Referências De Epistemologia
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Referências de Epistemologia Dr. Guanis de Barros Vilela Junior Alexander, P. (1977) “Boyle and Locke On Primary and Secondary Qualities” in Locke on Human Understanding (ed. Tipton, I.C.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alspector-Kelly, M. (2001) “Should the Empiricist Be a Constructive Empiricist?” in Philosophy of Science 68. ASQUITH, P.D. & GIERE, R.N. (eds.). PSA 1980 vol. 2. East Lansing, Philosophy os Science Association, 1981. AYER, A.J. (ed.) Logical Positivism. New York, The Free Press, 1959. Belousek, Darrin W., “Falsification, the Duhem-Quine Thesis, and Scientific Realism: From a Phenomenological Point of View”, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1998, 29 (2). 145-161. Bhat, P.R. and Sahu, Gopal, “Quine on observation Sentences”, Indian Philosophical Quarterly 1998, 25(3), 403-418. BLACKBURN, S. Spreading the Word. Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984. (Cap. 5: Realism and variations.) BOYD, R. Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology. In: ASQUITH & GIERE 1981 (PSA 1980 vol.2), pp. 613-662. BOYD, R. The Current Status of Scientific Realism. In: LEPLIN 1984, pp. 4l-82. Boyd, R. (1973) “Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence” in Noûs 7. Boyd, R. (1990) “Realism, Approximate Truth, and Method” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science v. XIV (ed Savage, C. W.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. BOYD, R. Lex Orandi est Lex Credendi. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 3-34. BOYD, R. On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis 19: 45-90, 1983. BROWN, J.R. The Miracle of Science. The Philosophical Quarterly 32(l28): 232-244, 1982. Bueno, Otávio (1999) O Empirismo Construtivo: uma reformulação e defesa. Campinas: Unicamp (Coleção CLE). Carnap, R. (1936-1937) “Testability and Meaning” in Philosophy of Science v. 3, n. 4; v. 4, n. 1. Carnap, R. (1956b) “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” in Meaning and Necessity (Segunda Edição.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Carnap, R. (1959) “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language” in Logical Positivism (ed. Ayer, A.). New York: Free Press. Carnap, R. (1963) “Carnap’s Intellectual Autobiography” in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (ed. Schilpp, A.). La Salle: Open Court. Carnap, R. (1984) “On the Character of Philosophic Problems” in Philosophy of Science 51. CARNAP, R. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. New York, Basic Books, 1966. (Parte 5: Theoretical laws and theoretical concepts.) CARNAP, R. Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. In: NEURATH et al. 1955 (F.U.S. vol 1), pp. 139-213. CARNAP, R. The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts. In: FEIGL & SCRIVEN 1956 (M.S.P.S. vol. I), pp. 38-76. (Trad. brasileira in Os Pensadores, vol. 44.) CARTWRIGHT, N. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983. CHALMERS, A.F. What is this Thing Called Science? St.Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1978. Chihara, Charles & Chihara, Carol (1993) “A Biological Objection to Constructive Empiricism” in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44. CHURCHLAND, P. M. The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of Superempirical Virtues. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 35-47. CHURCHLAND, P.M. & HOOKER, C.A. (eds.) Images of Science. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985. Churchland, Paul (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cohen Robert S., Realism and Anti-realism in the Philosophy of Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v. 169, 1996. DAUM, A. Schlick’s Empiricist Critical Realism. Synthese 52(3):..1982. Day, T., Kincaid, H. (1994) “Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in Its Place” in Synthese 98. Delaney, C.I., “Pragmatic Realism and Convergence on the Truth”, Modern Schoolman LXXVI, 1999. DESCARTES, R. Les Principes de la Philosophie. In: C. ADAM & P. TANNERY (eds.) Oeuvres de Descartes. Tomo IX-2. Paris, Vrin, 1971. (1a ed. latina 1644; francesa 1647.) DEVITT, M. Realism and Truth. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, l984. DUHEM, P. Salvar os Fenômenos. Ensaio sobre a Noção de Teoria Física de Platão a Mach. Trad. R.A. Martins. Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência. Suplemento 3, 1984. DUMMETT, M. Truth and Other Enigmas. London, Duckworth, l978. (Cap. 10: Realism.) ELLIS, B. What Science Aims to Do. