Who Was Robert, and Why Do We Still Follow His Rules, Anyway?
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Resolutions to Censure the President: Procedure and History
Resolutions to Censure the President: Procedure and History Updated February 1, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45087 Resolutions to Censure the President: Procedure and History Summary Censure is a reprimand adopted by one or both chambers of Congress against a Member of Congress, President, federal judge, or other government official. While Member censure is a disciplinary measure that is sanctioned by the Constitution (Article 1, Section 5), non-Member censure is not. Rather, it is a formal expression or “sense of” one or both houses of Congress. Censure resolutions targeting non-Members have utilized a range of statements to highlight conduct deemed by the resolutions’ sponsors to be inappropriate or unauthorized. Before the Nixon Administration, such resolutions included variations of the words or phrases unconstitutional, usurpation, reproof, and abuse of power. Beginning in 1972, the most clearly “censorious” resolutions have contained the word censure in the text. Resolutions attempting to censure the President are usually simple resolutions. These resolutions are not privileged for consideration in the House or Senate. They are, instead, considered under the regular parliamentary mechanisms used to process “sense of” legislation. Since 1800, Members of the House and Senate have introduced resolutions of censure against at least 12 sitting Presidents. Two additional Presidents received criticism via alternative means (a House committee report and an amendment to a resolution). The clearest instance of a successful presidential censure is Andrew Jackson. The Senate approved a resolution of censure in 1834. On three other occasions, critical resolutions were adopted, but their final language, as amended, obscured the original intention to censure the President. -
Simplified Parliamentary Procedure
Extension to Communities Simplifi ed Parliamentary Procedure 2 • Iowa State University Extension Introduction Effective Meetings — Simplifi ed Parliamentary Procedure “We must learn to run a meeting without victimizing the audience; but more impor- tantly, without being victimized by individuals who are armed with parliamentary procedure and a personal agenda.” — www.calweb.com/~laredo/parlproc.htm Parliamentary procedure. Sound complicated? Controlling? Boring? Intimidating? Why do we need to know all those rules for conducting a meeting? Why can’t we just run the meetings however we want to? Who cares if we follow parliamentary procedure? How many times have you attended a meeting that ran on and on and didn’t accomplish anything? The meeting jumps from one topic to another without deciding on anything. Group members disrupt the meeting with their own personal agendas. Arguments erupt. A few people make all the decisions and ignore everyone else’s opinions. Everyone leaves the meeting feeling frustrated. Sound familiar? Then a little parliamentary procedure may just be the thing to turn your unproductive, frustrating meetings into a thing of beauty — or at least make them more enjoyable and productive. What is Parliamentary Procedure? Parliamentary procedure is a set of well proven rules designed to move business along in a meeting while maintaining order and controlling the communications process. Its purpose is to help groups accomplish their tasks through an orderly, democratic process. Parliamentary procedure is not intended to inhibit a meeting with unnecessary rules or to prevent people from expressing their opinions. It is intended to facilitate the smooth func- tioning of the meeting and promote cooperation and harmony among members. -
Executive Targeting of Congressmen As a Violation of the Arrest Clause
Notes Executive Targeting of Congressmen as a Violation of the Arrest Clause Federal law enforcement has expanded to give the executive branch po- tent new weapons for investigating crime.' These new techniques, includ- ing undercover activity and surveillance, have created an unprecedented potential for abuses that not only endanger the constitutional rights of private citizens, but may threaten the balance of power between the exec- utive and Congress. "Executive targeting," as described in this Note, refers to the deploy- ment of law enforcement power against a congressman with intent to dis- credit him, and without prior reasonable cause to suspect that he has com- mitted a crime.2 "Legitimate law enforcement," on the other hand, takes place when the executive suspects that a crime has occurred and deploys the law enforcement power to investigate that crime. Targeting first iden- tifies a victim and then discovers his offenses; legitimate law enforcement first discovers an offense and then seeks to find out whether the actor is criminally responsible.' Although the executive can target any adversary, 1. Responsibility for early federal law enforcement was confined mainly to the United States mar- shals, the Capitol police, and the Coast Guard. B. REKTOR, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGEN- cIES (passim) (1975). Prohibition and the resultant rise in organized crime expanded federal law enforcement. L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 29 (1979). See also Note, The Scope of FederalCriminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 805, 806-07 (invention and success of automobile an impetus toward expanding federal criminal jurisdiction). -
