Challenges and Opportunities for Canada- Korea Cooperation

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KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 제16차 한국-캐나다 포럼 결과 보고서

Strategic and Technological Transformation in the Making: Challenges and Opportunities for Canada- Korea Cooperation

- 01 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 일시 2018년 12월 13-15일 (December 13-15, 2018)

장소 인터컨티넨탈 서울 코엑스 (Intercontinental Seoul COEX, Seoul, Korea)

공동주관 서울국제포럼 (The Seoul Forum for International Affairs, SFIA) The Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI

지원 한국국제교류재단 (The Korea Foundation, KF)

- 02 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 목차

04 1. 종합 보고 Executive Summary

한글 Korean

영문 English

10 2. 세션별 요약 Session Summaries

11 Session 1: Strategic Transformation on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond

Session 2: Middle-Power Diplomacy during International Transition: U.S.-China Fight for the Asia-Pacific

Session 3: U.S.-China Trade War and its Effects on Canada and Korea

Session 4: Demographic Change and Immigration Policies

Session 5: Korea-Canada Cooperation in the Age of Technological Innovation

Session 6: Gender Equality and Women’s Role in Business

26 3. 참석자 명단 List of Participants

30 4. 프로그램 Program

- 03 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Executive Summary

종합 보고

- 04 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 제16차 한국-캐나다 포럼은 양국의 학계, 정부, 연구기관, 산업계 등 다양한 배경의 전문가들이 모인 가운데 2018년

12월 서울에서 개최되었다. 총 여섯 개의 세션으로 구성된 포럼에서 참석자들은 각 부문 내 전략적, 기술적 협력의 기회를

마련하는데 초점을 맞추어 다양한 정책적 제언을 하였다.

첫 번째 세션에서는 한반도의 안보 상황을 다루었다. 남북 간 화해 국면과는 별개로 북한의 비핵화 의지에 대해서는 우려가

제기되고 있다. 핵심은 비핵화 이행 방식에 대한 북한과 미국 간 이견이다. 한 참석자는 현재의 한반도 상황을 미국, 그리고

러시아의 지원을 받는 중국 간의 게임에 빗대어 표현하기도 했다. 대부분의 참석자는 캐나다가 한반도뿐만이 아닌 아시아

태평양 지역에서의 역할을 확대해야 하며, 특히 다자주의 질서 유지를 위해 노력해야 한다는 의견에 동의했다. 인도주의적

영역에서 영향력이 큰 캐나다는 북한의 반인도 범죄 해결에도 도움이 될 수 있다.

두 번째 세션은 아시아 태평양 지역 내 미·중 경쟁이 치열해지는 가운데 중견국 외교의 역할과 잠재력에 대해 논의했다.

중국은 아시아 내 미국의 영향력 축소와 중국의 영향력 확대를 동시에 추진하고 있으며, 미국은 대중 적대 정책으로

대응하고 있다. 이에 따라 한국과 캐나다는 적극적인 협력을 통해 중견국 외교를 강화해야 한다는 의견이 있었다. 양국은

국제 안보 이해관계를 대표하는데 핵심적인 역할을 할 수 있기 때문에 아시아 태평양 지역에 외교의 중요성을 상기시킬

수 있으며, 자유주의 국제 질서를 유지 및 개혁할 의지가 있기 때문이다. 중견국 외교 제도화의 실제 사례인 MIKTA는 좋은

벤치마크가 될 수 있다.

세 번째 세션의 초점은 미·중 무역 전쟁의 함의였다. 분쟁 당사자인 미·중의 목적은 기술 진전이 가속화됨에 따라 발생하는

디지털 패권을 확보하기 위함이다. 이처럼 변화하는 세계무역체제에서 미국과 중국이 지속해서 선택을 강요하고 있기

때문에 캐나다와 한국 등 중견국들은 중요한 전환점에 있다. 무역 다각화가 시급한 시점이다. NAFTA(북미자유무역협정)

개정안인 USMCA(미국-멕시코-캐나다 협정)는 배타적 무역블록 형성의 중심에 있다. 회원국들이 중국과 무역 협정을 맺지

못하도록 하기 때문이다. 따라서 USMCA는 TPP 및 RCEP 협상에도 부정적인 영향을 끼치고 있다. 결과적으로, 다자주의의

반대 개념인 지역주의가 두드러지고 있다. 다자주의를 수호하고 개혁하려는 시도는 계속되어야 하지만, 가치와 방향성이

같은 국가 간의 무역블록 형성 또한 현재로서는 효과적인 대안일 수 있다.

네 번째 세션에서는 캐나다와 한국의 인구 변화와 이민정책을 논의했다. 특히, 성공적인 이민정책을 운영하고 있는

캐나다의 참석자들은 지속적인 저출생률로 인해 경제활동인구 감소를 겪고 있는 한국에 많은 조언을 했다. 캐나다는

이민과 다문화 정책을 저출산 및 인구 감소의 장기적인 해결책으로 삼고 있다. 한국의 노동인구 충당을 위한 단기적

- 05 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 해결책으로 캐나다 측의 전문가는 이미 한국에 터를 잡고 있는 이주 노동자들에게 이민의 기회를 높여줄 것을 제안하면서,

이에 가장 큰 걸림돌은 이민자들의 국내 적응과 문화적 동화일 것이라 지적했다. 캐나다는 이민자들을 자국에 동화시키는

데 있어 큰 역할을 한 정부 덕분에 광범위한 이민정책의 경제적 혜택을 누릴 수 있게 되었다. 한국 또한 비슷한 정부

프로그램들을 운영하지만, 다문화 수용을 정부의 우선 과제 중 하나로 삼는 결단력이 부족하다는 의견이 있었다. 현재

한국의 이민자 프로그램은 정착하고자 하는 이민자들을 교육하는 데에만 초점이 맞춰져 있기 때문에 이민정책의 혜택과

관련하여 자국민을 교육시키는 프로그램 또한 강화되어야 할 것이다. 캐나다의 전문가들은 이민자들이 자신의 목소리가

국가에 충분히 반영되고 있다고 느낄 때 이민정책으로 인한 경제 및 사회적 혜택이 비로소 극대화된다는 점을 지속적으로

강조했다.