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 48-74. FEIGL, H. & SCRIVEN, M. (eds.) The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. I.) Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1956. Feigl, H. (1954) “Scientific Method without Metaphysical Presuppositions” in Philosophical Studies v. Feyerabend, P. (1963) “How to Be a Good Empiricist – A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological” in Philosophy of Science (ed. Baumrin, B.). New York: Interscience Publishers. FEYERABEND, P. K. Against Method. London, Verso, 1978. (1a ed. 1975.) FEYERABEND, P. K. Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method. (Philosophical Papers, vol. 1.) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. FEYERABEND, P. K. Science in a Free Society. London, Verso, 197_. FIELD, H. Realism and Relativism. The Journal of Philosophy 79:553-567, 1982. (Resenha PUTNAM 1981.) Giere, R. (1999) Science Without Laws. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. GIERE, R.N. Constructive Realism. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 75-98. GLYMOUR, C. Conceptual Scheming, or, Confessions of a Metaphysical Realist. Synthese 51(2): 169-180, 1982. GRAYLING, A.C. Realism. Cogito 1(l): 25-27, 1987. GRIMES, T.R. An Appraisal of van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. Philosophical Studies 45: 261-268, 1984. Grimes, Thomas R., “Scientific Realism and the Problem of Underdetermination”, Protosociology 1998, 12, 238-248. GUTTING, G. Scientific Realism versus Constructive Empiricism: A Dialogue. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 118-131. Gutting, G., “How to be a Scientific Realist”, Modern Schoolman LXXVI, 1999. HACKING, I. (ed.) Scientific Revolutions. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981. HACKING, I. Do We See through a Microscope? In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 132- 152. HARDIN, C. & ROSENBERG, A. In Defense of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science 53: 31- 51, 1986. Harman, G. (1965) “The Inference to the Best Explanation” in The Philosophical Review 74. HEALEY, R. (ed.) Reduction, Time and Reality. Studies in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. (Resenhado por NEILICH 1981.) HELLMANN, G. Realist Principles. Philosophy of Science. 50: 227-249, 1983. HEMPEL, C. G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York, The Free Press, 1965. HEMPEL, C. G. Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. In: NEURATH et al. 1970 (F.U.S. vol. 2), pp. 652-745. (b) HEMPEL, C. G. On the “Standard Conception” of Scientific Theories. In: RADNER & WINOKUR 1970 (M.S.P.S. vol. IV), pp. 142-163. (a) HEMPEL, C. G. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1966. (Cap. 6: Theories and theoretical explanation.) HEMPEL, C. G. Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets. In: MORGENBESSER, SUPPES & WHITE 1969, pp. 179-199. Hintikka, Jaakko, “Three Dogmas of Quine’s Empiricism”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4/1997 (202), 457-477. HÖLLDOBLER, B and WILSON, E. O. (1990) The Ants (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press). HOOKER, C. A. Surface Dazzle, Ghostly Depths: An Exposition and Critical Evaluation of van Fraassen’s Vindication of Empiricism against Realism. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 153-196. Horwich, P. (1991) “On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment” in Philosophy of Science 58. HORWICH, P. Three Forms of Realism. Synthese 51(2): 181-202, 1982. Hume, D. (1990) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed. Bell, M.). London: Penguin Books. IRANZO, V. (2000) Manipulabilidad y entidades inobservables, Theoria, 15, pp. 131-153. Kirk, Robert, Relativism and Reality: a Contemporary Introduction, 1999 Kosso, P.(1998), Appereance and Reality, Oxford, University Press. KUHN, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd. ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970. (1a ed. 1962.) Kuhn, T. (1991), “The Road Since Structure”, In PSA 1990. Proceedings of the 1990 Biennial Meetinng of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 2, en A.Fine, M. Forbes y L. Wessels (eds.). East Lansing, Michigan, Phylosophy of Science Association. Kukla, A. (1995) “The Two Antirealisms of Bas van Fraassen” in Studies and History and Philosophy of Science v. 26, n. 3. Kukla, A. (1998), Studies in Scientific Realism, New York, Oxford, University Press. Ladyman, J., Douven, I., Horsten, L., van Fraassen, B. 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