BRNOVICH V. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus BRNOVICH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, ET AL. v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 19–1257. Argued March 2, 2021—Decided July 1, 2021* Arizona law generally makes it very easy to vote. Voters may cast their ballots on election day in person at a traditional precinct or a “voting center” in their county of residence. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16–411(B)(4). Arizonans also may cast an “early ballot” by mail up to 27 days before an election, §§16–541, 16–542(C), and they also may vote in person at an early voting location in each county, §§16–542(A), (E). These cases involve challenges under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) to aspects of the State’s regulations governing precinct-based election- day voting and early mail-in voting. First, Arizonans who vote in per- son on election day in a county that uses the precinct system must vote in the precinct to which they are assigned based on their address. See §16–122; see also §16–135. -
A History of the US Senate Republican Policy
03 39-400 Chro 7/8/97 2:34 PM Page ix Chronology TH CONGRESS 79 (1945–1947) Senate Republicans: 38; Democrats: 57 Republican Minority Leader: Wallace H. White, Jr. Republican Policy Committee Chairman: Robert Taft Legislative Reorganization Act proposes creating Policy Committees; House objects Senate Policy Committees established in Legislative Appropriations Act Republicans win majorities in both the Senate and House, 1946 Senate Policy Committee holds first meeting (December 31, 1946) TH CONGRESS Sen.White (R–ME). 80 (1947–1949) Senate Republicans: 51 (gain of 13); Democrats: 45 Republican Majority Leader: Kenneth S. Wherry Republican Policy Committee Chairman: Robert Taft Republican Policy Committee begins keeping a “Record Vote Analysis” of Senate votes Harry Truman reelected President, 1948 ST CONGRESS 81 (1949–1951) Senate Republicans: 42 (loss of 9, loss of majority); Democrats: 54 Republican Minority Leader: Kenneth S. Wherry Republican Policy Committee Chairman: Robert Taft Sen.Vandenberg (R–MI), President Truman, Sen. Connally (D–TX), and Secretary of State Byrnes. Sen.Taft (R–OH). Sen.Wherry (R–NE). ix 03 39-400 Chro 7/8/97 2:34 PM Page x ND CONGRESS 82 (1951–1953) Senate Republicans: 47 (gain of 5); Democrats: 49 Republican Minority Leader: Kenneth S. Wherry Republican Policy Committee Chairman: Robert Taft Kenneth Wherry dies (November 29, 1951); Styles Bridges elected Minority Leader Robert Taft loses the Republican presidential nomination to General Dwight Eisenhower Dwight Eisenhower elected President, Republicans win majorities in Senate and House, 1952 RD CONGRESS 83 (1953–1955) Senate Republicans: 48 (gain of 1); Democrats: 47; Independent: 1 Republican Majority Leader: Robert Taft Republican Policy Committee Chairman: William Knowland Robert Taft dies (July 31, 1953); William Knowland elected Majority Leader Homer Ferguson elected chairman of the Policy Committee TH CONGRESS 84 Sen. -
April 21, 2020 the Honorable Zoe Lofgren Chairperson Committee On
April 21, 2020 The Honorable Zoe Lofgren The Honorable James P. McGovern Chairperson Chairman Committee on House Administration Committee on Rules 1309 Longworth House Office Building H-312, The Capitol Washington, DC 20515 Washington, DC 20515 Dear Chairperson Lofgren and Chairman McGovern: As our nation continues to confront the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, the American public must have confidence that their Members of Congress continue to perform the people’s business. I know that both of your committees have been working hard to identify secure ways to begin allowing remote voting and remote committee work, including mark-ups, hearings, and essential oversight. Beyond implementing the proxy voting as a first step, we ought to use this time as an opportunity to prepare for Congress to be able to work according to its full capabilities even with social and physical distancing guidelines in place. As you know, I have already indicated my clear preference for voting by the use of video-conferencing technology that millions of Americans now use to conduct business. These systems allow one to see and identify the person who is speaking and hear what is being said with little doubt about the identity of the participant. Used for the purposes of Floor and committee business, there would be little doubt who voted aye or nay. As, invariably, such action is performed in public and is public record, the issue of security appears to be minimal. While any distance-voting is less optimal than in-person voting or debating in committee or on the Floor of the House, the sound and image of the Member doing so virtually is far superior to the utilization of proxies. -
The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: a Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules
