr., needs to have
^Ba'th Publication, Al-Nizam al-Dakhili (internal Regulations), (Damascus, 19U7), Chapter II, Article $, Section e.
^ Ibid_., section b.
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the ability "both to hold together the inner core of the party organiza
tion and to reinforce the loyalties of the great mass of party follow ers.”^
In parties with a democratic structure and leadership like the Ba’th, the
two q u a litie s do not have to be combined in the same person or persons.
Party officials, elected by the members to serve for a limited period of
time, do not necessarily become party leaders simply by holding responsible
p o sitio n s fo r one or more terms o f o f f ic e . N everth eless, the two capa
cities are often combined.
In discussing the Ba’th party leadership, the author has chosen to
cite Michel Aflaq, Salah al-Bitar and Akram al-Kurani. Several facts con
tribute to the acknowledgement of their leadership of the party. These
men are the founders of the party. Their devotion and their contributions
to the party have been determining factors in its steady development and
successful growth. The prevalent impression, which seems to be true, is
that Aflaq is the philosopher of the party and its inner core pulse, that
al-Kurani is its politician and practical maneuverer, and that al-Bitar
combines and balances the two aspects of leadership possessed by the
other two.
The selection of these three leaders does not imply that they are
the only leaders of the party, nor does it discredit the other leaders or
potential leaders whose future contributions may equal or even exceed
those of the three Ba’thists whom the author has cited,
Michel Aflaq, known as the "Ba’th Philosopher," is one of the most
^ V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (Newr York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19ltM, p . 319.
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influential of the contemporary Arab intellectuals, if not the most influen
tial* His influence is derived not only from his ideological philosophy,
but from the numerous thousands of young educated Arabs who follow his
political thought, and from the struggles and achievements of the movement
he has established. His life has been a combination of thought and action,
a distinguishing characteristic that the Ba'th party tries to identify
itself with by attempting to uphold its principles by its practices—a
phenomenon that i s a lie n to most p o lit ic a l p a r tie s in the Middle East.
Thus, Aflaq is a political leader as well as a philosopher, although his
latter role is the dominant one. As the publishing house, Dar al-Arab,
describes him,
Michel Aflaq—the name that shines in the history of political and ideological thought . . . the intellectual light that has enlightened a whole generation of educated people throughout the Arab world—is a leader, an educator and a preacher. . . ,h7
Born in Damascus in 1910, M ichel Aflaq pursued h is higher education
in Paris. From 1928 to 1933, he studied history at the Sorbonne Univer
sity where he earned his ''Licence" degree. During his student years in
France, he was in close contact with other Arab students and participated
in the founding of Arab student unions and Arab societies which aimed at
serving the Arab cause.
Upon his return from Paris, Aflaq taught history and began to write
articles that carried the seeds of the Ba'th principles. His teaching
career was very rewarding as it provided him with an opportunity to
preach his doctrine and to be in direct contact with the new generation.
^ Aflaq, Ma'rakat al-Masir al-Wahid, op. cit. , p. 3.
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By this means, he and his colleague, Salah al-Bitar, were able to plant
the seeds of their revolutionary philosophy and to recruit educated Arab
youth for their movement. Aflaq left the teaching profession in 19U2
when h is preaching e ffo r ts m aterialized in an organized movement that
consumed most o f h is tim e.
Aflaq made three unsuccessful attempts to secure a seat in the
Syrian Parliament—in 19U3> 19U7, and 1 9b9. He was M inister of N ational
Education from August 1$ until early October 19U9. Since 19U9, he has
not run fo r any p u blic o f f ic e .
While pursuing their principles and fighting for their beliefs,
Aflaq and his companions have been persecuted by the authorities on
several occasions. Aflaq: was arrested by the French in 1939, by Husni
al-Zaim in 19b9, and by S h ish ak li in 1952 and 1951;. During the S h ish ak li
regime, he escaped custody and lived outside of the country for ten months.
When the national headquarters of the party moved from Damascus to Beirut
following the union of Egypt and Syria in 1958, he moved to Beirut because
he was, at that time, the secretary-general of the party.
Michel Aflaq is well educated and well read. He has a broad knowl
edge in various fields, especially history, sociology, and economics.
-He is the author of two books, the co-author of others, and has written
several pamphlets and booklets and numerous a r tic le s . Through h is
writings, speeches, lectures, and party publications, he has contributed
to modem Arab thought.
Salah a l-B ita r , the co-founder of the party, was born in Damascus
and has led a life that, in many ways, parallels that of his colleague,
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Michel Aflaq, Both men are about the same age. They studied together at
the Sorbonne University where al-Bitar received his "Licence" degree in
science in 193U. From that time until 19h2, al-Bitar, like Aflaq, was a
secondary school teacher. He has been arrested several times—in 19U5
under the Quwatli regime, in 19U9 by Husni al-Zaim, and in 1952 and 195>U
by Shishakli.
, He is well-read and is the author of one book and several articles.
He failed to be elected to the Syrian Parliament in 19h7 and 19h9, but was
elected as a deputy from Damascus to Parliament in 195U. He was Minister
of Foreign Affairs from June 15,. 1956 until the merger of Egypt and Syria
in February 1958, and he headed the Syrian delegation to the United Nations
during its twelfth session in 1957. He served as Federal Minister of
State for Arab affairs in the first cabinet of the United Arab Republic
from March 6, 1958 until the end of the year 1959 when the Ba'thist
ministers, acting as a body, resigned their posts with the UAR government.
He made an unsuccessful attempt to be elected to the Syrian Parliament
in the December 1961 e le c tio n s .
Akram al-Hurani, somewhat younger than Aflaq and al-Bitar, is the
politician of the party and the leader of its deputies in Parliament,
having served as a deputy since 19U3. He held the posts of Minister of
Agriculture in 19h9 and Minister of Defense in 1950. He scored a striking
victory by defeating a coalition of feudal families supported by the Arab
Liberation movement of Adib Shishakli and the P.P.S. in the 195U elections
in Hamah. In that election all the Ba'th candidates were elected and all
the members of the list drawn from the feudal families failed. On
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October 15, 1957 he was elevated to the post of Speaker of the Syrian
Parliament. He was one of the four vice presidents of the United Arab
Republic from March 6, 1958 until his resignation, along with other Ba’thists
at the end of 1959. All of the members of the Ba’th list in Hamah, headed
by al-Hurani, were elected to the Syrian Parliament in December 196l.
Al-Hurani was born in Hamah of a bourgeois family. He received
his ’’Licence" in law from the Syrian University in Damascus. He is the
co-author of two books and the writer of several articles. He won his
popularity in Hamah by appealing to the liberal and progressive elements
as early as the 19h3 elections. At that time, al-Hurani began to form a
progressive and nationalist group that became the nucleus of the Arab
Socialist Party which he founded in 1950. In the same year that the party
was founded, it began to issue a paper called al-Ishtirakiyah (Socialism).
In 1951 he set an example for feudal landlords by distributing a
portion of his lands to the peasants who cultivated them. In 1953,
during the struggle against the Shishakli dictatorship, al-Hurani*s party
merged with the Ba’th party.
Organization
In contrast to the majority of the European socialist parties,
which attempt to win as many members as p o ssib le and to organize them in
a semi-decentralized way, the Ba’th adopts a strict centralized system
with vertical links uniting the leadership with the membership base. The
cell system practiced by the Ba’th is one of its elements of strength.
It provides strict discipline and efficient contact between the party’s
members and its leaders.
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The National Executive Committee is elected indirectly by the
members due to the difficulty of implementing direct elections which would
require the holding of a general meeting. The members of the National
Executive Committee elect the Secretary-General of the Party. Each
country has its own executive committee which elects its secretary-general.
Secretaries-general of the party branches in the different countries are
ip so fa c to members o f the N ational Executive Committee. Each s ta te execu
tive committee is elected in turn by the executive committees of the
various party divisions in the different districts of that state. These
divisions are subdivided into branches, groups, and so on down until the
cell is reached. The cell, which is the smallest party unit, is composed
of a few members who elect their secretary-general.
The policy of the party is prescribed by the National Congress,
which is composed of delegates representing the party organizations in
each country, and implemented by the National Executive Committee and
the National Secretary-General. Each state branch holds an annual con
vention to decide upon the political strategy to be followed during the
year to carry out the party policy.
The organization of the party is close to that of the Communist
and Fascist parties except that while the latter use autocratic methods,
the Ba'th party follows strictly democratic procedures. Thus, it does
not necessarily follow that strict discipline and centralization cannot
be achieved by the democratic process. Maurice Duverger said, "strong
articulation must not be confused with democratic structure . . . a rigid
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system of articulation may or may not b9 democratic." ^8 -p^e Ba'th party's
hierarchical pyramid of power is erected on the democratic procedure of
elections at all levels to assure the combination of party discipline and
democracy. Nevertheless, this strict organization of a party professing
democracy may pose a question since such organization is practiced by
parties in authoritarian nations, and since parties advocating democracy
generally have a loose organization.
llfi Maurice Duverger, trans. by B. k R. North, Political Parties Their O rganization and A c tiv ity in the Modern State (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 195h), p. Uu
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THE ARAB RESURRECTION SOCIALIST PARTY:
HISTORY AND ACHIEVEMENTS
The Ba'th is the only Arab party that has members and branches in
the various Arab states. In applying its principles throughout the Arab
world, it treats the area as one indivisible unit. Two decades after its
inception, it is the strongest single Arab party and one of the most
influential popular forces in the Arab world, especially among the young
intelligentsia.
The Ba'th movement was esta b lish ed in Damascus in response to pre
vailing political, social and economic needs. It did not emerge from an
existing political force, nor was it ever identified with a popular group
of traditional politicians. The party started propagating its principles
by exposing the Arab conditions, uncovering the Arab potential, and
revealing the path that would lead to the recovery and reconstruction of
Arab s o c ie ty .
Its diagnosis of past failures in Arab history seemed accurate, and
its appraisal of Arab destiny and avowal of future Arab grandeur appeared
attractive and convincing to the young generation of Arabs. At the
beginning, it was a purely ideological movement, far removed from the
practice of traditional politics and the aspiration to hold power. With
i t s grandiose and id e a lis t ic approach to l i f e , the Ba'th movement became
the rage of the Arab youth.
The party's principles were declaimed by its founders for several
115
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years before the party was formed in 19k0* As ea rly as 1935* Michel
Aflaq stated that the Arabs were seeking liberty and independence as the
means for utilizing their creative powers and potentials to achieve in
their society, as well as in every society, "human perfection1' ■which is
the ultimate goal of all human beings. Aflaq described socialism as one
of the basic pillars of a perfect life and an ideal society.^ In 1936,
he wrote that socialism, by securing work for everyone and by giving all
human potentials and qualifications the opportunity to develop and to be
utilized, assures a just distribution of wealth. In 19U0, Aflaq ex
plained that Arab nationalism should spring from the conditions of the
Arab s o c ie ty and the s p ir it o f Arab cu ltu re and c i v ili z a t io n .3
By 19U0, the propagation of the Ba'th principles materialized
into an active, although secret, movement. The Ba'th party was pro
claimed publicly in 19U3. Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar resigned their
positions as secondary school teachers in 19-U2 and devoted their time
and efforts to spreading their beliefs and organizing their movement.
I . EARLY HISTORY (19UO-19U9)
Since its inception, the policies of the Ba'th party have been
oriented toward the Pan-Arab interest rather than the local interests of
a p a rticu la r Arab s ta te . Even in i t s ea rly days, when the party was
^ Aflaq, Fi_ Sabil al-Ba' bh, op. cit., p. 19.
2 Ibid. , p. 22.
3 Ibid., p. 27.
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confined, to Syria, its activities were not limited to that part of the
Arab world.
In 19Ul, the party supported Rashid Ali al-Kaylani's revolt against
the British in Iraq by mobilizing Arab public opinion in support of the
revolt and by offering to send volunteers. Using the same means, the
Ba’th rushed to t-he aid of the Lebanese in their uprising against the
French in 19U3.
Believing that a sound unity should be based on popular consent
rather than on government agreements and treaties, the Ba’th party
criticized the formation of the Arab League in 19hS on the basis that its
covenant provided for a loose confederation.
In 19h$, the party exposed the personal and regional interests
behind the Greater Syria scheme and the proposed unification projects of
the Fertile Crescent. The scheme was popular in official circles and
even among some Arab nationalists. President Shukri al-Quwatli,in an
address before the Syrian Parliament on February 27, 19U3; said that he
welcomed the scheme and supported it provided that it was based on the
free w ill of the people inhabiting the area known as ’’Greater Syria.
The party opposed the scheme on two grounds: First, the formation of a
Greater Syria would enhance the belief in the existence of a Syrian
nation and, thus, jeopardize the position of Arab nationalism. Second,
the movement, which had sta rted in Damascus at th e General Syrian Con
ference of 1920, was adopted in the 19h0’s by King Abdullah of Jordan
^ Al-Qabas, No. 2862 (February 28, 19U5), p. 1.
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and Nuri al-Said and was suspected of having British backing.
During its early period, the party's struggles were concentrated on
two main targets* French imperialism and corrupt national leadership.
Its immediate aims were to liberate Syria from her foreign yoke and achieve
her independence, and to fight internal corruption by exposing the faults
and weaknesses, the selfishness and exploitation of the national leader
ship. The important role that the party played in fulfilling these aims
revealed the extent of its popular appeal, especially among students and
intellectuals.
After the evacuation of French troops from Syria, the party opened
i t s headquarters in Damascus in July 19l|6 and sta rted publishing i t s
newspaper, ' a l-B a 'th . The f in a l form o f the c o n stitu tio n o f ~the party
and its internal administration were decided upon during its first conven
tio n held in Damascus in A pril 19k7 •
Following the advent of Syrian independence, the party assumed a
role of opposition to the government. It opposed the famous Decree 50
issued in October 19U6 which restricted freedoms granted to citizens by
the constitution by making the Minister of Interior the sole authority to
determine the extent of freedom to be enjoyed by the public, the p oliti
cal parties and the press. Public pressure incited by the Ba'th caused
Parliament to cancel the decree. The members of the Constitutional Com
mittee of the Chamber of Deputies, which included Akram al-IIurani,
recommended that the decree be voided because i t was u n con stitu tion al^ —
^ A lif Ba', No. 7396 (November 19, 19^6), p. 1*.
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a recommendation that was adopted by Parliament on November 18, I9I46.
In the same spirit, the party fought the system of indirect elec
tio n s adopted by Jamil Mardam's government in 19U7. I t m obilized public
opinion against the law, and this resulted in student demonstrations In
Damascus. Demonstrators carried placards reading, "We want direct elec
tions,” and ”The nation insists on abolishing the existing electoral laws."
The government was forced to yield to this pressure, and, in April 19U7S
the Parliament adopted a direct elections law.
Looking back over the activities of the Ba'th in this period, it
appears that while the party's opposition to the Syrian government may
have been well-motivated, its policies were hardly realistic enough to
challenge traditional politics. The party was too liberal and too
enthusiastic in its desire for rapid change.
The authorities took a negative stand on the party's candidates
and banned the party paper during the 19U7 election campaign. However,
the Ba'th continued its opposition to the regime. In the spring of
19)48, it mobilized public opinion to oppose the amendment of the Syrian
Constitution legalizing the reelection of the President of the Republic.
The amendment was proposed by the government to enable President Quwatli
to run for another term. Despite the party's efforts, the amendment
passed, and Quwatli was reelected for a second term on April 10, 19)48.
During the war in Palestine, the party, while recruiting volunteers
to fight in Palestine, persisted in its sharp criticism of the Arab
^ Ibid., No, 7$05 (April lU, 19U7), p. 2.
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rulers. The Ba’th asserted that the Arab governments, by being primarily
concerned with concentrating all authority in their hands and in the
hands of a few individuals who represented the feudal families and there
fore, ignoring the wishes of their people and the Arab national issues,
including the Palestine question, were mainly responsible for the loss- of
Palestine. The outcome of the Arab-Israwli war gave the Ba’th party a
strong impetus for its first major plunge into the inner circles of
Arab p o lit i c s .
The Palestine question has greatly influenced the foreign policy
of the Arab states. The Ba'thists see it as one of the major reasons
for the Arabs’ adoption of a neutral policy in the East-West conflict.
Justifying this policy, Aflaq said on January 21, 19U8,
If the. Arabs today were in a situation which was free from imperialism, occupation, and division; and if they wished to determine freely that attitude towards the world conflict which was nearest to their ideals and national interests, it might be that this attitude would be more inclined towards the side of the democratic nations rather than the side of the totalitarian states because they know that freedom is the essence of their lives, and it was the strong basis for their past awakening, as it w ill be in the future. But the position of the Arab countries and the attitude of the Western bloc towards Palestine prevent the Arabs from being on the side 01 the Western bloc. . . . ‘
I I . THE PERIOD OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS (l9h9-I95U)
The Ba'thists played an important role in preparing the people to
accept Husni al-Zaim’s coup d'etat on March 30, 19U9 and were later the
first group to oppose that dictatorial regime in public. On June 2, the
party addressed an open letter to al-Zaim explaining why it had at first
7 Al-Ba’th (January 21, 19H8), p. 1.
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welcomed the coup and why it had later started opposing his regime; "We
have been surprised by your policies and actions which contradict the O statements declared with the coming of the revolt." The leaders of the
party demanded th at th e new regime do away w ith corruption, provide more
liberties, hold free elections, and resume constltutional democratic life
in the country. Al-Zaim answered by dissolving all political parties,
imprisoning the Ba’th leaders, and introducing an authoritarian regime.
After the downfall of Husni al-Zaim by the Hinnawi coup on August
ill, 19U9, Michel Aflaq accepted the post of Minister of National Education
in the cabinet formed by Hashim al-Atasi. In the elections that were held
that same year, three party candidates were returned as deputies to the
Syrian Parliament.
In 1950, Akram al-Hurani formed another socialist party in Syria,
the Arab Socialist Party (al-Hizb al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki). His party
aimed at "the revival of the Arab nation by making it follow its real
id e a ls , at u n itin g the Arabs and providing them w ith f u l l sovereignty . . . 9 and at applying a socialist system."
The party was organized first in Hamah, the home of al-Hurani, and
in some of the villages in the districts of Horns, Ma’arra, and Aleppo.
Its power was derived mainly from al-Hurani’s influence and his ability
to in still in the peasants and farmers a sense of their own worth. He
aroused the peasants to fight against the feuds landlords and to defend
® Al-Nahar, No. Ij209 (June 3> 19h9), p. 3. 9 Muhammad H. Farzat, Al-Hayat al-Hizbiyah fi Surya (Party Life in Syria), (Damascus: Dar al-Rawad, 1955 ), p. 233.
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their rights.
The interests and objectives of the Ba’th and al-Hurani’s party
coincided on a number of issues. This led to the merger of the two
parties in 1953 when they were both involved in the underground struggle
to overthrow the Shishakli dictatorship. The newly formed Arab Resurrec-
tion Socialist Party retained the complete constitution of the former Arab
Resurrection Party (Ba’th) without the slightest change.
While it may be too early to predict the long range effect of the
merger, certain phenomena have developed which allow for reasonable judg
ment of its consequences. On the one hand, the merger has solidified the
socialist front in Syria and strengthened the party. On the other,
certain segments of the Arab intelligentsia have criticized the Ba’th
leadership for joining with Akram al-Hurani whom they consider more a
professional politician than a doctrinaire. Although its doctrines and
its ideals have not changed since the merger, the party has become more
p o lit ic a l. Whereas i t was once prim arily an id e o lo g ic a l movement, i t now
aspires to propagate its principles and attain its goals by building up
its political power.
The Ba’thists opposed the Shishakli regime on two accounts: its
dictatorship and its foreign policy. Their heaviest criticism was
directed at Shishakli's proposals to join the Middle East Defense Scheme
and to settle the Palestine Arab refugees in Syria. This criticism led
to popular discontent with the government's policies, particularly in
army and student c ir c le s .
On December 28, 1952 Shishakli arrested sevenfy-six army officers
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who, as he put it, were deceived by "some extremist elements of the dis
solved political parties." On the following day, Michel Aflaq and
Salah aL-Bitar, leaders of the dissolved Arab Resurrection Party, and Akram
al-Hurani, leader of the dissolved Arab Socialist Party, were taken into
custody and charged with undertaking "political, attempts against the
national unity." On January 3j 1993 the three leaders escaped custody and
entered Lebanon as political refugees.
Colonel Shishakli was annoyed with the Lebanese press for supporting
his opponents and with the Lebanese government for granting them political
asylum, an action which precipitated a crisis between the two countries.
Explaining the cause of the crisis, Emir Khalid Shihab, the Prime Minister
of Lebanon, said:
The press attacks, which were bitter enough after last week's poli tical purge of the Syrian army, took on a revived intensity when three leading Syrian Socialists escaped from custody and sought political asylum in the Lebanon on January 3, giving press inter views which added fuel to the inflammatory attacks. ®
While it gave the three political refugees asylum, the Lebanese govern
ment requested th a t they r e fr a in from making statem ents to th e press and
undertaking political activities in Lebanon.
When Shishakli entrusted to a committee of civil servants the
responsibility of drafting a constitution, the three leaders, along with
others, signed a letter criticizing that move and submitted it to the
Syrian government in June 1933* Their action, added to constant pressure
from Shishakli, caused the Lebanese government on June 21 to request that
^ "Tension Between Syria and Lebanon," Mideast Mirror, Vol. U, No. 39 (January 10, 1933), p. 1.
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the political refugees leave Lebanon. They went to Switzerland and then
to Italy where they stayed until October 21, 1953» the day they returned
to Damascus.
In the meantime, political parties were reactivated following the
issuance of a decree on July 10, 1953 allowing parties to function with
in certain lim its. Alleged constitutional life was restored in that same
month following Shishakli*s proclamation of a constitution which adopted
the presidential form of government.
The s till prevalent dissatisfaction with the Shishakli regime re
sulted in a conference at Horns among the three major parties in Syria —
the Sha'b (People), the Ba’th, and the Watani (National) parties — and
the formation of a ’’National Front." At the conference, the parties
agreed to cooperate in boycotting elections held under an authoritarian
regime, in securing liberties, and in achieving democracy.'11
Upon their return to Syria, Aflaq, al-Bitar, and al-Hurani resumed
their struggles against the regime by issuing circulars and publications,
and holding popular meetings and demonstrations. These activities gave
Shishakli good reason to arrest them, along with other political leaders,
on January 27, 1954. They were detained for about one month, but the
army revolt which they had instigated in the Suwaida Province led to the
dow nfall o f S h ish ak li on February 25, 1954-.
I I I . ATTAINMENT OF POWER AND ACHIEVEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1954-1959)
Following the collapse of the Shishakli government, the Ba’thists
•^Farzat, o£. cit. , p. 273.
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agitated for the formation of a neutral government to organize and hold
elections. The first cabinet, formed by Sabri al-Asali, did not meet
their specifications, and they refused to be represented in that cabinet.
The five Ba'thist deputies were the only representatives who did not
give a vote of confidence to the al-Asali government. The formation of
a neutral cabinet under Sa'id al-Ghazzi met their request.
In the September 195U elections, party members won sixteen seats
and party supporters won ten in a House where independents numbered 53
out of lii2 members. The party scored a significant victory in Hamah
where it was opposed by the biggest feudal families in Syria and some of
the most influential landlords who had the support of the P.P.S. 12 and the
S h ishak li Arab L iberation Movement. Akram al-H urani, heading the Ba'th
list, received 17,95U votes to defeat Abd al-Rahman al-Azm, the head of
the opposing list, who received 10,255 votes.^
The party opposed the government formed by Faris al-Khuri on
November 1, 195U for "vagueness" in its foreign policy, as defined by
its statement submitted to Parliament, but agreed to join a coalition
government formed by Sabri al-Asali on February 13, 1955. Dr. Wahib
Ghunayim, Minister of State and of Public Health, represented the Ba'th
'Party in that cabinet.
-*-^The P.P.S. (Le Parti Populaire Syrien) believes in the existence of a Syrian nation composed of people living in geographic Syria known as "Greater Syria." Hence, this party aims at the unification of this geographic area including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine and Cyprus.
~^A1-Ayam, No. 53U6 (September 27, 195U), p. 5.
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When Shukri al-Quwatli, who was elected President of the Republic on
August 18, 1955. took office on September 6, the party issued a statement
denouncing foreign military alliances and supporting the proposed Arab tri
p a r tite pact between Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The statem ent went on to
say that the party had decided to be on the opposition to assure that "past
political mistakes w ill not be repeated." This statement referred to the
corruption that had existed during the previous Quwatli regime which had
led to the first military coup d'etat in the summer of 19^9.
The power of the Ba'th party grew and its influence multiplied
after the overthrow of Shishakli. Its expansion threatened the interests
of the rightist elements, and they resorted to violence and political
assassination to maintain their power.
On February 27, 1955» Ba'th party members clashed with Syrian
National Party (P.P.S.) members in Deir al-Zor. That clash was followed
by two others on March 5 in th e Harem and Suwaida d is t r ic t s . The follow
ing day, a more serious battle took place in al-Ma'ara between the Ba'thists
and supporters of the landlords, resulting in two deaths and thirty in
juries. Clashes in Hamah on April 17 between the Ba'th and the Arab
Liberation Movement resulted in several casualties from both parties. One
of the people killed was Wasil al-Hurani, Akram's brother and a prominent
Ba'thist. The series of clashes culminated in the assassination of
Colonel Adnan Maliki, a Ba'thist and the deputy chief of staff of the Syrian
Army and. its strong man. The assassin, Sergeant Yusif Abd al-Rahim, was
a P.P.S. member. Documents discovered by the police allegedly revealed
that the assassin was carrying out party (P.P.S.) orders. "Other
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documents were claimed as revealing that the Party, in turn, was acting 1 ^ L under orders from a foreign country." That incident, which was con
demned by Arab public opinion, accelerated the decline of the P.P.S. and
increased the popularity of the Ba’th.
The party has always tried to influence the Syrian government to
adopt a more lib e r a l p o lic y toward th e labor movement and to respond
favorably to the laborers’ demands. In April, 195^» three deputies from
Korns, Hamah, and Deir al-Zor, a ll party members, submitted a b ill to
Parliament requesting the legislation of a new labor code which would be
in conformity with Article 26 of the Constitution. That article required
"the establishment of an economic and social system that w ill provide
social justice and protect the workers and peasants." Pending the draft
in g o f th e proposed code, Parliam ent amended th e 19^*6 code, removing some
articles that were considered detrimental to the workers. Although their
b ill was not enacted, the Ba’thist deputies continued to propose legis
lation in the interest of labor and to champion the workers' rights.
When the newly created Ministry of Labor, headed by a member of
the Peopleb Party, issued a decree in 1956 allowing business firms to
withhold a portion of the laborers' wages as disciplinary action, the
Ba'th representatives in Parliament and in the cabinet, supported by
the press and the laborers, were able to arouse public opinion that led
to the annulment of the decree. During the same year, when a Ba'thist was elected to head the
Aleppo Minimum Wage Commission, the People's Party, which controlled the Ministry of Labor and considered Aleppo its political stronghold,
^"Political Unrest Again in Syria," Mideast Mirror. Vol. 6, No. 50 (April 30, 1955). p. 10.
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declared the election illegal by invoking Decree 2h-3. The decree, intro
duced in 1952 during the Shishakli regime, prohibited members of labor
syndicates to affiliate with any political organization. The Ba'th
party explained the faults of the law to the public and organized a
demonstration against the government's actions Incited by the Ba'th,
fifteen thousand workers demonstrated in Aleppo, and the law was abolished
on February 27, 1956.
Consequently, the Ba'th became an influential party among the
workers. An "on-the-spot check" made in 1957 revealed that 18 out of 21
syndicates in Hamah were dominated by the B a'th ists, with the others
being conservatively inclined; in Latakia, 8 of the 12 syndicates were
Ba'thist-dominated, and the rest were either independent or dominated by
the National Party; of 29 syndicates in Horns, 15 were Ba'thist., 5 were
communist, and the others were either conservative or independent; in
Aleppo, where the strength of the People's Party (and to a lesser extent,
the National Party) lies, 7 of the 31 syndicates were under Ba'thist in
fluence; in Deir al-Zor, 1 syndicate was Ba'th-dominated and 3 were inde
pendent; of 26 syndicates in Damascus, k were dominated by Ba' th is ts , 2
by communists, and the rest by the National and People's parties and inde
pendents.1^ It need hardly be added for the sake of accuracy that the
fact that the leadership of a syndicate is controlled by or inclined to
ward a certain political party does not necessarily indicate that all ,
or even a majority o f the members of the syndicate are members or sup
porters of that party.
1^Hikmat M. S. Nabulsi, Labor Organization and Development in Syria: 1946—1958 (A Ph.D. dissertation at Georgetown University, October, I960 ), p. 335.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 In the spring of 1956, the Ba’thists, finding the circumstances
suitable, reactivated their campaign for unity between Syria and Egypt.