다섯 번째 세션은 인공지능 등 제4차 산업혁명의 기술 혁신 속에서의 한국-캐나다 협력을 다루었다. 1950년대에 개발이

시작된 ‘사고 기계’의 개념에서 파생된 오늘날의 인공지능 기술은 심층 지도학습(managed deep learning)에서 자율학습

(unsupervised learning)으로 발전하고 있다. 그 와중에 개인정보 보호법에 대한 의견이 분분하다. 소비자들은 본인의

개인정보 사용처에 대한 충분한 고지에 따라 현명한 소비 결정을 내릴 수 있어야 하며, 그러기 위해서는 적절한 규제가

필요하다는 의견에 한국-캐나다 포럼의 참석자들은 대체로 동의했다. 개인정보 보호와 관련된 보편적인 국제 규범을

만드는 데에 캐나다와 한국을 포함한 중견국들이 좋은 중재자 역할을 할 수 있을 것이다. 또한, 참석자들은 인공지능 관련

정책과 규제의 토대를 마련해야 할 지금 한국과 캐나다가 결속하고 참여해야 한다고 의견을 모았다.

마지막 세션에서는 특히 고용시장에서의 양성평등에 관한 논의가 있었다. 발표자들은 한국과 캐나다 모두 직장 내

양성평등에 있어서 더딘 발전을 보인다고 평가했다. 캐나다는 여성의 노동시장 참여에 어느 정도 성과를 이뤘지만, 여전히

‘새는 송수관’이라는 진로 이탈 현상이 지속되고 있다. 한국은 이보다 더 뒤처져 있으며, OECD의 2017년 유리천장지수의

여러 핵심 범주에서 최하위를 차지했다. 다른 한편으로는, 양성평등에 대한 전반적인 인식이 상당히 개선되었기 때문에

현상에 안주할 위험이 있다는 의견이 있었다. 현재의 추진력을 유지하고 대중의 인식 변화를 고착시키기 위해서는 정부의

적극적인 차별 철폐 조치가 결정적인 역할을 한다는 결론에 많은 참석자가 동의했다.

- 06 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 The 16th Korea-Canada Forum, held in Seoul in December 2018, brought together a distinguished group of experts from the Korean and Canadian governments, academia, think tanks, and industry. The participants attempted to fathom shifts and changes in six subject areas and discern opportunities for bilateral strategic and technological cooperation.

The first session dealt with the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. In the wake of inter-Korean reconciliation talks, concerns were raised about North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization. The central issue is North Korea’s chosen method of denuclearization, which is at odds with Korea and the United States’ desired method. One participant linked the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the “great game” between China and the United States, with Russia assisting China on the side. The participants agreed that Canada should offer to play a bigger role in the Korean Peninsula, particularly in leveraging multilateralism. Canada also can be impactful in the humanitarianism sphere, and help address North Korea’s crimes against humanity.

The second session discussed the direction and potential of middle-power diplomacy amid the rise of an assertive China and resulting Sino-U.S. competition in the Asia-Pacific region. China is assuming an expanded role while trying to neutralize U.S. influence in Asia. In response, the United States is adopting confrontational policies against Beijing. Korea and Canada should cooperate and form a partnership to increase middle-power diplomacy. They could have a key presence in representing global security interests, bringing diplomacy into Asia-Pacific regional issues, and defending and reforming the international rules-based order. MIKTA is a benchmark example that highlights the effects of a concrete strategic initiative among middle powers.

Implications of the Sino-U.S. trade war were the focus of the third session. The core aim of both sides is securing digital supremacy as technological development unfolds. Canada and Korea are at a critical juncture in the changing global trading system. They must adjust to cope with rising pressure by China and the United States to choose sides. To that end, diversification of trade partners is crucial going forward.

The USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement) – a revision of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – is representative of America’s exclusionary efforts. It contains an article that seeks to steer Canada and Mexico away from trade agreements with China. Assuming it is approved by the US Congress, the USMCA puts an additional burden on the TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) and on the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) negotiations to find ways to diversify markets and to avoid choosing sides. The world is clearly seeing a rise of regionalism over multilateralism. While attempts at reforming the WTO and multilateral concepts should continue, regional trading blocs of like-minded countries and ‘coalitions of the willing’ may have merit at the moment.

- 07 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 The fourth session examined demographic change and immigration policies in Canada and Korea. Special attention was placed on how Canada’s successful experience with immigration may assist Korea, where a steadily declining birth rate is threatening the future availability of workers. Canada’s long-term solution to the same problem is immigration and multiculturalism. A Canadian expert on immigration suggested an immediate solution to boost Korea’s working force, which would widen immigration opportunities to migrant workers. The main obstacle is cultural adjustment and naturalization. Canada has enjoyed economic benefits from its wide immigration policy thanks to effective government leadership in assimilating immigrants in a multicultural setting and working to retain public support. Korea has relevant programs, but lacks leadership in making multiculturalism a priority. The nation’s immigration-related programs are geared to indoctrinating migrants but more attention should be placed on educating Koreans about the benefits from immigration. Experts from Canada repeatedly emphasized and advised that benefits—both economic and social—of immigration policies are amplified when immigrants feel secure about their future place in the country.

The fifth session dealt with Korea-Canada cooperation amid technological innovations—artificial intelligence (AI), in particular—of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Derived from the 1950s’ dreams of thinking machines, today’s AI technology is shifting from managed deep learning to unsupervised learning. Arguments both for and against privacy regulations have intensified. Most participants in the Forum agreed that smart regulations are necessary for consumers to enjoy the benefits of technology based on informed decisions concerning impacts on their privacy. In this process, it was pointed out that middle powers such as Korea and Canada are well positioned to develop universal regulations for international jurisdictions. Participants agreed that Korea and Canada should exercise solidarity when laying a foundation for AI policies.

The last session discussed gender equality and women’s role in business. Presenters said both Canada and Korea are still progressing slowly. While Canada has tried to increase women’s participation in the work force (and succeeded to some degree), the “leaky pipeline” continues to shed women before they reach senior leadership positions. Korea is further behind, ranking last among key categories in the OECD’s 2017 Glass Ceiling Index. With gender equality in business finally being embraced on a wide scale, there is now the risk of complacency. Government affirmative action policies and regulations are critical to maintaining the current momentum and altering company and the public’s behavior, which would ultimately lead to attitude change.

- 08 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 - 09 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Session Summaries

세션별 요약

- 10 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Session 1 Strategic Transformation on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond

This session was especially timely, coming in the wake of an unprecedented U.S.-North Korea summit and cordial inter-Korean summit. The talks defused the 2017 atmosphere when South Korea faced the most dangerous national security crisis since the Korean War. But Forum participants questioned the viability of denuclearization by the North.

