INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and . reproduce______this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon t^ie quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproductic n.

1.The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was posiible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film ilong with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was pi rt of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap, continued again - beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual co>ntent is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproducti on could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understandini of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at add itional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog n umber, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms SOONorti Zeeb Road Ann Arb >r, Michigan 48100 76-18,021 PALMER, Shirley Adams, 1933- THE PARLIAMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND: A GENERAL SYSTEMS APPROACH TO CONFLICT. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1976 Sociology, general

Xerox University Microfilms , Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© 1976

SHI RLE V! ADAMS PALMER

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE PARLIAMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND: A

GENERAL SYSTEMS APPROACH TO CONFLICT

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Shirley Adams Palmer, B .A ., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State U niversity

1976

Reading Committee: Approved By

Russell R. Dynes Enrico L. Quarantelli J Kclviser f) James W. VanderZanden Department of Sociology ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Sincere appreciation is hereby extended to my husband, Mel, for his constant help and support.

Thanks are also extended to Dr. Russell Dynes, my adviser, fo r his comments and suggestions, and to my reading committee.

A special note of thanks is due to Dr. Thomas Mil burn for his encouragement when i t was needed the most.

11 VITA

September 3, 1933...... Born, Monmouthshire, Wales

1965 ...... B.A., The Ohio State University

1966-196 7 ...... Mershon Fellow in National Security

1967-196 9 ...... Tearhing Associate, The Ohio State University

1969 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University

1969-197 0 ...... Travelling Scholar — University of Wisconsin

1970-197 1...... Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University

1972-1976...... Instructor, The Ohio State University, Newark Regional Campus

FIELDS OF STUDY

Sociological Theory, Collective Behavior, Race and Ethnic Relations, and Political Sociology.

111 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......

VITA......

Chapter

I THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

What Constitutes or is Acceptable as Theory ...... History of Social Theory ...... Logico-Deductive Theory...... Conceptual or Concatenated Theory ...... The Particular Theory to be Used ...... Structural-Functional Model ...... Conflict Model...... Symbol ic-Interact! on ism M odel.. . Collective Behavior and Middle-Range Theories ......

I I PROCEDURE.

Systems Model...... System ...... Components...... Structure of the System ...... Goals of the System . Environment...... Inputs ...... Outputs ...... Feedback Loop...... Time Period...... Source of Data ...... Form of Analysis ......

I l l HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE......

Early Settlement ...... The Planatlon of Ireland ...... Battle of the Boyne ...... Rebellion Against British Rule ...... The United kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland ...... The Division of Ireland ...... Northern Ireland - C onflict Continues Chapter Page

IV SUMMARY OF FINDINGS...... 35

Inputs ...... 35 Structure...... - 35 Perceptions...... 36 Outputs ...... ' 36 Summarization ...... 60

V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 62

Inputs —- Intrasocietal ...... 62 Inputs — Extrasocietal ...... 65 B rita in ...... 65 Eire...... 66 Perceptions — Unionist ...... 67 Perceptions -- Conservative Unionist ...... 69 Perceptions — Republican Opposition ...... 70 Structure — Unionist...... 73 Structure — Republican Opposition ...... 75 Outputs — Unionist ...... 75 Outputs — Conservative Unionist ...... 77 Outputs — Republican O p p o s itio n ...... 78 Overall System Operation ...... 79 The Role of Authorities in Dealing with Episodes of Collective Behavior ...... 80

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 91

APPENDIX

1965 ...... 95 196 6 ...... 105 196 7 ...... 118 196 8 128 1969...... : ...... 141 1970...... 190 1 9 7 1 .... : ...... 222 1972...... 264

V CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In 1968, after several years of peace, Northern Ireland erupted once again in violence, protest and assassination. This conflict s till spurts and sputters on in 1976 with seemingly little prospect of settlement.

This study deals with one aspect of the current co n flic t in Northern Ireland, the response of the Northern Ireland Parliament to increasing episodes of protest, bombings and shootings from 1965 to 1972. A general systems model is used to order the data and generate hypotheses.

The general theoretical orientation is at firs t considered. Then, various theoretical models are examined to determine the most suitable model to use in trying to understand a conflict situation. P articular insights concerning the actions, of authorities in dealing with disturbances are noted. A brief account of the historical antecedents of the conflict is given. Finally, the data is organized according to the general systems model. The Parliament of Northern Ireland is designated as the system and inputs, perceptions, structure and outputs are analyzed. Conclusions are then drawn, and the insights concerning the actions of authorities in dealing with dis­ turbances are tested.

Theory guides research and in this sociological study of the Northern Ireland Parliament, the kind of theory used w ill determine research methods and the data used. It is Important for the researcher to spell out his theoretical perspective so that his under­ lying orientation is apparent to the reader.

There are at least three levels of theoretical consideration Important to the researcher. Decisions and judgments must be made at each level before embarking on any empirical study.

Level I — This is the most general le v e l. I t deals with philosophical questions such as "What constitutes or is accept­ able as theory?"

1 Level II — This is a less general level. It deals with general sociological theory and asks the question "What particular model or theory w ill be used?"

Level III — This is the most specific level. It deals with middle range theories, and raises the question "What area of sociology does this study fall under and what insights can be contributed from middle range theories 1n this area?"

What Constitutes or is Acceptable as Theory

Three different phenomena pass for theory in sociology: (1) the history of social theory, (2) logico-deductive theory and (3) conceptual or concatenated theory.

History of Social Theory

Sociologists who work with the history of social theory analyze the ways sim ilar Ideas appear under d iffere n t guises In the development of the fie ld , or how "old wine is put into new bottles." They trace continuities and discontinuities in the development of sociological theory and point out sim ilarities and differences among, various theorists.' This is a worthwhile endeavor, but it does not go fa r enough. Theorists working along these lines usually do not crystalize out of past theory a model that could be used to guide empirical research. They do contribute insights and concepts, or bits and pieces, but no unified, understandable, usable model.

Loglco-Deductive Theory

Sociologists who work with logico-deductive theory often claim this as the only true theory. They concern themselves with the formulation of the most parsimonious and precise statements about the results from different research. They develop systems of hypotheses which sum up past findings and predict future ones. Theory for them is often defined as a set of facts in their invariant relationship to one another. This approach, as exemplified by Hans Zetterberg, suggests that theorems and laws can be deduced from a few basic axioms, general propositions or universal generalizations. According to Zetterberg, these general propositions can be b u ilt up from the results of past research and from Insights contributed by the classics and literary writers. These propositions are ordered in a hierarchy with every statement in the structure related logic­ ally to every other statement. Together, they sum up data or codify what is known. 3

Logico-deductive theory has certain advantages. I f 1t 1s stated properly2 it can be proven false, and it can provide a parsi­ monious arrangement of central concepts. However, there are serious disadvantages to this type of theory construction. In reducing down the results of past research into a small number of propositions, the meaning of research results is often changed in the reduction process.3 Another problem with the logico-deductive type of theory is that it demands universal generalizations and there seems to be no agreement on any such universal generalizations among socio­ logists.4 Zetterberg himself cannot supply them. The propositions he offers as the fru it of his method are not even stated in a manner that can be proven fa ls e .5 The imperfect propositions suggested by Zetterberg become so generalized, they lack meaning. They are very restricted 1n scope and of no help in understanding a socio­ cultural system. Basically, this approach seems to call for a manipulation of language, rather than insightful understanding of the real world. Logico-deductive theory seems to offer a form, in which theory can be stated, but is not very productive of new knowledge. Several w riters on the philosophy of science do not accept logico-deductive theory as "theory." Brown maintains that laying out a structure of d e fin itio n s , axioms and theorems is not the same as producing a formal theory.” Nagel points out that true theory is not negatable because i t contains descriptive terms which are not specified by overt, experimental procedures. These descriptive terms are associated with conceptions and images derived from analogies; they are often idealizations, e.g., a perfect gas, therefore, theory , cannot be put to a direct experimental test.7 Nagel describes theories as free creations of the mind, not empirical generaliza­ tions from observational data. Blalock supports this point of view, pointing out th a t even theory in the natural sciences cannot be negatable because one thinks in terms of theoretical language, with notions o f causes, forces and systems, but one tests in terms of covariation, operations, and printer readings. For example, a concept of mass is not equivalent to mass as Inferred by pointer readings.6 Kaplan points out that the groat theories of our time, such as evolutionary theory, and the theory of pathogenic germs, are not stated in postulational or formal style. Creative imagina­ tion is necessary to construct theories; theory is not just the discovery of facts, but a way of looking at the facts. It is possible, as Nagel points out, to write up these great theories in a deductive manner.

Conceptual or Concatenated Theory

Now to the th ird view of theory, conceptual or concatenated theory. Theory is defined as an abstract symbolic construction, an intellectual tool, or conceptual framework devised to direct inquiry. The interrelated concepts form a pattern or configuration. The function of theory is then to help organize raw data, not to sum­ marize or duplicate such data. The advantage of conceptual theory is that i t is richer and denser and easier to understand than logico- deductive theory stated in propositional form.

The decision here is to work with conceptual or concatenated theory. However, every effort will be made to state the results of the research as clearly as possible.

The Particular Theory to be Used

After deciding what is acceptable as theory, it must be decided what particular theory is to be used in this study of the Northern Ireland Parliament. Three basic theories have generally been recognized in sociology: (1) structural-functionalism, (2) conflict theory, and (3) symbolic-interactionism, all conceptual or concatenated theories. A ll three theories are currently being used by sociologists in their research, but over the past fifteen years or so, efforts have been made to fuse two, or a ll three, of these theories Into a new model. It is this writer's opinion that systems theory can Incorporate the insights of the three basic models and can become the f ir s t paradigm, in the Kuhnian sense of the word, in s o c io lo g y . 10 By including the insights from the three major models, systems theory can be the most useful model to use in understanding co n flict.

Structural-Functional Model

The structural-functional model, as exemplified by Parsons,H focuses mainly on structure. Four systems with individual patterning feed into each other. At base the Biological System, or behavioral organism, puts out energy, needs, p la s tic ity and perceptual capacity into the Personality System. As basic organic needs are met through interaction with the mother, social needs for love and respect arise. An organized system of interaction is b u ilt up between ego and a lte r, with reciprocal expectations of each others behavior. A patterning of the Personality System develops.

The output of the Personality System to the Social System 1s the motivation to accept social roles to fill individual needs. The Social System is composed of a pattern of complementary roles, a ll fitting together. These roles are oriented to values of the system. A general consensus on the rights and obligations of each role is absolutely necessary in the social system.

The Cultural System is a mosaic of ideas, beliefs, expressive symbols and normative ideas. Consensus on basic Ideas and values is v ita l to a stable social system. Cultural patterns feed into the 5

Personality Systems and the Social System. When there Is Inconsis­ tency 1n the value system o r when basic ideas are not common to a ll members of the collectivity, then there is strain in the Personality and Social Systems. . .

Each of these four systems has its own equilibrium and a ll four systems enter into a huge moving equilibrium. Changes In one system bring changes in another so equilibrium is restored. Change is dysfunctional if it disturbs the equilibrium of the system beyond some unspecified range of tolerance. Society is thus a loosely federated congeries of systems and sub-systems. Members of the system are socialized fo r conformity and inadequate socializa­ tion produces deviants and s tra in . Change comes about mainly by functional d iffe re n tia tio n , but change can also come about by strain in any system or between systems.

Each of the four systems has certain functional problems. The Cultural System has the problem of pattern maintenance and tension management; the core of common values and norms must be maintained and the motivation of members to conform to these norms. The Social System has the problem of allocating individuals to d if­ ferent roles and assuring these roles are integrated with each other. The Personality System has the problem of motivating members to embrace and work fo r the goals of the total system. The Biological System has the problem of adaptation, the necessity of coming to terms with the environment so th at basic needs for food and shelter are met. i While each sub-system must face the four problems of pattern maintenance, integration, goal attainment and adaptation, each functional problem is primary to one sub-system. The total social system is an open system, engaged in a process of interchange with the environment.

The structural-functional model is an inadequate model for the understanding o f co n flic t situations. I t is particularly inadequate for use in understanding Northern Ireland, a state that has existed for f i f t y years with persistent and severe episodes of conflict. The structural-functional model tends to identify a certain structure as the normal and correct state of affairs. The model implies that the system is self-maintaining and perpetual; children are born, socialized, take their roles and then die.12 Such a model ill-fits a state like Northern Ireland that fights anew each generation for preservation of its structure, and has teetered on the brink of collapse for the last several years. The model has trouble dealing w ith social change, but change is central to lif e . In the real world, structure 1s being continuously changed by the problem-solving behavior of individuals responding to concrete social situations.13 The concept of equilibrium also poses problems. The social system is supposed to maintain a relatively stable equilibrium with parts in a state of mutual balancing. There are continuing processes in the system which neutralize sources of variability that would change the structure too much. However, sociocultural systems do change their structure, sometimes drastically, and it is this ability which gives them an adaptive advantage in the evolutionary schema.14

I t is the changing structure of the Parliament of Northern Ireland under severe stress that is of interest in this study. The concept of functionalism, even after the limitations suggested by Merton have been applied, does not seem particu larly useful.15 The emphasis placed on consensus is another problem with the structural- function model. It takes but a cursory examination to realize that in any plural society there are different and often contradictory value systems, yet these societies have managed to exist for long periods of time. Such 1s certainly the case in Northern Ireland.

Despite these shortcomings, structural-functionalism does provide the concept of interacting systems and the importance of structure, and these elements are essential in understanding any societal phenomena, including conflict.

Conflict Model

The co n flict model is a dynamic model focusing, not on structure, but on change. The prototype of the conflict model comes from Karl Marx.16 Marx had an evolutionary perspective. He thought a ll societies passed through the stages of prim itive communism, a slave system, feudalism, capitalism, industrial communism, and, fin a lly , socialism. Societies evolved through these stages by the process of the dialectic. Each state (thesis) contained within 1t its opposite (antithesis) and, through c o n flic t, these two were resolved into a new synthesis. Thus, as Industrial technology developed, 1t made the social structure of feudalism outmoded and through class conflict the system of capitalism was instituted. In turn, as technology and organization of labor developed furth er, capitalism would be outmoded and would be replaced, through class conflict and violent revolution, by industrial communism. Marx thought a ll change came through class c o n flic t. Class c o n flict was the great generator of structural change.

Dahrendorf has suggested a d iffe re n t con flict model from that of Marx. For Dahrendorf, class is not determined by one's relation to production, as in the Marxian model, but according to one's participation in, or exclusion from, authority. Conflict, then, originates from the structure of roles that enables some to exercise authority, while others are excluded from exercising authority. The economic situation or the standard of living is irrelevant 1n conflict generation. Power is emphasized in the c o n flic t model and is defined as the facility for getting what one group, the holders of power, want by preventing another group, those excluded from power, getting what they want.

Power is not exercised on behalf of society as a system, as claimed by Parsons. Occupants of positions of domination and occu­ pants of positions of subjection have certain interests which are contradictory because of their respective positions. Those who exercise authority want to maintain the status quo, while those deprived of authority would like to upset the present structure. The interests of the ruling group are transformed into an ideology of values which legitimizes their role, while the interests of the subjected group pose a threat to this ideology and the social structure it tries to legitimize.

Dahrendorf claims that 1n any c o n flic t there are only two interest groups—one attacks the existing authority relations while the other defends them. Conflict is necessary for social processes; it breaks down social structure and gives direction to social change. Conflict is good and desirable because all creativity, innovation and development comes from c o n flict.

Both the Marxian model and the model used by Dahrendorf have certain weaknesses which make them inappropriate to use in this study of the Northern Ireland Parliament's response to rising c o n flict. The Marxian model claims that a ll c o n flic t is class c o n flic t. Certainly the conflict in Northern Ireland is not clearly or prin­ cip ally a matter of class c o n flic t. According to Marx, violent outbreaks, leading to revolution, occur when need and oppression have reached an extreme point. Although the disturbances in Northern Ireland did originate around problems of housing and unemployment, the country was 1n a relatively better economic position than 1t had been for some time. As other critics have suggested, revolu­ tions do not occur when need and'oppression are at their worst, but when things are getting better.17 Marx's idea of unilinear evolution— that a ll societies pass through Identical phases and a ll are pro­ gressing in terms of moving toward "better'1 forms—has been adequately refuted by the pattern of development of the developing countries.

One of the greatest weaknesses 1n Marxian theory 1s the assumption that a ll history unfolds according to the process of the d ia le c tic , but once fu ll socialism is reached, these processes some­ how no longer operate. This is like saying that the law of gravity w ill operate u n til the day fu ll socialism is achieved and then w ill operate no longer. Finally, the assumption by Marx that the Government is merely a tool 1n the hands of the bourgeoisie is not a fact that can be accepted on face value. The exact relationship between the p o litic a l sphere and the industrial sphere must be established by empirical research.18 1 8

Dahrendorf's conflict model also has weaknesses. To define class according to one's exercise of authority,or lack of authority, splits a population into so many shifting classes that the concept of class its e lf becomes unusable. Dahrendorf claims there are only two interested parties in any conflict situation, one party attacking the system of authority, the other party defending it. However, this is an over-simplification of many conflict situations.

In Northern Ireland, it is not just a matter of the Republican sympathizers attacking the system and the Loyalists defending it. There is at least one additional party—the Government of Great Britain—who are rather unconcerned about who exercises authority so long as peace and order are maintained. Furthermore, the claim that all creativity, innovation and development comes from c o n flic t is either a bald exaggeration or such a widening of the meaning of the term "conflict" as to make the term meaningless. Both c o n flic t models are v/eak in claiming that a ll changes come from c o n flic t; change can also come about through innovation and d ifferen ­ tia tio n , as claimed by the structural-functionalists.

Despite the weaknesses of the conflict model in its various forms, it does contribute important elements that must be built into any usable model. The conflict model is a dynamic model that posits con flict as a normal and necessary process in social l i f e . C onflict breaks down social structure and gives direction to change. This 1s clearly the process that took place in the Northern Ireland Parliament. The conflict model stresses the type of integration achieved through coercion rather than consensus; i t emphasizes power and interests. All these are necessary points of consideration when studying the conflict situation.

Over the last few years there have been a number of attempts to synthesize the structural-functional model and the conflict model. Van Den BerghelS posits a synthesized model in which societies are looked at holistically as a system of interrelated parts. In these systems, causation 1s multiple and reciprocal, not uni-causal, as in the co n flict models, with either one's relation to the means of pro­ duction or one's relation to authority being the determinant.

Value consensus is one important source of integration, but there are other sources as w ell, such as economic interdependence and coercive power. The concept of equilibrium is preserved, a society is thought to need a minimum of equilibrium or Integration to exist, but i t is also accepted that a system sometimes fa ils to adjust to extra-systemic change and a vicious cycle of deepening malintegra­ tion sets in. Change can be revolutionary and far-reaching, or it can be gradual. I t can come from the adjustment of the system to exogenous change or i t can come through structural d iffe re n tia tio n . 9

Coser20 points out that there is no need to abandon Integra­ tion theory just because conflict is recognized; conflict is one of the tolerable processes which fosters stability of the social system. C onflict sets boundaries between groups, draws the In-group together, and establishes and maintains a balance of power. David Lockwood21 also maintains there is no real riv a lry between consensus theory and conflict theory; conflict is no more inevitable than brder. Conflict is never merely over-interests, but also involves Values. Gideon Sjoberg22 believes that structural functionalism bould be modified to handle social change and c o n flict. A system tends to o s c illa te between emphasizing one set of requirements, then Another, like a dialectic. This process has to be set 1n a structural- functional framework. Equilibrium is then the balance achieved In a system's response to pressure from coexistent contradictory jimperatives. However, says Sjoberg, the actual functional needs of the social system must be determined through empirical research.

S.vmbolic-Interactionism Model

The third major sociological model 1s symbol1c-1nteract1on1sm. symbolic-interactionism is a dynamic model, with its focus on actions md interactions of components in an ongoing system. Structures a ris e , persist fo r some time, and then change. All structures are temporary 2nd results of processes of interpersonal accommodation, adjustments ind conflicts.2^ Social organization is not a determinant of action, jut is, rather, a framework Inside of which social action takes place. Social structure is then just a sum of processes in time. There 1s (10 single coherent structure for the entire society; there are always dissociations and cleavages. Societies continually shift their structures as adaptations to internal and external conditions. If interaction between components of a system 1s the central focus, then the way these components orient themselves to each other becomes /1 ta l,

Language and the construction of meaning must be studied. I t is through language that definitions of the situation are made. Language, in a sense, creates r e a lity .24 Human meaning arises fhrough cooperative group action. , Every group develops Its own system of significant symbols which are internalized by members and lelp structure their reality and affect their Individual acts.

Goffman25 is one sociologist currently using the symbol 1c- In teractio n ist model. He describes how people play parts, how they define the situation for others and give certain impressions which jlead others to act voluntarily in accordance with a plan. Physical coercion is a display fo r persuading audiences; 1t is often a means 3f communication, not merely a means o f action.

The main problem with symbol1c-interaction1sm as a model 1s that it is difficult to use with large groups, and perhaps impossible 10

to use in terms of an entire society. It works well with dyads and small groups but has not been used in terms of the society as a whole. I t is d iffic u lt to see how this model could be used with the multiplicity of players in the Northern Ireland conflict situation.

Exchange theory26 and game theory2? and the theory o f cognitive dissonance28 also focus on interaction. In exchange theory all interactions are looked at in terms of exchange of power, status, economic goods, affection, etc. For all these theories, the basic problem is the same—how do interacting personalities and groups define, assess, interpret and act on the situation.

It is clear that neither of the above three models are adequate to deal with a conflict situation such as that in Northern Ireland, yet all have important aspects that need to be built in to a usable model. What is needed is a model that can incorporate the contributions of these models, while avoiding their major lim ita­ tions. It appears to this writer that general systems theory, as developed by Buckley, can be such an over-arching model.29

General systems theory incorporates equally the concepts of structure and process, perception, cognition and Information. Systems theory offers the po ssibility of being the f ir s t paradigm in sociology. The systems perspective postulates a system operating within an environment. The system might be an organism, a group, or a sociocultural system. The system is composed of a number of com­ ponents related or oriented to each other in a more or less stable way within a particular time period. The structure inside the system is continually changing or emerging as the system adapts to Its varying external and Internal environments. Adaptation to the environment is made possible by a communication process.

Tension is always present in the system and may manifest Itself as a constructive or destructive force. Tension in the system can be generated by the information coming from the external environ­ ment or it can be generated within the system Itself. The external environment 1s made up of a number o f distinguishable elements, states or events with relatively stable relations between them. Because of the heterogeneity of these elements, the environment can be said to provide variety. According to the information i t receives, the components of the system map out this environmental variety and reflect this mapping in the organization of the system. The mapping of the environment makes the components In the system selectively sensitive to certain elements or events in the environment and so fosters selective communication. The mapping also affects the In te r­ action of the system with the environment.

The system has goals and can sense, through negative feedback, if there is deviation from goal states. A piece of information works on the orientation of the component. The meaning o f an item of information is not something in the information itself, nor is it 11

something in the system receiving it, but lies in the relationship between the two. Meaning is generated in a process of social in te r­ action. Once generated, meanings have a selective function.

Morphostasis refers to those processes in complex system- environment exchanges that tend to preserve or maintain the system's organization or state. Morphogenesis refers to those processes that tend to change a system's form. Both of these processes are present in the system.

Systems theory can provide a simplifying insight to socio­ logy, such as that provided by evolutionary theory in biology. Systems theory, in a sense, borrows the concept of evolution, or the idea of constant change and adaptations to an environment, but instead of focusing on the physical structure of organisms and the process of genetic mutations and natural selection which lead simultaneously to adaptation and a more complicated organism, human systems theory is concerned with communication and its Implications for social structure and social change.

The systems model has the advantage of being objective or colorless. It posits no functional necessity for existing institu­ tions; i t elevates no temporary equilibrium between institutions or systems as somehow better than another. Its focus is on constant change. The systems model appears to be the best available model for organizing the data on the Northern Ireland Parliament's reaction to a situation of conflict.

Collective Behavior and Middle-Range Theories

General theory, such as that discussed above, should be used to guide all empirical studies. However, in all sociological areas there are middle-range theories that can sometimes be very helpful. This study is concerned with how a Parliament reacted to repeated episodes of protest and violence. As such, i t is most closely related to the area of collective behavior, specifically the area that deals with social movements and revolutions. However, this study is not s tric tly a study of collective behavior because 1t does not focus on street activities or the mobilization of dissent. Rather, it is a study of how one institution reacted to, and tried to deal with, episodes of collective behavior; 1t 1s a study that deals with Parliamentary efforts a t social control. The actions of agencies of social control have been of interest to those studying collective behavior, especially those researchers concerned with social move­ ments and revolutions fo r some time. However, not much work has • been done in this area, and what has been done has focused on the police and lower levels of social control, rather than on the national government. Nell Smelser has produced the most comprehensive theory of collective behavior.30 According to Smelser, social control can prevent, interrup t or in h ib it the accumulation of.the determinants of collective behavior. Authorities can contain .value-oriented movements by the following actions:

1. The quick, impartial use of force to control In­ stitutionalized expressions of hostility, such as rio ts .

a. Authorities must be quick and decisive in deciding to use force against hostile outbursts.

b. There must be impartial enforcement of justice. The authorities must not take sides in the controversy. If they do so, the favored party may take this as approval of violent methods and the ill- favored party may come to feel they cannot re ly on the forces of law and order and must resort to even more extreme methods of expression.

c. The authorities must not have complicity in the outbursts or this will further the spread of collective disturbances,

2. The authorities must rule out direct challenge to legitimacy by drawing a definite c irc le around those government activities which are constitu­ tionally inviolable.

3. The authorities must open channels fo r peaceful agitation for change and permit a patient and thorough hearing for the aggrieved groups.

The authorities do not have to accede to the demands made, but they must leave open the pos­ s ib ilit y that these demands w ill be heard.

4. The authorities must be responsive and attempt to reduce the sources of strain that initiated the value-oriented movement.

According to Smelser, i f the authorities behave 1n these ways, the value-oriented movement should disappear or change Into some less threatening kind of movement, such as a norm-oriented movement. 13

Smelser's theory raises four questions concerning the role of authorities in dealing with episodes of collective behavior, that we w ill try to answer as they pertain to the Northern Ireland Parliament's response to episodes of collective behavior.

1. Were the authorities (the Government of Northern Ireland) able and willing to use force effec- tively?31

a. Were authorities quick and decisive in deciding to use force against outbursts?

b. Was there impartial enforcement of justice?

c. Did the authorities take sides in the controversy?

d. Did authorities have complicity in the outbursts?

2. Did authorities rule out direct challenges to legitimacy by drawing a definite circle around the government a c tiv itie s which were constitu­ tionally inevitable?

3. Were dissenting groups allowed the right to organize and voice th eir grievances, and, i f so, did this reduce the chances of violent conflict? Was there patient and thorough hearing of aggrieved groups.32

4. Were authorities responsive and did they attempt to reduce the sources of strain? What effo rts at reform were made by the Government? I f re­ forms were passed, what effect did this have on the level of violence?

There is a good deal of disagreement over the efficacy of reforms in reducing incidents of collective behavior. Dahrendorf maintains that when concessions are made the chances of violent con­ flic t are decreased.33 Brlnton, however, maintains that efforts at reform will not necessarily prevent revolution. In all four revolutions he studied, efforts at improving the machinery o f govern­ ment failed to prevent revolution.

Nothing could be more erroneous than the picture of the old regime as an unregenerated tyranny, sweep­ ing to its end in a climax of despotic indifference to the clamor of its abused'subjects.34 14

Oberschall also warns against assuming that reforms Introduced by the government In good fa ith w ill reduce the strain and cause the conflict to subside.35

Another question raised by Brinton and Oberschall concerns the state of the economy. Brinton maintains that before all the revolutions he studied, the governments had serious economic and financial d iffic u ltie s , but the countries themselves were prosperous. In the pre-revolutionary period there were groups in the society who fe lt that the prevailing conditions hindered their economic a c tiv ity . Oberschall questions the notion that because the general economic situation in a society prior to revolution is found to be good, then economic misery is not an important precipitating factor in revolution. He points out that even when the per capita income of the population as a whole has increased, there are often pockets of poverty l e f t behind. In fa c t, a period of economic growth often results in increased inequality of incomes. Oberschall points out that an authoritarian regime can most successfully prevent revolu­ tion i f i t f ir s t institutes socioeconomic reform designed to improve the conditions of the lower classes and then, only a fte r achieving a measure of success In economic reform, introduces c iv il and political rights. This suggests the fifth question.

5. Was economic reform fo r the lower classes in s ti­ tuted before c iv il and p o litic a l reform? I f the socioeconomic needs of the lower classes were attended to , did this lower the general back­ ground of fear and impending violence?

To sum up, this study will operate at two levels—at the level of general theory and at the middle-range level. At the general theoretical level, a systems perspective will be used to organize the data and generate hypotheses. The Parliament of Northern Ireland w ill be looked at in terms of inputs, outputs, changing perceptions and structural changes. A more complete description of the systems model will be given in the next chapter. At the middle-range level, an attempt will be made to answer the above five questions. FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

^Hans Zetterberg, review of Modern Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change,edited by Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff, in the Minerican bocioTogical Review, Vol. 23, 1958, p. 95. ^To be correctly stated, a logico-deductive statement must: (a) be non-tautological, (b) specify the relationship between the antecedent and consequent clauses {as necessary, su fficien t, or biconditional), and (c) incorporate the subjunctive conditional.

^Hans Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (The Bedminster Press, 1965), p. 31. See how Zetterberg changes the meaning in his example.

^Eugene J. Meehan, Explanation in Social Science: A System Paradigm (Homewood, IIlin o is : The Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 3,

^Hans Zetterberg, "Compliant Action," Acta Soclologica; Scandinavian Review of Sociology. Vol. 2 (1957), p. 189.

^Robert Brown, Explanation in Social Science (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963), p. 175.

^Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of S cien tific Explanation tHarcourt, Brace and Morld, In c ., i960, PP. U4-85.

®Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Honexperlmental Research (Chapel H ill: The University of North Carolina Fress, 1961), p73

9Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Ingulry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing C o.), Chapter 8.

l°Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962),

^ T a lc o tt Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951).

15 16

^2Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," 1n System. Change and Conflict, ed. by N. J. Denierath and Richard Peterson (Hew York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 465.

^W alter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, inc., 1967).

14Ibid.

15Robert Merton, "Manifest and'Latent Functions," 1n System. Change and C o n flic t, ed. by N. J. Denierath and Richard Peterson (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 10.

^6Max Eastman, ed., C apital, The Communist Manifesto and Other Writings by Karl Marx (New York: Random House, 1959).

^ R a lf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, California! Stanford University Press, 1959),

18Ibid.

19piere Van Den Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," American Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (October, 1963).

28Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956).

^David Lockwood, "Some Remarks on 'The Social System'," in System, Change and C o nflict, ed. by N. J. Demerath and Richard Peterson (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

2ZGideon Sjoberg, "Contradictory Functional Requirements and Social Systems," in Systems, Change and C o n flic t, ed. by N. J. Demerath and Richard Peterson (New Vork: The Free Press, 1969), p. 339.

23Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, p. 18.

Z4George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934).

28Erving Goffman, The Presentation o f Self in Everyday Life (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., In c ., 1959). 17

26peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social L ife (New York: John Wiley & Sons, In c ., 1967)1

^Anatol Rapoport, "Game Theory and Human C o n flict," 1n The Nature o f Human C onflict, ed. by Elton B. McNeil (Englewood C liffs : Prentice-H all, 1965), p. 195.

2®Leon Festlnger, When Prophecy Falls (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966).

^Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory.

^ N e il J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

^Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965). Brinton also points to the inability or un­ willingness of the government to use force effectively, as being an important determinant in the outbreak of revolution.

^Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Dahrendorf maintains that when oppressed groups are allowed the rig ht to organize and voice their grievances, the chances of violent con­ flic t are decreased.

33Ibid.

3^Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, p. 39.

33Anthony Oberschal1, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 529. CHAPTER I I

PROCEDURE

Systems theory, i f used as a general framework and not applied too stringently, does not distort the data or force i t to conform to some prearranged design. Systems theory is general enough, colorless and objective enough to allow categories in the data itself to emerge a la Glaser and StraussJ But care must be taken in using any model to avoid premature closure of ideas. As Kaplan has warned, i t is easy to become too concerned with what must be true in principle instead of what is true in fact. A model can lim it our awareness of unexplored po ssibilities and conceptualizations and we can end up tinkering with the model instead of becoming emerged in the subject m atter.2

In this study certain modifications of systems theory are in order. There is no assumption of functionality in institutions, no assumption of an equilibrium, and no assumption that the components in the Parliament of northern Ireland share certain goals. A system cannot have goals, only people have goals, and the goals of the Members of Parliament are diverse and contradictory. These goals will, be noted as the research progresses. Furthermore, there is no prior assumption that the system as a unified whole adapts to the environ­ ment. The possibility is recognized that adaptation to the environment by components in the system might be quite diverse and even contra­ dictory.

Systems Model

The basic systems model that follows has been developed by merging and modifying the systems models described by Alfred Kuhn,3 David Easton,4 and Walter Buckley.5 The model is then applied to the Northern Ireland Parliament.

System

A system is a complex of elements or components d ire c tly or indirectly related in a causal network such that each component is related to at least some others in a more or less stable way within any particular time period .° The system in this analysis will be the Parliament of Northern Ireland.

18 19

Components

A component is any interacting element in an acting system. At any given time the components have more or less stable in te r­ relationships which constitute the structure of the system at that particular time. Thus, a certain degree of continuity and boundary are achieved.

The structure of the system may change from time to time, or even continuously, without the dissolution of the system itself. The interrelationships of the components are primarily psychic, involving complex communicative processes of information exchange.

The components in the system to be analyzed are the individual Members of Parliament.

Structure of the System

The components of the system are organized into sub-systems or parties. One party having been victorious a t the polls, forms the Government, composed of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

During the entire period of this research, the Unionist Party has a clear majority and forms the Government. However, a Conservative Unionist wing breaks with and attacks the policies of the Unionist Government. At the beginning of this study, in 1965, the Opposition is composed of Labour and Liberal Parties, and a group of other parties which are grouped together and designated as the Republican Opposition, since they a ll want a united Ireland. The Republican Opposition includes the N ationalist, Eire Labour, Republican Labour and National Democratic Parties. Since the Liberal and Labour Parties exert little or no Influence on the situation studied, their contri­ butions are not noted.

Goals of the System

Some goals are shared by nearly a ll components 1n the system, but some components and parties have conflicting goals. A ll Members want good economic conditions, but Members with Republican sympathies want union with the Republic in the South, while the Unionists want to retain the tie with Great Britain.

Environment

An open system engages in Interchange with the environment. This interchange is an essential factor underlying the systems viability. The environment can be divided into two parts—1ntra-soc1etal and extra- societal . Intra-societal environment consists of those systems In the same society as the Northern Ireland Parliament, but excluded from the Parliament itself.

Extra-societal environment includes a ll those systems that lie outside the given society its e lf , i . e . , outside of Northern Ireland. Such outside systems would include the Republic of Ireland and Great B ritain.

From the intra-societal environment and from the extra- societal environment comes input into the system.

Inputs

An Input is information that moves from the environment across the boundaries and into the system. An Input Includes any event external to the system that alters, modifies or affects the system In any way. Inputs in a p o litic a l system consists of demands and support.

Demands — Demands can consist o f demands for services, pleas fo r better government, improved economic conditions, etc. Demands may come from within the society or outside the society.

Support — Support can come from within or from outside the society. Support can be1 expressed in voting fo r candidates and expressions of support such as supportive parades, etc. The lack of support can be gauged by the number of breaches of the law, rio ts and revolution and the activity of separatists. Extra-societal support can be gauged by the behavior of foreign powers and the pressures they exert.

Outputs

An output 1s any movement of information from the acting system across its boundaries to the environment. Outputs influence events in the broader society of which the system is a part. Outputs may be 1n the form of verbal outputs or in the form of performance. Verbal out­ puts can be either formal outputs or associated outputs.

Verbal Outputs — Formal outputs are produced by authorities, and are decisions that Members consider as binding, such as laws, decrees, judicial decisions. This form of output is monopolized by the Unionist Government and Party since they have an overwhelming majority of members.

Associated outputs are decisions and actions that are not binding such as po licies, rationales, commitments. Sometimes these are expressed as ideological convictions or rationales and sometimes as simple articulations of policy or demands generated within the system. 21

Performance — Performance refers to the behavior output, e .g ., the actual enforcement of the law passed, or to action by MPs when they go out in the streets and march, etc.

Feedback Loop

The output from the system enters the environment and has some effect on the situation there. The moaning of outputs is not always readily apparent to people in the environment. Both the authorities (the Government) and those who are in competition for the authority roles w ill tend to interpret outputs in their own interests. Reaction to the output is then feed back Into the system and is known as feedback.

Through feedback, authorities can evaluate the consequences of their output. If they perceive negative feedback, they can make corrections in their outputs. If they receive positive feedback, this encourages them to produce more of the same outputs. I t is not what the outputs do in any objective sense, but what the citizens perceive them as doing that forms the basis for subsequent responses. Feedback response can include hostile apathy, pacific demonstrations or deputa­ tions, refusal to pay taxes and outbreaks of violent opposition.

Feedback will not be reported in a separate category in the research findings because i t is impossible to separate Input and feed­ back in any precise way. I t cannot be proved in this study that a certain Parliamentary output influenced those in the environment 1n such a way as to produce a particular feedback, such as a rio t or a disturbance. There could have been independent forces working in the environment to produce this particular input. For this reason, feedback is incorporated into Input.

_ _ The chart on page 22 summarizes the above systems model.

Time Period

The time period selected for this study was from 1965, well before any serious confrontations occurred, to 1972, when the Government of Northern Ireland f e l l .

Source of Data

The data used was the official Debates of the Northern Ireland House of Commons.' These records are a complete, verbatim account of what was said in the House and are published in Hansard, the o ffic ia l government publication. Such records are considered by Madge8 as a highly satisfactory and reliable source of data. SYSTEMS MODEL AS APPLIED TO NORTHERN IRELAND PARLIAMENT

Intrasodetal Environment

Ecological System Prime Minister Biological System Personality System Social System Cabinet

Unionist Party Input Output Ind. Unionist

Demands Labour Opposition Support Ind. Labour

Liberal

Nationalist Extrasoctetal Envlronaent Republican Opposition Ind. Nationalist International P o litic a l Systems Eire Labour } International Ecological Systems

Feedback Loop

SOURCE: Modified from: David Easton. A Systems Analysis o f P o litic a l L ife (New York: John Wiley A"Sons, In c ., 1965). 23

In the study of social movements, there has always been a problem in obtaining a running account of what was going on. Finding a good and complete source of information has proven a major d i f f i ­ culty. Police records, newspapers and historical accounts have a ll been used, but they often suffer from bias and incompleteness. Using Parliamentary Debates avoids the problems of bias and incompleteness and, in addition, gives the benefit of allowing the researcher to be steeped 1n firsthand data and so avoid the problem of being removed from the actual subject matter as cautioned against by Filstead.9

In it ia lly , since Northern Ireland is not a sovereign power, the Debates In the British Commons!0 were also used to gauge the pressure being exerted on the Northern Ireland Parliament. In addi­ tion to this, the newspaper, The United Irishman,*' was In itia lly used to sample Republican opinion. However, these last two sources had to be dropped because the work became excessive.

Two other sources were used as a guide to events—The Belfast Telegraph^2 and UlsterJ3 a book written by a team of reporters from the Sunday Times, which 1s a chronological account of some of the early co n flict. These la s t two sources were only used as background and material from them is not incorporated in the body of the research.

In addition to the above printed sources of information, two summers were spent in Northern Ireland and the Republic, collecting the printed data and observing the situation at f ir s t hand.

Form of Analysis

A ll the Debates from 1965 to 1972 were scanned. All material that could bear d irectly on the co n flict was photocopied. The Debates were then carefully analyzed. The data are reported on a yearly basis. For each year the following information 1s recorded:

1. The structure of the system as 1t existed in 1965 is noted and the changes in that structure are outlined as the cohfU ct progressed.

2. The Input into the system is enumerated. The Intrasocietal Input refers to all the street violence and other events 1n the society that Members of Parliament fe lt was important 1n the conflict situation. Extrasocietal input refers to statements and actions by parties outside the society, principally by the Government of Britain and Eire, which fed into the conflict situation. 24

3. The perceptions or reactions of the various groups to this input are noted. This was done by noting the reactions of each MP who spoke on a pertinent issue, and then sorting them according to party affiliation. Any significant differences in the perspectives or definitions of the situation of various party members were noted. It was found, a fte r some experience with the Oebates, that there was remarkable s im ila rity in the views and posi­ tions taken on the issues by respective party members. In fact, i t was possible to group a number of small parties, a ll Republican in sympathy, together in recording their perspectives.

4. The output generated by the system is also laid out. This includes b ills , statements about inten­ tions or beliefs, criticisms and demands made by any group within the system. The output has generally been organized so that Government out­ put is enumerated f ir s t and then Republican perception of that output. Then Republican out­ put is noted and the Unionist reaction to that.

5. A yearly summary of perceptions 1s reported. This is an effort to put together 1n brief form the orientation and perception of the various*, groups for that year.

The above detailed information 1s reported in Appendix I. A brief summary of the findings is reported 1n Chapter IV.

There might be some objection that what 1s said in the Commons by Members of Parliament is not a reflection of their world view, but is said for effect, or to achieve a certain political goal. However, this study covers a period of eight years and i t is d iffic u lt to keep up a pretense for that long, especially in the cut and thrust of Parliamentary Debate. Also, the truth or falsity of any statement is not the most important thing in systems analysis, but rather the effect of the statement on the rest of the system.

Another problem concerns the lack of data on what was said behind the scenes or in the lobby. There was no way of obtaining such data and this study has focused on public perceptions. Even accepting these lim itatio n s, the data is more complete than most materials available for research of this kind.

Another objection might be raised concerning the descriptive manner in which the data is presented. A numerical approach might be preferred by some. There are numerical methods of handling this kind of data, such as content analysis, which involves counting the number of times certain words appear or the number of times certain persons I 25 or events are mentioned. However, content analysis was not practical fo r this study which spans an eight year period. Content analysis, although sometimes very useful, was not considered appropriate fo r this study since we are concerned with how the components structured th eir world view or defined the changing situation over a long period of time.

It is popular to make a great distinction between descriptive studies and analytic studies, a distinction not altogether justified. Good description 1s analysis; it includes pertinent data and omits irrelevant data, thereby laying bare the skeleton of relationships and meaning. The theory of evolution was based on descriptive data, data described and lined up in a meaningful way. A numerical study is really just condensed description. Sometimes a numerical notation makes the data easier to understand, but sometimes 1t does not.

Descriptive data was used in this study because 1t makes it easier for the reader to get Inside the data, and understand I t from the inside out. Content analysis involves removing the reader from the data, in fact the reader often is not exposed to any of the original data. It is a little like a deaf mute trying to get the idea of sound by watching the vibration of a string. In defense of the descriptive methods used, we can do no better than quote F11stead, who recognizes the importances of both the inner and outer perspective on human behavior.

The inner perspective places emphasis on man's a b ility to know himself and, hence, to know and understand others through "sympathetic Introspection" and "imaginative reconstruction" of "definitions of the situation," thereby emphasizing one of the basic underlying assumptions of human behavior; that man, being a symbol manipulator, is only "understandable" through the perception and understanding of those symbols that are being manipulated. Through Meadian social psychology, sociologists can role take the part of those under investigation, thereby under­ standing the meaning of human behavior.14

In short, descriptive data is considered valid, despite the afore­ mentioned lim itations.

Using the above described systems model, and translating Into i t the data from the Northern Ireland Parliamentary Debates, for the years 19C5-1972, this study w ill attempt to do two things;

1. To generate Insights and hypotheses in terms of how a Parliamentary system responds to c o n flic t. 26

2. To test Smelser's notions concerning the behavior of agencies of social control, to see whether authorities can contain a value-oriented movement.

To this point the following steps have been taken. The under­ lying basic theoretical orientation has been laid out; general systems theory has been selected as an appropriate theory to be used; pertinent concepts have been drawn from middle-range theory; and the data source, time period and procedure have been specified. I t remains now to report the data and analyze the findings. But before this is done, a brief historical account will be given to acquaint the reader with the historical antecedents that resulted in Ireland being populated by two very d iffe re n t peoples. The presence of these different populations culminated in the division of the island and the formation of the factions in the current conflict. t

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I I

^Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Strategies for Q ualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970).

2Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 275.

^Alfred Kuhn, The Logic of Social Systems (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1974)^

^David Easton, A Systems Analysis of P olitical Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, In c., 196$).

^Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 19.

6Ibid., p. 41.

7Northern Ireland, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1965-1972*

3John Madge, The Tools of Social Science (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953), p. 92.

V illia m Filstead, Q ualitative Methodology (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), p. 4.

^Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons).

^ The United Irshman, Dublin, Eire,

12The Belfast Telegraph, Belfast, Northern Ireland.

l 3The Sunday Times Insight Team, Ulster (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, In c ., 1972).

^ F ils te a d , Q ualitative Methodology, p. 4.

27 CHAPTER I I I

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Ireland is a divided country. The Southern section has its own independent Republican Government and a population that is 96 percent Catholic. There exists in the South a strong desire for the reunification of Ireland. The Northern section, Ulster, has close ties with Great Britain. It sends representatives to Westminster and from 1920 to 1972, it had Its own Parliament. In the North, the population is composed of two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic. The Northern Protestants want to retain their tie s with Great B ritain , the Northern Catholics v/ant to sever these ties and jo in the Republic in the South. The present conflict in Northern Ireland is basically a conflict over contradictory political goals, but i t is a conflict that has been exacerbated by the existence of pockets of poverty, abominable housing, discrimination and extremist groups on both sides who have been w illing to wage gu errilla warfare to attain their ends.

No understanding of the present conflict in Northern Ireland is possible without an understanding of how this small island became divided into North and South and how a Protestant minority, ferociously loyal to Britain, came to exist in this anti-British, Catholic Island. In Ireland, historical antecedents more than lay the structure for conflict, they also supply its dynamism. History lives in Ireland. I t 1s remembered and canted lik e a catechism by both sides. Ancient battles and animosities provide the rationale for the parades and rituals of today, and the subject matter of current propaganda. An acquaintance with the history of Ireland is a necessary prerequisite to understanding the interchange of com­ munication between the conflicting groups.

Early Settlement

The original population of Ireland came from Europe around 6000 B.C. Much la te r, they were joined by the Celts from France and Spain. For many centuries, Ireland was a country of many small kingdoms warring with each other. Christianity came to Ireland through the teachings of the English-born Saint Patrick, who bu ilt many monasteries throughout Ireland,

28 29

In 795 A .D ., the Vikings came to rob and burn these monas­ teries and they managed to establish settlements, on the cast coast. One of the Irish chiefs, Brian Boru, organized the other chiefs, in one brief interlude of Irish unity, to drive the Vikings from most of the land they had seized. Unity ended among the chiefs when Brian Boru was killed at the battle of Clontarf.

The next invaders were the Normans, recruited by one of the Iris h kings, Dermot MacMurrough, with the permission of Henry I I of England. MacMurrough hoped to gain control over all Ireland and promised the Normans a share of whatever te rrito ry they invaded. After leading an invasion force, MacMurrough died. At this point, Pope Adrian gave Ireland to Henry I I , to be held as a papal f ie f . This gave Henry papal approval to establish English ascendancy in Ireland.

In 1171, King Henry visited Ireland and was declared Lord of Ireland, even though his Norman troops held only a small area of land on the east coast. During the 1200's, the Normans conquered more and more territory until they held lands throughout all Ireland. The loyalty of the Normans to B ritain began to weaken as they began to adopt Irish customs and intermarry with the Irish. To counteract this influence, the Statutes of Kilkenny were passed in 1366. These statutes forbade intermarriage between English and Irish, and tried to discourage the adoption of Iris h customs. However, the process was inevitable, and by 1400, the King of England ruled only a small part of Ireland, often no larger than a radius of thirty miles around Dublin.

In 1536, Henry V III closed the Catholic monasteries in Ireland and replaced the Roman Catholic Church with the Church of England. There was no concerted e ffo rt to change the religion of the populace and they remained Roman Catholic. A few years la te r, Henry declared himself King of Ireland and established English laws 1n Ireland. He divided much land among the Norman and Irish chiefs who supported him.

The Plantation of Ireland

In the 1550*s, the Catholic Queen Mary I of England initiated the policy of establishing colonies of loyal Englishmen in Ireland. This became known as the "plantation" of Ireland. The Irish resisted it. Queen Elizabeth I continued the policy and planted English settlers in Counties Antrim and Down. In addition, she ordered the Roman Catholic services in Ireland to be discontinued. A series of rebellions were led by Shane O'Neill and later, Hugh O'Neill, but they were put down by the B ritish. 30

In the 1600's, Janies I furthered the plantation system by establishing colonies of Scottish settlers in Northern Ireland. Although the Irish rebelled constantly, they were consistently defeated. After the English C ivil War, Oliver Cromwell, incensed over the massacre of English settlers in an uprising in Ulster during the war, forcefu lly subdued the Iris h and enlarged the B ritish settlements by giving land to his Protestant, English soldiers. He transplanted a number of Irish landowners to the west and made i t illegal for Roman Catholics to buy land in Ireland.

Battle of the Boyne

When the Catholic, James II, came to the English throne, he threw out many of the a n ti-Iris h lav/s. After he was forced from the throne, he went to Ireland and organized an army there to fight the British and regain his crown. It was his army that was defeated at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. This is the historical event that 1s so celebrated among the men of the Orange Order today.

During the reign of William of Orange and Mary, conditions 1n Ireland declined. Irish business could not compete with the highly developed British industries.

Rebellion Against British Rule

As the power of the monarcy waned, the Irish defined the new adversary as the British Parliament. In 1782, the Irish Parliament, led by Henry Gratton, declared that Irish laws and Irish court decisions could not be changed by the British Government. Roman Catholics received the right to practice their religion and to hold land. The B ritish Parliament agreed to these acts but refused to allow Catholics to hold political office.

In 1791, a Protestant lawyer of English descent, Theobald Wolfe Tone, founded the "Society of United Irishmen," with Its fir s t headquarters in Belfast. The goal of the Society was to unite a ll Irishmen against the unjust influence of Great B ritain, abolish a ll' "unnatural religious distinctions" and secure true representation in the national .Parliament. In 1798, a rebellion broke out, headed by Tone, demanding complete independence from B ritish rule. Wolfe Tone was defeated, but his was only one in a series of efforts to achieve independence from Great B ritain.

At the opposite end of the spectrum to Tone was the Orange Order, instituted "to maintain the laws and peace of the country and the Protestant Constitution, and to defend the King and his heirs as long as they maintained the Protestant ascendancy." 31

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland

The Act of Union in 1801 abolished the Irish Parliament and created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Ireland received representation in the British Parliament. In 1829, Daniel O'Connell led the Irish in demanding the right of Roman Catholics to hold o ffic e . O'Connell worked fo r the repeal of the le g is la tiv e union with Great Britain for the rest of his life , but further calami­ ties were to befall Ireland before this was achieved.

The potato blight hit Ireland in 1845. Over the next few years, about 750,000 people died of starvation and disease. Thousands emigrated from Ireland. Charles Parness tried to get home rule for Ireland in the form of a separate Irish government within the British Empire. In 1858, the Irish Republican Brotherhood was founded in Dublin, the parent organization of the Irish Republican Army.

As the 19th Century ended, Arthur G riffith founded the news­ paper, The United Irishman, and the Sinn Fein (we ourselves) political movement, dedicated to breaking the Act of Union and establishing an independent Ireland. Mot long a fte r, in 1912, the Ulster Volunteer Force was formed for exactly the opposite purpose, to resist home rule and preserve their status as citizens of the United Kingdom.

The Division of Ireland

By 1914, the British Parliament had accepted the principle of Home Rule of Ireland. A Home Rule B ill was passed, but was not put into effect because of World War I .

Great B ritain received the support of most of the Irish people during World War I , but a small group of Sinn Fein members organized a rebellion on Easter Sunday, 1916. They fought the Army and the police for seven days before they were defeated. The population was generally annoyed at this disruption, but inept handling of the situation by the Army and the police, and the final execution of the rebels, shifted sympathy to the Republican side. By 1918, Sinn Fein had become the most important political party in Ireland. In 1919, seventy-three S1nn Fein members were elected to the British Parliament. Instead of going to Westminster, the Sinn Fein members met in Dublin and on January 1, 1919, declared Ireland a republic.

Revolution broke out all over Ireland. An auxiliary police force, the legendary "Black and Tans," came from Great B ritain to * re-establish order. The revolution lasted for three years, at the end of whichj in 1921, Britain granted Ireland dominion status. However, the year before this, in 1920, the six northern counties (Ulster) had 32

been divided from-'the rest of Ireland, and provision made for them to be governed by a government and parliament o f their own, located at Stormont, with lim ited powers and subordinate to the Westminster Parliament.

This division of Ireland into Ulster in the North and the Irish Free State in the South precipitated a civil war which raged from 1921 to 1922. Eamon de Valera, one of the leaders in the movement fo r independence, wanted union with Northern Ireland, but the Irish Free Staters were content with independence for the South. Sinn Fein, the political party of the independence fighters, split into Fianna Fall, led by De Valera, dedicated to the united Ireland and complete Indepen­ dence from Britain, and the United Ireland Party, led by William Cosgrove, which, despite its name, did not oppose the partition of Ireland.

After the peace was established, De Valera refused to take part in the government and Cosgrove served as President of the Executive Committee that headed the Irish Government. In 1932, having given up this policy of boycotting the Government, DeValera became President of the Executive Committee. De Valera systematically began to break the ties with Britain; the Oath of Allegiance to the British Crown was abolished, and also the office of the British Governor General. Further steps were taken in 1937; the Irish Government adopted a new constitution and renamed the Irish Free State, "Eire." The final break came in 1949 under John Costello, Prime Minister and leader of the United Ireland Party, when Ireland drew out of the British Commonwealth and became an independent republic.

Northern Ireland — Conflict Continues

After the Constitution of free Ireland was signed in 1921, the Catholics in the north refused to participate in U lster p o litic s , thus laying the foundation for many of the problems of isolation from ... ^.power in la te r years. When offered state appointments, they refused ■ ' them. In addition, teachers in state schools went on s trik e for months. The Catholics strongly objected to being a Catholic minority placed among an English-supported Protestant majority. On the other hand, the Protestants felt like an endangered minority in the midst of a hostile Catholic Ireland. And so was laid the basis for the current conflict in Northern Ireland.

The partition of Ireland, an unforeseen cost of independence, could not be accepted by the Iris h Republican Brotherhood and by strong nationalists. The Brotherhood was pledged to the complete separation of Ireland from England. From 1920 on, periodic raids were made by bands from Northern Ireland and the Republic on British Government installations in Northern Ireland During the 1950's, another series 33

of raids indicated that the IRA was once again reactivated after its disintegration during World War II.

In December 1956, the IRA plan, known as Operation Harvest, was put into e ffe c t. Targets in ten areas around the border were blown up. The IRA planned to make the Catholic areas in Ulster serve as their strongholds. Ulster's population is one-third Catholic, but the Catholics are concentrated in certain areas. Londonderry, Newry and Armagh are Catholic-dominated towns. In 1956, about twenty IRA men came from the South to sot up local groups in these Catholic areas. From these locations they hoped to conduct sabotage operations. Operation Harvest collapsed almost as soon as it started. Not only did the IRA fail to get the expected Catholic support in the North, but they were effectively stopped by the policy of internment that was promptly introduced by both the Ulster Government and the Government in the Republic. In July of 1957, the Dublin Government picked up sixty of the key leaders of the IRA. Deprived of th eir leadership and a safe training ground in the South, the IRA organization in the North started to disintegrate. From 1958 to 1962 there was only very sporadic a c tiv ity . In 1961, the IRA called o ff their campaign.

The IRA v/as by no means a unified group. I t was s p lit internally, even in the 1950*s. The northern faction was much more m ilita n t than the southern faction. In 1963, the IRA came under the leadership of Cathal Goulding. Goulding took a new, Marxist approach to Ulster. The main problem, as he saw i t , was the colonial relation­ ship of Ulster to B ritain. The religious issue was ju s t a convenient device used by the ruling e lite to divide the Catholic worker from the Protestant worker. What was needed in the North was p o litical educa­ tion to make the workers aware of th is . What was needed 1n the South was a campaign to advance socialism and, more specifically at this time, a housing action campaign and trade union a c tiv ity . In this way, Goulding led the IRA away from the old simple goal of a th irty - two county Republic to be achieved by violence. The old-time IRA men did not like these changes. They drifted away from the movement. Those who stayed on were disgruntled with the new policy. The circu­ lation figures of The United Irishman, the newspaper of Sinn Fein, reflected this disenchantment. The circulation dropped from 100,000 to 14,000 over Ireland.

It was against this background that the 1960's Civil Rights Movement formed. The C ivil Rights Campaign started in 1963 when Mrs. Patricia McClosky, incensed because people were not allowed to occupy empty post-war u t ilit y homes, organized the Homeless Citizens League. Some months la te r , this organization became the Campaign for Social Justice, organized with the specific aim of collecting and distributing information about cases of injustice in Northern Ireland. 34

It was In this way, by plantation and settlement, that Ireland came to be the home of a Protestant minority. The power and Influence of this minority rested on the tie with Britain and made them fiercely loyal to Britain. The English Government's inept rule from a distance and their exclusionary policies toward Irish Catholics fired the Irish nationalists to push for independence. The cleavage between these two groups, the Protestant loyalists and the Catholic nationalists, was forged and hardened through years of c o n flic t. I t spawned action groups whose descendants are involved in the current c o n flic t.

