july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7

A New Phase of wounded.6 In another incident, at least approximately 70 million. The rest of five people were killed in an arson attack the country’s population is composed Resistance and Insurgency against a state-run financial center on of an array of minority communities, in Iranian Baluchistan June 2.7 including a large ethnic Azeri population—which makes up at least By Chris Zambelis The Iranian security services responded a quarter of ’s population—ethnic to the May 28 attack by carrying out an , Arabs, Turkomans, Lors, Baluch, while the world remains fixated on extensive crackdown across Sistan- Armenians, Jews and others. In spite the political turmoil engulfing Iran Baluchistan targeting suspected of Iran’s mosaic of cultural identities, following the June 12, 2009 presidential members and supporters of . Iranians representing different elections, ethnic and sectarian tensions On May 30, Iranian officials publicly backgrounds tend to share a sense of in the country’s southeastern province hanged three men near the site of the national identity rooted in feelings of of Sistan-Baluchistan1 continue to fester. mosque bombing claiming that they had pride and collective consciousness of On May 28, a massive suicide bombing confessed to supplying the attackers with Iran’s ancient heritage. targeting Shi`a worshippers ripped explosives.8 Following the execution, through the Amir al-Momenin mosque Jundallah issued a statement saying that At the same time, a number of ethno- in the provincial capital of . only one of the men executed was in fact sectarian and linguistic minority Ethnic Baluch Sunni insurgents known a member of the group.9 Tensions in the groups in Iran perceive the ethnic as Jundallah (Soldiers of God) claimed province escalated further when rumors Persian-dominated Shi`a Islamist credit for the attack, making it the latest circulated that Molavi Abdolhamid structure of operating a deliberate in a string of increasingly devastating Esmaeil Zehi, Zahedan’s leading Sunni policy of subjugation, discrimination, attacks by the obscure militant group cleric, was targeted in an apparent and repression.12 Iran’s ethnic Baluch since it emerged in 2003.2 Abdulraouf attempt on May 31, minority boasts a culture and a Rigi,3 a Jundallah spokesman, said the presumably by state security officials or historical narrative that is imbued with attack was intended as retaliation for pro-regime forces seeking to avenge the a sense of collective persecution at the ’s execution of a number of Sunni mosque bombing.10 Scuffles that ensued hands of colonial and modern regional clerics in recent years.4 Amid the chaos between his entourage and protesters powers; this has left the Baluch people of the bombing, Jundallah’s founder and led to some injuries and sparked clashes divided among Iran, , and leader Abdulmalek Rigi called for Sunni between civilians and the security forces and without a country of clerics in Sistan-Baluchistan to advocate elsewhere in the province.11 Jundallah their own.13 Moreover, ethnic Baluch a boycott of the June 12 elections.5 In a itself issued a harsh rebuke of the Sunni in Iran, who number between one and series of subsequent attacks in Zahedan cleric’s decision to criticize the May 28 four million and belong to the Sunni that Iranian authorities have also linked mosque attack. faith, inhabit one of the country’s most to Jundallah, armed gunmen attacked underdeveloped and impoverished President ’s This article will examine the recent regions.14 The region is also a hotbed campaign headquarters in the restive history of Baluch nationalism and of cross-border smuggling of drugs, province on May 29, leaving a number dissent in Iran, explain how Jundallah arms, and other contraband. Due to of campaign staff and bystanders has modified its tactics since the end the difficulty in managing the region of 2008, and assess whether or not al- through traditional administrative and 1 The province of Sistan-Baluchistan is often referred Qa`ida may be supporting the Baluch institutional means, Tehran has instead to as Iranian Baluchistan. Baluch nationalists some- terrorist group. times refer to all of the territories where Baluch reside 12 Significantly, the issue of ethnic and sectarian- ten within Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan collectively as Baluch Nationalism and Dissent sions in Iran was brought to the fore during the recent “Greater Baluchistan” and the territory in Iran as “West Iran is a patchwork of diverse