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Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program (MonTREP) Monterey Institute for International Studies Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report No. 17, June 21, 2010 CONTENTS: CE MILITARY AMIR AND INGUSHETIA VILAIYAT AMIR „MAGAS‟ CAPTURED CAUCASUS EMIRATE (CE) TERRORISM, MAY 2010 THREE SUICIDE BOMBINGS INTERDICTED IN MAY 2010 WAS DAGESTAN VILAIYAT‟S QADI THE KIZLYAR SUICIDE BOMBER? THE MUFTI YEVTEEV CONTROVERSY RADICALIZATION AMONG BASHKIR YOUTH REPORTED CAUCASUS EMIRATE‟S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP, AS OF MAY 2010 (PART 3 – INGUSHETIA AND DAGESTAN) ANNOUNCEMENT: NEW NON-PROLIFERATION/TERRORISM STUDIES MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE AND TERRORISM STUDIES CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS * IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted. Research assistance is provided by Leonid Naboishchikov, Daniel Painter, Fabian Sievert, and Daria Ushakova. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CE‟S MILITARY AMIR AND INGUSHETIA VILAIYAT AMIR MAGAS (ALI TAZIEV/MAGOMED YEVLOEV) CAPTURED On June 9, Russian FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov reported to President Dmitrii Medvedev on the capture of leading CE commander, the amir of CE Shura‟s MiIitary Committee and of the G‟ialgliache (Ingushetia) Vilaiyat Ali Taziev also known as Magas and sometimes identified in Russian and Caucasus media as Akhmad Yevloev. In the past, there has been some confusion in the reporting on who Magas actually was. Sometimes he was referred to as Yevloev, other times as Taziev. The jihadi sites only referred to him as Magas. Magas never issued video messages and had not appeared in any jihadi photographs or videos in many years. Nor did he issue any statements, at least none that had his name under them. The CE-affiliated website Kavkaz tsentr suggested that Magas had been poisoned like Caucasus-based AQ Abu Ibn Khattab was in 2004 and that this allowed Russian intelligence forces to capture him alive. The site stressed “the daring and decisiveness of amir Magas” would not have allowed him to be captured alive otherwise.1 Taziev‟s capture is another in a string of major neutralizations of leading CE figures. This is the first neutralization that has come in the form of a capture as opposed to the killing of top leaders. Recent Russian successes included the killings of Dagestan Vilaiyat amir Umalat Magomedov also known as al-Bara on New Year‟s Eve, Riyadus Salikhin Martyrs‟ Battalion operative and leading CE propagandist and recruiter Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii on March 3rd, and CE Shariah Court qadi and United Vilaiyat Kabardia, Balkaria, and Karachai amir Anzor Astemirov (aka Seifullah) on March 24th, among other lesser amirs, including the amir of Grozny Salambek Akhmadov, killed on March 21st. Thus, in a matter of a little more than five months Russian forces have removed from the jihad the amirs of three of its key regional commands, excepting only that of Chechnya; the CE‟s top operative, propagandist, and recruiter, Buryatskii; and its top ideologist and theologist, Astemirov. Also, Taziev‟s capture strikes another blow to the Ingushetia mujahedin. On September 5th, 2009 two of its key amirs were killed by Russian forces: Rustam Dzortov, also known as Abdul Aziz, and his naib Magomed Aliev, also known as „Abdul Malik‟. Buryatskii‟s demise in March also hit them hard, as he operated almost exclusively in Ingushetia. Now the CE‟s amir for Ingushetia has been removed. Most importantly, Taziev, as the CE‟s military amir and commander-in-chief during war time, was perhaps the Caucasus mujahedin‟s second most powerful leader after amir Umarov. This could seriously degrade CE‟s operational capacity, especially if he reveals all he knows to Russian intelligence. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CAUCASUS EMIRATE (CE) TERRORISM, MAY 2010 1 “Kafiry kosvenno podtverdili, chto amir Magas mog byt‟ otravlen,” Kavkaz tsentr, 9 June 2010, 15:55, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/06/10/73063.shtml. In May 2010 Russia saw approximately 49 terrorist attacks and terrorist-related violent incidents, bringing the total for the first five months of this year to 147 jihadi attacks/incidents. Those 147 attacks/incidents have led to approximately 76 state agents killed and 155 wounded, 56 civilians killed and 176 wounded. It remains unclear whether the May 26th car bomb explosion in Stavropol, which killed 7 and wounded 41 civilians, was a CE operation; neither the mujahedin nor the authorities have thus far claimed so. According to non-jihadi Russian sources, in the first five months of 2010 Russian security and police forces have killed 129 to 134, wounded 4 to 6, and captured 37 to 43 mujahedin. Over a hundred facilitators have been captured. As noted in IIPER, No. 16, the CE expanded its activity in the KBR to a new level. Thus, so far this year the CE has shown capacity to carry out operations over a larger geographical area than in recent years. The unprecedented number of attacks in Kabardino-Balkaria, the