The Orange Order and the Ulster Volunteer Force were organized to protect the Protestant ascendancy, the IRA and Sinn Fein were created to achieve Irish independence. Throughout the years, the conflict ebbed and flowed, flamed and embered, ready to be rekindled by any slight breeze of discontent. The Civil Rights Movement was such a breeze. Discontent over housing, jobs and proverty was skill­ fully structured into an all-out attack on the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland Government it s e lf . The Northern Ireland Government, once again, had to deal with fighting in the streets, precipitated by extremists, and a seriously divided population.

This brief history brings us to 1965. A systems perspective w ill now be used to order the data concerning the reaction of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to increasing episodes of collective behavior and violence. Inputs, perceptions, structural changes and outputs will all be noted, one year at a time, for the eight year time period. CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In this chapter, a condensed summary of the operations of the system (Northern Ireland Parliament) are presented in the form of a flow chart. For a complete, detailed account, see the Appendix.

For each year, from 1965 to 1972, inputs, perceptions, structure and outputs are noted.

Inputs

Inputs include both intrasocietal and extrasocietal inputs. Intrasocietal input refers to street activities, parades, marches, explosions, etc. Extrasocietal input refers to the input by the Westminster Government and the Eire Government.

Structure

The Parliament of Northern Ireland had nine parties represented in 1965.

Members

Unionist 32 Independent Unionist l r — Liberal 1 Labour 4 Opposition Independent Labour 1 Parties Republican Labour 1------Ei re Labour 1 .Republican Nationalist 9 Opposition Independent Nationalist 1=__.

The Unionists, having the majority of seats, formed the Government, composed of the Prime Minister, Terence O'Neill, and his Cabinet. For

35 36 the purposes of this study, the Republican Labour, Eire Labour, Nationalists and Independent Nationalists are grouped together under the term, Republican Opposition. All of these parties had the ultimate goal of separation of Northern Ireland from B ritain and its merger with the Republic in the South. The Unionists, Liberal and Labour Parties were in favor of retaining Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom. The main cleavage in the House was between the Unionists and the Republican Opposition. The Liberal and Labour Parties often sided with the Republican Opposition on social issues, but their numbers were so few that the consequences of th eir input was very limited and has not been treated separately.

Changes in the structure of the system are noted fo r each year, outside of the boxes.

Perceptions

The Unionist perception of the environment are indicated firs t, followed by the Conservative Unionists, after they had emerged as a clear group in 1969. The perceptions of the Republican Opposition come after the Unionists.

Outputs

Unionist Government outputs in the form of B ills passed or proposed, bans enacted, e tc ., are presented f ir s t . Conservative Unionist output is reported separately, after the Conservatives had emerged as a clear group in 1969. The Republican Opposition output, in the form of demands for reform, criticism of the security forces, e tc ., are then reported. SUKWRY OF FINDINGS

1KPUTS PERCEPTIONS OUTPUTS 1965

Unionist Govt, and Party [peace See no problem irith discrim ination k housing Unionist fiovt. and Party"

Conservatives O'Neill net with Lemass b rita i n ______Fear about constitution ___ c Hae Min. Wilson’s call for tripartite talks Republican Opposition

O'Nelll-Laaass meetings kindled hopes Republican Opposition o f union w ith the Republic Call fo r reforms See coaaunlty tension growing over housing ______and discrim ination ______

Nationalists Become O fficial Opposition

CO —I 1966

Unionist Govt, and Party

Fear IRA threats Unionist Govt, and Party Fear violence from Prot. A Cath. extremists Active celebration of Easter rising Renewed IRA a c tiv ity Blame both Prot. A Cath. fo r disturbances Ban train from DublIn carrying Threats to Ministers Label UVF as vicious Republican supporters Ban UVF Protestant Extremists United on supporting necessary measures to Paisley's march maintain law and order Short-tern ban on parades Defend the RUC and USC as re lia b le forces Intlnldation of Protestants and Catholics Reforms considered unworkable and unnecessary —local powers must be protected______

Republican vwosition

Republican Opposition Demand Paisley activities be curtailed Attack 13IC and USC See no threat of violence froa IRA Demand reforms See no danger froa Republican celebrations one man-one vote abolish plural vote ______Afraid of Prot. extremists ______Human Rights B ill end discrimination Republican M ilita n t Group Emerging reduce Influence o f ______Orange Order

Co Co 1S67

Unionist Govt, and forty Unionist Govt, and Party Republican Movement: Repressive Measures Republican a c tiv itie s are provocative Arranged to celebrate Fenian Rising Ban on Fenian celebration Republican Clubs are controlled by Sinn Fein Ban on Republican Clubs Republican Clubs organized Rejected demands fo r reforms—one Reform Measures ______man-one vote Impractical______Amalgamation of fiv e Fermanagh Councils Govt, promised to abolish plural vote

B rita in Republican Opposition Prime Min. Wilson - upholds p rin cip le o f N.I Republican Opposition consent fo r change 1n constitution Demand Refonus: Govt, is pandering to extremists by banning parades one man-one vote ------3re------abolish plural vote Republican clubs are no threat to anyone Human Rights B ill Prime Min. Lynch - pressure on B rita in reduce Influence o f ______fo r a united Ireland ______Orange Order end discrimination 1968

Unionist Govt, and Party

Sooe c iv il rlghs marchers genuine but c iv il rig h ts movement has been taken over by IRA —IRA are out to create violence

Disturbances are not due to discrimination

Civil Rights Marches: Republican HPs marched in Derry for political reasons Oct. 5 Londonderry c iv il rig h ts parade —They exaggerated grievances —attack on police Both Prot. extremists and Republicans are a t Unfonlst Govt, and Party Loyalists try to stop civil rights fault for disturbances parade Londonderry Area Development Coonlssion to Cannot give amnesty to IRA—they have com­ be set up to speed up housing 1n London­ mitted serious crimes derry There Is no discrim ination In N .I. Govt, issued a white paper on reshaping o f B rita in Condemn squatters—but have sympathy w ith local government those In need o f housing Prise Minister Wilson publicly supports O’Neill against Prot. extremists______Caledon A ffa ir—was a Republican p o litic a l stunt —Currie has been encouraging squatters

F ltt was also Inciting to disorder Defend police

Conservatives

Wilson's statement was an unwarranted 1ntru- slon Into affairs of N.I.______1968 — Continued

Republican Opposition Republican Opposition Ho IRA Involved In parades Republican HPs take part 1n Londonderry Craig Is just trying to turn public opinion parade against c iv il rights movement Demand amnesty fo r IRA 1n South Police should have protected dv11 rights marchers Demand reforms —Human Rights B ill Londonderry Area Development Coen 1ssion— —One man-one vote just trick to maintain Unionist control —Allocation of houses according to need Hot decided y e t about local government re­ organization D irect action—Currie squats in Caledon —Currie considered White paper on House local government reorganization as completely Inadequate Attack on RUC and USC—accuse thsn o f biased enforcement Caledon A ffa ir—squatters were innocent —Some Republican HPs were embarras­ Demand Inquiry Into police behavior Into sed by C urrie's squatting Londonderry on Oct. 5

Parliament 1s useless to get reforms —H ill carry floht on 1n other ways 1969

Unionist Govt, and Party Sam c iv il rights care hers are bona fid e —others are looking for chance to attack Unionist Govt, and Party the police Newry c iv il rights parade —c iv il rig h ts marchers are being used by Reforms —rio tin g extrenists O 'Neill pledged reforms

Burntoilet civil rights parade IRA are guilty of blowing up post offices Parliamentary Carolss1oner appointed —Palsleyltes tried to stop 1t —rio tin g Praised police Promised an equitable scheme fo r alloca- —but would investigate any charges of tio n o f houses RUC invaded Bogside hone b ru ta lity Cameron Comission appointed to look into RJC withdrawn froa Bogside Very sensitive to constitutional position disturbances in Londonderry on Oct. 6. —sensitive to fa ct Westminster could 1968 Election—O'Neill returned abolish powers of N .I. Government —thought that i f K .I. acted w ith ju s tic e Repression Explosions______this would prevent Intervention Public Order 8111 O'N eill w illin g fo r reforms —to control processions and counter —thought the main threat to constitution demonstrations ______now cooing froa conservatives______

Faulkner and Chlchester-Clark resign from Cabinet O'Neill resigns Chichester-Clark becomes Prime Minister Conservatives Taylor and Brooke become Parliamentary Secretaries

ro 1959 — Continued

Unionist Govt, and Party unionist Govt, and Party

Republican parades lik e ly to cause sectarian General amnesty Kay 6 s tr ife Chlchester-Clark pledged reforms Disturbances are part of a conspiracy to over­ —universal franchise Republican parades ’ throw the Goverraent —fa ir scheme fo r allocating houses —civil rights people are out for a united Inspector General Ireland Chlchester-Clark declared Unionists united behind reforms -•said he had evidence IRA supporting the Moderate Unionists f e lt they had been duped c iv il rights ooveoent August 12 See the Republican Opposition as trying to Govt, banned a ll parades fo r re st o f year August subvert the lawful Government—trying to B ritish troops came In discredit the police. Judiciary and legal Scaraan Tribunal of Inquiry set up to look system Into c iv il disturbances Orange parades attacked Cameron Commission Report Praised the police and defended the USC --rio tin g —but Mould Investigate any charges o f —blamed Special Powers Act fo r rio ts b ru ta lity —condemned local govt, fo r housing Widespread disorders ______;______allocations Very angry with Lynch—considered the Eire Cocsunity Relations B ill Govt, implacable and unfriendly • B rita in —the disturbances 1n N.I. are an inter­ Cosmlssloner fo r Complaints B ill nal matter—not a matter fo r the U.K. Pressure fo r reforms on N .I. Govemaent —believed the U.K. Govt, would protect Electoral Law B ill —supported only by lib e ra l Unionists the territorial Integrity of N.I. Threat th a t Westminster sig h t take over Promised a Central Housing Authority w u ld Prime Minister Chlcbester-Clark had a very be set up B ritis h Government pledged th a t N .I. Mould negative reaction to the Opposition demand not beeooe part of a united Ireland with­ fo r a timetable o f reform A Review Body to be set up to consider pro­ posals for restructuring of local govt. out consent o f N .I. Parllaaent Republican walkout o f the House considered —ttacrory the Chairman Just a political stunt Affirmed t i.l. domestic ju ris d ic tio n Hunt Report Rejected Republican proposal th a t a ll KPs —accepted by govt. resign from the Orange Order —suggested USC be disbanded ------m * ------—Republicans are conducting smear cam­ —create RUC Reserve, UOR, and a paign on Orange Order Police Authority IRA raiders cross froa Eire Into N.I. Rejected Republican charges th a t RX manipu­ lated by Unionist Govt, for Unionist poli­ Local Govemnent B ill Lynch attack on N.I. police tic a l purposes —commission to determine election —created mobile m ilitary hospitals boundaries along border General feeling that nothing would please the Opposition Protection of Persons and Property B ill Lynch took problem to United Nations Unionists (outside the Govt. Itse lf) voiced —severe penalties to those who concern.over no-go areas ____ Intimidated and use petrol bombs Deplored the Republican attack on the RUC —those spreading false rumors about the police wanted to destroy the state —police had been badly abused —fir e bombs thrown a t them, acid thrown (a ) 1n their faces, etc.______' 19S9 — Continued

Conservatives

IRA have In filtra te d c iv il rig h ts movement —want to make government Impossible IRA are using c iv il rights movement to achieve th e ir own ends

C ivil rig h ts people are trying to create and provoke violence Mith RUC Defended police —opposed withdrawal o f police from Bogstde

B Specials should be used to quell d istu r­ bances Conservatives Republican Opposition Is assisting IRA —their strategy Is to discredit Craig, Complaints about B ritis h Army behavior then USC, then RUC Army biased against Protestants Army using overkill tactics I f B rita in revokes transferred powers Blurred sphere o f authority between RUC . —1t would be unconstitutional and Army Arqy Is not going Into no-go areas Rejected Cameron Commission Report —should enforce law there —Cocmlsslon had unreliable, unsworn testimony Complaints about attacks on ju d ic ia ry by —Cosnisslon was biased—I t condemned c iv il rig h ts people Paisley but not rioters —not all local govt, doing poor job Reforms not pacifying c iv il rights people —they really want a united Ireland Reforms Opposed to reforms Generally s ile n t when reforms went through Opposed Central Housing Authority because I t cut down power o f local government Opposed to restructuring of local govt. Rejected Hunt Report —against police reorganization —against USC being disbanded —faulted Govt, fo r handing over respon­ s ib ility for armed forces to Westminster Permissible fo r RUC to be unarmed so long as ■ they continued to have arms training _____ 1969 — Continued

Republican Opposition Republican Opposition1

Civil rights marches Attacked RUC —should not be re-routed by police —accused them o f b ru ta lity and biased —this causes violence enforcement against Catholics —banning the c iv il rights parade 1s just the way the Govt, placates the RUC not moving enough against Protestant right-wing extremists —the IRA has no part 1n organizing marches Police directly controlled by Government —IRA has no part In c iv il rights move­ ment Police attacked Bogslders —unrest canes fran social and economic —wanted an Inquiry conditions—not from Republican agita­ tion USC attacked —unification of Ireland 1s not one of —was sectarian, biased, and Involved the goals of the c iv il rights movement with extreme Protestants —later admit the IRA have infiltrated the c iv il rights movement—IRA doing this Tried to get an Electoral B ill passed— rather than resorting to violence guaranteeing universal franchise —I t was defeated Orange Parades —are provocative Complained that UYF s t i l l existed —police should re-route them

Royal Ulster Constabulary —police are deliberately trying to biacken the c iv il rig h ts marchers —police should assure the safety o f Demanded a timetable o f reform from marchers Chlchester-Clark — Hay 20 —police are guilty .f brutality 1n Bogside Complain there Is serious Inconsistency 1n —RUC are thugs the court sentencing

U lster Special Constabulary Object to ban on United Irishman —B Specials should not be mobilized —la te 1n year B Specials accused o f con­ Call fo r Proportional Representation ducting an orgy of terror In a Catholic housing estate by firin g Indiscriminately Attacked Orange Order —want a ll MPs to resign from Orange A ny Order —welcomed as non-sectarian force Explosions —were set by UVF to dislodge O'Neill froo office —were not the work o f the IRA —O 'Neill cannot stand up to right-wing

Eire —permissible for Republic to station troops on Border

Public Order B ill —violently opposed to this Bill I

Reforms —reforms only granted when people took to the streets -re fo rm s not coming fa s t enough

Parliamentary Commissioner —creation o f th is post Inadequate— Conalssloner could not Interfere with local authorities Skeptical about new Chlchester-Clark Govt, —thought Unionists were not In favor o f reforms

Parliament completely Irrelevant to Irish Walked out a fte r simmer rio ts people —said RUC used CS gas 1nd1str1m1nately

Cameron Report accepted Returned to House In September______—consider I t a complete vindication o f the c iv il rights movement Real authority Is now w ith Westminster —not w ith Stormont

Reforms welcomed Community Relations B ill —welcomed, but a Catholic should have been chosen fo r Kin. o f Caen. Rel. Unionists are absent from House while re­ forms going through —th is shows there Is not widespread support fo r reforms Electoral Law B ill —I f Unionist Govt, had not brought out B ill, Westminster would have forced then to I t Central Housing Authority welcooed Restructuring of local govertnent —reservations about th is because I t would cut powers o f local a u thorities, ju s t when one nan-one vote coning 1n Hunt Report —wanted fu ll Implementation o f Hunt —police should be r.-joved front control of Kin. Hone Affairs —the new UDR should not have to take Oath o f Allegiance —feared the Govt. Intended to pack UDR w ith B Specials —no need fo r UDR ______1970 Paisley and Beattie to House, April 21, 1970

Unionist Govt, and Party

March—Vote o f confidence In the Government Unionist Govt, and Party Minister of Conmunity Relations Report Chlchester-Clark said he was fu lly behind re­ forms Commissioner o f Complaints Report turn Active------—moderate Unionists supported him —most complaints about housing and —c iv il rig h ts marches counter demonstra­ employment tions Condemned boob outrages Macrory Report Explosions Condemned People's Democracy meeting and —on reorganization of local government those who damaged Catholic businesses Orange parades attacked June 30 Criminal Justice B ill Orange Parades—rio tin g a fte r parades was due —mandatory sentencing o f rio te rs Build-up of IRA in Belfast to Bernadette Devlin's prison sentence — IRA marching 1n m ilita ry s tyle 1n being affirmed by court Chlchester-Clark announces that froa now Belfast —trouble not caused by Orange Parades— on gunmen would be shot —two men rardered as a re su lt o f In te r- they were orderly —1 iaison between RUC and Army would nal dispute In IRA______Orange Order very cooperative In re-rout­ be Improved ing parades Majority have a right to march Banned parades —th is prevented the Apprentice Boys Security forces are stretched thin Parade

Prime M1n. Lynch's Tralee speech Is heavy Involvement o f subversives In Housing to be Improved as quickly as pos­ —declared himself against violence Catholic Ardoyne area s ib le In poor areas

Lynch pressured B rita in to get Orange Situation in Derry is improving Parilamentary Secretary Brooke to oversee Parades called o ff Goverment Publicity and Information RUC are now in Bogside and Creggan Service Trial of Eire Ministers on gun-running —put rumors down, state Government charges Lynch's Tralee speech well accepted position quickly Gun-running t r ia l o f Eire M inisters Police B ill —Westminster takes care o f such threats —Implemented Hunt Report —USC disbanded Need period of calm and sta b ility —RUC civillanlzed —Police Authority set up Special Powers can only be abolished when there 1s no threat from subversives Housing Executive B ill —centralized a ll housing

-e* oo !

1970 — Contloied

fawn itlm C lrll rights aarthes proaocstlm Pol i n should halntatn Isa ted order

Orange Piredet —Police should protect Oroogt Paredes —Ortnge Ptrodes are tn d ltia o a l —Orange Parades were saregely attached Aicp—It iM ffectlre In dealing aith rioters —steed i/ith ta ils to those attaching Orange lurchers

There has heen a carefulty planned caagaiga to destroy Iritish prmises conuruas'.ees No-go arras in fiogslde —Should » t he aliened to e x is t Attached torernnent and Amy fo r laadeguete enfoixment of leu tcmbltcan Opposition is inealrad in elo- I n n —sane A e^ibllcsa 19s a t nettings Amy Sion In noting against IAA guinea afcere to to r and eras ashed fo r Inadequate liaison batmen XX and Amy Incensed eeer tan on parades —This another eictery fo r a nti-lo ya lists Cerement sbeold not bare handed orer —Deed lo y a lis t parades security to latstalnstar Objected to Lynch p m ta rin g tr it is h Cotem- Could not depend on 03A re s t to stop Orange Parades —Sou* UON nan said they m i d not de­ fend the (order Lynch hear gen-running m s going on—th is Jest another effort to tear doao the State of 1.1. XX not nov being trained in the use o f arm Otaoanced Cortf meat Slant HC reamed and adequate arm fo r Ccrcrlatent is steaarolleriog reforms police stations to defend th u o elrcs People shoeId he altoeed to decide mother thxj No-go amis s till exist eentnd reform -Wire barms for IAA ■■tlC not attoued In these arras Cortrmoet is not paying attcotiao to conttita- CMS 1M ham in filtra te d c lttte m defense e m itte r s in nemo areas , Feelted Corerecent fo r haodino oner control o f —Ham no-no areas searched DSC to C ritish Amy tomrenent lying about no-go areas Against ttacrnry leport —They s till do exist —Against ceotrallting local gum a net —P m t. close to these areas am eery sen Ices eutnerable —This m i d destroy local gerernnent C orerm at should c a ll a Central Election

Police *111 —Opposed to th is l i l t —Against Gonrnneat shirting responsi­ b ility for tan and order to Police Authority —AX is not a paranilitary organisation —DSC should not he dlshsnoed —(explained that AC recruits being tamed out nithoot training lan onforcmeot is biased against Pm t.

hbrhiag class Prat, ere treated hodly by COrtifflOit —Anqr protects Cath. and I U hut w ill -po not protect Prat. (O Amy Is gnilty of bratslity agaiest Pmt. 1I7D — Contimmt

M ite Order Act should lu ft been fe»d ^g ile ti Udti Oo c«ttH 9M ltr«tid —against U r civil rights airden Pmestifli m tfem irt Just traU li uten Explosions were set by t/fF Police should hive prevented People's Democracy n e ttin g Orange Parades ere p w e c it lr t -th e y stable be re ro u te d Supported C d rtrm e*t tan ce parades—thought I t tad de-escalated tension I je d t 't Tralee speech considered t t i t a w lik e ftfoinlzed pMKnmls) by Eire RPs —a ll Eire pertfes are coonltted to non* • violence feared takeover o f Covenvent by right-wing —then refom s woutd Bean nothing BesubUcaq Opposition Afraid Goveneeet Publicity Service would be used fo r U nionist Party purposes only ppand proportional representation te fo m —on ly went through because o f pres* Sure f n n Washington Attach Influence o f Orange Order on Govern* ■cut Police B ill -tclcw d this BUI m RJC —RUC tave been used by M a, o f H n A ff. —charges against WC in Bogs Ida should —has been biased enforccnent not be dropped —has b e n b n rta lity In BogsIda by po lice —senior RUC wwben are shielding wen —a fra id Com ment w ill pack RUC Reserve ufao attacked the Oevcooy faa tly with B Specials Aral authority Is now at Ifcstnlester DSC —are joining old towredcs associations Ib-go areas no longer as I i t and r if le clubs M inistry of Casualty Relations created —these clubs are jnst cicala fo r right- —supported th is wing activity Noosing Executive B ill Attached Amy —cool toward I t —Indiscrim inate use o f C l gas —gpverment vis forced to bring this In —any uncivil while conducting arms —govermnt given no credit for bringing searches th is In ' Nacrory Report —not unhappy w ith I t —wauld p re fe r systen d e n lo c a l a v tb o rf tie s kept t t a lr power Concerned about strength o f righ t-w ing —Craig is preaching hatred and fear dories art being Uttnfdated In controversial cases Intlaldatleo —Cattallcs are being forced to leave t t a lr fames a t gunpoint —eapleyers are being Intluldated Into d istillin g tta lr mplsyces Nationalist areas a rt not getting enough grants In Industry so Cstfc* ere being forced to M igrate Police Authority —cooplalnts because have Castle Catb* wta support Unionists on the Authority —need torfclfla class Catholics 1971

Unionist Govt, and Party

Rioting —not due to eras searches —due to Republicans

IRA are behind rio ts Unionist Govt, and Party —have Issued b ulletins asking fo r resis­ tance Govemaent presented plan fo r reorganization —there is evidence from the security o f local government forces that the Provisional IRA are at work Electoral Law B ill passed to provide for Severe rio tin g end disorders universal adult franchise Condemned a ll those Involved in rioting IRA funerals Public Order B ill —hearse flanked by men wearing black Government now engaged In a c iv il war —Introduced to control processions berets —ban would not be extended —disturbances Moderate Unionists called fo r Introduction o f —called for voluntary restrictions on Interment and reaming of RUC parades Three B ritis h soldiers shot Security forces Minister of Camunlty Relations Report Procession o f Protestant shipyard workers —any charges o f b ru ta lity against 1n protest o f murders security forces would be Investigated Chlchester-Clark went to Britain to get campaign against terrorists Intensified Pr1oe Minister Chlchester-Clark —B rita in agreed to send more troops —violence 1s due to sinister forces plus poor living conditions Chlchester-Clark said weapons would be d1s- —now have closer lia iso n between RUC and trlbuted to RUC as they were needed Array —IRA are in state of disarray and are seeking softer targets Moderate Unionists —containment 1s not working —need more vigorous policy by security forces______

March 23 Chlchester-Clark resigned Faulkner becomes Prise Minister and said he was coonltted to reforms Faulkner broke the Conservative alliance by bringing West Into Cabinet

CJ1 ei 1571 — Continued

Craig, best, WMde. llrv g t, lalfd, flttlQ , iH ttll K ttlig -ia i a cenfrootatloa bctuota —IRA ud security forces —IRA to M ac for rioting L w u d order hat o g l t t i l } brakes doao ISA f w t r i l i —being used fo r Republican p o litic a l purpotti —funerals p in d i through loyalist tactless Iq tlltU trill not cantim to tolerate flaunting of Tricolour -fltp lw of U li flog It plot to cano tro uble to -90 areas—s t i l l t o l l ! —poller can't go there to tone n rltl —wax U nK tear toot barricades to U n i no-go areas Trot, proem Ions or* orderly—should to olloued —se c u rity fo r m Should d u l orlUo U oto pondn that cooto tr o u b lo Aruy l i alncys MtcMig Prat.. n o t Cath. —charged nrny tr lt k b ru ta lity C outarratlTrt " —uaatad In q u iry Attacked torerneeot fo r uoy tbey acre band* Hi / lin g disorders —fillltf did n t h llu t itllln nM carry Out threat to shoot Misted aw olectioo Orange pa ra in should po oo Uadaadurr — Jure and July —the rearalna o f the »UC ■ w plr tt polarltatloa of Prot.a n d Cato. In loodonOcrry - c o q lc t r breakdouo o f la n a n d order rule try ISA ttu g t —o a illrr latlaldatlon of Prot. —troops hart Moo u lthdraun froa logtlda Cooeral Tuio has aade pact tr itk ISA An* It no In— r a ll— 4 to Doat nntrol

L jic a 'i speech —Ola only net!** In putting farto a plan for dm lopurt of best It to fnrtScr M t con* of o w lted lie land Tripartite talks K to p lIlM noulng to rt. plan fo r reorganization o f local goaero a n t— cast m t Important fwctloes taka* fros local goreron tt —osBtnatao boards are aadenocratle Cblebester-Ctari —gatt eore Sri t ilt to ld le n . but tboto u o n 't feolp —soldiers not able to preterm peace *0* K .I. needs an arord forgo uader I t l on c o n tro l Soot Coasem tlm called for latcnocot to t ream all M Hast lu re s Coaterrtt1*et to Join Fanlksur't U1 U 1971 — Continued

Conservatives

HcQuade, Boa1, Paisley, Craig, Beattie a ll express no confidence In new governnent

Ministry of Community Relations —money wasted on th is M inistry

Comalttee System—proposed by Faulkner Conservatives —rejected by Craig and Paisley as undemocratic October 13 Motion o f censure of Government fo r not August ensuring adequate police force to deal —Internment has failed with terrorists —almost total absence of law and order —no confidence In UDR because they are N.I. Is responsible for law and order but under B ritis h army had no say in methods used —must take In itia tiv e from B ritis h Prot. vigilantes defended army —they were trying to protect their hemes V igilante groups Reform —want a civilian force on Shanklll to —no amount o f reform would s a tis fy the watch fo r bombers Opposition Want a third force under the control of the Internment Crown______—wanted I t —Boal and Paisley against I t —Paisley wanted gunmen brought to tr ia l, not Just Interned______1971 — Continued

Republican Opposition

January —9DLP formed

Rioting—Is due to A ray behavior —search fo r anas Is one-sided —army looks mainly 1n Republican areas

Rioting—Is due to credibility gap —Catholics cannot believe reforms are Republican Opposition going 1n January Army uses obscene language while conducting Hotlon to repeal Govt, of Ireland Act searches —overwhelmingly defeated —army contrives confrontations Oeoand army be removed from sensitive Procession o f shipyard workers areas —was not spontaneous —was organized Only get peace 1f get sharing of power —Intention was to push Govt, out Demand proportional representation Orange Parades —ju s t an e ffo rt a t one-upmanship Demand withdrawal of licenses fo r guns —should stop them March Blamed Protestants for rioting Motion o f censure against Attorney General C iv il rights parades should not be stopped— —charged p a rtia lity o f enforcement are not sectarian and prosecution —court decisions not fair -______Incensed over Faulkner’ s statement that soldiers would not hesitate to shoot —considered th is appeasement to rig h t- wing

Goverment plan to reorganize local govt. —not enthusiastic about i t —preferred to maintain local councils and have proportional representation

Govemaent would not have brought in reforms I f not forced to by Westminster Electoral Law B ill “ we leaned —a t la s t, one nan-one vote —Govt. Mould not give 1n u n til people took to the streets

Public Order B ill —b itte rly opposed —gives the Min. Hose A ff. control over whether a parade should take place —Is an effort to stop the civil rights marches —1s just an effort to pacify right-wing

Faulkner as Prime M inister —suspicious o f Faulkner —afraid he won't push reforms -Republican Opposition say they w ill not tolerate slig h te st deviation from reforms —rig h t wing has power a t Stormont, but Westminster now has real power Republican Opposition

Reforms have been passed but so has repres­ Republican Opposition walked out o f House sive legislation SDLP organized campaign o f c iv il disobed­ Faulkner's Cabinet ience______Objected to appointment of Brooke—he is right-wing Afraid West agreed to serve 1n Cabinet only a fte r being reassured the RUC would be rearmed Bums to Cabinet—he Is also right-wing Faulkner, In making up his Cabinet, tried to unify the Unionist Party

M inistry o f Cocmunlty Relations Report —welcomes his e ffo rts —he cannot do much Coemlttee Idea proposed by Faulkner —cautious welcome

Londonderry erupted —two men k ille d —Opposition threaten to walk out unless Inquiry held July 16 — Opposition walked out 1972

Christinas Day, 1971 and January Marches against Interment NICRA planned march fo r Armagh January 30 NICRA Organized March in Londonderry RUC-aray statement warned that violence might ensue tinTonist 6ovt. and Party Violence did break out Faulkner Paratroopers moved in —police are tryin g to prevent these —13 civilians killed illegal processions against interment Marches a ll ever N .I. —break up processions tdiere practical Mass intim idation o f Prot. in Londonderry Moderates NICRA announced they would continue marehlng —did not want ban extended —Republicans are using IRA funerals as February 2 p o litic a l parades B ritis h embassy in Dublin burned —Republicans were flo u tin g ban on Unionist Govt, and Party Newry c iv il rights march peaceful parades Bombing and nurders Goverrsent extended ban fo r 12 mare months NICRA marches ille g a l on parades—so forces could concentrate Abercom Restaurant bombing on fighting IRA —two k ille d , many maimed Paratroopers have used great re s tra in t but Bombs being placed to cause most personal now people ca llin g them murderers February 10 harm State o f Emergency declared Blame those who organized march January—February—March IRA attack on RUC and UDR Inquiry w ill be held —many o ffice rs murdered Widespread intim idation by IRA Ban on parades would be maintained Hume and SDtP stated they would now accept nothing less than a united Ireland Bombings are an attempt to set cocmunltles at each other's throats ______March 27 General strike by Prot. to show distaste for Heath proposals to talk about a united Ireland ______

c ji ~-4 1972 — Continued

Unionist Govt, and Party Continued Border Incidents Regrettable lack o f control by South on th e ir Gelignite coming from Eire gelignite

Southern courts le ttin g IRA o ff South—1s a haven fo r the IRA —men are being trained 1n the use o f ants Amy fire d on from across Border there

Lynch said he would send money to SDLP 1n Government decided to crater unapproved roads Unionist Govt. and Party North Accepted Paisley’ s motion rejecting any RUC and UDR being Increased Or. H illery announced In USA that Eire union trlth the South Government could no longer control IRA Lynch Is working for overthrow of N.I. Insti­ tutions B ritain IRA has Lynch 1n tow Announced talks on eventual unification of Ireland ______Security forces having greater success w ith IRA every day 1972 — Continued

Conservatives C iv il rig h ts starches should have been stopped

Absolutely opposed to extension of ban on parades — ovemment could not enforce ban Conservatives -•Republicans paraded anyway —ban could only work against lo y a lis ts Paisley Country Is facing a constitutional crisis Protestants on Shanklll have decided not —is useful for loyalists to assenble to accept ban on parades and parade Motion rejecting any talks about a united NICRA march In Londonderry Ireland —marchers had n a il boobs, etc. —supported from a ll Unionists —they case to do battle Inquiry would ju s t be a platform fo r Attacked Government fo r fa ilu re Republican propaganda —1n security field —no policing 1n Bogslde and Creggan Border —security a t Long Kesh and Crumlln —wanted complete sealing o f Border j a i l Inadequate

South 1s a hostile country Protestants w ill not continue to be patient —a sanctuary for terrorists

Wanted complaints made to Westminster over Lynch sending money to SDLP

C iv il rig h ts people are marching fo r the destruction of the N.I. Parliament ______

March 28 B ritis h Government assisted d ire ct control o f security of Northern Ireland The Unionists resigned In protest—General feeling they had been betrayed hy Britain 60

Summarization

To summarize very briefly, the dynamics of the 1965-1972 period- appear to be as follows.

The year 1965 looked lik e a hopeful year for Northern Ireland. The IRA had ceased th e ir campaign of violence in 1961 and community relations were better than they had been for many years. At Stormont, Captain O'Neill, a progressive Unionist, was Prime Minister. At Westminster, the Labour Party, led by Harold Wilson, was in power. In the Republic of Ireland, the Taoiseach was Lemass. It was in this atmosphere of improved relations that Prime Minister O 'N eill made an unprecedented gesture of goodwill to the South; he invited Taoiseach Lemass to meet with him in Belfast, so breaking the diplomatic isolation that had existed between these two heads of state since 1920. This meeting once again brought the constitutional position of Northern Ireland into focus. Constitutional uncertainty, plus growing discontent over inadequate housing and employment, were to provide the fuel for the coming conflagration.

The O'NeillrLemass meetings seemed to galvanize the extremists on both sides, and in the next two years there was increasing street activity as both the Republicans and Protestant extremists started to mobilize their followers by parading and marching. The Unionist response to this increased street activity was to repress the activi­ ties of both Protestant loyalists and Republican activists. The response of the Republican Opposition in the House was to c a ll more loudly for reforms and to attack the security forces.

In 1968, there was a change in the nature of street activity. C iv il rights marches, rather than Republican parades, became the vehicle of dissent. Civil rights marchers, led by Republican Members of Parliament, demanded reforms. The Protestant loyalists tried to stop these civil rights marchers, seeing them as old Republicans in new clothing. The Unionist Government feared IRA involvement in the civil rights movement and followed a dual policy of repression and reform. Efforts were made to control the distur­ bances, w hile, at the same tim e, substantial reforms were promised.

The civil rights marches continued into 1969 and 1970. The Protestant loyalists continued trying to stop them and violence escalated. Republican parades and Orange Parades proliferated in a mutual e ffo rt at one-upmanship. The IRA, now clearly a force to be reckoned with, b u ilt up th e ir forces in Belfast and Londonderry. In August, the British troops were called- in to help control the rioting in Londonderry and Belfast. The Unionist Government passed a sub­ stan tial number of promised reform measures, but these did not appease the agitators or reduce the violence. The O'Neill Government fell under the Conservative Unionist criticism of the reforms and inadequate law enforcement. 61

In 1971, there was massive escalation of violence, with numerous explosions, direct attacks by the IRA on security forces and a campaign of c iv il disobedience led by Republican MPs. The Unionists continued th eir policy of reform, but disorders did not abate and another Unionist Government f e l l , Faulkner became Prime Minister and he intensified the dual policy of repression and reform. He instituted large scale searches for arms and, finally, internment, to try to control the violence, while simultaneously suggesting a Committee System that would bring about power sharing with the Republican Opposition. Nothing stemmed the violence.

In 1972, although a ll marches were now Ille g a l, marches against internment and civil rights marches occurred, culminating in the deaths of thirteen c iv ilia n s , as paratroopers tried to bring these illegal marches under control. Britain assumed direct control of the security of Northern Ireland, and the Unionist Government resigned, not wanting to be a Government without power.

The dynamics of this time period—1965-1972—v/iT1 be analyzed according to the general systems theory in the following chapter. CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this study, the Parliament of Northern Ireland has been considered as a system and Inputs, perceptions, structural changes and outputs have been noted. A separate analysis w ill now be given of inputs, perceptions, structural change and outputs, and a consideration of the movements 1n the system as a whole. An attempt w ill then be made, using the collected data, to answer the five questions raised concerning the role of the authorities In dealing with episodes of collective behavior. Inputs, perceptions and outputs w ill be analyzed separately, and 1n turn, and then the system considered as a whole.

Inputs — Intrasocietal

The general trend of the inputs was a gradual, and then rapid, escalation of disturbances and violence, culminating In a situation of gu errilla warfare. The meeting between O'Neill and Lemass was an attempt at some conciliation with the South, but 1t seems to have excited sensitivities about the constitutional question once again, and provided an issue around which both Republicans and loyalists were mobilized. The meeting raised hopes among Republicans and raised fears among the Protestant loyalists that a united Ireland was a d istin ct possibility. The Republicans renewed th e ir a c tiv itie s , celebrating Republican events and organizing Republican Clubs, while the Protestant loyalists marched against any change in the status quo.

In 1968, there was a distinct change 1n the Input. Now Republicans marched, not under a Republican banner, but under the flag of c iv il rights. They were led by Republican Members of Parliament, disillusioned after several years of trying 1n vain to get reforms through Parliament. The issue of c iv il rights blended happily with Republican sentiment, since i t provided a more legitimate rationale fo r attacking the Government and the current system. The Protestant loyalists counter-marched in effo rts to stop the c iv il rights marchers, who they quickly branded as Republican.

The year 1969 was a time of mass mobilization. Civil rights people marched and th e ir parades were plagued by Protestant counter demonstrations. Protestant Orangemen paraded and were attacked by

62 63

Republicans. Widespread disorder resulted. At this time the first real evidence appeared that the IRA were involved in the civil rights movement.

By 1970, there was no doubt that subversives were digging themselves in. The IRA had b u ilt up their numbers in Belfast and were marching openly in m ilita ry style. Two men were murdered in an internal IRA dispute, the f ir s t instance of IRA aggression directed inward. The c iv il rights parades and lo yalist counter demonstrations continued.

By 1971, a state of guerrilla warfare existed. The IRA were using th e ir funerals as p o litical parades to mobilize Republican sentiment. They tauntingly flew the Tricolour, an act guaranteed to enrage the Protestant loyalists. They undertook an active attack on the security forces. Three soldiers were shot in the head on a country road, and members of the Special Branch and the RUC were murdered. Guns and bombs were now well-established parts of the conflict. Attacks on petrol pump attendants and bank robberies increased, as the IRA sought funds to finance th e ir campaign. Tarrings and featherings took place as the IRA exerted their discipline on the Catholic popula­ tion. The incidence of general crime and unexplained murders shot up. For th e ir part, the loyalists used the Orange Parades as shows of strength and were systematically attacked by Republicans. After the three British soldiers were murdered, the Protestant shipbuilders, in a huge body, marched in protest of these murders despite the ille g a lity of such a march.

Faced with this degree of violence, the security forces took a more active stance in trying torestorelaw and order. The Army started to return fir e and kille d two men and la te r, two women, who fired on them from a car. Searches for arms were instigated and, finally, internment was introduced to try to control the IRA. The SDLP, having withdrawn from Parliament by this time, called fo r a campaign of civil disobedience.

In 1972, despite all marches being illegal, the NICRA started marching again, ostensibly against internment. Several of these marches were held and ended peacefully, but the Government, under fir e from loyalists for allowing illegal Republican parades, while Orange Parades were prevented by the ban, had to enforce adherence to the law. After dire warning of possible violence.if there should be further marches, the paratroopers moved in on a demonstration in Londonderry. The marchers were armed and in the subsequent firin g , thirteen people were k ille d . There was a great outcry against this show of force by the Army and Republican marches occurred a ll over Ireland. The SDLP announced they would now accept nothing short of the union of Ireland and they intensified their campaign of civil disobedience. The IRA stepped up its bombings, now placing bombs in areas where they would do the most physical damage to people. They 64

continued th e ir murders of RUC and UDR men. Finally, in a massive show of strength, power and peaceful resistance, the loyalists staged a general strike against the Heath proposal for a united Ireland.

In it ia lly , both factions seemed to be using the marches and parades, perhaps unconsciously, as a means of emphasis, a form of extraordinary action that seemed necessary in order to get the other faction to hear. The civil rights people were trying to get action on housing and reforms, the loyalists were trying to communicate th eir resolve to maintain Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. This extraordinary action simultaneously communicated to the opponents and to the supporters themselves th e ir own strength, support and depth of feeling. Old rituals v/ere used and new rituals created for this purpose. Both factions also used the parades and funerals to mobilize support and emphasize the truth of their particular definition of the situation.

Smelserl suggests that a generalized belief arises to explain strains in the environment and this generalized b elief then guides collective behavior. Other researchers have questioned the existence of a generalized belief shared by individuals involved in episodes of collective behavior. This study was not concerned with a ll the members of a social movement, as such, but i t was concerned with members of Parliament, some of whom became involved with the civil rights move­ ment. What appears to have happened in this case is that people participated in episodes of collective behavior, having varying inter­ pretations and beliefs of the current scene, but through action and interaction, and later interpretation, there eventually emerged a generalized belief or a common definition of the situation.

The episodes of collective behavior, the parades and the marches did not take place because individuals shared a generalized belief; the parades and marches were an effort to generate a particular generalized b elief. They were a form of communication, a way of defining the situation to participants as well as to the public. It is reminiscent of Marx's class consciousness. I t is not a matter of class consciousness arising firs t and then directing conflict with the bourgeoisie, but rather that through c o n flic t, class consciousness arises.

I t seems possible that through collective behavior a generalized belief, or definition of the situation is helped to emerge. Smelser's order has to be reversed; it is not a matter of people having a generalized belief and then participating in episodes of collective behavior, the collective behavior is a way of generalizing a belief. For example, when F it t , Currie and McAteer took part in the October 5th c iv il rights march, McAteer was a reluctant marcher, a moderate, pres­ sured Into a m ilitan t stance. For quite a while a fte r the October 5th march, F itt, who had been arrested there, and Currie said little about i t . However, la te r, as the marches continued, the October 5th march was 65

regarded as a milestone in the c iv il rights movement, and F it t was portrayed as the great martyre for getting his head trudgeoned. Even McAteer came to wear his participation in this march as a badge of honor. The action appeared f ir s t , and only la te r was the meaning of that action attached. The action itself was instrumental in defining the situation. When Currie squatted in the Council House a t Caledon with the local Republican Club members, his fellow Republican MPs were embarrassed and apologized fo r him. Later, as direct action became an accepted strategy, Currie's stand at Caledon was rein ter­ preted as one of the first blows struck in the war for civil rights. It was only after his stand that it was interpreted as a last ditch e ffo rt to get the attention of the Government for long-needed reforms.

Inputs -- Extrasocietal

Britain

The British input over the eight-year period unwittingly drove the Republican and Loyalist factions further and further apart and contributed to the final total polarization of the country. British input consisted of a continuous pressure to force the North closer to the South. Wilson precipitously suggested tripartite talks soon after the firs t hesitant Northern move toward the South in the O'Neill- Lemass meeting. This attitude on the part of Great Britain encouraged the Republicans to believe that union was not only possible, but imminent, and at the same time, i t stiffened the Protestant resolve not to be pushed into such a union. Britain then pressured for reforms and threatened intervention i f O'Neill was prevented from implementing them. This, again, encouraged the Republicans to believe that i f they kept up th eir pressure in the streets, they would achieve th eir ends. They realized they had the power of the British Government behind them. The Unionist Government and Party were squeezed by the Republican street a c tiv ity on the one hand, and the B ritish Parliament on the other. They reluctantly capitulated and passed the reform measures.

The main concern of the B ritish Government was to restore peace to Northern Ireland. They thought this could be done by forcing reforms, pacifying the c iv il rights people, the Republican movement and, finally, the IRA. In trying to bring this about, the British input was rather biased in favor of the Republican faction. For example, the initial attitude of the British Army was that the Protestant working classes, the lo y a lis ts , were the aggressors and this resulted 1n rather biased law enforcement by the Army. This led to resentment on the part of loyalists and further polarization of the society. 66 The British Government tried to reassure the Unionists and loyalists that union with the South would not be affected without the consent of the northern Ireland Parliament. However, Wilson le ft no doubt that he was in favor of union with the South. At one point, he lauded the IRA for their devotion to their cause. When the violence was at its height, the British Government again suggested trip a rtite talks, leading to unification of Ireland in fifteen years. This was further encouragement to the IRA that th eir objective was being achieved, and further proof to the loyalists that their interests were not being considered. Complete polarization of the community was inevitable. Respective positions were frozen into irreconcilable opposites. Finally, the British Government took over control of security, virtually forcing the Parliament to resign, or become a powerless figurehead of a Parliament.

Eire

Although B ritish input unwittingly exacerbated the conflict 1n Northern Ireland, the input from Eire was decidedly aggressive and hostile. The Eire Government kept pressure on the British Government for a united Ireland. The Eire Government one-sidely supported the Catholic Republicans in the North and was unsympathetic to the Northern Ireland Government’s efforts to keep the violence under control. They exerted pressure by creating mobile m ilita ry hospitals along the Border and taking the matter to the United Nations. The Eire Government allowed the IRA free movement in the Republic; Eire became a convenient sanctuary to which the IRA could flee after com­ mitting violence in the North. Members of the Eire Government were d ire c tly Involved 1n gun-running to the North and although they were tried by Southern courts, there were no sanctions levied against them.

A few conciliatory moves were made by the Eire Government. Lynch condemned the violence of the IRA and suggested parts of the Eire constitution might be changed to make it more acceptable to Northern Protestants. He offered to cooperate with Northern Ireland in the development of the West of Ireland. However, these gestures were marred by his insistence that all thirty-two counties belonged to the Republic and the Implication was there that mutual development of the West would aid final reunification.

Later, as the violence In the North grew, the Eire Government did not effectively stop the flow of gelignite across the Border or the firin g at B ritish troops from the Eire side.. There was no co­ operation on the part of the Eire courts on extraditing IRA men known to have committed murders in the North, and on the occasional Instance when the IRA were taken before the courts in the South, they were released. The fin al insult to the Northern Ireland Government was Lynch's statement that he would support "his people" in the North and would send money to the SDLP, who had withdrawn from Parliament and were meeting independently. 67

The total impact of the inputs from the South was to split the Northern community and the Northern Ireland Parliament apart.

Inputs from the B ritish and Eire Government were largely dependent on what was in the best interests of politicians in those two respective governments. It was in the best interest of Eire politicians to press for union, since this was a popular cause in the South. I t was in the interests of the B ritish Government to restore peace to Northern Ireland, and money and arms were provided for th is purpose. However, the B ritish Government f e lt that the way to restore peace was to appease the Republicans and the IRA. While they did th is , they ignored the interests of the loyalists and so exacerbated the conflict situation.

Perceptions — Unionist

The Unionist Government was exceedingly slow in recognizing there was discontent in the community and that reforms were needed. They rejected a ll reforms fo r three years, from 1965 to 1968, as unnecessary and unworkable. As Republicans started to organize and increase their activity on the streets, and threats were made against Government m inisters, the Unionists came to fear renewed IRA a c tiv ity . Protestant extremists also became active on the streets. In con­ demning those who caused the disturbances, the Unionists were even- handed, blaming both Protestant extremists and Catholic Republicans. When the civil rights marches started in 1968, all but the Conservative Unionists were ready to acknowledge that some of the marchers were sincerely attempting to bring about economic and social change. As time went on, and evidence accumulated, there was a growing realization that the c iv il rights movement had been infiltrated by the IRA. There was still a denial that discrimination, poor housing, unemployment and generally poor social conditions might have been the cause of the growing disturbances. The Unionists had a generally negative view of the Republican Opposition m ilita n ts . They saw Currie and F itt, in their vehement calls for reform, as inciting people to disorder. Direct action taken by Currie at Caledon was considered a Republican p o litic a l stunt.

By 1969, there was a clear recognition that the civil rights people were involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of Northern Ireland and achieve a united Ireland, and the distur­ bances were caused to achieve this end. Moderate Unionists f e lt duped for believing the civil rights movement had been at least partly genuine. The Republican Opposition v/as seen as closely Involved in this effort to subvert the lawful government. Their attacks on the police, judiciary, legal system and Orange Order were all perceived as directed toward this end. A fter reforms had been promised, the pres­ sure exerted by the Republican Opposition fo r a timetable of reform 68 was resented, and their walk-out of Parliament in August of 1969 was considered a p o litic a l stunt. After numerous reforms were passed, and the Republican Opposition did not appear satisfied, the Unionists came to the conclusion that nothing would satisfy them.

Early in 1970, the Unionists thought the situation was improving, despite the buildup of subversives in the Ardoyne area. The Government claimed that the police were back in the Bogside and Creggan and a period of calm was needed. However, rioting broke out again and continued into 1971. The Unionists blamed the severe rioting on the IRA who were capitalizing on poor living conditions. They saw repressive measures, such as wide scale searches and intern­ ment, as being the only way of dealing with the rioters, since reforms had been passed and had had no e ffect. They noted that rioting had erupted again in Londonderry despite a ll the money and e ffo rt put Into housing and providing employment in that c ity . The policy of contain­ ment clearly had not been sufficien t and the Unionists thought the security forces must take a more active approach. The Government promised to keep sustained pressure on the IRA and they interpreted the IRA attacks on soft targets, and their use of indiscriminate violence, as evidence of IRA disarray, and the attachment of criminals to the organization. The Government considered the arms searches and hot pursuit as successful ways of dealing with the IRA. The final walk­ out by the Republican Opposition was seen as a move forced by the IRA.

By 1972, the Moderate Unionists began to question the u tility of banning parades. The Republicans were conducting ille g a l parades against internment and the IRA were using their funerals as political parades, but the Orangemen were not marching because of the ban on parades. This, they thought, was a clearly unfair, lopsided situation. However, they eventually went along with the Government view that the ban on a ll parades should be extended.

Throughout the entire time period, the Unionists supported the security forces in the face of heavy Republican criticism , but they were w illing to investigate any charges of b ru tality. They believed the reorganization of the police, the disarming of the RUC and the disbanding of the USC would take care of some of the grievances voiced by the Opposition. They recognized the heavy price paid by the security forces, in lives lost and punishment taken. They saw a peculiar irony in the protestations of the Republicans after thirteen civilians had been killed in the crossfire when the paratroopers attempted to control an ille g a l demonstration. They noted that the Republicans very vigorously condemned the Art^y but did not fa u lt those who attacked and murdered the security forces.

Unionist sensitivity concerning the constitutional position of Northern Ireland increased steadily as the disturbances continued. The Unionists were quite aware of the fact that Westminster could abolish the power of the Northern Ireland Parliament. The Unionists 69

generally regarded the B ritish Government as being very helpful in the situation, right up to the last minute, when Wilson suggested talks leading to a united Ireland in fifteen years. All Unionists rejected this. Finally, when Britain took over control of security, the Unionists generally felt betrayed.

The Unionist attitude tB^the Eire Government became increas­ ingly hostile as the Eire Government meddled in the affairs of Northern Ireland by taking the problem to the United Nations, establishing mobile hospitals on the Border and having Eire Government Ministers involved in gun-running to the North. The Unionists generally relied on Westminister to take care of such matters. However, the Unionists developed a deep distrust fo r the Eire Government when the gun-runners were allowed to go free, when Lynch continued to claim all thirty-two counties, when gelignite was allowed to flow across the Border, and when IRA murderers were given sanctuary in the South. They fin a lly concluded that Lynch was working to overthrow the Northern Ireland institutions, including the constitution.

Perceptions -- Conservative Unionists

The Conservative Unionists emerged as a clear group in 1969. They were very suspicious of the civil rights movement, IRA activity, and the involvement of the Republican Opposition in the disturbances. They were the f ir s t to charge that the c iv il rights movement had been infiltrated by the IRA. Civil rights marches, they believed, v/ere just an excuse fo r Republican marchers to fig h t the police, since marchers came prepared with missiles and nail bombs. They blamed the IRA alone for the rioting. From 1969 on, the Conservatives warned that the IRA were using the no-go areas to build up th e ir strength and they persistently brought evidence that despite what the Government said, the no-go areas continued to exist. The Republican Opposition were seen as actively involved in helping the IRA.

The Conservatives consistently defended the Orange marches as traditional and orderly. They considered such marches useful and necessary fo r the loyalists to show th e ir strength. When the Government banned all marches, the Conservatives rejected the move, pointing out that the ban hurt only the loyalists, since the Republicans marched whether 1t was legal to march or not, and managed to get away with I t . The Conservatives thought the loyalists would not continue to stand for such a state of affairs.

The Conservatives were either silent on the matter of reforms or against them. They were opposed to the reorganization of local government on the grounds that the plans presented by the Government, by centralizing the important functions, would destroy local government and make i t undemocratic and remote from the people. They objected to 70

the Central Housing Authority on the same grounds. They saw the Government as g u ilty of steamrolling through reforms which were not supported by the electorate, and they called for new elections to test the support fo r the Government. They were opposed to Faulkner's suggested Committee system fo r sharing power with the Republican Opposition, seeing i t as dangerous and undemocratic. They thought no amount of reform would appease the Republican Opposition or the c iv il rights people.

The Hunt Report and subsequent Police B ill created more concern among the Conservatives than any other reform measure. They feared that disbanding the USC and c ivilian izin g the RUC at the time of greatest threat from subversives would seriously weaken the a b ility of the Northern Ireland Government to maintain law and order. They accepted the principle of an unarmed police force so long as that force continued to be trained in weapons use. They severely criticized the Government when the RUC were turned out with no arms training and police stations were le ft without arms to protect themselves. They believed the RUC had to be armed if they were to be in any position to control the disturbances. They faulted the Government for handing over responsibility for the armed forces to Britain.

Right from the beginning the Conservatives perceived the Army as biased against Protestants and accused them of protecting Catholics and the IRA, but refusing to protect Protestants. They thought the Army should enforce the law in no-go areas. As rioting got more severe, they pointed to the inadequacy of the Army in dealing with rioters. After Londonderry, they charged that the Army was no longer allowed to shoot bombers. They saw no help from bringing in more soldiers, since the soldiers already there were not making a great effo rt to keep the peace. The Conservatives concluded that Northern Ireland needed an armed force under its own control.

The Conservatives had a deep distrust for the Eire Government. They were convinced Lynch knew gun-running was going on, and his only aim was a united Ireland, As Border problems continued, the only solution they saw was a complete sealing of the Border.

Perceptions — Republican Opposition

From 1965 on, the Republican Opposition were sensitive to the growth of community tension over inadequate housing and poor social conditions. They thought reforms were badly needed to end discrimina­ tion 1n the allocation of housing and jobs and to increase the number of people e lig ib le to vote. By 1968, afte r three years of vainly asking for reforms, the Republican Opposition m ilitants came to the conclusion that Parliament was a useless institu tio n to meet the needs of the people and they started taking direct action, leading street parades and squatting. This direct action by the militants, at first, rather 4

71 embarrassed the more conservative members of the Republican Opposition, but very soon the militant view prevailed.

When the Unionist Government did bring in reforms they were not always well received by the Republican Opposition. One of the e a rlie s t reforms passed by the Government to aid in housing, the Londonderry Area Development Commission, was branded by the Republican Opposition as a Unionist trick to maintain political control over Londonderry, and i t was not u n til much la te r that they acknowledged that the Commission had done a good job. In 1969, numerous major reforms were passed, but the Republican Opposition gave no credit to the Unionist Government for these reforms. The Republican Opposition believed the Unionist Government only granted reforms when the people took to the streets and pressure was exerted from Westminster. They perceived a reluctance on the part of many Unionists to enthusiastically support the reforms and they complained because the reforms were not coming fast enough.

The Republican Opposition welcomed most of the reforms that were introduced, but there were several reform measures they had vigorously demanded, which once Incorporated into b ills , received only lukewarm acceptance from them. For example, the fa ir allocation of Council Houses had been demanded by the Republican Opposition since 1965, but when the Housing Executive B ill was passed, they were very cool toward it because It centralized the allocation of housing. Similarly, the Republican Opposition claimed credit for in itia tin g action on local government reorganizat1on,.although the Unionist Government were actually the f ir s t to announce plans to study the question. When the Government accepted the Macrory plan for reorganizing local government, the Republican Opposition said they preferred a system where local authorities kept th e ir powers and where a system of proportional representation was used.

With each change 1n the Government, the Republican Opposition were afraid the reforms would not be vigorously pursued. The most far reaching reform of a ll, the idea of functional committees, proposed by Faulkner, which would bring the Opposition into a position of power sharing with the Government, received only a cautious welcome from the Republican Opposition and did not prevent them from walking out of Parliament soon after the idea was presented. The Republican Opposition did recognize that the Government had passed many reforms, but this recognition did not a lle v ia te the resentment they f e lt because of the repressive measures taken by the Government in th e ir efforts to control the disorders.

The Republican Opposition saw no danger from the IRA and no involvement of the IRA in the civil rights movement until 1969, They consistently denied Unionist charges that the IRA had in filtra te d the civil rights movement and they insisted that the unification of Ireland was not a goal of the c iv il rights movement. They objected to any 72 re-routing of civil rights marches and called on the police to protect the marchers. Then, in 1969, in a complete reversal, they admitted the IRA were involved in the civil rights movement, but insisted that this fitted in with new IRA policy of engaging in social action, rather than violence, to achieve th e ir ends. As social unrest continued, the Republican Opposition continued to insist that the disturbances were not due to the a c tiv itie s of the IRA, or to Republican causes, but to social and economic conditions. Later, they blamed the violence on the police for having re-routed civil rights marches. Later again, with continued rio tin g , they blamed the Army for abusive behavior and obscene language and a one-sided search for arms. They persistently defended the rig h t of the c iv il rights marchers to parade, but demanded that the Orange parades be stopped. Efforts to control disorders, such as the Public Order B ill, were perceived as efforts by the Unionist Government to stop the c iv il rights movement and pacify the right-wing. Republican Opposition members rejected the charge of the Conservative Unionists that the no-go areas continued to exist despite Government denial.

While the Republican Opposition was very slow to see any IRA involvement in the disturbances, they were very much afraid of the activities of the Protestant extremists and blamed them for setting several of the early explosions in an effort to get rid of O'Neill. They regarded Protestant marchers as troublemakers and Orange Parades as provocative attempts at one-upmanship that should be stopped. They supported the Government ban on parades. They regarded the 1971 march of the Protestant shipyard workers who marched in protest at the murders of the three British soldiers as an organized attempt to push Chichester-Clark from office.