ethnic, presidential campaign. Opposition candidate Mir Hos- Baluchistan.” This article will use the terms Sistan-Bal- sectarian, and linguistic communities. sein Mousavi, an ethnic Azeri himself, sought to tap uchistan and Iranian Baluchistan interchangeably. Iran’s Farsi-speaking, ethnic Persian into the simmering resentments of Iranian minorities by 2 “Cleric: Clues of US, ’s Involvement in Zahedan population—nearly all of whom promising greater rights and opportunities. In an effort Bombing Discernable,” Fars News Agency [Tehran], are Shi`a—represent only a slight to win over the support of Iranian Baluch and other Sun- May 29, 2009. majority among Iran’s population of ni minorities, for instance, Mousavi promised to permit 3 It is unclear whether Abdulrauf Rigi is related to Jun- Iranian Sunnis to construct their own mosque in Tehran. dallah founder and leader Abdulmalek Rigi. Members 6 “‘Gunmen Attack’ South Iran Election Office,” BBC, For more details, see Shahin Abbasov, “Iran: Azeris Cau- of Abdulmalek Rigi’s family, including a number of May 29, 2009. tious About Supporting Native Son Mousavi in Tehran his brothers, have been implicated in previous attacks 7 “‘Arson Attack’ Hits Iran’s Zahedan,” al-Jazira, June Political Fight,” EurasiaNet, June 23, 2009; Nahid Siam- and other militant activities. In fact, Iranian authorities 2, 2009. doust, “Can Iran’s Minorities Help Oust Ahmadinejad?” sometimes refer to Jundallah sarcastically as the “Rigi 8 “Iran Hangs Three Over Mosque Blast,” al-Jazira, May Time Magazine, May 30, 2009. Group” in an effort to downplay the idea that Jundallah’s 30, 2009. 13 The Baluch nationalist narrative often portrays the message resonates outside of a close circle of militants 9 “Unrest Mounts in Zahedan,” Rooz Online [Paris], plight of the Baluch alongside that of the Kurds of the linked to the Rigi family. June 2, 2009. Middle East. In this regard, much like the Kurds, the Ba- 4 “Jundallah Claim Responsibility for Bomb Blast,” 10 In a possible attempt to downplay the incident and luch have also been dispersed and divided across hostile Press TV [Tehran], May 30, 2009. reduce sectarian tension, the cleric later refuted reports borders. 5 “Leader Urges Vigilance Against Plots,” Iran Daily that he was the target of an assassination attempt. 14 Chris Zambelis, “Violence and Rebellion in Iranian [Tehran], May 31, 2009. 11 “Unrest Mounts in Zahedan.” ,” Monitor 4:3 (2006). july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 relied on heavy-handed repression to civilian20 target that claimed the lives Abdulghafoor Rigi, a Jundallah member ensure order, an approach that has fed of least 25 worshippers and injured who also happened to be another one resentment toward the state.15 more than 125. Significantly, the attack of leader Abdulmalek Rigi’s brothers, occurred while worshippers mourned rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into According to Jundallah leader the death of the Prophet Muhammad’s the headquarters of Iran’s joint police Abdulmalek Rigi, his group has taken daughter Fatima—an important day and anti-narcotics unit in Saravan, up arms in an effort to highlight the of mourning for Shi`a and killing four police officers and injuring plight of the Baluch people in Iran, a national holiday in Iran—at the scores more.22 While mentioning that who he sees as victims of an ongoing second largest Shi`a mosque in the suicide bombings are not compatible “genocide.”16 He has also claimed that in predominantly Sunni Muslim city and with Baluch values, Baluch nationalist spite of Iranian accusations, Jundallah region. The potential impact of the sources claim that the decision by is not an independence movement attack on the June 12 elections also Abdulghafoor Rigi to execute a suicide nor does it have a radical sectarian likely figured into Jundallah’s calculus. bombing meant to serve as an act of agenda.17 Rigi has even said that he is The timing of the high-profile attack— symbolism that would hopefully inspire an “Iranian” and that his only goal is occurring as it did in the run up to fiercer resistance by Iranian Baluch to improve the lives of his people as the elections—in addition to the other against the regime.23 Iranians.18 Nevertheless, it is likely disturbances in Sistan-Baluchistan also that ethnic Baluch in Iran look to their likely linked to Jundallah suggest that The introduction of suicide bombings kin across the border in Pakistan’s the militants intended to escalate their into Jundallah’s arsenal along with a Baluchistan Province—which is