The U.S.-North Korea summit held in Singapore was a good start as it confirmed that Kim Jong-un was ready to negotiate denuclearization. However, North Korea’s subsequent behavior shows that North Korea is still dragging its feet, trying to gain U.S. concessions on a quid pro quo basis, a practice not based on international standards.

North Korea has not declared its inventory, a demand by Washington and Seoul, but has suspended its nuclear and missile tests. The United States believes that it has reciprocated North Korea’s actions via suspending the US- ROK joint military exercises. Most importantly, North Korea expressed willingness to dismantle nuclear facilities in Yongbyon if the United States takes measures in accordance with the “US-DPRK Joint Statement” signed in Singapore. North Korea has been demanding an official end of the Korea War. Its latest demands include removal of U.S.-supported sanctions. So far, Washington has resisted, and the positions are not considered easily reconcilable.

The ultimate question is North Korea’s method of denuclearization. South Korea and the United States want an inventory report first, but North Korea has no intention to comply with this request. North Korea’s proposal of “voluntary, self-driven denuclearization” is liable to start on the margins; dismantling small apparatus one by one as proof to the world. Nevertheless, South Korea needs to insist on the traditional model for denuclearization, which includes a thorough inventory of the arsenal, dismantlement and verification. This is because North Korea has walked away four times from verification.

Deep pessimism and skepticism about North Korean denuclearization cannot be erased. Stakeholders must be clearly reminded of how the current round of engagement was started; North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization is very much conditional. According to South Korean special envoys to Pyongyang, North Korea is willing to commit to denuclearization under the specific condition that South Korea and the United States no longer constitute a military threat. North Korea is keenly watching for the reaction to this condition. South Korea, on the other hand, wants to see concrete progress in denuclearization by Pyongyang. This is a parallel impasse. In order to overcome this hurdle, major stakeholders must agree to a common roadmap that is at least roughly outlined, if not set out in detail.

- 11 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 One Canadian participant linked the situation to the “Great Game” between China and the United States, with Russia assisting Beijing out of a shared interest in keeping the United States off-balance. And while bilateral and trilateral relationships revolving around Northeast Asian issues are also influenced by this dynamic, the North Korean issue is an unpredictable and dangerous sideshow to the Sino-U.S. confrontation.

Although President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo proclaim “great progress” in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula, such constructive ambiguity may not be helpful at this point. On the other hand, actual North- South movement in the military domain is evident. Measures to signal non-aggression such as dismantlement of some border guard posts may be considered easy moves. But they are a start.

In sum, the two Koreas have made modest progress, while North Korea and the United States are at an impasse. China and Russia seem to be enjoying the current situation, and Japan is discontentedly observing. Nothing has been achieved beyond the current stoppage of nuclear and missile tests. There is no agreement on what CVID (Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Denuclearization) entails. Hence, little progress is materializing. Meanwhile, South Korea President Moon seems to be in a hurry as he and his administration see this warmer period the sole window for real peace. South Korea has visions of co-prosperity and sustainable development. The feasibility of both is debatable without denuclearization beforehand but as of now, the South Korean government does not appear to have a different roadmap.

One adverse outcome for South Korea is North Korea offering denuclearization (apparently complete, but actually partial) in return for diplomatic normalization between itself and the United States, accompanied by the lifting of sanctions. Many foreign policy establishments already believe that CVID is not feasible in reality; many U.S. experts tend to argue for partial denuclearization that puts more emphasis on U.S. security priorities such as nonproliferation and dismantlement of ICBMs. In this case, North Korea will be able to stop there. This may be what Kim Jong-un is pursuing, and this is worrisome for South Korea.

North Korea also possesses significant cyber warfare capabilities, chemical and biological weapon stockpiles and links to terrorist groups, all of which will remain, regardless of what happens with its nuclear weapons.

For years Canada has had a “controlled engagement” policy with North Korea, making it a marginal player. One Canadian participant pointed out that it is up to Canada to ask how it might play a future role on the Korean Peninsula. Canada’s strategic interest in the region is a continuation of multilateralism. On the economic side, Canada has a vested interest in the Korean Peninsula and relevant trade agreements as it too borders the Pacific Ocean. In terms of multilateralism, Canada is always active. Taking on a larger role in the North Korea issue in particular can be Canada’s stepping stone to larger engagement in the Asia Pacific region.

- 12 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 One issue where Canada can immediately have an impact is on crimes against humanity. The United Nations has documented allegations that the North Korean regime regularly engages in political oppression, and fails to protect its own people and prevent starvation. Nevertheless, the international community has been largely silent.

That raises questions for Canada’s liberal values. Canada has a significant role to play when it comes to calling out North Korea on human rights. It possesses political capital to speak up on such issues as it has a long tradition of promoting humanitarianism around the world, as well as a long-standing history of being the honest broker. Canada’s humanitarian engagement can include food, hospital and other supplies.

- 13 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Session 2 Middle-Power Diplomacy during International Transition: U.S.-China Fight for the Asia-Pacific

In 2009, China’s declared core interests included South China Sea lanes. A flurry of debate ensued about China seemingly adopting an assertive posture but subsided in 2013, when Xi Jinping took control. Five years on, the debate has resurfaced due to China’s increasing displays of confidence and substantial empirical evidence that it is becoming more assertive.

The Asia-Pacific region is in the front row of the “Chinese Dream,” with numerous projects such as the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), OBOR (One Belt One Road), and CIDCA (China International Development Cooperation Agency). Also importantly, China opened its first military base in Ethiopia, and a couple of others might be forthcoming, which unnerves the United States. There are also explicit displays of economic power, force and influence.

In short, Xi Jinping’s China has been assuming an enlarged role. China’s current classification of the United States is close to “non-friend, non-enemy.” But at the same time, China wants to neutralize the U.S. influence in Asia.

As for the U.S. view of China, Chinese trade practices are considered unfair, its cyber capacities are a serious threat, and its military build-up is worrying. A bipartisan consensus on taking tougher stances against Beijing is rising in Washington. The United States seems to be making a transition from the Obama administration’s strategic patience to a proactive government-wide approach on China. There is an apparent absence of commonalities between the United States and China: values, region, ethnicity, history, and culture. When China seeks to become a leader or the leader, the United States will obviously have deep concerns about the type of international order that China may aspire to create.