The Republican Opposition resented the efforts of the security forces to control the disorders. They complained about the RUC and USC as early as 1966, and later accused the RUC of police brutality In the Bogside. They made no allowance for the conditions under which an undermanned, exhausted RUC had to battle bomb throwers. The Republican Opposition were adamantly opposed to the USC, accusing 1t of being undisciplined and of conducting an orgy of terror In a Catholic housing estate. Both the RUC and USC were thought to have used CS gas indiscriminately and the Republican Opposition walked out of Parliament on the basis of this accusation and vowed not to return until the USC were disbanded and the RUC disarmed. When the Unionists Government accepted the Hunt Report and agreed to disband the USC and disarm the RUC, creating in th eir place the UDR and the RUC Reserve, the Republican Opposition feared the Government intended to pack the new UDR and RUC Reserve with B Specials.

As the disturbances continued and became more severe, the Republican Opposition continued to accuse the police of b ru ta lity and biased enforcement. There was l i t t l e sympathy for RUC and UDR men murdered by the IRA.. Nothing was said about them. Even a fte r the USC were disbanded, the Republican Opposition were afraid of their 73 activities. They feared the USC men were banding together In rifle clubs and old comrades associations, which they feared could become hotbeds of right-wing activity.

Although the Army was at f ir s t welcomed by the Republican Opposition as a non-sectarian force, they soon objected when soldiers were told to return fir e . Just as the Republican Opposition had called for the RUC to be withdrawn from the Bogside, so they called for the Army to be removed from certain sensitive Catholic areas. The final walk-out of the Republican Opposition came after the paratroopers moved in on an ille g a l demonstration and thirteen people were k ille d . The Republican Opposition seemed to resent any effo rt at effective control of the disorders. Efforts to restore law and order were always interpreted as efforts by the Government to placate the right-wing.

After 1969, and the entry of the British Army into the Northern Ireland situation, the Republican Opposition considered that the real power, from this point on, resided in Westminster. They feared the power of the right-wing in Parliament who they perceived as being in the ascendancy. Each change of Government brought more right-wingers into the Government. Chichester-Clark brought Taylor and Brown, two Conservatives, into the Cabinet as Parliamentary Secretaries and Faulkner brought in West and Burns. The Republican Opposition feared that the price paid to West for coming into the Cabinet was an assur­ ance that the RUC would be rearmed. Throughout the entire period, the Republican Opposition saw the influence of the Orange Order on the Government as excessive and non-legitimate.

As for the Republican Government in the South, the Republican ' Opposition were conspicuously s ile n t when i t came to the Eire Government's role in allowing the South to be used as an IRA retreat and about the flow of gelignite from the South. They minimized the involvement of the Eire Ministers in the gun-running episodes.

Structure — Unionists

Included in the Unionist group are all those whose aim was to keep Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and away from a united Ireland. Included are a ll those in the Unionist Party, the Independent Unionists and the Protestant Unionists. The Unionist Party, being the majority party, formed the Government during the entire period of this study. The main structural changes in this group consisted of the splitting away of the Conservative faction and their gradual, but incomplete, reunion with the Party in the end.

The firs t crack in Party unity was visible right after the O'Nelll-Lemass meeting in 1965. The more conservative members of the Party were very fearful for the constitutional integrity of Northern 74

Ireland. With the fir s t disturbances in 1966, O 'Neill appointed Craig, a strong Conservative, as Minister of Home Affairs. Craig exerted a strong Conservative voice within the Government and used strong mea­ sures against the Republican clubs and street activities. O'Neill trie d .to get reforms through but faced strong opposition from the conservative members of his Cabinet and Unionist Party. In 1969, O'Neill fired Craig, ostensibly because he had suggested an independent Northern Ireland. With his ouster from the government circles, Craig and other Conservatives banded together to attack the policies of the Unionist Government. Craig differed from the other Conservatives only on the basis of his championship of an independent Northern Ireland, or a Northern Ireland incorporated into the United Kingdom via some federal system of government.

O 'Neill continued to push for reforms, but was deserted by two important members of his Cabinet. Faulkner and Chichester-Clark resigned, Faulkner claiming that reforms were not rapid enough, and Chichester-Clark saying the time was not right for one man, one vote. When Chichester-Clark became Prime M inister, he moved the Government to the right with the appointment of Taylor and Brooke as Parliamentary Secretaries. Despite the move to the rig h t, government policy did not change. Reforms continued, under pressure from the B ritish Government, and under the belief that reforms would bring a reduction in street violence.

Despite the reforms, the disorders continued and the Government was caught in a double-barrelled attack from the Republicans and the Conservative Unionists. Republican Opposition did not consider the reforms enough and the Conservative Unionists were not only against reforms, but faulted the Government for their inability to maintain law and order. Added to this was the pressure from Britain to institute reforms and th e ir reluctance to vigorously quell the disturbances. Chichester-Clark resigned.

Faulkner became Prime Minister and, once more, the Cabinet moved to the rig h t. Faulkner invited West, a prominent member of the Conservative faction, into the Cabinet, so splitting the Conservative faction. Other Conservatives, Burns and Anderson, were also wooed over to the Government. At this point,only the hard-core Conservatives were opposing the Government, Their main complaint was the in a b ility of the Government to restore law and order, but they were also strongly opposed to Faulkner's functional committees that would bring about power sharing with the Republican Opposition,

In the last days of the Parliament, all Unionists were united against the British Prime Minister's proposal that there should be a united Ireland in fifteen years. Structure — Republican Opposition

All parties who desired eventual unification of Ireland are grouped under the Republican Opposition. The major s h ift in the structure of the Republican Opposition was the growing Influence and final takeover by the more m ilitant members.

In 1965, the Republican Opposition was composed of the Nationalists, Independent Nationalists, Eire Labour, Republican Labour and National Democratic Parties. After the OMIeill-Lemass meetings, the Nationalists, In a very short-lived compromise with the Unionists, accepted the position of the O fficial Opposition.

In 1966 and 1967, with Republican a c tiv itie s intensifying on the streets, a militant group began to emerge. Two militants, F itt and Diamond of the Eire Labour Party and Republican Labour Party respectively, joined forces in the Republican Labour Party.

By 1968, the m ilitants, Currie, F it t , Richardson and Diamond, were very strong. They championed the cause of the squatters against the more conservative Nationalists and took an active part in the c iv il rights parades.

In 1969, the militants virtually gained control of the Republican Opposition. Two new m ilitan ts, former c iv il rights workers in Londonderry, Hume and Cooper, were elected to the House. Hume defeated the more conservative McAteer, the leader of the Nationalist Party. The Republican Opposition was now composed of the Nationalist Party, the Republican Labour Party, Independents and Devlin, of the Labour Party, In 1969, they all left the House for a short time in protest of the force being used to bring the disorders under control.

There was no other structural change in the Republican Opposition until 1971, when the m ilitants re-grouped under the leader­ ship of F itt to form a new party, the Social Democratic Labour Party. F it t , O'Hanlon, Currie, Devlin, Cooper and Hume became members. This group were clearly dominant in the Republican Opposition and on July 16, 1971, they walked out in protest when two people were killed in Londonderry when the security forces tried to control the disorders there.

Outputs — Unionists

The output of the Unionist Government was generally a mixture of repression and reform.

The O'Neill-Lemass meeting was the most significant output of the Unionist Government in 1965. For the next two years, with Craig 76 as Minister of Home Affairs, Government output was mainly repressive, the tra in carrying Republicans to the North to celebrate the Easter Rising was banned, a short ban on parades was put into e ffe c t and the Fenian celebrations and the Republican Clubs were banned. Minor reforms were promised or enacted in 1967 and 1968. A promise was made that the plural vote would be abolished. The Londonderry Area Development Commission was created to speed housing in Londonderry, and a Government white paper was issued on the reshaping of local government.

The year 1969 was a time of numerous reforms, both promised and enacted, and one repressive bill to control disorders. The Government promised an equitable scheme for the allocation of housing, the Cameron Commission and Scarman Tribunal were appointed to look into the causes of the disturbances. Among the reform bills passed was the Community Relations B ill, and the Electoral B ill. A Review Body was set up to consider proposals for restructuring local government. The Hunt Report was accepted by the Government, which meant the dis­ banding of the USC and the c iv ilia n izin g of the RUC. The one repres­ sive B ill was the Public Order B ill, designed to control processions and counter demonstrations. All parades were banned for part of the year.

Reforms continued into 1970. The Police B ill, implementing the recommendations of the Hunt Report, and the Housing Executive B ill, centralizing a ll housing allocations, were passed. The Government conducted a fu ll debate on the reorganization of local government. Repressive measures in 1970 consisted of a Criminal Justice B ill, pro­ viding for mandatory sentencing of rio te rs , and a statement by Chichester-Clark that, henceforth, gunmen would be shot.

In 1971, more reforms were fin alized and new ones suggested by the Government, but repressive measures markedly increased as i t became clear that the disorders were out of hand. Among the reforms was an Electoral Law B ill which brought universal franchise and a plan fo r the reorganization of local government. Proposed reforms included Faulkner's plan for functional committees that would enable the Republicans to share in government power and decision-making. This was the most far-reaching reform suggested to this point. Faulkner also suggested holding wide-ranging discussions on how to solve the problems facing Northern Ireland. Repressive measures, geared to deal with the increasing disorder and serious guerrilla warfare, Included a Public Order Bill to control processions, an increase in the number of troops and police, and the rearming of the RUC. Large scale arms searches and hot pursuit of the IRA were instituted and, fin a lly , Internment was introduced to control the IRA and eradicate them from their strongholds. Despite the reluctance of the Unionists, proces­ sions were once more banned. 77

Only repressive outputs were forthcoming in 1972; parades were banned fo r tv/elve more months, and further increases in the RUC and UDR were made. Finally, a State of Emergency was declared.

The general pattern of outputs was a mixture of reforms and repression, the number of reforms increasing with the incidence of disorders, until no more reforms were possible without destroying the state of Northern Ireland. Thereupon, outputs became purely repressive.

Outputs — Conservative Unionists

The main concern of the Conservative Unionists was the inadequate enforcement of law and order and their outputs were centered around this concern.

Soon a fte r the B ritish Amy was brought 1n, in 1969, the Conservatives complained about th eir over-kill tactics and biased and brutal behavior against Protestants, while enforcing the law. They charged the Army with sealing off the no-go areas Instead of enforcing the law there. These charges of inadequate law enforcement and the continued existence of the no-go areas persisted from 1969 through 1972. The Government were severely criticized for handing over security to Westminster, and for creating a situation where there was poor liaison between the RUC and the Army which made law enforcement d iffic u lt. The Conservatives vigorously fought the implementation of the Hunt proposals, the disbanding of the USC and the reorganization o,f the RUC. As time went on and the disorders continued, they complained because the police were not being trained in arms use. They called for the rearming of the RUC.

These complaints culminated in 1971 1n a Motion of Censure of the Government fo r not ensuring an adequate police force to deal with terrorists. The Conservatives called for new elections to test the people's support for the Government. As the disorders continued, un­ abated, the Conservatives fin a lly thought the in itia tiv e should be taken from the British Army, since Northern Ireland was responsible for law and order, but had no say in the methods used to achieve 1t. They called for a civilian force to watch for bombers, then later, they suggested a third force should be created under the crown.

In 1972, the small hardcore Conservatives s t il l opposing the Government rejected the Government ban on parades. They said the loyalists would not accept the ban since the Republicans were marching anyway.

One of the last outputs of the Conservative faction was a Motion rejecting talks about a united Ireland. On this Motion they were supported by a ll Unionists. 78

Outputs — Republican Opposition

The two main outputs of the Republican Opposition throughout the time period consisted of demands for reform and attacks on the RUC, the USC and, fin a lly , the Army.

Demands for reform were continuously made from 1965 to 1968. In 1968, a new strategy was trie d —direct action. Republican MPs led the Londonderry c iv il rights marchers and Currie squatted in the house at Caledon. At f ir s t , Republican demands were fo r equitable alloca­ tion of houses and one man, one vote, but as reforms v/ere passed, demands increased until, finally, the demand was made for a sharing of power before peace would be allowed. As demands were met, new demands were raised u n til the Republicans were in sight of th eir eventual goal—a united Ireland. In 1971, a motion was introduced by the Republicans to repeal the Government of Ireland Act. I t was rejected by the Unionists.

Republican Opposition attacks on the RUC and the USC, and la te r the Army, were persistent throughout the time period. They accused the RUC of biased enforcement of the law, b ru ta lity against Catholics in the Bogside, and failure to move against Protestants. They demanded an inquiry into the police behavior in Londonderry on October 5, 1968 and the Government complied with the Cameron Commission of Inquiry. They complained that the RUC were under the direct control of the Government, that the Minister of Home Affairs directly con­ trolled them. The Government accepted the Hunt Report and created a Police Authority to oversee the administration of the RUC. The behavior of the RUC was the ostensible reason given by the Republican Opposition fo r walking out during the summer riots of 1969, They said the RUC were using CS gas indiscriminately.

The Republican Opposition branded the USC as biased, sectarian, and deeply involved with extreme Protestant groups. After the dis­ bandment of the USC, in 1970, the Republican Opposition voiced fears that the disbanded members of the USC were joining old comrades associations and rifle clubs. They feared these clubs were cloaks for right-wing a c tiv ity . The Republicans demanded the withdrawal of a ll gun licenses, so that these old USC men, who had kept th eir weapons, could be disarmed.

Although the Army was at f ir s t welcomed by the Republican Opposition, i t was not long before complaints were made about I t sim ilar to the complaints made against the RUC. The Army was accused of using CS gas indiscriminately and of in c iv ility while conducting arms searches. In 1971, the Republican Opposition demanded the security forces be removed from sensitive areas, i . e . , Republican areas. 79

In addition to their attacks on the armed forces, the Republican Opposition also consistently denounced the Orange Order on the grounds that i t exerted too much influence on the Government. They demanded that all MPs resign from the Orange Order.

The Courts were also attacked for inconsistency in sentencing. In 1971, the Republican Opposition introduced a Motion of Censure against the Attorney General, claiming p a rtia lity of enforcement and prosecution. They considered many of the court decisions unfair.

Finally, In 1971, the Republican Opposition, after demanding an Inquiry into the shooting of two c iv ilia n s , shot during an episode of rio tin g , walked out of the House and organized a campaign of c iv il disobedience.

Overall System Operation

The Unionists got caught in a continuous spiral of negative feedback from inside and outside of Parliament regardless of what they did. Neither reforms nor repression worked to control the disorders on the streets or conciliate the Conservative Unionists or the Republican Opposition. The reform measures energized the Conservatives into opposition, without appeasing the Republicans, while the repres­ sive measures tended to invalidate the reforms for the Republicans. The Republican Opposition attacked every measure aimed at controlling the disorders, while the Conservatives called for more effective control of the disorders. Caught in this spiral of negative feedback, the Unionist Government lacked any clear indication of what course to pursue to protect their goals. They continued to give in to the demands of the Republican Opposition even to the point where this affected their ability to maintain law and order.2 Eventually, the Unionist Government suggested a reform themselves, Faulkner's functional committees, that would bring the Republican Opposition right into the heart of Government. This seemed a little like inviting the fox into the chicken coop, since the aim of the Republican Opposition was the even­ tual destruction of the Northern state and its merger with the South. Even taking the mildest view of power sharing, it can be said that its repercussions for the integrity of Northern Ireland were unknown.

Inputs from outside the system, from Britain and E ire, also represented negative feedback to the Unionists. B ritain pressured for reforms which the Unionist Government passed, but they did not allow the security forces to be used in a stringent enough manner to allow them to control the te rro ris ts . The Eire Government clearly supported the Republican movement. 80

The same feedback that proved negative to the Unionists, proved a continuous stream of positive feedback to the Republican Opposition. Direct action, attacks on the RUC, all brought the reforms they wanted. Any repressive measures used by the Government could be used to further mobilize public opinion and further their cause. They continued to use the techniques that proved successful. Being constantly reinforced for their activities, they grew corres­ pondingly strong and widened their demands.

This d iffere n tia l impact of feedback on the system, being almost to ta lly negative for one section and almost to ta lly positive for another, resulted in the final demise of the system.

The Role of Authorities in Dealing with

Episodes of Collective Behavior

Now an e ffo rt w ill be made to answer the fiv e questions concerning the role of authorities in th e ir dealing with episodes of collective behavior.

Here the authorities (the Government of Northern Ireland) able and willing to use force effectively?

a. Were authorities quick and decisive in decid­ ing to use force against outbursts?

b. Was there impartial enforcement of justice?

c. Did the authorities take sides in the contro­ versy?

d. Did authorities have complicity in the out­ bursts?

The evidence clearly shows that the authorities were not able to use force effectively in dealing with parades, riots and subversion. Early mild attempts at control by banning parades and re-routing marches had l i t t l e e ffe c t. Stronger measures such as mandatory sentencing for those convicted of riotous behavior, large scale searches and intern­ ment were also ineffective.

The Northern Ireland Government could not be quick and decisive in using force against the rioters because, once the British Army entered the situation, the Northern Ireland Government lost a good measure of control over security. They had to clear basic policy with the British Government. There were problems of liaison between the police and the Army which led to confusion in dealing with disturbances. 81

Both Chichester-Clark and Faulkner tried to use decisive force by warning that security forces would return f ir e , but in both cases this policy was later reversed. It was Chichester-Clark's inability to persuade the British Government that sterner measures v/ere needed to control the violence that percipitated his resignation. The British Government had a policy of containment, of sealing off the sensitive areas and not enforcing the law there. This enabled the IRA to build up their forces in these areas. Finally, when large scale searches and internment did not destroy the IRA, and when the Army moved against the illegal anti-internment marches, with resulting civilian casualities, Britain moved in and took over direct control of security.

Another factor that m ilitated against the quick effective use of force was the reorganization and consequent weakening of the RUC at the very time when disturbances and disorders were rising. The B Specials who knew the people and what was going on in th eir local areas were disbanded and the RUC disarmed, ju s t at the time when sub­ versive activity was on the increase and military-type opposition was starting. The RUC, for a period of time in 1959, wore not even receiving arms training and police stations were without sufficient arms to defend themselves. Thus, in an e ffo rt to meet criticism and institute reform, the Government reorganized the security forces and weakened them at the same time of maximum need.

Neither the Conservative Unionists nor the Republican Opposition believed there was impartial enforcement of justice. The Republicans accused the RUC of biased enforcement of the law against Republicans, of acting as the militant wing of the Orange Order, and operating under the command of the Minister of Home Affairs. They accused the USC of being a sectarian force, undisciplined, and guilty of going on a shooting spree in a Catholic housing estate. The Republican Opposition also complained about the courts and the sentencing of offenders which they described as biased and unfair. The Conservative Unionists accused the Army of biased enforcement and overkill tactics against Protestants, which purportedly occurred because the British troops had been briefed that the Protestants were to blame fo r the "troubles." Later, the Conservatives came to feel the policy of containment was not working and they called for a firm er, more e ffic ie n t stand against the IRA and a greater willingness to return fire. As the situation deteriorated further, the Conserva­ tives charged that law and order had completely broken down. They accused General Turzo of making a pact with the IRA to withdraw troops from the Bogside.

Both the Republican Opposition and the Conservative Unionists championed one side to the exclusion of the other. Throughout the period of c o n flic t, the Republican Opposition kept up a barrage against the police and the USC. They charged the police with b ru ta lity and indiscriminate use of CS gas. They demanded that the RUC be kept out of sensitive, i . e . , Republican areas. Objection was even made to the 82

USC receiving riot training. The situation with the Army was similar to that of the police. The Republicans, at first, welcomed the Army, but welcome soon changed to criticism as the Army conducted searches for arms and information on the IRA. The Army were accused of using obscene language when they searched residences and of unnecessarily damaging homes. The Republican Opposition complained that the searches were very one-sided, always taking place in Republican areas. The Republican Opposition wanted the searches stopped and the Army pulled out of sensitive areas. The Republican Opposition protested strongly when the Army started to take a firmer stand against rioters and ille g a l marchers, and in 1971, they walked out of the House, ostensibly because two civilia n s had been killed by the Army in an e ffo rt to control an illeg al demonstration, and the Republican demand for an inquiry was not forthcoming.

The Conservatives championed the cause of the Protestant working class, pointing out the brutality of the British Army toward them and their vulnerability to Republican attack.

Certain members of Parliament certainly had complicity in the outbursts. Members of the Republican Opposition led c iv il rights marches, squatted in houses, and eventually, organized a campaign of c iv il disobedience. Members of the Conservative Unionists, especially Craig and Paisley, were deeply involved in the mobilization of loyalists.

Did the authorities rule out direct challenges to legitimacy by drawing a definite circle around the government a c tiv itie s which were constitutionally inevitable?

The Unionist Government tried very hard to prevent a direct challenge to their legitimacy by protecting the sanctity of the Government of Ireland Act, but at the same time, they allowed that it was permissible to talk about the final reunification of Ireland and persuade others of its desirability, as long as no resort to violence was made. It was exceedingly difficult for the Northern Ireland Government to retain its legitimacy under the pressures from Eire, Britain and the IRA. The British'Government, at the height of the disturbance, gave a fatal blow to the legitimacy of Stormont by sug­ gesting unification with the South in fifteen years. In addition to these problems, the efforts of the Unionist Government to bring in reforms fin a lly culminated in Faulkner's suggestion of functional committees through which the Republican Opposition could be brought into pov/er sharing. The problem is, however, and this problem s t ill persists into the present (1976), how can power be shared with a group whose ultimate aim is the destruction of the state and its merger with another?

Were dissenting groups allowed the right to organize and voice their grievances and, i f so, did this re­ duce the chances of violent conflict? 83

C iv il rights marchers were allowed to march fre e ly and voice their grievances until the violence engendered by these marches forced the Government to ban them. Banning protest marches proved an ineffective means of controlling violence, since marches went on in defiance of bans. The civil rights movement and the Republicans also had spokesmen in Parliament its e lf.

There is a problem with the term "grievance." While discrim­ ination is clearly a grievance, does the desire to be incorporated into a united Ireland also constitute a grievance? If a broad defini­ tio n of grievance is accepted, then perhaps this could come under that definition. Republicans were allowed wide, but not unlimited, latitude 1n expressing their desire for a united Ireland. Republican celebrations of the Easter Rising were allowed, but celebration of the Fenian Rising was banned, along with Republican Clubs and The United Irishman newspaper.

As soon as c o n flic t groups have been permitted to, and are able to organize themselves, the most uncontrollable violent form of conflict, that of guerrilla warfare, is excluded. The very fact of organization presupposes some degree of recognition which, in turn, makes the most violent forms of con­ f l i c t unnecessary and, therefore, u n lik e ly .3

The data from this study would Indicate that Dahrendorf was not correct in his statement. The c iv il rights people were organized In to NICRA, and those with more extreme views were organized into the People's Democracy. The IRA were prominent in these organizations and soon took over control of NICRA. The existence of these organi­ zations did not prevent the emergence of guerrilla warfare; 1n fact, it provided the background support that made guerrilla warfare possible. The important variable 1s not that co n flic t groups be organized, but that all sides in the conflict be heard and their contribution have some impact on the situation. Even this, however, is not enough to prevent the outbreak of violence when basic goals are absolutely contradictory and a zero-sum is the only outcome possible.

Within Parliament its e lf, the Republican Opposition were free to discuss any grievance, but the Unionist Government did not pay serious attention to their suggestions and few Unionists attended debates when Opposition motions were being discussed. For example, few Unionists were in the House to hear the Human Rights B ill debated, and the Government spokesman b e little d Republican complaints about election irregularities. The Republicans were quite free to voice their grievances and call for reforms, but they did not feel these grievances were being heard. Finally, in what they characterized as desperation, they started taking direct action, commencing with C urrie's squatting a t Caledon and followed by particip atio n in c iv il 84 disobedience. It seems quite clear that it is not sufficient for groups who feel aggrieved to be free to voice th e ir grievances; they also have to feel they are being heard and responded to, i f direct action and violence are to be avoided.

Dahrendorf has said that within a pariiamentary system, Opposition Members have some degree of authority due to th e ir Parliamentary position because they may sanction decisions of the government in power, assent to, or even inaugurate, legislation.4 But Dahrendorf was really missing the point of the problem when you have a significant minority being represented in a Parliamentary system. Members of the Opposition exercise authority only if and when they are in agreement with the majority or can convince the majority to agree with them.

Arranging for conflict groups to have adequate verbal input and influence was not ju s t a problem for Republicans; the working class, Protestant loyalists also had a difficult time in this regard. As the street disorders continued and increased in violence, the Unionist MPs, supposedly representative of the Protestant loyalist population, saw the necessity for power sharing. Faulkner introduced his functional committee idea which would bring Republican Opposition into the innermost realms of Government. The Unionist politicans were willing to do this because they realized the situation demanded i t and th e ir own po litical futures were dependent on i t . However, the working class Protestant loyalist did not want this; they realized it went directly against their interests because, eventually, it would weaken the ties with Britain. Therefore, as Protestant loyal­ ists came to see they no longer had representatives who were taking * care of their interests, they increasingly turned to underground activity, so increasing the level of violence.

Were authorities responsive and did they attempt to reduce the source of strain? I f reforms were passed, what effect did this have on the level of violence?

In it ia lly , the Unionist Government was very slow to see the need for reforms. Indeed, the Government was arrogant in Its dismissal of the petitions for reforms submitted by the Republican Opposition. I t was, however, a Unionist Prime Minister who made the f ir s t move of conciliation with the South by inviting Lemass to Belfast. This meeting seemed to precipitate Conservative opposition to reforms and Republican pressure to force reforms, so setting a collision course.

Once the Unionist Government were convinced that reforms were necessary, they moved ahead very rapidly with nearly a ll the reforms demanded by the Republican Opposition, and some additional ones. When reforms were passed, the Government received no credit fo r their passing. Instead, the Republican Opposition claimed that the pressure they had exerted through street demonstrations, or pressure from Westminster, had forced the reforms. Some reforms that were not asked fo r, such as the Londonderry Area Development Commission, were 85 t rejected as a trick by the majority to deprive the minority of the control of Londonderry. Later, 1t was admitted the Commission had done an excellent job in providing homes and jobs in Londonderry. Sometimes reforms demanded by the Opposition were Introduced, only to receive a lukewarm reception from the Opposition, e.g., the Housing Executive Bill and the plans for local government reorganization.

As the demands fo r reform were met, the Republicans kept raising new demands. The p o litic a l demands progressed from one man- one vote, to proportional representation, to power sharing until, finally, only a united Ireland was acceptable. Even this last demand was considered by the British Government as a suitable topic for talks. These reforms in no way lessened the degree of violence. As reforms were speedily passed, the violence escalated. I t might be argued that the reforms became a reward fo r violence, but by the time most of the reforms were operating, the IRA had established strong g u e rrilla units in the cities and the control of violence was principally in their hands.

In terms of our system model, i t can be said that the Republicans were constantly getting positive feedback. They ju s t had to keep doing more of the same to keep things going th e ir way. Each new spate of violence was followed by new reforms and an erosion of Unionist power. The Unionists, on the other hand, were constantly getting negative feedback, neither repression nor reform lowered the rate of violence.

Was economic reform for the lower classes instituted before civil and political reform? If the socio­ economic needs of the lower classes were attended to , did this lower the general background of fear and impending violence?

This study did not include a detailed consideration of economic conditions in Northern Ireland, therefore, the data that can be marshalled to answer this question is fragmentary. However, in one area, Londonderry, economic reform came early. The Londonderry Area Development Commission was one of the f ir s t reform measures passed. Massive social and economic investment was made in Londonderry. Thousands of new homes were b u ilt and, according to Faulkner, there was even a prospect that the long-standing problem of unemployment would be solved. Even the Republican Opposition admitted a great deal had been done. However, these expenditures did not lower the general background of fear and violence. After all these efforts, Londonderry erupted once again in almost uncontrollable violence.

The Government made a concerted e ffo rt to deal with the problem of housing and they had plans to involve the Shankill and Falls residents in efforts to fight unemployment, delinquency and over­ crowding, but there is no way, using the data from this study, to know 86 how effective these measures were. There is no doubt that there were pockets of poverty in Northern Ireland; in Ballymurphy, the unemploy­ ment rate ran up to 50 percent.

There seems to have been a measure of misunderstanding on the part of Republicans about what was being done. There were complaints that the Western areas, predominately Republican and Catholic, were not getting a fa ir proportion of government grants because they did not get a certain percentage of the monies available. However, i t was pointed out by Government spokesmen that i t was the policy of the Government to encourage labor intensive industry in areas l.1ke Fermanagh, and these labor intensive industries did not always demand the largest amounts of capital investment. While all members of Parliament wanted economic growth, there was disagreement on how this should be achieved. Republicans wanted the introduction of state- controlled industry to help supplement private industry in supplying jobs. Unionists were opposed to any state-controlled industry. The Republican Opposition was also slow to admit, and face up to the fact, that disturbances were hurting prospects for industrial development. Despite the desire of the Government to substantially improve economic conditions, this was a very difficult thing to do.

There was no clear sequence of economic and p o litic a l reform; both occurred more less simultaneously. There was some p o litic a l reform very early in the co n flict; the Government abolished the busi­ ness vote and the university vote. These, however, v/ere rather minor reforms and i t was not until 1969 that one man-one vote was passed. During the entire eight year period the Government was trying to improve the persistently d ifficu lt economic situation 1n Northern Ireland.

This study has contributed a number of insights concerning conflict:

In a society where there Is a large minority with contradictory goals, a move toward reconcilation and integration, made by the Government, can have the opposite effect. It can work to mobilize extremists on both sides. This is especially true if the move is perceived as threatening a core value, and no compromise Is possible.

A Government, under attack from a significant minority, may in itia te reform measures that seriously undermine its own power position. A Government, representing the majority group in a society, may at firs t resist reforms, but when widescale disturbances occur, the Government may institute very large scale reforms. Reform measures, in itia te d by the Government under attack, may weaken its ability to maintain law and order and may seriously undermine its power position. The Government may, In fa c t, destroy or seriously weaken its own power base.

Political representatives of the majority may agree to so many reforms, in an effort to protect their own p o litic a l positions from the onslaught of the minority, that they no longer protect the interests of the majority members they represent.

Reforms do not necessarily bring an end to violence. In fa c t, the most serious violence may occur after significant reforms. Some writers have explained this on the basis of rising expectations. As the minority received more, expectations increase, and delivered goods cannot keep pace with the rising expectations. This does not seem to explain the situa­ tion in Northern Ireland. A better explanation, 1n this instance, is that reforms ore interpreted as success for the militant confrontation tactics, and this strengthens the militant minority group that has been using these tactics vis-a-vis the more moderate minority members. By the time reforms have been passed, leadership of the minority has passed to the m ilitants.

In a system composed of minority and majority repre­ sentatives, pressure from a militant minority, outside the system, can lead to polarization within the system. Political representatives of the minority become increasingly militant as militancy and direct confron­ tation prove to be effective strategies. Political representatives of the majority split, under minority pressure, into two segments. One segment emphasizes reform and accommodation to the minority, the other segment emphasizes repression and the restoration of law and order.

The political representatives of the minority at firs t use the strategies of direct action, confrontation, and exploitation of violence, to squeeze out reforms from a recalcitrant majority Government. However, when these strategies prove effective in producing reforms, the same strategies are used to change the power structure, so altering the balance of power between political representatives of the minority and representatives of the majority.

The political representatives of both majority and minority groups tend not to see the dangers coming from illegal organizations on their own side, but are extremely sensitive to dangers coming from extremists on the opposing side.

P olitical representatives of the minority tend to see all efforts by the authorities to control violence and disorders as ways of pacifying the majority extremists. They construct reality in a manner that gives them the maximum leverage in their contest with majority repre­ sentatives.

Political representatives of the minority give no credit to the majority Government for instituting reforms. Minority representatives perceive their street activities as the stimuli that produced reforms, and they give themselves credit for bringing the reforms about.

Leaders of a minority group, wanting to change the power structure within a society, can mobilize more support i f th e ir ideology stresses poor social condi­ tions, rather than a blunt demand for a change in the holders of power. Poor social conditions can thus be used to legitimate the push for change in the power structure.

When security measures become more severe, in the face of continued disturbances, these severe measures w ill be used by the minority as a new excuse for violence, and as a legitimation for a change in the power struc­ ture. Repression thus becomes the rationale fo r more co n flict.

In the absence of adequate controls by the security forces, militant members of the minority can achieve a vice-like control of the minority population and use terror to control them.

As militants 1n the minority population become stronger and exert more influence, the militants 1n the majority group build up their strength to meet the challenge.

Parades seem to function as a form of communication, a way of defining the situation, and a means of mobil­ izing support. These parades, which are episodes of collective behavior, function to generate a generalized b e lie f.

In a society with a significant minority population, the minority can exercise power way out of proportion to its numbers by using ille g a l means and violence. 89

Security forces will become the focus of attack by m ilitant minority members as confrontation between the security forces and the militant minority increase.

Efforts to control disturbances are at firs t mild as the Government tries not to antagonize the minority. But if violence continues and reforms do not bring an end to the disturbances, then there is a turn to repression.

A system can receive a stream of feedback that is positive for one segment of the system, but negative for another segment of the system. When one segment continues to receive negative feedback of such nature that no changed course of action brings the segment closer to its goals, while another segment receives nothing but positive feedback, the segment receiving positive feedback w ill grow in influence at the expense of the other segment. I f this continues over a period of time, the spiral of conflicting currents can destroy the system.

This study supports Smelser's notion that disturbances w ill increase if force is not used quickly and decisively; if authorities take sides in the controversy; if there is some doubt as to the impartial enforcement of justice; 1f authorities have complicity in the outbursts; and if authorities allow direct challenge to the legitimacy of government activities.

This study does not support Dahrendorf's idea that allowing groups to organize and voice grievances reduces the chances of violent conflict.

This study did not find supporting evidence fo r the idea that the passage o f reforms, or the improvement of the socioeconomic situation of the lower classes, lowers the likelihood or the level of violence.

All the above findings are merely suggestive. It 1s necessary to test them against similar situations of conflict to see if they stand up. General systems theory provides a useful model, a way of ordering data, so that comparison between different situations 1s possible. However, a great deal of work needs to be done 1n refining the systems model so that complicated data can be fed Into I t more easily. A great deal more needs to be known about system dynamics. More work must be done to refine and simplify the systems model before really significant comparisons can be made. FOOTNOTES OF CHAPTER V

^Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

2The civilianizing of the police at this time of distur­ bances drastically reduced its effectiveness.

^Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959).

4Ib id ., p. 293.

90 BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Belfast Telegraph. Belfast, Northern Ireland.

Blalock, Hubert M. Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. Chapel H ill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961.

Blau, Peter. Exchange and Power in Social L ife . New York: John Wiley and Sons, In c ., 1967.

Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York: Vintage Books 1965.

Brov/n, Robert. Explanation in Social Science. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963.

Buckley, Walter. Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.

Coser, Lewis. The Functions of Social C onflict. New York: The Free Press, 1956.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis.1' System.Change and C onflict. Edited by N. J. Demerath and Richard Peterson. New York: The Free Press, 1956.

______. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, C alifornia: StanfortT University Press, 1959.

Eastman, Max. Capital, the Community Manifests and Other Writings by Karl Marx. New York: Random House, 1959,

Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of P olitical L ife . New York: John Wiley and Sons, In c ., 1966.

Festinger, Leon. When Prophecy Fails. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966.

Fllstead, William. Qualitative Methodology. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 19?0.

Glaser, Barney and Strauss, Anselm. The Discovery of Grounded Theory Strategies for Q ualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970. 91 92

Goffman, Ervlng. The Presentation of Self in Everyday L ife . Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Book, Doubleday and Co., In c ., 1959.

Great B ritain . Parliamentary Debates (Commons).

Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry. San Francisco: Jossey- Bass Publishers, 1974.

Kuhn, Alfred. The Logic of Social Systems. San Francisco: Jossey- Bass Publishers, 1974.

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Lockwood, David. "Some Remarks on 'The Social System.'" System, Change and C o nflict. Edited by N. J. Demerath and Richard Peterson. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Madge, John. The Tools of Social Science. New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1963.

Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934.

Meehan, Eugene J. Explanation in Social Science: A System Paradigm. Homewood, Illin o is : The Dorsey Press, 1968.

Merton, Robert. "Manifest and Latent Functions." System. Change and . Conflict. Edited by N. J. Demerath and Richard Peterson. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961.

Northern Ireland. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1965-1972.

Oberschall, Anthony. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood C liffs : Prentice-H all, In c ., 1973.

Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951.

Rapoport, Anatol. "Game Theory and Human Conflict." The Nature of Human Conflict. Edited by Elton B. McNeil. Englewood Cliffs: Prent1ce-HalI, Inc., 1965.

Sjoberg, Gideon. "Contradictory Functional Requirements and Social Systems." Systems, Change and C onflict. Edited by N. J. Demerath and Richard Peterson. New York: The Free Press, 1969. 93

Smelser, Neil J. Theory of Collective Behavior, New York: The Free Press, 1962.

The Sunday Times Insight Team. U lster. Baltimore, Maryland: Penquin Books, In c ., 197^!

Van Den Berghe, Piere. "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." American Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (October, 1963).

Zetterberg, Hans. Review of Modern Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change, edited by Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff. American Sociological Review, Vol. 23, 1958, p. 95.

______. On Theory and V erificatio n in Sociology. The Bedminster Press, 1965.

______. "Compliant Action." Acta Sociologica, Scandinavian Review of Sociology. Vol. 2 (1957), p. 189. APPENDIX

94 OUTLINE — 1965

OUTPUTS — UNIONISTS

O'Neill — Lemass Meeting

OUTPUTS - REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Demand fo r Reforms

Race Relations Bill State Housing Trust

Amnesty fo r IRA

INPUT — EXTRASOCIETAL

Britain

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

95 STORMONT 1965

THE CABINET

Prime M inister, Captain Terence Marne O'Neill Minister of Home A ffairs, R. W. McConnell Minister of Finance, Ivan Neill Labour and National Insurance, W. J. Morgan Education, H. V. Kirk Agriculture, H. W. West Commerce, A. B. D. Faulkner Health and Local Government, W. Craig

UNIONIST PARTY

Bel fast Queens University

W. K. Fitzsimmons H. E. McClure W. S. Hinds B. H. Maconachie H. V. Kirk J. W. Kennedy Down W. J. Morgan I . Neill A. B. D. Faulkner W. Scott D. J. Little J. E. Warnock W. J. Long W. B. Maginess Antrim R. S. Nixon

W. Craig Fermanagh A. Hunter W. B. McConnell Viscount Brookeborough N. 0. Minford H. W. West P. R. O'Neill T. O'Neill Londonderry City R. Simpson E. W. Jones Armagh Londonderry County I . G. Hawthorne D. McNabb J. Burns N. Stronge J. D. Chichester-Clark

Tyrone

T. Lyons W. McCoy 96 INDEPENDENT UNIONIST NATIONALIST

Belfast Queens University

0. Boal C. Stewart

LIBERAL Down

Queens University J. Connellan J. O'Reilly S. M. Murnaghan Fermanagh LABOUR C. Healy Bel fast Londonderry County D. W. Bleakley W. R. Boyd P. J. Gormley T. W. Boyd E. G. McAteer F. V. Sinipson Tyrone REPUBLICAN LABOUR T. C. Gormley Belfast R. H. O'Connor J. A. Currie H. Diamond INDEPENDENT NATIONALIST EIRE LABOUR Armagh Bel fast E. G. Richardson G. F itt

INDEPENDENT LABOUR

Belfast

F. Hanna The year 1965 looked lik e a hopeful year for Northern Ireland. The IRA had ceased their campaign of violence in 1961 and community relations were better than they had been for many years. At Stormont, Captain O 'N eill, a progressive Unionist, was Prime M inister. At Westminster, the Labour Party, led by Harold Wilson, was in power.

STRUCTURE OF THE SYSTEM

The Parliament of Northern Ireland had nine parties repre­ sented in 1965.

Members

Unionist 32 Independent Unionist 1 Liberal 1 Opposition Labour 4 Parties Independent Labour 1 Republican Labour 1 Eire Labour 1 Republlean National 1st 9 Opposition Independent Nationalist 1

The Unionists, having the majority of seats, formed the Government, composed of the Prime Minister, Terence O'Neill and his Cabinet. The Unionists had held power ever since the state of Northern Ireland was created in 1920,

GOALS

Within the system there was a fundamental s p lit 1n goals held by the components. The Unionists, Liberal and Labour Parties were In favor of retaining Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom, whereas the Republican Labour, Eire Labour and the Nationalists wanted the separation of Northern Ireland from B ritain, and its merger with the Republic in the South. The latter four parties are referred to as the Republican Opposition. Their economic positions varied some­ what, with the Eire and Republican Labour Parties tending to be more

98 99 to the left. However, on the questions involving the border and community relations, they were united.

OUTPUTS — UNIONISTS

O'Neill — Lemass Meeting

On January 14, 1965, on O 'N e ill's in vitatio n , the Taoiseach, or Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, lemass, visited Prime Minister O'Neill at Stormont, so breaking the isolation that had existed since 1920 between the leaders of the North and South of Ireland. I t was a secret meeting, unknown to even the members of O'Neill's Cabinet, and it opened up the very sensitive subject of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and its relationship to the Republic of Ireland.

O'Neill's definition of the situation was optimistic. He thought that closer relations between North and South would clear up misunderstandings between the two countries, especially the idea in the South that the people in the North did not popularly support Northern Ireland's position in the United Kingdom and that this position was only maintained by the presence of the British Army. He saw no threat to the constitution from closer cooperation with the South, since the Ireland Act, passed at Westminster in 1949, safe­ guarded the constitution by leaving the decision to Northern Ireland as to whether the present relationship with Great Britain would be retained or not. O'Neill suggested the possibility that the visit of Lemass might have improved Northern Ireland's position because, In accepting the in vitatio n , Lemass had recognized the existence of Stormont, in fa ct, i f not in words. O'Neill reaffirmed that the people of Northern Ireland wanted to remain, part of the United Kingdom and he would never negotiate on the question of partition.

The Unionists generally supported O'Neill in his meeting with Lemass, but there were some notable exceptions and some indications that a r ift in the Cabinet was developing. Those Unionists who spoke in the debate thought i t necessary to reaffirm the Constitution of Northern Ireland and the will of the people to defend it, so indicating some sensitivity to the constitutional question.

The Parliament of Northern Ireland w ill never consent to giving away any of the rights we hold. The loyal people of this country over 40 years ago chose by their own free w ill a way of l if e and that was to go side by side and be part of Great Britain. The loyal people of Northern Ireland today hold the same faith, the same loyalties and the same deter­ mination to keep Northern Ireland a proud part of 100 Great Britain and the Commonweath. He must make 1t absolutely clear to the public outside that there w ill be no weakening on our part or on the part of the Government and no giving away of anything that we so rightly prize. (N. Minford, Feb. 3, 1965)*

Generally, the Unionists understood the need for secrecy 1n preparing the meeting.

Two Unionists, Warnock and Boal, roundly attacked O'Neill for arranging the meeting. They accused him of violating the policy of the Unionist Party, a policy under which he was elected to office. Unionist policy had always been that no meeting of the Heads of State of Ulster and Eire was to be countenanced until the Prime Minister of the Republic announced his recognition of the constitutional integrity of Northern Ireland. There had been no such recognition by the South; the Eire Government s t ill claimed sovereignty over both North and South. They also criticized O'Neill for the way he had arranged the meeting. He had gone ahead on his own without consulting his party or his Cabinet. Later, his Cabinet was faced with the option of supporting him or resigning.

The Opposition Parties a ll favored the Lemass — O'Neill meeting. The Nationalists and Gerry F itt of the Eire Labour Party used the occasion to propound th e ir belief 1n a united Ireland.

In my constituency there are many people who believe, in the ultimate ideal in which I believe, the eventual reunification of this country. The way to bring this about 1s to recognize that Stormont exists, to use this House and a ll its in­ stitutions to further the interests and well-being of all constituents, irrespective of their political b eliefs. I f we can bring peace and harmony to this community it will be only a little step further before we can eventually bring about a unity of mind in the whole island....although I realise that Stormont 1s here, and in spitq of the fact that I use its agencies to better the conditions of my constituents, I shall never give up the ideal to which I tenaciously .cling—that I shall live one day to see Ireland united in a 32-County Republic. (G. F it t , Feb. 3, 1965)

I do not lik e the suggestion in the Motion that we can ever be satisfied with a permanently divided nation. I do not know any people who are ever

*A11 quotes in this appendix are from Northern Ireland, Parliamentary Debates. 101

satisfied to have their country truncated or cut in two. We propose to use peaceful means to bring this unity about. (C. Mealy, Feb. 3, 1965)

Various spokesmen in the Opposition Parties thought economic benefits could accrue from closer cooperation with the South.

Labour Party Members called for trip a rtite talks between Northern Ireland, the Republic and Britain in order to fa c ilita te economic expansion.

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

The Republican Opposition generated a number of demands in 1965. They called for the adoption of Britain's Race Relations B ill, the creation of a State Housing Trust and Amnesty fo r members of the IRA.

Demand for Reforms

Race Relations Bill

Britain's Race Relations Bill was operative in Britain but Stormont had the choice of passing or not passing the necessary legislation to make i t effective in Northern Ireland. The Republican Opposition thought such a b i l l , extended to also cover religious discrimination, was sorely needed in Ulster. They were especially anxious that the Act get rid of the anti-Catholic, anti-Christian slogans that decorated walls in Northern Ireland. They considered the Government of Ireland Act as to ta lly inadequate to deal with religious discrimination since it prohibited religious discrimina­ tion only on the part of the N. I. Government in passing and executing laws. The Government, through the Minister of Home A ffa irs , f la t ly denied that there was any racial discrimination in Northern Ireland.

State. Housing Trust

The Republican Opposition also demanded that a State Housing Trust be created. Housing was a perennial problem in Ireland. Houses were in very short supply and in order to help meet this need, local county councils b u ilt and rented houses at moderate rates. In addition to the local government efforts, a Northern Ireland Housing Trust provided houses. The allocation of these houses was the central issue around which the C ivil Rights Movement started.

Throughout the year the Republican Opposition complained about the housing situation. They criticized local Unionist governments for 102 not building enough houses and for not allocating the houses they did build fairly and impartially. Specific local councils, like Dungannon D is tric t Council, were accused of not allocating houses to Catholics in certain areas because the influx of Catholics would upset the Unionist political majority in these areas. The Nationalists warned of trouble ahead.

There has been trouble in Dungannon before over this question and there will be trouble there again because of this particular question. People are not willing to tolerate this any longer. There is going to be a lot of trouble. This is an ultimate warning. (J. Currie, Hay 4, 1965)

The remedy suggested for these abuses was to take the building and allocation of houses away from the local authorities and put these responsibilities under one State Housing Trust. They added a note of pressure by saying there were campaigns against Northern Ireland going on in B ritain.

The Minister of Development replied to these recriminations by asserting that the local authorities and the Housing Trust had done a magnificient job of providing houses. At the same time, he was anxious for the building rate to be stepped up and he would try to increase the number of trained workers in the building industry and try to eliminate any bottlenecks. As far as Dungannon District Council was concerned, he could see no reason to believe they had acted improperly in allocating houses. The Minister of Home Affairs maintained that the allocation of houses was the responsibility of local councils, not the Government. The Government was interested only in the overall supply of houses.

Amnesty for IRA

F in a lly , the Republican Opposition called fo r amnesty fo r IRA political prisoners on the grounds that conditions in the country had now changed. Amnesty, they thought, would improve community relations. P o litic a l crimes were, a fte r a l l , not lik e ordinary crimes.

In a ll countries people g u ilty of p o litic a l offences are given a special place. They don't commit crimes for base motives. Many of them are motivated by the higher ideals of patriotism and idealism. (J. Currie, March 23, 1965)

The IRA campaign had been called o ff, asserted the N ationalists, and the release of these men would not start up another IRA campaign. 103

The Unionists were absolutely opposed to giving amnesty to IRA prisoners. I t was feared that such a release would hasten the next IRA campaign. Furthermore, such acts as had been committed were criminal acts.

No one should be allowed to belong to an illegal organisation and go and commit atrocities, destroy property and take human life in the name of Ireland. If a man kills a man it is murder, no matter by what name i t goes. (J. Burns, March 25, 1965)

The Minister of Home Affairs said nothing was known to British law as a p o litic a l offense and he could not see how amnesty would improve community relations.

INPUT — EXTRASOCIETAL

Britain

After O'Neill had reciprocated the Lemass visit in Dublin on February 9th, British Prime Minister Wilson issued a statement to the Press suggesting that trip a rtite talks take place. This was interpreted by some in Northern Ireland as a threat to the constitu­ tion. O'Neill responded very negatively to the suggestion, and once again reaffirmed the strength of the constitution. The warm aura of improved relations with the South had received its fir s t dampening.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

One of the direct results of the O 'Neill—Lemass meeting was the acceptance by the Nationalist Party of the role of O fficial Opposition. Even though they were the largest of the minority parties, they had previously refused this role because they would have been required to take an oath as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition. Such a role would have been unpopular with th e ir constituents and would not have been in keeping with their ultimate aim—a united Ireland. However, the improved relations between North and South now convinced them they could accept th is .

Within the Unionist Party a small group of Unionists with conservative views was beginning to emerge. 104

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

By the end of 1965, the Unionists were a little sensitive over the O'Neill—Lemass meeting in terms of its constitutional implica­ tions. They were deaf to complaints about discrimination, and to the Republican demands for a central housing authority. They saw the IRA as s t ill potentially dangerous, with any amnesty out of the question.

The Republican Opposition saw the O 'N eill—Lemass meeting as a promising step toward the unification of Ireland. They saw community tension growing over discrimination in the allocation of housing. They considered the IRA as harmless patriots who had called o ff their campaign of violence. OUTLINE — 1966

INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Republican Activity

Easter Rising Celebration Irish Repbulican Army

Protestant Extremists

Paisley's March Ulster Volunteer Force

OUTPUTS — UNIONISTS

Motion o f Full Support for the Government

Repressive Measures

Ban on Dublin Train and on Processions

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Attack on RUC

Cromac Disturbances Religious Composition of RUC

Attack on Ulster Special Constabulary

Demand fo r Reforms

Proportional Representation and the Eighteen Year Old Vote One Man - One Vote Special Powers Act Human Rights B ill and Housing

Election Irregularities

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS 105 INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

The conciliatory gesture made by O'Neill toward the South seemed to galvanize the extremists in the society. Both Republican extremists and Protestant extremists became active in 1966, holding parades and threatening Members of Parliament. This renewed street activity brought the police into direct confrontation with the extremists.

Republican A ctivity

Easter Rising Celebration

Early in March, i t became known that certain Republican committees in Northern Ireland were preparing to celebrate the Easter Rising of 1916.

The Unionists did not lik e the idea of the Easter Rising being celebrated in Northern Ireland, but they f e lt the celebration should be allowed so long as i t did not cause a disturbance of the peace. Some concern was expressed about a rumor that 10,000 to 30,000 people were coming from Eire to join in the celebrations. The Unionists were aware that a small number of Republicans could easily cause a major incident if they stepped out of the railway station holding a Tricolour. The Unionists were also concerned about rumors that the Ulster Volunteer Force was reforming and would oppose Republican plans to hold a parade. The Government called for restrain t and warned that firm action would be taken against anyone responsible for provocation.

The Republican Opposition accused the Government of trying to indoctrinate the people with fear of the celebration and so build up pressure to get it banned.

Irish Republican Army

Renewed IRA a c tiv ity in 1966 caused alarm to the Government. Due to a series of threats, the Government were obliged to secure special guards for Ministers. A number of part-time members of the Ulster Special Constabulary were mobilized for this purpose.

The Republican Opposition did not believe that there was any serious threat of a recurrence of violence from the IRA. They accused

106 107 the Government of manufacturing the threat with the intention of provoking violence.

Protestant Extremists

Paisley’ s March

The Protestant extremists became active in 1966. On June 6th, the Rev. Ian Paisley marched v/ith his followers to the Presbyterian Assembly Hall in Belfast, where the annual international meeting of Presbyterian Churches was taking place. Paisley was protesting the ecumenical movement and the "Roine-ward" trend of the Presbyterian Church, as he termed i t . Paisley's followers carried signs proclaiming "llo money for Rome" and "The Pope is no Christ." As the procession came into Cromac Square, a Catholic area, a cordon of inhabitants of the area formed a human chain and tried to stop the procession.’ Violence ensued and the police had to step in; whereupon the police themselves were attacked. Prominent personages attending the Presbyterian Assembly were insulted and intimidated. Shop windows were broken, automobiles were wrecked and the Post Office was damaged.

The Unionists considered the banners carried by Paisley's followers as offensive and extremely provocative, but no excuse for the ensuing violence. I t was believed that a small hooligan element, inspired and organized by extreme Republicans, had carefully prepared beforehand, stockpiling missiles and weapons; for their attack on the police. The Unionists condemned both Paisley and the hooligan element for their part in the disturbances. O'Neill warned that the Paisley anti-ecumenical attitude would alienate British opinion, and Northern Ireland could not afford that since the country's welfare services and economic health, all depended on the link to B ritain.

Conservative Unionists blamed only the Cromac area residents for the violence. They pointed out that this was a lawful parade, carried out according to police regulations. Paisley and his followers were not attacked by the Presbyterians, against whom they were marching, but by the inhabitants of the Cromac area, supporters of the Republican Opposition. I t was not Paisley's followers who had attacked the police, it was the Catholic inhabitants of the area who had attacked them.

The Republican Opposition blamed only Paisley's followers. They praised the people in the Cromac area as peaceful, law-abiding people who were provoked beyond endurance.

The poor people of Cromac St. did not wish this business on themselves. They were living peaceful lives in their little houses until they were subject to what has been recognized as unendurable provoca­ tion. (H. Diamond, June 7, 1966) 108

Paisley and followers were characterized as the arch villains in the case.

I f this Devil's advocate is allowed to hold processions in Catholic and Nationalist areas carrying such slogans, there w ill be something approaching a blood bath at every procession. (J. Currie, June 8, 1966)

The Republican Opposition thought the Government should not have allowed Paisley to hold this parade and should curtail his activities. They accused O'Neill of vacillating in his efforts to enforce law and order and called for him to separate himself from sectarian entanglements. Diamond accused him of covertly encouraging Paisley's activities.

Ulster Volunteer Force

Protestant extremists were also active in 1966, drilling and threatening members of Parliament. The Republicans Opposition warned the Government that an illegally armed organization of Unionist extremists were d rillin g in Armagh, and Members of the House were being threatened by Paisley supporters. They wanted the Government to disallow any supporters of the Ulster Volunteer Force from s ittin g in Parliament. The charge was made that some Unionists were covertly supporting the extremists and that this abuse was being encouraged by the weakness of the Minister of Home Affairs.

At f ir s t the Minister of Home Affairs said he had no evidence of an illegal, armed organization drilling in Armagh and other Unionists dubbed these warnings as malicious statements. However, in June, a shooting incident triggered a Unionist MP to call for an investigation. On June 28th, the Prime Minister declared the Ulster Volunteer Force an unlawful association. I t had been linked, by the police, to the murder of a young man by the name of Scullion, and O'Neill characterized it as a dangerous conspiracy prepared at any time to use murder as a weapon. He accused Paisley of welcoming support from the U.V.F., despite his denial of knowledge of the organization. Unionist MP Minford said he had also been threatened by Paisley's followers and it was necessary for him to have police protection.

If this person.. . .thinks his strutting about lik e a bloody turkey cock or his mouthing and slobbering on public platforms is going to make me tremble, he 1s round the bend. (N. Minford, June 30, 1966)

The Republican Opposition welcomed what they considered the Government's belated e ffo rt to deal with the Protestant extremists. 109

Diamond described in some detail the kind of intimidation that was now going on in border d is tric ts between Shankill and the Falls. Both Catholics and Protestants in mixed areas were being intimidated and forced to leave the area. Prominent Catholic businessmen had had the tires of their cars slashed. Diamond himself had received threatening phone calls. The U.V.F. had been banned, but, Diamond said, there were other organizations operating such as the Sandy Row Revenge Squad and the Peep-O-Day Boys, who took an oath to deal with Catholics or Protestants who associated or mixed in any way. Catholic salesmen who operated in the Protestant Shankill area had been threatened and told not to return there. Many of the people involved in this sort of intimidation, Diamond thought, were the dupes of Ian Paisley and the victims of his hate propaganda.

OUTPUTS - UNIONISTS

Motion of Full Support fo r the Government

On June 15th, as a repercussion of the Paisley parade, a motion was introduced into the House assuring the Government of full support in taking whatever action was necessary to ensure that law and order were preserved. The s p irit behind this motion, introduced by a Unionist MP, was that i f the Government decided to use the Public Order Act of 1951, the Flags and Emblems Act of 1954 and other criminal law, the whole House would give its fullest support, no matter against whom these powers might be exercised.

We must take a stand now, before violence and intolerance becomes a tide, it is only an eddy at the moment. (J. Kelly, June 15, 1966)

Kelly called for all to speak out against violence, no matter from what fringe element i t might come and regardless of its religious complexion.

Repressive Measures

Ban on Dublin Train and on Processions"

The Unionist Government took a number of repressive measures in an effort to control the growing disorders. On April 14, the Minister of Home Affairs banned a train coming from Dublin carrying Republican supporters to celebrate the Easter Rising.

On July 26, the Minister of Home A ffairs, under the Special Powers Act, restricted the holding of processions within a fifte e n 110 mile radius of Belfast. The ban was to be in effect until the end of October. In October, the new M inister of Home A ffairs, Craig, announced he would not renew the restriction since present circumstances did not warrant such a curtailment of freedom. He said he would seek special pov/ers if the need arose, but he did not think that Paisley, who was about to be released from j a i l , would cause trouble.