March 29th Moscow subway suicide bombings and possibly the first attack ever carried out in Stavropol demonstrate this. Ingushetia, which lost its lead within the CE jihad in April 2010 in terms of number of incidents, still places second to Dagestan, with the mujahedin of the former having executed some 43 attacks/incidents to the Dagestanis‟ 46 in the first five months of this year. The fall off in attacks in Chechnya so far this year by 30 and the increase in the KBR by 25 is striking. Dagestan continued to be most deadly for state agents, with approximately 36 killed there through May of this year, compared to some 19 in Chechnya and 12 in Ingushetia. On the other hand, Ingushetia has seen nearly as many overall casualties among state agents this year, with some 83 (some 12 killed and 71 wounded), approaching Dagestan‟s 90 casualties (36 killed and 54 wounded). The mujahedin in Chechnya continue to lead the Ingush in numbers of state agents killed with 19 this year; 20 have been wounded in Chechnya this year. The KBR mujahedin have inflicted the most civilian casualties of all the regions in the North Caucasus, if one excludes the Stavropol car bomb attack. The March 29th Moscow subway suicide bombings caused the bulk of the civilian deaths and wounded inflicted by the CE this year – 40 of the 56 killed and 121 of the 176 wounded. SOURCES: www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, www.ng.ru, www.izvestia.ru, www.kommersant.ru, www.kavkazcenter.com, www.jamaatshariat.com/ru, www.islamdin.ru, and hunafa.com. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ THREE SUICIDE BOMBINGS INTERDICTED IN MAY 2010 The month of May saw three suicide bombing attempts interdicted before each of the three male suicide bombers was able to detonate his explosives. Two were interdicted on Victory Day, May 9th, and were likely targeting Victory Day celebrations commemorating the victory over fascist Germany in what Russians call the Great Patriotic War or World War II. The first failed May 9th attack occurred in Chechnya, where a suicide bomber was shot and killed as he tried to detonate his explosives while police checked his papers some 300 yards from a MVD checkpoint. There were no other casualties in the failed attack besides the would-be bomber.2 The second May 9th 2 “V Chechne ubit predpologaemyi boevik-smertnik,” Kavkaz uzel, 9 May 2010, 12:10, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/168609/. interdiction occurred in the same manner but in Dagestan instead of Chechnya.3 The month‟s third interdicted attack occurred on May 31st when, according to Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechen forces killed a suicide bomber on his way to commit an attack.4 None of these interdicted attacks resulted in any casualties besides the would-be suicide attacker. The first interdicted attack of the year occurred on April 9th, in the village of Ekazhevo, Ingushetia), when a female suicide bomber‟s explosives detonated after police shot her during a special operation that ended in a shootout between several mujahedin. The explosion killed one and wounded five MVD servicemen. Seven mujahedin were killed, including the shakhidka.5 If the April interdiction is indeed counted as an interdiction, then the number of attacks remains at 5 or 7 for the year, depending on whether one counts two double suicide bomber attacks as one attack or as two attacks. IIPER is inclined to count double attacks as two separate attacks, since it is possible one could be interdicted while another is successfully executed. As a result of these 11 successful and failed attacks, 11 suicide bombers have been expended, three of which were female. One of three female suicide bombers failed; three of eight male attackers failed. The number of casualties resulting from successful and attempted suicide attacks at the end of May remains the same as at the end of April: 20 killed and 44 wounded state agents, 43 killed and 112 wounded civilians. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ WAS DAGESTAN VILAIYAT‟S QADI THE KIZLYAR SUICIDE BOMBER? On May 26th, an article posted on the website of the CE‟s Dagestan Vilaiyat mujahedin, JamaatShariat.com, announced that the qadi of the Dagestan Viliaiyat‟s Shariah Court, one Daud, had been killed in Kizlyar.6 This could mean that Daud was the suicide bomber who detonated his suicide vest on March 31st in that town, killing 9 and wounding 18 MVD personnel and killing 3 and wounding 9 civilians.7 The suicide 3 Neskol‟ko Vzryvov Progrmelo v Vilaiyate Dagestan, Shakhidy Atakovali Kafirov,” Jammat Shariat, 9 May 2010, 08:22, http://jamaatshariat.com/ru/content/view/739/32/. 4 “Ramzan Kadyrov: v Gorznom ubit terrorist-smertnik,” 31 may 2010, 15:28, www.kavkaz- uzel.ru/articles/169517/. 5 “V Ingushetii na meste provedeniya spetsoperatsii podorvalas‟ terroristka-smertnitsa,” Kavkaz uzel, 9 April 2010, 17:08, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/167550/; “”FSB: ubityie v Ekazhevo boeviki prichastny k terakty v Karabulake,” Kavkaz uzel, 9 April 2010, 20:23, www.kavkaz- uzel.ru/articles/167556/; “Vilaiyat G-alg-aiche.
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