The United States is thus adopting confrontational policies against China. The U.S. National Security Strategy announced in December 2017 importantly defines China as a rival as well as a revisionist force that wants to strengthen its influence not only in Asia, but also in the Western Hemisphere. Many initiatives reflect the Trump administration’s hardline position. It is evident in the realms of CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) and FIRRMA (The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act), as well as a broadened war against academic, technological, and industrial espionage.

Korea is a U.S. ally and also heavily dependent on economic cooperation with China. As Sino-U.S. tensions increase, Korea encounters more and more situations in which it is forced to choose sides. This reflects the resistance to multilateralism by the current U.S. administration. Countries in such difficult circumstances tend to form a coalition. However, middle-power coalition or middle-power diplomacy works better in theory. In reality, it yields uneven results as success depends on developing mutual trust. Nevertheless, because China tends to target secondary or weaker players when at loggerheads with the United States, middle-power countries need to cooperate. In particular, Korea is the country physically closest to China, and hence is particularly susceptible to China’s threats.

- 14 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 So far, Korea has displayed strategic ambiguity, but it is also interested in middle-power diplomacy.

In order to deal with the Sino-U.S. standoff via middle-power diplomacy, three points need to be understood. First, this is a strategic contest for overall supremacy, not a single issue or set of issues. This implies that neither China nor the United States will be receptive to assistance from middle powers. Second, security and economic contests between the United States and China are no longer separated; they are now intertwined into a single context. Third, this is a contest between two systems and two sets of values -- a contest in which Korea and Canada have a fundamental stake in assuring a particular outcome, including as U.S. allies. This is not only where the two countries stand, but also where China sees them standing.

Given this situation, therefore, what can Korea and Canada do? First, both need to represent the broader interests of global stability, peace and prosperity. They should urge the United States and China to manage their differences and ambitions so as to avoid conflicts. Secondly, Korea and Canada need to bring diplomacy into play around emerging sources of tension in the Asia-Pacific region. Although they may be on the margins of the main arenas of Sino-U.S. contention, small problems cannot afford to become large ones. Lastly, Korea and Canada must continue to defend and reform the rules-based international order. This is not separate from the Sino-U.S. contest because a world dominated by two great powers is not the kind of world either country wants.

Most likely, many years will be needed for the Sino-U.S. relationship to sort itself out, but middle powers, including Korea and Canada, must be engaged and demand both of them to act in global interests. One way to do this would be to forge a ‘third force’ or power block of next-level countries and groups—the E.U., Japan, India, etc.—to weigh in more effectively with Washington and Beijing. In terms of the rules-based order, China used to be the variable; now, the United States has also become one. It should not be assumed that the United States will automatically spring back to the conventional rules-based order after the end of the Trump administration. Lasting changes seem to have occurred in American society and politics. Hence, the ‘third force’ is important. However, the fact that many of its potential members have their own limits due to their alliances with the United States may become an obstacle.

MIKTA (informal partnership between Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) highlights the pluses and minuses of putting together a concrete strategic initiative among middle powers. On the minus side, MIKTA is heading into its sixth year, and is still trying to define itself. Once an institution as such is formed, there must be a sustainable reason for its existence. Stipulating one may be an unexpected challenge. On the plus side, such a middle-power diplomatic arrangement can discuss soft power and public diplomacy. Here, trust building is key, and member countries are forced to unearth commonalities and start investing personnel and money toward this phase. Eventually, steps forward are made. Although the current MIKTA has ample room to improve, soft power is a significant modicum to develop the coalition of middle-power diplomacy.

- 15 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Session 3 U.S.-China Trade War and its Effects on Canada and Korea

The U.S. trade war with China began with tariffs on production inputs, a strategy aimed at keeping American companies from moving operations abroad and returning production to the USA. As China and the United States collide, third parties are motivated to benefit as alternative suppliers. But U.S. customs rules are designed to prevent this; any country that has products containing Chinese components may be subject to U.S. tariffs.

This trade battle is rooted in the desire to secure digital supremacy. However, the new digital economy features the risks of massive market failure (steep economies of scale). It also features pervasive information asymmetry. In the international domain, this creates incentives for strategic trade and investment policy. A massive trade conflict such as the past DRAM war between the United States and Japan may be repeated and far exceed the scope of the U.S.-China struggle for dominant companies.

The contest for digital supremacy is dangerous if the U.S. prevails enough to persuade U.S. companies to repatriate. That would raise the risk for more conflicts with China and its trade partners. Therefore, it is in the interest of third-party countries to devise a better solution.

Within the WTO, discussions so far have been based on appeasing the United States’ concerns, or dealing with the China friction. In the WTO China must be dealt more as a market-oriented economy. We also need to bring competition policies into the WTO (as was intended in the Doha Round).

The WTO also needs new intellectual property rules, particularly around the artificial intelligence and machine learning domain because technological acceleration in this domain makes patents irrelevant. Moreover, the current WTO system is based on economic activity, while the major issue in the digital economy is ownership of assets. This digital era is about capturing international rents with data flow serving as the medium of exchange for service.

Canada and Korea are at a critical juncture; they must adjust their future direction in the global trading system. The USMCA (United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement) negotiations were a shock to many, and legally speaking, this agreement is several steps ahead of even the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership). Clearly, new trade rules incorporated in the USMCA will become the foundation for the future FTAs, at least FTAs arranged by the United States.

Politically speaking, one provision, Article 22.10, of the USMCA inserted at US insistence is particularly interesting as it could mean that Canada must now abandon any plan for a bilateral trade agreement with China.1

1 Article 22.10 of the USMCA requires a USMCA Party to inform other USMCA Parties if it intends to enter into a free trade agreement with a non- market economy, and to give these Parties an opportunity to review this agreement’s terms 30 days before coming into force. If a Party enters into a trade agreement with a non-market country, other Parties have the right to terminate their participation in the USMCA on six month notice and proceed to a bilateral agreement.

- 16 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 This USMCA clause has burdensome implications for Korea whose economy is substantially dependent upon China. Korea’s prospects for joining the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) has changed since Korea’s bilateral relationship with Japan soured. And because the USMCA’s legal provisions have set a new precedent, Korea must significantly alter its domestic regulations in order to comply with the USMCA, for example, in state owned enterprises, digital trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and so on.

In fact, President Trump is willing to withdraw from any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement he feels is not tilted enough toward U.S. interests. Particularly with regards to China, President Trump’s administration is implementing a strategy that is popular with his political supporters. One aspect is the USMCA’s Article 22.10, the so-called China clause referred to above. Although the Canadian government has downplayed the importance of this clause, it will stick and is likely to be used by the Trump administration. And now that such language has been inserted in one trade agreement, the United States will insist on its inclusion in other future trade agreements.