The Republican Opposition rejected Craig's position. They considered the liftin g of restrictions on parades as an open invitation to disorder. Diamond feared the M inister's statement was giving the Paisley extremists cart blanche to act against the Catholic Nationalist section of the community. The Minister was accused of not extending the powers because he was either afraid to move against the Paisley group or he was in sympathy with them. However, they accused the . Minister of having no such compunction in acting against Republican groups.

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Attack on RUC

Cromac Disturbance

The Republican Opposition mounted an attack on the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 1966. They complained b itte rly about the behavior of the RUC in restoring law and order in the Cromac area after the Paisley parade. They charged that the police should have known that Paisley's parade would cause trouble and should have stopped i t . They accused the police of "intimidating" the people of Cromac Square by "ruthless interrogation" at th eir homes and places of business. They placed the responsibility for the riot on Paisley alone. They rejected any criticism of the people in the Cromac area, and called for less police activity in the area since the riot had passed.

The Minister of Home A ffa irs , 1n answering Republican Opposition charges, narrated a number of Incidents that had occurred in the area following the riot. The presence of the police was necessary because people were less lik e ly to commit crimes when the police were present. The police questioned people at th e ir place of employment only when they could not be reached at home.

Religious Composition of RUC

A second point of contention concerning the RUC was Its religious composition. The Republican Opposition objected because only approximately 300 Roman Catholic members were on the police force and the number had continually diminished over the years. It was charged that Catholics were not encouraged to join the force because they 111 knew promotion in the force was largely on the basis of membership 1n the Orange Order. The Minister of Home A ffairs was accused of deliberately making the RUC a sectarian force.

The Minister of Home Affairs assured the House that there was no question of religious distinction in joining or promotion in the RUC. Proportionately fewer Catholics applied to join. One Unionist pointed out that origin ally one-third of the places on the RUC were reserved for Catholics but this had to be changed when too few Catholics applied.

Attack on Ulster Special Constabulary

The deep division in the House over the RUC was even more pronounced when 1t came to the Special Constabulary, or B Specials as they were popularly called. The B Specials were a reserve police force, most of them part-time, who were kept available for special duties. They had tra d itio n a lly been mobilized whenever IRA a c tiv ity had become intense.

The Republican Opposition was extremely c ritic a l of the Special Constabulary. F1tt accused the Minister of mobilizing B Specials just so the Unionist Party could give "jobs for the boys" in this time of unemployment. Diamond objected to the B Specials having firearms. He felt it was not in the public Interest to have so many firearms around. Further objections were given that the B Specials did not represent, and was not recruited from, the entire community. Catholics were not v/elcome. Diamond charged that 1n some areas, B Specials had invented or manufactured incidents so that they would be mobilized in otherwise quiet areas, Currie was afraid that B Specials were joining branches of the U.V.F. in rural areas. The Republican Opposition Members called for doing away with the B Specials altogether. They thought the community was quiet and the B Specials were not needed.

The Unionists considered the B Specials as being of high standard and of having a developed sense of responsibility which qualified them for carrying arms. The B Specials were characterized as men of standing in th eir communities who gave their time for parading roads, looking a fte r property and the welfare of th eir people, a ll for a very nominal remuneration. These men could be mobilized and demobilized very quickly, thus saving great amounts of money when extra protection was needed.

Demand for Reforms

The Republican Opposition generated a number of demands 1n 1966. They called for proportional representation, the eighteen year- 112 old vote, one man-one vote, the abolition of sections of the Special Powers Act, the introduction of a Human Rights Bill and a points system fo r the allocation of housing. All of these demands were sum­ marily rejected by the Unionists.

Proportional Representation and Eighteen- Year-Old Vote

Early in 1966, the issue of the franchise emerged. This issue was keenly fe lt by Republican Opposition parties, who were supported by the Liberal MP, Murnaghan. On March 1, Harry Diamond introduced a motion to guarantee that a ll government elections should be on the principle of proportional representation and that all persons aged eighteen and over should get the vote. Diamond argued that the northern Ireland Government had originally had proportional represen­ tation and i t had worked very w ell. However, the Unionists had abolished it to maintain their power and once it was abolished, Unionist power was absolute. It was felt that proportional representa­ tion protected the rights of the minority by giving them fair representation. It v/as also believed that proportional representation would restore to the Unionist voters some choice in the election, since in many districts the election v/as virtually over once the Unionist Party had made its selection. Proportional representation would restore a fair system to Derry, where two-thirds of the population were Catholic, but were placed in the position of a minority due to gerrymandering. In addition, it v/as claimed, proportional representa­ tion would get rid of the worst abuses in the allocation of houses.

We all know that there are local authorities which refuse to allocate houses in particular sections of the areas to particular categories of the community for fear of altering the voting figures. (S. Murnaghan, March 1, 1966)

The eighteen year-old vote v/as favored because young people were now better educated and well-travelled and if an eighteen year- old v/as eligible for military service, he should be eligible to vote. Murnaghan made a special plea to the Government to consider this motion seriously and not ju s t put up with i t and tre a t i t with supreme contempt as was often the Government's habit when i t came to minority motions.

The Minister of Home Affairs completely rejected the idea of proportional representation as absolutely unworkable. Proportional representation meant fewer and larger constituencies. No MP was directly responsible for a particular area, instead several MPs were responsible for the whole county. This put great strain on conscien­ tious MPs. The Minister pointed out that proportional representation was a very complicated system, the voter had to remember a l i s t of names and put them in order, and there was a greater possibility of 113 the voter getting confused. As far as the age of franchise was con­ cerned, the Minister affirmed that there had to be uniformity in different parts of the United Kingdom, and in the United Kingdom the proper age of franchise was twenty-one, not eighteen.

One Man-One Vote

The second demand made by the Republican Opposition in 1966 was for one man-one vote. Gerry F itt introduced a motion on March 15, calling for the franchise to be based on the principle of one man, one vote. He called for the abolition of the company and business franchise. He pointed out that in Northern Ireland a person might be able to vote in an Imperial election but not in a local election. Some people could vote in a local election but not in a Stormont election. The whole system was tremendously complicated. F it t complained that nearly a quarter of a million people were denied the vote in local elections. These were the young married couples without homes. Only those who paid rates got a local vote and these people could not get houses, so they did not pay rates, so they did not get a vote. At the same time, they paid considerable amounts in income taxes, and since the local governing authorities were largely financed from grants from the Stormont Government, i t was only reasonable and f a ir , said Fitt, that they receive a vote. At the same time these people were denied the vote, a limited company might have as many as six votes, depending on its valuation. Many couples paid in taxes much more than these lim ited companies paid in rates. I t was argued that one man, one vote would strike a t the core of what was wrong in the community, the type of local government administration and maladministration and discrimination by local authorities. It was charged that the complicated machinery currently used was invented by the Unionists to maintain their domination.

The principle of one man, one vote was completely rejected by the Unionists. The Minister of Home Affairs pointed out there was a business vote in B ritain on the same basis as 1n Northern Ireland. In any local government election, the council v/as being elected to decide how the rates should be dispersed. For th is reason electors were rate payers, some were resident rate payers, and some were busi­ ness rate payers (rate payers who did not reside in the area but had their business there). The same system operated in Britain. The M inister declared that since expenditure of tax money was guarded by the House, the tax money given to local authorities had already been scrutinized by public representatives. It was unnecessary that there should be a second look at it from the point of view of the universal franchise.

Only one Unionist MP, Minford, considered the Opposition motion of importance and he agreed with it. Significant during these proceedings was the fact that few Unionists attended the debate. The Opposition Members interpreted this as a lack of interest, and lack of serious attention to their motion. Special Powers Act

The Special Powers Act was also a very sensitive issue as far as the Republican Opposition was concerned. In June, Currie moved a prayer that amending regulation number 82 of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, dated April 14, be annulled. Under this regulation the Minister of Home Affairs was given the power to prohibit or re s tric t any tra ffic on the railways in Northern Ireland. These powers were passed on April 14th and the Minister used them a few days later to ban a train coming from Dublin to Belfast carrying Republicans to celebrate the Easter Rising. I t was not until May 26th that these regulations came before the Statutory Rules and Orders Committee, the committee in Parliament responsible for reviewing such regulations. Currie objected strongly to the delay and to the dictatorial powers this regulation conferred on the Minister. The Opposition Parties all supported Currie. All objected to a Minister having such enormous power. Murnaghan objected to the Special Pov/ers Act for its other provisions, such as imprisonment without trial and entry of houses without v/arrants. Labour MP, Boyd, complained because the Special Powers were used only against groups the Government did not lik e , the Republicans, but were not used against groups In their own ranks, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force.

The Minister of Home A ffairs responded that the Government would be glad to do away with Special Powers i f the security of Northern Ireland was assured.

Human Rights B ill and Housing'

In 1966, a ll the Opposition Parties joined forces in bringing pressure to bear on the Unionist Government to take some action against discrimination. They felt there was widespread discrimination against Catholics 1n housing allocation and jobs. The Republican Opposition charged that authorities were allocating houses on the basis of relig ion , not need. Some people had had their names on the waiting lis t for nine or ten years without getting houses. In addi­ tion to this, only an infinitesimal number of Catholics or non- Unionists were on boards and local authorities.

Later in the year charges of discrimination were directed at Stormont Government its e lf. The Republican Opposition charged that while 48 percent of the members of the Bar of Northern Ireland were Roman Catholic, almost no Catholics were selected to the Departments of Government. I t was charged there was total discrimination at the Government level, at the level of the Attorney General, and at the level of the Minister of Home Affairs and other ministries, against highly qualified competent Roman Catholic barristers. The Opposition considered the Government of Ireland Aqt as to ta lly inadequate to deal with discrimination, since this Act could not be used in fighting discrimination in housing or discrimination in the private sector. 115

The Republican Opposition, with th eir Liberal and Labour supporters, wanted a Human Rights Bill and a points system similar to the one used by the Housing Trust. They wanted the Government to take responsibility in this matter and they warned that a number of HRs at Westminster were ready to press the matter there.

The Unionist response to the Human Rights Bill was negative. While several Unionists stated their detestation of discrimination, they considered the Bill impractical to enact. It was questioned whether the problem of discrimination was serious enough to extend the boundaries of crim inality by making discrimination an offence. I t v/as not regarded as the function of the House to a rtic u la te public conscience, and i t was thought that trying to drive people by force would only increase sectarianism. It was also fe lt that the Bill would encroach on the freedom of speech. The Government considered that adequate legislation already existed, in the Government of Ireland Act, to deal with discrimination. The Republican Opposition was accused of stirring up charges about discrimination and upsetting community relations when they v/ere improving. The Minister of Home Affairs charged some Members of purposely making speeches to divide the community.

Some Hon. Members are seizing opportunities to make speeches calculated to divide the community and give their supporters ideas and feelings about dis­ crimination. Hon. Members would serve the community better by trying to bring people together, by refraining from allegations which have not got sub­ stance and foundation. (R. McConnell, Jan., 1966)

The Government again asserted that the allocation of houses was a matter for the local housing authorities to decide. Two Unionists, Scott and Nixon, did support a points system for the allocation of houses.

Conservative Unionists were particularly vehement 1n their re­ jection of the charges of discrimination. They pointed out that 1n Londonderry, 71 percent of a ll houses b u ilt went to Catholics, and in Markethill, after allowance had been made for slum clearance alloca­ tions, 34 percent of all new houses were allocated to Catholics, even though Catholics represented only 19 percent of the population there. As for the charge that Catholics were discriminated against at Government levels, Taylor pointed out that consistently over the years there had been more Protestants in the fields of agriculture, medi­ cine and the sciences, while Roman Catholics were over-represented in the humanities. This was due to the social and educational back­ grounds of the people coming up from the grammar school. That was why in the Department of Agriculture there were no Catholics. Taylor emphasized that out of fourteen crown prosecutors just appointed, six were Catholic. Taylor accused the Roman Catholic Church and the Dublin 116

Government o f being behind the current d iffic u ltie s in the community because neither supported the existence of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom.

In short, the Unionist Government and Party totally rejected a ll the demands made by the Republican Opposition.

Election Irregularities

. Election irregularities were also an element in the increasing tension of 1966. The early year elections in 1966 gave rise to com­ plaints by the Republican Opposition that there had been election irre g u la ritie s . Diamond complained of being roughed up outside the polling booth by Unionist supporters. He said the Republican Labour telephone had been tampered with by some Unionist employee of the Telephone Exchange, and he complained of Unionists personating votes. Fitt objected to the general atmosphere of violence during the election. He had been obliged to ask for police protection. He had received threatening telephone calls telling his agents not to go into Unionist areas or they would be physically assaulted. Fitt pointed out that his agents had to go into Unionist areas to stop personation; mass personation had taken place on the Shankill Road. He complained of the mad, frenzied mobs which operated out of the Unionist camp. The Republican Opposition also complained of intim ida-' tion, some people were told they would lose th e ir jobs i f they v/orked in the election and one man did, in fact, lose his job. It was charged that in Coleraine there were too few police to man the election station and at Cullycapple two Nationalists had been beaten with sticks.

The Minister of Home Affairs belittled the incidents, saying i t was unfortunate such incidents occurred but they were not of earth-shaking proportions. Unionist Scott called the allegations untrue and iargely exaggerated. He accused F itt of bringing the matter up in Westminster only to create tension and ill-fe e lin g both in Northern Ireland and B ritain.

The Republican Opposition complained even more b itte rly la te r in the year when the Attorney General announced that investigations of these matters had not produced sufficient evidence to s ta rt any criminal proceedings. F itt was particularly incensed because thou­ sands of pounds had been spent investigating a complaint made against his conduct in the la s t election. The complaint turned out to be a trumped up charge by some individuals with criminal records. 117

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

The year 1966 was a period of conservative ascendancy, when the more liberal O'Neill came under heavy fir e from the conservative Unionists. This was reflected in changes in the structure of the cabinet. In October, the conservative Craig replaced McConnell as Minister of Home Affairs, a very key position.

During 1966 i t became apparent that a small group of m ilitan t Republicans were leading the fig ht for reforms. They included F it t , Diamond and Currie. Older Nationalists tended to be more low-key on these issues. During the year the Republican Labour and Eire Labour parties united into the Republican Labour Party, so uniting Fitt and Diamond in one party.

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

In 1966 the Unionists feared violence from both the Republican and Protestant extremists. They blamed both groups for the outbreak of violence. They were especially sensitive to the threat from the IRA, but were slow to recognize the threat from the UVF, tending to consider Republican warnings as malicious statements. However, there was no hesitation in banning the UVF when there was evidence of its criminal a c tiv ity . They regarded the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Special Constabulary as responsible forces in the con­ duct of their duties. They rejected a ll the reforms suggested by the Republican Opposition, seeing them as impractical, unnecessary or unwise. The conservative Unionists were less even-handed in th eir condemnation of the rio ters, placing the blame squarely on the Catholic minority.

The Republican Opposition saw no threats emanating from the IRA or from the Republican movement and blamed.the Government with trying to indoctrinate fear. They could see only Paisley's contribu­ tion to the Cromac Street disorders and were blind to the activities of the inhabitants of the area. Republican Opposition MPs thought that repressive measures should be used to squash Paisley's actions. On the other hand, the Republican Opposition perceived the Protestant extremist drilling as extremely dangerous. The RUC and the USC were not trusted by the Republican Opposition, even 1n the conduct of their normal activities investigating riot situations. The growing dissatisfaction in the community was sensed by the Republican Opposition and they called for a series of reforms, basically aimed at strengthening the social and political position of the Catholic minority. OUTLINE — 1967

INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Republican Activity

Fenian Rising Celebration Republican Clubs IRA Lotteries

INPUTS — EXTRASOCIETAL

B ritain

Eire

OUTPUTS - - UNIONIST

Repressive Measures

Reform Measures

Amalgamation of Five Fermanagh Councils

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Demand fo r Reforms

One Man - One Vote Orange Order Human Rights B ill- Housing

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

l SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

118 INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Republican A c tiv ity

The Republican activity was steadily increasing in 1967 with the planned celebration of the Fenian Rising, the organization of Republican Clubs and the disclosure of IRA lotteries. Protestant extremists were surplsingly quiet.

Fenian Rising Celebration

In March there were preparations made by the Republicans to celebrate the Fenian Rising of 1867, even though celebrating th is event was not customary in Northern Ireland.

The M inister of Home A ffairs condemned this proposed celebration.

I can only regard the proposals to commemorate this event as blatantly provocative and likely to endanger the p e a c e ....I do not propose to In terfere with the customary practice related to Easter cele­ brations providing the organizers can satisfy the police that these celebrations are not being held to commemorate the Fenian Rising of 1867 and, secondly, that the celebrations are organized 1n such a way as to minimise and contain the offence given to the majority of citizens. (W. Craig, March 7, 1967)

Craig said he had reports of proposed counter demonstrations to take place In public places at the same time and place as the Republican celebrations. He strongly condemned such proposals and threatened the prohibition of any such demonstration. Craig banned, fo r one month, a ll public processions and meetings other than those having specific permission from a Commissioner or County Inspector of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,

The Republican Opposition claimed it was a very thin- skinned attitude to be offended by these celebrations. They accused the Minister of banning the processions just to pander to extremist elements. They feared the extremist element were already taking

119 120 over the local Unionist associations in the city. They accused the Protestant extremists of threatening counter demonstrations just to get the celebration banned. Banning celebrations was just an attempt to cloud the issue and justify to the British Government the refusal of the Unionist Government to carry out reforms. The Republican Opposition thought it was useful for the Unionists* when unemployment was ris in g , to arouse emotional feelings between orange and green, so creating tension within the community and distracting attention from more fundamental economic problems.

Republican Clubs

In 1967, Republicans were also active organizing Republican Clubs. On March 7, 1967 the Minister of Home Affairs, Craig, reported to the House that the Inspector General of the RUC.had delivered to him an inquiry on the Republican Clubs. Craig reported that these clubs were, in fa c t, the unlawful Sinn Fein organization under another label. The Republican Clubs were established after the Sinn Fein annual general meeting in December of 1964 fo r the sole purpose of circumventing Northern Ireland's ban on Sinn Fein.

Sinn Fein was formed in the Republic to over­ come the Republican Government ban on the IRA. Both want to overthrow British rule in Northern Ireland and only differ slightly as to means. When the IRA commenced attacks on Northern Ireland in December, 1956, Sinn Fein issued a supporting statement. (VI. Craig, March 16, 1967)

The clubs were controlled by the government body of Sinn Fein 1n Dublin. There were some forty clubs and Craig asserted that almost h a lf the members were connected with the IRA. Craig pointed out that Sinn Fein and the Republican Clubs were not a p o litic a l organization in the ordinary sense, since a number of Sinn Fein executives had been Interned in Dublin due to IRA connections.

The Opposition Parties all objected to the ban on the Republican Clubs. The Republican Opposition claimed that the Republican Clubs were a p o litic a l organization and should be allowed to organize. The clubs were said to-have a small membership of about six members in each club, and were no threat to the country. The Republican Opposition saw no danger to an affiliation of the clubs with S1nn Fein since Sinn Fein had given up the idea of violence 1n the last few years. In fa c t, the Republican Opposition thought S1nn Fein it s e lf should not be banned. The suspicion was voiced that the Secret Service might have manufactured the evidence on the Republican Clubs and that banning the Clubs might be a s in is te r move to drive people to more extreme methods. The ban was seen as a capitulation to pressure from the Paisley extremists and the Orange Order. Finally, the Republican Opposition objected to the Minister of Home Affairs having the power to ban the clubs, since such power made him a v irtu a l d ic ta to r. 121

No dictator anywhere has the powers that the Minister of Home Affairs can exercise. Under the Special Powers Act, one is guilty until one has proved oneself innocent. It is an offense not to answer questions. The Minister can delegate these tremendous powers. There is power of arrest with­ out warrant, power to search without warrant and power to seize property and search premises. One cannot claim tria l by jury. (R. O'Connor, March 16, 1967)

A few days after the Republican Clubs were banned, a protest meeting was held. Four people were arrested, interrogated, then released. Craig said the four people v/ere arrested because they were suspected of being members of the Republican Clubs. He hoped the arrests would show that the ban would be enforced.

Later in the year the students at Queens formed a Republican Club. Craig banned 1t promptly. The students held a protest parade in Belfast. A counter protest meeting, to protest the students protest parade, was held in a busy street in downtown Belfast. This precipitated another demand for the removal of the ban, but to no a v a il.

IRA Lotteries .

In October, the police raided a hall where a suspected IRA lottery was being held. When the police arrived at the hall, they found a number of g irls dr.awn up in m ilitary formation and responding to m ilita ry commands. Many of the women there were known to the police as members o f, or sympathetic with, Cumann na mbam, the women's branch of the IRA, The hall was adorned with the Tricolour and a number of photographs of deceased IRA men. Republican and Labour MPs objected to this police search.

INPUTS - EXTRASOCIETAL

Britain

Early in the year Prime Minister Wilson made a statement on the Irish question at the Council of Europe Assembly. He said that no one would be happier than Great Britain 1f the Irish problem was solved by agreement within the emerald is le and he hoped there would be an intensification of the process of coming together which had begun in 1965. However, he also endorsed the principle that Ulster should consent to any new arrangements. 122

O 'Neill responded by saying that he was g ratified that Wilson had endorsed the principle of Northern Ireland consent which was incorporated in the Ireland Act of 1949. However, he thought the greatest contribution to North-South relationships would be an acceptance, by the Republic, that there would be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. The constitution of Northern Ireland was not subject to debate.

The Republican Opposition vigorously attacked O'Neill fo r not budging on the constitutional question. His statement was in te r­ preted as a "sugared version" of the Protestant Ulster "not an inch" philosophy.

I t was the answer of a weak Prime Minister, mentally tethered, first to a stupid reactionary Cabinet and party and secondly to the all-powerful, anti-political, anti-Rome, anti-Union-of-any-kind sectarian Orange Order. (P. Gormley, Feb. 1, 1967)

The Nationalists charged the Unionist Party of not trusting O'Neill to meet and discuss the constitutional position of Northern Ireland with the Republican Taoiseach. I t was suggested that the Dublin Government might have to use force on the Unionists to eradicate the "deep- seated religious prejudices" in the North and the Nationalists said they might have to campaign in Britain and elsewhere to eliminate the abuses in Northern Ireland. The British Government was seen as genuinely anxious for the two Irish Governments to work out a solution to their problem.

Eire

Taoiseach Lynch, commenting in the Dail on Wilson's statement, said he would continue to remind Wilson that the present division of the country could not continue without British support, and the matter of a divided Ireland was primarily a British responsibility.

The Unionists were sensitive to Lynch's statement in the D ail.

The words spoken in the Dail are very injurious to Northern Ireland. They show a pressure by the Government in the South—a pressure which they hope to keep on the Government at Westminster. (W. Scott, Feb. 22, 1967)

The Unionist position was that Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom, not because of the economic support received from the United Kingdom Government, but because the heritage of Ulsterman was there,- and that was where they wanted to be. 123

The time has come when we should declare unequivocally that we believe that our destiny lies in the 1949 Act, that we here must be the deciders of whether or not we remain a part of the United Kingdom. (W. Scott, Feb. 22, 1967)

The Nationalists warned that obligations to the Dail dialogue would hurt current negotiations going on over ta riff concessions.

OUTPUTS — UNIONISTS

Repressive Measures

Government output to control renewed Republican a c tiv ity 1n 1967 consisted of both repressive and reform measures. Public processions were prohibited fo r one month, and the Republican Clubs were banned.

Reform Measures

Reforms consisted of the amalgamation of the fiv e Fermanagh County Councils and a promise to abolish the plural vote. t Amalgamation or Five Fermanagh Councils

The Nationalists welcomed the amalgamation of fiv e Fermanagh Councils for reasons of efficiency, but they attacked the motives of the Government in bringing about the amalgamation. They charged the Government with engineering this amalgamation because they feared the Nationalists would soon control one of the Fermanagh councils.

All areas are threatened by this move which 1s part of a plot to meet the cry of reform by perpetu­ ating the greatest gerrymander of a ll. (J, Carron, March 15, 1967)

The Nationalists complained that 1n areas where Catholics were a majority, Unionists s till got most of the seats on the local councils. The majority of people in Fermanagh were Nationalists, but the majority of people on the voting lis t were Unionists. The local govern ment vote was considered completely undemocratic. The feeling was that when i t came to reorganizing local government, the Unionists would make sure th e ir ascendancy was protected. 124

Unionist MP, Taylor, in replying to these charges asserted that Unionist MPs also represented Catholics.

We in Fermanagh and South Tyrone are in a conr stituency with a considerable Roman Catholic majority and time and again the Unionists head the polls. We get the majority of support. It is wrong for the N ationalist members to get up and speak as though they represent every Roman Catholic in the community. We in the Unionist Party represent quite a few and we are proud to do i t . (J. Taylor, March 15, 1967)

OUTPUTS - REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Demand fo r Reforms

Republican Opposition demands 1n 1967 echoed previous years. They called for one man-one.vote, the adjustment of ward boundaries, the reduction of influence exerted by the Orange Order on the Government, and a Human Rights B ill. In these demands they were supported, and sometimes led, by the Liberal and Labour Parties.

One Man-One Vote

The Labour Party leader, T. Boyd, supported by the Republican Opposition, introduced a motion on May 30th for an electoral system based on one man, one vote, with a ll persons over twenty-one being given the right to vote in all elections. He called for all forms of plural voting to be abolished and for equal weight to be given to each vote. For a ll votes to have equal weight i t would be necessary to adjust constituency and ward boundaries. Parliamentary boundaries had remained unchanged in Northern Ireland for thirty-three years, despite changes and shifts 1n population. This had resulted in great variations in the size of constituencies; one member might be elected by 8,000 while another member might be elected by 40,000. It was charged that there was gerrymandering, with a pattern of small wards electing Unionists and large wards electing Nationalists. The Opposition faulted the Government for failing to deal with these problems.

The Minister of Home Affairs, Craig, pointed out that it was the Unionists who suffered most from the present election boundaries, not the Nationalists, since it was in the most solidly Unionist areas that a vote counted least of a ll. Changes could not be made a t this time in the franchise, because the whole system of local government was to be restructured and any change in the franchise should be decided on after the reorganization. 125

Unionist MPs questioned why this motion had been brought up now since the Government had already promised they would abolish all forms of plural voting, the business vote and the university vote. Extending the franchise to a ll over twenty-one in local elections would eliminate the qualification that local electors be rate payers and they wanted this preserved. They saw nothing in this system that smacked of narrow religious or political advantage.

Orange Order

The influence of the Orange Order on the Stormont Government was increasingly becoming a concern of the Opposition in 1967. Murnaghan stated the case quite concisely.

We a ll know that the Orange Order and the Unionist Party are virtually indistinguishable. The Orange Order has automatic representation in the Unionist Party. It is a known fact that a Unionist cannot get a nomination for a constituency unless he is a member of the Order. Members on this side of the House are justified in criticizing an organiza­ tion which dictates to the governing party in this country. (S. Murnaghan, July 19, 1967)

The Republican Opposition were fully in agreement with the Liberal Murnaghan, that the Orange Order was exerting undue influence on the Government.

Human Rights B ill

Early in the year, Murnaghan introduced a Human Rights Bill for the second time. This Bill differed from previous Bills because it did not make discrimination a criminal offence. The Bill proposed a Human Rights Commission that would take conciliation measures. If there were repeated allegations against a particular local authority or against a particular business concern, the Commission would decide i f the pattern was clear enough to ju s tify action against the person or business accused of discrimination. Murnaghan believed this new B ill took into account a ll the objections levelled against the earlier B ill. The Bill was enthusiastically supported by a ll Opposition Parties.

There were few Unionists in the House to hear this Bill and this was duly noted by the Opposition. One Unionist decided to speak impromptu since there were so few Unionists present. He pointed out that discrimination did not exist in hotels, theatres and such places and the sort of discrimination that existed in Northern Ireland could not be settled by legislatio n. The Attorney General, Jones, described the Human Rights B ill as unnecessary and impractical. He thought enough leg islative safeguards already 126

existed in the Government of Ireland Act. Jones declared there was no discrimination in northern Ireland on the grounds of race or color and none on the grounds of political belief, but it was true that religion and politics were almost synonymous in Northern Ireland. He charged that allegations of discrimination were based on surmise rather than fact. He pointed to the sparse attendance in the House as an indication that this was not felt to be a burning issue.

Throughout the year the Republican Opposition continued to complain about various forms of discrimination and charged O'Neill with having plenty of pious sentiments but no real reforms. O'Neill was accused of sitting on the fence, torn between his own progressive impulses and the reactionary restraints of the Unionist Party. The Opposition Parties cited two commissions that had come from Britain that had both found overwhelming evidence of discrimination. One was a commission of lawyers representing the Government side in B ritain, the other was a commission of British MPs.

Housing

Charges of discriminatory allocation of houses and shortage of houses continued to be made by Republican Opposition flembers in 1967, Currie was the most active HP in raising this issue. He attacked the Dungannon Urban D is tric t Council where, he charged, the Unionist-controlled council had deliberately practiced segregation in housing. The Unionists had housed their sympathizers in the east and central wards and non-Unionists had been placed in the west ward, so that the 14-7 Unionist majority was maintained. Currie charged the Dungannon Rural D istrict Council with doing the same thing, lumping all anti-Unionists into a small number of electoral divisions to minimize the non-Unionist vote. Individual councillors often could decide who got the houses built in their area, and would allocate according to relig io n , not need. Currie warned that people were starting to think of using other means to meet this problem. There was general agreement among the Republican Opposition that people were getting stirred up.

... . i f the homeless people in Fermanagh....feel they cannot look for help to the Unionist administra­ tion then they will be perfectly entitled and I would support them, to take any other means they think possible to remedy the existing situation. (G. F1tt, Nov. 8, 1967)

The remedies suggested to eliminate discrimination 1n housing was a Central Housing Authority and a points system.

The Minister of Development again maintained that allocation of houses was outside his province; it was the preserve of local government. He rejected a Central Housing Authority for allocating 127

houses and said points systems did not work well. He thought the real need was to build more houses: So long as some people did not get houses, they would complain.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

There were no sign ifican t structural changes 1n the system in 1967. The conservative Unionists were in the ascendancy with no sign ifican t reforms being made.

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

In the face of increased Republican activity, the Unionist Government and Party perceived a small renewed threat from Sinn Fein •and the IRA. The Government moved to meet this threat by banning public processions and Republican Clubs. They passed some minor reforms, such as the amalgamation of the fiv e Fermanagh Councils and they agreed to abolish the plural vote and the university seats. However, a ll other reforms were dismissed as unnecessary, impractical or unwise.

The Republican Opposition, in response to Republican a c tiv ity on the street, tried to protect that activity by objecting to any ban on parades. This completely reversed their previous position when they called for the extension of parade bans when Paisley was active. They saw no threat emanating from the Republican Clubs and labelled the Government banning as ju s t a pandering to extremists. They per­ ceived the conservative Unionists as exerting pressure on O'Neill to make these moves and prevent any reforms. They saw discontent building up 1n the community and reiterated their call for reforms. As far as Unionist response to these demands, the Republican Opposition noted the almost«complete lack of Interest. OUTLINE — 1968

INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

C ivil Rights A ctivity

Londonderry C ivil Rights March Armagh Civil Rights March

INPUTS — EXTRASOCIETAL

Britain

Eire

OUTPUTS — UNIONIST

Reform Measures

Londonderry Area Development Commission White Paper on Reshaping of Local Government

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Attack on RUC

Demand for Reforms

Human Rights B ill Housing

Call for Direct Action

Protestant Extremists

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

128 INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

C ivil Rights A ctivity

Late in 1968 real pressure fo r reforms was exerted by the C ivil Rights Movement in the form of parades and demonstrations. On August 25th a c iv il rights march took place without incident, but on October 5, 1968, a c iv il rights march in Londonderry ended in severe violence. In November, another c iv il rights march in Armagh was stopped by counter demonstrators.

Londonderry C ivil Rights March

On October 5th the c iv il rights marchers had planned a meeting and march through two lo y a lis t areas in Londonderry. The police were convinced that violence would ensue, so they advised the Minister of Home A ffairs, Craig, to ban the meeting and parade in these two areas only. The police urged the organizers of the march to re-route the procession and a lte r the location of the proposed meeting, but the marchers refused. Once the procession had moved along to the prohibited area, the police halted the procession. A meeting was held for about th irty minutes and then the police told the crowd to disperse. A barrage of stones was hurled at the police who endured this fusillade for two minutes before moving in with drawn batons and water wagon. Injuries suffered by civilians were slight and super­ f ic ia l. The Republican Opposition MPs, F itt, McAteer and Currie, took part in the march. F itt had attempted to force his way through a police cordon and was arrested for disorderly conduct. After the marchers were dispersed, pertrol bombs were thrown, constabulary buildings were set on f ir e , and bands of youth roamed the c ity , breaking windows, looting, and attacking the police.

The Republican Opposition'were not present In the House when the Londonderry C ivil Rights March was debated.

The Unionists were pretty consistent 1n their evaluation of the situation. They believed there were a few civil rights marchers who were genuinely concerned with advancing human rights, but they had allowed themselves to be taken over by the Republican agitators. The Unionists believed that the IRA had infiltrated the ranks of the civil rights movement and were now organizing the movement, following communist and IRA doctrine. IRA strategy, as outlined on television by 130

an IRA official, was to penetrate organizations, create unrest and dis­ order and, finally, use physical, force to put its program into effect. As early as July, 1968, the Minister of Home Affairs,*Craig, had noted the statements made by Sean Garland, a prominent member of the IRA.

Garland has said "The function of the c iv il wing of a ll successful revolutionary movements has been to act as the mass organizer of the people to lead them in their agitationary activities. Therefore, we should be leading the people by means of the c iv il v/ings in agitating for better working, living and social condi- * tions, in agitating for land, showing them in all these fights that their enemies are their landlords, their bosses and their gombeen exploiters and fin a lly get them to understand that a ll these opposing forces are banded together in an organization called the establish­ ment. This changes drastically our traditional line of tactics. There are no longer two different types of republican, physical force men and politicians. We in the Republican Movement must be p o litic a lly aware of our objectives and must also be prepared to take the appropriate educational, economic, political and finally, military action to achieve this." (VI. Craig, July 24, 1968)

Craig believed that the IRA strategy was now being put into effect through the c iv il rights movement. He pointed out that the C ivil Rights Association was made up of the Londonderry Housing Action Committee (the majority of whom were members of the Connolly Association), the Republican Party (which included well-known members of the IRA), Sinn Fein, the Young Socialists, and the Communist Party. Craig charged that Eamon McCann had organized the Londonderry rio t and he was the chairman of the Iris h Workers Group, a revolutionary socialist group dedicated to creating an all-Ireland Socialist Workers Republic.

As fo r the Republican Opposition M.P.'s who had taken part in the parade, the Unionists declared they had greatly exaggerated grievances or manufactured them for p o litic a l propaganda. By con­ vincing the minority they were discriminated against, the Republican Opposition was able to keep the united support of the Catholic community, something they needed to survive. The Nationalists were accused of having no social or economic policies of their own, and of being sectarian out of necessity. It was felt that Currie and F itt had long been inciting to unlawful a c tiv ity and c iv il disobedience. The Unionists rejected a ll the reasons the Republican Opposition had put forth to explain the rising tensions.

Prime Minister O'Neill rejected the view that the disturbances were due to discrimination. The allegation that the Government dis­ criminated against non-Unionist areas was completely untrue. 131 Londonderry, a N ationalist area, had an accepted p rio rity of number one. Nine new factories had been located there, providing 2,300 new jobs and another 2,000 were on the way. Housing remained the most pressing social need, but 12,000 new houses were well in sight and the religious minority (Catholics) were occupying a substantial proportion of the new houses. O 'N eill stressed that immense social and economic progress had been made over the last five years.

Armagh C iv il Rights Harch

The second c iv il rights march was held in la te November 1n the city of Armagh. Before the march took place the city was infiltrated by "loyalists" or Paisleyites, who took up strategic places in the city. Many were armed with sticks, staves and clubs. Their aim was to stop the c iv il rights parade. The parade only went one-quarter of a mile and then the marchers were advised by the police that, th e ir safety could not be guaranteed any further. The marchers dispersed. Later, there was a victory parade held by the Paisleyites, who claimed the enemy had been routed.

The Republican Opposition objected to what had happened in Armagh, They faulted the police for not protecting the civil rights marchers, and for not arresting the loyalists who tried to stop the march. I t was thought that the demonstrations had occurred because the people had lost faith in the parliamentary system. The Republican Opposition thought the Unionist Party was now split, with a substantial body of reactionary opinion obstructing every reform. The Prime Minister was considered too weak to deal with the dissidents. The Republican Opposition denied any IRA involvement in the civil rights campaign and called for.an amnesty for people suspected or convicted of IRA activities who had fled to the South. They accused the Minister v of Home Affairs of trying to turn public opinion against the civil rights marchers, by branding .them-as IRA, socialists and communists.

The Unionists criticized both the Paisley faction that had gathered in Armagh and the civil rights marchers. The civil rights march was provocative, its chief marshall was a leading member of the Republican movement in Armagh and.the marchers came in cars and had sticks. It was pointed out that while Nationalists condemned Paisley supporters for carrying sticks, they said nothing about the people 1n Londonderry who had used stones and f ir e bombs. The Unionists credited the Government with doing a great deal to better relationships 1n the community.

INPUTS — EXTRASOCIETAL

B ritain

Late in 1968, O'Neill visited Wilson in London. Discussions centered around full adult franchise, the abolition of the Special 132

Powers Act, the disturbances In Derry, sectarian and political discrim­ ination, and the appointment of an ombudsman or parliamentary commissioner. Wilson knew O'Neill was under great pressure from conser­ vative Unionists and Protestant extremists and he made a statement to the effect that I f O'Neill was overthrown, blackmailed, or intimidated by extremists within his party, or outside it, Britain would have to review her attitude toward Northern Ireland.

Wilson's statement was vigorously attacked by the conservative Unionists at Stormont-, who considered i t an unwarranted and unasked- for intrusion into the affairs of the Ulster Unionist Party, and a form of political and constitutional blackmail. The conservative Unionists believed that the situation in Northern Ireland was being misrepresented at Westminster by Gerry F itt.

Eire

There was not only an indication that interference in Northern Ireland affairs might come from Britain, but also some hint that interference might come from Eire. On December 4th, O'Neill commented that he s t ill believed in practical cooperation with the South but,

....ill-ju d g e d and unacceptable interventions by politicians in the South, such as Hr. Blaney, into our domestic affairs do nothing to further the s p irit in which such cooperation should be conducted. (O 'N eill, December 4, 196B)

OUTPUTS — UNIONIST

Reform Measures

Two important reforms were under consideration 1n 1968, the Londonderry Area Development Commission, and the reshaping of local government.

Londonderry Area Development Commission "

A fter the disturbances of 1968, the Government decided to set up a Londonderry Area Development Commission to ensure that the problems of housing, sewers, roads, etc. were attacked speedily. The Republican Opposition attacked the proposal as just another Unionist tric k to maintain power in Londonderry, where Unionist support had dwindled to 30 percent. They charged that by setting up the Commission, the minority would be denied control of their c ity . 133

White Paper on Reshaping of Local GoVeriiinent

Government output in 1968 also included a White Paper on the Reshaping of Local Government. The Minister of Development said the White Paper pointed the way to a radical revision of local government. Any new organization had to provide for efficiency, local decisions, innovation and variation. It was suggested that the number of local authorities should number around twelve to eighteen, so the areas would be big enough to be planned as a whole, yet small enough to carry local interest and local support. The Government was giving a lead, but was not laying down any exact boundaries. This would give maximum opportunity for public discussion, which was what the Government wanted.

The Nationalist Leader McAteer said the Nationalist Party view had not yet crystallized on the matter of local government reform, but generally the Nationalists fe lt that as one moved away from the local scene there v/as more im partiality and this would serve the minority. Currie regarded the White Paper as completely inadequate. Reorganization of local government was no good without universal suffrage. The Nationalists felt that the Government should consult with the Opposition before any firm decisions were made in this politically sensitive area. The Labour Party favored centralization but said universal franchise was imperative.

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Attack on RUC

The forces of social control came under attack from the Republican Opposition a fte r the Londonderry disturbances. Complaints were voiced because the RUC had been lodged in an Army in s ta lla tio n , the HMS Sea Eagle during the Londonderry disturbances and the Republican Opposition thought the public funds of Britain should not be used for a matter of this kind'. The Republican Opposition called for an Inquiry into what happened at Londonderry, claiming the police used undue force and they wanted charges brought against certain members of the RUC for their actions in the Londonderry disturbances. It was intimated that the Minister of Home Affairs, Craig, gave direct orders to the RUC to use th eir batons. In subsequent disturbances 1t was claimed that the RUC attacked the Catholic section of the crowd while protecting the Protestant section. The Republican Opposition called for the dismissal of Craig. The Reserve Force of the RUC was also criticized. It was described as a semi-military force raised 1n the early f if t ie s because of what were believed to be threats in connection with the border and it was no longer needed. Fitt objected to the Reserve Force because i t got special training and used notes on riotous situations obtained from the United States. 134

The Minister of Home Affairs, Craig, replied that the only special training the Reserve Force received v/as in crowd control and other special duties to enable them to cope with major disasters. He pointed out that no official complaint of misconduct by the police 1n Londonderry had been brought forward to the proper authorities. Craig would not reply to a question as to whether the RUC were given special instructions to use their batons, saying it was confidential informa­ tio n .

Demand for Reforms

The Republican Opposition, with support from Liberal and Labour MPs continued th eir concerted attack on the Unionist Government to bring in reforms. They demanded a Human Rights Bill to end discrimina­ tion, one man-one vote, allocation of houses according to need. The Nationalists called for amnesty fo r IRA members and Government action against Protestant extremists.

Human Rights B ill

In January, Murnaghan again introduced a Human Rights B ill. I t was the same B ill as introduced in 1967. The B ill was supported by all Opposition Parties. Diamond charged that discrimination was s till rampant in Northern Ireland, as indicated at a recent Unionist Party Conference where the Party said they v/ere not prepared to accept as members, anyone of the Catholic faith. The large industrial under­ takings in Belfast were accused of having practiced total discrimination so long that the bulk of their skilled operatives were all Protestant. Religious and political minority members were discriminated against in promotion. I t was noted th at, as on other, such occasions, few Unionists were present to discuss the B ill. Later in the year, Fitt charged there were few Catholics among the highly-salaried staff of officialdom. Of all the consultants appointed to the Hospital Authority, 387 were Protestant and 31 were Catholic, F it t charged that often appointments were made before Nationalists and Catholics knew there was a vacancy.

The Minister of Home Affairs, Craig, again rejected legisla­ tion as a means of combatting discrimination.

Discrimination is a word which 1s very loosely used. Apparently i t can mean anything from allega­ tions of improper exercise of its functions by a public body, to criticism of the fact that many people prefer to liv e and work with people whom they know.... No one would deny that discrimination exists 1n the sense of the exercise of unreasonable personal prefer­ ences. The whole essence of democracy 1s the exercise of free choice, even the choice to be unreasonable.... 135 People tend to be drawn to and to associate with people with the same backgrounds. (W. Craig, Jan., 30, 1968)

Craig's position was that such legislation was unnecessary since the Government of Ireland Act clearly provided that the Government could not act in a discriminatory way. As far as the appointment of Catholics to official positions, the Government's position was that public appointments under the control of the Government of Northern Ireland were, and would continue to be, open to a ll sections of the population on the basis of merit alone.

Housing

The problems of housing came to a head 1n 1968. As usual, theRepublican Opposition raised the issue. F itt protested a speech given by Unionist M.P. Kelly in which Kelly said the Glencairn estates in Belfast were to be used exclusively for Protestants. F itt said he realized that many people might be happier living among their coreligionists, but sometime a start had to be made in integrating the community, and the Belfast Corporation should not set up estates exclusively for one religion.

The Minister of Development replied that public housing had to be allocated according to the Housing Regulations which did not take any account of relig ion . Belfast Corporation operated a points system that did not take religion into consideration. Within these regula­ tions the allocation of particular houses was a matter primarily and . completely for the housing authority, and the housing authority naturally took into account the wishes of the prospective tenant.

Similar complaints continued throughout the year; there should be more mixing and less segregation; the allocation was not fair to Catholics; allocation should be on the basis of need. The Government was perceived as insensitive to the problem.

Must some of these councillors who perpetuate injustices be murdered before a Minister will say that there must have been something in the allega­ tions. (M. Keogh, April 4, 1968)

In June an incident occurred that was to become incorporated into the folk law of protest in Northern Ireland. A family that had been squatting in a newly b u ilt council house at Caledon was evicted in the fu ll glare of T.V. cameras. The Nationalists, Currie and Richardson, and the Republican Labour MPs, F itt and Diamond, defended the evicted family. Currie took the most extreme position. He pictured the family as innocent victims, bullied by the local b ailiff.

I have nothing but the highest praise and com­ mendation for the family for the way they behaved. No violence was used and despite the intense provoca- 4

136

tion and Intimidation, the family did not resist In any way the almost jack-booted b a iliffs who came to evict them from what had been th eir home fo r the past eight m onths....! ask Hon. Members to imagine the feelings of the young mother of three young children who was evicted yesterday afternoon. What were her sentiments as she was dragged from that house clutching her nine-weeks-old baby to her breast? How did she feel as she lay where she had been thrown, on the pavement outside the house hearing her children crying and seeing her broken furniture strewn a ll over the street. (J. Currie, June 19, 1968)

Currie blamed the Dungannon Rural D is tric t Council for the eviction and said the family would move out if they were given the next avail­ able suitable house. The squatting was a protest against the whole system of house allocation. Currie claimed lie had done everything in his power to champion the cause of homeless people. He said that i f this Goodfellow family did not get a house then parliamentary representation had failed.

I f I do not get a satisfactory reply today I will continue this fight in other ways until all public-authority houses in my areas are allocated only on the basis of need. (J. Currie, June 19, 1968)

Other Nationalists supported Currie but condemned squatting. Fitt said he shared Currie's sense of frustration.

I have tried in every way possible to highlight the injustices and bring them to the attention of the Government. I have been charged on occasions with either inciting or provoking violence. If my words meant anything they were never meant to provoke or incite people. They were meant to draw to the attention of the Unionist Government the great dis­ content which is existing in Northern Ireland at the moment. (G. F it t , June 19, 1968)

F itt hoped that c iv il disobedience would not break out. He noted that tension had been escalating in the House during the past few weeks and

....th e voices of reason, the voices of lib e ra l­ ism have been s tille d on the Government side of the House. (G. F it t , June 19, 1968)

The Unionists were sympathetic for the need for houses but they condemned squatting. The Convervative Unionists took a harder line. Burns pointed out that far from being peaceful and leaving 137 qu ietly, the Goodfellow family had their friends and neighbors in the house when the authorities came, and far from not offering resistance, the authorities had to use a crow bar to get in. According to Burns, the Goodfellow family had ju st returned from England and had their name on the waiting l i s t only one week, while the people to whom the house had been allocated, had been on the waiting lis t for over a year. The Dungannon Rural Council had to evict them or i t would encourage squatting all over. Taylor laid the blame for the squatting and subsequent eviction on Currie. He accused Currie of encouraging families to squat as a p o litical stunt. The Republican Club in Brantry, near Cal6don, had been fu lly involved in the whole issue. Members of the Club there had organized resistence to the ejection from the house and had corresponded with Prime Minister Wilson over the matter.

The next day I t was announced in the Commons that Austin Currie had gone to Caledon and barricaded himself in the Goodfellow house. The leader of the Nationalist Party, McAteer, appealed to the House Members for understanding. He told of the many, many times he and other members had trie d to penetrate closed minds to warn that some­ thing should be done to meet the legitimate grievances which they had spotlighted so long. McAteer said that there had been no product from discussions in the House, just a hardening of attitudes on both sides. The Government had used their built-in majority to steamroller every complaint the Opposition had made.

This can only produce one result out of the total frustration at the over use of the Government's parliamentary majority. It has brought the winter of despair, with the result that people with some justi-' fication, may point to us who are attempting the business of democratic representation and say, "What good is it raising the matter in Parliament. They are not going to listen anyway." This can only produce a state of a ffa irs which may well be in train at this very moment. (E. McAteer, June 20, 1968)

McAteer could see that the events of Caledon might well be a prelude to another period of turmoil and strife. He urged that a house be given to this family.

The Minister of Development replied that thousands of house allocations were made each year and it was impossible to please all applicants and assure unsuccessful applicants that fair play had been given. The present system had worked very w ell, with ju st a few mis­ takes. It was ludicrous to put allocation under a central authority.

I do not think the event in Caledon is a prelude to a renewal of strife, I believe this 1s an isolated Incident that has been blown up out of context and improtance. (W. Fitzsimmons, June 30, 1968) 138

Murnaghan, the Liberal MP who had supported the Republican Opposition in their demands for reform, saw serious implications following from this situation.

People are discovering that resort to direct action sometimes leading to force and, indeed to out-and-out violence, can often be the best way to achieve their ends. This, unfortunately, is a direct challenge to democracy. We cannot afford any form of violence because violence cannot be con­ tained and isolated. (S. Murnaghan, June 30, 1968)

Murnaghan f e lt that so long as the present system of housing allocation was used, there would be discontent.

Call for Direct Action

A fter the "Caledon A ffair" there was a marked change in the attitudes of the Republican Opposition. They started to question the utility of Parliament in bringing about reforms. Gerry Fitt in a Oerry speech declared that nothing could be gained from speeches at Stormont and since i t was not possible to get reforms by constitutional methods, he called on the people in Derry and a ll over Northern Ireland, who were victims of the system, to end these v/rongs by "any means at th e ir disposal." F itt said he was quite prepared to go outside con­ stitutional methods to bring social justice. Fitt reiterated his sentiments in the Commons.

While there is a denial of these fundamental lib e rtie s then the people in the c ity of Derry who are victims of the present system, are morally obligated to themselves, to th e ir fam ilies, and to this country to take whatever means are possible to redress those wrongs and to change the system to ensure that human rights and privileges are respected . . . . I do not ask any man pr woman in Northern Ireland to resort to the gun or the bullet in defence of their liberties but I say that they are quite entitled to have protest marches, to have s it-in s and to squat in houses where there have been unfair a llo c a tio n s .... I would have every sympathy for the people of Derry if they were to take to the streets to protest continuously and to take every action possible to focus the spotlight of B ritish public opinion—we are alleged to be an Integral part of Britain—on the injustices which exist 1n Derry. (G. F1tt, July 24, 1968)

By late October the situation had worsened. 139

The value of coming is s till open to question but the center of this protest has moved to the grass roots in the community, to those who are suffering. It has also moved into all the cities in these islands. I t has moved to Westminster. (II. Diamond, October 30, 1968)

Diamond warned that the crisis was worsening and some action would have to be taken by B ritain. He said he was sick of the speeches made by the Prime Minister and the Government, the time for speeches was over, the time for action was now. Diamond said he did not expect the Prime Minister to last long. The Republican Opposition complained that so far the only reforms that had been made were the abolition of the university seats and the business vote. As yet, there had been no reform in local government and no repeal of the Special Powers Act.

Prime Minister O'Neil 1 reminded the Republican Opposition of the reforms already underway, the parliamentary franchise had been reformed, new machinery had been set up for the redistribution of seats, and a radical look was being taken at local government structure. The Government deplored the necessity for the Special Powers Act, but they could not be abolished under present upset conditions. On November 22nd, O'Neill issued a five point proposal for reforms which incorporated most of the demands of the Republican Opposition.

The group of Conservative Unionists that had emerged by this time, considered F itt's Londonderry speech, and others in a similar vein, made by Currie and Richardson, to be an incitement to disorder,- especially since a bomb had been thrown a week e a rlie r and the IRA were becoming active. The Special Powers Act could not be shelved under such circumstances.

Protestant Extremists

The fin al concern of the Republican Opposition in 1968 was the activity of the Protestant extremists. Early in the year they had been active in Armagh and la te r i t was charged a paramilitary organization, using military titles and uniforms, had published a m ibilization notice in a morning newspaper.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

By 1968 a conservative group of Unionists had clearly emerged, mobilized to resist reforms. O'Neill was squeezed between these Con­ servatives on the one hand, and the increasingly m ilita n t Republican Opposition on the other. The Minister of Home Affairs, Craig, was one 140 of these Conservatives and 1n December, O'Neill forced him to resign.

A group of m ilita n t members of the Republican Opposition had come to the fore by 1968. They included Currie, F itt, Diamond and Richardson, and they were clearly developing ascendancy in the Republican Opposition forces. They disagreed with McAteer, the leader of the Nationalists, over the Government White Paper on the Reform of Local Government. They championed the cause of the squatters to the extent that they caused the more conservative members some embarras­ sment. The older and more conservative Nationalists could not condone squatting.

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

The definitions of the Conservative Unionists were holding sway in 1968. The Conservative Unionists were convinced the IRA had in filtra te d the c iv il rights movement, and were the basic cause of the disturbances. Other Unionists either agreed p a rtia lly with them or remained silent. The Government rejected the idea that the distur­ bances in Londonderry were due to discrimination, since the minority were getting a substantial number of the new houses. They blamed the Republican Opposition for exaggerating grievances for political propaganda. They condemned both lo y a lis t and Republican extremists for the disturbances. The Unionists did make some efforts at reform. They published a White Paper on government reorganization and they agreed to reform the Parliamentary franchise. After the disturbances, in Derry, they established the Londonderry Area Development Commission. The Unionists were not ready to accept the Republican Opposition's call for reforms in housing. They thought Currie and others in the Republican Opposition were g u ilty of purposely encouraging squatters and fomenting trouble.

The Republican Opposition claimed the IRA was not involved in the c iv il eights campaign. They thought the police had acted badly in Londonderry and an inquiry was in order. Furthermore, they thought the police were biased in th e ir enforcement of the law and should have protected the marchers at Armagh. They rejected the Government's efforts to improve the living conditions in Londonderry, by setting up the Londonderry Area Development Committee, as ju s t a Unionist tric k to maintain control. The m ilitant members also rejected the Govern­ ment's White Paper on local government reorganization. For the fourth year in a row they made the same demands, a Human Rights B i l l , an'end to discrimination, one man-one vote, the allocation of houses according to need, and more Catholic representation in the higher officialdom of the Government. By 1968 the more m ilita n t members were beginning to think that raising these issues in Parliament was useless, the Govern­ ment was completely insensitive to the problems. They warned they would now go outside of constitutional methods to get action and did so by leading civil rights marches, and in Currie's case, actually squatting in a house. \

OUTLINE — 1969

INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Civil Rights Activity

Newry Parade Burntollet

General Election Explosions Amnesty Republican A ctivity

Connolly Parade Irish Republican Army

Orange Parades

Dungiven Orange Parade Belfast Orange Parade Londonderry Apprentice Boys Parade

INPUTS — EXTRASOCIETAL

Britain Eire

OUTPUTS — UNIONIST

General Election Reform Measures

O 'N e ill's Plans for Reforms Conflict in Unionist Party Over Reforms Chichester-Clark's Plans for Reform Cameron Commission of Inquiry Report Community Relations B ill Commissioner of Complaints B ill Electoral Low Bill Central Housing Authority Hunt Report Local Government B ill Review Body to Reassess the Role of Local Government

141 Repressive Measures

Public Order B ill Protection of Persons and Property Bill

OUTPUTS — CONSERVATIVE UNIONISTS

Army Behavior Film - - John Hume's Derry C ivil Rights People

OUTPUTS ~ REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Attack on Royal Ulster Constabulary Attack on Ulster Special Constabulary Protestant Extremists The United Irishman Attack on Attorney General Attack on Orange Order

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

The year 1969 was a year of severe disruption in Northern Ireland. Numerous c iv il rights marches and demonstrations were held. In the firs t half of the year there were civil rights marches preyed on by extreme Protestants. Later in the year Orange parades were attacked by Catholic Republicans.

Civil Rights Activity

Newry Parade

On January 11th, a c iv il rights parade was held in flewry. One day before the parade, the route was changed by the police and on the day of the parade, police tenders were placed along that section of the route that had been banned. On.the day of the parade, when the marchers reached these police tenders, some of the younger marchers attacked the police vehicles with stones and then burnt them. Rioting broke out.

When this matter was debated in the Commons, the Republican Opposition tool, the position that the parade should not have been banned. They claimed there would have been no violence i f the parade had gone along the original route. The police were accused of putting up tenders to trap the more irresponsible members of the parade into violent actions.

I assert that a police trap was laid for these irresponsibles to fall into. The police vehicles were placed in such a manner that they were easy targets to be smashed or burned. (E. Richardson, Jan. 23, 1969)

It was charged that this trap was laid to blacken the civil rights marchers. Republican Opposition Members accused the Government of making some kind of a deal with Paisley and Bunting, to get them to call o ff a planned demonstration. Banning the parade was a way of placating Paisley and the "backwoodsmen" of the Unionist Party.

The question that many people are asking as a result of a ll this is "Was i t the Government's in te n -; tion on 11th January to place a ban on the march and

143 144

create a trap in the hope that because of a certain amount of violence which had not been prevalent on any of the other c iv il rights marches, they could discredit the civil rights movement in one fell swoop?" The Government did indeed set a trap. Because of this a number of tenders were burned and the civil rights movement received a certain amount of bad pu blicity. (P. O'Hanlon, July 8, 1969)

The Government were considered responsible fo r the continual disorder because they vacillated and placated the Protestant extremists.

The Minister of Home Affairs, Long, pointed out that the Newry march was not banned, i t was re-routed along a small area. People taking part in the parade had come in great numbers from out­ side. The RUC had set up road checks and had found many weapons being taken into town. This had suggested violence. There could have been a serious clash betv/een opposing factions. Long said some of the marchers were bona fide marchers, wishing to advance th eir b eliefs, but many more were looking for a chance to attack the police and inflict injury.

