ABSTRACT Title of Document: DIVIDED WE STAND, BUT UNITEDWE OPPOSE? OPPOSITION ALLIANCES IN EGYPT AND PAKISTAN Neha Sahgal, Doctor of Philosophy, 2008 Directed By: Dr. Mark Lichbach, Professor and Chair, Department of Government and Politics Why are opposition groups able to form alliances in their activism against the regime in some cases but not in others? Specifically, why did opposition groups in Pakistan engage in high levels of alliance building, regardless of ideological and other divides, while similar alliance patterns did not emerge in Egypt? I explain alliances among various opposition groups in Egypt and Pakistan as a result of two factors – the nature of group constituencies and the nature of the alliance. I argue that constituencies can be characterized as two kinds: Divided and Fluid . Under divided constituencies, different opposition groups receive consistent support from specific sections of the population. Under fluid constituencies, opposition groups have no consistent basis for support. Alliances can be of two kinds, Mobilization or Elite . Mobilization alliances are formed among two or more groups to bring constituents together to engage in collective action, for example, protest, sit-in or civil disobedience. Elite alliances are formed among group leaders to express grievances and/ or find solutions to issues without engaging their constituents in street politics. Groups may work together on an issue-based or value-based concern. Issue- based concerns focus on a specific aspect of the grievance being raised. For example, a law that imposes censorship on the press. Value-based concerns have a broader focus, for example media freedom. Mobilization alliances emerge among political groups that have divided constituencies and are unlikely among political groups that have fluid constituencies. Since a joint mobilization event requires groups to pool their supporters, groups with fluid constituencies fear that their participation will provide their partners with a perfect opportunity to make themselves visible to their support base and engage in “member poaching.” While groups with fluid constituencies are unable to form mobilization alliances, they are able to form issue- based elite alliances. Groups with divided constituencies are likely to form elite alliances on both issue-based and value-based concerns. Since elite alliances do not require groups to pool their constituents, groups with fluid constituencies have few concerns about “member poaching.” However, when formed to address a value-based concern, such alliances can easily lead to mobilization in the future, especially when the concern is broad and sensitive. For this reason, groups with fluid constituencies may form issue-based elite alliances. Groups with divided constituencies often form elite alliances when they are unable to engage in mobilization because of material or other constraints. Since they do not share the same concerns about mobilization in the future, groups with divided constituencies may form both issue-based and value-based elite alliances. I argue that examining the nature of constituencies and the nature of the alliance being formed provides more leverage in explaining the formation of alliances as compared to other explanations, such as ideological similarities/differences and regime policies. DIVIDED WE STAND, BUT UNITED WE OPPOSE? OPPOSITION ALLIANCES IN EGYPT AND PAKISTAN By Neha Sahgal Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2008 Advisory Committee: Professor Mark I. Lichbach – Chair Professor Ken Conca Professor I.M Destler (PUAF) Professor Jillian Schwedler Professor Shibley Telhami © Copyright by Neha Sahgal 2008 Table of Contents Table of Contents ii List of Tables iv List of Figures v List of Acronyms vi Chapter I: Introduction 1 Alliances in Egypt and Pakistan 11 Explaining Alliances 16 Formation of Alliances 29 Case Comparability, Method and Evidence 38 Outline of the Study 42 Chapter II: Political Parties, Organizations and Groups in Egypt and Pakistan Opposition Parties in Pakistan 46 Summary of the Party System in Pakistan 47 Opposition Parties in Egypt 70 Summary of the Party System in Egypt 71 99 Chapter III: Elite Alliances 106 Elite Alliances in the Literature 110 Formation of Issue-Based and Value-Based Elite Alliances 112 1995 Press Law Activism in Egypt 114 Kalabagh Dam and Anti-Sharif Activism in Pakistan 129 Elite Alliances-Why they are Formed and how they Work 143 Chapter IV: Mobilization Alliances 148 Formation of Mobilization Alliances 150 Mobilization Alliances in Egypt 152 Analysis: Mobilization Alliances in Egypt 171 Mobilization Alliances in Pakistan 195 Analysis: Mobilization Alliances in Pakistan 196 Chapter V: Conclusion Explaining Alliances Applying the Theory to