home campaign against the regime with the willingness to target civilians must to the world’s largest Baluch population knowledge that the world was following clearly be of concern to Tehran. Aside and a decades-long insurgency against events in Iran closely. This strategy from the myriad operational challenges Islamabad—as a source of inspiration draws international attention to the posed by having to defend against and possibly material support.19 Baluch cause and exerts pressure on the determined suicide bombers, let alone regime during a period of heightened defending against suicide bombers A Shift in Tactics and Targets political awareness in Iran.21 intent on striking soft targets such Until recently, Jundallah’s violent as mosques, Iranian authorities are campaign has generally featured In addition to its recent strike against also concerned about the spread of al- ambushes, abductions, and bombings a civilian target, the attack against the Qa`ida-style radicalism within the against Iranian security forces across mosque also marked the successful Baluch nationalist movement; suicide Sistan-Baluchistan and symbols of execution of Jundallah’s second suicide bombers have become the hallmark the ruling regime, especially officials bombing. The first suicide bombing of al-Qa`ida’s contribution to the and facilities associated with the occurred on December 28, 2008 when insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and various branches of the security most recently Pakistan. services. Jundallah’s decision to target 20 In spite of the fact that all of the victims are believed a prominent Shi`a mosque in Zahedan to be civilians and that the mosque was clearly a civilian Outside Involvement? signifies a new and more dangerous target, Jundallah spokesman Abdulraouf Rigi stated that Iran regularly accuses outside forces of phase in the insurgent group’s war the bomber was in fact targeting members of the elite Ira- fomenting internal dissent to destabilize against the Iranian government. The nian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other spe- the Shi`a Islamist regime from within. A latest attack was against a purely cial security units who he says were conducting a secret popular claim out of Tehran implicates meeting inside of the mosque. This statement indicates the intelligence services of foreign 15 For an overview of the human rights situation in that, in spite of its recent actions, Jundallah may still be powers led by the and its Sistan-Baluchistan, see Amnesty International, “Iran: sensitive to accusations that it is resorting to wanton at- allies in, among other charges, actively Human Rights Abuses Against the Baluchi Minority,” tacks against civilians. See “‘Gunmen Attack’ South Iran supporting Jundallah’s armed campaign September 17, 2007. Election Office,” BBC, May 29, 2009. through the provision of funds, arms 24 16 Maryam Kashani, “Interview With the Commander of 21 In an apparently unrelated incident a few days follow- and training. Iran also sees the United Jondallah and His Hostage,” Rooz Online, May 14, 2006. ing the mosque bombing, Iranian security officials re- States and its allies behind the array of 17 Ibid. ported that they had defused a homemade bomb planted violent ethno-sectarian insurrectionist 18 Ibid. on a Tehran-bound Kish Air passenger airline that had movements and other militant 19 Among other things, Jundallah regularly exploits the departed from , the capital of Iran’s southwest- opposition forces operating on Iranian porous border and harsh terrain along the Iranian-Pak- ern province of Khuzestan located along the Iran-Iraq soil and beyond Iran’s borders. Iran is istani frontier to circumvent both Iranian and Pakistani border. In addition to being home to most of Iran’s oil authorities. Jundallah often brings those it abducts into wealth and significant natural gas deposits, Khuzestan is 22 Nazila Fathi, “Rare Suicide Bombing in Iran Kills 4,” Pakistani territory, at least temporarily, suggesting that also home to most of Iran’s ethnic Arab minority. Ahvaz New York Times, December 29, 2008. the group maintains some level of operational infrastruc- and other locations within the province have witnessed 23 Reza Hossein Borr, “The Armed Struggle in the East- ture in Pakistani Baluchistan. Moreover, a number of attacks by ethnic Arab nationalist groups. Additionally, ern Parts of Iran Entered a New Phase When the First Jundallah members, including Abdulhamid Rigi, who Arab nationalists often refer to Khuzestan as Arabistan. Suicide Mission Was Carried