Such a policy effectively forces countries like Canada and Korea to choose between the United States and China. Hence, both Canada and Korea need to find ways to diversify their trade to avoid a binary choice. However, tools to do so are very limited, and breaking free from entrenched relationships will be challenging. For Korea, the CPTPP and China-Korea FTA may be such an opportunity. Korea’s entry into the CPTPP has become somewhat complicated, but if it is still an initiative that Korea would like to pursue, Canada will support it.

RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) also has interesting problems. Theoretically, it was to be the preliminary stage for a deeper trilateral FTA between Korea, China, and Japan. On the other hand, RCEP may be the only way Korea can produce a formal economic arrangement with Japan. A bilateral agreement with Japan may be nearly impossible to negotiate today, especially considering the political and diplomatic tensions between Korea and Japan in recent years.

Although the liberalization value of a RCEP may be small, it does have political significance. If Japan is restricted by the United States regarding its FTA partners, Japan may not be able to or may not wish to conclude an FTA arrangement with China under RCEP. This suggests no conclusion to RCEP negotiations in the near term, meaning that any ‘preliminary stage’ trade agreement among Korea, China and Japan will not see progress. The USMCA has created many roadblocks in this part of the world.

- 17 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Japan and the European Union on the other hand, have been quick to establish an EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) among themselves in reaction to the Sino-U.S. trade war. Such a movement signals a rise of regionalism against multilateralism. This insinuates that it may be time to move ahead with coalitions of the willing, rather than multilateralism. Although attempts at reforming the WTO and other broad multilateral concepts should not cease, such a coalition may not be a bad idea at a time when the United States is stepping away from its leadership role.

- 18 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Session 4 Demographic Change and Immigration Policies

Canada and Korea have undergone large and unique demographic changes. Korea’s birth rate has been in a steady decline during the last 15 years. The fall has accelerated since 2015, and in 2018 the birth rate was less than 1.0, far below the replacement-level fertility rate. Consequently, the size of the potential working population will contract severely.

One remedy to offset the shrinkage is through immigration. Canada has become a country of multiculturalism as a result of its comprehensive and integrated approach to immigration and economic growth. Canada’s model of immigration policies can be a good benchmark for Korea.

Net immigration to Canada accounts for all of the nation’s population growth. Some employers are already having trouble filling jobs with Canadian-born workers. However, because many immigrants are young and economically active (more than 80% of the immigrants admitted in recent years are under 45 years old), they contribute more than they receive in benefits over their lifetime. Immigrants contribute to the economy and create jobs for Canadians by paying taxes, and purchasing goods and services needed to establish themselves and their families. Canada’s business leaders are very positive about immigration.

In addition, many immigrants are entrepreneurial; beyond creating jobs for Canadians, immigrant-owned businesses provide trade ties for Canada. Immigrants also have high rates of education, thereby significantly augmenting the Canadian talent pool. Almost half of all immigrants between the ages of 25 and 64 held a bachelor’s degree or higher in 2016, compared to just under 25% of the Canadian-born population in the same age group. Currently 22% of Canadians are foreign born.

The number of expatriates in Korea has been rising sharply. It passed 4% of the total population in 2017, excluding migrant workers. Accepting more immigrants is being mentioned more frequently as a way to tackle the unfavorable demographic trends but has not been openly debated yet. Korea is traditionally a closed, homogenous society. Its immigration system largely involves asylum seekers and refugee policy. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan nationals, highly unlikely in the need of international protection, have filed the most refugee applications in Korea in 2018 with 2,015 applications. This attests to the demand for migrant workers to extend their stay. In other words, Korea should consider expanding opportunities for migrant workers, as there clearly is a demand.

However, in order for immigration to have the economic benefits that Canada enjoys, government leadership in successfully absorbing foreign arrivals is essential. This is the area that made Canada such a successful case.

Over time, newcomers’ sense of inclusion and earnings match those born in Canada. Levels of voting, volunteering, and charitable giving are comparable to those born in Canada. In 2016, 32% of immigrants volunteered and 61%

- 19 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 were members of social organizations, which is just slightly below their Canadian-born counterparts. The vast majority of immigrants feel safe in Canada, and there is a high level of social trust in cities with growing ethnically diverse populations.

Canada’s settlement programs are crucial to integrating refugees and immigrants effectively. The objective is to assist new ‘permanent residents’ in overcoming integration barriers, while supporting communities to become more welcoming and inclusive. The settlement programs provide newcomers with a comprehensive suite of services, including needs assessment and service referrals, information and orientation, language training, labor market services and community supports.

These services are largely delivered by a network of civil society service providers funded by government. Moreover, all immigrants to Canada (economic, family, and resettled refugee classes) arrive as ‘permanent residents’ with immediate permission to work, full rights and voluntary access to all services. Schools, libraries, and community recreation centers are also actively engaged, as are sponsors of refuges, host families and volunteers.

In short, Canadians regard immigration as nation-building as well as a long-term economic investment. They acknowledge that such investments in the first generation pay off in the second generation. This public acceptance could not have been achieved without the leadership of the government, both federal and local, in operating integration programs. Also important is the population’s trust in the government to competently manage the immigration program. The public must be confident that the government will screen and select immigration applicants carefully.

Unfortunately, Korea lacks political leadership to make immigration a priority and initiate albeit difficult but necessary steps such as establishing a government department for immigration. Moreover, the younger generation which is often considered “more liberal” may not be as educated about multiculturalism as assumed. Multiculturalism implies that essential parts of the newly introduced culture still exist after assimilation. This is not the case in Korea. Its newcomers effectively are expected to abandon significant parts of their culture, even religion in extreme cases. Education, the essence of moving onto multiculturalism, has been aimed at adjusting newcomers, but Koreans themselves need to be guided in accepting people from other cultures.

Canadians’ acceptance of broadened sources of immigration was not immediate. During the initial stages, public acceptance was stronger for European-based immigrants than for Asian immigrants. But the Canadian government succeeded thanks to three initiatives.

- 20 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 First, the government heavily invested in teaching English and French as a second language because integration into society requires entry into the education and work environment. Secondly, the government provided financial support for heritage schools so that immigrants’ native language could be taught to their children. This stemmed from the notion that the best way to assimilate immigrants is to make them feel comfortable and secure enough that they will be able to maintain their native culture and language. Lastly, the government funded immigrants so that immigrant groups could lobby the government. This helped the government in identifying what the gaps were in terms of its own institution in integrating the immigrants. Moreover, immigrants become better integrated when they feel their interests are being reflected in the country.