Ba'th leaders showered the public and press with statements explaining the
advantages and the necessity of that unity to the Arab cause.^ Follow
ing the resignation of the al-Ghazzi government on June 2, 1956, Sabri
al-A sali formed a new cabinet on June 14 in which the B a'thists were
represented by Salah al-Bitar as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Khalil
al-Kallas as Minister of National Economy. The party agreed to partici
pate in this cabinet only on the condition that unity with Egypt, at least
on a federal basis, be adopted as government policy. "The Ba'th party
said the government must commit itself to federation when seeking Parlia
ment's confidence, so that there would be no retreat from the scheme."^
The basic reason for the Ba'thists' decision to establish unity
between Syria and Egypt was that they felt that the revolutionary regime
in Egypt, which followed a liberal and socialist trend, had much in common
with, their own ideals. President Jamal Abd al-Nasser declared on July 6,
1955 that the revolution aimed at "abolishing feudalism, exploitation,
and the rule of capitalism. It came about to establish social justice 1 ^ and to lessen differences among classes."10 The decadent so c ia l and economic conditions were among the major
causes of the army coup d'etat of July 23, 1952 in Egypt. The revolutionary
'■ vz " ' Sabah al-Khayer, No. 17 (May 3, 1956), p. 12. ^"Federal Union of Egypt and Syria," Mideast Mirror. Vol. 8, No. kZ (October 21, 1956), p. 12.
18A1-Ahram. No. 25057 (July 6, 1955), p. 8.
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regime endeavored to improve these conditions by introducing social and
economic reforms, the most important of which was the agrarian reform
law. This law limited private ownership of agricultural land to 200
acres. Societies possessing lands for agricultural improvement, companies
using land for industrial purposes, and waste lands were exempted from that
provision. In addition to implementing the agrarian reform law, the
government of the revolution nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956,
established minimum wages for agricultural workers, abolished civil titles,
encouraged cooperative societies, and undertook similar measures to
relieve the peasants and workers from the tyranny of the feudal landlords
and c a p it a lis t s .
Clarifying the policy of his government, President Nasser stated
on December 3, 1957:
We aim to build a socialist, democratic, cooperative society free from political, economic, and social exploitation... We want to organize our economy according to a plan embodying the principles of social justice and designed for the welfare of the people and not for the welfare of a few individuals. We wish to coordinate the public social activity performed by the state and the private economic activity performed by individuals. We want to use public w ealth fo r serving the national economy and not to employ it for individual benefits. We plan to encourage coopera tion and make it replace separatism. We want to secure social security and to help the sick and provide social security to the old.-*-9
The Ba'th continued to cooperate with the left wing of the
National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) and with Khalid al-Azim, the leader
of the independent group in Syria. Al-Bitar and al-Kallas retained
their sensitive posts in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National
19 Al-Akhbar, No. 1690 (December 6, 1957), p . 6.
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Economy, r e s p e c tiv e ly , in the cab in et formed by Sabri a l-A s a li in Jan
uary 195?. This government was one of the most Pan-Arab oriented in
Syria since independence. It practiced the principle of positive neu
tralism and rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine. It refused to allow the
repair of the pipelines passing through Syria, which had been blown up
during the Suez crisis, before the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from Egypt early in March 1957- The Ba'thists were partially success
ful in checking communist infiltration and, with the cooperation of the
nationalist elements, were able to bring about unity between Syria and
Egypt early in 1958.
On the threshold of the emergence of the United Arab Republic,
the Ba'th party was almost in control of power in Syria, Ba'thists
occupied key positions in the government and they were firmly estab
lished in the popular base. They were "well entrenched in the army
and the civil service; well organized as a party among the people;
knit together by a coherent popular ideology which their rivals (except
the Communists) lacked." ^0
The party's popularity was tested in the by-elections held in
A pril 1957* In the Damascus e le c tio n s , the B a'th can d idate, Riyad a l-
Maliki, defeated his opponent, Dr. Mustafa Siba'i, leader of the Muslim
Brotherhood, who was supported not only by his party, but by the People's
Party, the Arab L iberation Movement, th e P .P .S ., and independent r ig h tis t
elements. On October 1^, 1957 Akram al'Hurani was elected Speaker of
"Behind Syria's Decision," The Economist, Vol. CLXXXVI, No. 5973 (February 15, 1958), p. 589-
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the Chamber of Deputies after defeating his opponent* Dr. Nazim al-Qudsi,
—the President of Syria at the time of writing—a prominent leader
of the People's Party, the majority party in Parliament, and a former
Prime Minister and Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. By the end of
the year, "the Socialist Renaissance party was the most influential single
political body in Syria,
To the Ba'th, positive neutralism means the cooperation, accord
ing to the Arab national interest, with all nations of the world without
commitment to or alignment w ith any p a rticu la r camp or b lo c.
Deriving its stand from its principle of positive neutralism,
denouncing the idea of a power vacuum in the Middle East, and feeling that
the Z ion ist th reat was more dangerous and imminent to the Arabs than the
communist threat, the party rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine. Explain
ing the Ba'th stand on this doctrine, Salah al-Bitar, then Syrian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, said at a party rally held on August 28, 1957,
The Eisenhower Doctrine is based on the assumption that the world is divided into two: the world of good, which is the Western world, and the world of evil, which is the Eastern world, and that aggression against Arab countries can only be expected from the Soviet Union or international communism. The United States cannot tolerate an international neutral bloc. The doc trine as it stands does not provide for aid except for those nations which give up the policy of positive neutrality and free policy and admit that communism is the only threat to their inde pendence, without any regard to the imperialist and Zionist dangers. The policy of positive neutrality does not necessarily mean cooperation with one bloc alone. Should one bloc refrain from extending a helping hand there would be no alternative but to look at the other bloc. That is why we consider the results
21 Joseph Lawrence, "The Levant Chooses Socialism," Middle Eastern A ffa ir s , V ol. IX, No. 5 (May, 1958), p. 176.
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o f the Moscow ta lk s a ogical consequence of the United States' policy against Syria. i
The Ba'thists, while accepting Russian assistance, continued to
suppress the communist movement in Syria. The communists, who were
willing to cooperate with Arab nationalists in the struggles to fight
Western imperialism, worked against Arab aspirations when the construc
tiv e and p o s itiv e stage came. Observing that subversive communist e l e
ments were attempting to sabotage the projected unity between Syria and
Egypt, both President Nasser and the Ba'th party realized the danger
o f the Communist Party and decided to put an end to i t s a c t iv i t ie s .
In interpreting the moves leading to the establishment of the
United Arab Republic, "The Economist" stated:
President Nasser was persuaded to accept union by the Ba'th party both he and i t had p a rtly in mind a d esire to lim it the Soviet directed Communist Party of the Levant. This is not an absurd supposition, for it is integral to the ideas of President Nasser and the Ba'th, despite their policies of the past two years, that a subservience to the Russian influence is as much an offense against the Arab nation as is subjection to Western policies.22
While the Ba'th party and President Nasser found a common cause
in th e ir e ffo r ts to suppress communist a c tiv ity , i t was not the d eter
mining factor in their decision to unite Syria and Egypt. The most
important factor, as we have noted, was that both Egypt and Syria at that
time followed progressive Arab policies. Both had the same revolution
ary, attitude and a similar outlook on foreign policy and internal reforms,
22 "Two Worlds," Mideast Mirror, Vol. 9, No. 35 (September 1, 1957), P- 3.
23 "Pan Arab Challenge to Ankara," The Economist, Vol. CLXXXVI, No. 5971 (February 1, 1958), p. 379.
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especially from the socialist point of view. A negative contributing
factor was that unity with Iraq and Jordan, which had commonly been
considered the logical first step in unifying the Arab world, was not
feasible at that time due to their monarchial form of government and
their foreign policy and treaty attachments with the West. The most
practical reason for Egyptian-Syrian unity was that these two states
were willing to merge, while the other Arab states — or at least their
governments — were not.
At a combined session of the Egyptian National Assembly and the
Syrian Chamber o f Deputies on November 1^, 1957» both bodies voted
unanimously to bring about union as soon as possible. Akram al-Hurani,
the presiding officer, addressed the representatives of the two Arab
states as follows: "The people want a comprehensive Arab unity in one
Arab homeland. They also want a just socialist system for this unity
th a t w ill work to save th e Arab nation from d eprivation and oppression.
Salah al-Bitar was authorized by the Council of Ministers to
discuss details of the union and made his first trip to Cairo for that
purpose on January 16, 1958. That trip was followed by several meetings
which materialized in the birth of the United Arab Republic in February
1958. The first U.A.R. cabinet, announced by President Nasser on March 6,
1958, included four Ba'thist ministers and one Ba'thist among the four
vice presidents.
The party, after achieving unity between Syria and Egypt, continued
^ J o in t Session of Syrian and Egyptian Parliaments," Mideast Mirror, Vol. 9. No. k7 (November 21957)* P* 3*
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its drive for unity in the rest of the Arab world. However, its efforts
were concentrated on effecting a more perfect system of government in
the United Arab Republic by applying its socialist and democratic prin
ciples. While the Ba'thists scored some successes in implementing
socialist measures, their efforts to institute a democratic form of govern
ment were frustrated.
A land reform law was introduced in the Syrian region similar to
the one in force in Egypt since 1952. Surplus lands were taken by the
state to be distributed among the peasants. The state set up a compen
sation plan whereby it would pay landowners an amount equal to ten times
the annual rent of the confiscated land, the payment to be made over a
forty-year period in government bonds yielding one-half percent interest
per year.
This law fixed the maximum lim it of ownership at eighty hectares of irrigated and orchard land and 300 hectares of non-irrigated land per person. In addition to the maximum lim it, the owner is entitled to dispose of ten hectares of irrigated land and forty hectares of non-irrigated land for his wife and each of his children, provided the total area in each case does not exceed forty hectares of irrigated land and 160 hectares of non-irrigated land. The law provides that the expropriated land shall be distributed to small farmers in plots not to exceed eight hectares of irrigated and orchard land and thirty hectares of non-irrigated land.^5
About 2.U5 million hectares, almost U5 percent of the total
cultivated area in Syria in 1957, was earmarked for redistribution
among 750,000 beneficiaries. Party members Khalil al-Kallas and Mustafa
Hamdun, holding the portfolios of Minister of Agriculture and Minister
25 United Nations, Economic Development, in the Middle East 1958-59 (New York: United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, I960), p. 13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 of Agrarian Reform, respectively, in the Syrian Region, coordinated
their efforts by extending credit through the Agricultural Bank to farmers and by creating farmers’ cooperative societies. However, in
attempting to implement the law, they ran into the opposition of the
big landowners and in flu en tia l feudal fam ilies. The Minister of Agrarian
Reform in the Syrian Region said on December 21*, 1958,
Some people have accepted the majority’s steps in good fa ith but others, few in number, have behaved in a manner which displays ill intentions, declining to carry out their commit ments in spite of their ability to do so and launching a wave of tendentious rumors against the law and its aim s.26
Before the end of October 1959> the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Syria
had confiscated about four million dunums of land, had distributed more
than two million dunums, and had established 101* cooperative societies.
These so cie ties, which were responsible to the Ministry, had the right
to buy agricultural machines, to sell their produce, and to train the
farmers to use modern agricultural methods. The other two million dunums of confiscated land had been leased to small farmers who were moved to
the Jazirah and Euphrates provinces where these lands were located. The following table shows the process of land requisition and distribution
in hectares in Syria early in 1961:
26 "Special Reforms Committee," Mideast Mirror, Vol. 10, No. 52 (December 28, 1958), p. 2.
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Irrig a ted Non-irrigated T otal
Land su b ject to the Law 9h, 109 1,10*9,526 1,51*2,635
Land req u isitio n e d by January 15, 19 6l l h , 273 582,1*62 596,735 Land d istrib u ted by January 15, 19 61 9,789 126,382 136,171
SOURCE: Ministry of Planning, U.A.R. (Syrian Region) Planning Memoran dum No. 3j March, 1961.
i/Jhile the Ba1th party aims at the same ultimate goals throughout
the Arab world, it recognizes that conditions vary among the several
Arab states and, therefore, it resorts to different techniques in different parts of the Arab world.
The party is active in Lebanon where it s ta ctics d iffer somewhat
from those it employs in Syria. It tries to attain its aims primarily
by (1) working for the secularization of the state in a country where the
form of government is based on sectarianism; (2) advocating socialist
measures in a society where businessmen and feudal landlords control
power; and (3) using democratic means to achieve Arab unity through the
expression of the popular will in a state where certain factions are vio len tly opposed to u n ity.^7 Until the Ba'th party joined the Opposition and the United National
Front (al-J abha al-Wataniyah al-Kuttahidah) in the revolution against the
27 Toufic Mokdessi and Lucien George, Les Partis Libanais En 1939 (Lebanese Parties in 1939), (Beirut: L'Orient-al’ Jarida, 1959), pp. 35-36.
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Sham'un regime in 1958 i t had operated underground in Lebanon and had
limited its activities to ideological preaching and popular participation
in national issues. It had not attempted to gain power or to participate
in the government.
Since the revolution, the party has grown considerably in Lebanon,
especially in Tripoli, the South, Bouka', and Beirut. In the last elec
tions, held in I960, Dr. Abd al-Majid al-Rafi'i, the Ba'thist candidate
in Tripoli who ran for office without support from any list, received
ill,052 votes as compared to the llj ,830 votes cast for his opponent on
the Karami list, a coalition list combining most of the electoral forces
in Tripoli including that of Premier Rashid Karami—the Prime Minister of Lebanon at the time of writing and at several times in the past, as
no well as the traditional leader in Tripoli. This is an indication of
the growing strength of the party in Lebanon.
IV. THE BREAK WITH NASSER
The revolutionary regime in Egypt and the Ba'th party were drawn
together by common interests and motives. "Both movements are externally
nationalist, internally radical; both aspire to Arab unity and the main
tenance of neutrality between East and West."^ However, the question
of liberty, the basic ideological difference between the two groups, was
never satisfactorily resolved. It was a constant underlying source of
friction that contributed, along with other reasons, to the rift between
28 Qubain, 0£>. c i t . , p. 166
29 "Behind Syria's Decision," The Economist, op. cit., p. 589.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Ba’thists and President Nasser in 1959. The B a'thists firmly believe that without freedom and democracy
Arab unity cannot be maintained and Arab socialism will not be fruit
fu l; for i f the masses of the Arab people do not choose to liv e under
unity and socialism, these two systems cannot, and should not, last. Nasser believes that at this stage of Arab history, a democratic
system of government would not be strong enough to undertake a program
leading to unity and socialism.
While the question of liberty was the ideological cause of the
split, there were other factors, some apparent, some hidden, that led
to the resignation of the Ba'thists from the UAR government by the end
of 1959. They are summarized in the following points:
1. Believing that the party is the organ that acts as a connect ing link between the people and the government, the B a'thists, although
they dissolved their party branches in Syria and Egypt, retained the
coherence of a party as an ideological and political movement. On being
asked only one month after the merger of the two states how the p oliti cal vacuum resulting from the dissolution of political parties could be
filled, Salah al-Bitar, a Ba'thist leader and a Federal UAR Minister,
answered, "No revolution can develop and progress i f i t does not depend
upon the awakened organized p eop le. "30 The term "organized people" re
ferred, according to the author's interpretation, to political parties.
It is significant to point out at this juncture that one of
the problems that aroused differences between the party leaders and
^°Rose el-Iou ssef, No. 1552 (March 10, 1958), p. Iu
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President Nasser while negotiating unity was the question of the dis
solution of political parties. The party leaders compromised by de
ferring to Nasser's point of view in order to achieve unity. Their
reasoning was that u n its which had been a dream to most Arabs and which
some had considered a theoretical concept that could not occur, was an
extremely important step which should be attained even at the price of
dissolving p o litic a l parties for a transitionary period. There were
some party members who objected even to that compromise believing that
the party should not have agreed to dissolve its branches in the UAR.
2. During the course of their partnership in governing the UAR,
each partner was dissatisfied with the other's attitude in certain re
spects. Nasser thought that the Ba'th party was still active underground
and that the Ba'thists were following a partisan policy in the northern
region. The Ba'thists believed that Nasser was carrying his suppression
of liberties too far and felt that he did not intend to apply democratic
procedures in governing the country, at least not in the near future.
The first symptoms of the split began to appear in the summer
of 1959 when the Ba'thists were opposed by President Nasser's supporters
as well as by their traditional rightist opponents during the National
Union electio n s. Senior in tellig en ce o ffic e r s, headed by Abd al-Hamid
al-Sarraj, "were instructed to ensure success for neutral candidates
and failure for the Ba'thists."31 To show their resentment, most of
the Ba'th candidates withdrew from the elections.
31«Political Quarrels in Syria," Mideast Mirror, Vol. II, No. 35 (August 30, 1959). p. 2.
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3. As members of an ideological party, the Ba'th leaders were
more doctrinaire and dogmatic than Nasser. Nasser, as the head of a
state, uses such phrases as "Arab countries," "Arab peoples," and "Arab world." The Ba'thists object to such phraseology and use, instead,
"Arab homeland," "Arab people," and "Arab nation." As a statesman, Nasser
was more compromising in his policies than the Ba'thists, while the Ba'thists' political actions were based more on their ideology and were
derived from their principles.
Nasser felt that the Ba'th Party was causing trouble in Iraq and
Jordan and that the Ba'thists were responsible, to a great extent, for
widening the gap between him and Premier Qassim and King Husayn. The
Ba'thists blamed Nasser for his conciliatory attitude toward certain Arab monarchs who, according to both the Ba'th and Nasser, were working
against the genuine Arab interest.
lu Another reason for the break, not as basic or as significant as the others, was the disagreement over the procedure to be followed
in applying the Agrarian Reform Law in Syria. President Nasser accepted
the responsibility of having the state pay the debts incurred by the confiscation of land, while the Ba'thists, considering that such a move
would restrict the application of socialism and would be interpreted as
appeasement to the landowners, in sisted that the state should not bear
such a responsibility.
All of these differences led to the break between the Ba'th Party
and President Nasser and caused the resignation of the Ba'thists from
the UAR government. Their resignation was followed by a wide purge from
the administration and the army of Ba'thists and their supporters.
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On July 21, 1961, at a time when the Ba'thists were on the oppo
sitio n , the UAR government nationalized a ll banks and insurance companies
in both regions in order to form one Arab Share Company (Sharikah Arabyah
Musahimah). At le a st f if t y percent of th is company's capital was to be
owned by the government. On July 26, the government promulgated new tax. and agrarian reform
laws. Adopting the progressive taxation system, the new tax laws exempted
from tax citizens whose net income was 10,000 liras or less per year, and imposed a ninety percent tax on net incomes amounting to 100,000 lir a s
or more per year. The new agrarian reform law lim ited land ownership
to 100 feddans per person instead of 200, the amount specified in the
1952 law.. The first two articles of the law read in part as follows:
Article 1 — No individual shall be permitted to own more than 100 feddans of agricultural lands. Fallow lands and desert lands owned by any individual shall be considered as agricultural lands. Any property transfer deed violating these laws shall be considered void and cannot be registered.
Article 2 — If the property of an individual exceeds that which he is legally permitted to own through, inheritance or any other manner other than by contract, the owner must dispose of the excess within one year from acquiring ownership or from the date of publication of this law, whichever is longer, provided that the disposal of this excess shall be made to small farmers.32
Citizens whose property was confiscated were to be compensated by
government bonds paying 1* percent interest over a fifteen-year period.
Among other measures adopted were those affecting labor. The
32 Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 11*3-1961 (July 26, 1961), pp. B3-B6.
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working day was reduced from eight to seven hours. The workers received
25 per cent of the net profits of industry, 10 per cent in cash and 15
per cent in social b en efits. These s o c ia lis t decrees were to have
nationalized "82 per cent of business and industry in Egypt and Syria."33
Agriculture, which remained in private hands, was to be guided "by strong
cooperatives supervised, in turn, by the Ministry of Agriculture."3^
In a statement supporting these measures, the Ba'th party declared
that they would achieve socialism and raise the standard of living of
peasants and workers. The statement went on to request "the introduc
tion of democratic measures which would secure the success of the so cia l
ist measures, under the auspices of the people, and their maintenance,
protection and development."35
The separatist coup of September 28, 1961, severing the unity of
Syria and Egypt, faced the party with a dilemma. The Ba'thists simul
taneously criticized the authoritarian rule in the U.A.R. and condemned
the separatist movement and the rightist elements supporting the coup.
However, they tended to feel that Nasser's formula for maintaining unity
was primarily responsible for the revolt. On October 3* two party leaders,
Salah al-Bitar and Akram al-Hurani, joined fifteen other Syrian leaders
in signing a statement blaming the failure of unity on Nasser's regime.3^
3'3rhe New York Times, Vol. CXI, No. 37* 872 (October 2, 1961),p. 10C. 3:%bid. ^^Al-Jaryda, No. 2639 (July 29, 1961), p. 6. 36A1-Alam. No. 4381 (October 4, 1961), p. 3.
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That statement confirmed that the Arab people in Syria want Arab unity
on a democratic and socialist basis, and that they w ill not tolerate the
use of d ictatorial methods to implement unity or socialism .
The party, while recognizing Nasser's faults, insisted that unity
be preserved and that democracy replace authoritarianism in maintaining
unity. In a statement made on October 4, Salah al-Bitar said that the
military coup in Damascus was the result of the dictatorial rule which
destroyed unity and its revolutionary spirit. "I believe," he said,
"that the sound national solution for the setback of unity could be found
in having popular representatives from both regions negotiate the estab
lishment of unity on a democratic basis."^7
The official party statement issued by the National Leadership on
October 5 attacked Nasser's police state as well as the separatist ele
ments in Syria. "The military coup that occurred in the northern region
of the U.A.R. was caused by the regional and dictatorial rule followed
by President Abdul Nasser in the united state."38 After describing the
serious mistakes committed by the governing group in the UAR, the state
ment goes on to say, "even if the military coup had not taken place a
few days ago, the p o ssib ility of it s occurrence would have been imminent
as long as matters continued to go in the wrong direction."-^ 9 There is no doubt that the fundamental reason for the failu re of
the first real attempt to achieve unity was the suppression of liberties.
3‘7salah al-Bitar, a public statement (October 4, 1961), p. 1. ^ %he Arab Resurrection Socialist Party, a party publication (October 5» 1961), p. 1. % b id .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Even Shukri al-Qnwatli, the former president of Syria and Nasser’s sup
porter until the time of the split, not only admitted this fact but attacked Nasser saying, "Those who caused a cleavage between unity and
the people are the governors and their governing system ... forming a
police state. The antagonism that resulted even among the liberal pro
gressive elements from the limitation of freedom and the suppression by
the police machinery of al-Sarraj was exploited by the separatist and
r ig h tist elements and contributed immeasurably to the success of their
revolt. The separatist element was composed of merchants, landowners,
conservatives and reactionaries who, wishing to preserve their interests
especially after the introduction of s o c ia lis t measures in July, 1961 —
cooperated in the plans for the destruction of the regime. The revolt
"in Syria was staged by or on behalf of the wealthy minority of land
owners and merchants."^
Here again, President Nasser holds the blame for strengthening
these elements and appeasing them. In his determination to suppress the
Ba'thists, he went to the extreme of instructing his government agents
to work against the Ba'thists and in favor of the reactionary elements,
calculating that he could win the support of the la tte r — an assumption
that proved to be mistaken. "We committed the mistake of reconciliation
with reactionism. We imagined that whatever the disputes between us and
the reactionary elements," said Nasser conceding his error, "that they
^ Al-Havat. No. 4762 (October 24, 1961), p. 7. ^The Christian Science Monitor, Vol. 53» No. 279 (October 23, 1961), p. W.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were the sons of the same homeland and the partners of the same destiny. ko But experience has proved to us the falsity of our illusions."
Another serious fault leading to the dissolution of unity was
the liquidation of the popular base upon which the success of revolution
and unity depends. There was a lack o f popular organization and an under
estimation of the political forces in -the country. The National Union
could not, by any means, fill the vacuum left by the banning of political
parties. It was not a real machinery. The suppression of popular organi
zation was a severe and costly fault. In Nasser's own words,
We have committed a great mistake. This mistake is an inadequate popular organization. Our means for popular organization was the formation of the National Union to serve as a framework around the cla ss s t r if e . Our fault was that we opened the way of the National Union to the powers of reactionism. The result of this mistake was that reactionism, which infiltrated the National Union, was capable of paralyzing its revolu tionary effectiveness and of transforming it into a mere front organization, not motivated by the masses' power and real demands. ^
President Nasser replaced his partnership with the Ba'th party with Abd
al-Hamid al-Sarraj's machinery, failing to realize that al-Sarraj's in
telligence service, which converted the Syrian Region into a police
state, could not possibly substitute for the Ba'th party or any other
political party that, regardless of its shortcomings, attempts to co
ordinate the relationship between the people and' the government.
Currently, the rightist elements in Syria are exploiting Nasser's
fa u lts and ca p ita lizin g on them to secure th eir own in terests and to
Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 201 - 1961 (October 17, 1-961), p. 813.
^3Ibid.
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control and maintain power in the country. In a statement addressed to
the “Arab people," the Ba'th National Leadership states:
The separation has opened the door in Syria to serious imperialist and reactionary ventures. The Syrian re actionaries, whose interests had met with the authori tarian system to suppress the progressive forces in 1958» have been trying now to lead political life in Syria to ward a m ilitary dictatorship which w ill protect it s c a p ita list economic in terests, suppress the progressive forces, and hinder the people's revolutionary potentials.
The majority of the Syrian rightist elements realize that their defeat of the progressive Unitarian trend would not have been achieved so early had it not been for the policy of Abdul Nasser during the years of unity. His means destroyed the liberal Unitarian base in Syria represented by the progressive front which brought about unity.
These rightist elements also realize that democratic life, based on sound party life and free institutional organizations, w ill lead to new revolutionary mobiliza tion. Through this mobilization the people will be able to surmount reactionaries and deprive them of the oppor tunity to coordinate their efforts and maintain power.
President Nasser, by his insistence on authoritarian rule, must
accept a great portion of the blame for the failure of unity between
Egypt and Syria. A major portion can also be laid to the eagerness of
the separatist groups to protect their own interests by taking advant
age of Nasser's shortcomings and exploiting his mistakes. Notwith
standing, the leadership of the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party at
the time of the merger must accept partial blame, for in their desire
to attain unity, they sacrificed some political liberties. At the time
ZJZf The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party, a party publication (October 14, 1961), p. 1.
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they had reason to believe that, in sharing the power with Nasser, they
could exert their influence to bring about freedom and democracy in the
United Arab Republic. In the language of negotiation, they had con
cluded a perfect deal.
When, after unity, President Nasser proceeded to impose s till
further limitations on liberties and seemed determined to follow an
authoritarian form of government, the Ba'thists, as ideological people,
had no choice but to resign from the government and to adopt an opposition
policy. In retrospect, one might conclude that the Ba'thists should
have forseen this trend at the time they consented to dissolve their
party branches in the UAR.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V
THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY
The socialist trend in Lebanon was initiated with Tanios Shahin's
revolt against feudalism in Mount Lebanon in 1858* Since that time,
most parties have displayed some so c ia lis t tendencies in their programs.
However, socialism did not emerge as a systematic ideology and was not
preached as a way of life in Lebanon until the formation of the Ba'th
Party and the Progressive S o cia list Party (al-Hizb al-Taqadumi a l-Ish tir a k i).
The Progressive Socialist Party, confined to Lebanon, has played a more
sign ifican t role in Lebanese p o litic s than the Ba'th. Like most so c ia list
parties, the P.S.P. appeals to the masses by promising social security to
the needy, employment to the unemployed, land to the landless, and a fairer
distribution of wealth among the members of its society.
I . IDEOLOGY Progressive Socialism
The Progressive Socialist Party, as its name implies, is progres
sive and socialist. The party believes that socialism is an outgrowth
of human progress and that it is the best workable means for coordinating
the innovations of scientific advancement and industrialization with the
existing legal and social conditions. Its leader, Kamal Juniblatt, has
declared, "We are progressive before being socialist . . . .We should have
called ourselves progressives instead of progressive socialists because
progress is the source of socialism."^
^Sabah al-Khayer, No. 37 (September 20, 1958), p. 2k-,
lk 9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150 The party’s progressive socialism is based on the elements of
Lebanese society and is dependent on the evolutionary process of that
society. The party believes that the individual should enjoy a "just
partnership in the state’s general wealth — that is, the intellectual,
spiritual, and material wealth — in accordance with his function and
a b ility ." 2
In order to achieve human progress, the party believes, efforts
should be channeled into securing freedom and knowledge, bringing about
human cooperation, and planning for human unity and international peace.