To make an issue of being excluded from a small area of the original route surely suggests that the confrontation with the police followed by riot and disorder v/as perhaps more in the minds of many of those taking part than the causes for which they were ostensibly marching. (W. Long, Jan. 23, 1969)

Long said the demonstrations were not adequately marshalled and i t was a police decision, not his decision, to re-route. He denied any Government deal with Paisley and Bunting.

Burntollet

In April a c iv il rights march was planned to go from Belfast to Londonderry. Rumor had i t that armed Paisleyite supporters were holding meetings in the Burntollet area ju s t outside Londonderry, and were organizing to stop the marchers. The Minister of Home A ffairs banned the march but the marchers defied the ban. There followed a spontaneous sit-down of civil rights people in the Guildhall Square in Londonderry and then the protesters marched to the Diamond. Rioting broke out. Mobs attacked several youths who were alone and injured at least one old man. In the rioting the police entered the homes of several families in the Bogside area. Sub-post offices were burnt down. Both Hume, the Independent, and Anderson, the Unionist, were in Londonderry trying to calm down the situation. Later some of the police were withdrawn from the Bogside. 145

The Republican Opposition described the situation as bordering on c iv il war. They accused the Government of being so intent on th eir own internal struggles, as to be incapacitated to deal with the situation. It was fe lt that the Government should have arrested the Paisleyites who had armed themselves around the Burntollet area. Hume accused the police of brutality in the Bogside. He described how the police had forced th e ir way into the home of a Samuel Devenney in the Bogside. The officers had beaten the father to the ground, so he had to have twenty-two stitches. The police had beaten Devenney's .sixteen year-old daughter, who had just come home from the hospital, and they had also beaten his eighteen year-old and twenty year-old sons. Younger children would also have been beaten had not a neighbor thrown himself over them to protect them. Hume admitted that the police had taken a great hammering that night. He thought many in the force were responsible individuals but some were not. Hume warned that this kind of police behavior led to a loss of confidence in law and order, and now the Bogside residents were in fear of the police entering that area. Republican Opposition Members were opposed to using the B Specials in the present troubles. To do so would exacerbate the problems. Republican Opposition Members accepted, at face value, the IRA official statement that they were not involved, and declared that the IRA had no part in the organization of the civil rights movement, nor in the demonstration.

The Government view of the c iv il rights movement was that while there were some people in i t imbued with high principles, there were a considerable number of people in i t who had no such principles. They thought sincere people v/ere being used by extremists to throw.the country into anarchy. The marches and demonstrations had stirred up an atmosphere of unrest that had resulted in violence. The Government had police information which definitely linked the explosions at post offices to the IRA. The Government pointed out that on November 22nd, a program of reforms had been put forward, but there had not, as yet, been time to implement them. The Minister of Home A ffa irs , Porter, explained it was impossible for the police to protect the marchers around Burntollet because of the topography of the area. Porter said he had met with the North Londonderry C ivil Rights Association and had told them of the rumors of people arming in the Burntollet area, but they went ahead with the march anyway. The Government praised the police for their efforts in controlling the disturbances, but also said that i f authentic evidence was presented about b ru ta lity , i t would be investigated.

The Conservative Unionists were much more m ilita n t in condemning the c iv il rights marchers. They accused the c iv il rights marchers of trying to create a state of anarchy. They defended the actions of the police, pointing out that 216 policemen were casualities, whereas only th irty casualties came from the crowd. They dismissed the ta lk of police brutality as crazy. It was natural for the police to retaliate, you couldn't expect them to stand up and be beaten over the head with 146

sticks and staves and not defend themselves. The use of the B Specials to help quell the disturbances were encouraged. Anderson, the Member of Parliament from Londonderry, strongly objected to an ultimatum issued by Bogsiders, that unless the police were withdrawn from the area, the disturbances would continue. After the police were withdrawn, Anderson said, he heard Hume te llin g them they had v/on a great victory. The Opposition was accused of starting up this fire , week after week, and it did little good to try to stop it once it was raging.

General Election

In March, O’N eill called a general election. He and his Unionists v/ere re-elected with a good majority. Two civil rights workers, Hume and Cooper, were elected to the House. They called them­ selves Independents, but held the same views as the Republican Opposition on the key issues.

Explosions

A number of explosions occurred in early 1969, blowing up water mains and electrical in stallatio n s. The Republican Opposition charged that these explosions had been set by the U.V.F. in an effort to dislodge O'Neill from o ffic e . They accused the Government of not trying hard enough to find out who had set the explosions. They categorically denied i t was the work of the IRA. The Government denied these charges, saying they did not yet know who had set these explo­ sions. They did have evidence, however, that the IRA had blown up some post offices 1n Londonderry early in the year. In July, Currie accused two Protestants of setting the explosions and leaked their names to the Press. The police investigated and found the allegations absolutely groundless, whereupon the Government accused Currie of acting in a very irresponsible way.

Amnesty

On May 6, 1969, the new Prime Minister, Chichester-Clark, announced a general amnesty for those charged in the previous p o litic a l protests and demonstrations occurring between October 5, 1968 and May 6, 1969. All persons serving terms for activity during this period would be released. Opposition Members a ll welcomed this statement. 147

Republican A ctivity

Connolly Parade

A third parade was held on June 15th, the James Connolly Commemoration Parade, a Catholic parade. The marchers announced they would carry the Irish Tricolour. The Shankill Defence Association, a Protestant group, declared its intent to police the center of Belfast i f this parade went ahead. A few hours before the parade, they gathered in Royal Avenue. Rumor had i t that they v/ere carrying rubber hoses and sticks. The police re-routed the march around the area. The parade was called off. Then the Shankill Defence Association declared a victory for Unionism.

The Republican Opposition complained because the RUC re­ routed the parade. They thought the police should have stopped the Shankill Defence Association from gathering and should have assured the safety of the marchers. They complained that non-Unionist parades were constantly being threatened in this manner.

The Conservative Unionists, Laird and Burns, called the Connolly Parade a provocative attempt to create trouble, especially the inten­ tion to carry the Tricolour. Burns complained that some people had destroyed millions of pounds of property, so creating pressure on the House to agree to certain reforms. Now these people, said Burns, thought they could rule the country from the gutter. The Conservative Unionists thought the IRA was using these "poor mugs" for its own ends.

The Minister of Home Affairs said the parade was re-routed because sectarian strife was very likely.

Irish Republican Army

On June 18, 1969 the Inspector General of the RUC, Peacocke, said he had evidence that the IRA was supporting the c iv il rights move­ ment. The Opposition called his statement a political statement. They asserted there were no grounds for him making i t .

Orange Parades

Dungiven Orange Parade

Later in the year the Orange Parades took place. Attacks on these marches led to more disturbances. In June, an Orange Parade was held In Dungiven. The Republican Opposition MP, .Cooper, had made a speech, saying the people in Dungiven did not want the parade. The march was scheduled to end up at a church, but i t had to pass close to 148 a playing field where the Gaelic Athletic Association was holding a football match. The parade was stoned, and when the police intervened, twelve people jumped on a policeman and kicked him unconscious.

Porter, the Minister of Home Affairs, pointed out that this was a customary Orange procession. The C iv il Rights Association had appealed to its followers not to interfere as the procession was going to a religious service. Porter paid tribute to the local parish priest who had tried to restore order, but roundly condemned Cooper for trying to lay the blame on the police fo r not diverting the march. Porter pointed out that Cooper had been against such diversions when they involved the civil rights marches.

Belfast Orange Parade

The customary July 12th Orange Parade in Londonderry and Dungiven led to widespread vandalism. On August 2nd there was Protestant rioting and looting in Belfast after a widely-circulated rumor that a junior Orange Parade had been attacked in Unity Walk. This inflamed the feelings of the Protestant Shankill Road district and the police had to intervene to avert sectarian strife. Protestant crowds were now batoned by the police. In the Catholic Hooker Street area, rioting continued from August 2nd to August 5th. These extended dis­ turbances meant that large numbers of police had to be kept in Belfast and could not be sent to help1 police in other areas where there was trouble.

Londonderry Apprentice Boys Parade

I t was in this atmosphere of extreme tension and disturbance that the August 12th Apprentice Boys Parade v/as held in Derry. Members of the parade were orderly, disciplined, and peaceful, but they were pelted with missiles. When the police moved in to deal with those throwing the missiles, many of them juveniles, they encountered a carefully-prepared resistance. Apparently the BBC had announced In the afternoon that the Apprentice Boys had marched into the Bogside. This was untrue but a retraction was not aired until late in the day and many people did not hear i t . In the evening the BBC showed pictures of barricades being built in the Bogside and children helping to build them. It was stated that these barricades were being built against invasion of the Bogside by Protestants. After that, there was continual disorder in Londonderry with widespread damage to property and many injuries. The police were forced to use C.S. gas to control the situation.

On August 14th, the Government banned a ll parades and meetings for the rest of the month, and gave the RUC county inspectors the discre­ tion to call out the Special Constabulary to support the police i f necessary. This ban was la te r extended to the end of the year. 149

By August 14th, the Government had come to view the distur­ bances as part of a conspiracy. •

The attack on the Apprentice Boys Parade was a direct and calculated affront to the forces of law and responsible government.. . .This is not the agita­ tion of a minority seeking by lawful means the asser­ tion of political rights. It is a conspiracy of forces seeking to overthrow the Government. Those who cry loudly for British intervention see it as a half-way house to the long-sought goal of an Irish Republic. (Prime Minister J, Chichester-Clark, August 14, 1969)

I t has recently been pointed out in the Press that the c iv il rights movement is concerned with something more than c iv il rights. This is now more than obvious. At one of its recent meetings in Newry it was stated without objection that the move­ ment was simply a means to an end and that the great majority of its members v/ere dedicated to the reuni­ fication of Ireland. That this is a true position is readily apparent from its readiness to receive support and assistance from members of the IRA and from its continued association with anarchists and the like. Last’ night the utterances of its leaders and its behaviour in general after the outrageous and intimidatory speech of Mr. Lynch demonstrate to the fu ll that i t is also prepared to condone and approve violence. (J. Taylor, August 14, 1969)

The Minister of Home Affairs, Porter, announced that British troops were being used to help the police in Londonderry and fu ll powers had been given to the RUC and the Ulster Special Constabulary to maintain law and order. Parliamentary Secretary Taylor said the Apprentice Boys Parade had not been banned because there was no evidence to suggest trouble would occur.

At this point the rioting brought the Unionists together. The Liberal Unionists fe lt they had been duped by the civil rights move­ ment and the Conservatives felt they had been right all along. The attack on the Apprentice Boys Parade and the following riots were perceived as carefully planned and premeditated; people had ammuni­ tion and petrol bombs ready there to use. Babington saw this as the demise of the c iv il rights movement. The movement had started out with ideals, with Protestant and Catholic working together, but now the followers of that movement were trying to destroy the constitution.

At one time I felt there were merits to the civil rights movement. I liked its non-sectarian approach. I and many others were taken in. I t 150

was a deliberate plot to use this movement and sub* vert the Constitution. (R. Babington, August 14, 1969)

Moderate and Conservative Unionists alike blamed Members in the Opposition Parties for their part in the disturbances. Hume, Cooper, O'Hanlon, Fitt and Currie were all characterized as guilty: Currie had broken the law by contravening a ministerial order banning procession; O'Hanlon had organized a rio t in Newry on August 13th and had said he v/as going to deliberately break the Government's ban on processions; F itt and Hume were accused of glossing over and trying to ju s tify the vandalism and attacks on the police in Londonderry. Opposition MPs were accused of leading assaults on the police. It v/as pointed out that Eamonn McCann, a leader of the c iv il rights move­ ment, had said at a meeting in Derry that peace v/as not necessary to solve the problems of Derry, and that a considerable percentageof Derry people were behind the boys who rioted there on July 12, 13, and 14. Bernadette Devlin had been photographed with a brick in her hand. She said she would knock the hell out of the police.

What is happening... .is that individuals and Hon. Members Opposite are trying to circumvent and subvert the lawful Government of this country.... People have been preaching that government and politics should be conducted not in this Chamber but in the street, that decisions should be made in the s tre e t.. . .Some Hon. Members Opposite remind me of firelighters v/ho go around setting buildings alight and then complain that the forces of the fire brigade are inadequate to put them out. (R. B ailie, August 14, 1969)

The Moderates who had been in favor of abolishing the Special Powers Act, now believed i t must be used to rid Northern Ireland of agitators who were threatening the future of the Province. There had been intimidation in Derry, three complete streets of Protestants were told to leave their homes at a moment's notice and told that if they remained they would be burned out. One street was sprayed with petrol and people were told that i f a policeman was seen a petrol bomb would be thrown into the street. The police were commended by all Unionists for showing great bravery and courage 1n the face of great batterings from both sides. The use of tear gas was accepted as the only recourse they had to restore order. The RUC were badly outnumbered and in many cases ill-fe d and ill-equipped. A much larger proportion of the RUC was injured than civilians. The RUC had had th e ir kneecaps broken by flexib le rods smacked across th eir legs and had acid thrown in th e ir faces. In Derry, people had thrown fir e bombs from the top of apartment buildings down on the police below. The petrol bombs had hooks on them so they could catch on police clothing and set them alight. No injustice, it was felt, could warrant 151

the police being treated in this way. The Unionists welcomed the mobilization of the B Specials.

The Republican Opposition blamed the Government fo r a ll the present troubles. The Government had not listened to the Opposition and had treated them with arrogance and contempt. The Apprentice Boys March in Derry was highly provocative. It was not just a matter of hooligans throwing stones and erecting barricades in Derry, F1tt declared, i t was also doctors, nurses and teachers who a ll succumbed to the mass hysteria and fear that the police were trying to wreck and loot th eir homes. The Government had to realize that they were not dealing with riots, they were dealing with an uprising. The police were thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the Catholic popula­ tion, said the Republican Opposition. Ever since Burntollet and the invasion of the Bogside by police on January 4th and 5th, and the batoning of individuals on April 19th, the Catholic public had lost confidence in the police. Many of the RUC wero decent and responsible, said F it t , but many were thugs. In Londonderry, tear gas had been used indiscriminately on rioters and innocent alike.

The Republican Opposition warned that the minority had strong feelings against the B Specials. The B Specials had been used in Dungannon for rio t duty a few hours after the Prime Minister had said the B Specials would not be used in rio t control. The B Specials were on the streets of Dungannon and Coal island on August 14th, even before i t was o ffic ia lly announced they would be mobilized by the Government. Currie accused the B Specials of engaging in an orgy of terror on the nights of August 13th, when a large number of them had roamed through a housing estate, indiscriminately firin g th eir guns, insulting the people in their homes and firin g into houses. Five people in Dungannon had been hospitalized for gunshot wounds. These B Speicals had been accompanied by extremist Protestants. The use of the B Specials, said the Republican Opposition, went completely contrary to the pledge given by the Government. Currie warned,

There is a high probability that the next con­ frontation in my area will not be a confrontation with sticks or petrol bombs. If guns are used on one side then inevitably guns w ill be used on the other. (J. Currie, August 14, 1969)

INPUTS - EXTRASOCIETAL

Britain

By 1969, In the face of increasing pressures from Eire and the Republican Opposition, and in addition to the pressures fo r reform coining from Great B ritain, the Stormont Government was very sensitive 152 to their constitutional position and British sovereignty over them. O'Neill believed Northern Ireland's bulwark v/as the Ireland Act of 1949, which stated that the consent of the Northern Ireland Parliament v/as necessary before Northern Ireland ceased to be a part of the United Kingdom. But, O'Neill warned, that Westminster could amend the Government of Ireland Act and curtail or abolish the powers of the Northern Ireland Parliament. Westminster had always acted with restraint and had not interfered with the powers that had devolved to the Northern Ireland Parliament. However, O'Neill pointed out that Hr. Wilson had made i t clear that i f the Northern Ireland Parliament did not face up to their problems, Westminster might decide to act over their heads. O'Neill believed that so long as the Northern Ireland Parliament acted sensibly and with evident justice, British public opinion would be against an intervention 1n their affairs. O'Neill said it was the declared policy of his Government that justice should be done and be seen to be done by a ll. He was willing to bring in reforms. Catholics comprised one-third of the population of Northern Ireland and 50 percent of the children of school age, and O'Neill wanted them to support the constitution. O'Neill said he did not v/ant intervention by Westminster but i f Westminster decided to intervene, talk of resisting such intervention was dangerous. Northern Ireland was enormously dependent on Great B ritain. The United Kingdom provided financial and economic assistance, collected the bulk of taxation, and controlled the m ilitary, naval and air force in the country. Craig had been removed, said O'Neill, because he was toying with the idea of a v irtu a lly independent Northern Ireland; this was the very negation of Unionism. Intervention had been a real possibility at one state, cautioned O 'N eill, but wise action rather than fiery talk had caused this danger to recede. Currently, the main threat to the Constitution, said O'Neill, was coming from the noisy intransigence of a minority of people who were unwilling to accept the facts of lif e of the Twentieth Century.

O'Neill v/as supported by his Cabinet members who pointed out that Northern Ireland would suffer immense damage fin ancially and economically i f cast o ff from the United Kingdom. Ninety percent of all Northern Ireland exports went to Britain and competed there on equal terms with no quotas or t a r if f barriers. Northern Ireland was making an Imperial Contribution of two million pounds but was receiving back 19.5 m illion pounds. Without this substantial assistance from B ritain, Northern Ireland would have to reduce expenditures or impose an intolerable burden in extra taxation. It was in the best interests of Northern Ireland that harmonious relations be maintained with Britain. Britain could, without changing the Constitution, decide to be much less generous to Northern Ireland. Home rule was rejected out of hand. The farther Northern Ireland drew away from Westminster, the more likelihood of the Westminster Parliament intervening. The Attorney General outlined the legal position of the Northern Ireland Parliament. 153

....W e can pass laws on a ll matters which are popularly called "transferred" and the U.K. Parliament passes lav/s for N .I. on a ll other matters which are called "reserved." Westminster has the legal power and the legal competence to legislate on any trans­ ferred matter and may do so, even without the consent of the N .I. Parliament. Westminster has the legal power to pass on any transferred matter i t chooses. (Attorney General Kelly, Jan. 29, 1969)

Kelly pointed out that while Westminster had parliamentary supremacy i t would be contrary to established convention for Westminster to intervene in Northern Ireland affairs unless under extreme conditions.

Many Unionists supported O 'N eill. They rejected both the idea of a United Ireland and the notion of Northern Ireland as an indepen­ dent unit. They perceived the vast majority of people as being in favor of Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. I t was thought unlikely that Westminster would intervene so long as the Northern Ireland Parliament did nothing foolish. Reforms had been set afoot and an independent inquiry was to be held into the Derry march of October 5th. Catholics must be given British standards of justice. O'Neill was seen as having the confidence of the British Prime Minister. I t was recognized that the Unionist Government had had a hostile press in Britain for years, but currently through 0 .N e ill's progressive effo rts, he had the support of the British press.

Conservative Unionists, Craig and West, squared off against O 'N eill. Westminster, they stated, had delegated certain powers to Northern Ireland and would not revoke those powers without the consent of the Northern Ireland Parliament; such revocation would be unconsti­ tutional. They thought O'Neill should have categorically stated he would oppose and denounce any threat of interference with transferred powers. No matter what happened with B ritain, Northern Ireland would . not go into a united Ireland. Craig called for constitutional change, with Northern Ireland being given federal status.

The Republican Opposition were largely absent from this debate, leaving the Unionists to fig h t i t out amongst themselves. The Labour Party supported O'Neill in maintaining full British citizenship 1n Northern Ireland, but came out strongly for reforms.

In August, the British Home Secretary, James Callaghan, and Lord Stonham visited Northern Ireland. Consultations with the Northern Ireland Government took place and a jo in t declaration was drawn up. The declaration stated that there was a clear pledge on the constitu­ tional position and in no event would Northern Ireland, or any part thereof, cease to be a part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. Domestic jurisdiction for the 154

Northern Ireland Parliament was affirmed and it was stated that Westminster would take fu ll responsibility for asserting this principle in all international relationships. It was further pointed out that the United Kingdom Government had ultimate responsibility for the protection of Northern Ireland citizens. Finally, the British Government said they welcomed the reforms planned by the Northern Ireland Government.

Eire

By January of 1969, the relationship between Northern Ireland and Eire had greatly degenerated. O'Neill perceived the Constitution as being under attack by unlawful organizations, the IRA, across the border. An insidious political propaganda attack had been launched, by the Eire Government, aimed at discrediting the loyal people of Ulster to the world by blaming them for the s trife and disharmony in Ireland. Northern Ireland wanted to have decent neighborly contact with the South, said O 'N e ill, but there could be no frien d ly relation­ ship i f Taoiseach Lynch intervened in the domestic a ffa irs of Northern Iceland.

After the series of riots and vandalism that occurred 1n Northern Ireland in July and August, Taoiseach Jack Lynch accused the Northern Ireland police of attacking the people of Londonderry. He announced that the Republic would create stop-gap mobile m ilitary hospitals along the border because he said certain of the injured were reluctant to use Northern Ireland hospitals. Lynch said he would take the case of Northern Ireland to the United Nations.

Prime Minister Chichester-Clark responded angrily to Lynch's statement.

In this context, a very serious new dimension was imported into these events—most unnecessarily and most Irresponsibly—by the remakrs of Mr. Lynch. History will record that in a responsible and neigh­ bourly way we have tried to conduct our relationship with the Irish Republic. All that has been brought to an end by this intervention. We must and we w ill treat the Government which seeks to wound us in our darkest hour as an unfriendly and implacable Government, dedicated to overthrow by any means the status which enjoys the support of a majority of the electorate. I am sure many Hon. Members who hear Mr. Lynch's remarks w ill have shared my intense anger and resent­ ment at their tone and content. This talk of the police attacking the people of Londonderry and of Injured reluctant to use Northern Ireland hospitals is not statesmanship but the effusions of a hostile propaganda. As for the graver part of his remarks, 155

let me reiterate that there will be no change in the position of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. The Government in London re­ affirm that no such change could be contemplated without our consent, and we do not consent nor will we consent in the future. As fo r the United Nations intervention, this absurd suggestion en tirely ignores the fact that this is not an international situation but an internal one. (Prime Minister Chichester- Clark, August 14, 1969)

Chichester-Clark said the Government was determined to protect the security of Northern Ireland and would not shrink from taking whatever action was necessary to achieve that end. Chichester-Clark was strongly supported by his Cabinet and the Unionist Party. Unionist Members pointed out that the United Kingdom Government v/as responsible for the te rrito ria l integrity of Northern Ireland and would make sure that the borders of Northern Ireland remained intact.

By October, 1969, the relationship with the Republic had deteriorated even further. The Republic had stationed troops on its borders and had made representations to the United Nations, Chichester-Clark fe lt a public reproof was in order.

I have always been in favour of friendly re­ lations with the Republic but there are three requisites for this. One is that there should be no troops stationed on our borders. The second 1s that there should not be continued representations in the United Nations about the affa irs of Northern Ireland which are domestic matters to the United Kingdom. The third is that the propaganda war of v ilific a tio n should cease. (Prime Minister Chichester-Clark, Oct. 28, 1969)

One Nationalist MP, O 'R eilly, openly supported the position of the Southern Ireland Government in stationing troops on the border since saboteurs had made incursions into the Republic and had blown up public utilities there.

OUTPUTS - UNIONIST

There was an enormous amount of a c tiv ity at Stormont 1n 1969. There was a general election, the introduction of numerous reform b ills , a temporary walk out by the Opposition Parties and the report of the Cameron Commission of Inquiry. 156

General Election

By January of 1969, O'Neill's position was precarious. He had fired Craig, the right wing Minister of Homo Affairs, and by so doing had alienated the more conservative members of the Unionist Party. At the same time his planned reforms in no way appeased the Opposition Parties. O'Neill needed a mandate from the people. In early March a general election was held and O'Neill and his Unionist Government were returned to o ffice. The election brought two new members into the House who had been c iv il rights workers in Londonderry, Hume and Cooper, both Independents. Hume had defeated the more moderate leader of the Nationalists, McAteer, and Labour Party Member, T. Boyd, lost his seat to Patrick Kennedy who was strongly republican in his sympathies. The Queen's University seats had been abolished so there was no representation from that area. There v/as a definite trend for individuals committed to c iv il rights and with strong Republican sympathies to replace more moderate Nationalists.

Reform Measures

O 'N eill's Plans for Reforms

In the opening session O'Neill laid out his plans for the year. He intended to introduce many reforms. He announced the appointment of Sir Edmund Compton as the f ir s t Parliamentary Commissioner, or Ombudsman. Consultations with local authorities were to take place to find a scheme for the equitable allocation of houses. A Development Commission v/as to replace the local councils in Londonderry and was to take over fu ll responsibility for the administration and develop­ ment of the Londonderry area. A Commission of Inquiry, la te r known as the Cameron Commission, was to be appointed to inquire into the violence in Londonderry on October 5, 1968. O'Neill called for firm­ ness and fairness but warned the situation could not be transformed overnight. O'Neill said he was quite w illing to put through reforms but he was not w illing to put up with anarchy on the streets.

The vast majority of people have lost patience with those who are again talking in terms of coercion and disorder. The majority of people look to Government to protect their civil right to peace in the streets and their civil right to have demo­ cratic decisions respected. They will hot look in vain. (Prime Minister O 'N e ill, March 4, 1969)

O'Neill announced he would give the highest priority to getting a new Public Order Bill on to the Statute Book so that disorderly demonstra­ tions and counter demonstrations could be properly controlled by law. 157 -

The. Republican Opposition now consisted of the Nationalist Party, the Republican Labour Party, the Independents and Devlin of the Labour Party. There was close agreement on th e ir reading o f, and reaction to , O 'N e ill’ s proposals. The Republican Opposition f e lt that-the Unionist Government had consistently refused to listen to them and had treated them with contempt; this had led to a great feeling of frustration.

After six years of frustration, six years of continuous pounding from this side of the House by Members of a ll p o litic a l shades, we found that nothing was being achieved by using the parliamentary vehicles as they existed....after five or six years of frustration on my part and many more years on the part of some other Hon. Members, we found that the democratic process was not working.. . .we were forced to take action outside the House. (G. Fitt, March 5, 1969)

The Republican Opposition charged that reforms were only granted a fte r people took to the streets. Many of the proposals now coming from Government had o rig in a lly come from the Opposition and had been ignored. The suspicion was voiced that the Orange Lodges up and down the country were the real government of the country. The cause of the current unrest and disorders, the Opposition claimed, was not Republican agitation, but social and economic conditions. I f reforms were not soon instituted there v/ould be more violence.

The Republican Opposition did not think the creation of a Parliamentary Commissioner would help much, since he would not be able to interfere with local authorities and it was at the local level that most of the injustices v/ere perpetuated. The Republican Opposition said little about the proposed Public Order B ill, other than the Government had said they needed it against the activities of Paisley and followers in controlling counter demonstrations. Some Opposition Members were inclined to give O'Neill a chance so long as he pressed hard for reforms, but others felt that O'Neill could not stand up to the recalcitrance of the right wing in his Party.

Conflict in Unionist Party Over Reforms

Throughout January, February, March and A p ril, there was con­ flic t within the Unionist Government and Party, brought on by the proposed reforms. There was a sustained effort to depose O'Neill and many changes were made in the Government. Faulkner, who was generally considered somewhat right-wing, resigned. The odd explanation he offered fo r resigning was that the Government was not moving ahead fast enough on reforms. The Minister of Agriculture, Chichester-Clark, also resigned, saying he did not think the time was rig ht fo r changes in the 158 local government franchise. On Hay 1, 1969, despite his recent re- election, O'Neill resigned and Chichester-Clark took over as Prime Minister. Chichester-Clark's Cabinet took on a rather conservative hue with the appointment of Taylor and Brooke as Parliamentary Secretaries.

One of Chichester-Clark's firs t acts was to announce a general amnesty for those involved with the marches, meetings and demonstra­ tions occurring between October 5, 1968 and May 1, 1969. Only those persons concerned with sabotage would s t ill be prosecuted. All persons serving terms of imprisonment as a result of such prosecutions would be released. This move had virtual unanimous support from the Unionist Party and Opposition Members.

Chichester-Clark*s Plans for Reform

On May 7, 1969, Chichester-Clark outlined his program for the country. He hoped to create an atmosphere of confidence based on complete and unimpeachable im partiality. At the same time he vowed to resist every threat to the community and the usurpation of lawful authority. Chichester-Clark pledged an accessible government and a government dedicated to reform. The reforms he pledged, v/ere those already suggested by the O'Neill Government. The Cameron Commission was already inquiring into the Derry incidents. Representatives from local governments were currently considering a model scheme for the allocation of houses. Each local authority v/as expected to adopt a scheme that best suited its needs, but the Government was determined , that each authority v/ould operate a fair scheme. Chichester-Clark said that although he resigned from the O'Neill Government because he did not think the time v/as right to bring in the local franchise, he now accepted the principle of universal adult franchise, and would introduce legislation to secure it. The work of restructuring local government would be continued and a Parliamentary Commission B ill would be introduced. The new Prime Minister emphasized that the community must be protected from terrorist attacks. To aid 1n this defense, retired members of the RUC were being asked to serve again.

The Minister of Development, Faulkner, promised a new economic and physical development plan for the 1970's. A series of schemes were underway for the construction of thousands of new houses, many of them in Londonderry. New road links to the western counties had been extended rapidly. Faulkner pointed out that the second largest Government training center was in Londonderry. The Republican Opposition was urged to believe there was unity in the Government, all members of the Administration were behind the Government policies and were trying to be fair and trying to get things done.

The Opposition Parties v/ere very skeptical about the new Government. Some tended to believe that Chichester-Clark and some members of the Government genuinely wanted reform, but others found i t 159 hard to believe the Government was united behind the reforms since some members had so recently been opposed to them. There was a united attack on the creation of three Parliamentary Secretaries. The Minister of Home Affairs, Minford, was perceived as a liberal, but his Parliamentary Secretary, J. D. Taylor, v/as considered an arch foe of reforms, especially one man-one vote. Taylor was also perceived as having close ties with Craig, the former right-wing M inister of Home Affairs. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce, Brooke, was also seen as a rig ht winger. The Opposition charged that these posts grafted right v/ingers onto the more lib eral M inistries and was an attempt to close the rift in the Unionist Party. It was suggested that soon there would be two Unionist Parties in Northern Ireland, one led by Craig, who was currently building new political organizations around the country, and the other one in Parliament.

The Republican Opposition called on the Prime Minister to meet with them and discuss th eir demands. They insisted that the Government must not be intransigent in bringing reforms or the situation would escalate and lives would be lost. I f the reforms did not go through, several Opposition Members threatened they would again take to the streets.

Unless we on the Opposition see that a ll sections of the community are getting an equal opportunity then v/e have no option but to take our politics on to the streets where they proved so effective in the past. (P. Kennedy, May 7, 1969)

Chichester-Clark's speech of May 7th, promising reforms was followed by a meeting with the Opposition on May 20th. At this meeting the Republican Opposition issued ultimatums; they demanded that the Prime Minister publish a timetable for reforms in six v/eeks. On June 5th, Chichester-Clark spoke at Ballymena and 1n that speech he c ritic ize d those who talked in terms of ultimatums to the Government and to Parliament. He called on Opposition members to join the Government in making a declaration of peace to restore the confidence of potential investors and potential tourists coming to Northern Ireland.

This speech was jumped on by the Republican Opposition. The Prime Minister v/as accused of heaping odium on the heads of the "very responsible Opposition."

He said the Opposition was all give and no take, that we were involved in "dangerous talk of ultima­ tums, demonstrations and other pistols held to the head of democracy." (P. Devlin, June 5, 1969)

They accused the Prime Minister of talking about reform but refusing to put reforms into practice. The reform program was not progressing 160 as the Opposition wanted; one man-one vote had been postponed for p o litical reasons; the points system being discussed v/as not mandatory; and the Government had "pushed through a repressive Public Order D ill." The Opposition renewed th e ir demand for a timetable of reforms. They demanded fa ir representation of properly-qualified people in public bodies, an end to the Special Powers Act, and withdrawal of the Public Order B ill.

Chichester-Clark responded that he had already given the approximate dates on which reforms v/ere to be achieved. He listed what had already been done; the Londonderry Commission v/as in operation, the Cameron Commission was at work, the ombudsman legislation was almost through Parliament, a model housing scheme v/as soon to be announced, and legislation v/as being prepared to introduce one man- one vote and to deal with grievances against local authorities, and fin a lly , positive proposals would be made fo r the reorganization of local government.

During the summer months of 1969 there v/ere many rio ts and demonstrations in Belfast and Londonderry. The House debate on these disturbances was the occasion fo r many of the Opposition Parties to formerly leave the House. The Opposition complained that the Government had consistently refused to listen to them and had treated them with arrogance and contempt. They said they took to the streets in October of 1968 to bring social justice and

....were brutally batoned into the ground by members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. (G. F it t , August 14, 1969)

Now, said F itt, the RUC were indiscriminately hurtling gas bombs at defenceless women, children and babies In arms in Derry. The police were accused by Kennedy of being biased and p a rtia l.

They are presently carrying on a witch hunt in my district. They are lifting innocent children of 15 and 16 off the streets, bringing them to barracks and charging them with throwing stones in an incident which took place in Unity Walk. (P. Kennedy, August 14, 1969)

The Republican Opposition completely rejected the Government and the Parliament as being irrelevant to the affairs of the Irish people. Currie was the first to leave, complaining that he had been intimi­ dated by a crowd of people outside the House. Currie said he no longer had any faith in the Government because three hours after they said the B Specials would not be used in riot control, they were used in Dungannon for that purpose. Just before he le ft he advised the Government that they were not dealing with riots now, but with an uprising. Kennedy was the next to leave with this ultimatum; 161

It is not my intention to return until two conditions are fulfilled; number one, that the police are disarmed, and, number two, that the B Special force is disbanded. (P. Kennedy, August 14, 1969)

Carron, Cooper, F it t , Hume, Keogh and O 'Reilly a ll le ft the House a short time after. Of the Opposition Parties, only the Labour Party remained in the House. The Labour Members accused the Government of waffling while Rome burned.

The Unionists who spoke said they were fully united and supported the Government. I t v/as pointed out that the reforms and timetable were fu lly supported. They accused the Republican Opposition of walking out just to pull a political stunt. The Republican Opposition had even informed the paper beforehand. Despite the agreement to reforms and a timetable, McConnell said,

....th e Members Opposition went back to th e ir people in a quiet seditious manner.. . .the cloak of c iv il rights has been stripped from them and now wo know many of them for what they are. (R. McConnell, August 14, 1969)

Late in August the Prime Minister set up a Tribunal of Inquiry, chaired by Scarman, an English Judge, and including one Protestant and one Catholic member to look into the explosions and civil disturbances of July and August. This inquiry was fu lly supported by a ll parties remaining in the House.

The Republican Opposition Parties returned to the House on September 30th, after the British Home Secretary, James Callaghan and Lord Stonham had visited Ireland and appealed to them to return and attend to their duties.

Cameron Commission of Inquiry Report

On September 30, 1969, the Cameron Commission of Inquiry Report was debated in the House. The Commission had been appointed to inquire into the Londonderry disturbances. The Commission blamed both the Unionists and the Roman Catholic community for the continuing division in the country. They especially condemned Paisley and Bunting for their part in the disturbances. I t was considered that the Special Powers Act had contributed to the rioting. The Commission severely criticized certain members of the RUC for misconduct and lack of discip lin e, but the Report pointed out that the police were pressed to the lim it 1n terms of numbers and endurance. Eight hundred out of a force of 3,000 had been injured. The Commission praised the RUC for th e ir subsequent handling of crowds, and emphasized that, in the majority of cases, the 162

RUC had acted with commendable discipline and re s tra in t. The Commission condemned local authorities in matters of housing allocation and local government appointments. They mentioned discrimination in the loca­ tion of new industry. The Commission recommended a number of reforms:

one man-one vote vote at eighteen years of age f a ir boundaries in a ll elections fair allocation in houses recourse to legal remedy in cases of dis­ crimination in public bodies in housing and jobs

The Commission recognized that there v/ere individuals in the community whose aim v/as to subvert and destroy the constitutional structure of the state. They made special mention of the attacks of the IRA from the founding of the State and made it clear that these activities v/ould probably continue, and it was vital the police force be properly equipped. The Commission recognized that while the October 5th Londonderry parade v/as formally under the auspices of the NICRA, i t was re a lly being run by an ad hoc committee representative of a variety of interests. However, the Commission thought the c iv il rights movement was divorced from the extreme element.

The Government and the more liberal Unionists generally accepted the Commission Report, although there v/ere elements in i t that they rejected. The Unionists did not believe that the Special Powers Act v/as causal to the disturbances. Government Ministers stated that they had been about to revoke the Special Powers Act in A p ril, but then acts of sabotage against electricity and water installations had made it unwise to do so, and since then, there had been continual trouble. The Unionists believed that the basic problem behind many of the difficulties was the constitutional problem.

When people complain that they are prevented from playing a fu ll part in Northern Ireland's a ffa irs because they are opposed to the position of N.I. within the U.K., when they differ not only from the Government Party but from majority opinion in Ulster, they create distrust and fear in the minds of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people. They must re a lly understand that. It is for that reason that 1t has been hard to take critics into full consultation or full partnership. Ordinary, responsible people have asked again and again how people who are constantly ready to deny our position in the U.K. can be accepted as partners. I say very responsibly that a recognition of the right of the people of N .I. to maintain th e ir position within the U.K. would produce a welcome improvement 1n com­ munity relations. The more the critics of the 163

Government can bring themselves to acknowledge that rig h t the more fu lly they can bo taken into consulta­ tion. (A. Faulkner, Oct. 1, 1969)

The Unionists supported the police, pointing out that extrav­ agant criticism had been made against them. Attention v/as drawn to a statement made by the Inspector General, admitting the RUC had made mistakes, but pointing out that they had learned from them. The Inspector General had indicated that sixteen members of the RUC had been charged for th e ir behavior in Londonderry.

The Government admitted that some local governments had been discriminatory, and the Government had probably attached too much importance to the detached and independent working of local government. I t was stated that the Government would not tolerate even a small number of cases of injustice in the future. Faulkner emphasized that the Government had made great efforts to hear a ll viev/s relating to the reorganizing of local government. The Government, during the last year, had held over 120 conferences to hear people's viev/s on this matter. All shades of opinion had been heard, the Orange Lodges, the Nationalist Party and the Roman Catholic Church.

The Government denied any discrimination in siting public developments or in the promotion of industrial investment. The Minister of Development, Faulkner, declared that the Government was determined that there should be no p o litic a l slant in the location of Government sponsored industry. The places in Northern Ireland v/here unemployment was highest v/ere Catholic, said Faulkner, but they were also the areas on the periphery of Northern Ireland, such as Newry, Londonderry and Strabane,and it was difficu lt to get industrial development to go there. The Unionists f e lt that the Republican Opposition v/ere keeping their minds firmly on the past, with total disregard for the Government's program of action.

The Conservative Unionists, Laird, West, Craig, Stronge and Anderson, rejected the Cameron Report completely. They pointed out that the inquiry had been unsworn, which meant that unsubstantiated evidence was taken and witnesses were not subject to cross examina­ tio n . The Commission had used television coverage of the marches and rio ts , and this coverage was an example of very selective reporting. In addition to this, only one side of the evidence was heard, the Republican side, since only one group of people gave evidence. The Conservatives considered the root cause of the trouble to be the fact that a minority of people in Northern Ireland would not recognize the constitution, and no reforms would change th is.

Reform won't disarm the forces of anarchy in this country. The leaders of these forces have openly and continually declared their ambition to destroy the Constitution. People who foster th is type of ambition will not be satisfied with reforms but will 164

regard them as stepping stones to th eir final goal. (H. West, Sept. 30, 1969)

The Conservative Unionists could not understand how the Cameron Commission could look at the groups belonging to the c iv il rights movement, such as the People's Democracy, the IRA, the Republican Clubs, the Connolly Clubs, the Labour Party, the Campaign fo r Social Justice, the revolutionary socialists, and HPs in the House, and then say the c iv il rights movement was divorced from these extreme elements. The Conservative Unionists pointed out that the Report never explained why the Republican movement gave financial aid to the marchers, supported their actions, spoke from the same platforms and united with them in the House. The Conservative Unionists thought the Report showed a totally unrealistic attitude to the civil rights demonstrators, fa ilin g to condemn them for arson and rio t. Revolu­ tionaries and hooligans had burned and looted and murdered with impunity, yet Paisley and Bunting were singled out by the Commission for condemnation. The Conservatives described the c iv il rights movement as parading as non-violent, buti in fa c t, deliberately seeking to provoke violence with the RUC and with the civil population. They thought the c iv il rights movement had many IRA members in its ranks, members committed to a strategy of blending p o litic a l action and military force.

The Conservative Unionists thought the Commission should have condemned the p o litic a l leaders of the Republican Opposition who had incited to violence; McAteer and Devlin had called on foreign forces to interfere; Cooper, O'Hanlon and Kennedy had been on a platform with Miss Coll ins of the Newry C ivil Rights Association when money, clothes and guns were requested for the C ivil Rights Association. O'Hanlon was accused of saying he would not settle for anything short of the abolition of Stormont. The Conservatives charged the Republican Opposition with direct participation in some of the worst disorders.

We find that as the pressure developed in Londonderry, some people in Belfast, and in the Falls area, with which the Hon. Member fo r Dock, {Mr. F1tt) seem to be very well acquainted, fe lt that a good and sensible thing to do was to start something to draw o ff forces from Londonderry, to give r e lie f to hard- pressed Londonderry. (W. Craig, Sept. 30, 1969)

I t was pointed out that there were now a number of areas shut o ff from law and order, the no-go areas. The Conservatives concluded that no amount of reform would stem the violence.

The Republican Opposition accepted the Cameron Report. There was a split on the constitutional position of the civil rights move­ ment. Hume and Cooper, the c iv il rights workers newly elected to 165 the House, denied that one of the goals of the civil rights movement was the unification of Ireland.

Those who speak in terms of ending Partition tomorrow morning are merely adding wood to the fir e because the issue which we are debating in this country is that of equal citizenship. I wish that people on both sides of the Border and on both sides of the religious fence, would realise that. {I. Cooper, Sept. 30, 1969)

We have always made i t clear that the c iv il rights movement has support from people whose p o li­ tic a l views go far beyond c iv il rights, but those parties have never introduced their p o litical view­ points into the movement. Most of us have made i t very clear that we have no wish to change the Constitution of N.I. without the consent of the majority of the people. (J. Hume, Oct. 1, 1969)

Both were obviously in favor of ending Partition, but this did not appear to be their immediate goal. They did not want to get the c iv il rights movement labelled as a purely Republican movement. O'Hanlon and O'Connor both came out in favor of a united Ireland but by the democratic process. The Opposition thought the Cameron Report had accurately specified the aims of the civil rights program:

a. universal franchise in local government elec­ tions b. redrawing of electoral boundaries by an inde­ pendent commission to ensure fa ir representa tion c. legislation against discrimination in employ­ ment at local government levels d. provision of machinery to remedy local govern­ ment grievances e. a compulsory points system for housing f . repeal of the Special Powers Act g. disbanding of the B Specials h. the withdrawal of the Public Order B ill

They characterized the civil rights people as decent, orderly people who were only drawn into disorder when counter-demonstrations were allowed. They fe lt the Report had completely vindicated the civil rights movement. As far as the Commission's criticism of local authorities and the need for reorganization of local authorities, the Republican Opposition voiced suspicion of the Government plans for reorganization. They objected to a member of the Government talking to the Orange Lodges about this reorganization. In view of the Report's criticism of the RUC, the Republican Opposition thought the 166

RUC should be disarmed and the 6. Specials should be disbanded. The Opposition charged that the Government no longer had any real authority, the authority now rested with Westminster.

Community Relations B ill

In October, a series of reform measures were passed through the House. On October 7, 1969, the Community Relations B ill was introduced by Dr. Simpson, the new Minister of Community Relations. The Bill established a Community Relations Commission, consisting of nine members; equal numbers of Protestants and Catholics and different classes were to be represented. The Commission would be concerned with the removal of prejudice and the fostering of harmonious relations throughout the country.

Only the progressive Unionists spoke in favor of the B ill. In fact, there were few Unionists in the House during the reading of the B ill.

The Republican Opposition welcomed the B ill, but complained because they thought a Catholic Member of the Opposition, or a Catholic outside of the House, should have been appointed Minister of Community Relations. They did commend Dr. Simpson on his resignation from the Orange Lodge once he was appointed. The Republican Opposition also stressed that they wanted working class Catholics and Protestants appointed to the Commission, not "castle Catholics." F itt pledged he would work with the Government to put reforms on the Statute Book.

Commissioner of Complaints B ill

A few days la te r, the Commissioner for Complaints B ill was passed in the House. All complaints about political or religious bias and maladministration would now be directed at the Commissioner. He had the power to investigate local bodies. His job was to try to settle the problem by conciliation; if this failed, he would take the matter to court.

Again, few Unionists were present and few spoke. Those who did speak v/ere in favor of the B ill.

The Republical Opposition noted this absence of Unionist Members and called i t most disappointing. They welcomed the B ill, saying i t was on the local government level that abuses and injustices were happening.

Electoral Law Bill

Two days after the Community Relations Bill was introduced, a second reform Bill was presented, the Electoral Law B ill. The Bill removed a ll forms of plural voting such as the company vote and the 167 general occupiers vote,-and allowed for lowering the voting age for parliamentary elections. There would be universal franchise for local elections as well as for parliamentary elections.

The Republican Opposition welcomed the B ill, but some f e lt i f the Government had not brought i t out they would have been forced by Westminster to do so. There was s t ill a great deal of suspicion 1n the minds of some Opposition members.

We must be very wary and v ig ila n t. We must make sure that even now, under the pretence of surrendering to our ju st demands, the Government and th e ir party are not preparing to n u llify the very things they have granted in this B ill by a further gerrymander of some of the constituencies and so give with one hand and take away with the other. {J. Carron, Oct. 9, 1969)

Now that universal franchise had been accepted, the Republican Opposition said they wanted proportional representation.

Central Housing Authority

On October 22, 1969, the Minister of Development, Faulkner, announced the Government decision to create a Central Housing Authority, Faulkner pointed out that Northern Ireland had a tremendous housing problem, despite the fact that they were building more houses per 1,000 population than was Great B ritain. The Central Authority could produce economies because the size of contracts would be increased. I t would have the chance for research and experimental work. I t would make possible the end of all discrimination in allocations. Despite the size of the new Central Authority, efforts would be made to make sure i t was not remote from the people.

A ll the Moderate Unionists favored the Central Housing Authority, but the Conservative Unionists had mixed reactions. Laird was afraid it would cut down on the powers of local authorities. Mitchell was generally in favor of i t , but thought house building and allocation should not be divorced from the remainder of local govern­ ment. West rejected the idea, saying he was completely opposed to the Central Housing Authority. The causes of the trouble did not arise in poor housing, and there was no evidence that this body would do a better job than the local governments.

The Republican Opposition generally welcomed the idea of a Central Housing Authority, after a ll, they had been promoting it for * some time. Therefore, the fact that F itt and O'Hanlon both had some reservations about the Authority was somewhat surprising. O'Han I on said the main worry of the c iv il rights movement in regard to the new proposal was that ju s t as one man, one vote was coming in, the local councils were to be deprived of most of their power. Fitt said although 168 local governments were responsible for many i l l s , most of the members of local authorities were decent, honest men. He could see no reason for the Government taking over from local authorities who were doing a good job.

Hunt Report

On October 3, 1969, the Hunt Committee,appointed to look into the operations of the security forces, sent its report to the Government. The Hunt Report recommended that the Ulster Special Constabulary be disbanded and two new forces be created—the RUC Reserve Force and the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR). The Royal Ulster Constabulary v/as to be completely civilian ized , i t would be disarmed, except in circumstances where arms were absolutely necessary. I t v/as to be supported by a new volunteer RUC Reserve Force of 1,500. In addition, the new Ulster Defense Regiment was to be created, to protect the country from armed attack across the Border and from acts of sabotage. This force was to be a regiment in the British Army. The police were no longer to be responsible for military duties. In addition, a Police Authority v/as to be set up. The Minister of Home Affairs was to consult with the Police Authority regarding the banning of demonstrations. The Hunt Report also recommended the abolition of the Special Powers Act. On October 10th, in a jo in t communique, the Government accepted the broad proposals of the Hunt Report.

The Unionist Government and Party v/elcorned the fact that the RUC would no longer have to discharge m ilitary duties against the IRA. The B ritish Government would now assume the responsibility of dealing with external aggression and attacks by the IRA.

Above a ll, the fact that the U.K. Government have repeatedly given us the most categorical assur­ ances that the in teg rity of Northern Ireland w ill be maintained by them by the use, i f need be, of the vastly greater forces at their command and that our constitutional position as a part of the U.K. will not be altered v/ithout our consent should fin a lly remove from everyone's mind even the slightest mis­ apprehension on the score of our security. (Min. Home Affairs, Porter, Nov. 18, 1969)'

The Government announced that while the emergency continued, the General Officer Commanding,would act as coordinator of security, generally. There would also be a Joint Security Committee under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Home A ffairs. I t v/as firm ly denied that the RUC had been manipulated by the Government. The Inspector General had not been accountable to anyone fo r his operational policies. 169

Since I took o ffice in the Government, I have never given directions to the police as to how they were to carry out their operational functions or how they were to enforce the law. I never instructed the police on re-routing. Time and again statements and allegations have been made that parades were banned by the Government for p o litic a l motives when they were re-routed In the interest of law and order by the police....When a ban was put on a parade i t was always done on the advice of the police. (Min. Home Affairs, Porter, Nov. 18, 1969)

I t was denied that the Government used the RUC fo r th e ir own p o litic a l aims and motives. The Government hoped members of the USC would jo in the DDR, but, reassured the Republican Opposition that members of the USC would get no preferential treatment in being recruited to the new force. The Government hoped that Catholics, who were loyal to the United Kingdom and could take the Oath of Allegiance with good conscience, would also join the new force. Such men were welcome and wanted.

Unionist MPs, by this time, had concluded that nothing would please the Opposition.

I t becomes clear as time goes on that neither this nor any other Unionist Government are going to be able to do anything right 1n the eyes of Hon. Members opposite. I cannot see Hon. Members opposite ever being satisfied whatever legislation, reforming or otherwise, 1s brought forward. The danger is to the community who learn of these attacks and these changes which are made. The community is fear-ridden and explosive. (W. Mclvor, Nov. 19, 1969)

The Unionists now had grave doubts about the motivation of both the c iv il rights movement and the Republican Opposition. I t was noted that Bernadette Devlin of the People's Democracy, and Eamonn McCann of the IRA, had both been active in the c iv il rights movement and they had both indicated their hostility to any new force that might strengthen the State of Northern Ireland. They wanted to abolish the Border and change the entire political and social struc­ ture of Northern Ireland. The Executive of the Civil Rights Association was saying that Northern Ireland did not need a defence force.

Are people of this sort re a lly interested in the security of Northern Ireland at all? (Prime Minister Chichester-Clark, Nov. 19, 1969) 171

Ireland. The GOC would be in command and he would answer to his masters in London. The Conservative Unionists thought that i t was a lrig h t for the police not to carry arms, so long as all constables and officers were fu lly trained in the use of a wide range of arms. They called on all loyal citizens to join the UDR or the Reserve RUC. The Conservative Unionists stressed the importance of s tric t security vetting, since they feared there would be efforts by subversives to jo in . I t was pointed out that Opposition Members had already called in doubt the Oath of Allegiance, saying it was just a hurdle to be jumped over.

How can a Nationalist join a force and pretend to be loyal to it when he is dedicated to destroying the constitution and upsetting the work that the new force w ill be performing. (J. Burns, Nov. 19, 1969)

Craig welcomed the closer association with Britain that the reorganization of the police force would bring. He said the United Kingdom Government had never failed in its responsibility to defend and uphold the integrity of the Constitution of Northern Ireland. But, Craig believed, the security problem lay with dealing with illegal organizations who were prepared to use arms, not with massive m ilitary attacks. Craig believed that the security of Northern Ireland could be better achieved by strengthening and streamlining the Ulster Special Constabulary and the RUC.

We have learned a lesson in N .I. that I hope we will never have to learn again, that when the police did th e ir job so magnificently in Londonderry on 5th October, we allowed the propaganda of irresponsible politicians and the Press of the world to cause a lack of confidence in the enforcement of the law of the land. (W. Craig, Nov. 19, 1969)

The Republican Opposition at f ir s t called for fu ll implementa­ tion of the Hunt Report. A civilianized unarmed force would be acceptable to the community, they thought. Republican Opposition Members charged the RUC with having acted in a p o litic a l manner and of having been pawns in the p o litical game. They believed the RUC were forced to act as the militant wing of the Orange Order.

The Orange Order dictated to the Government—the Government dictated to the police. (G. Fitt, Oct, 29, 1969)

They called for the removal of the police from the "political control" of the Minister of Home A ffairs, and they demanded that no member of the RUC belong to the Orange Order.

At f ir s t several members of the Republican Opposition seemed to welcome the setting up of the Ulster Defence Regiment. They urged I

170

There was concern on the part of some Moderate Unionists about the existence of no-go areas.

Before a detective can question a person residing in the Falls Road area, an application must be made to the Army which in turn gets in touch with Mr. Sullivan* who arranges a meeting with the detective concerned before entering the Falls Road area. (R. Babington, Nov. 13, 1969)

The Government replied that there were no no-go areas.

The police are patrolling a ll areas of Belfast at a ll times with the exception of the Falls Road and Hooker Street areas where patrolling has been confined to daylight hours since 17th October, when the police were reintroduced. Full patrolling will be introduced in a short time. (Min. of Home A ffa irs , Nov. 18, 1969)

The Conservative Unionists, Laird, Mitchell, Craig, West, and Burns, rejected the Hunt Report. They congratulated the RUC for their discipline and conduct during the disorders. The RUC had worked long hours and had been treated lik e animals.

In Londonderry they were covered with s p it, stoned and set alight with fir e bombs. (A. Anderson, Oct. 28, 1969} ......

The Conservative Unionists warned that there was s till a threat from the IRA, and to organize the police along the lines of English county police was entirely inappropriate. The Conservative Unionists reminded the House that IRA documents, revealed in 1966, showed that the IRA planned to in filtr a te organizations and campaign to make the Government of Northern Ireland unworkable. Members of the Republican Opposition were accused of assisting in the IRA strategy.. First they had discredited Craig as Minister of Home Affairs, then they dis­ credited the USC, and then they attacked the RUC. The next part of their strategy was to discredit the judiciary and the Orange Lodge, and this, said the Conservative Unionists, had already started.

The Government was accused of fa llin g the RUC and the USC by accepting the Hunt Report. The disbanding of the RUC had come out of a meeting with Wilson and Chichester-Clark in London. The Government had handed over the command of the USC to the General O fficer Commanding (GOC). In doing th is , charged the Conservative Unionists, the Northern Ireland' Government had removed from the Northern Ireland Parliament the responsibility for the security forces of Northern

*Sullivan was chairman of the C itizen's Defence Committee. 172

Catholics to join to make this a truly non-sectarian force. After the Government had advertised for men for the new force, the Republican Opposition members changed th eir minds. They accused the Government of running a newspaper advertisement that made the new force to ta lly unpalatable to the Catholic community. The advertisement indicated that members of the new force would have to take an Oath of Allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen. Members of the Opposition also objected to the Government sending application forms for the new force to members of the Ulster Special Constabulary. They accused the Government of trying to pack the force with B Specials. Republican Opposition members fe lt they had been duped into calling on minority members to join the new force.

To my mind members of the Opposition did a foo l­ hardy thing last week when they turned their backs on the past and issued an immediate appeal to people of the minority to join the new force. As soon as the words had le ft th eir lips the Government stabbed them in the back. An Army officer on TV said "The force w ill be largely composed of members of the USC." The Government has been trying to satisfy members of the Special Constabulary that there w ill be a special place for them in the new force, that they will have priority over all other sections of the community. ( I . Cooper, Nov. 19, 1969)

The Government was seen as trying to pack the UDR with B Specials, and in this way dilute the Hunt Report, and so calm the com­ plaints of the Conservative Unionists. The British Government was also believed to have agreed to the creation of the Ulster Defense Regiment to appease the B Specials so they would not go underground and form a subversive lo yalist force. However, the UDR would be a regiment in the British Army, and would come under the Minister of Defense, and the Republican Opposition believed that in the creation of this force, B ritain had taken arms out of the control of Stormont. The Republican Opposition a ll declared that there was no need for this UDR force. The Government in Dublin was not going to send a force to invade Northern Ireland—Lynch had clearly said he had no intention of coming into the country by force. Talk of IRA activity was considered by the Republican Opposition as utter rubbish. Such talk was indulged in s tric tly for p o litic a l reasons by the Unionists. * The IRA had been successful in in filtra tin g the social protest move­ ment, admitted the Republican Opposition, but that was what they intended to do, rather than use force. The Republican Opposition also objected to the Government upping the proposed size of the UDR from 4,000 recommended by the Hunt Report to 6,000. 173

Local Government B ill

On October 28, 1969, a Local Government B ill was Introduced which aimed to establish an independent Commission to determine electoral boundaries. The Commission would be composed of three men, a ll appointed by the Governor. The Government promised to consult members on all sides of the House before submitting names to the Governor for his consideration. The Bill would create the basic machinery to ensure f a ir distribution of council seats.

This B ill goes a long way to meet many of the allegations which have been made in this House from time to time. Those were allegations that the Government were acting in bad faith, that local govern­ ment elections were rigged, that the wards were drawn to avoid fair representation and to avoid giving the minority control of local government in certain areas. This B ill ensures that ward boundaries w ill be drawn fairly in future by a purely independent Commission. Before that body is set up there will be the fullest consultation. (N. Minford, Oct; 28, 1969)

The Republican Opposition gave this B ill a somewhat qualified welcome. Since i t was not known what the duties of local councils would be at this time, some Opposition Members thought this B ill should not be introduced at this time. Regardless of their degree of enthu­ siasm for the Bill now, all Republican Opposition Members called for the system of proportional representation to be introduced. This, they said, was the only way a system of one man-one vote, and each vote of equal value, could be obtained in Northern Ireland. It alone would give justice to the Nationalist areas, where the minority would have a fair voice.