MCGINN1 06/04/98 1:32 PM Essay THE RIGHTS OF LEGISLATORS AND THE WRONGS OF INTERPRETATION: A FURTHER DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY RULES JOHN O. MCGINNIS† MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT†† In 1995, the House of Representatives adopted a rule that re- quires a three-fifths majority of those voting to pass an increase in in- come tax rates.1 More than two years later, debate continues over a rule whose constitutionality has been controverted in Congress, in the courts, and in academia. Although a majority of the House passed the three-fifths rule again in 1997,2 several Representatives challenged its constitutionality in court.3 In the academic debate, the latest entry is Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress by Jed Rubenfeld.4 Professor Rubenfeld claims that the three-fifths rule † Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. †† Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. The authors would like to thank Larry Alexander, Carl Auerbach, Stuart Benjamin, John Duffy, Michael Herz, Shaun Martin, Michael Ramsey and Erela Katz Rappaport for their comments and assistance. 1.See H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong. §106(a) (1995), reprinted in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. No. 103-342, at 658 (1995) (Rule XXI(5)(c)). 2.See H.R. Res. 5, 105th Cong. §106(a) (1997) (re-adopting Rule XXI(5)(c) with minor modifications, but not changing the three-fifths requirement); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 105th Cong., Rule XXI(5)(c) (1997), available at <http://lcweb.loc.gov/ global/legislative/hrules/hrulestoc.html>. -
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: a Defense
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense John 0. McGinnist and Michael B. Rappaporttt INTRODUCTION On the first day of the 104th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted a rule that requires a three-fifths majority of those voting to pass an increase in income tax rates.' This three-fifths rule had been publicized during the 1994 congressional elections as part of the House Republicans' Contract with America. In a recent Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, seventeen well-known law professors assert that the rule is unconstitutional.3 They argue that requiring a legislative supermajority to enact bills conflicts with the intent of the Framers. They also contend that the rule conflicts with the Constitution's text, because they believe that the Constitution's specific supermajority requirements, such as the requirement for approval of treaties, indicate that simple majority voting is required for the passage of ordinary legislation.4 t Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. tt Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. The authors would like to thank Larry Alexander, Akhil Amar, Carl Auerbach, Jay Bybee, David Gray Carlson, Lawrence Cunningham, Neal Devins, John Harrison, Michael Herz, Arthur Jacobson, Gary Lawson, Nelson Lund, Erela Katz Rappaport, Paul Shupack, Stewart Sterk, Eugene Volokh, and Fred Zacharias for their comments and assistance. 1. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EFFECTIVE FOR ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS (Jan. 4, 1995) [hereinafter RULES] (House Rule XXI(5)(c)); see also id. House Rule XXI(5)(d) (barring retroactive tax increases). 2. The rule publicized in the Contract with America was actually broader than the one the House enacted. -
§ 12. Expulsion, Exclusion, and Censure
Ch. 8 § 11 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS expenditures to the Clerk and in- As to exclusion—or denial by dicated his intention once in the House of the right of a Mem- Washington to complete and file ber-elect to a seat—by majority the required forms. vote, the House has the power to On June 2, 1936, the House de- judge elections and to determine clared the contestee entitled to his that no one was properly elected seat.(4) to a seat. If violations of the elec- tion campaign statutes are so ex- tensive or election returns so un- § 12. Expulsion, Exclusion, certain as to render an election void, the House may deny the and Censure right to a seat.(8) [Note: For full discussion of cen- sure and expulsion, see chapter 12, infra.] Expulsion Under article I, section 5, clause 2 of the United States Constitu- § 12.1 In the 77th Congress, the tion, the House may punish its Senate failed to expel, such Members and may expel a Mem- expulsion requiring a two- ber by a vote of two-thirds. thirds vote, a Senator whose In the 90th Congress, the Sen- qualifications had been chal- ate censured a Member in part for lenged by reason of election improper use and conversion of fraud and of conduct involv- campaign funds.(5) And the Com- mittee on House Administration ing moral turpitude. recommended in a report in the On Jan. 3, 1941, at the con- 74th Congress that a Member or vening of the 77th Congress, Mr. Delegate could be censured for William Langer, of North Dakota, failure to comply with the Corrupt took the oath of office, despite Practices Act.(6) However, the charges from the citizens of his House and the Senate have gen- state recommending he be denied erally held that a Member may a congressional seat because of not be expelled for conduct com- campaign fraud and past conduct mitted prior to his election.(7) involving moral turpitude.(9) 4. -