the Cases 205 Areas of Future Research 209 Pakistan and Egypt Since 2005- Food Riots, 218 Ruling Coalitions and the Formation of Elite 225 Alliances ii 227 Notes 232 Bibliography 241 iii List of Tables Table I: Formation of Alliances 7 Table II: Formation of Elite Alliances 114 Table III: Formation of Mobilization 152 Alliances Table IV: Formation of Alliances 208 Table V: Formation of Alliances 225 iv List of Figures Fig I: Divided Constituencies 4 Fig II: Fluid Constituencies 4 v List of Acronyms Egypt ASU: Arab Socialist Union CPPA: Committee for Political Parties Affairs LR: Liberation Rally MB: Muslim Brotherhood NDP: National Democratic Party NPUP: National Progressive Union Party NU: National Unionq ` SLP: Socialist Labor Party Pakistan ANP: Awami National Party IDA: Islamic Democratic Alliance JI: Jamaat-i-Islami JUI: Jamaat-i-Ulema-i-Islami JUP: Jamaat Ulema-i-Pakistan LFO: Legal Framework Order MMA: Majlis-e-Muttahida-e-Amal MQM: Muhajir Qoumi Movement MQM(h): Muhajir Qoumi Movement (Haqiqi) NWFP: North West Frontier Province PCO: Provisional Constitutional Order PIF: Pakistan Islamic Front PML: Pakistani Muslim League PML(n): Pakistani Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif) PML(q): Pakistani Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) PNA: Pakistan National Alliance PPO: Political Parties Order PPP: People’s Party of Pakistan PPPP: People’s Party of Pakistan Parliamentarians PPP(s): People’s Party of Pakistan (Sherpao) vi Chapter I: Introduction In 1997 relations between the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party and its long- term ally, the Awami National Party (ANP) had never been worse. The two parties had developed deep differences over several complex issues. As ANP leaders deliberated their stance on continuing their alliance with the PML, a Karachi-based newsmagazine published a cartoon showing a man on a visit to his doctor. The man shows the doctor a large protrusion from his backside labeled – ANP. The man’s shirt reads – PML. The doctor exclaims in shock and horror, “Oh, alliancitis! 1” Politics makes for strange bedfellows. Groups that clash at certain times form alliances with each other at other times. Yet, as I will argue, the process through which opposition groups come to form alliances with each other given the constraints and opportunities presented by their environment remains an open puzzle. My research explores the answer to the following question: Why are opposition groups able to form alliances in their activism against the regime in some cases but not in others? Specifically, why did opposition groups in Pakistan engage in high levels of alliance building, regardless of ideological and other divides, while similar alliance patterns did not emerge in Egypt? In this study I examine two cases where opposition actors operating under seemingly similar circumstances show very different patterns of alliance formation. In Pakistan, groups have been able to work together through joint protests, strikes, civil disobedience as well as through parliamentary walkouts and joint statements. In Egypt, while opposition groups formed alliances under some circumstances, the same groups have been unable to work together under most other conditions. For example, Islamists, 1 The Herald, March 1997 1 leftists and right-wing parties engaged in a campaign against the regime-initiated Press Law Number 93 in 1995, but could not form an alliance to protest the results of the elections held a few months later, despite making individual public statements declaring their intentions to work with other groups on this issue. By contrast, Islamists, leftists and ethnic parties in Pakistan formed several alliances against the Sharif regime’s attempts to muzzle the press in 1998 and collectively protested the annulment of democracy in the country under General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. The contrast in the frequency of successful alliance building among groups in the countries is even more striking when comparing the 2005 political opening in Egypt to the 2002 elections in Pakistan. In 2005, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak held presidential and parliamentary elections in the same year. This was the first time in nearly a decade that the position of the president was contested. In Pakistan, Musharraf announced parliamentary elections in 2002 and provincial elections in 2005 after taking over the government in a bloodless coup in October 1999. While state- initiated political openings provided opposition parties and groups with opportunities to campaign, increase their support base and gain additional power in the parliament, the ruling regime maintained its hold on the state in both Egypt and Pakistan. Political