- 21 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Session 5 Korea-Canada Cooperation in the Age of Technological Innovation

Thinking machines, a dream in the 1950s, became a reality in the 21st Century as AI (artificial intelligence), a process that enables computers to emulate human capabilities by learning, soared to new heights. Machine learning involves algorithms that allow computers to learn from data without being explicitly programmed. Deep learning is a specific type of machine learning that has revolutionized the AI industry. By 2011, the technology was able to yield IBM Watson. Autonomous vehicles have been a surprising success story of the commercialization of AI, along with AI personal assistants such as Apple’s Siri and Amazon’s Alexa.

The Korean government’s spending on AI projects has increased since 2013. Two AI Grand Challenges were launched that year. Both were inspired by the United States’ DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) Grand Challenge. Also initiated are Star Labs—flagship research facilities selected and financed by the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT—and a national strategy project, which provides a platform for industry, academia and researchers to collaborate on the development of enabling technologies.

In 2019, the Korean Ministry of Science and ICT plans to establish three AI graduate schools that will be dedicated to developing autonomous cognitive machines. Korea has been relatively strong in hardware. Now the government as well as industry are pushing for software technology. Canada is already a reliable source of R&D in producing software for super-intelligent machines. Thus, Korea and Canada are suited to jointly drive the next generation of AI technology.

Today’s AI technology mostly involves supervised learning, with machines taught through data labeled by humans for fast recognition and analysis by computers. The major limitation of supervised learning is that it is difficult for artificial intelligence to exceed human intelligence. Moreover, an immense amount of data must be labeled in order to sufficiently train deep learning models. This leads to massive costs.

Next-generation AI will involve unsupervised learning. Here, AI learns on its own, interacting with the world and humans. The advantages are that super human capabilities are possible; AI can learn to do tasks without supervision. This minimizes costs of data labeling and supervision.

With advancement of AI, data has never been more important. Proper use of data and privacy concerns is also becoming an important issue as AI devices come into wider use. Nevertheless, regulations in Korea must be approached with caution because they reflect the lack of an understanding of the relevant technologies and industry. The nation’s strict regulations are one example. Regulators need to be aware that negative elements accompany the positive aspects that AI can bring to society. With this understanding, regulation can achieve a sound balance; consumers can become aware of the pros and cons of various products and services, and make informed decisions regarding their privacy.

- 22 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 The so-called “privacy paradox” is occurring in Europe with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Investment is declining due to stiff regulations on the handling of private data. As a result, companies are struggling to attract investors. Likewise, more problems will emerge when similar regulations start to block the supply lines of data.

Canada may be facing such problems as it is currently pushing to introduce legislation that follows the GDPR model. Such legislation will eventually stifle innovation unless governments and the industry can agree on an effective alternative. A good start may be developing universal regulations for companies worldwide. That would create a level playing field in different international jurisdictions. Breakthroughs may also be made from technological innovations. For example, Apple, a company that is very particular about privacy, had to devise innovative ways to read and process data without breaching private information. It succeeded in some parts. In order to go over these hurdles, technological innovation is as important as policy making.

For technological progress in an age of innovation, AI needs to be viewed as a field in which Korea, Canada, and other middle powers should join forces. Both Korea and Canada have technological innovators in academia and industry that can be pacesetters. However, both countries need to work on understanding the different nuances in governance and philosophy.

Privacy in the West is the right of an individual. Privacy in the East, especially in China, differs because of Confucianism; an individual does not exist outside of the community. This difference may become a challenge in AI ethics because any privacy discussion that features liberal democratic values is not a conversation that Beijing is willing to have. Another potential danger with AI technology is usage. The technology itself is neutral while usage is not. For example, China’s extensive use of facial recognition and tracking programs will only intensify as China rolls out its 5G network. Hence, issues of privacy, ethics and democracy may have to be compartmentalized. Here, Korea and Canada are positioned to hash out the nuances and hold conversations that can include both China and the Western countries.

Canada and Korea should also focus on the social economic challenges that technology brings. The representative example is rising inequality. Stakeholders need to continue to recognize the value that AI creates. Korea and Canada should exercise the power of solidarity and be true to core values when laying the groundwork for AI policies.

- 23 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 Session 6 Gender Equality and Women’s Role in Business

Gender issues in general and women’s role in society are extremely topical. Hence, the focus of this session was on the competitive advantage of increasing women’s role in business. McKinsey & Co. identifies three factors that could raise global GDP by $12 trillion if positively handled—more women participating in the work force, more part-time female employees moving to full-time jobs, more women working in sectors of higher pay ranges. In short, pulling women upward is good for business. Yet, Canada and Korea as well as most nations are seeing slow progress.

Canada has been working for a long time on establishing the business case for increased women participation in the work force. The government, as well as laws and regulations support women. The private sector is also progressing on gender diversity; there is an increase in investor pressure for it. Investors who ask companies to show active gender diversity policies are an effective pressure to move forward. Pressure for gender diversity on boards and in senior management roles is increasing. Regulators and investors have constantly been asking companies to either comply or explain why they are not.

Despite the commitment, a total breakthrough in workplaces has been slow to materialize. While more than 80% of eligible women are in the labor force in Canada, most are in low-paying jobs. There also exist cultural stereotypes and biases, and parental leaves are predominantly taken by women. Another imbalance in Canadian society is the fact that women end up doing most of the household work regardless of whether they are in the workforce.

This leads to the “leaky pipeline” phenomenon which leads to lower numbers of women in senior leadership roles. While there is near gender parity at the entry level, leakage of women employees starts as one climbs the career ladder. This is an issue that Canadian companies have recently begun to tackle. Currently, only approximately 15% of CEOs in Canada are female.

One bright spot is corporate boards. In 2018, almost 70% of corporate boards in Canada had at least one female director, an increase from less than 40% in 2014. The absolute number of women on corporate boards has increased slightly to 16%. But compared to the increase in women who have reached the pinnacle of success, overall progress towards gender parity is low. Also, progress has been uneven across industries, sectors, and different parts of a workplace.

Korea has an even wider gulf in terms of gender equality at the workplace. According to the 2017 Global Gender Gap Report produced by the World Economic Forum, Korea ranked 118th out of 144 countries. Specifically, it ranked 121st in women’s economic participation and opportunity.

