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LegisBrief A QUICK LOOK INTO IMPORTANT ISSUES OF THE DAY JAN 2019 | VOL. 27, NO. 3 Did You Know? • A state legislative body possesses inherent powers of self-protection, according to Mason’s Decorum in Debate: Manual of Legislative Procedure. • Mason’s Manual A Short Primer states that every BY BRENDA ERICKSON • “In a broader sense, it embraces everything governmental body which is said in the house by members, has an inherent right Parliamentarian Hugh Cannon wrote that “one’s whether upon a question pending, or in to regulate its own introduction to parliamentary procedure can be reference to any other proceeding, matter, or procedure, subject confusing and mystifying. The language is new, business whatever.” to provisions of the even strange. The process is very different from constitution or other the way in which people ordinarily discuss matters n Why is debate regulated by controlling authority. parliamentary rules? • Provisions of the may feel that you are in the middle of the process In his book, “Lawmaking and the Legislative U.S. Constitution and beforeand make you decisions even know in howtheir tohome start.” or office. You Process,” former NCSL staffer Tommy Neal wrote, 49 state constitutions This LegisBrief is designed to help readers gain a “The legislative process, on paper, is a mechanical specifically grant the better understanding of one legislative parliamen- process. There are many variations from state to right to determine tary process—decorum in debate. state but it’s basically the same in all states as well the rules of as in the U.S. Congress. What makes it different proceedings to the n What is debate? from a machine is the interaction of legislators, and chambers of their their personalities, who were elected to make the respective legislative debate in two ways: laws for your state.” bodies. Noted parliamentarian Luther Cushing defines • In its strictest sense, it refers “only to what is A legislative institution does not choose its said on the one side or the other of a question members—the voters from each congressional or which the house is to decide by a vote.” legislative district do that. Each chamber, however, has the right to protect its proceedings by control- n What is decorum, and why is it important during debate? and in committee. ling interactions among its members on the floor The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure and propriety of behavior, conduct or appear- says debate is regulated “to assure every member ance.”Decorum Within generally the legislative is defined environment, as “appropriateness decorum a reasonable and equal opportunity to speak.” And relates to “the proper order, etiquette and conduct according to Riddick’s Rules of Procedure, “Debate follows a pattern of formality to preserve an objec- tive, impersonal interchange of thought, as well as ofParliamentarians members during generally a floor session.” agree that debate to help maintain order. Formal debate provides for should not be overly personal. As a result, most leg- order and courtesy.” islative assemblies have adopted rules of decorum that place focus on the issue being discussed, not Simply stated, rules for debate exist to safeguard the the person speaking. rights, privileges and obligations of all members; to provide them with equal opportunities to be heard; • Members should not refer to each other by to ensure fairness and good faith among them; and proper name. Instead, legislators may be to promote full and free discussion of issues. required to address each other by district n How is debate controlled? number, geographic area, county, city or other It is essential that deliberative assemblies conduct debate in a manner that protects the rights of torespectful refer, as title.appropriate, For example, to other 2017-2018 members as “Lady,”Missouri “Gentleman” House Rule or 85 “Representative.” requires a member Ac- Additional Legislative chambers may control debate through: individual members to be heard, yet is efficient. cording to parliamentarian Alice Sturgis, this Resources • Recognition—which member may speak. The practice serves as a reminder that a legislator • Mason’s Manual of - is speaking not as an individual but as a repre- Legislative Procedure sentative of a constituency. presiding officer plays a key role in the con • 2020 Mason’s duct of business on the floor. Typically, debate • References to the other chamber, executive Manual Commission membermust be addressed may speak. to For the example, presiding U.S. officer, Senate branch, judicial branch or the actions thereof Videos on Best Ruleand the XIX-1(a) presiding states officer in part, determines “When a Senatorwhich are not permitted. According to Mason’s Man- Practices for Debate desires to speak, he shall rise and address the ual of Legislative Procedure, such references and Decorum are “inconsistent with the independence of a • NCSL Glossary of legislative body.” he is recognized ...” Legislative Terms Presiding Officer, and shall not proceed until • Frequency—how often a member may speak. • Indecent language and disorderly words are A member typically may speak only once or prohibited - twice per question. In the Maine House, Rule 401 states, “A member may not speak more mindful that. For children example, are 2017-2018 often present Ala when thebama House House is inRule session” 50 directs and tomembers “never use to “be NCSL Contact asking leave of the House.” language that is profane, tasteless, vulgar or than twice to the same question without first Brenda Erickson • Length—how long a member may speak. Time morally crude.” 303-856-1391 limits vary, but most commonly range from South Dakota Joint Rule 1B-1 offers another example of why decorum is important: “The people Colorado House Rule 13(d), “no member of South Dakota require that their legislators main- five to 15 minutes. According to 2017-2018 shall speak longer than ten minutes without tain the highest of moral and ethical standards as consent of the House.” such standards are essential to assure the trust, • Location—from where a member may speak. A legislative assembly may require its members have a solemn responsibility to avoid improper be- - haviorrespect and and refrain confidence from ofconduct our citizens. that is Legislatorsunbecom- tions in the chamber. According to Pennsyl- ing to the Legislature or that is inconsistent with vaniato speak Senate from Rule their 10, desks a senator or specified “may address loca the Legislature’s ability to maintain the respect and the Senate at a microphone located on the trust of the people it serves. While it is not possible Floor of the Chamber.” to write rules to cover every circumstance, each • Language—what a member may say. For legislator must do everything in his or her power to deal honorably with the public and with his or says, “No member shall in debate use any lan- her colleagues and must promote an atmosphere guageexample, or gesture2018-2019 calculated Virginia to House wound, Rule offend, 57 in which ethical behavior is readily recognized as a or insult another member.” priority and is practiced continually, without fail.” National Conference of State Legislatures | William T. Pound, Executive Director 7700 East First Place, Denver, Colorado 80230, 303-364-7700 | 444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 515, Washington, D.C. 20001, 202-624-5400 www.ncsl.org | The information contained in this LegisBrief does not necessarily reflect NCSL policy..
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