Out in a Military Base in is one of Abdulmalek Rigi’s brothers, were arrested in Tehran often accuses groups such as Jundallah of col- Sarawan, Baluchistan, on 29 December 08,” January 1, , the capital of Pakistani Baluchistan, before being laborating with other insurgent movements operating 2009, available at www.thebaluch.com/010109_report. extradited to Iran in June 2008. See “16 Iranian Police across Iran, to include ethnic Arab separatists. For more php. Taken Hostage,” Press TV, June 14, 2008; “Rigi Brother details about the airline incident, see “Iran Defuses Bomb 24 “Jundallah Claim Responsibility for Bomb Blast,” Extradited,” Iran Daily, June 15, 2008. on Tehran-Bound Plane,” Press TV, May 31, 2009. Press TV, May 30, 2009. july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 convinced that any potential American Nevertheless, observers of Iranian nationalist cause, it is important to or Israeli invasion of its territory would politics often raise concerns about the note that al-Qa`ida’s regional allies begin by supporting active insurgencies possible spread of al-Qa`ida’s influence and franchises tend to boast of their on its soil. within Iran and the ethnic Baluch association with al-Qa`ida and their nationalist movement.29 Proponents commitment to its global cause as Iran has also accused Pakistan of of this theory argue that Jundallah’s opposed to downplaying or concealing supporting Jundallah even though the ideology may have evolved from a such links. In fact, in February 2007 two countries have a shared interest in strictly nationalist one emphasizing Jundallah seemed keen on downplaying quelling Baluch nationalist aspirations the assertion of ethnic Baluch national its ethno-sectarian character and and have a history of cooperating identity, culture, and religion within refuting allegations of its links to radical to crush Baluch uprisings.25 In an an Iranian context that guarantees Sunni Islamists such as al-Qa`ida by apparent effort to downplay the group’s greater rights and opportunities to a adopting a more secular-oriented label: organic base of support among ethnic radical Islamist-oriented ideology that the People’s Resistance Movement of Baluch in Iranian Baluchistan, Tehran is influenced by al-Qa`ida’s brand of Iran (PRMI).31 Furthermore, while also frequently refers to Jundallah as a extremism. Additionally, the strategic strong ideological differences divide al- “Pakistan-based” movement.26 space occupied by Jundallah in Qa`ida and Iran, there is little evidence southeastern Iran adjacent to Pakistani to suggest that Iran has ever figured Additionally, Tehran accuses Jundallah Baluchistan—a region where the prominently as an al-Qa`ida target. Al- of receiving support from al-Qa`ida ’s influence has experienced a Qa`ida’s priority has always been to and the Taliban. Given the Sunni faith marked rise in recent years—may prove target the United States and its interests of its members and the increasingly to be beneficial for al-Qa`ida’s plans and allies abroad. Given the current Islamist tone of its discourse, Iran for Pakistan, as it provides another state of geopolitics in the greater Middle has suggested that al-Qa`ida and its base to operate against Islamabad and East, tensions between the United States Taliban allies in neighboring Pakistani the United States outside of the tribal and Iran currently work to al-Qa`ida’s Baluchistan are behind Jundallah’s war areas. As a result, al-Qa`ida could see benefit. In contrast, an effort by al- against Tehran. In a public statement in Jundallah an opportunity to gain Qa`ida to target Iran through Jundallah condemning the mosque attack during a foothold in Iran. Jundallah’s use of or other channels would present an Friday prayers the day following the suicide bombings and its apparent opening for closer cooperation between carnage, Ayatollah Sayyed Ahmad willingness to expand its operations the United States and Iran, to include Khatami, an influential cleric close to against soft civilian targets also bears cooperation against al-Qa`ida itself and Ahmadinejad and the ultra-conservative the hallmark of what some observers its allies in the region. ruling establishment, singled out both see as proof of an al-Qa`ida hand behind the United States and Israel in the Jundallah. The nature of Jundallah’s links to the attack, along with “evil Salafists”—a Taliban in Pakistani Baluchistan, on reference to Jundallah’s alleged ties Moreover, al-Qa`ida has demonstrated the other hand, is less clear. Jundallah to al-Qa`ida and possibly elements an