Review Body to Reassess the Role of Local Government

In December, the Government announced that since the decision had been made to transfer all housing functions, Including building and allocation, to a housing authority, a reappraisal of Ideas on local government was necessary. This reopened the whole question of the precise role of local government and, consequently, the number, size and character of local councils in the future. A Review Body was to be appointed tha.t was completely impartial and independent, that would make an authoritative reassessment of the whole position. The Chairman of the Review Body would be Patrick Macrory, a businessman, plus six other business, professional and trade union people. The Review Body was asked to review all proposals for reshaping local government and to advise on the most satisfactory organization to meet local health, welfare, educational and other needs. It was not part of the Review Body's duty to define new local authority areas nor draw th e ir 174 boundaries} this would be done by an Impartial body and then referred to the Parliamentary Boundary Commission at Stormont.

Repressive Measures

The Unionist Government passed two Repressive B ills in 1969, the Public Order Bill and the Protection of Persons and Property B ill, both designed to help control the disorders.

Public Order Bill

O'Neill had pledged that he would put f ir s t p rio rity on con­ trolling disorder and on March 12, 1969, a Public Order Bill was introduced into the Commons. The B ill was debated in Committee through to July 3, 1969. Porter, the Minister of Home A ffairs, introduced the Bill and described its provisions. The purpose of the Bill was to protect the public from the excesses of political demonstrations, while safeguarding the expression of opinion. Taking part 1n an unlawful procession was made an offence, and the notice time given to the police of an intended parade was doubled to ninety-six hours. The Minister of Home Affairs was given the power to ban a counter- demonstration in an area where a demonstration was to be held. Any person suspected of being about to molest a procession might be required to give his name and address and be arrested if he refused. The police were given additional power to deal with sit-downs and with those who took over a building. The B ill prohibited quasi-m ilitary organizations and the carrying of offensive weapons. The Government tflated its aim was not to be repressive but to make enforcement more effective. The Unionists supported the B ill, but Joe Burns, a Conservative Unionist, did not like the introduction of these laws regulating demonstrations.

The Republican Opposition strenuously opposed the B ill. They thought the answer to the demonstrations on the streets was not "repressive legislatio n," but the passing of reform measures. They thought more tension would be created by the B ill. The Republican Opposition disliked the prohibition in the Bill against sitting, kneeling or lying down in the roadway. One of the ways leaders of demonstrations could control restless marchers was to have them s it down. There were two clauses in the B ill that the Opposition readily accepted, the power to ban counter-demonstrations and the prohibition against carrying offensive weapons. It was generally agreed by the Republican Opposition that the Government already had sufficien t powers to deal with these problems and only put this B ill forward because they were intimidated by Protestant extremists. 175

Protection of Persons and Property Bill

I t became obvious a fte r the summer months that petrol bombers and those who Intimidated people and made them leave their homes would have to be dealt with. On October 16th, the Protection of the Persons and Property B ill was introduced to insure severe and swift punish­ ment to such persons. The Republican Opposition favored this B ill, and called for the maximum penalty to be made certain when a person was found g u ilty. Thousands of people had been intimidated by way of ille g a l radio, by telephone and by le tte r. Many of these people had been prevented from going back to work.

OUTPUT — CONSERVATIVE UNIONISTS

Army Behavior

In August of 1969, the Army was called in to help control the disturbances in Northern Ireland. Soon after, Conservative Unionists were complaining about B ritish Army behavior in th e ir areas. The Army was accused of using overkill tactics in dealing with situations. For a small fracas between two young men vying for the affection of a young lady, fourteen soldiers arrived on the scene and actually pointed their machine guns into the chip shop where the f is t fig h t had occurred. By October, these complaints were becoming more frequent. • Laird complained that a human chain, composed of women and children in the Protestant Sandyrow area, had narrowly escaped being hurt by Army lo rrie s , which accelerated and went straight for them. In a Catholic area, a sim ilar chain of people had been consulted with, by the m ilitary, and then left alone. Conservative Unionists were also concerned about the blurred spheres of responsibility between the RUC and the Army. The situation seemed to indicate there had been some erosion of power given to the Northern Ireland Government.

....th e re has been some eating away, some erosion of the powers given to the Northern Ireland Government by the 1920 Act, by our voluntarily giving over of the control of the streets of our country to the GOC, who Is not under our command. (D. Boal, August 27, 1969)

The Conservative Unionists also complained that the army was not going into the no-go areas.

The Republican Opposition members welcomed the advent of the Army. They described the Army as protecting lives and property. 176

Here we have the B ritish m ilita ry , who have never been particularly well liked by our side of the community, for reasons which are lost in the mists of history, being readily accepted by our side of the community, and we have the phenomenon of the so-called loyalist side attacking them and trying to bring them into ill-re p u te and to blacken th e ir name. (P. O'Hanlon, Oct. 16, 1969)

Republican Opposition members defended the Army against Laird's charge of partiality; the Army was not acting in a sectarian way. The Republican Opposition thought the women and children of Sandyrow should not have formed a human barrier.

No doubt there is a certain frame of mind, not only in this House but a ll over Northern Ireland, which has been incensed by the attempts of the British m ilitary forces on Saturday night to carry out their duty in an impartial way. I believe they are entitled to traverse all parts of Northern Ireland, including my constituency and the consti­ tuency of St. Anne's. (G. F1tt, Oct. 16, 1969)

The general belief was that the British Army was necessary in Northern Ireland at the time.

Film - - John Humes Derry

Toward the end of the year the Conservative Unionists com­ plained about a film shown over Telefis Eireann, made by Hume, called John Hume's Derry. The film showed Derry in a very negative way, stressing the slums and the unemployment. The Conservative Unionists complained that nothing was said about the enormous amounts of money the Government had spent on bringing industry to the c ity . Nothing was said about the number of jobs provided, or about the new building programs. Burns pointed out that millions of pounds of damage had been done in Derry, but the blame'for the violence, the blame for the criminal acts and for the destruction, was placed on the shoulders of the Government, and not on the shoulders of the crim inal. The people had fa lle n for this propaganda, said Burns, and many of them decided they could do more or less what they liked.

Civil Rights People

The Conservative Unionists condemned the behavior of the civil rights people, especially their attack on the judiciary. They cited one incident in which a magistrate, after having passed sentence in a 177 case, was jeered at and attacked by civil rights people. Obviously, said the Conservatives, the reforms were not pacifying the c iv il rights people.

Everything possible has been done to pacify these people. I never believed it was possible to pacify them. When the cry was "one man, one vote," I did not think that was what they wanted. I felt i t was just a parrot-cry. When the cry was, "more houses," I did not think that was what they wanted because they were too fond of burning down the houses that were there.. . .they said they wanted jobs but they were too fond of burning down the factories where they had work. (J. Burns, Nov. 11, 1969)

The Conservative Unionists complained that the civil rights people were ille g a lly parading, but were never arrested for i t .

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Attack on Royal Ulster Constabulary

Early in 1969, the Republican Opposition launched an attack on the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the USC. They charged the RUC with, using excessive force, p a rtia lity of enforcement, and fa ilu re to stay out of Catholic areas when it was in the interests of peace to do so. Police conduct in the Bogside on January 4th and at Burntollet Bridge especially canie in for criticism. Hume accused the police of using excessive force on the weekend of October 5, 1968 when the Bogside was "terrorized." This had been repeated, he said, on January 4th, when people's homes in the Bogside were attacked and windows were smashed in the middle of the night. Hume said he helped to set up vigilante groups to save the community from tearing its e lf apart. The police Inquiry into the events of January 4th by County Inspector Balllie was not acceptable to Hume because the police were judging themselves. Furthermore, the police who might be named in the B a illie Report as having committed criminal acts 1n the Bogside would be exempt under the general amnesty declared by Chichester-Clark.

Hume accused the police of p a rtia lity 1n the enforcement of the law. The police had not moved against the Protestants who had taken over Armagh to prevent a civil rights march there, but later they had used water cannons and batons against the c iv il rights sup­ porters. Hume charged that the police had fraternized with those who interfered with and attacked the civil rights marchers at Burntollet. The police had known in advance that stones were being piled up and that cudgels were in the hands of those trying to prevent the march, 178 but they had taken no action against these people.

We have witnessed throughout the civil rights campaign the police standing facing civil rights demonstrators while th e ir backs were to others who wished to in te rfe re . (J. Hume, March 28, 1969)

The Republican Opposition thought partiality of enforcement was due to the police force being under the direct control of the Government. This led to its use In enforcing political decisions.

The RUC have, on occasions, been misused and asked to enforce political decisions. These deci­ sions arose because processions were banned and police were used to clear demonstrators from the s tre e ts .. . .police were asked to remove largely Roman Catholic demonstrators. (J. O'Reilly, Flarch 28, 1969)

F itt said he had been viciously attacked by five or six policemen when he was in the c iv il rights march on October 5th.

A general investigation into the charges brought against the police was asked for. Several Republican Opposition Members said they were not condemning the whole force, only certain individuals in It. Opposition members fe lt that there was a general loss of respect for the forces of law and order and that vandals were taking advantage of it. The only way to restore confidence in the police force was to have a public airing of any brutality.

The Minister of Home Affairs, Porter, defended the police. They had been stoned and petrol bombed and they had not used unneces­ sary force in putting down the disturbances. Charges had been made that the police had assaulted persons taken into custody, but no formal complaints had been made of this to any senior officer. He charged that those who were spreading false reports about police were bent on the destruction o f the state.

Trouble-makers in the area have been supported and encouraged by ill-disposed persons from other districts. They are obviously prepared to go to any length to achieve their aims. Their intention 1s to overthrow this Government or to wreck Northern Ireland and its Constitution or probably just to create a state of anarchy. They seize upon and ex­ ploit minor incidents. The police are their first targets. They spread fa ls e reports and rumours about our police, any statement to denigrate our police. They operate on the principle that no matter how big the lie , if it 1s repeated often enough, people will believe it. These are the 179

tactics being used against the police. Some sections of the Press have clearly shown that the aim of these persons is revolution, not reform. (Minister of Home A ffairs, Porter, March 28, 1969)

Porter accepted the fact that when Hume helped to form a vigilante group in Londonderry during the riots of January 4th, he was trying to cool down the situation. However, Porter considered i t irresponsible for Hume to suggest that the police should be withdrawn from the Bogside. The police had th eir duties and could not withdraw in favor of a vigilante group, no matter how well-intentioned. Porter called on all right-thinking people in the community to support the police.

Moderate Unionists, B a illie and Ferguson, deplored the general attack on the RUC.

Wo have had a campaign to discredit the forces of law and order. In Hooker Street for the past 10 days the most gross lib e ls have been put up against the police. They have been accused of being drunk on du ty....h ig h ranking officers in touch with the men on the beat at a ll times have had no complaints made to them of mistreatment. A number of people taken into custody have come before the courts but there have been no complaints of police mistreat­ ment. (R. B a illie , March 29, 1969)

I deplore the general attack on the RUC. In recent months the force has been subjected to a campaign of v ilific a tio n and abuse. (R. Ferguson, March 29, 1969)

There is a campaign against the police. People making that campaign are followers or near­ followers of members opposite. (R. Bablngton, March 29, 1969)

They admitted that there were "bad eggs" 1n the force that needed to be taken out, but the RUC as a whole did a good job. The Unionists said hooligans and ruffians had arisen since October 5th and had joined the c iv il rights processions in order to vent th eir spleen against the police force.

Conservative Unionists, Mitchell, Stronge, McQuade and Laird, voiced their utmost confidence in the police. They interpreted the statements made against the police as a concerted campaign to under­ mine the constitution. They denied the police were used 1n a p o litic a l way. They accused the Opposition of conducting the campaign against the police. 180

I have listened day after day to certain Hon. Members on the opposite Benches spilling forth their daily spleen at the RUC and venom at the B Specials. (N. Laird, March 29, 1969)

Later in the year, the Cameron Commission reported that on January 4th, in the Catholic Bogside, a number of policemen had been g u ilty of misconduct, which involved assault and battery and mali­ cious damage to property. Hume blamed the subsequent attacks on policemen on this attack.

I t was only a fte r several months of people being subjected to attacks of this nature that retal­ iation finally did take place. (J. Hume, Oct. 29, 1969)

Attack on Ulster Special Constabulary

The Republican Opposition was strongly opposed to the Ulster Special Constabulary right from the beginning of the disorders, and they kept up a concerted campaign against them in 1969. They regarded the force as a sectarian force, recruited from a sectarian background. No Catholics were in the USC, and the force was viewed with suspicion by the Catholic minority. The Republican Opposition charged that there were few restrictions on anyone wishing to join the force; recruits had to be Protestant and without a criminal record. With these prerequisites, an individual could sign up and was given a gun immediately. The Republican Opposition accused this force of being low in intelligence and physical fitness, of being armed to the teeth, and of illegally using arms on and off duty to intimidate people. The USC were accused of being motivated by p o litic a l and religious bias. The Republican Opposition complained th a t, through­ out the years, the members of the USC had been charged with criminal offences in the courts but they were s t ill allowed to continue as members of the force.

In January, the Republican Opposition stated they did not want the recently drafted USC assigned to crowd control, and in March, the Republican Opposition complained because the B Specials had been used in areas where there had been civil rights disturbances, after the Government had said the B Specials would not be used in this way. The B Specials were charged with being involved with extreme Protestant elements in Newry, Armagh and Burntollet. I t was believed the B Specials had taken part in the ambush at Burntollet; their huts in the area had been used for meetings ju st prior to the Burntollet Bridge incident. Names of over sixty people involved in the Burntollet incident had been given to the police. Photographs of girls with gaping head wounds being put into the local river had been taken. In 4

181

• addition to this, the B Specials were accused of trying to hinder the People's Democracy march from Belfast to Derry. The Republican Opposition dubbed the general amnesty a convenient ploy to take the B Specials off the hook for their behavior at Burntollet. The B Specials were also accused of being involved with the extreme Paisieyites, of trying to storm a post office, and of raining a fusil­ lade of missiles on a civil rights meeting.

The Government and the Unionist Party responded by defending the USC.

The first thing that I want to make absolutely crystal clear is that neither my colleagues nor I accept the gross slurs which have been aimed against the record and reputations of this force. It has been widely characterised as a sectarian force. I should lik e to repudiate this and any fa cile assump­ tion that because a man is a Protestant and a loyal­ ist he is by definition biased and anti-Catholic in carrying out duties as a Special Constable. This is a very pessimistic view of men who have been pre­ pared to serve the community in some pretty arduous and uncomfortable duties over the years. Let us have an end of these grossly irresponsible generalisa­ tions which seem to have as th e ir aim the complete discrediting of the forces of law and order. There is no question of disbanding the Ulster Special Constabulary. There is no question of disarming the USC. (Prime Minister Chichester-Clark, Aug. 27, 1969)

The USC were considered a highly disciplined body that had rendered gallant service. As fa r as the behavior of the B Specials at Burntollet was concerned, the Minister of Home A ffairs, Long, said that only one d efin ite allegation had been made, and this person had since resigned as had several other persons who had been accused. However, in October, despite Chichester-Clark's statement to the con­ trary, the Government accepted the Hunt Report and the USC were slated to be disbanded.

Protestant Extremists

Late in 1969, the Republican Opposition voiced concern about the Protestant extremist organizations, the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Protestant Volunteers. Kennedy claimed the UVF s till existed and that British intelligence was conducting extensive investigations into its activities. He accused the Government and the RUC of knowing many of the men involved in this organization, but 182

of refusing to prosecute them for their own reasons. Cooper charged that the same men who were 1n the UVF were now in the U lster Protestant Volunteers. Hume accused Paisley of being chairman of the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee and the Ulster Protestant Volunteers, as well as editor of the new Protestant newspaper, the "Protestant Telegraph." Hume charged the Constitutional Defence Committee with being implicated in violence because one of its members had been sentenced to two years imprisonment fo r providing explosives to persons unknown, fo r purposes of damaging property.

The Minister of Home Affairs, Porter, replied that all alle­ gations were being thoroughly investigated by the police.

The United Irishman

The banning of the newspaper, The United Irishman, was also an object of Republican Opposition discontent 1n 1969. This newspaper was banned in Northern Ireland, although copies were freely available. On June 25th, the Republican Opposition called for the ban to be removed.

This banning 1s a denial of freedom of expres­ sion. People have a right to publish their political views. (J. Hume, June 25, 1969)

There is no evidence to substantiate the claim that i t preaches rebellion and subversion. (P. O'Hanlon, June 24, 1969)

The Minister of Home Affairs, Porter, said The United Irishman was the only publication in Northern Ireland which existed for the sole purpose of bringing about the destruction of the Government and the Constitution of Northern Ireland and was prepared to do so by violent means. This newspaper approved the a c tiv itie s o f the IRA, said Porter, and publication and distribution of The United Irishman was prohibited by regulations made under the Special Powers Act.

Attack on Attorney General

Late in the year the Republican Opposition complained of serious inconsistency in sentencing. The Attorney General was accused of serious partiality 1n carrying out prosecutions; different people were being charged under d iffe re n t Acts for sim ilar offences. The Attorney General was accused of le ttin g p o litic a l bias a ffe c t his decisions. . « 183

We believe he has taken prosecutions In the past, and prevented prosecutions, on a p o litical basis be­ cause he has been Influenced by his own prejudice, his own bias, and because of the party to which he belongs. (P. Kennedy, Nov. 13, 1969)

The Republican Opposition thought the Attorney General should have immediately resigned from the Orange Order once he assumed his post of Attorney General.

The Attorney General denied the charges.

I have been unmoved in the matter of public prosecutions by political or religious pressure from any quarter. (Attorney General, Nov. 13, 1969)

He pointed out that some members of the Opposition did not understand the function of the Attorney General's position. He was a public prosecutor, not a detective, and not an investigating officer. He was not permitted to go out seeking evidence against people. The decision to prosecute or not was taken in the vast majority of cases by senior members of the RUC. As far as being influenced by his membership in the Orange Order, the Attorney General denied there was any conflict between being a member of the Orange Order and being Attorney General. He thought i t was increasingly d iffic u lt fo r some people to retain a sense of objectivity about the law under the present circumstances. People tended to get vengeful and b itte r. The Attorney General said he received a lo t of correspondence and anonymous calls from both sides of the religious and political fence about public prosecutions and about penalties of the courts. He saw sinister implications behind the attack on his office.

I hope that the attack of partiality on the law officer, magistrates and judges is not a further and more sophisticated step in an attempt to undermine law and order in this country. The Royal Ulster Constabulary has been the object of a sustained attack for some time by certain elements in this com­ munity. Is it now part of the master plan of those who seek to subvert the Constitution of this country to formulate a concerted attack on the public prose­ cutors and the magistrates and judges? (Attorney General, Nov. 13, 1969)

Attack on Orange Order

In December, the Republican Opposition leashed a fu ll-s c a le attack on the Orange Order. A ll members of the Government were called on to resign immediately from the Order, to show th eir desire 184 * for better community relations. The Orange Order was characterized as bigoted, sectarian and intolerant. The Attorney General was accused of belonging to the Prince Albert Lodge, which had given fraternal greetings to a man convicted of murdering a Catholic. The Republican Opposition charged that the former Minister of Agriculture, P. O 'N e ill, was kicked out of the Order for attending a Catholic service, and recently, the Lord Mayor of Belfast hesitated to go Into a Catholic Church for the funeral of an old friend. The power of the Orange Order was seen to be greatest among the poorer sections of the community—the working class. Political leaders had exploited this. The Government and the Orange Order were accused of conning the people into believing that i f the Fenians were kept down and the minority treated lik e dogs, they would be secure and there would be no Westminster intervention. In re a lity , said the Republican Opposition, the Protestant workers were only very marginally privileged over the Catholic section, they had subsistance wages and poor living conditions. Four-fifths of the houses on Shanktll and Sandy Row had no toilets.

The suggestion that Unionist members should resign from the Orange Order was completely rejected by a ll Unionists. The Prime M inister thought this was an invasion into individual rights and called the accusations just another smear campaign by people who knew very l i t t l e about the Orange Order.

The Moderate Unionists supported the Prime M inister's position. It was pointed out that members of the Opposition had appeared on platforms where the banner for the Ancient Order of Hibernians had been unfurled, also for the Irish National Forresters and the Knights of St. Columbanus. Two of these were secret societies lik e the Orange Order. The demands made by the Republican Opposition were seen as striking at the very roots of freedom of choice.

The Conservative Unionists saw this attack as part of a larger campaign, ultim ately aimed at revolution.

I t appears that Hon. Members are following a plan of campaign step by step. The f ir s t thing was one man, one vote. They have that and votes at 18. They wanted a housing authority, they w ill get a housing authority. They tried to discredit the RUC, they got the Ulster Special Constabulary disbanded. The next part of the plan 1s to discredit and separate the Orange Order from the Unionist Party and the judiciary. Apparently the judiciary and the Orange Order are next in line. The Opposition wants revolution, not social reforms. (J. Burns, Dec. 2, 1969) 185

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

By January of 1969, O'Neill's position was precarious. He had fired Craig, the right-wing Minister of Home Affairs and this, along with the proposed reforms, had alienated the more conservative members of the Unionist Party. At the same time, his planned reforms in no way appeased the Opposition Parties. Throughout January, February, March and April, there was conflict within the Unionist Party, brought on by the proposed reforms. There was a sustained e ffo rt to depose O 'N eill. Faulkner, who was generally considered somewhat right-wing, resigned with the odd explanation that the Government was not moving ahead fast enough on reforms. The Minister of Agriculture, Chichester-Clark, also resigned, saying he did not think the time was right for changes in the local government franchise, O'Neill needed a mandate from the people.

In early March, a general election was held and O'Neill and his Unionist Government were returned to office. Of the Unionists elected for the first time, four were clearly conservative in orienta­ tion while six were liberal and in favor of reforms. On the Opposition benches, the election brought in two new members into the House who had been c iv il rights workers in Londonderry, Hume and Cooper, both Independents. Hume had defeated the more moderate leader of the Nationalists, McAteer. Labour Party Leader, T. Boyd, also lost his seat to Patrick Kennedy, who was strongly republican in his sympathies. Although there was a definite tendency for the more m ili­ tant Republicans and those fu lly committed to c iv il rights to be returned, there was no clear trend among the Unionists. On May 1st, O'Neill resigned and Chichester-Clark became the new Prime Minister. Chichester-Clark made few changes in the Cabinet, the most notable being Porter as Minister of Home Affairs and Faulkner as Minister of Development. Two new Parliamentary Secretaries were created: J. D. Taylor became Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Home Affairs and J. Brooke became Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce. Both of these men were considered right-wing by the Opposition Parties.

The Republican Opposition was now made up of the Nationalist Party, the Republican Labour Party, the Independents, and Devlin of the Labour Party. The Republican Opposition walked out of the House completely for a short period during the summer months. PARLIAMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND

1969

(After the election and after Chichester- Clark becomes Prime Minister)

Prime Minister, J. D. Chichester-Clark Minister of Finance, H. V. Kirk Minister of Home Affairs, R. W. Porter Health and Social Services. W. K. Fitzsimmons Education, W. J. Long Agriculture, P. O'Neill Commerce, R. H. Bradford Development, A. B. Faulkner

UNIONIST PARTY

Belfast Down

R. H. Bradford R. J. Babington D. Boal J . Dobson ^ J. Caldwell A. B. Faulkner W. K. Fitzsimmons J. W. Kelly J. W. Kennedy W. J. Long H. V. Kirk S. Magowan N. D. Laird R. W. Porter J. McQuade I. Neill Fermanagh W. Scott J. Brooke Antrim H. U. West

R. J. Bailie Londonderry City W. Craig A. L. Dickson A. W. Anderson R. Ferguson W. B. Mclvor Londonderry County N. 0. Mlnford R. Simpson J. Burns J. D. Chichester-Clark Armagh Tyrone J. Mitchell J. M. Stronge W. E. Fyffe H. Whitten J. D. Taylor INDEPENDENT UNIONISTS

Belfast

T ..H . Caldwell

LABOUR

Belfast

P. J. Devlin F. V. Simpson

REPUBLICAN LABOUR

Labour

P. Kennedy 6. F itt

NATIONALIST

Down

M. J. Keogh J. O'Reilly

Fermanagh

J. Carron

Tyrone

T. C. Gormley R. H. O'Connor J. A. Currie

INDEPENDENT

Armagh

P. H. O'Hanlon

Londonderry County

I . A. Cooper J. Hume SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

The Unionists at fir s t regarded the c iv il rights marchers as individuals genuinely concerned with bringing social change, but manipulated by the extremists, and plagued by individuals out for trouble, who had attached themselves to these parades. As the year wore on, the Unionists came increasingly to doubt the intentions of the civil rights marchers and came to see their actions as part of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government and attain a united Ireland. The Republican Opposition was seen as part of this conspiracy because of their attack on the police, the judiciary, and the legal system. The Unionists saw the police force as composed of largely responsible, courageous men who had taken a great deal of abuse at the hands of the rio ters, including being bombed and stoned. There were some "bad eggs" in the force and these men should be exposed. The Government was prepared to investigate any changes of b ru ta lity . Later in the year, as the denouncement of the RUC became more s h r ill, the Unionists came to view these complaints as part of a campaign designed to destroy the credibility of the RUC and destroy the state. The Unionists denied that the RUC were manipulated by the Government.

The Unionists were in favor of a civilianlzed and unarmed RUC, providing Britain accepted the responsibility of maintaining the Border. They vacillated regarding the Ulster Special Constabulary, defending them on the one hand, but allowing for th eir disbanding on the other. The major cause of the disorders was thought to lie in the constitutional problem, but poor social conditions were also involved. The program of reforms was generally accepted by the Unionists as needed to remedy some of the problems in the society, but efforts to control marches were also considered necessary. There was keen appre­ ciation of the fact that Westminster could abolish the powers of the Northern Ireland Government i f the Unionists did not deal with the problems. The Conservatives were faulted for their fighting of the reforms. The Government of the Republic and its Prime M inister, Lynch, were seen as hostile and Interfering.

The Conservative Unionists, from the beginning, Insisted the IRA were deeply involved in the c iv il rights movement and th eir aim was to create anarchy. They saw the Republican Opposition as directly involved in some of the worst disorders. Civil rights marches and republican parades were considered provocative strategies of the IRA. The conservatives unreservedly supported the RUC and the USC. They were totally opposed to reorganization of the police and the disbanding of the USC. They were not opposed to an unarmed police force, but they believed all RUC recruits should be trained in the use of arms. The withdrawal of the police from the Bogside and the existence of no-go areas were considered to play into the hands of the Republicans. The cause of the disorders was believed to be the small group of people who would not accept the Constitution. The 189

Conservatives either opposed the reform measures or remained silent when they were passed. They did not believe that any number of reforms would pacify the dissidents. After the B ritish Army was brought Into the situation, the Conservatives perceived them as biased against Protestants in their enforcement of the law. They saw the lines of authority of the Army and RUC as blurred, and a serious problem in terms of law enforcement.

The Republican Opposition not only supported the c iv il rights marches, but also took part in the marches. They disliked any re­ routing of these marches, considering i t the responsibility of the police to protect them. Any attempt to reroute civil rights parades, or ban them, was interpreted as an effort by the Unionists to placate the right-wing. The causes of the disturbances they believed to be the social and economic conditions, not Republican agitation. They f la t ly denied at f ir s t that the IRA were involved with the c iv il rights marchers, but la te r in the year, declared i t was the aim of the IRA to infiltrate the social protest movement and work through it rather than use violence. They branded Unionist talk of IRA activity as rubbish. The Orange Parades, they thought, should be rerouted because they were provocative. The RUC were perceived as being directly under the control of the Unionist Government. It was characterized as a force ready to set traps to blacken the name of the c iv il rights marchers, a force guilty of brutality and a force that used CS gas indiscriminately. The B Specials were regarded as sectarian, biased, and involved with Protestant extremists.

The reorganization of the police was welcomed but there was suspicion that the Government would pack the new force with B Specials. The reforms were welcomed as they were presented 1n the House, but the Republican Opposition thought they were slow in coming and were only being passed because of pressure from the streets and from Westminster. The British Army was welcomed as a non-sectarian force that was useful in maintaining order. The Republican Opposition were concerned over the activities of the Protestant extremists, and the influence of the Orange Order. OUTLINE - 1970

INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Civil Rights Activity

Enniskillen and Armagh C ivil Disobedience

People's Democracy Meeting Republican A ctivity

IRA

Orange Parades

June Orange Parade Apprentice Boys Parade

Explosions

INPUTS - EXTRASOCIETAL

Eire

OUTPUTS - UNIONISTS

Reform Measures’

Government's Economic Program Police Bill Ministry of Community Relations Report Commissioner of Complaints Report Vote of Confidence in the Government Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act Maccrory Report on the Reorganization of Local Government Housing Executive B ill

Repressive Measures

Criminal Justice B ill

190 191

OUTPUTS — CONSERVATIVE UNIONISTS

Attack on Government for Inadequate Enforcement o f Law No-Go Areas Biased Law Enforcement Against Protestants

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Concern Over Conservative Unionists Intimidation Attack on Orange Order Attack on RUC Complaints About Police Authority U lster Special Constabulary Attack on Army

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS t

INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

In the year 1970, continuing public turmoil existed with c iv il rights marches, Orange Parades, explosions and demonstrations of various kinds.

Civil Rights Activity

Enniskillen and Armagh

In March, counter-demonstrators tried to interfere with c iv il rights marches and meetings in Enniskillen and Armagh.

The Republican Opposition called for the Public Order Act to be used against the counter-demonstrators.

The Conservative Unionists described the marches as provocative. In Armagh the c iv il rights marchers had flown a Tricolour, and the Conservatives thought legal action should be taken against them. The Conservatives charged that great Inconvenience had been caused to the commercial l i f e of these towns by the marches and meetings which were always held 1n the center of town.

C ivil Disobedience

Later in the year, the Northern Ireland C ivil Rights Association made the decision to go back on the streets. Civil Rights demonstra­ tions took place throughout the country. At one such meeting, held in Enniskillen on October 10th, Hume advised the people to stop paying their rents and rates. He told the people of Fermanagh to load their rubbish on lorries and dump i t at the front door of Lord Brookeborough's home.

People's Democracy Meeting

Toward the end of March, the People's Democracy held a meeting on the main street of Portadown 1n the vicinity of a parish church, in which a service was being held. A crowd of loyalists gathered

192 193 around the small group of about sixteen. The police and the Army, holding fixed bayonets, held the loyalists back from interrupting the meeting. After the meeting, Protestant groups roamed the streets and damaged Roman Catholic business premises.

Unionists united in condemning the People's Democracy for holding a meeting outside a church.

....t h e disgusting bad taste of these people who decided to hold a meeting close to a church in which they knew a service was being held. (R. Porter, March 25, 1970)

They branded the People's Democracy as s o c ia lis tic and communistic, but also condemned those who had damaged Roman Catholic business premises.

The Republican Opposition, for the f ir s t time, condemned the People's Democracy for holding the meeting outside a church. They also blamed the police fo r not preventing the meeting from taking place.

Republican A ctivity

IRA

As the year progressed, there was growing concern about the build-up of the IRA in Belfast and Londonderry. One television program announced that there was a force of 2,000 fu lly -tra in e d IRA men in Northern Ireland. By November, the Prime M inister was sure of heavy involvement of subversives in the Catholic Ardoyne area. In November, two young men were brutally murdered. The police blamed the killings on an internal dispute 1n the IRA,

Republician Opposition member, Kennedy, said there was no evidence i t was the IRA and the Government should stop blaming the IRA for every act of violence that took place in the community, Fitt and Devlin, unusually critical toward another Republican, criticized Kennedy because he had not condemned these brutal murders. They said he should not have tried to exonerate anyone to whom there might be the slightest suspicion attached.

Protestant March

On March 10th, a Protestant march, to protest against the lack of playing field facilities, was rerouted by the police. Conservative Unionists objected to the rerouting, saying this was a denial of civil rights and the police should be able to maintain law and order. 194 * Republican Opposition Members said they were glad the police rerouted the march since the marchers were just trouble-makers who had not tried to get their playing field in other ways.

Orange Parades

June Orange Parade

Toward the end of June, plans were being made for the Orange Parades. The Republican Opposition warned that trouble would break out i f the Orange Parades scheduled for the 26th were not rerouted or restricted. They charged the organizers of these marches to see that they were not provocative, and did not pass through areas where there could be a confrontation. The Republican Opposition f e lt that in some cases, places were deliberately chosen to cause provocation.

The Minister of Home Affairs said that rerouting was decided upon only after the fullest possible consultation and discussion with the Joint Security Committee. All those who failed to comply with rerouting were liable to prosecution.

Conservative Unionists, Mitchell, Burns and Caldwell, defended the Orange Parades as traditional events, and called on the police force to protect them.

Those taking part in Orange processions do not march; they walk. It is not a militant organisation In any shape or form. The members have a tradition of walking over certain areas. I feel they should be protected and given lib e rty s t ill to walk over and use the same routes as previously. It 1s only when a procession of this kind goes beyond those areas that I think there is room for examination of the situation. (R. M itchell, June 25, 1970)

The Orange Parades took place on the 26th of June. They were accompanied by rioting and grave disorders. A sniper hid himself in St. Matthew's Chapel and shot into the Protestant Newtonards Road fo r several hours. It took two hours for the Army to arrive and when they did, they did not immediately make an attempt to route the sniper.

Chichester-Clark gave the Government's view of the severe disturbances. Events had started when the Court of Appeals had rejected Bernadette Devlin's appeal and affirmed her sentence of six months imprisonment. Chichester-Clark rejected the idea that the trouble had been caused by the Orange Parades. The Orange Order had shown great responsibility and had called off, with certain exceptions, all parades up until July 12th. For the parades that were to take place, they had agreed to accept RUC requests and directions as to rerouting. 195

Chichester-Clark fe lt the majority had a right to march.

A great deal has been said about rights of the minority. The majority also feel that they have rights. When the c iv il rights movement have marched and demonstrated up and down the country for causes which include the right to process freely; when Republican parades have been held as usual a t Easter without interference; when these things have happened is it surprising that a great many people mistrust the motives of some of those who call for the cancel­ lation or banning of all Orange Parades....People don't have to be provoked unless they choose to be. They don’ t have to muster in hostile groups waiting to attack the parade. People do not have to deny the rights of others while they assert their own. (Prime Minister Chichester-Clark, July 1, 1970)

Chichester-Clark was convinced the IRA was active in the disorders.

I am convinced that in some areas the violence was originated and in other areas exploited by dis­ ciplined, subversive elements working to overthrow the State. I conclude this because of the way f ir e ­ arms were used in certain situations and from care­ fu lly planned and prepared campaign o f fir e raising in the c ity center. There was s k illfu l use of w ell- designed incendiary devices. (Prime Minister Chichester-Clark, July 1, 1970)

Chichester-Clark explained that the security forces had been stretched very thin so that action could not be taken in every area as quickly as everyone would have wished. He emphasized that any disciplined force was reluctant to use firearms against civilians except in the most extreme circumstances. However, the Prime Minister said he now had the personal assurance of the 60C that the security forces would not hesitate to shoot gunmen. Instructions to shoot had gone out to all levels and he hoped there would be no further reluctance on the part of the Army to deal with snipers. Steps had been taken to improve the liaison between the Army and the RUC.

The Conservative Unionists, who now Included Paisley and ■ Beattie, newly elected to the House, faulted the Army for its ineffec­ tiveness in dealing with the rioters.

The parade was savagely attacked. The Army stood with their backs to those who were counter- demonstrating and faced those who were marching— those who had a legal right to march. At the same time there was a carefully planned campaign to destroy property and to lay incendiaries. There was 196

a plan of utter destruction of British-owned premises. ( I. Paisley, June 30, 1970)

The Conservatives complained because negotiations had been held in the Bogside and there was to be another no-go area created. The Conser­ vatives implicated members of the Republican Opposition 1n the violence.

Some months ago certain members of the Opposition went to Eire and were involved in meetings which called upon the people to pro­ vide money to buy arms. They were in Dublin, Cork, Clones and various places.. . .The Protestant people are not prepared to surrender. (R. M itchell, June 30, 1970)

The principal instigators of the violence were seen to be the IRA.

Known IRA leaders, officers, and men, were in the c ity on that day. These men paraded in military style in the no-go areas. These men marched with th eir uniforms on and in m ilita ry style. They marched publicly and demonstrated who they were; what they were and what their objectives were....This was a cleverly connived scheme to do the greatest possible damage to this c ity . ( I. Paisley, June 30, 1970)

The Conservative Unionists thought no reform, short of a united Ireland, would satisfy the Republican Opposition.

Republican Opposition members labelled the Orange Parades provocative, and they called for the curtailment of marches for six months. •

Apprentice Boys Parade

Toward the end of the year, on December 18th and 19th, the Apprentice Boys Parade was scheduled. The Government placed certain restrictions on this parade. The burning of Lundy from the Walker Memorial was prohibited and parades and marches were banned. The Conservative Unionists were incensed over these restrictions.

....simply another victory for what I would call the thugs, the anti-loyalists and the sectarian bigots. (A. Anderson, Dec. 9, 1970)

In this country for fa r too long we have had government on the streets; government from c iv il rights; government from the People's Democracy; government from people who are w illing to cause 197

trouble, and the time has come when we must have government by the Government here in this House.... Civil rights for whom? Not civil rights for the decent, ordinary lawabldlng people but civil rights for the anarchists so that they could burn this place down and destroy our Constitution. (J. Burns, Dec. 9, 1970)

Republican Opposition members claimed that the Apprentice Boys Parade and the burning of Lundy was deliberately provocative. F1tt said that 1n the last week, he and other members of the Opposition had refused to take part 1n any demonstrations because demonstrations could only further exacerbate tensions. He said the Opposition were subject to very severe criticism by th e ir supporters over the stand they took. The Republican Opposition supported the Government ban on parades; they thought it had helped to de-escalate tensions.

Explosions

In February and March, there were a number of explosions. One explosion was 1n the Crumlin Road courthouse and 1t was thought to have been set off to intimidate the ju ry . Another was at the home of the MP, Currie. I t was a small explosion and no one was hurt.

The Republican Opposition pointed out that a certain Captain Johnston had claimed the UVF were responsible for the explosion and that F itt might be the next subject of attack. They asked for protec­ tion against the UVF and demanded the Government apprehend these people. They also called for stricter controls on the use and storage of explosives.

A ll Unionists condemned the bomb outrages and also faulted the Parliamentary Secretary, Taylor, fo r a statement he made saying the explosion was to Currie's p o litical advantage.

INPUTS — EXTRASOCIETAL

Eire

Early in 1970, the Prime Minister of Eire, Lynch, made a speech at Tralee declaring himself strongly against violence as a means of unifying the country. This speech was well received by the Northern Ireland Government. The Republican Opposition described i t as "states­ manlike." Lynch was, however, s till exerting pressure on the British Government to intervene on the behalf of Republicans in Northern Ireland. In June, he publicly stated that his representative, Dr. 198

Hillery, was in London pressuring the British Government to see that the Orange Parades were called off. Paisley reacted very negatively to this intervention* emphasizing the need for loyalist demonstrations.

In October* events 1n the Republic indicated a serious In te r­ vention In Northern Ireland's a ffa irs . The Minister of Defence and the Minister of Finance in the Republic went on tr ia l fo r gun running to the North, along with an Eire Army intelligence officer, James Kelly, a Belgian businessman, Luykx, and John Kelly, who was an organizer of the Citizens Defense Committee in the North. John Kelly, who organized Citizens Defence Committees in and around Belfast, te s tifie d that the defense committees provided fir s t aid posts, engaged in fir e fighting, prevented looting and acted as a liaison with the British Army, but th e ir primary task was to organize the defense of the minority community and obtain arms. Kelly freely admitted having taken part in subversive activities. There was a further disclosure that there was an area in the Republic where people from the Bogside could go for training. Some Bogsiders had been taken in and trained in the Eire T e rrito ria l Army Camp. Money had been supplied by the Eire Government and placed in a special account. At least 500 r ifle s had been transported to Dundalk from the South.

The Conservative Unionists, Paisley, Beattie, Craig, Burns and McQuade, reacted strongly to this situation. They saw this as another effort to bring down the State of Northern Ireland. Lynch, they felt, knew a ll about what was going on in his Cabinet and was deeply involved. They called on Chichester-Clark to severely condemn the Eire Government, to re-arm the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and to recall the B Specials. In addition, they wanted strong representa- ’ tions made to Her Majecty's Government regarding this espionage. Beattie was not sure the British Army could be relied upon 1n the present situation.

Is there not a feeling that Ulster should be left to sort out its own troubles now that the B men have been disbanded and the Government have bent over backwards in appeasement and sold out Ulster to the Republican Movement 1n the Province? (W. Beattie, Oct. 21, 1970)

The Republican Opposition minimized the whole matter, claiming that the Government of the Republic had the situation well in hand. All the major parties in the Republic, Fianna F a il, Fine Gall and the Labour Party, had committed themselves to a policy of non-violence and i t was the overwhelming opinion of the people in the Republic that the problem of partition could only be solved 1n a non-violent way. The Republican Opposition thought i t was ill-advised to bring the matter up.

The Prime M inister, Chichester-Clark, would not deal with the contents of a trial that was still in session. He pointed out 199 that this trial concerned matters external to Northern Ireland and, as such, were the responsibility of the Westminster Government, He had complete confidence that any threats by internal or external enemies could be met with available forces. There was some indica­ tion, at the trial that certain MPs at Stormont were implicated and Chichester-Clark announced that this was being investigated. He fla tly turned down any suggestion of re-arming the RUC or recalling the B Specials, explaining that the Northern Ireland Government was not a sovereign power and could not, even if it wanted to, raise again the Ulster Special Constabulary, which was a military-type of force. It was pointed out that any attempt to bring arms into Northern Ireland had been singularly unsuccessful. Chichester-Clark reassured the Conservatives that the views of the Northern Ireland Government had been fu lly represented to Westminster and Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had made appropriate representa­ tions to the Iris h Ambassador in London.

OUTPUTS — UNIONISTS

Reform Measures

Government's Economic Program

On February 10, 11 and 12, 1970, Government policy was out­ lined by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. It was pointed out that Northern Ireland's economic position had been hit hard by the dis­ turbances, but new plans for the physical and economic development would be forthcoming through the year. I t was f e lt that communal stability was needed to attract industry, but stability could not be assured without a faster rate of economic development. The Government aimed to provide as many new employment opportunities as possible.

Living conditions, especially housing, was to be improved as rapidly as possible; a target of 73,500 houses was set for the next five years. Much more was to be done in areas like the Falls and Shankill, where there was overcrowding, high unemployment and problems of delinquency. More social workers were to be employed and play groups fo r pre-schoolers were to be established. The Prime Minister pledged his Government to work for everyone, regardless of class or creed. He saw the fundamental issue as being one man-one job and one man-one house. Chichester-Clark said the new Parliamentary Secretary, Brooke, would oversee the Government's Publicity and Information Service and would state the Government's position quickly and clearly when rumors and loose ta lk circulated. A film was being made about Derry to counter the bad publicity put out by John Hume's film on Derry. 200

Moderate Unionists supported Chichester-Clark and his Government, but Conservative Unionists, Burns, Mitchell, Stronge, and Laird, were very c ritic a l. As fa r as housing was concerned, Burns thought the private sector should be used more in solving the housing problem.

Ulster has built 170,000 since the end of the war. Our building record is better than that of Great B ritain. (J. Laird, Feb. 10, 1970)

Republican Opposition members voiced a number of concerns 1n reply to the Government program. They called for both private and state controlled industry to supply jobs to meet the severe unemploy­ ment problem in Northern Ireland. O’R eilly said he did not believe private enterprise could provide the answer to unemployment, and public enterprise had met with a good deal of success In the Republic. Devlin thought the money to start up state-owned industry could come from the British Home Secretary, dim Callaghan. He thought any money received from Westminster should be spent in areas west of the Bann, in Strabane, Derry and Newry, where i t was needed the most.

I t was acknowledged by the Opposition that many reforms had been passed, but no credit was given to the Government fo r th eir passage.

A large packet of reforms has gone through Parliament in the last year. The reforms went through because of pressure from the streets and pressure from Westminster. Some members of the Unionist Party think the reforms are good, but not a ll of them think so. (J. Hume, Feb. 10, 1970)

O 'R eilly said continual reforms were needed, not a period of p o litical calm and s ta b ility as the Government stressed.

All Republican Opposition members called for the Special Powers Act to be abolished. Hume complained because the removal of the Special Powers Act was supposed to be one of the earlie s t reforms but i t was s t ill operating. He complained because 1t had not been used against the Protestants who took over Armagh on November 30, 1968, and he charged that the Special Powers were there only to deal with the Catholic section of the community.

As fa r as community relations were concerned, Republican Opposition members thought the underlying causes of division in the country were unemployment, bad housing and economic depression, not religious divisions.

The Republican Opposition feared a takeover of the Unionist Party by right-wing forces, who they perceived as getting stronger all the time. The lib e ra ls, O'Neill and Ferguson, were gone. I f the 201 right-wingers took over, they were afraid the reforms would mean nothing, and some warned that unless the Prime Minister took a firm stand with these recalcitrant members of the Unionist Party, the Government would not be in existence in 1971; there would be d irect rule from Westminster. Hume feared the Government Information Service would be used fo r Unionist Party purposes.

Police Bill

A Police B ill, implementing the reorganization of the police, as recommended by the Hunt Report, was introduced on February 19, 1970, by the Minister of Home Affairs, Porter. Porter said that because of the circumstances in which the State was conceived, a paramilitary role’had been thrust on the police. This role had tended to isolate them from the l i f e of the community. Now, because B ritain had accepted the practical responsibility for the defense of Northern Ireland, the RUC could divest themselves of th e ir param ilitary role. The RUC could now offer the community a police service.

The.direction and control of the police would remain with the Inspector General, said Porter, but a Police Authority was to be established with the duty of maintaining an adequate and efficient police force. Representative organizations would be asked to nominate persons so that the Authority represented the whole Northern Ireland community. The Minister of Home A ffairs would consult with a committee of three members from the Authority before any procession was banned. The Police Authority would also keep its e lf informed about how the Inspector General was dealing with complaints against members of the. RUC, but the Authority could not intervene between the Inspector General and his men. Every complaint, however t r iv ia l, must be referred to the Inspector General and he must have every complaint investigated. Any complaint that the Minister of Home Affairs thought affected the public interest had to be referred to a specially con­ stituted tribunal, and the investigation would be conducted in public, unless security was involved.

The Minister of Home A ffairs was also empowered by the B ill to appoint independent Inspectors to report on the efficiency of the police force. The Police Authority would establish a RUC Reserve that would number about 1,500. The Reserve would be under the direct control of the Inspector General, and would assist the police In their regular duties. Porter voiced his appreciation of Opposition Members and Unionist Members who, 1n recent weeks, had shown sincere concern for the well-being of the whole community and had assisted in the restoration of peace.

Moderate Unionists, Dickson, Babington, and McConnell, sup­ ported the Police B ill. McConnell hoped that the new police service would be welcomed in the no-go areas. He faulted the right-wingers for not supporting the B ill. 202

Conservative Unionists, Burns, West and Craig, were against the Police B ill. They were afraid that v/ith the creation of the Police Authority, the Government had shifted its responsibility for law and order from itself to the Authority. .

There is no good reason fo r making this change. It is the responsibility of the Government, and they alone, to see that law and order in the country is maintained and in order to discharge that responsibi­ l i t y fu lly the Government must be in a position to secure the maintenance of an adequate and e ffic ie n t police force, but they are shunting that responsibi­ lity off to a statutory authority selected from members representing a wide range of interests in the community. I cannot see, however wide that range may be, that i t makes its members any better qualified to discharge this responsibility than the Government themselves. (W. Craig, Feb. 19, 1970)

The B ill relieves the Government of th e ir most important responsibility. It says the Government no longer will look after peace, welfare and the lives and property of these people. (J. Burns, Feb. 19, 1970)

The Conservative Unionists condemned the disbandment o f the Ulster Special Constabulary. They rejected the idea that the RUC was a paramilitary organization; the police were armed and trained in the use of arms due to the nature of their duties.

How can we envisage the police operating against an Illegal, armed subversive organisation 1n its new set-up or are we going to become accustomed to living in a permanent situation where the Army 1s a t the aid of the c iv il authority. (W. Craig, Feb. 19, 1970)

Concern was expressed because, fo r the f ir s t time, RUC recruits were now being turned out without any training in arms. The RUC were defended as having discharged th e ir duties admirably. I t was f e lt they should have unrestricted movement through the Falls and the Bogside.

Republican Opposition members welcomed the B ill. They charged the RUC had been used fo r p o litic a l purposes by the M inister of Home A ffa irs .

There is criticism of the RUC over the years because the Minister of Home A ffairs had undue control over the forces of law and order in this country. Who is to doubt that the police were not acting under the instructions of the Minister of 203

Home A ffairs (Craig) when they invaded the Bogside on 4th and 5th of January 1969. (G. F itt, Feb. 19, 1970)

The RUC were considered to be a mercenary arm of the Unionist Party....the RUC were used as the arm of a political party for the political purposes of that party. For example on Oct. 5, 1968, when a p o litic a l decision to ban a march in Derry v/as made, the RUC were given instructions to implement that decision. (J. Currie, Feb. 19, 1970)

The RUC were also charged with acting in a p o litical manner when they carried out their duties.

It was noticeable that when there was a confron­ tation between civil rights supporters and Protestant extremists, members of the RUC always turned their backs on the Protestant extremists and watched the civil rights protesters. They thought the enemy was the c iv il rights marchers. (J. Currie, Feb. 19, 1970)

The Republican Opposition charged that the RUC, for years, had been concerned v/ith ille g a l elements on the minority side. They had informers and knew how to get information on the IRA. However, the RUC had paid little attention to the Protestant extremists and when the campaign of bomb outrages and explosions started, they were not fitte d to act sw iftly and capture the people who were responsible. It was noted that Unionist Associations around the country, day after day, came out with motions of confidence in the RUC and the USC. I t was f e lt that they would have come out fo r the RUC no matter what happened.

Opposition members welcomed the disarming of the police. Concern was expressed that there was a movement to bring the B Special force into the RUC Reserve Force as a body. As members of the Reserve, B Specials would be able to go into barracks and obtain Information about individuals who were suspected, or who were being watched. Kennedy called for the Reserve force to be kept at a minimum and the RUC to remain at the same size. The Republican Opposition now believed that the real authority for law and order was in the hands of Westminster.

The only criticism the Republican Opposition had of the B ill was that it s till left too much up to the Minister of Home Affairs, and no Minister could be expected to be im partial. They were concerned that the present Minister of Home Affairs, Porter, was under extreme pressure from the right-wing. They insisted that there were no longer any no-go areas; complete police functions were being carried out in the Falls. 204

People who say the Falls Is not policed are obviously trying to force a conflict between the Army and the police on the Falls on this issue. (P. Devlin, Feb..19, 1970)

Ministry of Community Relations Report

On February 25, 1970, the Minister of Community Relations, Simpson, reported on the work done by his Ministry. A Community Relations Commission and a Cornnissioner of Complaints had been estab­ lished. He said they were making an effort to become Involved with all representatives of the community, to understand their criticisms and fears, and help them understand the views of those from whom they differed. An e ffo rt v/as being made to reach young people in school to discuss ways in which young people could best contribute to improved community relations.

Simpson said it was quite clear that no single factor was responsible fo r perpetuating the situation. One important element was the poor social condition in which too many people lived, coupled with a lack of knov/ledge of what was being planned to remedy the defects. This, he said, led to frustration and resentment of those in authority. New play groups and play centers were needed, along with family advice centers and the employment of extra social workers. These were a ll re la tiv e ly Inexpensive projects which would have Immediate and beneficial effects.

The Republican Opposition generally supported the Minister of Community Relations. Hume called fo r legislation which would prohibit incitement to religious hatred. Hume thought people in the Shankill, in the Falls, and in the Bogside should get to know each other, then they would realize they were largely the same kind of decent,'hardworking people who wanted to liv e in peace i f people did not whip them up.

Commissioner of Complaints Report

On March 12th, the f ir s t report of the Commissioner of Complaints came before the House. Most complaints were about housing and employment; only eight were about discrimination. Few Unionists were 1n the House to hear this report.

Vote of Confidence in the Government

On March 18th, a Vote of Confidence 1n the Government was intro­ duced into the House. Chichester-Clark told the House that members of the Government must know where they stood, and upon whom they could rely, since there seemed to be some doubt in people's minds as to the degree of support for the Government policies. This had to be resolved. 205

Chichester-Clark said his Government stood by the reforms introduced. They supported a civilianized and normally unarmed force, a Central Housing Authority, and reorganization of local government. The Government stood by an absolutely f a ir allocation of houses and employment and they did not intend to water down any of these recom­ mendations.

The Moderate Unionists supported the Government. They recognized there was apprehension about the Central Housing Authority and the reform of local government,but decried the right-wing Unionists for trying to deflect the Government from its course.

Let's stop hoodwinking the people that we are a united party. The Constitution would not be in jeopardy if there was a clear, divided form of unionism. In fa c t, the one threat to our Constitu­ tion is more from these dissidents than from extreme republicanism or extreme Socialism... .This side of the House has trailed its coat for 50 years. Those who are now unable to accept the changes are merely the victims of a parliamentary party system which has hardly been conducive to enlightened thinking. (T. Caldwell, March 18, 1970)

There is a real split in the Unionist Party. The right wing faction who have caused the s p lit are trying to bring down the Government. The people gave me a very strong mandate to support O'Neill last year. Within a few weeks the Unionist Party deposed O 'N e ill....1 am glad the Government carried out the policies of O'Neill in the past year....I often found myself as one of the few Back Benchers on this side of the House supporting the reforms. Quite often the right-wingers were conspicuous by th e ir absence and silence. On some occasions the total strength of the Unionist Party they could muster was 12 votes.. . .that is not Indicative of a very healthy support of the Government. (R. McConnell, March 18, 1970)

The Conservative or right-wing faction of the Unionist Party roundly denounced the Government. They declared that they were not against the program of reform, but were against the manner in which the reforms had been introduced. The Cameron Report, the Hunt Report and the Housing Authority had been accepted without consultation with the Unionist Party; Party members were treated with contempt.The Government was seen as using steamroller tactics and forcing policies on the Party. It was felt that the people should be allowed to decide these important matters. » 205 Chichester-Clark said his Government stood by the reforms introduced. They supported a civilian ized and normally unarmed force, a Central Housing Authority, and reorganization of local government. The Government stood by an absolutely f a ir allocation of houses and employment and they did not intend to water down any of these recom­ mendations.

The Moderate Unionists supported the Government. They recognized there was apprehension about the Central Housing Authority and the reform of local government, but decried the right-wing Unionists for trying to deflect the Government from its course.

Let's stop hoodwinking the people that we are a united party. The Constitution would not be in jeopardy if there was a clear, divided form of unionism. In fa c t, the one threat to our Constitu­ tion is more from these dissidents than from extreme republicanism or extreme Social ism ....This side of the House has trailed its coat for 50 years. Those who are now unable to accept the changes are merely the victims of a parliamentary party system which has hardly been conducive to enlightened thinking. {T. Caldwell, March 18, 1970)

There is a real s p lit in the Unionist Party. The right wing faction who have caused the s p lit are trying to bring down the Government. The people gave me a very strong mandate to support O'Neill last year. Within a few weeks the Unionist Party deposed O 'N e ill....I am glad the Government carried out the policies of O'Neill in the past year....I often found myself as one of the few Back Benchers on this side of the House supporting the reforms. Quite often the right-wingers were conspicuous by th eir absence and silence. On some occasions the total strength of the Unionist Party they could muster was 12 votes....that is not indicative of a very healthy support of the Government. (R. McConnell, March 18, 1970)

The Conservative or right-wing faction of the Unionist Party roundly denounced the Government. They declared that they were not against the program of reform, but were against the manner in which the reforms had been introduced. The Cameron Report, the Hunt Report and the Housing Authority had been accepted without consultation with the Unionist Party; Party members were treated with contempt. The Government was seen as using steamroller tactics and forcing policies on the Party. It was felt that the people should be allowed to decide these important matters. 206

I am seriously concerned about the danger to democracy in this country. Members of Parliament are paying less and less attention to the views of their constituents and the Government are paying less attention to the views of Parliament. Things seem to be coming more and more centralised. The Executive seems to be getting more power everyday. (H. West, March 18, 1970)

West said he had never known a Government to make as many mistakes and blunders as the present one. He accused the Prime Minister of yielding to pressures, from inside and outside of his Administration; pressures that were not beneficial to the country as a whole.

The Conservative Unionists were against the Hunt Report and the subsequent Police B ill. The Hunt Report had been accepted publicly by the Prime Minister before people in the party had had a chance of discussing it. The Police Bill was unacceptable because It made no adequate provision for sufficient arms and ammunition to be made available in each police station, so that the men could defend them­ selves, and th eir station, when attacked. The Government was faulted for handing over to the British Army the control of the Ulster Special Constabulary.

There was the v is it of four Cabinet Ministers to Downing Street last August when they offered the command of the Ulster Special Constabulary to the British Army without any mandate from the Ulster people or consultation with the elected representa­ tives in Parliament. The USC was handed over, sur­ rendered, fo rfeited , whatever one likes. The Government forfeited the control of a valuable security and defence fo rc e ....th is was Ulster's darkest hour. (H. West, March 18, 1970)

How, the Conservative Unionists charged, the Government could not main­ tain law and order. The Army had come in and pushed the police to one side, while the Army contented its e lf with sealing o ff the areas of riot and disorder. The Ulster Special Constabulary was to be stood down on April 29, 1970, without an adequate replacement.