Moreover, Korea ranked 29th out of 29 countries in the OECD’s 2017 Glass Ceiling Index. The labor force participation rate for women is 20.5 percentage points lower than that of men. Women hold only 10% of managerial positions and 2.1% of seats on company boards. Both numbers are at the bottom of the Index. Also, Korean women earn

- 24 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 36.7% less than men, the widest gender wage gap among the 29 countries. The public sector is not significantly better; women hold 17% of seats in parliament.

An area in which Korea is doing well is that of net child-care costs. In Korea, net child-care costs were 5.6% of the average wage in 2015. Mothers and fathers are entitled to 25 and 17.2 weeks of paid paternity leave, respectively. Also, e-commerce has become promising for Korean women. This industry has more women entrepreneurs because it is often closely related to retail and marketing. Such businesses are also easier to start for women; their shopping experience gives them insight in consumer decisions. Moreover, because e-commerce is a rather young industry, it lacks the “old boys’ network.”

Korea’s efforts to reduce the gender gap in the workplace mirrors other OECD countries: affirmative action regulation. Companies with more than 500 employees must expand female employment, and give 90 days of maternity leave, 60 of which are paid. Despite such action, Korea continues to rank highest for unfair opportunities in the workplace for women.

Globally, the biggest shift in the rhetoric surrounding gender equality is from why women should be absorbed into the workforce to how they should be incorporated. Business leaders, both female and male, are embracing the issue more broadly. In particular, men have become more comfortable in championing this issue.

The progress, however, can lead to complacency, which may lead to a dramatic reversal. Hence, building and maintaining momentum is critical. Moreover, the business society must be vigilant of the many obstacles that remain: cultural biases and societal attitudes that are barriers to women’s advancement; system discrimination; gender stereotypes; barriers that keep women from accessing key sponsors, information, and resources; embedded gender roles; double standards applied in promotions, lower pay scale at the start and a slower rate of salary increases. These challenges and obstacles mean that women have to work harder to be noticed and gain access.

Government policies are necessary, but the climate for real social change is not in place yet. Social change needs to become part of the culture. Otherwise, government affirmative action policies have no guarantee that they will produce intended consequences.

For example, the Korean government has been promoting paternity leave, but participation is still low. Among those who took parental leave in 2017, only 13% were fathers. The reasons included fear of facing disadvantages upon returning. Likewise, the necessary rules and system are in place, but change in culture and acceptance has been difficult and time consuming. Still, the government should lead, not follow. A policy that alters behavior will ultimately lead to a change in attitude.

- 25 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 3. 참석자 명단 List of Participants

CANADIAN PARTICIPANTS

Naomi ALBOIM Distinguished Fellow & Professor, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University

Bez BABAKHANI Director, Northeast Asia and Oceania Division, Global Affairs Canada

Donald BOBIASH Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia Pacific, Global Affairs Canada

Tim BOWMAN Counsellor (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada), South Korea Embassy of Canada

Edward CHOI President, Datametrex AI Korea

Dan CIURIAK Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation; Associate Professor & Reisman Chair in International Affairs, Carleton University

James COTTER Captain (RCN), Defence Attach´e, South Korea Embassy of Canada

Michael DANAGHER Canadian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea

Beatrix DART Executive Director, Rotman Initiative for Women in Business, Rotman School of Business, University of Toronto

Patrick DESCHENES^ Captain (Navy), Director Asia-Pacific Policy, Director General International Security Policy, Canadian Armed Forces

Leonard J. EDWARDS Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation; former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada

Wayne EYRE Deputy Commander, United Nations Command

Elaine FELDMAN Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

Corey FREDERICKSON Lieutenant-Colonel, Senior Military Advisor to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Department of National Defence, Canada

Steven GOODINSON Minister Counsellor & Senior Trade Commissioner, Embassy of Canada

Marius GRINIUS Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute

Fen Osler HAMPSON Distinguished Fellow & Director of the Global Security and Politics Program, Centre for International Governance Innovation

Patrick HEBERT′ Counsellor (Political / Economic), South Korea Embassy of Canada

Gordon HOULDEN Director of the China Institute & Professor of Political Science & Adjunct Professor of the Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta

- 26 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 Dongwoo KIM Post-Graduate Research Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

Julia KIM Retired VP & Investment Counselor, RBC Phillips Hager & North, Vancouver

Annabelle LAROUCHE Counsellor (Trade), Embassy of Canada

Meredith LILLY Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation; Associate Professor & Simon Reisman Chair in International Affairs, Carleton University

James MITCHELL Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

Giles NORMAN Executive Director, Security and Defence Relations, Global Affairs Canada

Lana NOVIKOVA Founder and CEO of Heartbeat AI Technologies

Sonja PANDAY Counsellor (Economic Affairs -Ontario), South Korea Embassy of Canada

Tina PARK Executive Director, Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto

Carole PIOVESAN Lawyer & Co-lead of the National Cybersecurity, Privacy and Data Management Group, McCarthy Tetrault

Frank REMUS UNHCR Representative in Korea

Andrew RYU Chief Executive Officer & Chairman, Datametrex AI Limited

Joseph SEXSMITH Chief Executive Officer, Exia Biomedical and President of Actinomics

Ian SHUGART Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada

Jeff STEVENS President and Chief Operating Officer, Datametrex AI Limited

Tod STRICKLAND Senior Staff Officer, United Nations Command

Carmen SYLVAIN Strategic Advisor, QG100

Gordon VENNER Associate Deputy Minister for the Department of National Defence, Canada

Jane WILLIAMSON Protection Officer, Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Seoul

- 27 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 KOREAN PARTICIPANTS

AHN Choong Yong Distinguished Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Chung-Ang University; former Chairman, Korea Commission for Corporate Partnership

AHN Dukgeun Professor, Seoul National University; Commissioner, Korea Trade Commission

CHO Hyun First Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

CHUNG Chong Wook Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University; former Korean Ambassador to China

CHUNG Jae-Ho Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

CHUNG Raekwon Professor Emeritus, Incheon National University; former Climate Change Ambassador of Korea; former Principal Advisor on Climate Change to UN Secretary-General

HAN Sukhee Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University; former Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai

JO Daeshik President, Korea NGO Council for Development Cooperation; former Ambassador to Canada

JUN Bong-Geun Department of Security and Unification Studies, IFNAS, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