The P.S.P. denounces nationalism as a destructive element. It believes that socialism is an international doctrine and preaches that
equality and prosperity should be applied throughout the whole human
community regardless of national barriers. "From the very nature of
socialism it is historically and intrinsically international in scope. I t recognizes no boundary lin e ."3 In th is respect, the P.S.P. program
is similar to that of the Socialist Party of India which places great
emphasis on humanity and human equality. A rticle 16 of the Indian party's
program states, "The socialist doctrine needs to be retold in terms of
the simple truth that all men are equal, not only within the nation but also among nations...."^ Like most socialists, the P.S.P. emphasizes the
international tradition and stresses the importance of international
2P.S.P. Program, p. 21.
^Ralph Carleton, World Unity (New Yorks The Paebar Co., 19^+7)» P. 117. ^S- cialist Party of India, o£. cit. , p. 14-.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 cooperation and brotherhood. "The Socialist movement has had a tremen
dous influence, and a very honorable influence, in creating the tradition
that we know as the international tradition."5 It agrees with the
Socialist Party of India that "...socialism must first achieve the union
of mankind in the mind before it can translate that into practice. The party believes that the pattern of human society had been
repeating itself for thousands of years in the tribal, feudal and bourgeois
systems u n til the introduction of machinery and the progress of time
paved the way for their replacement by the industrial system. With the
development of industry and trade, capitalists began to exploit their
workers to increase th eir p ro fits, and nations started to occupy other
territories and to increase their spheres of influence in order to en
large the markets for th eir products.
The Progressive Socialist Party finds the remedy for the ills of
the industrial system in socialism which nationalizes the means of pro
duction and provides a fairer distribution of wealth.
The P.S.P. does not agree with Marxism that the economic factor
is the determining factor in shaping society. Its socialism emphasizes
the humanitarian and social aspects of life as well as the economic as
pect. The party endeavors to raise the standard of living of the indi
vidual and to make him a free and useful member of society by liberating
him from the feudal and capitalist lords who control the economic and
^Barbara Wooton and E. Hardy, Should S o cia lists Support Federal Union? (London: The Socialist Party of Great Britain, 19^;, p. ^Socialist Party of India, o£. cit.. p. 15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 & political power in Lebanese society. Therefore, it advocates the national ization of the major means of production, including land, industry, and
trade. Socialism means "collective ownership and control...of at least 7 the principal instruments of production..." As Joseph Schumpeter states in his definition of socialism,
By socialist society we shall designate an institutional pattern in which the control over means of production and over production itself is vested with a central authority — or, as we may say, in which, as a matter of principle, the economic affa irs of society belong to the public and not the private sphere.
Nationalization does not mean confiscation. Rather, it implies the
transference of ownership from the individual to the state by due process
of law, the state paying the individual a fair price for his property.
Today "no socialist party advocates any longer that all industries be
collectivized.. .nationalization is recommended only for some industries."
How many is "some"? William Ebenstein explains, "There is no clear-cut
answer, but there seems to be universal acceptance among socialists of the idea that natural monopolies in the public utilities field be publicly
owned and managed.The sector of the economy which should be national
ized depends upon existin g economic conditions.
As to the degree and extent of nationalization that the party advocates, Jumblatt informed the author that in stitu tion s which are basic
7 Edward McNall Burns, Ideas in Conflict: The P o litica l Theories of the Contemporary World (New York: Norton & Co., Inc., I960), p. 181.
8 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Ipth ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 195U), p. 167. 9 Ebenstein, Today1s Isms, op. cit. , p. 229.
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in serving the common interest and industries which are important to
the economy of the country should be nationalized. The significance
of these in stitu tio n s and industries might change depending upon the time and prevailing conditions. "At the present stage such institutions
as the electric company, the water company, schools, universities and
hospitals should be nationalized," said Jumblatt. As to the financing
of these institutions in case they become free and public, he stated
that the application of the progressive taxation system and the reduc
tion of the number of government o ffic ia ls in Lebanon, half of whom can run the government machinery, may finance these institutions."^
Believing that each citizen should be an owner, the party preserves
the right of private property and encourages it within certain limits. Private property provides social security and individual liberty. The
party program states:
In the present stage of the evolution of human society, private property is considered the basis of individual liberty and security, a means of support for the family, a factor of pro duction, and a stimulus for personal initiative, provided that it is not a cause for the immobilization and steriliza tion of wealth, nor an instrument for social parasitism and lazinessj and that it does not come into conflict with public ownership.
In the field of agriculture, this aim could be attained by limiting land
ownership and distributing the surplus lands and that of the state among
small farmers and peasants. In the field of industry, each laborer could
become an owner by receiving a fair share of the profits of the firm in
addition to his wages.
10 Kamal Jumblatt, Personal Interview (Beirut, November 15, 1957).
11 P.S.P. Program, p. 70.
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Since the cooperative system socializes wealth and secures the
interests of owners, laborers, producers, and consumers, the party adopts
this system and encourages the establishment of consumers'and producers'
associations in both industry and agriculture. In his book, L1Organiza
tion du Travail, Louis Blanc (1811-1882) suggested that profits of in
dustrial associations be divided into three shares: the first share to
be distributed among the laborers of the shop in addition to their wages,
the second to be used to provide some social security benefits for the
workers, and the third to finance the means of production in order to
expand business. The Progressive Socialist Party adopts a cooperative
policy similar to this plan.
Unemployment is a serious economic and social disease in Lebanon.
The percentage of the unemployed working force is high. To solve this problem, the party advances the following measures: (1) To follow a
planned economic policy controlling the amount and kind of production
in accordance with the needs of the market and the requirements of the
people; (2) to confiscate unreasonable profits, especially those of
the middleman and those earned from usury;^ (3) to utilize idle wealth for productive purposes; (^) to consider work as a duty and a necessity;
(5) to allocate the largest portion of the budget for productive ex
penditures; and (6) to adopt a sound monetary policy urging investment
of wealth and circulation of m o n e y . ^
^Usury here refers to profits earned from capitalist enter prise in general and from interest charged on loans in particular. 13 P.S.P. Publication, Muwatin Hurrwa Sha'b Sa'id (A Free Citizen and a Happy People) , (Beirut: P.S.P., n.d.), pp. 25-26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155 In addition to these measures, the party proposes that a Govern
ment Employment Agency be established to secure work for the unemployed
and to administer an unemployment compensation program sim ilar to those
in operation in several advanced countries.
The party advocates the expansion of the social security system
to include free medical care for the poor and needy, free public educa
tion, accident insurance for laborers, old age and disability compensa
tion, and similar protection.
The party believes thata planned economic policy is necessary to
finance the establishment and operation of institutions to execute its
proposed projects. The policy should be directed toward increasing pro
duction and improving trade, maintaining equilibrium in the balance of
trade, reducing the cost of living, nationalizing the essential means
of production, limiting land ownership, and applying a progressive tax
ation system.
The P.S.P. maintains that a fairer distribution of income can be
achieved through the application of a progressive taxation system such
as those used in advanced countries. Edmond Na'im, a leading member of
the party, proposed in a lecture delivered at the Cenacle Libanais on
November 23, 1953 that a progressive tax should be imposed on annual in
come in excess of LL 50,000 and that no income tax should be levied
against people earning less than LL 8,000 per year. The 1ax system
should be devised in such a way as to ensure social security and justice and to help the growth and development of the national economy. I t
should be based on "financial ability and public expenditure according
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to need."^ A high inheritance tax is proposed by the party since the
inheritor does not work to earn the inherited wealth. It also advocates
decreasing the indirect tax on essential commodities which is shared
equally by the rich and the poor.^ $
The P.S.P. program, the exact translation of which is set forth
in Appendix B, includes the detailed principles and measures for achiev
ing its aims.
The Progressive Socialist Party does not believe in the use of
force or revolution to attain its aims or apply its principles; nor does
it accept the theory of class struggles. It is not Machiavellian and
does not believe that the end justifies the means. It aims at acquiring
power through legal democratic channels. Its means is based on educating
the people to believe in its principles rather than on imposing those
principles on society by force or by a coup d'etat.
On being asked by the author to discuss the differences between
the Progressive S o c ia lists and the Communists, Kamal Jumblatt rep lied ,
''We are evolutionary and not revolutionary in fulfilling our aims. The
Communists are revolu tion ary." ^ Jumblatt continued to contrast the two parties by saying that
whereas the Communists are exclusively m aterialistic, the Progressive
Socialists believe in humanity and do not agree that the material rela
tions of production are the only determining factors of human behavior.
^ P .S .P . Program, p. 82. ^Edmond Na'im, Nazariyat al-Takaddumiyah al-Ishtirakiyah wa Tatbjquha Fi Lubnan (The Tiieory ox Progressive Socialism and its Appli- cation in Lebanon), (Beirut: al-Nadwa al-Lubnaniyah, 1953)> P* 31 • ^Jumblatt, Personal Interview, op. cit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 7 Although they believe that the state should control many things for the
common welfare, they want to secure individual freedom provided that
individuals and groups within the state work in conformity with the
conmon interest. The Progressive Socialists believe that Marxism is
an important stage in the development of socialism , and that Karl Marx
is the father of modern socialist thought. They agree with Marx on many
points but feel that his socialism, which was inverted at a specific period of time for a certain country or countries, does not fit Lebanon
at the present time.
Social security and individual liberty are among the party's main
concerns. To secure these two ends, the party advocates democratic
socialism . Like the Fabians, the P.S.P. combines socialism and democracy.
As Bernard Shaw said, socialism i s "the economic side of the democratic
ideal.In a lecture entitled "My Message as a Deputy" and delivered
at the Cenacle Libanais in 19U6, Jumblatt said that a deputy should work to provide the people witn both liberty and security. He said that in capitalist societies people enjoyed more freedom than in coiranunist societies
but did not have as much security, whereas, in the latter, employment
and social security were more certainly provided, but there was not as
much liberty as there was in the farmer.
Believing that the purpose of all social institutions is to serve
the individual and to provide a suitable environment for the development of his personality, the party endeavors to build a society based on social
ist and democratic principles. Such a society provides a system wherein
^Bernard Shaw, Sidney Webb, and others, 0£„ cit., p. 9»
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social justice, economic security, liberty and peace prevail; where
human rights are guaranteed and equal opportunities are available; and
where the best possible civilization of human society might be attained.
The party believes in the power of the people and in the domi
nation of the popular will. Its leader says:
To achieve these progressive aims and this socialism in human society, it is your duty, before it is the duty of anybody else, to trust yourselves and to be your own master. I f you have th is in your power and in yourselves, nobody will stand in your way, and you w ill walk on the road to victory . . . and l i f e is for those who are strong in themselves, not for those who are weak. ..«The things that build the citizen's personality are complete liberty from fear, want, vice, and selfish ness. 18
In an interview by Kul Shai* newspaper, Jumblatt was asked whether
socialism could solve the problems of Lebanon. He replied:
How could i t not solve the Lebanese c r is is and problems while i t is solving world crises and problems? There is an inter national tendency driving toward socialism and soon i t w ill reach the shores of Lebanon and the Middle East. 9
Foreign Policy
In its foreign policy, the Progressive Socialist Party calls for
adherence to the principle of non-alignment, the rejection of military
pacts, the formation of an international front representing nations and
groups of people who advocate the creation of a “Third Force" to mediate
and maintain the balance between the Western and Eastern blocs, and co
operation among the Afro-Asian bloc.
1A P.S.P. Publication, Muwatin Hurr wa Sha'b Sa'id, op. cit. , p. 29.
1%ul Shai1. November 1^, 195^»
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 Jumblatt touched upon the idea of Afro-Asian cooperation in a
series of a rticles published in ”Les Cahiers de L'est" in 1941• In his
book * Haqlqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah1 (The Truth About the Lebanese
Revolution), he mentioned that he started preaching the idea of the -
’’Third Force" as early as 19^5*^ His party elaborated the idea in 1949.^
In the summer of 1951» the P.S.P. and the Socialist Party of India issued
a joint communique stating the principles upon which the moral power of
the "Third Force” is based and inviting all nations and peoples to join
th is bloc. Motivated by this spirit of neutrality and cooperation, the party
calls upon Lebanon and the rest of the Arab states to follow a neutralist policy in the cold war and to welcome cooperation with foreign nations —
whether p o litic a l, economic or any other kind — provided that i t is
based on mutual respect and benefit.
In explaining it s stand on the Eisenhower Doctrine, the party
stated that it would oppose the doctrine if its purpose was to replace
one foreign influence by another and to offer aid with strings attached,
while the party would support the doctrine if it merely intended to offer economic, technical, and military aid with no direct or indirect con
ditions implied.^3
2°Kamal Jumblatt, Haqiqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah (The Truth About the Lebanese Revolution), (Beirut: Dar al-Nashir al-Arabiyah, 1959) P. 52. 21 P.S.P. Publication, Mawqifuna al-Dakhili wa al-Khariji (Our Stand on Internal and External Issues), (Beirut, 1957)• P. 23. 22Ibid. , p. 25. 23Ib id ., p. 14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nationalism
The Progressive Socialist Party does not believe in nationalism.
It maintains that nationalism is out-of-date, that, nationalist principles
are emotional and are not usually based on objective scientific thinking,
that extreme nationalism makes people blind to the truth and fanatic and
hinders the progress of socialism. The party believes that the national
ist trend is dangerous and destructive because it creates a clash of
national interests.
When the leader of the party was asked why the P.S.P. does not
adopt nationalism along with socialism , he answered that nationalism, which
is the product of the selfishness of the group and is the cause of wars
and conflicts among nation?, is the contradiction of socialism which
aims at human cooperation and world peace. He added, "Besides, our
socialism is confined neither to Lebanon nor to the Arab world. Its
objective is the well-being of a ll humanity.
The party does not advocate Arab unity. It believes that Lebanon
should remain an independent sovereign state, although it favors closer
cooperation among the Arab states and works to strengthen that trend.
The P.S.P. considers Lebanon "a real entity and an independent Arab State."
I I . STRUCTURE Membership
The Progressive Socialist Party has about 16,000 members and 15,000
_ Oil Jumblatt, Personal Interview, op. cit.
25p . s . p : Publication, Ra'una a l-S iyasi Min Khilal Mabadi*na wa Ahdafina (Our Political Opinion Through Our Principles and Goals), (Beirut: September 20, 1961), p. 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161
supporters^ comprised of laborers, peasants, small farmers, professional
p eop le, and stu d en ts.
Most of these members are the traditional followers of the Jumblatt
family who have joined the party because Kamal Jumblatt, the head of the
prominent Druzi family, is the leader of the party. Their allegiance is
to Jumblatt himself rather than to the party and its principles. There
is no doubt, however, that a small portion of the members have joined the
party because they are true believers. The socialist and leftist people
who believe that communism is too extremist and leftist for them and who
are deterred from joining the Ba'th party because it is not licensed in
Lebanon, find the P.S.P. their best resort. There are other elements
•who join, as is the case in other political parties, for personal reasons.
This category includes people who join the party for prestige, for oppor
tunistic reasons, and to reap benefits and get the support of Jumblatt.
Although up to the present time, most of the party members have
been Jumblatt's supporters and Cruzes by religion, Jumblatt and the party
leaders have been trying to alleviate this situation and develop a wider
following, a fact that is revealed, for example, by the composition of
the party's Leadership Council. This council, made up of sixteen members,
included thirteen Christians, two Druzes, and one Sunni Muslim in 1958
Leadership
Unlike most socialist parties, the P.S.P. relies mainly on the
An official party letter addressed to the author and signed, on behalf of the P.S.P., by Mr. Abbas Khalaf in his capacity as a party liaison officer (Beirut, September 20, 1961), p. 2. 27 Mokdessi and George, op. c it., p ..12,
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traditional leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. Having used his potentialities
and exerted his efforts to form the party and develop it, Jumblatt identi
fies himself with the party and his interests with its interests. Dis
cussing the question of identification of the party with the leader,
Robert Michels said in his book, "Political Parties,"
The despotism of leaders does not arise solely from a vulgar lust for power or from uncontrolled egoism, but is often the outcone of a profound and sincere conviction of their own value and of the services which they have rendered to the common cause. The bureaucracy which is most faithful and most efficient in the discharge of its duties is also the most dictatorial.28
Born in Moukhtarah, Lebanon on December 6, 1917, Kamal Jumblatt
comes from an influential feudal family. Both his father, Fuad, and his
mother, Nazira, known as Al-Sit (the Lady), belong to the Durzi Jumblatt
family which is one of the wealthy and prominent families in Lebanon.
Jumblatt received his primary education in the village school
and his secondary education at Ainturah High School. He studied for one
year in France at the Sorbonne University where he earned diplomas in
psychology and sociology. After returning from France in 1938, he studied
law at the St. Joseph University of Beirut from which he received his
"Licence en Droit" in 19lil. Studying economics and philosophy independent
ly, he qualified to teach a course on "The History of Economic Doctrines"
at the Academie Libanaise for several academic years beginning in 1953.
Jumblatt is influenced by certain Indian philosophies, especially
that of Gandhi, and has translated several Indian books into Arabic. He
is the author of three books — one in French, Nouvelle Democratic (New
Democracy), and two in Arabic, Haqiqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah (The
28 Robert M ichels, P o lit ic a l P a r tie s, tran slated by Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 19U9), p. 229.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163 Truth about the Lebanese Revolution) and Ma.jra al-Siyasah al-Lubnaniyah
(The Course o f Lebanese P o litic s) — and has w ritten several a r tic le s .
He has been a member of the Lebanese Parliament since 19^3 except
during the term from 1957-1960. When he started his political career
as a deputy, Kamal Jumblatt was a member of the National Bloc which was
headed by Eknile Edde, a pro-French statesman and a former head of sta te. However, he deviated from the policies of Edde when the national duty
called for that. On November 7» 19^3> Emile Edde and the Director of
the French Security Forces called a meeting in Edde's o ffic e to request
that his supporters absent themselves from the Parliamentary session to
be held the following day at which time the Lebanese Parliament was to
consider the question of amending the Constitution to confirm the
sovereignty and independence of Lebanon. The purpose of Edde's request
was to prevent a quorum and, thus, to hinder the legislative process.
Jumblatt, along with other deputies, refused to comply with the request,
and the amendment passed. Jumblatt served in Riyad al-Suluh's cabinet, formed in December
19**6. as a Minister of National Economy, of Agriculture and of Social
Affairs. He resigned his position in May 19^7 because, as he put it,
the ministers were not free to administer their own departments and
exercise their power without the consent of Riyad al-Suluh and Bishara
al-Khuri who limited the ministers’ functions and interfered in their affairs. Another reason for his resignation was the failure of the Parlia mentary committee to check with honesty the soundness of the 19^7 election s.
2%unir Takiyddin, Wiladat Istiqlal (The Birth of an Independence), (Beirut: Dar al-Ilim Li al-Malaiyn, 1953)» P»
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He was a Minister of National Education from August 1960 until
May 1961 when he was appointed Minister of Public Works and National
Planning, a position he held u n til October 23, 1961. On October 31.
1961, Jumblatt was appointed Minister of Interior in Rashid Karami's
cabinet, a post which he still holds at the time of this writing.
Organization
The Progressive Socialist Party has a directive organization with
distinct hierarchical traits. In its rules of procedure, it employs
democratic processes. However, neither it s democracy nor its d iscip lin e
are as efficient as those of the Ba'th organization. This is due to the
dominance of its leader's personality and to the way it recruits members. Its membership requirements are far less restrictive than the Ba'th party's.
The registered party members make up the General Assembly which
meets at lea st once a year. The General Assembly elects the members of
the Leadership Council for a four-year term, and each year it elects the
president, three vice presidents and a secretary-general from among the
sixteen members of the council.
The Leadership Council appoints the Board of Directors, made up
of twelve members, for a period of four years. The board is responsible
for the internal administration of the party. ^ Each member is required "to be loyal to the principles of the P.S.P.,
to execute its orders in fulfillment of these principles, and to abide by the secrecy of the party orders and endeavors."30
3°P.S.P. Internal Regulations, pp. ^1-42.
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I I I . HISTORY AND ACHIEVEMENTS
H istorical Background
The party principles have been expounded by Kamal Jumblatt, as
an intellectual and as a politician, since the early 19^0's. They were
embodied in a series of articles appearing in such magazines as "Les
Cahiers de l'Est" and "La Revue du Liban" in 19^1 and 19^ respectively.
The articles were substantiated by his speeches in Parliament and his
lectures in the Cenacle Libanais.
The idea of forming a party began to materialize during the
summer of 19^+6 when Jumblatt started working on the party pact and con
sulting selected thinkers and specialists in the fields covered by
socialism. Sa'id Himadah and Joseph Hajjar helped to shape the economic
p r in c ip le s; Fuad B u stani, George Hanna, Majid Fakhri and other prominent
intellectuals contributed to the philosophical and cultural bases of the
party; Dr. Muhammad Talhouq and Dr. Tawfiq Riziq assisted in drawing up
the health program; and Shaykh Abd'Allah al-A layili refined the classi
cal Arabic language of the party covenant. "The party was not formed
by accident. It is, rather, the fruits of investigation and research
combined with knowledge and experience."31
The Progressive Socialist Party, formed and proclaimed on Labor
Day, May 1, 19^9» came into existence before the unsuccessful revolt of
the Syrian National Party (P.P.S.) of Antun Sa'adah in June 19^9. Hence,
the claim that Jumblatt formed his party to replace the P.P.S., which
31A1-Anbat. No. 23 (August 17, 1951), p. 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was dissolved on June 11, 19^. is not historically verifiable. In
clarifying this point, Jumblatt informed the author that in the course
of three meetings with Antun Sa'adah, the leader and the founder of the
P.P,S., Sa’adah offered him a vice presidency of his party if Jumblatt
would join the party. The latter answered that he might be prepared to
join the P.P.S. if the following three amendments were introduced into
its constitution:
1. To devise an economic policy for the party adopting so c ia lism .
2. To g iv e more value to , and put more emphasis on, the freedom of the individual.
3. To exclude Iraq from Greater Syria, because Iraq, a late addition to the original concept, was included for its oil and wealth involving a contradiction of the P.P.S.'s original concept of unity based on the geographic factor.-'
After Sa'adah's execution, the leading members of the P.P.S.
pursued the negotiations with Jumblatt but no agreement was reached as
they were unwilling to revise their party constitution to meet his terms
While there had been a fair chance of reaching an agreement with the
founder of the P.P.S., there was no prospect of coming to an under
standing with his followers.
When the party was first established, its power was concentrated
in the Shouf D istrict and in Alayeh, where Jumblatt1s influence is en
trenched. In the recruitment of ideological members and indoctrination
of personal and family supporters, the party was spread to Beirut, Bouqa
Southern Lebanon and other Lebanese districts. Its weekly newspaper,
32 J Jumblatt, Personal Interview, op. c it.
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Al-Ariba' (The News), carries its ideological teachings and spreads its
message to the people.
The Progressive Socialist Party has played a prominent role in
Lebanese politics since its inception. Its leaders have attested to
implement its principles through parliamentary and popular pressures,,
A few months after the formation of the party, Kamal Jumblatt
started propagating its principles and pressing for their adoption by
the state. Early in 1950, he alleged that the authorities were opposing
the party because it was progressive while they were reactionaries. On
January 13, 1950, he proclaimed that his party was battling with the
government to apply the party program and to introduce social justice
and economic planning: "We want to nationalize public institutions.. .to
make each citizen an owner...to make the worker a partner of the employer."33
When the Lebanese opposition to Bisharah al-Khuri’s regime organized
the Socialist National Front (al-Jabhah al-Ishtirakiyah al-Wataniyah)
on May 22, 1951 which included th e P .P .S ., and o f which Jumblatt was the
secretary-general, the party representatives were able to have the front
adopt a considerable portion of their program. Included in the front's
reformist program were ten points which practically covered all of the
functions of the state. These points embodied principles limiting land
ownership, distributing land among peasants, forming cooperatives, establish
ing industrial and agricultural loan banks, nationalizing public u tilities,
solving the unemployment problem and introducing a sound social security
sy ste m .3^ The program was signed by the seven Opposition deputies in
33A1-Nahar, No. IUiOO (January 13, 1950), p. 2. 3^A1-Nahar, No. i*799 (May 22, 1951), p. 1.
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Parliament and was adopted as their platform in the event that they
assumed power. The signatories were Kamal Jumblatt and Anwar al-Khatib
representing the Progressive Socialist Party, Pierre Edde and Abd'Allah
al-Haj representing the National Bloc, and Kamil Sham'un, Emile al-Bustani
and Dekran Tosbatt as independents. Former P residen t Sham'un and Jumblatt
were the dominant figures in the front.
From the 1952 Coup d'Etat to the 1958 Revolution
In the summer of 1952, the Socialist National Front called a popu
lar meeting of the opposition parties and personalities throughout the
country. I t was h eld a t Dayr al-Qamar, th e hometown o f Sham'un, on
August 17. The P.P.S. played a major role in making that gathering a
success. During the meeting, which signaled the beginning of the down
fa ll of Bisharah al-Khuri's regime, the Opposition threatened to unseat
the government by any means if the president did not restore liberties,
justice and democratic rule. An oath was taken to compel the regime to
work for the public interest or face destruction. In a fiery speech
attacking the President of the Republic, Jumblatt apostrophized him per
sonally saying, "President, reform or resign."
The Dayr al-Qamar meeting, followed by a series of cabinet crises
and peaceful demonstrations and strikes, led to the resignation of Presi
dent al-Khuri in the early hours of September 19, 1952. During that
period of crisis, attempts were made to form a cabinet to rescue the
country by introducing reforms. Jumblatt, trying sincerely to save the
country from corruption but probably overestimating the power of his party,
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announced, on September 11, 1952, that the P.S.P. would join a coalition
cabinet only if his party were given the majority in that cabinet and if
its ministers were given a free hand in running their ministries.
When Sham'un, elected President of the Republic by the Chamber
of Deputies on September 23, entrusted Premier Abd1Allah al-Yafi with
th e task o f forming th e ca b in et, Jumblatt demanded th at h is party hold
at least half of the cabinet seats and that the ten-points reform program
of the Socialist National Front be carried.
His demand was rejected. Subsequently, Jumblatt was persuaded to
participate in a tripartite cabinet with Abd'Allah al-Yafi and Hamid
Franjiyeh. During a meeting of the three cabinet candidates on September
29, "1952, Jumblatt insisted that the cabinet adopt the key principles of
his party program by incorporating into the government program the
nationalization of important industries, the distribution of land, the
introduction of social security, and the use of surplus money of the
state for social and economic projects — demands which were not accept
able to al-Yafi.35 After the failure of al-Yafi to form a cabinet due
to Jumblatt's demands, a four-man cabinet composed of civil servants
was formed by Amir Khalid Shihab.
P resid ent Sham'un d eviated from th e program o f th e S o c ia lis t
National Front by his failure to implement all of its reformist measures.
That, combined with local and personal conflicts, caused Jumblatt to
attack his former ally's regime.
Referring to the peaceful coup of September 8, 1952, Jumblatt said,
-^Beirut, No. *4-358 (Septenber 30, 1952), p. 2.
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The memory of the coup d’etat is passing away as if it had never existed, and the people are still boiling with hatred...and it seems that those who are responsible are willing to obliterate this cherished memory of the coup d'etat which freed the Lebanese from the inferiority com plex that was dominating him and strengthened his belief in the power of the p e o p le36 .
Jumblatt's failure to seize power and to share the responsibility
of governing the country after the 1952 coup d'etat in order to a;pply
his party's program was among the reasons for his opposition to Sham'un’s
regime.
In the first parliamentary elections held during the Sham'un regime,
in 1953, the P.S.P. was on the opposition side. Jumblatt was the only
representative of his party to be elected. At a press conference held
in Beirut on July 15, Jumblatt alleged that a foreign agent by the name
of Sir Bradford offered him one million Lebanese pounds to stop his cam
paign against the Middle Bast joint defense schemes. He further alleged
th at when he refu sed th e o ffe r , th at same amount o f money was spent in
the elections to defeat him and the other P.S.P. candidates. In protest
against interference by the government and by foreign agents, he announced
during the press conference, the party candidates in the south and the
north would withdraw from the elections to be held on July 19 and 26.
Pursuing his criticism of the new regime, Jumblatt condemned the
gerrymandering of the electoral districts and the amendment of the electoral
law reducing the number of deputies to forty-four. During the first ses
sion of that Parliament, the P.S.P. leader said, referring to the President
^°A1-Anba*, No. 89 (September 13, 1953), P* 1,
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of the Republic, ’’The Royal Master dreamed of subduing the Republic by
decreasing the number of deputies and distorting the electoral law re
sulting in the election of a Parliament that does not represent the 37 struggling masses."