impressive ability over the years and ethnic Baluch insurgents operating in , a rival of Iran—all of to exploit and bolster protracted in Pakistani Baluchistan are known whom are presumably intent on sowing insurgencies in places as diverse as to profit from the smuggling of divisions between Shi`a and Sunni Algeria, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, drugs, arms, and other contraband. in Iran.27 There is clearly a political and Pakistan. In this context, the Afghanistan supplies more than 90% motive behind Iranian discourse that brand of violent Salafist Islam that of the world’s ; Iran, particularly accuses Jundallah of joining forces with shapes al-Qa`ida’s worldview detests Sistan-Baluchistan, plays a critical al-Qa`ida or other outside forces. For Shi`a Muslims, seeing them and by role in the smuggling of the narcotic Tehran, associating Jundallah with al- extension the Shi`a Islamist regime to international markets.32 In light Qa`ida helps to delegitimize the group’s in Tehran essentially as heretics and of Jundallah’s widely known ties to cause.28 unbelievers.30 smuggling in Iranian Baluchistan, it is likely that the group (along with other 25 The Iranians have said that even if Pakistan is not In spite of these claims, there is no Iranian drug smugglers) crosses paths supporting Jundallah, it is at least turning a blind eye evidence to support the theory that with the Taliban. Jundallah’s contacts while the United States supports the group from Paki- al-Qa`ida is supporting Jundallah. with the Taliban are most likely based stani territory. Moreover, although some observers on jointly profiting from the illicit trade 26 Iran even went as far as to summon Pakistan’s ambas- suggest that al-Qa`ida may be mounting and smuggling as opposed to ideology. sador in Tehran to protest what Iran sees as Jundallah’s a covert campaign against Iran through association with radical elements and supporters over Jundallah and the larger ethnic Baluch Conclusion the border in Pakistani Baluchistan. See “Iran Summons While there is no evidence linking Pakistani Envoy Over Zahedan Terror Attack,” Tehran 29 Syed , “Al-Qaeda Seeks a New Alli- Jundallah to al-Qa`ida or other radical Times, May 31, 2009. ance,” Asia Times Online, May 21, 2009. Sunni Islamist extremist movements 27 “Suspects in Zahedan Attack Arrested,” Tehran Times, 30 While there is no evidence linking al-Qa`ida to Jun- May 30, 2009. dallah, violent Salafist militants do pay attention to Iran, 31 Chris Zambelis, “Baloch Nationalists Up The Ante In 28 In a related point, Iranian authorities sometimes refer especially on the internet. The official website of the Sons Iran,” Terrorism Focus 4:3 (2007). to Jundallah as Jund al-Shaytan (Soldiers of Satan) in a of Sunna Iran is a case in point, located at www.sun- 32 “U.N. Hails Iran for Curbing Flow of Afghan Heroin,” further attempt to undermine the group’s reputation. nairan.wordpress.com. , May 21, 2009. july 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 7 with a global agenda, the group’s apparent willingness to execute suicide bombings and other attacks against civilian targets will remain a cause for serious concern in Iran. To date, Jundallah’s violent activities appear to be confined exclusively to Sistan- Baluchistan. Given the group’s steady escalation in terms of its execution of tactics and choice of targets in recent months, the next step in Jundallah’s evolution may result in attacks outside of Iranian Baluchistan. Indeed, the international focus on Iran during the run up to the recent elections and the attention paid to minority issues during the campaign may have also emboldened the group to escalate its fight. In the meantime, violence and instability in Iranian Baluchistan will continue to present a series of challenges to the Islamist regime in Tehran.

Chris Zambelis is an associate with Helios Global, Inc., a risk management consultancy based in the Washington, D.C. area. He specializes in Middle East politics. He advises clients in the public, private, and non-profit sectors on a range of social, political, security, and economic issues affecting the Middle East and other regions. He is a regular contributor to a number of publications, where he writes on Middle East politics, political Islam, international security, and related issues. He has lived and worked in the Middle East, East Europe and the former Yugoslavia, and Latin America. Mr. Zambelis is a graduate of New York University and holds an M.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University.

4