JUNG Ku-Hyun President, The Seoul Forum for International Affairs

KANG Minah Professor, Ewha Womans University; Commissioner, The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea

KIM Dalchoong Professor Emeritus, Yonsei University; President Emeritus, The Seoul Forum for International Affairs

KIM Euy-taek Professor, Hankook University of Foreign Studies; former Minister, Korean Embassy in Ottawa; former Ambassador to Laos

KIM Il-bum Director, North American Division 2, MOFA

KIM Jin Hyun Chairman, The World Peace Forum; former Minister of Science and Technology

KIM Jiyoon Senior Research Fellow, Center for Public Opinion and Quantitative Research, Asan Institute for Policy Studies

- 28 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 KIM Sung-han Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University; former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade

KIM Yoon Executive Vice President & Head of AI Center, SK Telecom

KIM Younghoon Chairman & CEO, Daesung Group; Chair, World Energy Council

LEE Hong-Koo Chairman, The Seoul Forum for International Affairs; former Prime Minister

LEE Inho Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University; former Ambassador to Russia and Finland; former Chair, KBS Board of Governor

LEE Jae-Seung Professor, Division of International Studies, Korea University

PARK In-kook President, Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies; former Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations

PARK Jin President, Asia Future Institute; former Chairman, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee of the National Assembly

SHIN Maeng-ho Korean Ambassador to Canada

SOHN Jie-Ae Professor, Ewha Womans University; former President & CEO, Arirang TV& Radio

YI Insill Professor, Graduate School of Economic, Sogang University; Director, Nam Duck-Woo Economic Research Institute

YIM Sung-Joon Senior Advisor, Lee International IP & Law Group; former Ambassador to Canada

YOO Jang-Hee Professor Emeritus, Ewha Womans University; former Chairman, National Commission for Corporate Partnership (NCCP)

YOON Young-kwan Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister

ZHANG Byoung-Tak Professor, Seoul National University

- 29 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 4. 프로그램 Program

DECEMBER 13TH (THURSDAY)

Moderato (B1) 17:30 - 18:00 Registration

18:00 Welcoming Remarks JUNG Ku-Hyun, President, The Seoul Forum for International Affairs

18:10 - 20:30 Dinner

DECEMBER 14TH (FRIDAY)

Allegro (B1) 08:00 Registration

08:30 - 08:40 Opening of the Forum YIM Sung-Joon, Korean Co-Chair Leonard J. EDWARDS, Canadian Co-Chair

08:40 - 09:30 Opening Address CHO Hyun, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ian SHUGART, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada

09:30 - 11:00 Session 1: Strategic Transformation on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond

Moderator: YIM Sung-Joon, Korean Co-Chair, Canada-Korea Forum

Panelists: JUN Bong-Geun, Professor, Korean National Diplomatic Academy KIM Sung-han, Professor, Korea University; former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Marius GRINIUS, Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute Tina PARK, Executive Director, Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto

- 30 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 11:00 - 11:10 Coffee Break

11:10 - 12:40 Session 2: Middle Power Diplomacy at Moments of International Transformation: US-China Strategic Competition in the Asia-Pacific

Moderator: Jim MITCHELL, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

Panelists: CHUNG Jae-Ho, Professor, Seoul National University HAN Sukhee, Professor, Yonsei University Leonard J. EDWARDS, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation; former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada Gordon HOULDEN, Director of the China Institute & Professor of Political Science & Adjunct Professor of the Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta

Jupiter (30F) 12:40 - 14:10 Lunch Special Speech by LEE Hong-Koo, Chairman, The Seoul Forum for International Affairs; former Prime Minister

Allegro (B1) 14:10 - 15:40 Session 3: US-China Trade War and its Implications for Canada and Korea

Moderator: Elaine FELDMAN, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa

Panelists: AHN Dukgeun, Professor, Seoul National University; Commissioner, Korea Trade Commission Meredith LILLY, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation; Associate Professor & Reisman Chair in International Affairs, Carleton University Dan CIURIAK, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation; Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

15:40 - 16:00 Coffee Break

- 31 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 16:00 - 17:30 Session 4: Demographic Change and the Immigration Policies

Moderator: YI Insill, Professor, Sogang University

Panelists: KIM Jiyoon, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Public Opinion and Quantitative Research, Asan Institute for Policy Studies Naomi ALBOIM, Distinguished Fellow & Professor, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University Jane WILLIAMSON, Protection Officer, Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Seoul

Hanmiri 18:30 - 20:30 Dinner (hosted by the Canadian Ambassador to Korea)

Congratulatory Remarks: Michael DANAGHER, Canadian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea

Introduction of Keynote Speaker: Leonard J. EDWARDS, Canadian Co-Chair

Special Speech: “The Global Refugee Crisis: How the Findings of the Centre for International Governance Innovation’s World Refugee Council can make a Difference” Fen Osler HAMPSON, Distinguished Fellow & Director of the Global Security and Politics Program, Center for International Governance Innovation

- 32 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 DECEMBER 15TH (SATURDAY)

Allegro (B1) 09:00 - 10:30 Session 5: Korea-Canada Cooperation in the Age of Technological Innovation

Moderator: PARK In-kook, President, Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies

Panelists: Lana NOVIKOVA, Founder and CEO, Heartbeat AI Technologies Carole PIOVESAN, Lawyer & Co-lead of the National Cybersecurity, Privacy and Data Management Group, McCarthy Tetrault ZHANG Byoung-Tak, Professor, Seoul National University KIM Yoon, Executive Vice President & Head of AI Center, SK Telecom

10:30 - 10:45 Coffee Break

10:30 - 10:45 Session 6: Gender Equality and Women’s Role in Business

Moderator: Carmen SYLVAIN, Strategic Advisor, QG100

Panelists: KANG Minah, Professor, Ewha Womans University; Commissioner, The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea Beatrix DART, Executive Director, Rotman Initiative for Women in Business, Rotman School of Business, University of Toronto Julia KIM, Retired VP and Investment Counsellor, RBC Phillips, Hager & North, Vancouver

10:45 - 12:15 Concluding Remarks

Jupiter (30F) 12:30 - 14:00 Farewell Lunch

- 33 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 - 34 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 - 35 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2017 - 36 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 - 37 - KOREA-CANADA FORUM 2018 서울국제포럼 The Seoul Forum for International Affairs

(우.04511) 서울시 중구 세종대로 7길 25(에스원빌딩, 순화동) 3층

Tel. 82-2-779-7383 Fax. 82-2-779-7380

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