V/hile leading the Opposition, the party did not neglect its ideo
logical cooperation with the rest of the Arab and Asian socialist parties.
Following a meeting with the Arab Socialist Party of Syria (which merged
later with the 3a'th Party) and the National Democratic Party of Iraq
in 1951. the P.S.P. realized the significance of cooperation with the
Ba'th Party, the only other socialist party in Lebanon. Contacts be
tween the two parties paved the way for establishing closer ties and
better cooperation and led to further meetings.
The P.S.P. was represented at the first Asian Socialist Conven
tio n which was held in Rangoon during th e week o f January 6 -15, 1953.
This convention, representing socialist parties in fourteen Asian countries,
created the permanent Organization for the Asian Socialist Conference to
fu lfill the following objectives:
1. To strengthen relations between the Asian Socialist Parties.
2. To coordinate their political attitude by consent.
3. To establish closer relations with socialist parties in th e world.
To establish a liaison with the Socialist International and to champion the cause of all colonial and oppressed peoples and to guide the freedom movements toward the establishment of demo cratic national independence.
^Al-Hahar, No. 5^32 (September k, 1953). p. 1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5. Cooperation for the maintenance of world peace.
The P.S.P. and the Ba'th formed a committee in March 1953 for
the purpose of inviting prominent Arab personalities and intellectuals
to participate in a meeting to discuss the question of the "Third Force.
Although their efforts to attract the interest of this group were not
successful, they resulted in a meeting between representatives of the
two parties on April 26, 195^ in Sheturah, Lebanon, from which issued a
joint statement proclaiming cooperation in Arab affairs:
The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party met at Sheturah on the 26th of April 195*+ and decided to establish the principles of cooperation between them in dealing with matters confronting the Arab states.
The two parties feel, in this historic and critical stage through which the Arab countries are passing, that they respond to and represent the wish of the Arab people tend ing toward socialism and the resistance of imperialism. Thus, they in v ite a l l Arab s o c ia lis t movements to form a front to unify their popular struggle for the achievement of their aims in lifer freedom and justice.39
These meetings were discontinued due to the dissolution of the
Socialist Democratic Party in Egypt and the National Democratic Party
in Iraq and to the differences that developed between the Ba'th and
the P.S.P. over the question of Arab nationalism.
The Arab policy of the P.S.P. and Jumblatt's personal dominance
of the party caused a schism in its ranks late in 1956. On being asked
by Samir Sanbar of Sabah al-Khayr magazine to explain his position on
Arab n ation alism , Jumblatt answered,
oo 1-1 Josey, op. c it., p. ?8.
39A1-Anha», No. 1W- (May 1, 195*0. P* 5.
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We want to return Arabism to its depth and to our real culture... Arabism is more of a culture than a nationalism... We despise the idea of nationalism because it was imported to us from Europe...It is the selfishness of the individual . and of society that may win temporarily but lose ultim ately...
This attitude, added to the absolute dominance of Jumblatt's character
and his control of the party, brought about the resignation of several
of the party's prominent members and intellectuals including Fuad Rizq,
a vice president of the party, Jibran Majdalani, Clovis Maqsud, and
Maurice Saqir.
Explaining the factors leading to the split, Gibran Majdalani
remarked,
This party was founded in 19^9 by a young landowner who also enjoyed the privilege of being the temporal head of a religious community. At first it attracted a number of intellectuals and workers who, while playing up to its founder's attachments to the past, hoped they would be able to conteract the pressure exerted upon him by his personal supporters. In this they failed; between the conflicting claims of the past and the present, the leader at f i r s t took up con trad ictory p o s itio n s , and then appealed more and more to ancestral aspirations. In the end the ideals of the past carried the day, to the detriment of socialism in general in the Lebanon, for by discrediting his party the founder discredited the movement i t s e l f .
This schism weakened the party considerably from an ideological
point of view but did not significantly affect its popular support.
Nevertheless, Jumblatt was defeated in the 1957 elections for the first
time in his political career due to government opposition and pressure.
Sabah al-Khayr, No. 37 (September 20, 195&), P* 25.
li 1 Gibran M ajdalani, "The Arab S o c ia lis t Movement," The Middle East in Transition, Laqueur, o£. cit. , p. 3^7.
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Nasim Majdalani of Beirut and Shafiq Murtada of the Ba'albeck D istrict
were the only party representatives in Parliament between 1957 and i 960, h p the most critical period in the modem history of Lebanon.
The P.S.P. was on the opposition side during the 1953 revolution.
Kamal Jumblatt was one of the leaders of the revolution and led the re
volutionary forces in the Shouf District. In fact, Jumblatt's followers
started the wave of disorders in Lebanon when they blew up the railway
line on August 16, 1957» an event that touched off an exchange of gunfire
between them and the police for several hours on August 15 in Jebel
al-Kuneiseh. This skirmish led, in turn, to the surrounding of Jumblatt’s
p alace at T-Ioukhtarah on August 21.
The P.S.P. shared in the formation of the United National Front
(al-Jabha al-'Jataniyah al-Muttahidah), representing the opposition parties
and leaders, that carried the fight against the Sham'un regime.
The murder o f jo u r n a list Nasim al-M atni on Kay 8 , 1959 sparked
the armed rebellion in Lebanon. The United National Front, which included
the Ba'thists and the Progressive Socialists, blamed the government for
that shameful incident and declared a general strike. In a statement
issued on that same day, the United National Front announced:
The rulers are responsible for what has happened and what i s s t i l l happening in th e way of provocative a c tio n s, and for the consequent feuds, plots, assassinations, and our national duty requires us to spare our fatherland from their calamitous results.43
Nasim M ajdalani withdrew from the party in November 1961, and Shafiq vurtada withdrew earlier in the same year.
Qubain, ojo. cit. , p. 69
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The Aftermath
The 1958 rebellion was followed by the election of General Shihab
to the presidency on July 13. the expiration of Sham'un1s term on Septem
ber 23, the counter-revolution from September 20 to October 14, and the
formation of Rashid Karami's "No victor, no vanquished" cabinet on Octo
ber 14. The P.S.P. supported Karami's four-man cabinet although it did
not include any members of the party.
In the period between the revolution and the i960 elections, the
party campaigned for administrative reforms and for an increase in the
number o f d ep uties to Parliam ent. The creation o f th e C iv il S ervice
Council by the new regime coincided with the P.S.P. proposal for admin
istrative reforms.^ However, some credit should be given to the party
for the part it played in increasing the number of deputies from 66 to 99.
although this fell short of Jumblatt's request for an increase to 121.
This enlargement, he said, is the means for "governing Lebanon in a free,
democratic, and sound way .... and for giving the young, liberal elements 4 c an opportunity to be members of Parliament. J
In the present Parliament, el.ected in the early summer of i960,
there are four party members and five supporters out of the ninety-nine
deputies. Jumblatt heads the United Struggle Front (Jabhat al-Nidal
al-CTatani) represented by these nine deputies. So far, the P.S.P. has
cooperated with the Shihab regime and has played a constructive role.
Jumblatt realized that his party could not get the majority of
Jumblatt, Haqiqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, op. c it. , p. 167•
^Rose EL-Youssef, No. 1616 (June 1, 1959). P» 1^«
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cabinet portfolios after the 1958 revolution — a condition that he had
insisted on following the 1952 coup — and agreed to be represented by-
two out of eighteen portfolios and one out of eight portfolios in the
coalition cabinets formed by Saib Salam in August 1960 and May 1961,
respectively. In the first cabinet, the party was represented by Kamal
Jumblatt holding the position of Minister of National Education and Nasim
Majdalani holding the position of Minister of Justice. In the second
cabinet Jumblatt held the portfolios of the Ministries of National Works
and Public Planning.
Although he was a member of coalition cabinets, the leader of the
party followed a partisan policy and considered the Shihab regime a
victory of the revolution. He announced; ”1 consider myself governing
on behalf of the revolution ... that is on behalf of the reformist and
n a tio n a l demands which lea d us toward th e d esired g o a ls for which the
people fought.
During their stay in office, the party representatives tried,
according to a party official^ to base Lebanon’s foreign policy on the
Arab national interest; to introduce basic reforms in the fields of
education, public works and general planning; to establish a civil ser
vice commission; to secure a basic and well-rounded social security pro
gram; and to nationalize medicine and public u tilities. Some of these
programs were interrupted by the resignation of Salam1 s cabinet on Octo
ber 2k, 1961, due to personal clashes between Salam and Jumblatt.
^ Sada Lubnan, No. 2397 (August 11, i960), p. k. k7 An official P.S.P. letter, Loc. cit.
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“Salam1s resignation followed a squabble with Public Works Minister Kamal
Jumblatt over domestic political issues.
Jumblatt!s disagreement with Salam was not based on general prin
ciples or major policy differences. It was rather the outcome of clashes
over government appointments and over the division of spoils, which is
the sad story of Lebanese politics and the prime mover of Lebanese politi
cia n s.
In his statement explaining the causes of his resignation, Jumblatt
said: "Our differences with politicians in Lebanon are old and nearly
permanent, because we do not belong to th e old s c h o o l...o u r means are
different from theirs, our principles are not similar to theirs, and our
understanding of power is not in harmony with theirs."^ While this is a
genuine and accurate statement describing the differences between a pro
gressive socialist and a traditional politician, it conflicts with Jumblatt's
rule as a leader of the Jumblatt clan and the head of a feudal family who
is inextricably involved in traditional Lebanese politics. To what ex
tent it is applicable to Jumblatt as the president of the Socialist Pro
gressive Party as well as the chief of his family w ill be an interesting
political phenomenon to observe. Thus far, Jumblatt has been trying to
be progressive and socialist, but he has not gone far enough in trans
forming himself from a feudal landlord into a progressive socialist.
^ The Washington Post. 84th year, No. 323 (October 24, 1961), P. A9. ^ A l-J a ry d a , No. 2711 (October 21, 1961), p. 4.
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THE ARAB SOCIALIST MOVEMENT:
COMPARISON AND CONTRAST
The practice of socialism embraces a variety of forms. While all
forms of socialism have similar ultimate objectives, they may differ in
the degree of common ownership and public control of wealth and in
their means of applying socialist principles and achieving their common
goals. These differences have given rise to several socialist movements
and to various kinds of socialism ranging from that of Great Britain,
where certain basic and key industries have been nationalized but the
private sector of the economy remains larger than the public, to the
socialism practiced in the U.S.S.R., where there is "one form of public
ownership o f the means o f production.
I. COMMUNISM AND ARAB SOCIALISM2
Ideological Differences
I f we were to d ivide the s o c ia l is t movement in to two broad c la s s i
fications, the Marxian or alleged scientific socialism and the democratic
or liberal (sometimes referred to as utopian) socialism, the two
1 "Text of Soviet Party's Draft Program," The New York Times, V ol. CXI, No. 37810 (August 1 , 1961), p. Ll6.
2 The term "Arab socialism" refers to the Arab forms of socialism embodied in the Arab socialist movement. These forms are represented by the socialism advocated by the Ba'th, the P.S.P., the Democratic Socialist Party in Iraq and the revolutionary regime in the U.A.R.
178
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socialist parties under study as well as the Arab socialist movement as
a whole would belong in the latter category.
The fundamental premise of Marx's theory of dialectical materi
alism is that the economic factor determines the history of man, the
people's thoughts, and the structure of society. The material relations
of production, constituting the economic structure of society, determine
the general character of society. Social, political, legal and other
institutions are influenced by and formed in accordance with the
existing material relations.
The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual process of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.3
Marx believed that history proceeds only from economic stress and
revolves around the conflicts among opposing classes of society. He
asserted that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the his
tory of class struggles."^1 He concluded that opposing classes must
inevitably struggle until the working class gains power and a classless
and stateless society ultimately emerges.
According to Marx, socialism is achieved by the revolution of the
working class whose conditions, during the struggle between the capi
talist bourgeoisie and the nonpropertied proletariat, would deteriorate
under the exploitation of the capitalists. He based this premise on his
surplus value theory. He presumed that the value of a commodity is
equal to the amount of labor embodied in it. "That which determines the
3 Karl Marx, A C ontribution to the C ritique o f P o litic a l Economy, translated and edited by N. F. Stone (Chicago, 190U77 pP* H -1 2 .
li Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto, a Gateway Edition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 195U), p. 9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 0 magnitude of the value of any article is the amount of labor socially
necessary, or the labor-time socially necessary for its production.11
Assuming that value equals labor, the difference between the value of the
commodities produced and their cost represents the profit of the capi
ta list. The employer pays his employees a wage which is lower than the
value of labor and keeps the difference for himself. Hence, the capitalist
exploits his employees by taking the difference between the value of the
commodities produced and the wages paid to the laborers to produce them.
This difference Marx called the surplus value.
These two great discoveries, the materialist conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production through surplus value, we owe to Marx. With these discoveries Socialism becomes a science. The next thing was to work out a ll i t s d e ta ils and r e l a t i o n s6 .
Marx prophesied that the dictatorship of the proletariat would
be the final stage of class struggle. At that stage, the principle,
"From each according to his capacity, to each according to his n e e d ," ?
would be applied. Since Marx assumed that the only source of conflict
among human beings is economic or material strife, the achievement of
a classless society would preclude the necessity for a state, and
gradually, a stateless society would evolve.
Socialism is inevitable, according to the Marxists, because the
existing material conditions in which the laborers live drive them
towards socialism. The inevitability of socialism does not imply that
5 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, translated by S. Moore and 15. Jveling, edited by Friedrich Engels (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. 1906), p . U6.
6 Friedrich Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, translated by Edward A veling (New York: New York Labor New Company, 1 901), p . 28.
7 Karl Marx, Critique of the Goth Programme (New York: Inter national Publishers, 1933 )f p . 31*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. it will be attained by a specific date or within a certain period of
time. Progress toward the achievement of the final stage of socialism
can be retarded or accelerated but cannot be prevented. Therefore,
Marxists believe that although socialism is inevitable, it must be
worked for, and it w ill be attained after a certain period of time the
duration of which depends upon the amount of effort exerted by the
socialists.
The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party and the Progressive
Socialist Party, being part of the democratic socialist school, do
not accept the m aterialistic interpretation of history and do not agree
with the Marxian theory that socialism is the inevitable result of
class struggles.
The speaker of the U.A.R. National Union, Anwar al-Sadat, when
he led a parliamentary delegation to the Soviet Union early in June,
1961, spoke for all Arab socialists when he informed Premier Khrushchev,
"We are not convinced that the evolution of human history marches in a Q predetermined path sta r tin g w ith cap italism and ending w ith communism."
Arab socialists believe that socialism will result from the
conviction of the majority of people that it answers the need for a
more moral and just order in society. They believe that socialism can
be achieved without violence, bloodshed, or class hatred and agree with
other democratic socialists that the triumph of socialism "will depend
upon the ability of socialists to persuade people in general that
socialism affords a better way of life than any other form of economic
or political organization."^
8 Al-Hayat, No. h6k5 (June 10, 1961), p. 6.
9 Norman Thomas, Democratic Socialism: A New Appraisal (New York League for Industrial Democracy, 1953), p. 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182
Arab socialists do not accept Marx's assumption that capitalism
necessarily leads to the impoverishment of the working class. They
assume that, rather than the middle class being proletarized as the
Marxists conceive, the proletariat are likely to become indistinguishable
from the middle class. Therefore, the desire for socialism must have a
stronger basis than the decay of capitalism, a phenomenon that may or
may not occur. That basis must be the superiority of socialism over
capitalism as a way of life. G. D. H. Cole said,
There is an old conflict in Socialism between the 'moralists' and the 'class-warriors'. The Utopian Socialists hoped to regenerate society by appealing to men's better feelings, through the spread o f’enlightenment', and by persuading the rich as well as the poor that they would be really happier in a classless society of economic equals. Scientific Socialists, of whom Karl Marx is a prophet, scoffed at the Utopians and offered, by way of refuting them,an interpre tation of human history in terms of power and con flict.... Justice among men w ill come, they te ll us, not when men in the mass are prepared to act more justly, but only when the material forces on the side of justice grow stronger than the forces waged against it...The call of the Marxists is to a class war waged for the victory of justice but with the weapons of sheer material force.
Marx discounted nationalities and nationalism as unifying forces
and believed that class ties are stronger than national ties. To the
communists, the state represents the interests of a particular class
and is used as an instrument of suppression by protecting the
interests of the dominating class.
The state is the organ of class domination, the organ of oppression of one class by another. Its aim is the creation of order which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the collisions between classes.
With the abolition of classes, there w ill be no more suppression and,
hence, no more need for the state. Therefore, the communists oppose
10 G. D. H. Cole. The Simple Case For Socialism (London: V. Gollancz, Ltd., 195>3J, p. 19U. 11 V. I. Ulianov N. Lenin, The State and the Revolution (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1919), p. IT1
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nationalism and work to eliminate nation states in order to establish
a c la s s le s s s o c ie ty .
Arab socialism preaches the elimination of class distinctions
and the d isso lu tio n o f c la ss p r iv ile g e s ; but Arab s o c ia l is t s , w ith the
exception of the P.S.P., believe in nationalism and nation states and
in applying their socialism within the framework of national unity.
The Ba’th party recognizes the existence of struggles among
classes and acknowledges the role of class struggle in the history of
human society, but it believes that the communist theory of class struggle
is exaggerated and that history, so far, has proven the invalidity of
Marx's thesis.-*-2 The Ba'thists admit that there is a conflict between
the capitalists and the laborers; they also agree that cooperation exists
among the laborers and the socialists in the different nations; but they
do not believe that the laboring classes of the different nations
should be tied to one organization which is controlled by one nation and
subordinated to its policies.
Arab socialists adopt a moderate kind of socialism. While Arab
socialism advocates the nationalization of the major means of produc
tion, it encourages personal initiative within the lim its of the
national interest. It upholds the rights of limited private property
and inheritance and recognizes the individual's right to receive compen
sation proportionate to his efforts and abilities in production. It
also accords him the rig h t to use h is earnings in any way he deems f it ." ^
12 Michel Aflaq, "Nazratuna Li al-Ra'ismaliyah wa Li al-Sira' al-Tabaqi" (Our Outlook on Capitalism and Class Struggles), Aflaq and others, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiyah, op. cit., p. 2$.
13 Wahib Ghanim, "Al-Ishtirakiyah wa al-Hurriyah al-Insaniyah" (Socialism and Human Freedom), Aflaq and others, Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiyah, op. cit., p. 135.
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The communists advocate an extreme totalitarian socialist system
with fu ll control of all of the wealth of the community and its common
ownership. They maintain that all owners are exploiters and, therefore,
they aim a t n a tio n a lizin g a l l the means o f production, consumption, and
exchange and at abolishing private property and the right of inheritance.
In his introduction to the book On the Economic Theory of
Socialism, Benjamin E. Lippincott made the following differentiation
between socialism and communism: "A socialist economy is one that
socializes production alone, as contrasted with communism, which
socializes both production and consumption.
Communism attempts to bring about the condition of economic
security at the cost of individual liberty. Under the communist system,
the individual has little significance and is denied his freedom for
the sake of collective freedom.
Arab socialists feel that collective freedom has little value
if it does not guarantee individual freedom. Arab socialism attempts
to maintain a balance between economic security and individual liberty.
Early in 1961, Adam Schaff, a leading Marxist philosopher in
Poland, warned that the communist philosophy, unless it placed more
emphasis on the significance of the individual, would lose the struggle
for the mind of man. "Since then, apparently with the tentative approval
of the Marxist hierarchy, Professor Schaff has built on the concept of
socialist humanism," reported the Christian Science Monitor, "to argue
that communism really does struggle for the highest happiness and
lU Oskar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, On the Economic Theory of Socialism (Minneapolis: The University of Ptinnesota Press, 1938), p. 9.
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development of the individual, but that can come only through the
happiness of society as a whole.
Arab socialism aspires to establish a democratic state in Arab
society, while communism practices authoritarian rule within its states.
In comparing Arab socialism vwith communism, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal,
chief editor of Al-Ahram and a close associate of President Nasser,
concluded his discussion saying:
Summing up the difference between our attitudes toward the individual, we would say that communism regards the indi vidual as a product of history, while Arab socialism believes that the reaction between the individual and history is complete and continuous. Man is made by history, but man also makes h isto r y .
Political Differences
I d e o lo g ic a lly , Arab so cia lism and Marxian so cia lism have b a sic
differences and irreconcilable contradictions.
P o lit ic a lly , as a movement aspirin g to achieve Arab u n ity and
liberation, Arab socialism identifies itself with Arab nationalism and,
th erefo re, considers communism a dangerous and d estru ctiv e movement in
the Arab world. Arab socialists, deriving their policies from the Arab
national interest, base their actions on the aspirations of the Arab
n a tio n a list movement th at has evolved to f u l f i l l the needs o f Arab i. s o c ie ty . Arab communists, receivin g in stru ctio n s from Moscow and in sp ired
by the Communist International, are considered foreign agents within the 17 Arab homeland.
15 The C hristian Science Monitor, V ol. 53. No. 298 (November lli, 1961), p. 2. 16 Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 151-1961 (August 7, 1961), p. B7. 17 Mahir Nasim, Al-Shuyu'iyah wa al-Ishti'm ar (Communism and Imperialism), (Cairo: Al-Matba’ah al-Alamiyah, 1957), pp. 68-70.
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The h isto r y o f the Arab communist p a r tie s , as w ell as of a l l
communist parties all over the world, has been to pursue policies that
further the Soviet national interest rather than the Arab national
interest. These policies may agree or conflict with the Arab national
interest depending upon Moscow's orders and the policy of international
communism.
Since the introduction of the communist regime following the
Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Soviet Union has aimed at ideological
infiltration in the Arab world through local communist parties. The
communists believe that the existence of colonies and semi-colonies in
the area provides a major impetus for the proletariat in their fight 18 against capitalism. Looking upon the Middle East as a strategic area,
they have taken advantage of the Arab struggles for liberation from
Western influence in order to achieve a popular following and to replace
Western colonialism with Soviet imperialism.
Realizing the communist threat, the Ba'th party exposed the
purpose of the Arab communists as early as lpixU in a statement entitled
"Arab Nationalism and Its Stand on Communism," which criticized the
Marxian ideology and attacked communism for the dangers it imposed on
the Arab world. The following year, the Ba'th party issued another state
ment, "The Communist Party: A Base for Internationalism and Propaganda
for the Foreigner," revealing that the policies of the Arab communist
parties link their destiny with that of Moscow and follow the policy of
18 George Lenczowski,. "Evolution of Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (February, 1958), p. 165.
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international communism and that, therefore, Arab communists should be
considered foreign agents.
In a speech d elivered a t Damascus on March 13, 1959, President
Nasser expressed the same p oin t o f view when he sta te d :
We in C airo, b reth em , know th at the Communists are agen ts. We did not permit the establishm ent o f a Communist party in Egypt because we were sure th at the Communist party in Egypt does not act in conformity with its own w ill or work for the interest of its own country. We were sure that it received inspiration from abroad arid worked for the foreigner.
The Communist party in Egypt used, since 1953, to receive directives from the Communist Party in Italy and carried out these instructions.
The Communist party here in Syria comprised agents who received their inspiration from abroad and even received funds from abroad.
We a l l know th at Communists are agents. We w ill not accept, brethem, to have agents rule us, for when we took it upon ourselves to get rid of imperialist stooges we also sought to put an end to the reign of agents. The era of agents in our country exists no longer. We pray to God that the people of Iraq, who last year had risen to liberate their country of the stooges of imperialism and did actually rid themselves of them, would be able also to get rid of agents and enjoy freedom and independence. '
In order to achieve its universal revolution, communism must
annihilate capitalism. According to communist doctrine, capitalism and
socialism cannot coexist peacefully. "As long as capitalism and
socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in the end one or the other
w ill triumph," declared Lenin on November 26, 1920. "...International
19 President Gamal Abdel Nasser1s Speeches (Cairo: Information Department, 1959),p. 135.
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imperialism, with its mighty capital... could not under any circumstances, 20 on any condition, live side by side with the Soviet Republic..."
During the period that Arab nationalism concentrated its struggles
primarily to end Western domination, the Soviets supported the Arab
cause and deviated from their stand against peaceful coexistence,
preferring a neutralized Middle East to a Western-influenced Middle East
and believing that their ultimate objective would be served. Seeking to
sever Arab-Western relations, they propagated the slogans of self-
determination and national liberation. In February 1955# Moscow
announced the following principles of peaceful coexistence: "(l) equality,
(2) non-interference in internal affairs, (3) non-aggression,
(1;) refraining from attempts directed against territorial integrity, and 01 (5) respect for sovereignty and national independence."
After the Afro-Asian demonstration of neutralism and the
Bandung Conference of April 1955, the Soviets, basically opposed to
neutralism, were willing to accept it.
Whatever successes the Soviets and the Arab communist parties
have scored in the Arab world can be attributed mainly to Western poli
cies and actions in the area. The Palestine question, the Tripartite
Declaration of May 1950, the Common Defense projects proposed by the West
between 1951 and 1953* the Western sponsorship 01 the Baghdad Pact
20 V. I , Lenin, "Speech D elivered at a M eeting, November 26, 1920," Committee on Un-American A ctivities - Facts on Communism, Vol. II, The S o v iet Union From Lenin to Khrushchev (Washington, D .C .: U .S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. ~81u
21 Lenczowski, "Evolution of Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East," The Journal of Politics, op. cit., p. 176.
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concluded in February 1955., the Suez crisis and the tripartite aggres
sio n on Egypt in the f a l l o f 1956, th e A lgerian war of lib e r a tio n , and
the British imperialism in Southern Arabia, along with other Arab-
Western points of friction, have paved the way for communist infiltration
into the Arab world.
The refusal of the West to sell arms to Egypt in 1955 the
conclusion of the arms deal between Egypt and the communists was the
immediate cause for the great breakthrough of the Soviets in the Arab
world. "Once Abdel Nasser declared his independence of the West, the
Soviets made the most of the opportunity to prove to him and to the
Arabs," remarked John C. Campbell, "the benefits of what they had to
offer: arms in quantities far greater than anything the Arabs had
received or could expect to receive from the West..."22
At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party held in
February 1956, special attention was devoted to some Afro-Asian countries,
including Syria and Egypt. Nikita Khrushchev declared that one of the
major tasks of the party was,
To reinforce indefatigably the bond of friendship and coopera tion with the republics of India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and other states that stand for peace. To support countries that refuse to be involved in military blocs; to cooperate with all forces seeking to preserve peace.23
At the same congress, it was also decided to resort to coopera
tion with the national bourgeoisie instead of fighting it. The Arab
^2john C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I960), p. 212.
^^Nikita Khrushchev, The Soviet Union From Lenin to Khrushchev, op. c it., p. 3U9-
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communist parties were instructed not to threaten "its vested interests,
but were to join with all other parties supposed to be fighting for
nationalism against Western imperialism."^ After the Suez crisis,
military and technical assistance was offered to Egypt and Syria
accompanied by diplomatic support to the Arab states in their conflict
with the West and Zionism.
Communist support o f Arab nationalism la s te d only from 1955 u n til
19^8 during the period that the nationalist aims were limited to libera
tio n from Western im perialism . When the Arab n a tio n a lis t movement
extended its interests to include the introduction of social and economic
reforms and the application of socialist measures within the framework of
Arab society, the communists withdrew their support. For they realized
that the success of such a venture would prove that communism is not
the only solution for developing the underdeveloped areas. It would
support the theory that different systems and measures should be
applied to correspond to different existing conditions.^ And it would
expose the fallacy of communist propaganda in Asia and Africa,
These were the motives behind Arab communist opposition to the
Arab n a tio n a lis t movement follow in g the b irth o f the United Arab
Republic and the emergence of its socialist program. The Soviet Union
welcomed the creation of the U.A.R. "as an anti-im perialist move, but
2h 0. E. Wheeler, "Russia and the Middle East," International Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July, 1959), p. 300.
2$ Sa'dun Himadeh, Nahnu wa al-Shuyu'iyah Fi al-Azamah al-Hadirah (We and Communism in the Present- C risis), (Beirut: Dar al-'.fali * ah, n.d.), PP. 7^-75
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i t was pointed out th at the Arab u n ity movement could be used fo r purposes pZ contrary to the interests of the people."
Communist in f ilt r a t io n o f Iraq and the S oviet attempt to dominate
that country contributed to the estrangement between communism and Arab
nationalism. Khrushchev, addressing the Iraqi economic delegation to
Moscow in March, 1959> attacked the U.A.R. for its attempts to include
Iraq and accused it of following policies toward Iraq that suppressed
"freedom-loving aspirations."
The secretary-general of the communist party in Syria and
Lebanon, Khalid Bakdash, in a statem ent made in Prague on November 22,
1961, explained that there is only one road for Syria to follow:
"...the fight against imperialism, the road of democratic development,
the road.leading to the formation of a national front of all democratic
fo r c e s.