On April 21, 1970, Ian Paisley, leader of the so-called Protestant extremist group, and his friend, the Reverand Beattie, were elected to the House of Commons. They formed a new party, the Protestant Unionist Party, but in perceptions and loyalties, they joined the Conservative Unionists already in the House. 207

Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission

On April 29, 1970, the Minister of Community Relations, Simpson, spoke on the projects of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission. The Commission was trying to id en tify those areas in the social environment which were in the greatest need of attention in the context of community relations. A fellowship was to be established at Queen's University for research into community relations. There was a scheme to bring Catholic and Protestant • children together in the countryside of County Down in the hope that they could get away from the animosities that had grown up in their urban surroundings.

Paisley wanted to know why not one fundamentalist Protestant was appointed to the Community Relations Commission, since every other shade of opinion was represented.

The Republican Opposition supported the Community Relations Commission. They bemoaned the fa ct that the more the liberal Unionists had tried to construct bridges of understanding, the more their support at the grass roots level had eroded.

Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act

On June 30, 1970, the Minister of Home Affairs, Porter, intro­ duced the Prevention of Incitement to Hatred B ill. This Bill was similar to the English Race Relations Act of 1965, but extended Its scope to cover religion. It dealt with incitement to fear, as well as Incitement to hatred, and was aimed at the malicious spreading of harmful rumors that in the past had led to widespread violence. Moderate Unionists, Dickson and B a illie , welcomed the B ill.

Republican Opposition members gave a qualified welcome to the B ill. It was recognized that it would be a hard Bill to operate. Fitt described it as "bristling with difficulties." Fitt accused Paisley of inciting hatred, fear and hostility in the community, but wondered i f the B ill would mean that Paisley would have to desist from the expression of the sentiments in which he fundamentally believed. Patrick Kennedy cautioned that a Republican speech could arouse fears on the grounds of national origins.

The Protestant Unionists, Beattie and Paisley, were totally opposed to the B ill, protesting that the Bill was directed at Paisley. Paisley saw the purpose of the Bill to curtail and hinder those who wanted to express th e ir opposition to the Church of Rome and to the Unionist Party.

The Opposition have been taken into the confi­ dence of the Government and told that the one aim 208

of this Bill 1s not to put down the Republican move­ ment or the Voice of the North or the United Irishman, but to put me 1n ja il. (I. Paisley, June 30, 1970)

Paisley, in turn, accused F itt of doing nothing but preach hatred since he was elected.

With the present Government, F1tt w ill have tons more freedom than any Protestant Unionist In this House will be permitted to have. He will be allowed to say anything he likes about the Queen, the Throne, the Constitution and the flag. (I. Paisley, June 30, 1970)

Maccror.y Report on the Reorganization of Local Government'

On June 25, 1970, the Minister of Development, Faulkner, presented the Maccrory Report on the Reorganization of Local Government for the consideration of the House and the public at large. On October 29th and December 17th, the Report was debated in the House. The Prime Minister pointed out that the reorganization of local govern­ ment could not wait without great damage to the public good, and that his Government was committed to a f a ir and Impartial drawing of district and ward boundaries.

Moderate Unionists gave qualified support to the Report, but Conservative Unionists were absolutely opposed to the Report on the grounds that the centralization of the major service would destroy local democracy. I believe local democracy and local government w ill be v irtu a lly destroyed in the long term because the most worthwhile functions of local authorities will be taken away from them altogether. (W. Beattie, Oct. 29, 1970)

The Conservative Unionists accused the Government of not reflecting the views of the people who elected them and of bending to the pres­ sures from the Opposition.

The M inister of Development has had a gun put to his head on this Issue; he is being threatened that there will be more disorders on the streets 1f the reshaping o f local government does not go through. We have the Minister and the Government once more under pressure to appease the Republican element. (W. Beattie, Oct. 29, 1970) t

209 *

Complaints were made that the Prime Minister had no mandate whatever for presenting these far-reaching decisions to the House, and he should call a general election to find out if the country approved or disapproved., The Conservatives thought this system would destroy the voice of democracy in local government, and was just a further policy of appeasement by the Government.

Republican Opposition members were not unhappy with the Maccrory Report, but said they would prefer a system whereby local authorities kept a ll services, provided there was a change to the proportional representation system of election. This, they thought, would provide a completely democratic electoral system. Proportional representation, they thought, was inevitable. The Government was given no credit for introducing local government reorganization.

. . . . i t has been because of continued p arlia­ mentary agitation within the confines of this House that the Government have at last been forced to see the rectitude of our demands and the merits of bringing about this change before fu ll local govern­ ment elections next take place. (G. Fitt, Oct. 29, 1970)

Nevertheless, relations between the Opposition and the Government seemed quite good at this time. F itt perceived a great improvement.

Every day that passes we are coming closer to the recognition that we have had a divided com­ munity for far too long and that there were certain elements v/ithin the Government party and possibly on occasions on this side of the House who sought to create further divisions within the community. . {G. F it t , Oct. 29, 1970)

F itt said the Opposition was prepared to cooperate with the Government at a ll levels provided the Government would act on behalf of a ll the people living in the six counties.

On December 17, 1970, the Prime Minister announced that the Government had decided to accept the Maccrory Report in its general form. There would be twenty-six d is tric t councils, the members elected lo c a lly , who would be responsible for local environmental services, such as civic improvement, sanitation, cemeteries, etc. The vast bulk of social services would be removed from the authority of the local areas and would be administered through Stormont, via a series of regional boards.

Housing Executive B ill

On October 21, 1970, the Minister of Development, Faulkner, introduced the Housing Executive Bill which concentrated the provision 210 and management of public authority housing 1n the hands of a single body, the Northern Ireland Executive. The local authorities lost th e ir housing function. I t was f e l t that this arrangement would Increase the number of houses and bring more order and fairness to housing.

Moderate Unionists were 1n favor of the B111, but Conservative Unionists, West and Craig, were opposed to 1t, branding 1t a socialist scheme. Paisley was also opposed to 1t on the grounds that the Housing Executive would be out of touch with the people.

The Republican Opposition members were surprisingly cool 1n their reaction to this B ill, since they had been asking for such a bill since 1969. It was felt that the Housing Executive should have more power. The Government was not given cred it fo r in itia tin g the centralization of housing.

The Government did not take the decision to proceed with a central housing authority. I t was forced on them by the former Home Secretary, James Callaghan during his visit here last October. (P. Kennedy, Oct. 21, 1970)

Repressive Measures

Criminal Justice Bill

On June 30th, the Minister of Home Affairs, Porter, Introduced a Criminal Justice B ill. The purpose of the B111 was to ensure that convicted hooligans on the street would be sent to prison for a con­ siderable time. The penalty for riotous behavior would be prison and nothing less. The object was to remedy the Idea that some people had that courts were inconsistent or overlenlent. The magistrate would now have to sentence a man fo r six months.

Moderate and Conservative Unionists generally supported the B ill.

Ruthless methods must be adopted to deal with the lunatic fringe. We should use the Special Powers to collect those people who are causing and fomenting trouble. (R. M itc h e ll, June 30, 1970)

Only Paisley, with more street experience than the others, said he would fig h t the B111. OUTPUTS - CONSERVATIVE UNIONISTS

Attack on Government fo r Inadequate

Enforcement of Law

Throughout 1970, the major output of the Conservative Unionists was a barrage of heavy criticism directed at the Government for what they considered to be inadequate enforcement of the law. They com­ plained about Army recalcitrance in moving against IRA gunmen. During the June Orange celebrations, a crowd of people had gathered on the Crumlin Road. On one side of the road Catholics were gathered, on the other side, Protestants. Among the crowd there was a number of policemen, and a detachment of the m ilitary. From the Catholic side of the road, four or five men ran out and directed shots across the . road. They were perfectly visible, said the Conservative Unionists, and they were wearing handkerchiefs to hide th eir features. People f e ll and screamed in agony, but the soldiers stood there, weapons pointing to the heavens, and did not return the fire.

Boal complained that the Inspector General did not allow the police to have riot shields or even allow them to use their batons. The Army was u tte rly useless, said Boal, and i f ten times the number of men came to Northern Ireland, they would not make any difference. Furthermore, charged the Conservatives, there was not proper or adequate liaison between the Army and the police. I t was f e lt the Government had failed the people by handing over control of security to Westminster.

....th e blood of these innocent victims lie s at the door of those who took the arms from the Royal Ulster Constabulary, who disbanded the B Specials at the whim of Harold Wilson and at the whim of the petrol bomb throwers, the stone throwers, the murderers and the revolutionaries who s it opposite us in this House. These are the people who put the pressure on the Government, and the Government today have disarmed the police, have left vast territories of this city without any defence whatsoever, have taken away the bulwark that was the safety of this Province....the Ulster Special Constabulary. (I. Paisley, July 1, 1970)

I t was thought that the police had been emasculated. The new Ulster Defence Regiment was f e lt to be unreliable because individuals in that force had told the Press that they would not defend the Border against external attack, while others had said they would not go into 212 the streets. Later In the year, the Conservatives complained because the RUC were not being trained In the use of weapons as the Government had promised.

In the la s t 12 months between 500 and 600 recruits have passed through the training school at Enniskillen. Not one of these members of the RUC have been trained in the use of firearms of any kind. (H. West, Dec. 16, 1970)

The Conservatives pointed out that often these unarmed police had to deal with very dangerous situations and they demanded categorical assurance from the Government that the RUC would be trained in arms use. The Conservatives called for the rearming of the police and the provision of adequate arms at a ll police stations so they could be defended. They also called for the new RUC Reserve to be trained and equipped with arms. Some called for the reinstatement of the B Specials.

Government response to this charge of inadequate law enforce­ ment v/as that i t was up to the Chief Constable to decide what training should be given to the RUC in terms of firearms. It was explained that in December of 1969, the RUC had ceased to train recruits in the use of arms because i t wanted to increase the force rapidly.

No-Go Areas

The Conservative Unionists were very concerned over the exis­ tence of the no-go areas during 1970. These no-go areas were seen as safe havens fo r the IRA.

These areas are controlled, according to the briefing that was given by the British Army, by com­ mittees and these committees are heavily laden with known IRA men. According to the briefing that was given in Andersontown on 1st November to the B ritish troops 1n that area, the Irish Republican Army had consolidated its position by infiltrating these com­ mittees. We are also informed that the Army had been able by negotiation to find some sort of normalisation with these committees. ( I. Paisley, May 20, 1970)

The Conservatives believed arms were built up in these areas, and they called on the Government to make searches. The police were not allowed Into these areas. Craig described an incident where a man had a bullet hole 1n his window. He called the police, but was informed by people in the v ic in ity that the police were not allowed there. Two plain clothes men visited him, but they were told the same thing. The man was then told by people in the community that 213

he had no right to call the police, and he was prevailed upon to say that he did not wish the police to continue their Investigations. Paisley described an incident where a friend of his had his car stolen. It was found in a no-go area, but the police told him they had no jurisdiction there and could not recover the car for him. The Conservative Unionists charged that because the police were not allowed in these areas, there had been a consequent rise in breaking and entering. They objected to the fact that the Army went into these no-go areas only a fte r having negotiated with certain committees, composed of vigilantes.

We are against ordinary people, five or six of them, calling themselves vigilantes or committees, stepping out into the road and ordering people out of their cars to be searched. For too long we have stood for this no-go land and this "softly softly." (J. McQuade, March 18, 1970)

The Conservative Unionists pointed out that Protestants who lived close to these no-go areas felt very vulnerable. They had been attacked from these areas in the past. I t was this feeling of vulner­ ability that had made Protestants erupt.

The good, loyal people of Shankill, being very human like the rest of us and feeling frustrated and perplexed beyond measure, could not contain themselves any longer and the place erupted. Violence, bloodshed and death followed. (H. West, March 18, 1970)

The Government were perceived by the Conservatives as not telling the truth about the no-go areas.

For the Prime Minister and other members of the Government to go round the country saying that the police can go anywhere is an operation in deception. U * Paisley, May 20, 1970)

In December, M inister of State, Taylor, said the Government had opened a new police station in the Bogside so there was twenty-four hour policing of the area.

Biased Law Enforcement Against Protestants

Apart from the inadequacy of law enforcement and the existence of the no-go areas, the Conservative Unionists also complained, be­ cause what law enforcement there was, was biased against Protestants, and in favor of Catholics and the IRA. They charged that the working class Protestant had been badly treated by the Government. 214

The trouble 1n this country is that those who are known to be lo yalists, those who are known to be opposed to the appeasing policies of the Government, those who are known to be opposed to the Prime Minister and his present Government, are the people whom the Government are prepared at any time to break. ( I . Paisley, June 30, 1970)

The Attorney General was seen as being very quick to prosecute Pro­ testants who were upholding the principles in the Constitution of Northern Ireland. The Conservative Unionists saw the Protestant workers as the most ill-used group In Northern Ireland.

The most discriminated against people in Northern Ireland today are the constituents of Woodvale. We have no children's playgrounds, no public baths. Our transport is not good—in fact it is cut off with no-go lands. {J. McQuade, March 18, 1970)

Boal warned that he sensed a new feeling of impatience and frustration with the forces of law and order in these Protestant areas, and this was potentially dangerous. The Conservatives com­ plained that the Army refused to give.Protestants protection, but they protected Catholics and fraternized with the IRA. Paisley described an incident on Ballarat Street when a car had gone up and down the street emitting sniper fire. The military refused to give the people protection, so the people barricaded the street. However, the m ilita ry then dragged away the barricade. At the same time, the Army protected the Catholics in Unity Flats. Paisley warned that if the Protestants were not to receive protection from the security forces, they would have to protect themselves. Fin ally, Conservative Unionists complained of Army brutality to Protestants.

. . . . a young lad of 15, going home from the cinema, got into his house, but soldiers smashed their way through the doors, they broke the glass. They hauled the young lad out of the house and ripped his arm on the broken glass—i t was bleeding seriously. The Major gave instructions for this lad to be taken to hospital but a very short while after­ wards I found him in Tennent Street police barracks . . . . I personally witnessed the arrest by the Army o f another lad, aged 14, Four soldiers kicked him senseless 1n the street. He was then taken lik e a sack of potatoes and hurled into the back of an armoured vehicle and two soldiers inside the vehicle kicked him when he was thrown in . (W. Beattie, June 4, 1970) 215

Usually, Protestants welcomed searches, but the Conservatives com­ plained that some of these searches were carried out more to harass Protestants than to find arms.

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Concern Over Conservative Unionists

The Republican Opposition were very concerned about the strength o f the Conservative Unionists 1n 1970. They accused Craig of preaching hatred and fear and threatening to take up arms to defend the Constitution of Northern Ireland i f the Westminster Government in te r­ vened in the affairs of Northern Ireland. They charged the right­ wingers with being a great threat to the Constitution because they would not accept v/hat was directed by the Government at Westminster.

Intimidation

Intimidation was widespread in 1970 and the Republican Opposition charged that juries were being intimidated 1n cases of con­ troversial p o litic a l nature. Explosions had been set o ff for this purpose and the result v/as that certain people got o ff free, while others, especially petrol bomb throwers, were sentenced to three-years imprisonment.

F itt complained that Catholics, living in mixed areas, were forced to leave their homes at gunpoint, and leave their houses lying vacant. He wanted the Government to compensate these homeowners for th e ir houses. In addition to th is , employers were being intimidated into dismissing their Catholic employees, often at gunpoint. Fitt wanted the Government to give financial aid to those treated in this fashion. The M inister of Health and Social Services said he sould try to get redundancy payments for these people.

Attack on Orange Order

The Republican Opposition continued th e ir attack on the Orange Order in 1970, complaining about the influence exerted on the Government by the Order.

Where religious qualification is required for membership of any political party this in Itself Is a major obstacle to good community relations. Another major obstacle is membership by members of 216

the Government 1n sectarian secret societies which are opposed fundamentally to the Interests of other religious groupings....I object to the Orange Order having such Influence on a major p o litical party. No one can deny that this Influence exists. So long as membership of the Orange Order, of the Government and of a political party are all Inter­ woven, we do not have much hope of going along the road to good community relations. (J. Hume, Feb. 25, 1970) '

F itt and Currie echoed the same sentiments. * The Orange Order can decide whether or not this Government remains 1n power, and when one has a situation where any organisation has such power that i t can dictate whether a government stands or fa lls , that Government cannot say i t is in complete control of the country. (G. F itt, Feb. 25, 1970)

F1tt said that 1n Britain everyone now believed that the Orange Order wielded a very unhealthy influence on the forces of Government in Northern Ireland.

Unionist denial of the negative influence of the Orange Order was sharp.

The Orange Order is a loyal Institu tio n—they have no right to call 1t a secret organisation. The ■ members build halls, identify themselves with 1t and make no secret of th e ir membership. (H. Whitten, Feb. 25, 1970)

Mitchell accused the Republican Opposition members of trying to fan the flames and keep the pot boiling.

The Orange Order Is not a secret nor a dangerous society. I t does not seek to dominate either the Unionist Party or the country.. . .There 1s a far more serious division, one which 1s created by an Institu­ tion which believes 1n and has 1n operation a decree known as the Ne Temere decree. (R. M itchell, Feb. 25, 1970)

Mitchell said the basic difference 1n the community was due to the unwillingness of a certain section of the community to accept the con­ stitutional position. 217

Attack o h RUC

The Republican Opposition b itte rly attacked the RUC 1n 1970. They.complained because the Inspector General had announced that the sixteen members of the RUC, named in the B a illie Report as being gu ilty of misdemeanors in the Londonderry disturbances of October 5, 1968, were to have the charges dropped against them. The Inspector General and senior members of the RUC were accused of protecting peopt1e in the force who were guilty of serious misdemeanors against the Devenny family. The Republican Opposition fe lt there would now be a complete lack of confidence in the RUC.

The Government response was that the Inspector General only withdrew the charges after careful consideration. The Minister of Home A ffairs said that the Inspector General could find no ju s t if i­ cation for the more serious allegations made against the police and had, therefore, dropped the alleged offenses against discipline. The Prime Minister said a very thorough and complete investigation had been made. Only eight men out of 500 on duty in Londonderry that day were involved. Some members of the RUC knew who the culprits were, but out of a misguided sense of loyalty would not say.

Conservative Unionists, Burns, Anderson and Beattie, defended the RUC. They pointed out that Devenny's house had been used as an escape route by the rioters; the door v/as left open. This, they thought, proved Devenny was involved, or was sympathetic to the rio ters. Devenny had put up strong resistence to the police so that the rioters could escape.

Complaints About Police Authority

Even a fte r the police reorganization, the Republican Opposition were not entirely satisfied. Complaints were made about the make-up of the Police Authority.

We have not got ds good a Police Authority as we might. There Is a small clique of Castle Catholics, or token Teagues who adorn every committee which 1s set up. They permutate from committee to committee, and give the impression they no longer rate as second class citizens. They support the Unionists. (P. Devlin, June 25, 1970)

Devlin complained because the Catholic members on the Police Authority were beyond middle age and had never been active in the c iv il rights movement. He thought they did not represent the working class* Devlin said the Republican Opposition did not want people merely 218

because they were Catholic, they wanted non-Un1on1sts.

The Minister of Home Affairs defended the constitution of the Authority, saying that out of twenty-one members, seven were Catholic. He said he had consulted a wide lis t of organizations and had recom­ mended fo r appointment a ll of the Roman Catholics nominated by the organizations consulted.

Ulster Special Constabulary

Toward the end of the year, the Republican Opposition voiced concern that the Ulster Special Constabulary had kept their old uniforms and were joining old comrades' associations and rifle or shooting clubs. The security forces were asked to keep a careful watch on these old comrade associations, because the Republican Opposition considered them to be cloaks for right-wing a c tiv ity . Currie believed that in his area some were involved with the UVF.

The Minister of State for Home Affairs, Taylor, passed off the fears of the Opposition, saying i t was very normal fo r former USC men to get together and talk about old times.

Attack on Army

In December, the Republican Opposition members complained because the Army had indiscriminately used canisters and cartridges of CS gas with the result that many people not involved in the rio ts were incensed and came out onto the streets. A second complaint concerned the in c iv ility of the Army when they searched fo r arms, and the amount of damage they did to property while they were searching.

On Tuesday last there was a search on some farms in County Down...,The military drove their lorries into farmyards. They blocked entrances to gates and houses. They never even said to the owners of the farms that they were being searched. As fa r as I can hear the searches were abortive; no arms were fo u n d .... A great deal o f resentment has been caused 1n other places~1n Fermanagh, Derry and areas of Belfast--by the way arms searches have been carried o u t ....( J . O 'R eilly, Dec. 9, 1970)

The Minister of State of Home Affairs, Taylor, replied that it was impossible to carry out a search for weapons without some damage being done. Compensation would be paid. He pointed out that the searches had uncovered large hoardes of weapons, and i t was the 219 responsibility of the Government to confiscate them.

Recent events In the Republic have underlined the need for a stringent control of arms in the face of persistent attempts by extreme Republicans to step up the opportunities for terrorism in Northern Ireland. In the face of these threats no responsible Government could do other than attempt by all means within their power to prevent the distribution and use of illegal firearms. (0. Taylor, Dec. 9, 1970)

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

On April 21, 1970, Rev. I. Paisley and Rev. Beattie entered the House of Commons. They were both Protestant ministers who had been active in street demonstrations. They formed the Protestant Unionist Party, but their views and positions aligned them with the Conservatives or the right-wing. Throughout 1970, the Conservatives continued fighting the reforms and continued trying to bring down the Government. The Republican Opposition feared a takeover of the Government by the right wing.

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

The Unionists saw the hand of the IRA involved in the distur­ bances of 1970. They called for firmer measures of control, including security men more w illing to shoot back at the gunmen. Late in the year they thought the situation was improving. They presented plans to ameliorate the social and economic conditions, but pointed out that a period of s ta b ility was v ita l i f these were to be brought to fru ita tio n . The Unionists continued to press through reforms, despite opposition from the Conservatives. They enacted repressive measures such as the mandatory sentencing of convicted rioters in order to contain the disorder in the streets. The Government con­ tinually denied the existence of no-go areas, and emphasized the success of arms searches. The Unionists were s t ill supporting and defending the RUC, but i t was recognized that some RUC were protect­ ing those who had been guilty of brutality.

The Conservative Unionists were incensed oyer the civil rights marches and the flying of the Tricolour at these events. They thought that now, with the Constitution under attack, loyalist demonstrations and marches were necessary. They opposed the re­ routing of one Protestant march, and complained that the res tric ­ tions on the Apprentice Boys Parade was just another victory for the 220 a n ti-lo y a lis ts . The Conservatives thought the Government was incap­ able of maintaining law and order; the emergence of the no-go areas in the Bogside indicated this. The Army was accused of moving slowly against the gunmen and of having inadequate liaison with the RUC. The trouble, believed the Conservatives, stemmed from the Government handing over the security of Northern Ireland to Westminster when British troops moved in. The Army, they saw, as gu ilty of biased enforcement and brutality against Protestants. The RUC were not being trained in the use of arms, and the UDR could not be trusted because i t was a regiment of the British Amy and not under control of the Northern Ireland Government. They wanted the RUC rearmed and the B Specials recalled. Law enforcement was thought to be biased against the Protestant working classes.

The Conservatives saw the IRA as the main instigators of violence. The Republican Opposition were seen as deeply involved in the violence, since they had appeared at meetings in Eire where money and guns had been asked for. The Government of the Republican was seen as deeply involved 1n the plot to bring down the state of Northern Ireland. The Conservatives were against any reform that would weaken local government. They saw the reforms being steamrolled through by a Government afraid to go to the people 1n a general election.

The Republican Opposition wanted the Government to use the Public Order Act against those who interferred with the civil rights marches, but they welcomed the rerouting of Protestant and Orange Parades which they thought were provocative. They supported the Government ban on parades. They were concerned about the a c tiv itie s of the extreme Protestants who they blamed for the explosion at Currie's house. Concern was expressed because juries were being intimidated and Catholics were being forced from th e ir homes at gun­ point. It was feared the right-wing would take over the Government and the reforms would then mean nothing.

The Republican Opposition called for legislation prohibiting incitement to religious hatred, and branded Paisley as guilty of such incitement. They thought the reforms were going through, not because of the Government, but because of- the street violence and the pressure ' from Westminster. Proportional representation and the abolition of the Special Powers Act were called fo r. The Republican Opposition blamed the disturbances on unemployment and poor housing and they called for more state-controlled industry to help supply jobs. Nationalist areas were perceived as not getting a fair allocation of Government money for the purpose of encouraging Industry. The Republican Opposition accused the RUC of brutality and biased enforce­ ment of the law. There was concern that the B Specials were now joining old comrades' associations which were really a cloak for right wing a c tiv ity . The Army was now considered uncivil and indiscriminate in its use of CS gas. The Republican Opposition denied the existence of no-go areas. They accused the Orange Order of wielding too much power in the Government. Finally, the involvement of the Eire Government in the gun running was minimized. The Republican Opposition were convinced that a ll parties in the South were opposed to violence. OUTLINE - 1971

INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Riots in Belfast IRA Funerals Three B ritish Soldiers Murdered Voluntary Restriction on Parades Junior Orange Parade Intimidation and Explosions Gallaher Factory Mob Londonderry IRA Activity

INPUTS — EXTRASOCIETAL

Eire Britain

OUTPUTS - UNIONISTS

Local Government Reorganization Electoral Law Bill Public Order (Amendment) B ill Intensification of Campaign Against IRA New Unionist Government Ministry of Community Relations Faulkner's Committee System Republican Opposition Members Walk Out of Parliament Londonderry Disturbances and Security Measures Suggested Changes 1n Northern Ireland Parliament

OUTPUTS — CONSERVATIVES

Attack on Government for Method of Handling Disturbances Third Force Motion of Censure of the Government

OUTPUTS - REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Motion to Repeal the Government of Ireland Act Proportional Representation Special Powers Regulation

222 OUTPUTS - REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION (Continued)

Licensed Guns Non-Enforcement of the Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act Motion of Censure Against the Attorney General Criticism of Court Decisions

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Riots in Belfast

Early in 1971, there was more rioting and severe disturbances in Catholic areas in Belfast.

The Republican Opposition saw the rio ts as a consequence of Army behavior. They accused the Army of brutal behavior and conducting one-sided searches for arms, with the concentration of searches being in Republican areas. The Republican Opposition charged that when the troops searched houses, they used obscene language against the inhabitants. M ilita ry jeeps had roared through residential areas, placing life and limb in jeopardy. The Army was accused of contriving confrontations with the inhabitants of Republican sections and of making no attempt to deal with complaints made against them. The Republican Opposition wanted the Army removed from these sensi­ tive areas in Belfast, and the "deliberately provoking" searches stopped. The Republican Opposition now f e lt they had something 1n common with the Conservative Unionists, in their dissatisfaction with the behavior of the m ilita ry .

The Prime Minister announced that fourteen soldiers had been ' wounded in a rio t period of twenty-four hours and he commended the restraint of the British Army. He did not think the rioting had anything to do with the searches, but everything to do with Republicanism. The Prime Minister read two leaflets that had been circulated in the areas of rioting.

This bulletin will be coming to you every week with news and facts of Clonard and other areas. I t is issued by your local Sinn Feinn Cumann which has been re-named Peadar De Balca. We believe 1n the near future that an attempt will be made in this area (Clonard) to raid homes, detain and Intern the men and young boys. We need the support of the People of Clonard in order to prevent this. We especially ask the womenfolk to come into the streets, and to resist by all means possible attempts at raids and internment.

Another le a fle t had this to say:

224 225

We ask a ll residents to observe the following rules, remember It was Sprlnghlll last night, to­ night 1t could be your home....

1. Never open your door to the M ilita ry or RUC at any time. 2. A lert your neighbours, e.g. ra ttle your bins. 3. If raiders force their way In, you are advised to remove a ll valuables or breakables to a safe place. 4. Never leave raiders alone 1n any part of your home. 5. I f you hear of a raid , go to the spot at once. 6. Don't fratern ise....bo ycott those people who do.

The Prime Minister saw the sinister hand of the IRA behind these le a f­ le ts and the rio tin g . Searching houses had brought a very substan­ tia l haul of arms and ammunition. The whole country, said the Prime M inister, was fed up with these Republicans who were trying to Impose th eir w ill on everybody else, tired of th e ir kangaroo courts and their tarrlngs and featherings.

The Unionists supported the Government. They pointed out that during the last twenty-four hours stones, petrol bombs, acid bombs and grenades had been thrown. According to General Farrar- Hockley, these were not spontaneous a c tiv itie s , but highly organized ’ activities by the Provisional IRA.

The Conservative Unionists also supported the Prime Minister, ointing out that this was not a sectarian war, but a confrontation Eetween the IRA and their sympathizers, and the security forces. It was an attempt to drive the security forces out of the area completely and prevent them from searching this d is tric t for arms.

IRA Funerals

Disturbances and rioting continued, along with elaborate IRA funerals, complete with Tricolour draped coffins. The Conservative Unionists complained about these IRA funeral processions, which paraded through strongly lo yalist areas. The Conservatives charged that the processions were being used for Republican p o litic a l purposes. Paisley warned that the lo y a lis t people would not continue to tolerate the flaunting of the Tricolour 1n their areas. The Conservatives wanted those men who appeared 1n IRA uniform on the streets to be arrested and law and order enforced 1n no-go areas. 226

The Prime Minister denied there were no-go areas. The arms searches, he thought, proved that the Army and police would go into any area of Belfast. He considered the IRA funerals to be a to ta lly irresponsible provocation. There had been security plans to deal with.these funerals, but somehow these plans had fa lle n through. The Prime Minister promised an investigation would be made into this failure to deal with IRA funerals. He called on the Protestants to remain calm.

I am absolutely convinced that this is a real master plan to sedition. I t is a master plan to try to set one community against another, to try to get the Army sandwiched in between and thus to create in B ritain a growing demand for change in a situa­ tion which public opinion here would find intolerable. This must not be. Let the Army and police do their job as they can do it. {Prime Minister Chichester- Clark, Feb. 9, 1971)

Three British Soldiers Murdered

On March 12, 1971, three British soldiers on leave, were shot in the head and dumped in a rural area. A few days a fte r, there was a massive procession of shipyard workers, protesting these murders. Ghichester-Clark went to London to seek stronger powers to use against the IRA.

The Unionists, Moderates and Conservatives alike requested that no action be taken against the shipyard workers who participated in the processions. I t was admitted that the workers had not complied with the Public Order Act, but it was pointed out there had been many parades that had taken place ille g a lly , and no action had been taken against the participants. The shipyard workers were protesting a barbarous murder, they were not breaking windows, nor abusing their neighbors; they were orderly. The general purport of the marches, said the Unionists, was to call for the internment of known IRA leaders.

The Republican Opposition emphasized that the marches were not spontaneous, they had been organized over a period of two or three days. Their purpose was to push the Government "off the c lif f " and give credence to right-wing charges'. I t was not known who murdered the soldiers, said Republican Opposition. Placing the g u ilt on the IRA could swing public opinion both in Northern Ireland and B ritain, and this had happened. They called for the law to be administered to the marchers. 227

Voluntary Restriction of Parades

On March 30, the Government called for a voluntary restriction on the number of parades held.

The Conservative Unionists thought that Protestant processions should not be curtailed since they had always been orderly; only processions that caused trouble should be curtailed. The Opposition was castigated fo r trying to see Protestant processions stopped, while ignoring the IRA funerals and individuals marching in full combat jackets.

The Republican Opposition dubbed the Orange Parades as efforts at one-upmanship, one tribe trying to assert its superiority over another.

Junior Orange Parade

Over the Easter weekend there was more serious rioting. Trouble started around a Junior Orange procession, when a group of Protestants following the parade had broken through the police cordon and clashed with an opposing group. Shots were fired and two c iv ilia n s and a twelve year-old boy were wounded. Troops were moved in and a search was made fo r the sniper. Guns and ammunition were found and twenty-three people were arrested. Later, St. Matthew's Roman Catholic Church was defaced with slogans, and property was burned and looted, and the security forces were attacked.

The Republican Opposition blamed the Protestants fo r running into a Catholic area, and for firing hundreds of petrol bombs at St. Matthews Chapel. Devlin asserted that the shots that were fired came from the Protestant mob.

The Conservative Unionist, Paisley, defended the Protestants. He explained that people following the parade had rushed suddenly into the Catholic area because a Tricolour had been displayed further up the street. Paisley considered this to be incitement, a carefully la id Republican plot to cause trouble. The shots had come from the Catholic section of the crowd. Paisley deplored the obscene slogans w ritten on the walls of St. Matthews and said these slogans should have been removed immediately, not le ft there for two days. Paisley complained that the Army was always watching the Protestants but not the Catholics in this area. He explained that people believed the Chapel was being used as an IRA arsenal and recruiting ground. Feelings had been ruffled in the area because the police had been stopping people passing on the other side of the road from St. Matthews Chapel and asking them to remove th eir Orange commemorative badges while passing the Catholic Chapel. Paisley charged the Army 228 with b ru ta lity . One uniformed Royal Ulster Constabulary constable had been severely beaten twice, even though he was in uniform, by a member of the British Army. The Army had arrested innocent bystanders. One man was hammered with a r if l e and the lower part of his eye was sittin g out on his cheek, but he was not allowed to go to the hospital until eleven o'clock that night. Paisley said that the Protestants f e lt they were being picked out to be shot at f ir s t , and to have brutal treatment metered out to them, while the IRA marched in uniform and incited to violence, without anything being done. Paisley called for an impartial inquiry.

Intimidation and Explosions

Through April and May there were incidents of workers being intimidated in factories 1n Belfast. Keogh claimed that one young man had returned home with the letters UVF cut into the flesh of his stomach. The homes of two RUC o fficers, members of the Special Branch, were bombed, doing extensive damage and causing minor injuries. There was an explosion at Omagh Barracks, and an explosion at the Industrial and Forensic Science Laboratory. An Army vehicle was ambushed by the IRA and two men injured.

Prime Minister Faulkner thought this a c tiv ity on the part of the IRA occurred because they were being pushed by the security forces and were now in a state of disarray.

Gallaher Factory Mob

On May 19th another IRA funeral took place. The hearse was flanked by men wearing black berets and several thousand men marched in lines of four behind i t . The next day trouble developed among the women who worked in the Gallaher factory, a result of the ill - feeling caused by the funeral. An unruly mob gathered outside the factory and a running battle with the Army developed. Verbal abuse, stones and bottles were thrown at the Army.

The Prime Minister announced that from now on, any soldier seeing a person with a weapon, or seeing a person acting suspiciously, might fir e to warn, or fir e with effe c t, depending on the circum­ stances, and without waiting for orders from anyone. Conservative Unionists doubted that these orders would be carried out, since such orders had been issued before and had amounted to nothing.

The Republican Opposition were incensed over Faulkner's statement. It meant that any soldier could use his own initiative and discretion as to when to fire , thus putting thousands of people 229

1n Belfast at risk. This announcement, they charged, was just an appeasement to the right-wing. Kennedy accused the Army of Invading the New Lodge Road and of grabbing men returning home from work. One docker had been beaten by seven soldiers and his skull fractured. The soldiers were charged with using foul language. I t was thought they somehow identified the people In that area with the death of the three soldiers who were shot.

Throughout June and July, there were armed attacks on petrol pump attendants, robberies, murders, Incidents of tarring and feather­ ing. As the Orange Parade time approached, Republican Opposition members called fo r the prevention of Orange Parades through the Catholic areas. They charged that Orange Parades were sectarian and, therefore, should be restricted, but civil rights marches were not sectarian, and should be allowed. The Unionists wanted the traditional Orange Parade to go through, because they were orderly and the marchers did not cause trouble.

Throughout July the disturbances continued, and on August 9th, the Government banned a ll processions un til February 8, 1972.

Londonderry Disturbance

When the House reconvened in October, the c ity of Londonderry was seriously disrupted. There was gross intimidation of Protestants in the city, and . stone-throwing, petrol bombing, and explosions were regular occurrences. Anderson, the Conservative Unionist from Londonderry, said law and order had completely broken down; there was complete polarization of the Protestants and Catholics. What they had 1n Londonderry now, said Anderson, was the rule of the thug and the IRA. Whole streets had been evacuated. One couple had been told to get out of th e ir house in two hours or be burned out. ' When they returned to try to get out their furniture, they found a Catholic family living there. Vicious intimidation was going on, said Anderson, but the police and the m ilita ry said they could not help.

If a Protestant family 1s living in a certain district the first thing that happens is that the children are roughed up....the intimidation 1s then carried out on the woman of the house. The man 1s left to the last. Intimidation is not done directly by anyone they know. Their Roman Catholic neigh­ bours abhor this, but it is a well-organised system of Intimidation. One family goes and then another until a whole Protestant street is emptied. (A. Anderson, Oct. 6, 1971)

Anderson said that even school buses had to be guarded. 4 230 I t is no use saying that the IRA 1s mainly re­ sponsible for 1t. The people who are carrying out this sort of intimidation are not all members of the IRA, but, whoever they are, they are breeding something that will go on for generations. (A. Anderson, Oct. 6, 1971)

Anderson accused General Tuzo of making a pact with the IRA to withdraw the troops from the Bogside. Patrols no longer went through the area, and it was believed that the Army was ho longer allowed to shoot at petrol bombers. Anderson warned that withdrawing troops from the Bogside and Creggan only gave the IRA time to rest and recuperate before the next siege of riots. Many Catholics, as well as Protestants, were having a pretty dreadful time.

IRA Activity

During the last three months of 1971, there were a number of shootings and explosions. In one explosion, four people were killed and twenty-two hospitalized. There were a number of murders, Including that of Senator Barnhill, a soldier, and others by the IRA.

In October, the Army appeared to be taking a firmer stand with terrorists, two women were shot after they had fired at security forces from their car. The women were burled 1n a Republican plot 1n Mil town. The Republicans complained about the shooting of these women, claiming they were not Republicans.

The Unionists a ll supported this more aggressive stand by the Army.

INPUTS — EXTRASOCIETAL

Eire

Early 1n 1971, Lynch made a speech on television , condemning violence and the IRA, but reaffirming the claims of his Government to the territory of the North. He said he wanted to extend the olive branch to the North, and his Government was w illing to consider some of the aspects of the 1937 Constitution that might be offensive to the Northern Protestants.

The Unionists, 1n discussing Lynch's speech 1n the House, pointed out that the prohibition of divorce and family planning and the censorship of books were aspects of the Eire Constitution that Northerners could never accept. Lynch's claim to te rrito ry In the 231

North was Interpreted as a denial, to the people of Northern Ireland, of the basic right of self-determination. Unionists reaffirmed that the people of Northern Ireland would not be forced or coerced against their will into any kind of united Ireland. The 1937 Constitution of the Republic that claimed a ll thirty-tw o counties had only been In existence for seventeen years, whereas the Agreement, which was registered with the League of Nations as an international treaty, and allowed for separate jurisdiction fo r North and South, had existed since 1925.

The Prime M inister, Chichester-Clark, responded to Lynch's speech by saying the dangers and problems now faced by Northern Ireland could not be solved by discussions of imminent constitutional change; this would merely cause greater instability and greater danger to life and limb. What was wanted was a policy aimed at mutual confidence, friendship and understanding. Chichester-Clark wondered how, in retro­ spect, the Northerners should judge the motives of the Southern Ministers who had e a rlie r entered into discussions with the Northern Government to improve relations, and then had participated in gun- running to the North.

Moreover, le t those who have conducted the Government of the Irish Republic a ll down the years, examine their consciences and ask themselves the question; have they really been concerned to create in the south the kind of State with which a neigh­ bourly relationship could be developed? When successive politicians in Dublin have talked about "our people" in the North, to whom have they been referring? Not, I would suggest, to the historic community which values its links with Britain*. These links have been brushed aside as a thing of no account. People who commemorate Easter 1916 have not had the courage to say that the 36th Ulster Division decimated at the Somme in that same year had a concept of patriotism too—and patriotism is a word which has often been 1n the mouth of Dublin politicians. (Prime Minister Chichester-Clark, Feb. 24’, 1971)

Chichester-Clark pointed out that housing and education In the North far surpassed that in the Republic, The Northern Constitution specifically debarred the giving of a preference by reason of religion, whereas the Southern Constitution declared the special position of the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholics in the North had flourished, while the Southern Protestant minority had withered away. The best interests of the Catholics in the North, said Chichester-Clark, was to remain within the present constitu­ tional framework. Chichester-Clark declared that it was the policy of his Government that there should be no second-class citizens in

ft 232

Northern Ireland. He hoped the day would come when more Catholics would become Unionists, because to him, Unionism was not a sectarian, but a political faith. The Prime Minister saw the attitude of the Republic to be just as inflexible as ever on the question of claiming the territory 1n the North. This was a real cause of offense.

In June, the Prime M inister of the Republic, Lynch, offered to cooperate in having a jo in t development plan fo r the north-west of Ireland. Lynch was willing to have the north-west of Ireland treated as one region, fo r planning and development purposes, operated by a jo in t e ffo rt by both Governments. This statement was met with scepticism from the Conservative Unionists who fe lt Lynch's only motive fo r encouraging economic progress 1n the area was fo r the final unity of the country.

After great disturbances in the summer months and the advent of Faulkner as the new Prime Minister, there were tripartite talks held in September between Heath, Lynch and Faulkner.

Toward the end of the year, relations between Northern Ireland and Eire became p a rtic u la rly strained. There were numerous Border incidents which involved cross-Border attacks on Customs posts and attacks on troops involved in blasting operations in Northern Ireland. G elignite was flowing from South to North and the IRA were using the Republic as a safe base of operations.

At the September tr ip a r tite meeting, Faulkner had asked Lynch to tighten up security along the Border against the movement of gelignite from South to North. On October 20th, in a statement 1n the Dali, Lynch denied lax controls on the storage and movement of explosives, and called any such charges "unscrupulous." Lynch was, in fact, calling Faulkner and Members of Stormont, unscrupulous. He denied the Republic was tolerant of illegal organizations.

Prime Minister Faulkner pointed out that on the very day that Lynch discounted criminal activity against Northern Ireland by citizens of the Republic, four men, three of them with addresses south of the Border, had appeared 1n court 1n Dundalk on charges of shooting across the Border. In addition to this, great quantities of arms were discovered a t Cork, apparently delivered from a ship from the United States.

I do not accept that Mr. Lynch can honestly say that he 1s unaware of the activities of leaders of the Provisional or the Official wing of the IRA who live in and who openly admit to such activities in the Irish Republic and to a c tiv itie s , I would emphasize, within our jurisdiction here in Northern Ireland. (Prime Minister Faulkner, Oct. 21, 1971) 233

Faulkner said, there had been five Incidents 1n the past week 1n which more than twenty-five shots had been fired at the security forces In Northern Ireland from places across the Border. Of a ll the explo­ sives discovered by the security forces in Northern Ireland over the past.few months, Faulkner said 65 percent to 80 percent came from the Irish Republic. There had been no cooperation by the courts in Eire on extradition of men charged for offenses by the RUC 1n the North.

On November 20, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, Taylor, reported that since August 29, 1971, there had been twenty-two incidents which involved cross-Border shooting or c iv il disturbances where members of the Garda, or the Republic of Ireland Army were present but took no immediate action.

The fact that such incidents have occurred and that no action has been taken either by the Southern Iris h police or the Southern Iris h Army emphasises the manner in which the IRA is facilitated in its murderous activities by the Dublin authorities. Of that there can be no doubt. I want to make it clear that we have made these incidents known in London and that there are continual discussions between the Westminster and Dublin Governments on a wide range of matters involving security,- including security along the Border. (J. Taylor, Nov. 30, 1971)

Unionist Mitchell pointed out that after one incident the authorities south of the Border did take action, and th at, as a resu lt, four men were apprehended, subsequently trie d , but then freed by the jury.

The problem of extradition continued throughout the rest of the year. On December 16th, Laird pointed out that so far In the te rro ris t campaign, no court proceedings in the South had got to the stage of extradition. I t was noted by Laird that Mr. L'Estrange, a member of the Da1l, had remarked in Dail Eireann that the Eire Army had instructions to keep their eyes closed. L1 Estrange charged that the Army had apprehended a group of men with machine guns about a month earlier,- but had just told the men to "get off." If the men had been brought to t r i a l , L'Estrange charged, the Fianna Fall district judges would not convict them. L'Estrange was forced to withdraw from the Dail for making these statements, but not before he had publicly stated there was no longer law and order in the Republic.

' Britain

Late in the year, the Prime Minister of Britain announced that he was prepared to have a meeting of the Government representatives of Eire, Northern Ireland and Britain to discuss changes in the 234

Northern Ireland Constitution leading, in fifteen years, to a united Ireland.

Conservative Unionists rejected this outright. On December 9th,.Paisley Introduced amotion branding this idea anathma. There should be no capitulation to terrorists he fe lt. Paisley charged Faulkner with tampering with the Constitution, because Faulkner had made certain proposals to change the Senate and Parliamentary arrange­ ments. These proposals, said Paisley, had been taken by the British Prime Minister as firm decisions. The Conservative Unionists fe lt the terrorists had substantially achieved what they went out to do.

The reason active consideration 1s being given to these changes is to try to reach an accommodation with those subversive elements that set about to destroy us. It is not to establish a stronger, more secure Parliament of N .I. but to enable a Republican minority to participate in the Innermost a c tiv itie s of Government. We know from long and hard exper­ ience that they have one overriding objective, an objective they propose to achieve whatever the cost 1n social and economic terms, and that is , to destroy any vestige of a British heritage or a British way of life in this Province. (W. Craig, Dec. 9, 1971)

The Conservatives branded former Prime Minister Wilson as no friend of Northern Ireland and of having the same objectives as the IRA.

He declared on 17th March when he drank a toast at the Irish Club that he hoped he would see in his day a united Ireland, ( I. Paisley, Dec. 9, 1971)

Northern Ireland was seen as facing a continuing conspiracy.

....w e can no longer say with any degree of truth that there 1s not a continuing conspiracy directed against Ulster as part of the United Kingdom from a small section In the community. I t is the official policy of the Government of the Irish Republic and 1s to a lesser extent, the policy of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland and it is very much the policy of what is called the Republican Movement.... (W. Craig, Dec. 9, 1971)

Craig considered the proposals for a united Ireland in fifte e n years as to ta lly abhorrant and he thought that 1f such'changes were forced on the people, they would be justified In seriously considering th e ir position within the United Kingdom. 235

Changes to enable the Republican minority e ffe c tiv e ly to participate in the machinery of govern­ ment w ill be changes that w ill enable them to use, as the Ireland Act of 1949 enables them to use, the Government for the purpose of destroying our B ritish constitution just as they have used this House when i t suited them for that purpose. (W. Craig, Dec. 9, 1971)

The Conservatives also rejected the proposal made by Wilson that the responsibility for law and order be transferred to Westminster. This would leave a situation of weakness 1n Northern Ireland, they thought, that could easily be exploited by the elements that sought to destroy Northern Ireland.

Prime Minister Faulkner cautioned that now was not the time to recriminate the Parliament of the United Kingdom; a major effort in men, money and will-power was being made to crush terrorism 1n U lster. There was a degree of strain between the major parties at Westminster and Faulkner said he did not want this to develop Into open party warfare over the Ulster question. The leaders of the two parties at Westminster were aware of this and wanted to preserve a common approach to Northern Ireland 1f possible. Faulkner said he did not think that direct rule was imminent, nor did he think Ulster would be pushed into a united Ireland against her w ill. The real problem was to find a way to unite the community in Northern Ireland against terrorism and then to achieve more constructive ends.

Faulkner reminded the House that Wilson had said firm ly that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom as long as the people wanted it that way. Faulkner said Unionists objected to the 1937 Constitution in the South because 1t claimed all thirty-two counties. If that Constitution was changed to simply proclaim unifi­ cation as an aspiration, this would be significant in establishing a sound relationship. An al1-Party Committee on the Constitution In the South had recommended this 1n December of 1967. Faulkner was ready to accept people working for the unity of Ireland by peaceful means. Faulkner warned that every time a southern court showed a soft spot for the gunmen, the possibility of good relationships was set back. Faulkner was highly critical of the Government of the Republic.

We have had many references by Mr. Lynch and his colleagues 1n increasingly strident and offen­ sive terms to the alleged failures and imperfections of the Northern Ireland Government. In the face of a ll these statements I have tried to be as patient as I could, knowing as I do that Mr. Lynch faces grave problems of his own. But I can no longer remain silent 1n the face of this comment, directed as it Is against the interests we were sent here to represent. 236

The Dublin Government, this so-called friendly Government In a neighbouring State, have now hired a professional public relations agency to spread around the world their well-tailored version of the Anglo- Irish relationship. I hope 1t will Inquire at a very early stage how many times armed men from the Iris h Republic have come across the Border Into Northern Ireland to do violent mischief here. I hope 1t will publicise the fact that there are now at large In that State numerous men wanted for t r ia l on serious charges in N .I. I trust 1t w ill te ll the world that the prime movers of the violent conspiracy engaged 1n k illin g and maiming innocent people in the North, move freely about in Dublin, giving well-publicized Press conferences, printing glossy leaflets and organizing private armies with remarkably l i t t l e interference from any of the authorised forces of the State. (Prime Minister Faulkner, Dec. 9, 1971)

Faulkner pointed out that the political system 1n the South was alien to Northerners.

We have seen established 1n that country a type of State and a type of society totally alien to the northern majority. We have watched every formal tie between the southern State and the B ritish mainland being cast aside. We are asked to throw in our lo t with a community whose record in education, in house building, in the development of the social services, lags abysmally behind the B ritish performance. We are expected to attach ourselves to a p o litic a l system many of whose recent manoeuvres have been extraordinary by any standards. (Prime M inister Faulkner, Dec. 9, 1971)

Faulkner pledged himself to defend the democratic rig h t of the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own destiny.

OUTPUTS - UNIONISTS

Local Government Reorganization

On January 20, 1971, local government reorganization was debated. Faulkner presented the Government's plan fo r a series of executive local offices throughout the country, to which responsibi­ lity would be delegated by Ministers. There would be twenty-six new district councils with new, impartial boundaries. These councils would deal with leisure, recreation, social facilities and the quality of l i f e . 237

The Republican Opposition was not enthusiastic about the type of local government reorganization suggested by Faulkner. They preferred to maintain the local councils and have a proportional representation system of voting to ensure minority rights. They blamed the Unionists for a general lack of Interest in the debate and said the Government would not have brought in reforms 1f they had not been forced to do so.

....th e Government had no intention of tackling the problems of local government until they were forced to do so by civil rights agitation 1n the streets and because of pressure exerted on them by the then Labour Government at Westminster. There can be no doubt that it was that agitation and that pres­ sure which made them bring in the reforms now being considered by the House. (P. Kennedy, Jan. 20, 1971)

Reforms would never have been introduced had the gun not been put to the head of the Government by people going to the streets and by Westminster. (J. Hume, Jan. 20, 1971)

The Minister of Development, Faulkner, pointed out that the Government had been thinking about local government reorganization since 1967, i t was not brought on by the c iv il rights movement. As fa r as proportional representation was concerned, the Government con­ sidered i t an open question that should be discussed. Faulkner perceived the Opposition's lack of support for the proposed reorgani­ zation as an example of negative politics.

The Social Democratic and Labour Party position is now perfectly plain. They have put into print, In prominent record, what supporters in my party have been trying to explain for years past, namely, that these people have no Interest in services or Improve­ ments, that they ignore facts; that they ignore state­ ments of policy; that as soon as decisions are taken they are too embarrassed to face them; that they immediately step aside and make some new demand and that they accompany each new demand with a new threat. My Hon. Friend the Member of Newtonabbey was very quick to draw attention to the sinister aspects of the speech made by Member for East Tyrone. I propose to go further and to use 1t for what it 1s, namely, a naked exposure of negative p o litic s , a frank statement of a deliberately uncooperative attitude and the continuing threat of civil disturbance for its own sake. (A. Faulkner, Jan. 21, 1971)

Moderate Unionists supported the Government In this form of local government reorganization. 238

Conservative Unionists, Laird, Stronge, and Paisley, complained that the most Important functions were being taken away from local government and the nominated boards were undemocratic.

Electoral Law Bill

On January 28, 1971, the Minister of State for Home A ffairs, Taylor, Introduced an Electoral Law B ill. Local general elections were to be postponed until October of 1972, when there would be uni­ versal adult franchise.

Republican Opposition Members welcomed the B ill as bringing In one man, one vote, and they claimed this as an accomplishment of the c iv il rights movement. O’R eilly said the Government had refused to concede universal franchise until the civil rights movement went out on the street.

If 1t had not been for the pressure, the public turmoil, the destruction, and Indeed the death of people, we would have no reform yet. I am completely convinced of that fact. (J. O'Reilly, Jan. 28, 1971;

Public Order (Amendment) B ill

On February 10th, the Minister of State for Home A ffa irs , Taylor, introduced a Public Order (Amendment) B ill. The Government had rejected the Idea of extending the prohibition on marches and processions and had Introduced this B ill to provide some controls. The motive time given to the police about an Intended parade was to be lengthened. The Minister of Home Affairs, after consultation with the Police Authority, could prohibit a procession i f i t might cause serious disorder and undue hardship to persons working or carrying on business In the area. This Bill was accepted generally by the Unionists, although some preferred that processions s t ill be banned. r The Republican Opposition was b itte rly opposed to the B ill, calling 1t repressive legislation that gave the Minister of Home Affairs absolute control to determine whether or not a parade should take place. The Minister could always say the march would cause undue strain on the security forces, or that there was a possibility of trouble on the streets. The Bill was interpreted as an effort to stop c iv il rights meetings, and a device to pacify the right-wing of the Unionist Party. The Republican Opposition complained that the notice time necessary would completely rule out the spontaneous, angry protest that might develop as a result of Government or local govern­ ment action 1n an area where people might want to have th e ir feelings known. 239

Intensification of Campaign Against IRA

In March, the three British soldiers were murdered, and this precipitated a round of demonstrations in protest. Chichester-Clark went to London to discuss the Northern Ireland situation with the British Prime Minister. Chichester-Clark explained in the House that the entire campaign against the IRA was to be intensified. He wanted to make the country too hot for the terrorists. The B ritish Government had agreed to send over additional troops, increasing the force from 7,500 to 9,700, Chichester-Clark thought this would give Northern Ireland the force to clamp down on the IRA.

The IRA campaign of 1956-62 was quite d ifferen t from the campaign of today. I t was fought in the country, this one now is being fought in the cities. There is much more general involvement in this cam­ paign. The terrorists of 1956 were on th eir own. This time they have had the support of a great many more people In areas where i t is much more d iffic u lt to run them to earth. (Prime Minister Chichester- Clark, March 18, 1971)

The Prime Minister Indicated there were 7,000 IRA men 1n Northern Ireland and more were coming. The country was engaged 1n a form of g u errilla war. Internment might have to be used. In addition to the new forces, weapons had been distributed for use by the RUC on a scale demanded by present conditions and the rate of training with new weapons would be trebled. Chichester-Clark said that the question of a third force had been raised. He did not know what exactly was meant by this, but did not rule it out.

Conservative Unionists were convinced that reforms would not bring peace. Nor did they think that more soldiers would help, since the army had not been effective in capturing the IRA so far. The Conservative Unionists contended that Northern Ireland had to have an armed force under its own control. Arms must be given to the RUC and a third force should be considered. A few Conservatives thought internment should be introduced. It was pointed out that the no-go areas had had serious psychological consequences.

Those people living in those enclaves came to realise that they could cock a snook at the Crown. They came to realise that by exerting mob power and by manifestation of public disorder they could do exactly as they liked and get away with it. Then we find gradually, almost Imperceptibly, to start with and then much more dramatically, a change 1n their attitude. We find awakening strength, a realisation of their power. Then a cheekiness, then a brazenness. Now we have that culminating 240

in the spectacle—the walking of hundreds of men with hurley sticks under the noses and the guns of men of the British Army, with guns in their pockets. (D. Boal, March 18, 1971)

The Conservatives noted that now the Press was saying what they had been saying for three years, that the trouble started when the security of Northern Ireland was handed over to Westminster, to people who had l i t t l e sympathy and l i t t l e understanding of the prob­ lems in Northern Ireland. Westminster was responsible fo r the Border, pointed out the Conservatives, but at present 1 t was wide open; the dead and dying were taken across the Border and arms and ammunition were brought back.

Republican Opposition members stated that the IRA were not always to blame fo r shootings and explosions; there were other sub­ versive organizations as well. They were glad the Prime Minister was not going back on any of the reform programs, but they thought the Government was slow in implementing the reforms. They were opposed to a third force and said they would consider I t a resurrec­ tion of the B Specials.

New Unionist Government

On March 23, Chichester-Clark resigned and Faulkner was Invited to form a new Government. Faulkner said he was committed to follow . through with the program of reform.

The Republican Opposition members were very suspicious of Faulkner, especially when 1t came to the matter of pushing through reforms. They were suspicious because there were men s ittin g on the Government side who, they thought, would try to prevent the reforms becoming fully operational. They believed that the reform program was dictated by Westminster and was not voluntarily accepted by the Unionist Government. They warned they would not to lerate the slight­ est deviation from the reform program. They saw the right-wing as having the real power. The right-wing had hounded Chichester-Clark out of office, the Republican Opposition charged, and sooner or later there would have to be a confrontation between the right-wing and the B ritish Government.

F1tt noted that there had been an extension of repressive legislation; the Temporary Provision B ill had made prison sentences mandatory, the Public Order B ill had taken away certain rig h ts, and now there was a proposed Firearms B ill that would do away with tria l by jury 1n certain instances, and change the onus of proof to the accused. These repressive measures, said F it t , had been supported by the same people who had been unwilling to vote fo r reform measures. 241

So, while there had been reforms, there had been repression as well. Cooper was concerned le s t Westminster take over.