The battle between communism and Arab nationalism is not of
recent origin. It started with the communist infiltration in Syria and
Lebanon in the early 1930's.
A study of the communist record in the area clearly reveals
that, with the exception of communist support of Arab liberation from
Western domination, the Arab communists have worked again st Arab
national aspirations throughout their history. For obvious reasons,
they offered valuable support during the Suez crisis and after the
26 G. E. Wheeler, "Soviet P o licy Towards the Middle East," Jaan Pennar (ed.), Islam and Communism (New York: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1960)7 p. 33.
27 Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 227 - 1961 (November 2h, 1961), P. G3.
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Anglo-French-Israeli aggression on Egypt in the fa ll of 1956. They have
also offered economic and technical assistance to Syria and Egypt.
Otherwise, one can safely say that they have worked against Arab
interests in all major issues including Palestine and Algeria. Following
Soviet interests, they supported French colonialism in Syria and
Lebanon. They resen t the Arab p o lic y o f neutralism and work again st
national unity.
In 19U7, the Arab communist parties declared their support of
the partition plan of Palestine and welcomed the idea of a Jewish
n ation al homeland. They condemned the P a lestin e war in 19U8, c a llin g i t
"a racial and religious war," "a feudal war," "a war waged by the
bourgeoisie to make the laborers forget their economic demands," "a
war instigated by imperialism to train the Arab armies to fight in 28 preparing them for war against the Soviet Union." From 19^8 until
1955, the year the Soviets started to establish better relations with the
Arab nationalists, the communists campaigned for the conclusion of a
peace treaty between the Arabs and the Israelis because, as they put it, 29 th is "tension b e n e fits im perialism ." On May 15, 191*8, when the Arab
armies entered Palestine, the communist party of Syria and Lebanon held
a meeting in Beirut to discuss the crisis and issued a statement
declaring its stand against the war. After describing the war as a
racial and religious war, the party called upon the Arab armies to with
draw from P a lestin e im m ed ia tely .^
28 Al-Hakam Darwazah, Al-Shuyu'iyah al-Mahalliyah wa Ma'rakat al-Arab al-Qawmiyah (Local Communism and the Arab N ational B a ttle ), (Beirut:-Car al-Fajer, 1961), p. 235.
29 Ib id .
30 I b id ., p . 283.
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During the war, the communists asked for a settlement of the
Palestine question by recognition of Israel, a proposition that was
rejected by the Arab nationalists. Al-Ittihad (Union), the communist
newspaper in Palestine, called upon the "government of Israel" and the
"Arab governments" to start negotiations to end the war which had been
imposed by colonialism on the people of Palestine and to withdraw all
armies. The paper went on to say, "We ask for direct negotiations
to save the Arabs of Palestine from foreign occupation...the presence
of the Arab armies, which appease imperialism, is an occupation also."^
In analyzing the reasons for the war, the communists enumerated
causes that are far from being close to the truth and which Arab national
ists reject completely. Under the title "Palestine - the War Dictated
by Imperialism," the communist paper Sawt al-Proletariat (Voice of the
Proletariat) summarized these causes as follows:
a - British colonialism had prepared for this war for several years in order to defend its position in the Middle East.
b - This war serves the Arab bourgeoisie by suppressing the growing and progressive proletariat.
c - This war i s one of the numerous exp losion s in stig a te d by international reactionism for the purpose of creating fortresses out of some areas which the reactionary forces want to use as launching bases for attacking the Soviet Union.
d - Lastly, this war is directed today against the Jewish revolutionary proletariat in Palestine .™
Al-Qa'idah (The Base), the newspaper of the Iraqi communist party,
wrote on January 26, 1931* that the governing classes in the Arab
countries had grown more "hysteric" in spreading national hatred against
31 A l-I ttih a d , (November 22, 191*8), p. 1 .
32 Sawt al-Proletariat, No. 2 (November, 191*8), p. 1.
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the Israeli brotherly people, and that their newspapers as well as their
n ation al and r e lig io u s gatherings had paved the way fo r a war in
P a le stin e .
With regard to the Algerian question, until 1936 the Arab
communist p a r tie s supported the lib e r a tio n movement in North A frica at
a time when the French communist party was a m inority party having only
tw elve deputies in the French parliam ent. But when the Popular Front
emerged victorious, after the communists had cooperated with the
s o c ia lis t s and r a d ic a ls , and when the communists won more than seventy
seats in the French National Assembly, the Arab communists changed their
policy toward North Africa and the Levant. Instead of supporting the
independence and liberation of the Arabs in North Africa, they started
propagating the idea that it is in the interest of Morocco, Tunisia
and A lgeria to be bound by clo se t ie s w ith France. That s h if t in
policy is typical of the several, and sometimes contradictory, shifts
in the Arab communist policy toward Arab national issues depending upon
the stand o f Moscow and in tern a tio n a l communism.
In the case of North Africa, the French communist party, which
has played a major role in influencing the communist policy toward that
area, has mainly shaped the policy of the Arab communists toward the
question of the liberation of North Africa from French imperialism. The
French communist party believes that the independence of Algeria, as
Elie Murkus shows in his book Al-Hizb al-Shuyu'y al Faranci wa Qadiyat
a l-J a z a 'e r (The French Communist Party and the A lgerian Q uestion),
33 A l-Q a-idah, (January 2ii, 19$k), p. 1 .
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that the French Union provides peoples overseas (meaning French
colonies) with the only opportunity to attain liberty and democracy.
Two days after the outbreak of the Algerian revolution on
November 1 , 195k, the French communist party issu ed a statem ent req uestin g
the search for a democratic solution respecting all the inhabitants of
Algeria with no racial or religious distinction, after taking into
consideration the interests of France.^ Another statement issued by the
party on March 2, 1956, read, "We support the necessity of maintaining
special political, economic and cultural ties between France and Algeria."
As late as July 31, 1956, the French communist party maintained "the
necessity of establishing permanent relations between France and Algeria
in the political, economic and cultural fields within a real French 37 U nion.Irrespective of its merits this policy is resented by the
Arabs because it conflicts with their national aspirations.
During the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon, the communists
supported the 1936 treaties concluded between France on the one hand and
Syria and Lebanon on the other upon the instructions of the French o Q communist party. The former had sent a delegate, Rafiq Rida, to Paris
3l* Al-Hakam Darwazah, o£. c i t . , p. 1*51.
35 Ibid., p. 1*53.
36 I b id ., p. 1*57.
37 A l-B a'th , No. 102, (May 30, 1958), p . 1. 38 In'am al-Ju n d i, I la Ayna Y asir al-Shuyu'iyun b i al-Iraq (Where Are the Communists Going in Ira q ), (B eiru t: Dar al-N ashir al-A rabiyah, 1959), p p . 56-59.
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to coordinate the policies of the two parties pertaining to the French
interests in Syria, Lebanon and North Africa . ^ "The executive committee
of the French communist party called me and asked me to request the
executive committee of the communist party in Syria and Lebanon to
campaign for the acceptance of the treaty," said Rafiq Rida, "and to
urge the Syrian negotiators to be agreeable because the French communist
party does not want to jeopardize the position of the French government,
which the party supports."^ Upon the execution of these instructions,
Khalid Bakdash delivered a speech in Aleppo on January 22, 1937 saying,
,rWe supported the Syrio-French treaty, and we helped to remove the
obstacles blocking its way."^
Communist support of French colonialism in Syria and Lebanon was
not limited to the 1936 treaties. When the Arab nationalists attacked
France for giving the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey, the communist
party in Syria and Lebanon defended the French action apologetically.
"It was not France that disappointed the Arabs. It was not France that
backed up in the face of Turkish imperialism and which did not live up to
its international commitments," wrote Bakdash in the party newspaper,
Sawt al-Sha'eb (Voice of the P eop le), on June 7, 1938. "No, France did
not do this. These were rather the actions of certain French diplo
mats . . .
39 Al-Hakam Darwazah, 0£ . c i t . , p . 362.
IiO Ibid. , p. 363.
IfL Ib id .
Ij2 Sawt al-Sha'b, No. 18U (June 7, 1938), p. 1.
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In 19U3, when the Arab nationalists supported the Lebanese revolt
against the French, the communist party advised the Lebanese government
to stay on good terms with France and "to seek the strengthening of the
ties of friendship with them (the French) instead of weakening these
ties."^ Following the same policy, the communists called upon the
people of Syria, Lebanon and. France to remain partners in their struggles
fo r democracy and freed om .^ Even in 19k5> when Syria and Lebanon asked
for the evacuation of foreign troops from their lands and the French
wanted to prolong their stay in the two countries, the communists
supported the French stand. The party asked Syria to conclude a treaty
with France that would be "a document of friendship and alliance between
the Syrian and the French p eop les.
_ Regarding the Arab position in the cold war, the communists have
opposed the policy of positive neutralism followed by the Arabs and have
rejected the idea of the "Third force". They believe that the world is
divided into two blocs: the communist bloc advocating democracy and
fighting colonialism, and the imperialist capitalist bloc supporting
colonialism and suppressing democracy.^ Calling upon the Arabs to join
the Soviet bloc, the party issued a statement condemning the tripartite
agreement of 1930 and stating, "The place of our country and people is
with the huge democratic international bloc which includes 800 million
1*3 Ib id . , No. 662 (November 10, 19L3)* P. 1 .
lUi Al-Tariq, No. 7 (May 1, 19U3), p. 3.
Sawt al-Sha'b , (January 15, 19U5)* P. 1.
1*6 Al-Tariq, No. 10 (October 19U7), p. 101.
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people in the Soviet Union, China, and the People's Democratic Repub-
j n lies." Khalid Bakdash, addressing the Central Command of the Communist
Party in Syria and Lebanon on January 1, 1951, attacked the Arab
socialists for championing a neutralist policy. The Arab socialists,
Bakdash said, are trying
... to prevent the growth of popular sympathy and socialism led by the Soviet Union by calling for a so-called "third force" or "neutrality" between the two camps. This, in effect, leads to a breaking up of the wave of hatred and growing struggle (a) again st war and the aggressive schemes o f the Anglo-American imperialists aiming toward the occupation of our country and (b) against the treason of the r u l e r s . ^8
Following the same l i n e , A l-T ariq, the Lebanese Communist magazine,
remarked, "The most ardent advocates of cosmopolitanism are the leading
supporters of the 'Third Force' who belong to the socialist right. They
1.0 betray their country and step on the national feelings.
The communist attitude toward Arab unity has been no less antagon
istic than its attitude toward other Arab national aspirations. Communist
opposition to Arab unity has grown since the birth of the U.A.R. in 1958.
The communists have supported Arab unity merely as a slogan to be used
against Western imperialism and not a principle in which they believe.
As W alter Laqueur w rote, "The Arab movement toward u n ity w ill be
supported as long as it can be used as a weapon against the West but
hardly any longer."^
In conformity with their ideology, Arab communists do not believe
in the existence of the Arab nation. In their writings they refer to
ij8 Khalid Bakdash, "For the Successful Struggle for Peace, National Independence, and Democracy We Must R esolu tely Turn Toward the Workers and the Peasants," The Middle East Journal, Vol.7, No. 2 (Spring, 1953)* P* 208.
Ii9 Al-Tariq, (August, 1952), p. 59.
50 Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 3U5.
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Arab states as Arab nations and they use such terms as "Egyptian nation"
and "Iraqi nation" to refer to the Arab people in Egypt and in Iraq
respectively. “The union of the Syrian nation is not a matter of feelings
and emotions. It is rather a matter imposed by the economic and social
necessities...,"'^'' wrote Bakdash in reference to the Arab people in
S yria.
In refuting the arguments presented in favor of Arab unity, Aziz
al-H aj, a lead in g Arab communist from Iraq, explained th at a p eop le,
having one nationality, does not necessarily constitute one nation state;
and that the establishment of a nation state is not the only expression
of unity. A united nation state may not be the most preferable expression qp of unity under all circumstances. Basing his arguments against Arab
u n ity on th ese two prem ises, he went on to say th a t Arab n a tio n a lis ts
who concentrate their efforts on uniting all the Arabs in one nation state
are hurting the Arab cause because, during this period, the struggle for
unity is the struggle against imperialism and against the conservative
governing classes.
Arab s o c ia lis t s as w ell as Arab n a tio n a lis ts condemn communism
and try to prevent its further infiltration into the area. The success
of their efforts w ill depend to a large extent on the Arabs' relations
with the West and the Soviet Union. The deterioration of Arab-Western
relations has been mainly responsible for Soviet infiltration in the Arab
world; and the improvement of these relations w ill, no doubt, check
that infiltration.
91 Sawt a l-S h a 'b ,. No. I 3I4 (A pril 6, 1938)j P* 1 .
52 Al-Hakam Darwazah, op. c i t . , pp. 223-2214.
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I I . ARAB SOCIALISM AND WESTERN SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS
Western socialism and Arab socialism have many sim ilarities. Both
movements belong to the democratic socialist school and, therefore, refute
the Marxian claim of the inevitability of scientific socialism and his
theory of class struggles and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their
economic programs are very close in method and in the degree of nationali
zation they advocate. Both place special emphasis on improving the
cond ition s o f workers and p easan ts, but Arab so cia lism g iv e s more con sid
eration to the problems of the peasants than does Western socialism due
to the special economic conditions existing in Arab society. Both
believe in democracy and individual freedom, but Arab socialism is more
nationalistic than Western socialism because the Arab world is in a less
advanced stage of political development.
Emerging in the nineteenth century as a reaction to the conditions
resulting from the Industrial Revolution, Western socialism developed to
solve problems brought about by industrialization. The miserable condi
tions of the workers and their struggles to improve these conditions were
the main unifying factors for socialists in all countries.
Due to a lack of industrialization, similar conditions do not
exist in the underdeveloped countries, including the Arab states, where
problems arising from industrialization are not as acute, and where more
emphasis is placed on the conditions of peasants, on land reforms, and
on problems of national liberation. Therefore, Arab socialism is more
concerned than Western socialism with agricultural workers, national
problems, and humanitarian ideals.
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The wage laborers in Europe who organized as a reaction to the
evils of capitalism conceived of the struggle as a class struggle to
liberate the suppressed individual in his society and to preserve his
d ig n ity and secure fo r him happiness and s o c ia l j u s t ic e . To a tta in the
same end, countries facing colonialism and outside pressures have to
lib e r a te th e ir lands and peoples from w ithout and the members o f th e ir
society from within. Thus, nationalism and socialism, in striving for
freedom and social justice in those countries, share the same cause.
Western society differs from Arab society in that the Western
nations have already completed their formative stage and are now in a
stage of social and economic development. As they are fully free and
sovereign, nationalism has ceased to be a motivating factor and they place
more emphasis on finding solutions to social and economic problems. The
Arab n ation i s s t i l l in a form ative stage and lack s independence and
unity. Therefore, its emphasis must necessarily be on national issues
and the attainment of national aspirations. Arab socialists realize that
they cannot successfully implement the needed social and economic reforms
until they have achieved an independent and well-organized Arab society.
It should be pointed out that Western socialism does not reject
nationalism. Unlike Marxism, which maintains that nationalism is a
reaction ary, bourgeois movement and th at the b ou rgeoisie i s the stron g
hold of nationalism,-^ Western socialism tends to be tolerant of
53 Abd al-Aziz al-Duri, Al-Judhur al-Tarikhiyah Li al-Qawmiyah al-Arabiyah (Historical Bases for Arab Nationalism), (Beirut: Dar al-Ilim Li al-Malayin, i 960), p. 102.
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nationalism and to believe that it w ill gradually undergo atrophy as
humanity progresses.^
Strained Arab-Western relations over the question of colonialism
have caused a rift between Arab socialists and Western socialists
because Arab socialists feel its inhumanity more than Western socialists.
For example, French socialists have actually supported the suppression of
the n a tion al movement for the lib e r a tio n of A lgeria, w hile Arab
socialists consider such an action not only anti-socialist, but inhuman.
Socialism, as a humanitarian movement, is bound to support human
liberation. Thus, socialists who oppose people’s struggles for libera
tion do not conform to their principles. ^ls
The Palestine question is another point of disagreement between
some ’Western socialists and Arab socialists. Certain socialist circles
in Europe believe that Israel is a solution to the Jewish problem.
Irrespective of the political and national aspects of the issue, Arab
socialists quarrel with that attitude on purely moral grounds. Acknowl
edging that the Jews were badly persecuted by the Nazis,.Arab socialists
do not believe that this injustice can be or should be corrected by
committing as grave an injustice against other innocent people, namely
the Arabs who were uprooted from th e ir homeland and forced to become
refugees by the creation of Israel as a home far persecuted Jews. To
Arab socialists, that solution was unjust and immoral, and they cannot
but censure those 'Western s o c ia lis t s who supported i t .
5k Munif al-R azzaz, Tatawwr Ha1na al-Qawmiyah (The Development o f the Meaning of Nationalism), (Beirut: Dar al-Ilim Li al-Kalayin, i 960), p. 7k. 55 Maqsud, Hahwa Ish tirak iyah Arabiyah, op. c i t . , p. 135. 56 C lovis Maqsud, Azamat al-Y asar al-A rabi (C r isis o f the Arab Left) (Beirut: Dar al-Ilim Li al-Malayin, I960), p. 170.
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I I I . ARAB SOCIALISM AND ASIAN SOCIALISM
With the independence of the Asian countries, especially since
the Second World War, there has emerged what may be called "Asian
socialism" as distinct from Western socialism and Marxian socialism. The
id ea o f organizing such a movement was f i r s t d iscu ssed during the Asian
R elations Conference in March 19U7 in D elh i. I t was pursued fu rth er by
the Socialist Party of India which made preliminary preparations for
calling an Asian Socialist Conference.
The plans were developed by the socialist parties of India,
Indonesia and Burma during the Asian Regional Conference of the Inter
national Labour Organization convening in Delhi in December, 19U7- In
March, 1952, rep resen tatives of the three p a rties met in Rangoon and
la id the groundwork fo r the f i r s t Asian S o c ia lis t Conference which was
held in Rangoon in January', 1953* That was follow ed by a second con fer
ence in Bombay in November, 1956.
Asian Socialists, although they have common grounds, do have
obvious differences.
The new Asian organization differs basically from the Western- oriented Socialists, although its thinking has not yet been clarified. Many of its adherents, like the left-wing socialist party of Japan, feature revolutionary radicalism and h a il Marx as th e ir true prophet.57
While this is the case in Japan, in some Asiatic countries like India
and Burma "socialists tend to blend their doctrine with the prevailing
$7 David J. Saposs, "The Split Between Asian and Western Socialism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32 (19510, p. 569.
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religious or social philosophies, most of them steering clear of
Marxism and revolu tion ary rad icalism ." '5
Arab socialism could be considered a part of Asian socialism.
The problems it is confronted by are more or less similar to those of
Asian socialism, and both advocate democratic socialism as the means to
attain their objectives and reject both communism and capitalism.
During the Rangoon meeting of March 25, 1952, the socialist parties of
India, Burma, and Indonesia declared:
S ocialism and the S o c ia lis t movement sta rted in the Western world as a logical consequence and opponent of capitalism.
Capitalism based on the profit motive gave birth to imperialism and colo n ia lism . I t has not been able to provide means fo r the emancipation of the masses. It is a form of exploitation o f man by man.
Cominform communism den ies in p r a c tic e the d ig n ity and eq u a lity of man. Its views and convictions cannot be separated from the position of Soviet Russia which it regards as its bulwark. Cominformists are essentially merely the vanguards, observers and informers of Soviet Russia.
In the Cominform cou n tries there e x is ts a d icta to rsh ip of the Cominform p a r tie s , employing methods o f terror o f the secret police, which is also felt in the sphere of production.
For these reasons, the Asian Socialist parties reject both cap italism and communism.^9
Drafting the principles and objectives of socialism as they
conceive of it, the Asian Socialist parties meeting at Rangoon in 1953
sta ted :
Socialism opposes feudalism and capitalism, whether conser vative or liberal, because they are contrary to human
58 Ib id . , p. 50.
59 Josey, o£. c i t . , p. 76.
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justice; it opposes totalitarianism, whether fascist or communist, because it is degrading. Socialism strives to secure the sharing by each individual in the cultural heritage and spiritual progress of mankind.
Asian socialism, like Arab socialism, places special emphasis
on the question of liberty. Both movements associate the concepts of
democracy and socialism, believing that the one enhances the other, and
stress the freedom of the individual. They condemn communism for its
suppression of individual liberties. At the 1953 Rangoon conference,
the Asian socialist parties declared, "Socialism recognizes man both
as an integral part of a class or group and as a human individual. It
therefore avoids totalitarian forms of government and methods of mass
coercion."^'
Both Arab and Asian socialism put emphasis on improving peasants!
conditions and introducing land reforms. The whole character and the
entire trend of Asian socialism are affected by the fact that most
Asian nations have an economy that is predominantly agricultural and
a working force that is mainly composed of farmers and peasants. In
Asia as well as in other underdeveloped nations depending on agriculture,
socialism concentrates on improving the conditions of peasants as much
as those of the laborers and on introducing land reforms.
Among the recommendations of the Rangoon Congress of 1953 were
the following:
1) Feudalism should be abolished, agrarian serfdom, forced labor and tying the peasants to the land should be totally and completely removed.
60 Ibid., p. 22.
61 Josey, 0£ . c i t . , p. J
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2) Landlordism in all.forms should be liquidated; and land should be given to the tiller of the soil,
3) Compensation to be paid, if any, should be decided in the light of the conditions prevailing in different countries. In no circumstances, however, should the burden fa ll on the peasants.
1;) Land should be re-distributed on the basis of economic holdings where pressure of population on land is not great; where pressure is heavy the distribution may be equitable.
3) Re-distribution of lands and other reforms should be carried out through Land Committees consisting of represen tatives elected by and from among the tillers of the soil,°^
Socialist parties in Asia as well as in the Arab world are, in
gen eral, firm ly involved in the n ation al movement and rooted in i t s
aspirations. They are involved in the struggle for independence and
attainm ent o f th e ir n ation al o b je c tiv e s. Arab so cia lism and Afro-
Asian socialism were born out of the national tragedies experienced
in the two continents in their struggles for self-determination and inde
pendence.^ They associate the nationalist and the socialist movements
and believe that nationalism and socialism help each other at this stage
of the history of their nations. "Socialism in the Arab nation is the
essence of the national movement,"^ said an Arab socialist in supporting
the Ba'th point of view. "In nearly every case, the socialist movement
in Southern Asia had developed as part of the national independence
movement," asserted Saul Rose in accounting for the development of the
Asian movement. "The common basis was anti-colonialism and the desire for
political independence."
62 I b id ., p. 63.
63 Muhsen Ibrahim, "Ara'Fi al-Ishtirakiyah al-Aratfyuh" (Opinions on Arab Socialism), Al-Thaqafa al-Arabiyah, op. cit. , p. Ul.
6U Maqsud, Nahwa Ishtirakiyah Arabiyah, op. c it. , p. 3U. 63 Rose, oj>. c i t . , p. 26U.
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Neutralism in the East-West c o n flic t and the form ation and
strengthening of the "Third Force" are policies advocated by both Asian
and Arab socialists and adopted by the Afro-Asian bloc. The role played
by the Ba'th and the P.S.P. and shared by Asian socialists in pursuing
this line of policy has been demonstrated in previous chapters. "Both
wings of the s o c ia lis t movement in Asia are n e u tr a lis t.
The efforts of the Asian and Arab socialists have materialized
in the formation of a bloc of neutralist powers which advocates a policy
of positive neutralism.
The nonaligned and neutralist nations, at the Belgrade Conference
held in September 1961, declared their intention to enlarge and
strengthen the neutralist bloc in order to maintain world peace and
order and to "provide encouragement and support to a ll peoples fighting
for their independence and equality."^
Positive neutralism, as conceived by its advocates, has both
positive and negative aspects. Its positive aspect serves to maximize
the minimum alternatives characterizing the foreign policies of the
states adopting it due to their resistance to alignment with either the
Communist or Western bloc for ideological and political reasons. In its
negative aspect, positive neutralism expresses the residue of Afro-
Asian resentment tu-jard colonialism due to their unfavorable historical
experience with Western colonialism. The term is often used by Afro-
Asian governments to confirm their national sovereignty and independence.
66saposs, o£. cit. , p. 590.
^^The New York Times, V ol. CXI, No. 37, 8 Jj7 (September 7, 1961), p . 8L .
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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Historical study indicates that the endorsement of an ideology
is not contingent merely upon the intrinsic merit of the ideas that
make up its principles. The ideology must correspond to the wants and
needs of a given society as well. There is a correlation between
existing political, economic, and social conditions and the ideologies
that men develop and endorse.
It is worthwhile to inquire why socialism as an ideology appeals
to some of the Arabs and how it corresponds to certain wants and needs
o f Arab s o c ie ty .
In addition to the evident need for social and economic reforms,
three circumstances of contemporary Arab life may be illuminating. The
first demands an understanding of the historical context from which the
logic of the modern Arab world has evolved; the second concerns the
difficulty the Arabs have had in deciding the crucial question of their
national destiny; and the third relates to the Arabs' encounter with
Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel.
When considering the prevailing logic in the Arab world, observers
too frequently forget the upheavals, the indignities, and the pains that
have attended Arab experiences with the Ottomans and encounters with the
Western powers, Ottoman subjugation being replaced by Franco-British
domination. One needs to consider, also,the frustration in Arab life
208
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caused by Arab weakness in the face of Western prowess and Arab cultural
stagnation in the face of Western cultural vitality and self-assurance.
In brief, the logic of modern Arab history is one of deep hurt.
This historical experience has transmitted to the Arabs a legacy
of political insecurity and has nourished deep longings and passions for
such human needs as freedom, equality, and happiness. Socialism, to many
Arabs, is the ideology that corresponds to their needs and promises the
fulfillment of their desires.
The second circumstance is no less significant than the first.
The era of independence in the Arab world has activated a variety of
im pulses and needs th at have caused the Arabs to search fo r ways and
means to sustain their new status of self-responsibility. While they
are determined to reco n cile tr a d itio n w ith the demands of modern l i f e
and thought, the adjustment has been difficult, particularly since large
segments of the Arab world are economically underdeveloped.
The Arab intelligentsia see in socialism a satisfactory philosophy
for Arab resurgence since it utilizes the nation's wealth in the
interests of the whole Arab society, not just that portion represented
by the governing classes and the power elite. They believe that
so cia lism i s the means to a productive s o c ie ty , s e lf - s u f f ic ie n t and able
to satisfy the growing needs of the Arab people.
Zionism i s the th ird fa c to r that con d ition s modern Arab l i f e and
thought. Rightly or wrongly, the Arabs consider Zionism to be basically
against their interests and regards it as an insidious, intrusive force
constituting a danger to their security. The establishment of the State
of I sr a e l in the midst o f the Arab world has become a source of deep
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embarrassment to the Arabs and has resulted in a real loss of faith in
their governing classes for their failure to build the Arab society on
sound and strong b ases.
Socialism is a form of mobilization that many Arabs believe can
compete with the rapid economic and social development of Israel and
strengthen Arab society to meet the challenge Israel presents.
The three circumstances described help to explain the dynamic
appeal of socialist organization in Syria and Lebanon and in other parts
of the Arab world. They, along with internal circumstances, shape the
featu res o f the Arab s o c ia lis t movement.
I . BA'TH AND P .S .P . SOCIALISM: NATURE AND SCOPE
The Ba'th and the Progressive Socialist Party share the common
desire of all socialists for equality.
Socialism is about equality. A passion for equality is the one thing that links all socialists; on all others they are divided. Because they are concerned about equality socialists have to be concerned about property, since the system of property is the most important cause of inequality.
However, they reject the communist view that socialism is primarily an
economic concern and believe that the humanitarian and social aspects
of socialism are as important and necessary as the economic one. A
socialist ’’expects the advent of socialism to mark a fundamental change
in human relations. He regards it as a moral and religious affair as 2 much as an economic one."
1 Arthur M. Lewis, The Principles of Economic Planning (London: Dennis Dobson, Ltd., n.d.), pp. 10-11.
2 Franz Borkenau, Socialism: National or International (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 19L2), p. 35.
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In so doing, the Ba'th and the P.S.P., as well as all Arab social
ists, align themselves with the democratic socialist school which is an
outgrowth of Western socialist thought and advocates a moderate kind of
socialism. Democratic socialism decries the totalitarianism of communism
and champions individual liberty. "Socialism is not a particular way of
dealing with property; it is a demand for equality and for social justice
...it is also a demand for individual liberty."^
Since there is no fixed line of demarkation between a socialist
state and a welfare state, it is safe to say that the Ba'th and the P.S.P.
programs promote the establishment of a welfare state, Asher Achinstein
summarized the major objectives of the welfare state as follows:
(l) A comprehensive social insurance program, including insur ance and provision against the hazards of old-age, disability, ■unemployment, and the costs of medical care; (2) prevention or mitigation of cyclical unemployment through planning of public works; (3) improvement of the standard of living through such programs as slum clearance and public housing and by providing better facilities and opportunities lor education; (l|j limita tions on the growth of powerful corporate enterprises with a view to protecting the interests of small business firms and less privileged classes.^1
To further its objectives and provide a minimum standard of living,
the welfare state pursues a policy of wealth redistribution. Pigou notes'’
a considerable transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor through the
implementation of the measures of the welfare state.
A study of the programs of our two parties reveals that they
d evise a reform ist program based on s o c ia l ju s tic e and eq u ity . They
advocate a fairer distribution of wealth, improvement of labor conditions,
3 Lewis, o£. cit., p. 11.
U Asher Achinstein, The Welfare State: The Case For and Against (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service—Public Affairs Bulletin No. 83, June, 1950), p. 9. 5 Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers, o£. cit., p. 796.
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all levels, with compulsory elementary education, free medical treat
ment, old-age pensions, and unemployment compensation. They encourage
equal opportunities and rights for all citizens with no class distinc
tions; freedom of speech, thought and association; marriage and family life
and con stru ctive work by the members o f s o c ie ty . They preach th a t work
i s a righ t and a duty, and th at i t is a lso the duty o f the s ta te to secure
employment fo r i t s c itiz e n s .
This general summary of the programs of the two parties from the
economic and social points of view illustrates their close association
with the welfare state program. "The Welfare State is a compromise
between the two extremes o f Communism on the one hand and unbridled in d i
vidualism on the other," said D. L. Holiman, "and as such, in spite of
all its imperfections, it sets a pattern for any humane and progressive
/ s o c ie t y ."
While the kind of socialism advocated by the two parties under
study encompasses the welfare state concept, it goes beyond that to
include socialist measures not accommodated in the welfare state program
such as nationalization of the major means of production, the lim itation
of p rivate property and in h erita n ce, and the in trod u ction o f other
socialist measures which are not necessarily adopted by a welfare state.
The Progressive Socialist Party believes in nationalizing institu
tions that are "of a public character or of particular significance in
6 D. L. Holiman, The Welfare State (London: John Murray, 1933 )> p. 1 .
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Arab Resurrection Socialist Party believes that the wealth of the nation
should belong to the n ation . I ts program s ta te s th at the major means o f
production, public u tilities, and natural resources should be owned and g operated by the nation state.
Nationalization is not a necessary element of the welfare state
program, but in a socialist society, the basic means of production, at
least, should be nationalized. In recent years, however, a tendency has
been noted among democratic socialists to de-emphasize the process of
nationalization.
If public ownership of the material means of production is an essential feature of a socialist economy, the British economy is not socialist. That nationalized sector of the economy is, as yet, small, and it is doubtful whether it w ill grow very much in the future.9
The Sixth Congress of the Socialist International, held in the summer of
1959, emphasized public welfare rather than class welfare and national
ization. Voogd”, the Dutch socialist, made the following remark
expressing the prevalent mood of the Congress: "The most important
question for Socialists is no longer who owns the means of production
in society, but how people live in society,
The land reform programs advocated by the Ba'th and the P.S.P.
are socialist programs. They specifically recommend the setting up of a
7 P.S.P. Program, Art. 1*, Part 2, Section b.
8 Ba'th Program, Art. 29.
9 George N. Halm, Economic Systems: A Comparative Analysis (New York and Toronto: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1955), p. 361.
10 Sidney Hook, "A New Ism fo r Socialism ," "The New York Times Magazine, Vol. CIX, No. 37,332 (April 10, I960), p. 13.
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maximum amount of land ownership, the nationalization of land exceeding
that maximum, and its redistribution among needy peasants.
Thus, while both parties advocate the lim itation of private
property, this lim itation is not required in a welfare state.
Whereas the two parties adopt the progressive tax system as a
means for accomplishing equitable distribution of wealth, this system
may or may not be applied in a welfare state.
Laborers are the backbone of a socialist movement, and the
protection and promotion of their interests are among its basic func
tions. Both of the parties under study support the laborers' struggles
to secure more rights and privileges, and advocate the development of a
strong labor union movement, adoption of the profit sharing system and
the establishment of cooperatives to aid in bringing about social and
economic justice for the workers.
They believe that the development of industry, whether public
or private, requires the comparable development of organized labor so
that problems arising from industrialization, such as settlement of
labor disputes, collective bargaining, freedom of association, and
sim ilar problems, can be resolved equitably. The existence of good labor
conditions in the United States is indicative that a well-organized labor
movement can function effectively in any society. However, a socialist
society has to protect labor rights through advocating certain socialist
m easu res.
A principle upheld by the Ba'th and the P.S.F. is that the
laborers should share in the profits of their labor. Although the profit
sharing system has become a common practice in many industries including
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some in the United States and other non-socialist countries, it is not
required in a welfare state or in a capitalist society. The programs
of our two parties, however, require that the laborers receive a share
of the profits in addition to their wages. They consider that this
system helps to bring about a fairer distribution of income and, at the
same time, encourages personal initiative and improves production.
The P.S.P. and the Ba'th encourage the establishment of coopera
tiv e a sso c ia tio n s, b e lie v in g that the cooperative movement contributes
to the advancement of socialism because it embodies the fundamental
socialist idea that wealth should be owned by all members of society.
The cooperative theory was originated by Robert Owen (1771-1858) who
believed that it was possible to reform the capitalist system without
violence through the adoption of the cooperative system. He preached
that when laborers associate to produce and distribute their products,
the function of the middleman, who is the capitalist, disappears.
"Distributors add nothing to the value of wealth, but add to its cost
by the whole expense of their living and that of the people whom they
employ,"^ Owen wrote in describing the role of the middleman.
Discussing the socialism of Owen, G. D. H. Cole said,
Owenite Socialism was never concerned mainly in terms of state or o f p o lit i c s . I t was e s s e n tia lly a form o f cooperation, aiming a t a way o f community liv in g th at was to come about by the volunt .ry action of the converted, and not through legislation.
By analyzing the programs of the two parties under study, we
have seen that they advocate "a group of measures which reject the
11 Robert Owen, The Book o f the New Moral World (New York: G. Vale, 18145), p. 55.
12 G.D.K, Cole, Socialist Thought: The Forerunners 1789-1850, Vol. I, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1953), P« 131.
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p rivate enterprise.The kind of socialism that both the Ba'th and
the P.S.P. are trying to establish in Arab society is moderate and
democratic.
I I . CPJTICAL ASSESSMENT
An examination of the constitutions of the Ba'th and the
Progressive Socialist Party reveals that they contain vague statements
and broad abstractions, especially in stating economic principles.
Article U of the P.S.P. program illustrates this point: "Each worker
is an owner, whereby, in addition to his wage, he w ill receive a fair
share of the net profits which will be divided, according to a just
r a tio , between c a p ita l and labor.. . Article 32 o f the Ba'th c o n s ti
tution declares, "Workers should share in the administration of the
industrial enterprise and should be granted, in addition to their wages
which must be determined by the state, a fair share of the profits...
The terms "just ratio" and "fair share" are not specific and,
therefore, are vulnerable to broad interpretation. The adjectives "just
and "fair" are relative and can be interpreted differently by different
people. To a Marxist, who believes that the value of a commodity is
equal to the amount o f labor put in to producing i t , a " fa ir share"
implies the distribution of the income among the workers. A capitalist
13 W illiam 0 . Douglas, Strange Lands and fr ie n d ly People (New York: Harper, 195.1), p. 209.
Ill P.S.P. Program, Art. h, Part 2, Section b.
1^ Ba'th Constitution, Art. 32.
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may interpret the same term to mean a fixed wage that the wcrker receives
irrespective of profit or loss involved in the enterprise. Hence, the
parties should replace these indefinite and sweeping terms with more
scientific language.
The two parties include in their programs social and economic
measures, such as free medical treatment and free education, without
prescribing methods to finance these measures. Even their nationaliza
tion measures may involve a loss and do not necessarily guarantee an
income. The mention of the way of financing these projects and their
proposed social security system would make the programs of these parties
more realistic and practical rather than speculative and theoretical.
The major deficiency of the Ba'th movement lies in the brevity and
the generality of its economic program. While it provides a comprehen
sive socialist outline, it does not offer a detailed socialist theory.
The reason can be found in the Ba'thist concept of socialism.
The party strongly advocates Arab unity and considers that Arab
socialism cannot be fully applied without unity. It believes that the
economic potential of a united Arab nation operating as a single economic
unit is far greater than that of the present Arab world functioning as
separate states.
The great variation in economic development and economic potential
among the Arab states makes it impractical for the Ba'th to prescribe
one detailed economic program for all of them. What might be workable in
one state might not relate to the present needs of another. To develop
l^Elyas Farah, "Tatawwr al-Harakah al-Ishtirakiyah Fi al-Watan al-Arabi" (The Development o f the S o c ia lis t Movement in the Arab Homeland), Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiyah, op. cit. , p. 203.
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individual economic programs for each Arab state would encourage
continued political separation and, thereby, prevent the realization of
a greater economic potential that could come out of unity. Therefore,
the party lays down general socialist principles now, leaving the details
to be worked out with the achievement of Arab unity. The Ba'th economic
theory w ill develop as Arab society progresses and will be shaped in
accordance with the needs of that society.^
The Progressive Socialist Party has two inherent weaknesses of
major proportions—one in its theory of nationalism and one in its
leadership.
At this stage, in which the Arabs are passing through the phase
of nation state building, nationalism is an essential and constructive
fo rce. I t i s a means o f lib e r a tio n and n ot, as the P .S.P . leadership
maintains, of domination leading to war and human destruction.
During this particular period in Arab history, nationalism and
socialism are compatible with and complementary to each other. Both
socialists and nationalists have the same immediate objectives of
national liberation, independence, and progress toward a better life, and
they should join forces to attain these aims.
Since the P.S.P. looks upon nationalism as a destructive force
and advocates internationalism, it does not attract many Lebanese who
believe in some form of nationalism. Lebanese nationalists who maintain
that Lebanon should be an entity in itself, Syrian nationalists who
contend that Lebanon is a part of natural Syria, and Arab nationalists
17 Jamal al-A tasi, "Al-Ishtirakiyah Bayn Madiha wa Mustaqbaliha" (Socialism Between Its Past and Future), Dirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiyah, op. cit., p. 96.
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who argue that Lebanon is a part of the Arab nation and should be united
with the other Arab states all disagree with the P.S.F.'s outlook on
nationalism.
I t was mainly due to Jum blatt's views on Arab nationalism th at
several prominent members of the party resigned. These people, who were
considered the intellectuals of the P.S.P. and were especially notable
for their understanding of socialism, represented the leading Arab wing
in the party. They believed that the P.S.P. should adopt Arab unity
in word and in a ctio n .
The Progressive Socialist Party is more of a leader party than an
institutional party. Its leadership revolves around its founder, Kamal
Jumblatt, who is also the leader of the Durzi Jumblatti clan in Lebanon.
Jumblatt's dual roles as head of a socialist party and of a
feudal family are at once the cause of the party's strength and its weak
ness. His feudal position, whether Jumblatt likes it or not, is the
source of his political strength and the strength of his party.Most
of the party's members are his personal or family supporters rather than
doctrinaire or convinced socialists. Yet, Jumblatt is preaching
socialism. In so doing, he threatens to destroy the remnants of tribal
and feudal society in Lebanon upon which his political power is based.
The fact that the head of a prominent and influential family,
the symbol of feudalism in Lebanon, dominates and controls the policies
of the party limits its popular and ideological growth. Socialists and
18 Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring, 1961), p. 132.
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believers in the party principles do not find the picture of a tradi
tional politician controlling a socialist party very appealing or very
convincing.
III. IDEOLOGICAL CONTRAST: THE BA'TH VS. THE P .S .P .
The ideological differences between the Ba'th and the P.S.P. are
concentrated mainly on the question of nationalism and the means of
attaining their principles.
Michel Aflaq, in replying to a question presented to him by the
author, said th at the names o f the two p a r tie s c le a r ly in d ica ted one
difference. The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party calls for basic and
inclusive changes in all aspects of Arab society, while the Progressive
Socialist Party advocates the improvement of existing conditions within
the framework of the established society. Aflaq explained, "Since we
believe in 'resurrection' and they believe in 'progress' to reform our 19 society, we are revolutionary and they are evolutionary." 7
It should be made clear at this juncture that the revolutionary
concept of the Ba'th bears no resemblance to the Marxian concept of
revolution. Ba'thists do not believe in Marx's theory of class struggles
or in his doctrine that force must be the means of revolution. They
believe that a revolution can be achieved without violence and that evolu
tio n can become a revolu tion ary means i f i t w ill lead to the implementa
tion of the basic changes advocated by the Ba'th and if it is the most
e f f ic ie n t means o f bringing about th ese changes. PO w
19 Michel Aflaq, Personal Interview, (Damascus: November 20, 19!?7).
20 Abdallah Abd al-Da'im, Al-Tarbiyah al-^awmiyah (National Education), (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, I960), pp. 68-69.
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The other difference between the two parties cited by Aflaq
concerned th e ir d iverse outlooks on Arab nationalism . "They favor Arab
u n ity and may work for i t , but we emphasize more the n a tion al p oin t o f
view and the importance of working to establish an Arab nation state, for
we believe that socialism cannot be fu lly achieved without unity,"
explained the Ba'th philosopher. Then he added, "but that does not
preclude some Arab states from partially applying socialism before the
o th ers.
The Ba'th and the P.S.P. are both humanitarian and idealistic.
However, they disagree about the role that nationalism plays in
attaining an ideal society.
The P.S.P. believes that only by transcending the boundaries of
nationalism can world harmony and cooperation among a l l people be
achieved. It denounces nationalism as an instrument of war and suppres
sion and a deterrent to world peace and unity. By failing to realize
that nationalism plays a positive role in Arab society at its present
stage of political, economic, and social development, the P.S.P. ignores
the realities of the modem world, in particular, of the Arab society.
The Ba'th believes that world unity should be the ultimate
goal of all humanitarian movements. But it seeks first to establish an
organized national unit in the Arab world as a necessary prerequisite to
internationalism.
The Ba'thists do not assume that human beings automatically seek
universal understanding. People must be prepared to live in a world
21 A flaq, Personal In terview , op. c i t .
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society by first learning to act as responsible citizens in their
national societies. The Ba'thists further maintain that only a strong
and well-organized national society can make a positive contribution
toward world society.
In the national formative stage through which the Arab states
are passing,, Arab socialism, as a humanitarian movement, should be
prim arily concerned w ith the construction of i t s own community and the
introduction of needed social and economic reforms.
The Ba'th, believing in the positive value of nationalism, has
drawn up its socialist program to fit the Arab society. The attainment
of its socialist principles depends to a large extent upon the fu lfill
ment of its national goals, especially the achievement of Arab unity. A
single Arab national state will be stronger, politically and economically,
than the combined strength of the divided Arab states. The resultant
political and economic stability will contribute to world peace and
prosperity.
The P.S.P., functioning in a society that is still in the
construction stage, should place greater emphasis on introducing
specific socialist reforms that are tangible to the nationals of its
society along with its stress on ideal principles and the welfare of
humanity.
Looking realistically at the current world situation, it would
seem that the maintenance of world peace and order, although a major
concern of national states, has not taken precedence over national
prestige and national interests. The ideologies and values adopted by
people are still expressed mainly in terms of nationalism and national
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sovereignty, and their governments are still willing to go to war to
defend these concepts.
Neither of the two international organizations of our era has
been able to bring about a significant change in the submission of
states to the will of the international community when the interests of
the nation states have conflicted with the organizations' laws. Both
the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United
Nations have acknowledged the concept of national sovereignty. Thus,
it would be unwise as well as unrealistic for Arab socialists to over
look the influence of nationalism on our age.
I t should be made clear th at the Arab s o c ia l is t movement i s not
id e n tic a l to the Arab n a tio n a list movement. The two movements are in
a working partnership at the present time because they are striving
for the same immediate goals. It is not inconceivable that their
objectives may diverge at some point in the future. If that should
occur, a latent dual loyalty may become articulate among ideologically
oriented persons. This possibility poses a problem for Arab socialists
who believe that socialism and nationalism should be combined.
Unlike the P.S.P., the Ba'th party believes that the Arab nation
is a nation in being. The fact that it is divided at the present time
into separate political entities has no bearing on its status as a
nation for nationhood is distinct from statehood. A state may include
one or more n a tio n s, and a nation may be composed o f sev era l s ta te s .
The id ea l i s reached when the two combine to form a nation s ta te . That
ideal is one of the ultimate goals of the Arab nationalist movement.
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The emergence o f Arab nationalism as a p o lit ic a l movement and
as an ideological philosophy presupposes that the Arab nation is a nation
in being. However, the existence of the Arab nation does not necessarily
imply the existence of an Arab nation state. Some thinkers, among
them certa in Arab n a tio n a lis ts , m aintain th at the Arab nation i s a n ation
in becoming.^ Those who believe in Arab aspirations and in the goals
of Arab nationalism and still maintain that the Arab nation is a nation
01 in becoming are at fault. J They are confusing being with becoming; the
former implies the existence of the Arab nation and the latter denies it.
IV. ROLES AND PROSPECTS
The Arab s o c ia l is t movement makes a s ig n ific a n t con trib u tion to
the formulation of Arab national and international policy in addition
to its internal role. It was one of the original proponents of the
policy of positive neutralism for the Arab world, and it has been
influential in bringing about the adoption of that policy by the Arab
governments.
Neutralism implies nonalignment with either the Western or the
Communist bloc. Positive neutralism, advocated by most of the Arabs,
while it rejects the solution of world problems in terms of capitalism
or communism, transcends these two ideologies by adopting an ideology
that is more positive and more liberal than either.
22 Sayegh, o£. cit., pp. 75-89.
23 George Tomeh, "The Arab World in T ransition ," a speech d eliv ered at the O.A.S. East Coast Regional Convention in the Spring of I960 at Boston University.
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During the cold war period, the concept of neutralism has
embraced a broad variety of politics and political attitudes.^ The
Ba'th party believes that neutralism should be based on a nationalist
and socialist system that strives for cooperation among peoples and
preserves the dignity of man and sanctifies his freedom .Dem ocratic
socialism offers the best ideological compromise between the extremes
of democratic capitalism and totalitarian communism because it embodies
human values on the individual as well as the group levels and provides p Z an ideological base for the neutralist nations.
The Nationalist Democratic Party in Iraq was the first party to
call upon the Arab states to adopt a neutralist policy between the two
blocs in 19U6. The P.S.P. published a series of articles in its paper,
al-Anba1, in 1951 j explaining the meaning and the significance of the
"Third Force." Under the influence of the Ba'th and other nationalist
elements, Syria and later the U.A.R. formally adopted a neutralist policy.
In a speech delivered on July 22, 1961, the eve of the ninth
anniversary of the revolution in Egypt, President Nasser declared that
the Arabs proceed in their international policy on the basis of the
policy of nonalignment and positive neutralism.^ The Arabs believe
2ii Peter Lyon, "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism," The Review of Politics, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April, i 960), pp. 256-257.
25 Michel Aflaq and Jamal a l-A ta s i, Mawqifuna a l-S iy a s i Min al-Shuyu'iyah (Our Political Stand on Communism), [Cairo: n.pub., 1957), pp. 36-37.
26 Al-Ishtirakiyah, No. 3 (May, i 960), p. 3«
27 Al-Hayat, No. 1(682 (July 23, 1961), p. 2.
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that adherence to this policy helps to lessen the tensions of the cold
war.
King Hasan II of Morocco (then Crown P rin ce), in an address before
the U. N. General Assembly on October U, I960, said,
We refuse in advance to play either an active or a passive role in the quarrels which oppose the West and the S oviet camps. These wrangles form no part of our program nor of our heritage. By simply refusing to be easy customers, the new nations w ill remove some ground from the realm of the Cold W a r . 28
At present, the Arabs desire "not only to be independent and
united but also to remain outside the great spheres of power conflict.
Thus, neutralism has become a co rollary o f Arab nationalism and Arab
so cia lism .
The policy of positive neutralism is a rejection of the theory
of the vacuum of power in the Middle East.
The West has suggested that the Arabs should align with the
Western bloc in order to prevent Soviet infiltration due to the vacuum
of power left following the withdrawal of British and French influence
from the area. That was the assertion of the "Eisenhower Doctrine,"
declared in the fall of 1956.
The Communist bloc declares that the Arabs cannot fight Western
im perialism alone and recommends th at they look to the S o v iet bloc for
support again st ca p ita lism and Western colon ialism and adopt the
communist id eology.
28 News of Morocco, Vol. 3* No. 11 (November, I960), p. 3.
29 Richard H. Nolte and William R. Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1* (July, 1958), p. 650.
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Arab nationalists and socialists reply that if there were a
power vacuum at all, it would be filled only from within by achieving
the Arab nationalist aspirations and establishing one united democratic
and s o c ia lis t Arab state.While the West sees only the danger in
communism and the communists see only the danger in Western imperialism,
the Arabs are cognizant of the dangers im plicit in both Western colonialism
and communism.- Their on ly so lu tio n i s to m aintain an a ttitu d e of
neutralism and nonalignment and to follow a policy of cooperation with
both camps within the lim its of the Arab national interest.
Arab so cia lism and Arab nationalism combine to form the most
powerful force for the liberation of the Arab homeland from the remnants
of Franco-British domination and the most effective deterrent to Soviet
p en etration and the expansion of communist id eology.
Whatever advances the communist movement has been able to make
in the Arab world can be attributed mainly to Arab resentment against
Western colonialism and discontent with the existing economic and social
conditions in Arab society where abject poverty, disease, and ignorance
are prevalent.
Anti-W estern fe e lin g makes the Arabs responsive to communist
propaganda and paves the way for communist infiltration. Bernard Lewis
said, "Communist propaganda against the West can...always count on a
ready response, especially when striking the anti-imperialist drum.
30 Harakat al-Qawmiyyn al-Arab Fi Lubnan, Al-Hiyad al-Ijabi wa Ma1rakatuna al-Qawmiyah (Positive Neutralism and our National BattleT, (Beirut: n.pub., 1959), PP. 137-1^3.
31 Ba'th Publication, Siyasat al-Taharrur wa al-Hiyad al-Ijabi (The Policy of Liberation and Positive NeutralismTT (Damascus: n.pub., 1957), p. 12 32 Bernard Lewis, "Communism and Islam," International Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January, 19E>U), p. U.
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Thus, the communists have been able, with some degree of success, to
capitalize on the Arab national aspirations although, in the long run, it
is not in the interests of communism to support Arab nationalism.
The greatest threat to the advancement of communism in the Arab
world is Arab socialism which introduces social and economic reforms and
works to ab olish the corrupt con d ition s e x istin g in Arab s o c ie ty , and
which supports nationalism in its effort to build a free and united Arab
n ation.
With the termination of Western control and the implementation
of socialist measures, the communists will be left with no foundation
for their propaganda. Their role as social reformers and liberators
of the Arab people w ill be exposed for what it really is—that of
communist propagandists who are attempting to replace Western domina
tion with Soviet domination. As the nationalist and socialist movements
gain momentum, as they are doing, the communist movement w ill fade from
the scen e.
The communists realize that this process is taking place and are
attempting to avert it by discrediting Arab socialism in the eyes of the
workers and peasants by claim ing th at the Arab s o c ia l is t movement does
not actually represent their interests or embody their hopes. The
Central Command of the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon unanimously
agreed to adopt as a party policy a report delivered by its secretary-
general, Khalid Bakdash, in January, 195>1, stating,
We must work co n stan tly a lso to unmask groups and p a r tie s claiming to be "socialist," such as the Arab Socialist Party, the Islamic Socialist Front, the Ba'th (Resurrection) Party in Syria; and the Socialist Progressive Party of Jumblat,
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etc. in Lebanon... for through their seductive propaganda they constitute a danger to the growing democratic national move ment again st war and im perialism , feudalism , and e x p lo ita tio n . They try to exploit the increasing popular orientation toward socialism .... They especially destroy (the effectiveness of our) slogans of distribution of lands of feudalists and big landowners to the peasants, and they call for the buying-out of foreign companies.. .and the putting of these companies under the control of the reactionary feudalist government which serves imperialism. This they call nationalization, etc.-^
This policy and the reasons behind it explain the communist cam
paign against the socialist measures introduced by the U.A.R. in the
summer of 1961.
Al-Jumhuriyah newspaper, a spokesman for the U.A.R. government's
viewpoint, stated on August 6, 1961, in reply to the attacks of the
- communist p ress,
Not much effort is needed to understand the aims behind the misleading campaign of the communist agents in casting doubt on the UAR economy. Why do the communist agents attack our socialist trial and our social revolution? The answer to this question lies in the genuine essence of our socialism and in the effect it w ill have on other rising peoples. Our socialist experience, which springs from our own circumstances and our prosperity, similar to the circumstances and being of the peoples fighting for their freedom, will block the road to certain foreign ideologies. This accounts for the indignation of the communist agents regarding our experiment. We in the UAR have been able to prove the fallacy of the claim that the evo lu tio n o£ mankind begins w ith cap italism and ends in communism.
The most distinctive feature of Arab socialism is its identity
with Arab nationalist aspirations. "The merger of the Arab Socialist
and Arab Resurrection parties in Syria indicates that ideological labels
33 Bakdash, "For the Successful Struggle for Peace, National Independence, and Democracy We Must R esolu tely Turn Toward the Workers and the Peasants," The Middle East Journal, op. cit., p. 207.
3li Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 151-1961 (August 7, 1961), p. Bll.
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such as pan-Arabism and socialism are to a large extent interchangeable."35
This bond e x is ts at the present time because both the Arab s o c ia lis t
and the Arab n a tio n a lis t movements are str iv in g to achieve the primary
aims of the Arab community which can be summarized as independence and
u n ity , freedom and democracy, and economic and s o c ia l reform. "Arab
socialism is, therefore, the framework within which the Arab individual
enjoys a true political and social freedom. "36
Thus far, the Ba'th party, with branches in all of the Arab states,
has been the most effective popular force preaching the Arab socialist
and nationalist principles and aspirations. Despite its shortcomings,
i t i s more in flu e n tia l and has a m d er appeal among the masses than any
of the other Arab•socialist parties or movements.
As our study has indicated, the P.S.P. principles are in conformity
w ith the Arab s o c ia l is t and n a tio n a list p r in cip les on s o c ia l and economic
bases; but its activities are confined to Lebanon, and it does not
espouse Arab nationalism. The National Democratic Party, which was
briefly discussed in Chapter II, advocates, in general, principles similar
to those of the Ba'th, but it functions only in Iraq. In the U.A.R.,
where there is no organized socialist movement on the popular level,
except for the Ba'th underground branch which does not carry significant
35 Bankwart A. Rustow, "The Politics of the Near East," editor Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The P o litic s o f the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, I960), p. ul3.
36 Aly Sabri, "Arab Socialism," The Arab Review, Vol. 2, No. 16 (July 23, 1961), p. 21.
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political weight, the destiny of socialism is bound to that of the regime
and, more specifically, to the person of President Nasser; so there is
no way o f determ ining the strength o f the movement and the exten t o f i t s
entrenchment among the people.
Arab nationalism and socialism, in order to thrive, must be
founded upon popular support and have an organized machinery. They
cannot be accomplished by authoritarian means no matter how sincere and
devoted its advocates may be. The U.A.R. split in October, 1961 is
indicative of that fact. The Syrian break was brought on mainly by
the refusal of the U.A.R. authorities to allow a popular and revolutionary
movement to flo u r is h and th e ir in siste n c e on the use o f to ta lita r ia n
methods to implement socialist reforms.
Thus, in their search for an ideology, Arab revolutionaries
have adopted a philosophy that serves the needs and aspirations of their
society. That ideology is manifested in the Arab nationalist and
socialist movement spearheaded by the Ba'th party. So far, that
ideology has appealed to the masses. Its success, however, will depend
upon the willingness of the Arab people to strive for its goals and
fu lfill its mission; and upon the organization, growth, dedication, and
effectiveness of the popular base supporting it.
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The domination of the conservative elements in Syria starting
with the military coup d'etat of September 28, 1961, which brought
about the dissolution of unity between Syria and Egypt, and ending with
the March 28, 1962 coup, caused the Ba'th popularity to suffer a tempo
rary setback, but it may prove to be a source of strength for the party
in the long run.
During that six-month period, the Ba'th party was faced with a
dilemma. While it opposed the authoritarian regime of President Nasser,
i t condemned th e se p a r a tist elem ents and the con servative regime at the
same tim e.