For Westminster to take over 1n any circumstances would be a fatal step. The solutions to our problems He In the hands of the people here. I f Westminster were to attempt to take over there would be resistance not only from the Protestant community but from a great section of the Catholic community. ( I. Cooper, March 23, 1971)

In the days following his election to head the Government, Faulkner proceeded to form his Cabinet. He kept many members of the old Cabinet in his new Cabinet. New appointments included West as Minister of Agriculture, Brooke as Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance, Burns as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health and Social Services. A ll these men were Conservatives. Faulkner, himself, had been considered a Conservative before the Chichester- Clark Government. By appointing West to o ffice , Faulkner broke up the West-Craig partnership that had been such a source of strength to the Conservatives. Faulkner announced he would serve as his own Minister of State and he kept Taylor as the Minister of State for Home Affairs. The one Liberal appointed was Bleakley, who was not a member of the House, to the position of Minister of Community Relations.

On March 30th and 31st, there was a fu ll scale debate on the new Government. Faulkner emphasized that the f ir s t problem was law and order and the restoration of confidence. He enumerated all the reforms that had been passed.

We have legislated to give universal franchise at 18, established machinery for independent and impartial drawing of district and ward boundaries, established a Parliamentary Commissioner, a Commissioner for Complaints. We have created a Community Relations Commission and a Ministry of Community Relations. Through the Social Needs Act of 1970 we have given the la tte r the means to pro­ vide special help for socially deprived urban areas. We have set up the Londonderry Development Commission. We have enacted radical legislation for centralisation of house building and have appointed a new Housing Executive. We have taken firm decisions on the reorganisation of local government. We have assisted statutory bodies and local authorities to develop acceptable codes of employment and have created a civilianised police service. (Prime Minister Faulkner, March 30, 1971) •

Faulkner pledged that there would be no going back on these reforms; they would be carried to completion with the utmost energy and 242

urgency. In response to questions by the Opposition, he categorically denied that any secret assurances had been given to West before West accepted the post in the Cabinet. The only assurances that had been given, said Faulkner, had been given pubicly, and that was that the Administration would make absolutely certain that the measures taken on security were effective.

Faulkner said that new directives had been given to the security forces, but he would not say whether arms would be given to the RUC. Faulkner said a general rearmament of the RUC would not lead to the defeat of the IRA; arms could only be used in certain limited and justifiable circumstances. There was no single way of defeating the IRA. Faulkner pledged that there would be no more no-go areas, no more cases of hijacked cars, and inadequate law enforcement. Faulkner emphasized that his Cabinet fully supported, without reserva­ tion or q u alificatio n , what he had pledged on law and order and the continuance of their progressive policies.

The Opposition Parties expressed no confidence in the new Government. They objected to the appointment of Brooke to the Cabinet because he had been against one man-one vote. They were worried about concessions given to get West into the Cabinet. I t was sus­ pected that assurances had been given to him that the RUC would be rearmed. They demanded to know i f there had been a reversal in the law and order policy of the Government. The appointment of West was seen as a bending toward the right-wing.

Faulkner could k ill two birds with one stone, silence the right wing for a while and have an efficient Minister of Agriculture. (G. Fitt, March 31, 1971)'

The appointment of Burns as Parliamentary Secretary in the area of Health and Social Services was c ritic ize d because Burns had been opposed to the Welfare State and was a "reactionary" in the field of workers wages and industrial relations. The Republican Opposition noted that Taylor had been kept on, and they regarded him as a rig h t­ winger and a supporter of Craig. As far as Bleakley, the Liberal appointed as Minister of Community Relations, the Opposition thought i t would be d iffic u lt to question him, since Bleakley was not a member of the House.

I t was generally f e lt that in making up his Government, Faulkner had paid more attention to uniting the Unionist Party than to the interests of the community. The Republican Opposition thought 1t was Impossible to have Unionist unity and fu ll complete acceptance of the reforms. Keogh warned of the consequences i f the reforms were slowed down.

I would be on the streets myself if there were any danger of the reform programme not going through. 243

It would be the duty of anybody representing the minority to lead his people on to the streets to defy these new Government measures. (M. Keogh* March 31, 1971)

The Conservative, or right-wing, Unionists, now reduced to Boal, Paisley, Beattie, Craig and McQuade, expressed absolutely no confidence in the new Government. They accused Faulkner of being a member of the delegation that had handed over security to Westminster. They did not think Faulkner would follow any new policy.

Faulkner has made it abundantly clear that he is going to pursue the same disastrous sort of thinking that prompted the last Administration. (W. Craig, March 31, 1971)

West's acceptance of a Cabinet post was incomprehensible to them.

I do not understand West's sudden conversion. If there is something about this Administration that distinguishes it from the last one, I have a right to know what i t is . I t is p o litic a lly immoral i f there is a secret agreement. (D. Boal, March 31, 1971)

I have no time for a man who is prepared to surrender cherished principles fo r the sake of party o ffic e . ( I . Paisley, March 31, 1971)

Dissatisfaction with, the appointment of Bleakley was expressed. He was characterized as a socialist and one who had kept company with IRA men. The Conservative Unionists emphasized the importance of the Northern Ireland Parliament continuing.

I believe there are forces a t Westminster who would like the destruction of this Stormont Parliament. I am glad the vast majority of the Hon. Members opposite believe this Parliament should go on. ( I . Paisley, March 31, 1971)

Paisley and Craig called for new elections. Mitchell, who often espoused right-wing points of view, was at th is time supporting the new Government.

Ministry of Community Relations

By 1971, the Ministry of Community Relations had been in operation for one year. Minford, speaking for the Minister of Community Relations, Bleakley, who was not a member of the House, outlined the work done by that Ministry. The Ministry had the following alms:

To ensure that the reform program was fin a lize d . To improve the quality of life in deprived urban areas by first aid projects. To encourage the community development approach of the Community Relations Commission. To ensure that a citizen can have his grievances against local or central government impar­ tially Investigated.

The Ministry had also assisted in the preparation of codes of employ­ ment procedures fo r public bodies.

Unionist members generally supported the M inistry of Community Relations, but the Conservative Unionists thought the money spent on the Ministry was wasted, with little evidence that community relations had improved. I t was deemed impossible to leg islate fo r community relations and the Ministry would sooner or later be redundant.

Republican Opposition members welcomed the efforts of the Ministry but felt they were "like pouring water into a bucket with a hole in it." It was felt that Protestant and Catholic workers had been blind in following religious hatreds; the real divide was between the workers and the vested interests, and real progress would only come with the practice of ordinary left-right politics.

Faulkner's Committee System

With the opening of Parliament on June 22, 1971, Prime M inister Faulkner introduced a proposal fo r a new committee system that would enable the Opposition to take a more active part in the discussion and decision-making 1n Parliament. He envisioned three new Functional Committees, covering social services, environmental services, and industrial services. These committees would consider major proposals of policy, review the performance of Government agencies and consider certain legislation. Faulkner said that his aim was to govern with the consent and the acceptance of a fa r wider m ajority.

Faulkner suggested that wide-ranging discussions be held to try to reach widely agreed solutions to the present d iffic u ltie s . Such discussions would represent a ll views in the House, they would be open-ended in terms of time, and conducted in terms of the existing constitutional framework, wherein Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom.

Faulkner indicated that the IRA campaign was moving toward more indiscriminate violence. The Provisional IRA had attracted Into 244 work done by that Ministry. The Ministry had the following aims:

To ensure that the reform program was fin alized. To improve the quality of lif e in deprived urban areas by first aid projects. To encourage the community development approach of the Community Relations Commission. To ensure that a citizen can have his grievances against local or central government impar­ tially investigated.

The Ministry had also assisted in the preparation of codes of employ­ ment procedures fo r public bodies.

Unionist members generally supported the Ministry of Community Relations, but the Conservative Unionists thought the money spent on the Ministry was wasted, with l i t t l e evidence that community relations had improved. I t was deemed impossible to legislate for community relations and the Ministry would sooner or later be redundant.

Republican Opposition members welcomed the efforts of the Ministry but f e lt they were "like pouring water into a bucket with a hole in it." It was felt that Protestant and Catholic workers had been blind 1n following religious hatreds; the real divide was between the workers and the vested interests, and real progress would only come with the practice of ordinary left-right politics.

Faulkner's Committee System

With the opening of Parliament on June 22, 1971, Prime Minister Faulkner introduced a proposal for a new committee system that would enable the Opposition to take a more active part in the discussion and decision-making in Parliament. He envisioned three new Functional Committees, covering social services, environmental services, and industrial services. These committees would consider major proposals of policy, review the performance of Government agencies and consider certain legislation. Faulkner said that his aim was to govern with the consent and the acceptance of a fa r wider majority.

Faulkner suggested that wide-ranging discussions be held to try to reach widely agreed solutions to the present difficulties. Such discussions would represent a ll views in the House, they would be open-ended 1n terms of time, and conducted 1n terms of the existing constitutional framework, wherein Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom.

Faulkner Indicated that the IRA campaign was moving toward more indiscriminate violence. The Provisional IRA had attracted into 245 th eir ranks criminal types with records of personal violence. Security forces had to keep up a sustained unrelenting pressure on the IRA. The RUC would be rearmed where and when i t was necessary.

The Prime Minister received considerable support from Moderate Unionists for his proposals. The new Alliance Party supported his proposals for committees and even Conservative Unionists, Mitchell, Laird, Anderson and Stronge, supported the committee idea. Paisley and Craig rejected the idea outright.

The response of the Republican Opposition to Faulkner's suggestions was a cautious welcome. Devlin came out in fu ll favor of the committee, while Kennedy rejected them. F it t , Cooper and Hume, in a rather unusual stance for them, came out strongly against violence.

There have been too many people who have sat on the fence and have refused clearly to denounce those who perpetrate violence on the streets, those who attempt to achieve po litical objectives by violent means, those who have no respect for human lif e and who seem to think that human lives are expendable as a means of achieving p o litical ends, those people who have no compunction in playing p o litics with the lives of Innocent people.. . .There are men of violence abroad on our streets today and they have made i t clear that their violence aims at political ends. We on this side of the House do not believe that violence should be used to achieve p o litic a l ends. {J. Hume, June 22, 1971)

I have absolutely nothing but contempt for the IRA and a ll that 1t stands fo r. ( I. Cooper, June 24, 1971)

Hume branded Craig and Paisley as the real problems.

Craig and Paisley need violence for political survival. They cannot exist without I t . We are witnessing among those people the growth of Hitlerism in this community and these are the people who must be stopped. (J. Hume, June 22, 1971)

Generally, there was a feeling of guarded optimism in the House at this time. Fitt remarked that the House was friendlier than it had been for a long time. 246

Republican Opposition Members

Walk Out of Parliament

Disorders in Northern Ireland were very intense throughout July. On July 4th, Londonderry erupted in fierce rioting and violence. On July 7th and 8th, the Army, in an effort to get the situation under control, returned fire and two men were killed. There­ upon, the Opposition Members issued an ultimatum that unless an inquiry was held, they would walk out of the House.

On July 16th, the Opposition walked out of the House and organized a campaign of c iv il disobedience, encouraging people not to pay their rents, etc. There was then a massive escalation of violence, and on July 23rd the Army began a series of large scale searches of houses of IRA suspects. On August Dth, Internment was introduced.

When Parliament returned from the summer recess, the Conservatives, Paisley, Boal, Beattie, Craig and McQuade, moved across the House and took up the position of Opposition to the Government.

Londonderry Disturbances and Security Measures

On October 5th, there was a fu ll scale debate on the distur­ bances in Londonderry. Prime Minister Faulkner pointed out that the people in Londonderry had been the beneficiaries of massive social and economic aid. The long-standing unemployment and housing problems were being solved. Despite all this, said Faulkner, riots had broken out again. Army behavior was described as restrained and patient beyond measure. The Army had returned fir e only after successive . nights of intolerable behavior, during which firearms and bombs were used against them. There was no condemnation of those who treated the soldiers In this way, said Faulkner, but when the Army finally did respond, hysterical accusations of b ru tality were made against them. In response to the SULP demands for an inquiry into Army behavior in Londonderry, Faulkner said only Westminster could decide on an inquiry into the British Army.

Faulkner believed that the Republican Opposition had been forced to walk out of Parliament by the IRA. Faulkner explained that internment was introduced to break down the IRA sufficiently to penetrate the wall of silence and so get Intelligence; people would not testify so long as they were subject to intimidation by the IRA. Faulkner said that sixty-three officers and ninety-six volunteers of the Provisional IRA had been Interned, and thirty-three officers and twenty-eight volunteers of the Official IRA had been interned, plus seventy or eighty others. j 247

Information was now starting to flow as the threat of In ti­ midation had been reduced. The men interned would not be released until there was no further danger of violence. The overriding objective was the defeat of terrorism, said Faulkner. The main on­ slaught on terrorism was now directed at Belfast. There was a' problem of shooting attacks on the security forces and bomber attacks. Even children and women were used by the IRA to place bombs, so there was a problem of Identifying the enemy. What was needed to combat terrorism, said Faulkner, was a widespread public surveillance; a corps of eyes and ears to watch and lis te n .

Faulkner stated that the Constitution v/as not 1n danger. Lynch had been told by Prime Minister Heath that the guarantee, given to Northern Ireland in the Ireland Act of 1949, remained inviolate. Preserving the Constitution meant, fo r Faulkner, maintaining Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom, it did not mean there could not be a change in the p o litic a l machinery, as there must be to meet the needs of the day.

Moderate Unionist, Mclvor, and former Unionists Porter and Caldwell, now Independent, saw the defeat of the IRA as the immediate task. Various suggestions wore made for accomplishing th is; the complete sealing o ff of areas and house-by-house searches to catch the IRA, car curfews, expansion of the UDR, use of the T e rrito ria l Army and the blowing up of unapproved roads along the Border. Internment was not judged a success. Caldwell said internment had not worked because i t had not simultaneously been imposed in the South. Mclver was concerned with the ideas that the Protestants were., developing.

....w h a t is happening now is that decent Protestant people, especially middle class people and those in the constituency of Woodvale, have come to identify the whole Catholic community with support for IRA policy and, I hasten to add, wrongly. (W. Mclvor, Oct. 3, 1971)

The old group of Conservative Unionists, Boal, Paisley, B eattie, McQuade, now esconsed on the Opposition side of the House, continued their attack on the Government from that vantage point. They saw the current situation as one in which there was fierce, sustained physical attack by the IRA, with an almost total absence of law and order 1n the community. All agreed that the situation was getting worse and the appeasement policies of the Government had failed. All of the Conservative Opposition members fe lt that Internment had failed because 1t had been Ineptly carried out. They wanted those interned brought to tr ia l so that they would not easily be released, once peace returned to the streets. 248

As fa r as the security forces were concerned, the Conservatives thought new policies were needed. They thought the Government would not be able to raise the UDR to a new high of 10,000 because loyalists had no confidence in the UDR. Loyalists lacked confidence in the UDR because it was under the control of Westminster, not the Northern Ireland Government. McQuade said that he could guarantee a ll the men that were needed i f the UDR men were allowed to serve in th e ir own districts and not made to serve 1n remote areas.

Paisley pointed out that the Westminster Government had made it clear that the only reason they wanted an increase in the UDR was to remove troops from Northern Ireland. Paisley complained because good lo y a lis ts , who were B Specials and members of the Orange Lodge, had not been accepted into the UDR. Paisley defended the Protestant vigilantes.

....Lord Carrington was here. He is Minister of Defence and what did he say? He drove a t high speed round East Belfast, three armoured cars 1n front of him and three armoured cars behind and said he condemned the actions of the vigilantes; they were not needed and there would be no c iv il defence corps. Whether Lord Carrington likes it or not and whether the Prime Minister likes i t or not, in every street in Belfast there will be barricades erected by men who love th e ir wives and children and who w ill stand there w illin g to die rather than that their children should suffer. Let the Government learn that and learn it well.

There was a time when I would have said to such people, "Do not build barricades for they are out­ side the law." I say no such thing to them today. Morally, they are entirely and absolutely justified. They have no arms in th eir hands. They stand there a prey to the gunman and some time the Prime Minister w ill be standing up, perhaps even tomorrow, express­ ing sorrow because one of these men has been shot down by a gunman. Let me te ll the Prime Minister that it is his policy, 1t 1s the policy he has pur­ sued, th at has brought about this sad and te rrib le state of affairs. (I. Paisley, Oct. 5, 1971)

In December, McQuade and Boal announced they were forming a c iv ilia n force on the Shankill Road to watch fo r bombers.

Suggested Changes in the Northern Ireland Parliament

On November 3, 1971, Faulkner warned that the IRA were Intent on destroying Stormont. 249

Just as Hitler made his Intentions all too clear in Mein Kampf, for a ll who cared to read, so the Provisionals—that latter-day band of fascist thugs; that Is what they are—have spelled out their goals with equal c la rity ; overthrow Stormont, get d ire c tly to grips with so-called British imperialism, escalate s till further the campaign of terror and brutality and in time benefit from a growing sense of fru s tra ­ tion and despair to impose at least upon the whole of Ireland the iron grip of a fanatical military dictatorship. I f these things were to come to pass democracy would be dead, not only here but in the Republic, too, and the cause of freedom would have suffered a sickening blow in that country and the United Kingdom where i t has always been most strongly entrenched. (Prime Minister Faulkner, Nov. 3, 1971)

Faulkner said he wanted to get to the root of the problem, not just defeat the IRA. He stated that changes had to be made 1n Parliament to meet the needs of the day. Stormont must be satisfying to a ll who participated in its activities. Faulkner believed that the radical nature of his suggested Committees had not yet been appreciated. He pointed out that the Government was voluntarily offering to t ilt the balance of influence as between the Executive and the Legislature, toward the Legislature. The Committees would be weighted in favor of the Republican Opposition, so that on a committee of nine, there would be at least three members from the Opposition, and the Opposition would chair at least two of these committees. Faulkner believed it would be necessary to increase the size of the House. Faulkner suggested that ten Senators be appointed to the Senate who would represent the widest range of interests, both political and otherwise. A situation had to be created at Stormont, said Faulkner, where a man f e lt he did good by attending. The task was nothing less than the overhaul of the whole machinery of government. Faulkner was supported by a ll the Unionists except the most conser­ vative.

The Conservative Unionists were unimpressed by the functional committees. I t was f e lt that the Government had already decided to adopt them, so i t was fu tile to discuss them. Paisley pointed out that Faulkner's committees only allowed for religious minorities, yet there were many other kinds of minorities that should be protected under any legislation. The Conservatives were against increasing the size of the House and against appointments to the Senate, One of the strongest objections to the functional commit­ tees was the fact that they were not democratic.

. . . . i t is wrong to bend democratic structures 1n the vain hope that by bending them we w ill do what is quite impossible to do—by means of demo­ cratic machinery, perverted though i t may be, to 250

reconcile two sections of the community. (D. Boal, Nov. 3, 1971)

Paisley predicted that soon Westminister would take over law and order from Stormont, then the courts would be removed from th eir jurisdiction and Stormont would become something lik e a g lo rifie d county council. Paisley also noted that the Government was losing heavily when they submitted themselves to Unionist Associations across the country*, they did not have the support of the people.

OUTPUTS — CONSERVATIVES

Attack on Government fo r Method

of Handling Disturbances

Early 1n the year, with renewed rioting in the Ballymurphy Estates and on the Shankill, the Conservative Unionists attacked the Government for their handling of the disorders. Burns and Mitchell, although supporting the Government in this case, had the same point of view on other issues as the Conservative Unionists Craig, West, McQuade, Stronge and Laird.

There was agreement among the Conservatives that the IRA were responsible for the disturbances. They pointed out that it was the , pronounced intention of the IRA to lead the people by agitating for better working and living conditions, and then to move in with military action. The Conservatives pointed out that the IRA was aligned with the left-wing People's Democracy and with the Civil Rights Association. The Republican Clubs were accused of blatantly selling The United Irishman to raise funds for the IRA.

The Conservatives pointed to all the reforms that had been passed, yet s t il l trouble persisted. No amount of reform, they believed, would please the Republican Opposition. The Conservatives condemned the existence of the no-go areas now existing 1n the Falls, Andersontown, Ardoyne, New Lodge Road and Unity Flats.

....th e Lower Falls 1s controlled by the regular wing o f the IRA now some 600 strong. The other areas are controlled by the provisional wing of the IRA which is about 800 or 900 strong. Do not attach too much importance to the differences within the IRA. Differences and disputes there are, but these people are capable of coming together for the final crunch.... The strength of the a u xiliaries is about 3000 in Ballymurphy area—women's battalions and youth batta­ lions. (W. Craig, Jan. 27, 1971) 251

The Conservatives faulted the Army for not tearing down the IRA barricades around the no-go areas, and they faulted the Government for denying the existence of the no-go areas. Army policies were seen to be disastrous. The Army had pushed the RUC to one side but had not moved in to restore law and order. Instead, the riot-torn areas had ju s t been sealed o ff. Furthermore, charged the Conserva­ tives, the Army had been inappropriately briefed.

We were led to believe that when the Army came in i t was going to deal with the situation. ,1 have talked to Army officers and they have told me that they were briefed that they were coming to keep the peace and that it was their job to keep rival fac­ tions apart. They were also briefed that the Protestant people were the aggressors and must be dealt with severely while the Roman Catholic people were oppressed and must have the fu ll benefit of their protection. That was their briefing. (I. Paisley, Jan. 27, 1971)

Most Conservative Unionists thought internment might have to be introduced, but Boal was completely opposed to i t .

Internment means immediate arrest and Immediate detention of somebody without immediate tria l, with­ out a specific charge having been put and without his immediately being able to rebut that charge by proper evidence duly adduced. I am aghast at such a sugges­ tion. One of the fundamentals of natural justice is that a man should know what i t is he is being detained for. He should be able to rebut the charge. (D. Boal, Jan. 27, 1971)

Boal pointed out that the police obtained their Information from informers, who were often morally depraved and prepared to say any­ thing for the money they received for informing. Furthermore, Boal did not trust the Government with so much power in such a situation.

The Conservatives blamed the Government for Inadequate handling of the disorders. Chichester-Clark was criticized for not keeping his word to preserve the B Specials and maintain law and order and for his in a b ility to persuade the Westminster Government to go along with firmer control measures. The Conservatives called for a new election and a new Government, the rearming of the RUC and the reversal of the policies of Hunt.

The Prime Minister, Chichester-Clark, defended his policies against the persistent attacks of the right-wing. He said he understood the utter frustration and anger which had swept over the community 1n the face of renewed disturbances, but worthwhile things had been accomplished and there was a growing isolation of the 252 elements of violence. Chichester-Clark thought that unemployment and poor housing, coupled with sinister forces, had produced the violence. He did not consider I t appeasement to try to remedy the poor living conditions. It was explained that the Army had only been brought in when every other resource had been used, and when the RUC were exhausted.

Close liaison had now been developed between the police and the Army. Chichester-Clark pledged that the security forces would not be driven out of any areas by physical force or political pressure. He explained that there were no no-go areas in Belfast, in the sense that police were excluded from these areas, but there was non­ cooperation with the police 1n these areas. This could only be broken down, said the Prime M inister, by showing the people that the police were there to protect them. As far as weapons instruction, all members of the RUC were now receiving weapons training. Chichester- Clark also pledged that i f the security experts advised that intern­ ment was necessary, then the Government would not shrink from using 1t.

Moderate Unionists supported the Government in its policies but not without some criticism . The Government policies had been effective, they thought, because they had not gone back on the reform program and they had unmasked the IRA.

Many of the p o litic a l undertones of the IRA which have now become apparent and are seen to be apparent not only here but in public opinion in the newspapers in B ritain and throughout the world would not have become apparent 1f the Government had not stuck to their reform programme and so demonstrated that they have clean hands. (R. B a illie , Jan. 27, 1971)

Several television programs were dubbed Irresponsible for showing self-confessed IRA Republicans proclaiming that they were the law and order in certain parts of-the city. The Moderate Unionists emphasized that i t must be recognized that Stormont was subordinate to Westminister, and their authority could not be questioned. As far as the Army was concerned, the policy of containment was not working.

Once we get on containment, on a position where the rule of law and forces of law and order, the police forces, are not effective in every part of the land then we get to a position where society is dis­ integrated * where people look to other forces than the forces of the State. (R. B a illie , Jan. 27, 1971)

The Moderate Unionists fe lt that a more vigorous and direct policy was required, and the United Kingdom Government had to realize th is . They pointed to problems of liaison between the RUC and the 253

Army and they attributed this to the fact that the Northern Ireland Government was not completely responsible in all the fields of security, law and order.

The Republican Opposition fe lt that the riots in the Shankill and Ballymurphy were due to a cred ability gap. The Catholics of Ballymurphy were rio tin g because they could not believe the Government meant business with the reforms. The Protestants of the Shankill were rio tin g because fo r f i f t y years the Government had told them they needed the B Specials and repressive legislation to retain the Constitution. Now these were gone and so had their confidence in the Government. The Republican Opposition thought unemployment was also a factor in the rioting. In Northern Ireland as a whole, unemployment was 10 percent, but 1n places lik e Ballymurphy i t ran as high as 50 percent. Opposition members agreed with McQuade and Boal that the behavior of the Army was reprehensible and contributed to the rioting.

On Sunday night there was a c o n flict. The military arrrested children of 10 and 11. There were children of 10 and 11 with urine running out of them because they were so frightened by the handling they were getting. So people up there reacted against the army. (P. Devlin, Jan. 27, 1971)

I t was believed, that h o s tilitie s were also engendered through the searches for arms which were always highly charged emotionally. The Republican Opposition called for the withdrawal of the Army from Republican areas and th eir replacement by a police force. Republican Opposition members also agreed with the right-wingers that the Army would not investigate its e lf and that methods used by the police were objectionable, especially their use of informers. Hume pointed out that there had been many reforms, thousands of houses had been b u ilt and there had been changes in the electoral law, but there would only be peace with the sharing of power.

In the last analysis unless all the people In the community feel part of it, feel that they have a share In 1t, a share 1n the power and the decision­ making of the community, we w ill go on and develop the arrogance of power, unchallenged and unchecked power by one party, and in another 20 years the barbed wire w ill again be put up and barricades will again be placed across our streets. (J. Hume, Jan. 27, 1971)

The Republican Opposition thought i t would be a catastrophy to introduce internment. 254

Third Force

The Conservative Unionists became increasingly discontented with.the Government handling of the disorders as time progressed. Paisley called for a third force, an unarmed force, under the control of the Crown. Such a force was needed for protection, especially the protection of Protestant churches; one church had its windows smashed in while the congregation was praying for peace. Catholic churches already received great protection.

What is the situation? The Prime Minister has been to see Mr. Heath; the situation worsened. He then went to see Mr. Lynch and Mr. Heath together, and the situation is worse. He is now going over - tomorrow and what does he go for? Does he go to suggest that we now must have in the conminity—and I have read his speech carefully— the eyes and ears of a ll people? Is he going to suggest at th is late stage that we must have a c iv il defence force and that the vigilantes, who have been deplored in this House and condemned by the Minister of Defence across the water, should now at long last be given the privilege of legal backing to do the job that is absolutely necessary? ( I . Paisley, Oct. 6, 1971)

Paisley called for a general election.

Mitchell, formerly very close to the right-wing Unionists, was now opposed to the vigilante groups. He thought these men should go into the UDR. He supported a civil defense organization and called fo r tig h ter control of the Border. He wanted no more reforms or p o litic a l change.

Motion of Censure of the Government

On October 13, the Conservative Unionist, Craig, introduced a motion of censure of the Government fo r not ensuring an adequate police force that could deal with the terrorist threat. He charged that Northern Ireland was in the invidious position of having constitutional responsibility for maintaining law and order but having no re a lly effective say in the methods used. Craig thought a tru ly effe c tiv e , armed police should be established; the UDR was an Army auxiliary and was considered of l i t t l e importance. Craig thought the in itia tiv e must be taken from the B ritish Army, since the soldiers were not allowed to shoot until they had f ir s t been fired upon, and unless the person who fire d was clearly seen. The Conservatives complained about the wholesale intimidation going on. They pointed out that Roman 255

Catholics were being terrorized and intimidated by the IRA gun as well as Protestants. Internment, they fe lt, had not been successful. Paisley questioned why, i f the Prime Minister had evidence against the gunmen, did he not bring them to ju stice and have them proven guilty or innocent.

Prime Minister Faulkner said he was aware that Catholics were being intimidated by the IRA.

I t is neither tenderness nor appeasement to refuse to equate Roman Catholics with terrorists; it is simple justice to those who live in fear through Intimidation and simple common sense for the future of this country....there are many people in areas dominated by the IR A ....u n til they know for certain that the forces of law and order are going to come out on top, they fear to throw in their lo t with them. But as the balance swings perceptibly against the IRA there w ill, I believe, be a strong movement of opinion in support of the forces of law and order. (Prime Minister Faulkner, Oct. 13, 1971)

The security forces had been told to eradicate the IRA from their strongholds, where they exercised a regime of intimidation and repres­ sion, Faulkner pointed to the success of the security forces; weapons and materials were seized every day, and every day more wanted men were detained. Almost 600 people had been tried and convicted by the courts in 1971.

Faulkner thought internment was very successful because more information about IRA membership and organization was coming in every day. Internment was necessary because i f men were brought to t r ia l, witnesses would have to risk their lives testifying 1n court. The lives of the RUC who had to produce evidence would also be under threat of assassination, murder and kidnapping. Faulkner said he had good evidence before a man was interned, but this was not the kind of evidence that would be accepted 1n court. I f there v/as a prlma facie case against any person arrested under the Special Powers Act, that person would be prosecuted 1n the ordinary way.

....when I announced in August that Internment was being Introduced there were large numbers of dangerous men involved in armed conspiracy, whom no court would convict, and I had to weigh in my own mind which was the greater evil; the arson, the des­ truction, the death of many innocent people, or the freedom of people, who, I am convinced, had In the past or would 1n the future commit, or be associated with these evil acts. (Prime Minister Faulkner, Oct. 20, 1971) 256

I t was pointed out that unapproved roads were being cratered to prevent the crossing of gelignite across the Border and police stations had been provided with enough arms to protect themselves. Faulkner thought the IRA wanted to Involve the community in the struggle because it was obvious that 1t could not defeat the British Army.

. . . . i t reckons that in Great B ritain , the Issues can be sufficiently blurred to make the British people see this struggle as an ugly, mean­ ingless sectarian war from which the Army and the B ritish nation should be disengaged. (Prime Minister Faulkner, Oct. 13, 1971)

A recruiting drive was to take place to increase the police force to 5,000, the police Reserve to 1,500, and the UDR to 10,000. Faulkner was supported by a ll the Unionists except the most conserva­ tiv e .

OUTPUTS — REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION

Motion to Repeal the Government of Ireland Act

On February 16, Republican Opposition member Kennedy Intro­ duced a motion to repeal the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 in order to hasten the reunification of Ireland. He said the Act had created the seeds of violence, and peace would not be achieved un til this Act was repealed. Kennedy claimed that Northern Ireland was an embarrassment to the British Government. Once Britain had sent over the Army to protect,the Catholic minority, they had, in fact, assumed direct responsibility for the security of Northern Ireland. The British Government did not trust the Northern Ireland Government, claimed Kennedy, and so they took the arms away from the B Specials and the RUC and shipped them to England, Then, said Kennedy, they appointed an agent to keep an eye on the proceedings at Stormont and report back to Westminster. This agent took part 1n a ll Cabinet decisions and dictated policy. Kennedy called the Unionist Government a rubber stamp for the wishes of Westminister. Kennedy thought that i f Westminster was 1n fu ll control, i t would be possible to get the implementation of a reform program. He thought the only long-term solution to the problem was reunification of the country.

Prime Minister Chichester-Clark rejected Kennedy's motion outright; he would not support a demand for the voluntary liquida­ tion of Stormont. The United Kingdom representative did not attend Cabinet meetings, said Chichester-Clark, nor did he decide policy for the Northern Ireland Government. The majority of people in the North 257 wanted to remain citizens of the United Kingdom and any move toward unification would make fear and tension worse.

In March, the Opposition Parties changed somewhat, with a new party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, being formed, headed by F itt and including O'Hanlon and Currie. Devlin, Cooper and Hume were later to join the SDLP.

Proportional Representation

On March 2, the SDLP called for all elections in Northern Ireland to be held on the basis of Proportional Representation. This was considered the f ir s t step in creating the necessary institu tio nal •changes so that the minority could have an effective voice in decision­ making. Even with the reorganization of local government, declared the Republican Opposition, Proportional Representation would be neces­ sary to get fair representation. Proportional Representation would give the voters more choice and would reduce the powers of the selection committees. Currie believed that Proportional Representa­ tion would make politicians on both sides of the House seek for a consensus of opinion.

Every candidate would have to think not only of f ir s t preference votes but of second, th ird , fourth, etc. Therefore any candidate who relies completely on attracting firs t preference votes would be a foolish candidate. Speeches would have to be beamed to the middle ground. (J. Currie, March 2, 1971)

The disadvantage to Proportional Representation was that members of the same party in a multi-member constituency would find themselves competing against each other more than they would be competing against politicians of a different political party. That, thought Currie, could cause serious disadvantages fo r practicing p o litician s. I t was claimed that Proportional Representation would right the situation in Northern Ireland where the Government had depended too much on one side of the community.

The Conservative Unionists could not see any merit in PR; the Republic of Ireland had tried 1t, and it was a failure. Proportional Representation was considered cumbersome and awkward and i t took away from personal contact between an MP and his constituents because the area he represented would be very large. Laird pointed out that countries that had PR tended to be unstable.

The Moderate Unionist, B a ilie , thought PR should be carefully examined to see i f i t might be used to break down trad ition al rig id ity of patterns and get greater stability. 258

The Minister of State of Home Affairs, Taylor, stated that the Government would welcome informed debate on PR.

Special Powers Regulation

On March 10, 1971, the Republican Opposition called for an annullment of a Special Powers regulation which made i t an offense to fa il to report injury or death caused by,gunshot, explosion or any other offensive weapon. Opposition members complained that this would make informers of the medical profession, and was a measure brought in by the Government to appease the right-wing.

Licensed Guns

In March and A p ril, there were renewed complaints by the Republican Opposition about the number of licensed guns in the com­ munity, and the number of weapons used by gun clubs. Opposition members called for the withdrawal of all gun licenses in circulation and the turning in of all guns.

On March 30, Faulkner asked all the people to voluntarily hand in their firearms and on April 2, the RUC were instructed to review the licenses of a ll those who held guns.

The right-wing complained that the RUC review of licenses had developed into a campaign to pressure people who held guns to give up their guns. The whole process was just appeasement to placate the Opposition. The real problem was the guns held ille g a lly .

Non-Enforcement of the Prevention of

Incitement to Hatred Act

On February 3, the Republican Opposition complained because the Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act had not been used against the w riter of a le tte r, published in a newspaper, who complained about the influx of Catholics into the Tobermore area and the jobs being given them. The letter stated that this influx would destroy the Protestant character of the village and the incoming Catholics would get all the houses, since they had all the children, and, therefore, the most points. The Act should have been used against this le tte r w riter because he was inciting people against Roman Catholics and was stirring up hatred by being threatening, abusive and insulting. 259

The Attorney General pointed out that the Act had limitations. It was difficult to prove an individual had an intent to create hatred and fear.

One must fir s t show that the words published or used are threatening, abusive or insulting. One must then show that they are lik e ly to s tir up hatred against a section of the public of N.I. This hatred must be hatred against people, not against a religious denomination or a church or a society, secret or otherwise. (Attorney General Kelly, Feb. 3, 1971)

Kelly pointed out that the British courts were having similar d iffi­ culties with their Race Relations Act. It was an inflated expectation that the Act would end a ll expressions of racial discrimination and hatred. He thought the Act was designed to deal with the more dangerous and insidious forms of propaganda campaigns which engendered violence, and not

....e v e ry triv ia l bigoted statement or writing scrawled on a wall or every offensive t i t b i t in a news sheet. (Attorney General Kelly, Feb. 3, 1971)

Kelly said that prosecution under the Act was sometimes counter productive; individuals welcomed prosecution because i t gave them a judicial forum, a publicity platform for their extremist views. Burns pointed out that freedom of speech had to be safeguarded.

Motion of Censure Against the Attorney General

On May 13, the Republican Opposition brought a motion of censure against the Attorney General. They charged him with partiality in in itia tin g prosecutions and p a rtia lity in the fa ilu re to in itia te prosecutions. The Attorney General was a member of the Unionist Party and the Orange Order, and this made him biased, said the Republican Opposition, and p o litic a lly motivated in the cases 1n which he had to give a decision. I t was thought that many cases had received strange verdicts. Some people were convicted for five years for receiving arms Illegally, while others got four or two years, and some even got suspended sentences. The Republican Opposition charged that Protestants holding Illegal parades v/ere treated differently from Catholics holding ille g a l parades.

I cannot see why a man gets 12 months in ja il for shouting "Up the IRA," when every Saturday hundreds of people gather outside Unity Falls, shouting obscenities at the inmates. Occasionally someone gets arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. He gets away with a fin e. (P. Devlin, May 13, 1971) 260

The Republican Opposition claimed that the legal profession was up 1n arms about the situation. They called for a Department of Public Prosecutions.

The Unionists defended the Attorney General. They charac­ terized the censure as a p o litical manoeuver to smear the Attorney General, and part of a succession of attacks against the Institutions of the State.

The police were attacked, Parliament was attacked, local government was attacked—the only Institution le ft for them to attack is the law and its administration. (R. Babington, May 13, 1971)

One has only to look to the manuals of the Communist Party to see how closely events here have followed what is laid down. The first thing one does is to attack the Government and try to dis­ p ir it them by a ll means. Then one attacks the forces of law and order and accuses the m ilitary and the police of brutal attacks. (A. Anderson, May 13, 1971)

I t was pointed out that both Protestant and Catholic areas In Belfast were complaining about the administration of justice.

The Conservative Opposition member, Paisley, objected to the political affiliation of Crown prosecutors; justice was not seen to . be done i f a politician had the final say in the charging of someone who was also a politician. Paisley said the Attorney General had been most d ilig en t 1n the performance of his duties. Press reports could not be relied upon to give a ll the facts and were not an accurate reflection of any case.

Criticims of Court Decisions

The opposition to court decisions by the Republican Opposition was continued on May 18th, when Devlin moved that Judge Topping be removed from the position of Recorder of the c ity of Belfast on the ground he was discriminating against Catholic defendants. Devlin main­ tained there had been a great outcry at what went on 1n Topping's court, people were burning th eir census forms and throwing stones at police barracks in protest. Topping was accused of suspending mandatory sentences for the loyalists.

The Prime Minister himself retorted to these charges, asserting that no allegations of bias or Improper conduct had ever come before 261

the Council of the Incorporated Law Society. Faulkner interpreted these charges as part of the wider attack on the institutions of Northern Ireland.

A series of attacks are being mounted against the institutions upon which our State depends for its well-being and for its existence. Not least of these is the judiciary. The Independence and the impartiality of the judiciary is one of the main bastions of any free and democratic soeity. (Prime Minister Faulkner, May 18, 1971)

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

On March 23, Chichester-Clark resigned and Faulkner assumed office. Faulkner appointed West to his Cabinet and so broke up the close association of West and Craig in the right-wing. Other Conservatives were coopted into the Government, so weakening the Conservative Opposition. In March, the Republican Opposition militants formed the Social Democratic and Labour Party. This Party v/as headed by F itt and was composed of O'Hanlon, Currie, Devlin, Cooper and • Hume. The organization of this Party merely formalized the close working and thinking relations these MPs had had for some time. They clearly led the Republican Opposition. On July 16, the Republican Opposition v/alked out of Parliament.

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

The Unionists saw the rioting as Republican inspired; the result of the sinister forces of the IRA plus poor living conditions. They saw the Provisional IRA as behind a master plan of sedition to set one community against another. I t was thought that the Provisionals were behind the indiscriminate violence being used and a ll the e ffo rt and money expended.on Londonderry, to Improve living conditions there, was no match for the Provisionals. The IRA funerals were seen as irresponsible provocation and p o litic a l ploys. The country was believed to be facing civil war, and even the Moderate Unionists were calling for Internment.

The Army was supported by the Unionists fo r Its restrained behavior, but as street violence increased, the Unionists wanted the Army to make more vigorous attempts to run down the gunmen. The Government banned a ll processions because they fostered violence and tied up the security forces. Continued searches brought vast hauls of arms. 262

When Faulkner became Prime M inister, he promised there would be no more no-go areas. Once internment was introduced, i t was in itia lly perceived as successful, bringing in information about the IRA. The increased activity on the streets, the bombing and indis­ criminate violence were interpreted by the Government as a result of the IRA being pushed by security forces and seeking soft targets. The Unionists thought a vigilante group could be used as the eyes and ears of the Government.

Faulkner introduced his idea of the Committees to bring in the Opposition into power sharing within the Government. This was really the epitome of the reform program. There was nothing more that could be given, except the final demand—a united Ireland. The Unionists saw the Eire Government as a hostile Government that allowed the IRA free movement in their country. Eire courts could not convict the IRA, nor would they cooperate on extradition. The Unionists f e lt that the Eire Government was not controlling the movement of gelignite across the Border. The whole system of Government in the South was abhorrent to the Unionists.

The Republican Opposition were seen as really not Interested in providing services and improving conditions. It v/as noted that the Republican Opposition had not stayed in the House to give serious consideration to the committee proposal, and i t was concluded that their aim v/as really a united Ireland.

The Conservative Unionists saw the continued rio ts as stem­ ming from the confrontation of the IRA with the security forces. IRA funerals were used by Republicans for po litical purposes. The Government was attacked for being unable to maintain law and order, and for allowing no-go areas to persist. Conservative Unionists thought Orange Parades were needed to mobilize the Protestant people in the face of this dire threat to the Constitution.

The Army was considered biased in Its enforcement, always watching the Protestants and meting out brutal punishment to them. I t was f e lt that more vigorous measures were needed to defeat the IRA— containment had not worked. Conservative Unionists denied that more soldiers could restore peace; what was needed was a force under the control of the Northern Ireland Government, and a civilian force mobilized to watch out for bombers. The Conservatives defended the vigilantes fo r doing the only reasonable thing in this time of te rro r, defending th eir homes. The Conservatives called for the RUC to be fu lly armed. They thought internment had fa ile d . Paisley and Boal, always against Internment, wanted the gunmen brought to t r ia l.

The Conservatives rejected the committee idea because i t would allow the Republicans Into the innermost part of Government, from which vantage point they could destroy the Northern Ireland Government, There was a feeling of complete distrust for the Eire Government, and 263 this spread to the B ritish Government when Heath proposed talks that could lead to a united Ireland in fifteen years. The Conservatives wanted new elections.

The Republican Opposition thought the riots were due to Army behavior when searches for arms were carried out. They called fo r the Army to be removed from sensitive areas. They objected to the more aggressive effo rts of the Army to apprehend the IRA. The Orange Parades were considered to be effo rts at one-upmanship and demands were made that the parades be stopped. C ivil rights marches v/ere not considered sectarian and the Republicans thought the c iv il rights marches should not be curtailed. The Republican Opposition thought internment would be catastrophic. They were not enthusiastic over any of the reforms, including Faulkner's committee idea.

Efforts by the Government to control street disorders were interpreted as efforts to pacify the right-wing and attempts to stop the c iv il rights marches. The Republican Opposition walked out on July 16th, ostensibly because they wanted an inquiry into one of the disturbances v/here two people were k ille d . OUTLINE — 1972

INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Marches Against Internment Ban on Processions Armagh C ivil Rights Parade C ivil Rights Marches IRA Attacks on RUC and UDR General Protestant Strike

INPUTS - EXTRASOCIETAL

Eire

OUTPUTS — CONSERVATIVE UNIONISTS

Motion Rejecting a United Ireland Attack on Government for Failure in Security Field

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

264 INPUTS — INTRASOCIETAL

Marches Against Internment

On Christmas Day of 1971, four hundred persons, mostly women and youths, headed fo r Long Kesh, the internment camp, demonstrating against internment. The march was organized by the Tyrone Trade Action Group with the cooperation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and the People's Democracy. The parade moved up the Falls Road where it was joined by an additional 400 marchers, making a total of 800 in a ll. The marchers stopped 100 yards short of the police lin e . They asked to proceed but were told they were in breach of the order prohibiting processions. The marchers dispersed. A second rally, organized by NICRA against internment, occurred on January 2nd, involving 2,000 people, mostly young teen­ agers and women. The ra lly lasted fo r an hour and fifte e n minutes and then ended without incident.

The Conservative Unionists complained about these marches. They f e lt they should have been stopped and prosecutions should have been instituted against the marchers. I t was wrong to impose bans that could not be enforced.

The Prime Minister, Faulkner, said the tactics used by the police were to prevent ille g a l processions from taking place, to break up such processions where p ra c tic a l, and to iden tify persons taking part in ille g a l processions so they could be prosecuted la te r.

Ban on Processions

On January 18th, the Government extended the ban on proces­ sions fo r a further twelve months. Faulkner said this was necessary so the security forces could put all their energies into fighting the IRA. Security forces were needed to process the information that was flowing in due to internment. Apart from stretching security forces too thin, parades also Increased tension.

Moderate Unionists did not want the ban extended. They pointed out that the Republicans were using IRA m ilita ry funerals as p o litic a l processions and were flouting the ban on parades. This was incensing

265 266

the Protestants. I t was f e lt that the Orange Parades should be allowed to go on. However, i t was understood how important i t was to keep the security forces free to fight the IRA and the Moderate Unionists would not fig h t the Government on this issue.

Conservative Unionists were absolutely opposed to the extension of the ban. It was clear that the security forces were unable to enforce the ban against the rebels, the Republicans paraded anyway. The ban would only work against the lo yalists, and this was bad for their confidence. It was fe lt that the country was now facing a major constitutional crisis and it would be useful for the loyalists to assemble in their thousands to demonstrate th eir feelings.

Armagh C ivil Rights Parade

In the middle of.January, the civil rights movement announced 1t would continue its marches and a c iv il rights parade was planned for Armagh. The Government warned that the security forces would use physical measures to prevent any such parade occurring. However, the parade did take place, and the marchers marched about one mile before being stopped. Later Paisley announced that the loyalists in the Shankill had decided not to accept the ban on parades.

C ivil Rights Marches

On January 30th, the NICRA organized a march from Creggan Estates in Londonderry to Guildhall. Before the march there was a jo in t Army-RUC statement issued, warning that such marches often ended in violence. The marchers assembled in the thousands. Violence erupted with stone throwers and marchers spitting on the police who manned the barricades. Paratroopers moved in to make arrests, and thirteen civilians were killed, some by IRA bullets, it was believed.

The Conservative Unionists pointed out that the marchers had come to do b a ttle , they had missiles, nail bombs and CS gas ready. - After the violence, a vicious propaganda campaign had been waged against the security forces. The Government had announced there was to be an Inquiry into the disturbances, but the Conservatives thought I t would be nothing more than a propaganda platform for Republicans. They noted that the Roman Catholic leaders were calling for this inquiry, but they had not called for an inquiry when the IRA had murdered security forces.

Moderate Unionists f e lt pretty much the same way. The parade was ille g a l, but no one was yet condemning those who organized 1t. The paratroopers had used great restraint, said the Unionists, yet people were branding them murderers. Unarmed RUC and UDR men had 267 been shot in th e ir homes without th e ir k ille rs being branded murderers. Some of the paratroopers had their faces badly burned with acid.

The Government placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of those who had organized the march and they commended the bravery of the security forces.

The day afte r the Londonderry march, there were incidents and marches a ll over Northern Ireland. A thousand students from Queen's University marched to protest at an Army post, 150 workers marched to a RUC station, 600 workers from a factory in Strabane marched to a RUC station, 800 persons marched in Draperstown, ending up in a r io t. In the days following there was mass intimidation of Protestants in the Londonderry area, three policemen and four Fire Service men were injured by a stone-throwing mob, and a man who was to be a crown witness was murdered. On February 2, 1972, the B ritish Embassy in Dublin was burned. The Civil Rights Association stated they would continue marching and they planned a march in Newry.

The Senior Parliamentary Secretary, Anderson, said that the ban would be maintained. Prime Minister Heath had sent le tte rs to Cardinal Heenan and Cardinal Conway warning another march could provide further violence.

The Conservative Unionists called for a complete sealing of the Border, so that the IRA could not infiltrate into Newry and cause trouble. The Newry march took place, sponsored by NICRA. The members marched a short distance and then were addressed by F it t , then dispersed peacefully.

On February 10th, the State of Emergency was declared in Northern Ireland. There followed a period of bombing and k illin g that lasted to the end of March. One of the worst explosions was at the Abercorn Restaurant, where two young women were k ille d and 136 injured, many maimed for l i f e . The bombs were now being placed in such a manner to cause the most personal harm to people, rather than to property. Faulkner interpreted this wave of bombings as the waging of war by the IRA on the civilian population. He believed the reason behind the bombing was to get communities at each other's throats.

On February 25th, there was an attempted assassination of the Minister of State, Taylor, by the O ffic ia l IRA. Taylor was shot while sitting in his car; he was severely wounded, but not killed.

IRA Attacks on RUC and UDR

Throughout January, February and March, there were concerted IRA attacks on the RUC and UDR; many security officers were murdered 268 at their homes. There was also widescale intimidation by the IRA. People who resisted were shot in the legs. This intimidation resulted in at least one factory being shut down and several Post Offices being shut down because the Postmasters were intimidated. One characteristic form of terrorism was to hood a man, usually a member of the UDR, tie his hands, and then shoot him in the head.

General Protestant Strike

On March 27th and 28th, a general strike, supported by nearly a ll Protestants, was held to demonstrate th e ir distaste fo r the Heath proposals that discussions should be held on a united Ireland,

INPUTS - EXTRASOCIETAL

Eire

During the f ir s t few months of 1972, there were continuing incidents taking place along the Border. Large amounts of gelignite were being taken across to wreck th e ir havoc in the North. One man, driving to the Border with a large amount of gelignite, was caught by the Southern police. The man said he was taking the gelignite across the Border, but the court found him not g u ilty . Soldiers were being fired on by IRA stationed across the Border and the Southern security forces often did nothing about i t . Several soldiers were blown up by mines whose wires ran across the Border where they could be detonated in safety.

The Conservative Unionists considered the South a hostile country, a sanctuary for terrorists, and they called for the Border to be sealed. The Conservatives accused the Republic of giving out a "spate of lying propaganda" that there was no Border incidents, but the Conservatives pointed out, this was clearly untrue. The Southern security forces were unable to deal with the troubles. The Conserva­ tives saw a double standard operating for North and South. The Southern Government thought i t was acceptable to murder law-abiding citizens and members of the security forces in the North, but when security forces In the North got to grips with terrorism, that was not acceptable.

The Government thought there was a regrettable lack of control of gelignite, and armed men carrying out subversive acts, In the South. The South was considered a haven fo r the IRA. Faulkner pointed out that men were being trained in Eire in the use of arms and they were then carrying out their dirty work in the North. The Government had decided to crater unapproved roads to try to stop the flow of gelignite. 269

Early 1n the year, Jack Lynch announced he would be sending money to the SOLP to look a fte r "his people in the North." Sometime later, Or. Hillery, the Foreign Minister of the Republic, announced in the USA that the Eire Government was no longer able to control the IRA.

The Conservative Unionists considered Lynch's statement repugnant, especially in the light of statements made by Hume, and others of the SDLP, that they would now settle for nothing less than a united Ireland. They wanted representations made to Westminster about this g if t of money to the SDLP.

Faulkner said the matter had already been brought to the attention of Westminster and the Government there were fu lly aware of the implications of Lynch's statement.

By January 1972, both parties at Westminster had agreed to hold talks on the eventual reunification of Ireland,

OUTPUTS — CONSERVATIVE UNIONISTS

Motion Rejecting a United Ireland

During the months of January, February and March, the Conserva­ tive Unionists dominated much of the debate in the House. Paisley was especially vocal. On February 8th, he introduced a motion rejecting any merger of Northern Ireland with the Republic. This was in response to Heath's proposals that talks on a united Ireland take place. Paisley saw the Labour Party at Westminster and a small fragment of the Liberal Party determined on a policy of uniting Ireland. Paisley considered talks on a united Ireland as dangerous and pointless.

The c iv il rights people were seen as no longer marching for housing, employment or social amenities, but the destruction of the Parliament of Northern Ireland and the link with the United Kingdom. Paisley reiterated his stand for the Constitution.

We are determined, come what may, to stand for the Constitution of this country and to resist to the very end, and that is to the death—any attempt to overrule the democratic wishes of the majority as expressed a t the b a llo t box. ( I . Paisley, Feb. 8, 1972)

Faulkner accepted Paisley's motion, rejecting any merger with the Republic. 270 «

What we see of the Iris h Republic, we do not lik e . We do not admire the petulant and bellicose utterances of Its public figures on the world stage. We hold 1n small regard a Government which makes available fo r use against us, money for subversion or worse. The whole ethos of the Republican State— the structure of its Constitution and of its laws— these things are repugnant to us. Above a l l , we are contemptuous of the cant which marks that State's behaviour towards N .I. At one moment Its leaders appear to accept the principle of consent; a t another, to be prepared to ride on the back of terrorism. They tell us that they cherish equally all who live on this island, but they confine th eir demonstrations of sympathy with the victims of terrorism to one side of our community. They assert in their Constitution a claim to jurisdiction over the whole island of Ireland, but are quick enough to accept us as a foreign country when there is a question of returning a sus­ pected murderer fo r tria l....W e w ill not allow Northern Ireland to be forced into an a ll-Ire la n d Republic against the will of the majority of its citizens. (Prime Minister Faulkner, Feb. 8 , 1972)

Faulkner accused Lynch of choosing to work fo r the overthrow of Northern Ireland's institutions and by so doing, of exposing himself and his own Government to the pressure of insidious and undemocratic influences. Faulkner considered this very dangerous for the whole of Ireland. Faulkner pointed to the many changes wrought 1n the pattern of government and administration that were designed to create a more participatory and representative system. By suggesting these changes, he said he had trie d to give a lead 1n bringing about a united community in Northern Ireland.

Moderate Unionists also supported Paisley's motion, so, fo r the first time, all the Unionists were united 1n their resolve not to be bombed or propagandered into a united Ireland. Moderates now questioned the civil rights movement and the SDLP that would call on Roman Catholics to withdraw from various committees on which they sat under the Establishment. Moderate Unionists were opposed to negotiating with anyone who had been involved 1n any way in the subversive activities. The concern was raised that Lynch was not in control of his own country, the IRA had him in tow.

Attack on Government for Failure

in Security Field

Throughout the f ir s t three months of 1972, Paisley, supported by Conservatives, led a'steady attack on the Government for their failure in the security field. Paisley charged'that there was no policing at a ll in Creggan, in the Bogside, and in Londonderry. Catholic schools were being used for arsenals and their parking lots for stolen cars. Paisley faulted the security at Long Kesh intern­ ment camp, where he said the laxness was so great, the prison officers were only allowed through the gates by permission of those who occupied the area. The camp was rea lly being run by the internees and there had been too many escapes. Paisley condemned Wilson fo r holding the IRA Provisionals up for respect, talking about th e ir dis­ cipline and closely knit organization. Paisley emphasized that these people had cold-bloodedly murdered innocent people; there could be no negotiation with them. Paisley saw the present situation as the culmination of the c iv il rights movement, which was re a lly a con­ spiracy aimed at the destruction of the State. To achieve their objectives, the Republicans had attacked the bulwarks of the State, the USC and the RUC. The Northern Ireland Government had negotiated with Wilson and had capitulated to the agitators; the Hunt Report had been accepted. Now, Lord Hunt retracted his report. Sir Arthur Young, the former Inspector General, had allowed the no-go areas to remain, so allowing the IRA to build up. The B ritish Army had had a policy of containment, rather than a policy of enforcing the law. They le f t the Republican barricades standing, but tore down the Protestant ones. The Government were now saying the IRA were beaten, but Paisley did not believe this. . The Protestant people had been patient, but Paisley warned, they would not continue to be patient.

There is a feeling that i f the Government are not prepared to do their duty the people w ill have to look to themselves for protection against a pos­ sible betrayal and an everlasting sell-out. (I. Paisley, March 14, 1972)

Paisley said the country was in a state of war, the Government policies were not working. A new m ilita ry in itia tiv e was needed, said Paisley, to deal with the bomb planters, bomb makers and gelignite smugglers. He called fo r a massive mobilization, so the country could be flooded with enough men trained and equipped to deal with the escalation of violence.

The Government position was that the security forces were having greater success against the IRA every day. The recent IRA outrages were the last death throws of a beaten organization. The RUC Reserve and the UDR were being increased sign ifican tly. The security forces were increasingly successful in detecting ille g a lly - held explosive materials and finding illegally-held firearms. 272

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

On March 28, 1972, the British Government assumed direct rule of Northern Ireland, stripping Stormont of its security powers. Northern Ireland was to be ruled for the next twelve months by William Whitelaw, who was given legislative power, and a Commission. After this was announced, the Faulkner Government and the Members of Parliament resigned In protest. Faulkner stated there was total dis­ agreement between his Government and the United Kingdom Government. Conservative Unionists expressed great bitterness at this move, which they regarded as a betrayal by the British Government.

SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS

The main concern of the Unionists was the defeat of the IRA. All processions were banned. The Army was seen as a restrained force, constantly beleagured by snipers and stone-throwers. The Unionists noted that when the Army had finally moved in to enforce the law, and people were subsequently k ille d , the Army was denounced. No such denouncement of the IRA had been forthcoming when Army personnel were murdered. I t was considered by this time that the IRA had Lynch 1n tow in the South. The Unionists stood united against being forced into a united Ireland.

The Conservatives saw the Republicans getting away with marching, despite the ban; the ban only hurt the loyalists. They thought loyalists needed to march to show their loyalties at this time, since the civil rights people were marching for the destruction of the Northern Ireland Parliament. The Conservatives would not talk to Heath about the possibility of a united Ireland.