The Ba'thists, who were on the opposition in the U.A.R. during
the last two years of the union, believed that the U.A.R. could not act
as a nucleus for greater unity as long as President Nasser followed his
au th oritarian means and that such means would make the other Arab sta te s
hesitant about joining the U.A.R., would set a bad example for achieving
Arab unity, and most probably would lead to the dissolution of the U.A.R.
The ideal solution, for the Ba'thists, was to maintain unity and
to introduce a free democratic regime in the U.A.R. that would permit the
operation of political parties. To this end, they concentrated their
efforts on propagating the principles of wider political participation
and on try in g to implement them by m obilizing p u b lic opinion and re
sorting to other means short of breaking up the unity between the two
countries. However, the realization of this goal proved difficult under
the existing circumstances due to the strict control of the police state
and to the banning of political activities.
232
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When the Ba'thist aim was not attained, the party felt that it
had no choice but to oppose Nasser as well as the conservative elements
in Syria. As a result, the Ba'th was bitterly attacked by both sides,
especially during the emotional outburst which swept most of the Arabs
following the Syrian setback.
Adhering to its principles of Arab unity and socialism, the
party suggested, after the breaking away of Syria, that negotiations
be held to reunite the two countries on a wider political base and that
objective and unbiased examination of the causes of the separation be
undertaken to avoid them in making new efforts to attain unity.
It should be noted, since some observers have failed to realize
this fact, that the gains which the party had attained before and during
unity were not completely lost with the staging of the September coup.
A study of the course of events between the two coup d'etats, especially
some of the causes of the March coup, indicates that the rightist regime
which controlled power in the country during that period had to preserve
some of the socialist measures introduced by the Ba'thists and later by
the U.A.R. Government.
The December l? 6l elections resulted in a Parliament dominated by
the rightist elements representing the Sha'b, Watani, and Ikhwan al-
Muslimin parties and including family, tribal, and other conservative
elements. This bloc, supported by big business and feudal landlords in
the country, opposed the Ba'th party for ideological reasons and because
it considered the Ba'thists mainly responsible for uniting Syria and
Egypt and initiating the socialist trend in Syria.
The election of Ma'rnun al-Kuzbari as Speaker of the House on
December 1 ?, 196l and o f Nazim al-Qudsi as President of th e Republic on
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December lb and the formation of the cabinet by Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi on
December 22, all of whom are conservative, solidified the right wing in
Syria.
In a Parliament numbering 172 members, the Ba'th party members
and their supporters totalled 30 representatives who formed the parlia
mentary opposition.
When Prime Minister al-Dawalibi announced in his government's
policy statement to Parliament on January 8, 1962, that "his government
favored the abolition of total and partial nationalization in its present
form,"-!- Akrarn al-Hurani replied on January 10 that "the parliamentary
socialist bloc . . . would never accept retrogressive action."2 The
members of that bloc withheld their vote of confidence on January 13,
1962, and were the only members of Parliament to oppose the government.
Realizing the danger of antagonizing the workers and the peasants,
the Dawalibi government preserved the profit sharing system of giving
workers 23 per cent of the net profits of industrial companies in addi
tion to their fixed wages and retained the land reform law issued on
September 27, 1938 with some modifications.
An amendment to the agrarian reform law was introduced by the
government on December 29, 1961. I t was debated and passed by the
Syrian Parliament in February 1962 by a vote of 92 to 30. The Ba'thist
bloc strongly opposed the b ill and seven independent members abstained.
1 "Dawalibi*s Statement of Policy," Mideast Mirror, Vol. lb, No. 2 (January 13, 1962), p. 8.
2 Ibid. p. 9.
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The new agrarian reform law preserved for the peasants the land
that was distributed to them under the previous l a w , 3 but i t amended the
maximum area of land ownership as well as the method of compensation.
Article One of the new law fixes the maximum area of land which an owner may retain at between 80 and 200 hectares of irrigated land, according to the nature of the land and method of irrigation. The previous law fixed the maximum at 80 hectares, irrespective of the nature of the land and how it was irrigated. An individual can also now own between 125 and 600 hectares of non-irrigated land, including land on which trees are grown, according to the kinds of trees and the annual rain fa ll in the area. The previous law fixed the maximum ownership at 80 hectares of tree-growing land and 300 hectares of other land irrespective of the type ....
In the case of land in excess of the new maximum expro priated under the previous law and distributed or leased to peasants for periods exceeding three years, the previous owner is entitled to compensation for the excess part by granting him an area of expropriated land equal in value to that which he is entitled, or if this is impossible, by giving him government bonds redeemable within three years from the date of the expropriation.^
Apparently, with the dominance of the rightist and conservative
elements, the law was issued but was not adhered to. Although the
government was in power too short a time to determine the extent of the
application of the law, it has been alleged that it was abused by the
landowners and by the people in power as can be deduced from this state
ment issued by the governing junta in justifying the army coup of March
28, 1962:
Because the Constituent and Parliamentary Assembly has not carried out the mission entrusted to it, because it has been completely unable to bear the responsibility of govern ment, because its only concern has been to insure the personal -
3 Al-Hayat, No. JuBiiU (January 30, 1962), p. 7.
^ "Syrian Agrarian Reform Law Amended," Mideast Mirror, V ol. Ill, No. 8 (February 2lt, 1962), p. lh .
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b e n e fits and in te r e s ts o f i t s members, and because i t has not sincerely sought to achieve the aims of 28 September—the aims • of the people, who are the source of authority—the general • command of the army and the armed forces declares the disso lution of the Constituent and Parliamentary Assembly as of the issuance of this proclamation ....
These elements, through this domination, were able to divert the legislative and executive officials from their basic mission and also to render ineffective all the legis lation, laws, and regulations, which achieved and guaranteed the gains of the peasants, workers, and other classes of the people. These elements issued instructions and orders which contradicted the legislation and the laws while they tried to drive the peasants out of their villages, to usurp their land, and to force them to leave their land and migrate, in order to restore the domination of their supporters, favor i t e s , and co lla b o ra to rs. They demolished the homes o f the peasants over their heads and turned their land, which had been cultivated through their sweat, tears, and efforts, into ruins. These elements also tried to maintain the legislation which made the gains of the workers nominal, theoretic, and unrealistic. They thus undermined their gains, disregarded the laws and legislation, stifled freedoms, and did not try to achieve stability or advance economic development.5
Allowing for exaggeration, there might very well be an element
of truth in that statement. The army officers who staged the two coups
should have felt the resentment of the people toward the government's
policy. Apparently, they felt that the workers and peasants resented
the government's measures, that other factions of the people did not
like the Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement resulting from the meeting between
the heads of the two states on March lli and 13, 1962, and that others
did not appreciate the open attacks on President Nasser by the Syrian
officials. These army officers probably believed that the continuation
of such a policy would strengthen Nasser, the Ba'thists, and the leftist
elements in Syria. For these reasons, combined with a network of other
5 Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 61-1962 (March 28, 1562), pp. Gl, Gh, and G£. .
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personal and political reasons, the same junta that had carried out the
September 1961 coup suspended democratic and parliamentary life in the
country on March 28, 1962. That coup was follow ed by two others w ith in
the same week.
These army coups and counter-coups culminated in the adoption of
the Horns Pact resolutions which were agreed upon by about 100 army
officers representing the various factions in the army who conferred at
Horns between April 1 and 3. The resumption of constitutional life
followed by a referendum on the question of the reestablishment of
unity between Syria and Egypt were the t„o most important resolutions of
th at p act.
Despite the frequent shifts of power and the various coup d'etats
of the different army groups, one fact appears to be constant—namely
that the slogans which have appeared since the March 28 coup are in con
formity with the Ba'th principles. They are closer to the Ba'thist
program than to Nasser's. They preach the introduction of socialism and
unity within the framework of a democratic regime and through democratic
procedures.
In a p ress conference on March 30, Major General Abd al-Karim
Zahr al-Din, the Syrian Chief of. Staff, stated:
The 28 September revolution had defined its attitude toward these subjects in clear, broad lines. I declare anew th at the rev o lu tio n b e lie v e s in a ju s t, co n stru ctiv e, Arab socialism which aims at establishing a sound society which will liberate the individual from all types of slavery—socialism which springs from the core of the re quirements of our society and which sincerely and clearly expresses the stages of the economic and social developments through which we are passing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238
The main objective of this socialist policy is to achieve the greatest possible advance in the field of national development, increase the national income with the government's help and encouragement, and insure a just distribution of this income among all groups participating in production .°
Even the new army group which ousted the junta that had carried
out the September and March coups and forced them to leave the country
on A pril 3> has confirmed the same general policy. .On April 7, the Syrian
Government radio stated that the policy of Syria is based on "positive
neutralism . . . genuine democracy, and fair socialism. "7
The situation is far from stable at present. Many changes are
expected to occur and various shifts of power are likely to take place.
The Ba'th principles appear to be attractive and their slogans
appealing, but a comeback to power by the B a 'th ists in Syria seems un
likely in the near future. However, they have a better chance of regain
ing control with the introduction of representative government in the
country whether it remains the Syrian Arab Republic or returns to its
former status as the northern region of the U.A.R. Of the two alternatives,
tie Ba'thists prefer the latter provided that the reestablishment of the
U.A.R. is based on democratic principles.
^ Ibid., No. 63-1962 (March 30, 1962), p. GI4. 7 The New York Times, V ol. CXI, No. 38,060 (A pril 8, 19o2), p. 30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
I, Publications by Syrian and Lebanese Socialist Leaders
A. Books
Abd al-Da'im, Abdallah. Durub al-Qawmiyah al-Arabiyah. Beirut: Bar al-Adab, 1959. 256 pp. The Paths o f Arab N ationalism .
______. Al-Tarbiyah al-Qavnniyah. Beirut: Dar al-Adab, i960. 133 pp. National Education.
Aflaq, Michel. Fi Sabil al-Ba'th. Beirut: Bar al-Tali'ah, 1959* 252 pp. For the Resurrection.
. Ma1 rakat al-Masir al-Wahid. Eeirut: Dar al-Adab, 1958. . I 96 pp. The Struggle for Common Destiny.
Aflaq, Michel, Akram al-Hurani, Kunif al-Razzaz and Jamal al-Atasi. Hav:l al-Qawmiyah wa ,al-Ishtirakiyah. Cairo: al-Matba'ah al-Alam iyah, 1957. 86 pp. On Nationalism and Socialism.
Aflaq, Michel, Akram al-Hurani and Salah al-Bitar. Ittihad i-Iisr wa Suriya. Cairo: n. pub., 1958. 55 pp. The Union of Egypt and Syria.
Aflaq, Michel and Jamal al-Atasi. Hawqifuna al-Siyasi Min al-Shuyu*iyah. Cairo: n. pub., 1957. 50 pp. Our P o lit ic a l Stand on Communism.
Aflaq, Michel and others. Lirasat Fi al-Ishtirakiyah. Beirut: Dar a l-T a li'a h , i 960. 287 pp. Studies in Socialism.
______. Dirasat Fi al-Qawmiyah. Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, i960. 13U pp. Studies in Nationalism.
-x Following each Arabic source is the author's translation of i t s t i t l e . 239
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2l;0
A l-Bahnasi, A fif. Madkhal H a a l-Ish tir a k iy a h al-A rabiyah. Damascus: Mu'assasat al-Nuri, 1958. l59 pp. Introduction to Arab Socialism.
A l-Bahnasi, A f if , C lovis Maqsud and Jamal a l-A ta s i. Ma Hiya al-Ishtirakiyah al-Arabiyah. Baghdad: Maktabat al-Nahdah, 1959. 82 pp. What i s Arab S ocialism ?
Himadeh, Sa’dun. Nahnu wa al-Shuyu'iyah Pi al-Azamah al-Hadirah. Beirut: Dar al-'Tali'ah, n.d. (ca. 19% 9)T 88 pp. We and Communism in the Present C r is is .
Jum blatt, Kamal. Haqiqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah. B eiru t: Dar al-Nashir al-Arabiyah, 19^9. 175 pp. The Truth About the Lebanese Revolution.
Al-Jundi, In*am. IIa Ayna Yasir al-Shuyu'iyun bi al-Iraq. Beirut: Dar al-Nashir al-Arabiyah, 19% % 150 pp. Where are the Communists Going in Iraq?
A l-K hatib, Anwar. Al-Naz1ah a l-Ish tira k iy a h F i a l-Isla m . B eirut: • Dar al-Ilim Li al-Malayin, 1958. 271 pp. The Socialist Trend in Islam.
Al-Razzaz, Nunif. Al-Hayat al-Qawmiyah. Beirut: Matba'at al-Sharq, n.d. (ca. 1959). 86 pp. The Nationalist Life.
. Ma'alim al-Hayat al-Arabiyah al-Jadidah. Cairo: Dar Misr, 19^3. 308 pp". Landmark o f the New Arab L ife .
______. Tatawwur Ma1na al-Qawmiyah. B eiru t: Dar a l-I lim Li al-M alayin i 960. 96 pp. The Development of the Meaning of Nationalism.
B. A r tic le s
"Forum Interviews Michel Aflaq," Middle East Forum, Vol. 33, No. 2 (February, 1958), pp. 9,10 and 33.
"Forum Interviews Salah Bitar," Middle East Forum, Vol. 33, No. 2 (February, 1958), pp. 8 and 33.
Majdalany, Gibran. "The Arab Socialist Movement," The Middle East in Transition, (ed.) Walter Laqueur, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. pp. 337-350.
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II. Literature of Socialist Parties.
A. The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party (The Ba'th).
Abd al-Da'im, Abdallah. Fikratuna Haiyah. Damascus, 19lr9. Our Thought is Alive.
Aflaq, Michel. Dhukra al-Rasul al-Arabi. Damascus, 19h3» Memory o f th e Arab Messenger (Prophet).
______. Fi al-Siyasah al-Arabiyah. Damascus, 19k8. Concerning Arab P olitics.
______. Hizb al-Inqilab. Damascus, 1 9h9» The Party of the Coup d'etat.
______. A l-Jiil al-Arabi al-Jadid. Damascus, 19lRi. The New Arab Generation.
______. Mafalim al-Ishtirakiyah al-Arabiyah. Damascus, 19^6. The Landmarkof Arab Socialism.
. Mustawa Jadid Ia-N id alin a. Cairo, 1997. A New Level for our Struggle.
. Nidal al-Wihdah Huwa Nidal al-Jamahir. Cairo, 1997. The Struggle for Unity is the Struggle of the Masses.
. Al-Qawmiyah al-Arabiyah wa al-Nazrah al-Qawmiyah. Cairo, 1957. Arab N ationalism and the N a tio n a list View.
______. Al-Qawmiyah Fi Nazar al-Ba'th. Cairo, 1997. The Ba'th Outlook on Nationalism.
Al-Qawmiyah Haaiqah Haiyah Dhat Madmun Insani Ijabi. Cairo, 1957. Nationalism is a Living Reality Having a Positive Humanitarian Context. ~
______. A speech delivered at "The Struggle Against Imperialism Convention," Athens, November 1, 1997.
______o Wajib al-Amal al-Qawmi. Damascus, 19^U. The Duty of National Action.
Ahadith al-Ba'th. Beirut, I960. The Presentations of the Ba'th.
Al-Arab Bayn Madihim wa Mustaqbalihim. Damascus, 1991. The Arabs Between Their Past and Their Future.
Al-Atasi, Jamal. Ma Hiya al-Ishtirakiyah? Cairo, 1997. What is Socialism?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2h2
Al-Ba'th al-Arabi Darurah Tarykhiyah. Beirut, 1955. Arab Resurrection is a Historical Necessity.
Al-Ba'th al-Arabi Fi Tariq al-Nidal. Beirut, I960. The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party on the Road of Strife.
Al-Ba'th al-Arabi Huwa al-Inqilab. Damascus, 1950. The Arab Resurrection is the Coup d'etat.
Al-Bitar, Salah. Marhalat al-Inqilab. Damascus, 19h7. The Revolutionary Transition.
______• A Public Statement. Damascus, October b, 1961.
Dawr al-'Ommr1 Fi Tahqiq al-Wihdah wa al-Ishtirakiyah. Damascus, 1956. The Laborers' Role in AchievinglTnity and Socialism.
Al-Dawr al-Tarykhy li-Harakat al-Ba'th. Beirut, i 960. The H istoric Role o f the Ba'th Movement.
Destur Hizb al-Ba'th al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki. Damascus, 19^7. The Constitution of the Irab Resurrection Socialist Party.
Fi al-Hiyad al-Ijabi. Cairo, 1957. Concerning Positive Neutralism.
Fikratuna. Damascus, 19^8. Cur Thought.
Al-Hurani, Akram. Mabda' Eisenhower. Cairo, 1957. The Eisenhower Doctrine.
______. Usturat al-Musa'adah al-Amerikiyah. Cairo, 1957. The Myth of~Imerican Aid.
Isma'il, Fayez. Hawl al-Hurriyah. Beirut, I960. Concerning Freedom.
Al-Kasem, Badi'. Ahamiyat al-Tanzim al-HLzbi. Damascus, 19U6. Importance of Party Organization.
Ma'rakat al-Wihdah Fi al-Iraq. Damascus, 1959. The Battle For Unity in Iraq.
Nazrat al-Ba'th Ila al-Insan. Beirut, I960, Ba'th CutlooF~on the Human Being.
Al-Nidal al-Ijabi. Damascus, I9I48. The Positive Struggle.
Al-Nizam al-Dakhili. Damascus, 19^7. Internal Regulations.
Al-'Ommal wa al-Ishtirakiyah. Damascus, 1950. The Workers and S ocialism .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2k3
A Party Publication, Beirut, October 5, 1961.
A Party Publication. Beirut, October llj, 1961.
Al-Risalah al-Khalidah. Damascus, 1950. The Eternal Mission.
Shareh Destur Hizb al-Ba'th al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki. Damascus, n.d. Explanation of the Constitution of the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party.
Siyasat al-Taharrur wa al-Hiyad al-Ijabi. Damascus, 1957. The Policy of Liberation and Positive Neutralism.
Al-Tanzim al-Inqilabi. Damascus, 1950. The Revoluti onary Organization.
Tumuh al-Ba'th. Damascus, 1957. The Ba'th Ambitions.
Al-Wihdah al-Arabiyah wa al-Ishtirakiyah. Beirut, 1956. Arab \Jnity and Socialism .
Al-Wihdah Thawrah Tarykhiyah. Damascus, 1958. Unity is a Historical Revolution.
B. The Progressive Socialist Party (P.S.P.)
A1-Daman al-Suhhi Fi Lubnan. Beirut, 1955. Health Insurance in Lebanon.
Al-Harb al-Baridah. Beirut, n.d. The Gold War.
Al-Hiyad Bayn al-Mu1askarayn. Beirut, n.d. Neutrality Between the Two Blocs.
Ila al-Amel al-Lubnani. Beirut, 1957. To the Lebanese Laborer.
H a al-Ommal a l-I s h tir a k iy n . B eiru t, 1957. To the S'ocialist Laborers.
Mawqifuna a l-D a k h ili wa a l-K h a r iji. B eirut, 1957. Our Stand on In tern a l and Hbcternal Issu e s.
Mithaq al-Hizb al-Taqaddumi al-Ishtiraki. Beirut, 19U9. The Program o f the Progressive S o c ia lis t Party.
Muwatin Hurr wa Sha'b S a 'id . B eiru t, n.d. A Free Citizen and a Happy People.
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Na'im, Edmond. Nazariyat al-Taqadaumiyah al-Ishtirakiyah wa Tatbiquha Fi Lubnan. Beirut, 195>3. The Theory of Progressive Socialism and its Application in Lebanon.
Al-Nizam al-Dakhili. Beirut, 195k* Internal Regulations.
Ra'una a l-S iy a s i Min K hilal Mabadina wa Ahdafina. B eiru t, 1957. Our Political Opinion Through our Principles and Goals.
Al-Ta'alim1 al-Taqaddumiyah al-Ishtirakiyah. Beirut, n.d. The Teachings of Progressive Socialism.
C. Newspaper Editorials by the Ba'th and P.S. P. Leaders,
Al-Anba1, No. 23, August 17, 1951. Beirut.
No. 89, September 18, 1953.
No. lk k , May 1 , 195k.
No. Ik7, May 22, 195k.
No. II4.9, June 6, 195k.
No. 157, July 30, 195k.
No. 215, September 9, 1955.
"r-A l-B a'th , No. July 6, 19k6. Damascus (D aily),
No. k , July 8, 19k6 .
No. 8, July 13, 19k6.
No. 10, July 16, 19k6.
No. 11, July 17, 19U6.
No. 17, July 27, 19k6.
No. 18, July 28, 19k6.
No. 22, August 2, 19k6.
No. 2k, August 6 , 19k6.
No. 27, August 9, 19k6.
No. 216, January 10, 19k8.
January 21, 19k8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2h$
, No. 16, August 17, 1956. Damascus (Weekly).
, No. 2kt October 12, 1956.
, No. UI4, March 2, 1957.
, No. 102, May 30, 1958.
D. Personal Interviews and Correspondence.
Aflaq, Michel, Personal Interview, Damascus, November 20, 1957.
Jumblatt, Kamal, Personal Interview. Beirut, November 15, 1957.
An official party letter addressed to the author and signed, on behalf of the P.S.P., by Mr. Abbas Khalaf in his capacity as a party liaison officer. Beirut, September 20, 1961.
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Beirut: Dar al-Rawa'i1, n.d. 237 pp. From the H istory o f I n te lle c tu a l Movements in Islam . Josey, Alex. Socialism in Asia. Singapore: Donald More, The Straits Times Press Ltd., 1937. 112 pp. Key, V. 0., Jr. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1 9hh. 8lif pp. Khadduri, Majid. Independent Iraq: 1932-1938. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, I960. 388 pp. Khadduri, Majid and Liebesny, Herbert J. Law in the Middle East: Origin and Development of Islamic Law. Vol. I. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955. 395 pp. Khalid, M. Khalid. From Here We Start. Translated by Isma'il el-Faruqi. Cairo: Dar alDHil:Li aL-Taba1 at, 1950. 165 pp. Khuri, Ra'if. Al-Fikr al-Arabi al-Hadith wa al-Thawrah al-Faransiyah. Beirut: Dar al-Makshuf, 19h3. 289 pp. Modern Arab Thought and the French Revolution. Kirk, George E. Contemporary Arab P olitics: A Concise History. New' York: Frederick A. Praeger, I961I 231 pp7 ______. 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New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 362 pp. ______. ed. The Middle East in T ran sition. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 195b, 5l3 PP. ______. The Soviet Union and the Middle E ast. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 366 pp. Laski, Harold J. Liberty in the Modern State. New York: The Viking Pres 1919. 175 PP. Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. 2nd ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 19565 576 pp. Lenin, V. I. Hianov. The State and Revolution. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1919. 123 PP. Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958. u6F”pp. Levy, Reuben, The Social Structure of Islam. Cambridge: The American Press, 1957. 536 pp. Lewis, William Arthur. The Principles of Economic Planning. London: D.Dobson, 191:9. 128 pp. Longrigg, Stephen H. Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate. London: Oxford University Press, 1958. I1OI1 pp. Marx, Karl. The Civil War in France. 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New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956. 639 PP. ______. The Republic of Syria. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 19551 777 pp. Pennor, Jaan (ed.). Islam and Communism. New York: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., i 960. 72 pp. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 2 Pigou, Arthur C. Socialism Versus Capitalism. London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1939: 13B“pp. President Gamal Abdul-Nasser1s Speeches. Cairo: U.A.R. Information Department, 1959. 628 pp. Qubain, Fahim I. Crisis in Lebanon. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East I n s titu te , 1961. 2^3 pp. Al-Rayes, Muhammad D. Al-Nazariyat al-Siyasiyah al-Islamiyah. 2nd ed. Cairo: Al-Maktabat al-Ingliziyah al-Misriyah, 1957. 318' pp. Islamic Political Theories. Rojjj?, Saul. Socialism in Southern Asia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford tlniversity Press, 1959. 277 pp. Rousseau, Jean Jacques. Social Contract. Chicago: The University of Chicago Bookstore, 1950. L8 pp. Sands, William (ed.). The Arab Nation: Paths and Obstacles to Fulfillment. Washington, t). C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961. 177 pp. . (ed.). Middle East Report 1959. Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 19597 Tl6 pp. Sayegh, Fayez A. Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1958. 272 pp. Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George A llen and Unwin L td ., 1953. 3^1 pp. Shukri, Muhammad F. Al-Sanusiyah: Din wa Dawlah. Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-A rab i, I 9I48. 525 pp. Al-Sanusiyah: A Religion and A State. Shaw, Bernard and Webb Sidney and oth ers. Fabian Essays in S ocialism . New York: The Humboldt Publishing Co., 1891. 283 pp. Al-Siba’i, Mustafa. Ishtirakiyat al-Islam. Damascus: Mu’assasat al-Matbu’at al-Arabiyah, 1959. 523 pp. Islamic Socialism. Siddiqi, M. Mazheruddin. Development of Islamic State and Society. 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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 255 Lawrence, Joseph, "The Levant Chooses Socialism, 11 Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 5 (May, 1958), pp. 172-178. Lenczowski, George. "Evolution of Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 20, No. 1 (February, 1958) pp. 162-186. Lewis, Bernard. "Communism and Islam," International Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January, 195b ), pp. 1-12. Lewis, John D. "Marxism, R evolution and Democracy* I8b8-19b8 , " The Journal of Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August, l°b9), pp. 518-522. Lyon, P eter. " N eu trality and the Emergence o f the Concept o f Neutralism," The Review of Politics, Vol. 22, No, 2 (April, I960), pp. 255-268. Maqsud, Clovis. "Al-Ahzab al-Ishtirakiyah Fi al-Iraq," Al-Thaqafah al-Arabiyah, op. c i t . , pp. 8-15. "Socialist Parties in Iraq" Mughaizel, Joseph. "Secularism and Arab Nationalism," Middle East Forum, Vol. 26, No. 10 (December, I960), pp. 11-16. Muslim Bortherhood Leader Explains I t s Aims and A c tiv itie s ," Middle East Report, Vol. 6, No. 3 (October 2, 1953), pp. 1-2. Naccache, Muhammad. "The Outside Lane," Middle East Forum, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January, I960), pp. 7-9. Nolte, Richard H. and William R. Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. b (July, 1958), pp._ 6U5-658. "Pan Arab Challenge to Ankara," The Economist, Vol. CLXXXVI, No. 5971 (February 1, 1958), pp. 379-3^07 Perlmann, M. "In the Street Called Straight," Middle East Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 10 (October, 1957), pp. 326-333. Persen, William. "Lebanese Economic Development Since 1950," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1958), pp. 277-29L. "Political Quarrels in Syria," Mideast Mirror, Vol. 11, No. 35 (August 30, 1959), pp. 2-3. "Political Unrest Again in Syria," Mideast Mirror, Vol. 6, No. 50 (April 30, 1955), PP. 10-12. Sabri, Ali. "Arab Socialism," The Arab Review, Vol. 2, No. 16 (July 23, 1961), pp. 18-21. Saposs, David J. "The Split Between Asian and Western Socialism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, No. b (195b), pp. 588-59b. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "Special Reforms Commiotee," Mideast Mirror. Vol. 10, No. 52 (December 28, 1958), pp. 2-3. "Syrian Agrarian Reform Law Amended," M ideast M irror, Vol. lb , No. 8 (February 2k, 1962), p. lb. "Tensions Between Syria and Lebanon," Mideast Mirror, Vol. k, No, 35 (January 10, 1953), pp. 1-b. "Two Worlds," Mideast Mirror, Vol. 9, No. 35 (September 1, 1957), p. Wheeler, G. E. "Russia and the Middle East," International Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July, 1959), pp. 295-30b. Zurayq, Costi. "Al-Hadarah al-Arabiyah," Al-Abhath. Vol. I (March, 19U9), P P . 3-22. "Arabic C ivilization". III. Newspapers Al-Ahram, No, 25057, July 6, 1955. Cairo. ______, No. 25076, July 25, 1955. Al-Akhbar, No. 1690, December 6, 1957. Cairo. Al-Alam, No. !i 381, October It, 1961. Damascus. Alif-Ba1, No. 7396, November 19, 19b6. Damascus. ______, No. 7505, A pril lb , 19b7. Al-Ayam, No.53b6, September 27, 195b. Damascus. Beirut, No. b 358, September 30, 1952. Beirut. Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. lb l, July 2b, 1961. Washington, D.C. ______, No. lb 3, July 26, 1961. ______, No. 151, August 7, 1961. ______, No. 201, October 17, 1961. ______, No. 227, November 2b, 1961. ______, No. 61, March 28, 1962. ______, No. 63, March 30, 1962. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Al-Hayat, No. b6b5, June 10, 1961. Beirut. ■______, No. 1|682, July 23, 1961. ______, No. I4762, October 2b, 1961. ______, No. b8bb, January 30, 1962. Al-Ishtirakiyah, No. 3, May I960. Beirut. Al-Jaryda, No. 1552, March 10, 1958. Beirut. ______, No. 2639, July 29, 1961. ______, No. 2711, October 21, 1961. Kul S hai1, November lb , 1951a. B eirut. Al-Nahar, No. I4209, June 3, 19b9. B eirut. ______, No. bbOO, January 13, 1950. ______, No. b799, May 22, 1951. ______, No. 5b32, September I4, 1953. ______, April 26, 1956. News of Morocco, No. 11, V ol. 3, November, I960. Al-Rabat. Al-Qabas, No, 2862, February 28, 19b5. Damascus. Al-Qa*edah, January 2b, 195b. Baghdad. Rose El-Youssef, April 16, 1956. Cairo. ______, No. 1552, March 10, 1958. ______, No. 1612, May b, 1959. ______, No, 1616, June 1 , 1959. Sabah al-K hayer, No. 17, May 3, 1956. Cairo. ______, No. 37, September 20, 1956. Sada Lubnan, No. 2397, August 11, i 960. B eiru t. Sawt a l-P r o le ta r ia t, No. 2, November 19b8. Jerusalem. Sawt al-Sha*b, No. 13b, A pril 6 , 1938. Damascus. ______, No. 18b, June 7, 1938. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 8 ______, No. 662, November 10, 19U3« ______, January 15, 1915. Al-Tariq, No. 7, May, 19U3. Beirut. ______, No. 10, October, 19^7. ______, August, 1952. The Christian Science Monitor, Vol. 33, No. 279, October 23, 19 6l. Boston. ______, V ol. 33, No. 298, November iJj, 19 6 l. The New York Times, Vol. CIX, No. 37,332, April 10, i960. New York. ______, Vol. CXI, No. 37,810, August 1, 196l. ______, Vol. CXI, No. 37,8Li7; September 7, 1961. ______, Vol. CXI, No. 37,872, October 2, 1961. ______, Vol. CXI, No, 38,060, April 8, 1962. The Washington Post, 81jth year, No. 323, October 2h, 1961. Washington, D. C. Tripoli Mirror, Vol. 2, No. 123, August 13, 1961. Tripoli. IV. Government and International Organization Publications Food and Agriculture Organization. FAQ Mediterranean Development Project. Rome: F.A.O. of the United Nations, 1939. ______. Should Land Policy Promote Owner Cultivatorship, Tenancy or Large EstatesT S’alahuddine, Iraq: October, 1935. U.A.R. Ministry of Planning, U.A.R. (Syrian Region) Planning. Memorandum, No. 3, iMarch, 1961. ______. Statistical Abstract 1939. 12th Yearbook. Damascus: Government P ress, I960. United Nations. Economic Development in the Middle East 1958-59. New York: United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, I 960. Statistical Yearbook i960. 12th Issue. New York: Statistical Office of the U. N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, I960. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 9 V. Encyclopedia Articles Jaszi, Oscar. "Socialism," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. XIV, 188-210. New York: The MacMillan Co., 193ii. Levi-Provencal, E. "Zawiya," The Encyclopedia of Islam. IV, 1220. London: Luzac and Co., 193UV Hassignon, L. "Zandj," The Encyclopedia o f Islam . IV, 1213. London: Luzac and C o., 193U. VI. Unpublished Materials Aridi, Bashir A. "Parties and Politics in the Lebanese Society." UnDublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The American University, Washington, D.'C., 1955. International Cooperation Administration. "Lebanon's Gross National Product and Per Capita GNP." Unpublished Letter from ICA to the Embassy of Lebanon, Washington, D. C ., June 9, 1961. Lebret, R. P. "Le Liban Face A Son Development." Unpublished lecture, B eirut, November 19, I960. N abulsi, Hikmat H. S. "Labor O rganization and Development in Syria." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, D."C., I960. Tomeh, George. "The Arab World in Transition." Unpublished lecture, Boston University, the Organization of Arab Students Convention in the Spring of i960. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIXES Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX A THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB RESURRECTION SOCIALIST PARTY* One United Arab Nation With An Eternal Mission The Arab R esurrection S o c ia lis t Party i s a N ation al, Populist, Revolutionary Movement Striving to Achieve Unity, Liberty, and Socialism. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES I. The First Principle: The Unity and Liberation of the Arab Nation. The Arabs form one nation having its natural rights to live within a single state and to be free to realize and direct all of its potentialities. Thus, the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party considers: 1. The Arab homeland is an indivisible politico-economic unit. It is impossible for any Arab state to live satisfactorily by itself isolated from the others. 2. The Arab nation is a cultural unit. All existing differ ences among its people are artificial and accidental, and they w ill disappear -with the awakening of the Arab consciousness. 3. The Arab homeland belongs to the Arabs, and they alone have the right to direct its affairs, utilize its wealth, and control its potentialities. II. The Second Principle: Character of the Arab Nation. The Arab nation is distinguished by certain characteristics revealed in its successive renaissances. It is characterized by the abundance of its vitality and creativeness and by its tendency toward regeneration and resurgence. Its resurgence always corresponds to the growth of individual freedom and to the extent of harmony between the development of this freedom and the 'national interest. Therefore, the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party considers that: 1. Freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of belief, and freedom of art are sacred and cannot be limited by any authority whatsoever. The tr a n sla tio n o f th is document was compared w ith the only other English translation, that of Leonard Binder which was published in The Middle East Journal (Spring, 1959 5 pp. 195-200). While the author benefited from that translation, he here presents his own translation of the original document. 260 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 261 2. The value of citizens is to be assessed—after they have been granted adequate and equal opportunities—exclusively on the basis of the efforts they exert for the progress and efflo r escen ce o f the Arab n ation . III. The Third Principle: Mission of the Arab Nation. The Arab nation has an eternal mission manifesting itself in new and complete forms throughout the stages o f h is to r y , and leading to the reformation of human values, the advancement of human progress and the development and enhancement o f harmony and cooperation among n a tio n s. Therefore, the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party declares that: • 1. Colonialism, and everything related to it, is an evil which w ill be fought by the Arabs with every possible means. They w ill make continuous efforts, within their material and moral capacity, to help all. peoples who are struggling for their freedom. 2. Humanity i s a whole, u n ifie d in the p u rsu it o f i t s common welfare, and mutually responsible for its values and civiliza tion. The Arabs draw upon world civilization and, at the same time, they make their contribution to it. They extend a brotherly hand to other nations and cooperate with them in bringing about the rule of just laws providing prosperity, peace, and moral and s p ir itu a l ele v a tio n fo r a l l p eop les. GENERAL PRINCIPLES Article 1 - The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party is an inclu sive Arab party which w ill establish branches in all of the Arab regions. It is not concerned with regional politics except from the point of view of the higher Arab interest. Article 2 - The general headquarters of the party is presently at Damascus, but it may be transferred to any other Arab city if the national interest so requires. Article 3 - The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party is nationalist. It believes that nationalism has a living and permanent existence, and that the national conscience which firmly binds the individual to his nation is a sacred feeling, imbued with creative power, longing for sacrifice, awakening the sense of responsibility, and striving to channel the individual personality usefully and efficiently. The nationalist idea which the party preaches is the w ill of the Arab people to be lib e r a te d and u n ited , to be given the opportunity to realize the Arab character in history, and to cooperate with other nations in assuring for humanity its direct progress toward goodness and p rosp erity. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 262 Article it - The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party is socialist. It believes that socialism is a necessity derived from genuine Arab nationalism because it is the ideal system which allows the Arab people to r e a liz e th e ir p o t e n t ia lit ie s and causes the Arab genius to unfold in the most complete manner, thus providing continuous growth of the nation in its spiritual and material production and guaranteeing close fraternization among its individual members. A r tic le $ - The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party is populist. It believes that sovereignty belongs to the people, that they alone are the origin of authority and leadership, and that the value of the state is derived from the will of the people, and its sanctity is proportionate to the extent of their freedom in choosing its government. Therefore, the party depends upon the people for the fulfillm ent of its mission; and it endeavors to tie itself closely with the people to raise their intellectual, moral, economic and hygienic standards in order to help them realize their potential and exercise their rights in the individual and the national life. A rticle 6 - The Arab R esurrection S o c ia lis t Party i s revolu tionary. It believes that its principal goals of reawakening Arab nationalism and bringing about socialism cannot be achieved except through revolution and strife, and that the dependence upon the slow march of evolution and the contentment with partial and superficial reforms threaten these goals with failure and loss. Therefore, the party decides to: (a) struggle against foreign imperialism to attain absolute and complete lib e r a tio n o f the Arab homeland; (b) struggle to unite all the Arabs in a single independent s ta te ; and (c) revolt against existing evils touching all the intellectual, economic, social and political aspects of life. Article 7 - The Arab homeland is that part of the world which is inhabited by the Arab people and which lies between the Taurus Mountains, the Zagros Mountains, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the mountains of Ethiopia, the Sahara Desert, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Article 8 - The Arabic language is the official language of the state and of its citizens. It is the language authorized for publi ca tio n and in str u c tio n . Article 9 - The flag of the Arab state is the flag of the Arab revolt which erupted in 1916 for the purpose of liberating the Arab n ation and u n itin g i t . Article 10 - An Arab is he who speaks the Arabic language, lives or aspires to live in the Arab homeland, and believes in his allegiance to the Arab n ation . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 263 Article 11 - Whoever considers himself to belong to a racial group that opposes the Arabs and who. immigrates into the Arab homeland for im perialistic purposes w ill be expelled from the country. Article 12 - The Arab woman shall enjoy the fu ll rights of citizenship. The party strives to raise the standard of woman so that she becomes worthy of enjoying these rights. Article 13 - All citizens shall be offered equal educational and economic opportunities in order that they may demonstrate in all areas of human activity their true abilities to the fullest extent. PROGRAM The Domestic Policy of the Party Article 1U - The system of government in the Arab state should be a representative and constitutional system. The executive authority must be responsible to the=legislative authority, which should be directly elected by the people. A r tic le 1$ - The national bond w ill be the sole tie existing in the Arab state. This tie w ill guarantee harmony among the citizens, facilitate their fusion into a single society, and fight denominational, sectarian, tribal, racial and regional allegiances. Article 16 - The system of administration in the Arab state should be decentralized. Article 17 - The party works to make the populist spirit prevail and to make it a living reality in the life of the individual. It seeks to lay down a constitution which guarantees for all Arab citizens absolute equality before the law, complete freedom in expressing their w ill and free elections in choosing their representatives, thus pro viding them with a free life within the limits of the laws. Article 18 - A unified legislative code should be enacted for the Arab state in full freedom. This code should be in harmony with the spirit of the contemporary age and based upon the past experience o f the Arab n ation . Article 19 - The judicial authority should be protected from and independent of any other authority, and it should enjoy absolute immunity. Article 20 - Pull rights of citizenship should be granted for every citizen who has lived in the Arab homeland, has been faithful to it, and has disassociated himself from any racial grouping. Article 21 - Military service should be obligatory in the Arab homeland. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26U The Foreign Policy of the Party Article 22 - The foreign policy of the Arab state should be inspired by the Arab national interest and by the eternal Arab mission which aims at cooperating with other nations in order to found a harmonious, free, and secure world advancing with continuous progress. Article 23 - The Arabs w ill struggle with all their might to abolish imperialism, foreign occupation, and any foreign political or economic influence in their country. A rticle 2h - Since the Arab people alone sire the source of a ll authority, all treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the Arab governments that infringe upon the absolute sovereignty of the Arabs should be abrogated. A rticle 2$ - The Arab foreign policy should aim at revealing the correct image of the w ill of the Arabs to live in freedom and of their true wish to see all other nations similarly enjoying freedom. The Economic Policy of the Psirty Article 26 - The Arab Resurrection Socialist Party is socialist. It believes that the economic wealth of the country is the property of the nation. Article 27 - The existing distribution of wealth in the Arab homeland is unjust; therefore, this distribution should be re-examined, and wealth should be redistributed among citizens on a just basis. Article 28 - All citizens are equal in their value as human beings; thus, the party forbids exploitation of the labor of others. A rticle 29 - Institutions of public u tilities, great natural resou rces, major means o f production, and means o f tran sp ortation are the property of the nation and should be administered directly by the state. Foreign companies and concessions should be abolished. Article 30 - Agricultural ownership should be limited in accord ance with the capacity of the owner to fully exploit his land, without exploiting the efforts of others, under the supervision of the state and. in conformity with its general economic plan. Article 31 - Small industrial ownership should be regulated in accordance with the economic level enjoyed by the rest of the citizens of the state. Article 32 - Workers should share in the administration of the industrial enterprise and should be granted, in addition to their wages which must be determined by the state, a share of the profits, the proportion of which should be determined by the state. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 265 Article 33 - Ownership of real property in buildings should be allowed all citizens provided that they are not permitted to rent it or to exploit it at the expense of others; moreover, a minimum of real property for all citizens should be guaranteed by the state. A r tic le 3k - Ownership and inheritance are natural and sacred rights within the lim its of the national interest. Article 3!? - Usury among citizens should be abolished, and a single government bank should be established to issue bank notes supported by national production and to finance essential agricultural and in d u str ia l e n te r p r ise s. Article 36 - The state must supervise directly domestic and foreign trade to eliminate exploitation between producer and consumer, to protect both, to protect national production from foreign production and to maintain equilibrium between exports and imports. Article 37 - An inclusive program should be drawn up, in the knowledge of the latest economic experiences and theories, for indus trializing the Arab homeland, expanding national production, and opening new opportunities for development, and directing its industrial economy in every region in accordance with its potentialities and with the availability of its natural resources. The Social Policy of the Party A r tic le 38 - Family, C hildren, and Marriage: (a) The family is the basic unit of the nation, and the state is responsible for its protection, development and welfare. (b) Children are first the responsibility of the family and secondly of the state. It is their responsibility to increase their number and to take care o f th e ir health and education. (c) Marriage is a national duty. Its encouragement, facilita tion and regulation is the responsibility of the state. A rticle 39 - Public Health: The state should establish, at its own expense, institutions of preventive medicine and clinics and hospitals which will satisfy the needs of all citizens to the fullest extent, and w ill guarantee medical treatment for them. Article UO - Labor: (a) Work should be required of all people capable of it; and the state should guarantee either intellectual or physical employment for each citizen. (b) The product of labor should ensure its producer, at least, an appropriate standard of living. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 266 (c) The state should provide for the subsistence of all those who are unable to work. (d) Just labor legislation should be enacted limiting the daily hours of work, granting the worker weekly and annual paid vacations, protecting his rights, and guaranteeing him old age social security and compensation for partial or full disability caused during the course of work. (e) Free syndicates for workers and peasants should be organ ized and encouraged to become useful instruments for defending their rights, raising their standard of living, preserving their capabilities, increasing their opportunities, creating a spirit of cooperation among them, and representing them in the high labor tribunals. (f) Special labor tribunals should be organized in which the state and the workers and peasants guilds are represented. These trib u n als should s e t t le d isp u tes occurring among la b o r, management and the representatives of the state. Article Ul - The Culture of the Society: (a) The party strives to establish in the Arab homeland a general culture which i s nationalist, Arabic, free, progressive, com prehensive, profound, ,?.ndhumane in its aims and to spread it among all sections of the people. (b) The state should be responsible for protecting freedom of speech, publication, association, protest, and press within the lim its o f the high Arab in t e r e s t , and fo r o fferin g a l l means and p o t e n t ia lit ie s for the attainment of this freedom. (c) Intellectual work is the most sacred kind of work. It is incumbent upon the state to protect intellectuals and learned people and to encourage them. (d) There should be freedom, within the lim its of Arab nationalist ideology, to establish clubs; to fcrm associations, parties, youth organizations and tourist institutions; to utilize movies, broadcasting, television and all means of modern civiliza tion for diffusing national culture and improving the standard of the p eople. Article U2 - Abolition of Class Distinctions and Differences: Class distinctions are the result of a corrupted social system. There fore, the party struggles in the ranks of the oppressed working classes in society until such manifestation and distinction cease, until all citizens are restored to their full human value and dignity, and until they are to live under a just social system without discrimination between one citizen and another except in the adequacy of the intellect and the skill of the hand. A rticle ii3 - Nomadism: Nomadism i s a p rim itive s o c ia l sta te which weakens national production and renders a great portion of the nation paralyzed, hindering its growth and progress. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 6 7 The party strives to urbanize nomads, to grant them lands, to abolish tribal systems, and to apply the laws of the state to them. The Educational and Instructional Policy of the Party The educational policy of the party aims at developing a new Arab generation believing in the unity of its nation and the immortality of its mission, using scientific thinking, free of the fetters of superstition and archaic traditions, and filled with the spirit of optimism, sacrifice and cooperation among its fellow citizens to achieve the universal Arab revolution and to further human progress. To this end, the party declares that: Article hu - All intellectual, economic, political, cultural and artistic manifestations of life should be stamped with the impress of Arab nationalism which shall bring back to the nation its ties with its glorious history and shall urge it to look toward a more glorious and exemplary fu tu re. Article U5 - Education is the function of the state alone; therefore, all foreign and private institutions should be abolished. Article I16 - Education, in all its stages, should be free for all citizens and compulsory in its primary and secondary levels. A r tic le hi - Professional schools should be established in accordance with the most advanced precepts, and instruction therein should be free. Article 1*8 - The teaching profession and all functions related thereto, except in the case of higher education, should be confined to Arab c itiz e n s . AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION Special Article - The fundamental and general principles of the constitution cannot be amended. The remaining articles of the constitution may be amended with the agreement of two-thirds of the members of the Party Council upon a proposal submitted by the Executive Committee, or by one-fourth of the members of the Council, or by one-tenth of the members of the General Assembly. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX B THE PROGRAM OF THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY* IDEOLOGY Part 1. Believing that human institutions should be established on the highest possible principles and that human society, in all of its institutions including the political, is not an end in itself but rather a means by which the individual is served, the party aims at: (a) Establishing a democratic society founded on social justice, security, prosperity, peace, and liberty in conformity with the human rights stated in the United Nations Charter. (b) Achieving the most perfect human justice and civilization possible within the existing human society. Paid. 2. This goal can be attained: (a) On the social, political, and administrative levels by assuring: - Equality in rights and duties. - Justice based on brotherhood and cooperation. - Respect for all individual liberties, taking into considera tion the liberties of others and the public good. - Political equality among citizens, taking into consideration their value and the extent of their contributions to society. - Brotherly cooperation based on the division of labor and on the encouragement and development of the qualities of leadership, creativity, and responsibility. (b) On the international level by: - Cooperation and understanding among nations based on the unity of the family and the nation. translated from Arabic by the author. 268 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 9 - Recognizing the nation as an effective organ in the process of human evolution which strives toward human cooperation and complete civilization. - Basing all individual, national, and governmental activities on the human value. - Ensuring the right of freedom of thought. FOREIGN POLICY Part 1. The party seeks to maintain international peace and to parti cip ate in a l l sin cere e ffo r ts and movements that aim to achieve c o lle c tive security based on the principle of equality among nations and respect for their rights. Part 2. The party advocates the establishment of close cooperation among the Arab s ta te s . INTERNAL POLICY Article 1: The State Part 1 . I t sh a ll be empowered to draw up a charter as a preface to the constitution declaring the rights and duties of the citizen. Part 2. It shall regulate existing organizations and respect their activities within the state which is merely a representative of these groups and in s titu tio n s and a means by which to achieve th e ir common ends. Part 3. It shall formulate a constitution in accordance with the party principles and the requirements of the time and place that ensures the rights and duties declared in the charter and is based on: (a) Separation of powers. (b) A strong Executive. (c) The final authority of the Judiciary to determine the legality of laws. (d) Equality of women and men in civil and political life. (e) Representation in the government of professional people, specialists, and the various trade and professional associations. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 7 0 Part !i. It shall invest the Judiciary with the final authority and shall make it the defender of rights and individual liberties. This body shall be characterized by responsibility, educational ability, promptness of execution, and freedom from political pressure and material need. It shall make comprehensive regulations for citizens. In addi tion, the State shall: (a) Define the rights and duties of the judges: - The Judiciary shall be the highest position in the State and shall be composed of a select few with high ability. - The Judiciary shall have financial security. - The Judiciary shall be secured against administrative authority in order to protect the members from expulsion or removal from office without just cause. - A member of the Judiciary shall be held responsible for his legal errors. (b) Form a continuous supervisory body to observe: - The judge's personal conduct. - His performance of his duty. - His legal ability. (c) Determine the division of the Judiciary: - It shall be decentralized. - There shall be separate responsible judges in every district. - There shall be one supreme judicial authority to decide on judicial interpretations and to resolve judicial differences. (d) Ensure justice in judicial decisions. (e) Ensure promptness of execution. Part 5>. It shall promulgate an electoral law that requires compul sory voting, small electoral districts, an increase of polling stations, and sound elections under a judicial authority. Part 6. Its administration shall be characterized by simplicity, decentralization, widened authority, a clear definition of responsibility,- the employment of specialized people, continuous independent supervision, and respect for the official and impartial evaluation of his merit. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 7 1 Part 7. It shall respect freedom of thought and belief and abolish the system of the distribution of political positions according to religious sects. Part 8. It shall establish a democratic regime. Part 9. It shall educate the people politically and socially in order to assure a democratic regime in which citizens voluntarily practice self discipline. Article 2: Society Part. 1. Early marriage should be encouraged in order to strengthen family formation. Part 2. The posterity of the human race should be safeguarded by permitting only healthy people to marry and by combating disease of all kin ds. Part 3. The people should form one social unit, and religion should be considered an important element in the building of the best possible society based on the principles of human perfection. Part Ii. Society should be considered not as a collection of indi viduals, but as an organic whole in which every kind of work has value insofar as it leads society toward perfection. Part S. The class system and the feudal system should be opposed. Part 6. The system of obligatory social service should be adopted. Part 7. An approximate balance should be maintained between the populations o f ru ral and ui'ban areas. Part 8. The standard of living in rural areas should be raised by p lacin g le g a l r e s tr ic tio n s on the movement from v illa g e s to c i t i e s and by b uild in g roads, providing water and e l e c t r ic it y , and e sta b lish in g schools and clubs in villages. Part 9. Local customs and ways of life should be encouraged. Part 10. Every citizen should have the right to obtain education and employment and should be insured against unemployment, old age, and d ise a se . A rticle 3 ’ Public Health Part 1. It is the responsibility of the State to maintain the health of its citizens by disseminating among the people a knowledge of elemen tary hygiene and by observing that necessary measures are taken in all fields of public health. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 272 Part 2. Hereditary diseases should be abolished by requiring a health certificate as a condition for marriage and for enrollment in any insti tu tio n . Part 3. The State should fight contagious diseases by requiring the isolation of the sick and applying necessary precautionary measures. •- Part U. The State should facilitate the provision of medical treatment for all citizens by providing hospitals and medical care for the poor. Part 5>. The medical profession should be required to maintain a high academic standard and should have at its disposal a sufficient number of laboratories for training purposes. A rticle 1*: Economy and Commerce The economic standard of the country should be raised by adop tio n o f a planned economy and a commercial p o lic y th at aim a t the following objectives: Part 1. The standard of living should be stabilized and increased and a social security system should be established by improving production in quality and quantity, reducing the cost of living, and securing an equilibrium in the balance of trade, These objectives can be accomplished by the following means: (a) Production should be improved by encouraging sk ill and ability, by encouraging entrepreneurs to use centers of research and experimentation, by educating and training the workers, and by using the machine to standardize production.' (b) Individuals should be- encouraged to work by implementing an appropriate tax system, establishing a generous loan policy for indus trial exploitation and agriculture, establishing research institutions, and awarding scholarships to talented individuals. (c) The talents of the citizens should be used and they should be employed according to their specialization. (d) The useful branches of the national economy should be encouraged and appropriately directed. Agriculture should be specialized, of high quality, and production should be increased according to the demand of the market. Tourism should be encouraged by building good residential areas and providing adequate recreation, sports, and amusement. Industry should meet the needs of the local and the external markets. (e) The cost of living should be lowered by decreasing the cost of production, lowering indirect taxes as much as possible and customs d u ties and t a r if f s on consumer goods produced in the country, making transportation facilities cheaper and more available, and forbidding excessive profits, especially those of the middle man. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 7 3 (f) The budget should be balanced by following an internal policy that aims at economic security and low-cost living and, externally, by applying a marketing policy whereby production equals demand in outside markets. In the international field, the party welcomes the admission and the employment of foreign capital provided that it is used in the interests of the country. Part 2. An equitable law should be codified for property, capital, and employment to assure their harmonious collaboration and general pros p e r ity . (a) In the present stage of evolution of human society, private property is considered the basis of individual liberty and security, a means o f support fo r the family'* a fa cto r in production, and a stim ulus for personal initiative, provided that it is not a cause for the immobilization and sterilization of wealth, nor an instrument for social parasitism and laziness, and that it does not come into conflict with public ownership. (b) Work, the duty of a human and noble life, is the essential condition for social productivity and u tility. The one who is able to work and does not work should not have the rig h t to e a t. To f u l f i l l these principles the following policies'should be effected: - Public ownership: the nationalization of all institutions of a public character or of a particular importance to the economy of the country or to its social and political life. - Distribution of the property of the state and imposition of a progressively ascending tax on inherited wealth. - Abolition of very high incomes and of idle wealth by imposing high taxes on them under a system of progressive taxation. - Adoption of the cooperative system, wherever possible, in all branches o f production and consumption. - -Adoption o f a stab le fin a n c ia l p o lic y and a free com petitive commercial system. - Each worker should be an owner, whereby, in addition to his wage, he will receive a fair share of the net profits which will be divided according to a just ratio between capital and labor. - The worker should be provided with as much machinery as possible in order to increase the power of production. Part 3. Taxes and public expenditure should be used to develop the national economy and as means for security and social justice. Because of this, a system of finance and taxation should be adopted based on the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27U principle of "work according to ability and expenditure according to need." To execute this principle the party makes the following recommendations: (a) To reform the tax system whereby enough money shall be collected to perform the constructive and social projects of the government. (b) To increase direct taxation and decrease indirect taxation insofar as possible. (c) To operate the financial affairs of the state on an economic and e f f ic ie n t b a s is . (d) To establish a permanent research institute. Part h. An International Cooperative for economic exchange through international institutions and through unilateral and multilateral commercial, agreements should be established. Article !?: The Intellectual Life Part 1. Knowledge should be considered a value in itself, a center for human activity, a measure for every human deed, and a source of freedom and pleasure. Therefore, the party makes the following stipu la tio n s : - To grant freedom of thought in the search for truth. - To consider the publication of knowledge as a duty of every individual. - To ensure obligatory and free education in its elementary and secondary stages and free education in its higher stages. - To establish night schools for elementary, secondary, higher and professional education. - To use education for publishing the truth and for developing the best possible individual and citizen. Part 2. Knowledge i s a source o f s o c ia l and n ation al stren g th . There fore, the party proposes: (a) To send missions abroad for specialized study and to benefit from them by establishing institutions in all branches of arts and sc ie n c e s. (b) To give prizes and establish local and international exhibi tions for intellectual production. (c) To strengthen the intellectual ties among the intellectual people in the country and their colleagues in other countries, especially Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. <-1/ through international research institutes and international, educational and intellectual centers. Article 6: Journalism The press law should be reformed in accordance with the import ance of the press as an' effective connecting link between public opinion and government and as a means for publishing the truth. A r tic le 7: Organization Part 1. The general organization consists of: (a) The President, who represents the party before the legal authorities, heads the Board of Directors, appoints party officials, and directs the fulfillment of the constitutional provisions. (b) The Vice-President, who heads the judicial authority of the party and replaces the President in his absence. (c) The Board of Directors, consisting of five members, forms the policy of the party, furnishes new laws that are not found in the party convention, supervises the party organization, and advises the P resid en t. (d) The Delegates, twelve in number, are chosen by the President to run the affairs of the party that are divided into: internal, external, financial, judicial, employment, economics and construction, education, health, social, propaganda and publication, youth and a t h le t ic s , and le g is la t iv e . (e) The Advisors, who are chosen to give social and technical advi ce . (f) The General Inspection Committee, that inspects party organs and rec eiv es com plaints. (g) The Council of Honor, which consists of the highest and most distinguished party officials who have contributed useful services to the party. Part 2. The regional organizations consist of: (a) The Divisions, forty-two in number, consisting of several branches each. (b) The Branches are found in towns and villages. Each branch is headed by a director with a secretary and an assistant director, and a treasu rer. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2?6 Part 3« To be admitted as a member, the candidate must be twenty years of age or older, know the basic principles of the party, not have been convicted of a serious crime, and must take an oath that he accepts the p r in c ip le s and the c o n stitu tio n o f the party and th a t he i s ready to abide by them. Part lu The party is financed by admission fees, subscription fees, contributions, profits from functions organized by the party, social help profits, and interest on the money of the party deposited in banks. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.