White Paper 1984 Light Infantry Divisions

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

White Paper 1984 Light Infantry Divisions r I ·,·I . I ") I Chief of Staff, US Army I I I I • 1 White Paper 198.4 I I I' : ILIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS 3S6.1 US6~l c 2~ LIBR:ARY USA ~ FT IfAVENWOOH KAN ACXI6SION 00._-­ POR£GtSTR -~ 3C I I 1 I , U 5~,:' C. ~ It is important for all of us to recognize the geo-strategic value as UNITED STATES ARMY ~ell as battlefield utility of the light infantry division concept. The THE CHIEF OF STAFF concept has releva~ce.because it involv:s deve~opment o~ not only highly 16 April 1984 deployable, hard h1tt1ng combat units w1th a h1gher rat10 of combat to support capabilities but also lighter, technologically current equipment and resources. The smallest Active Army in 34 years requires an Army of Excellence which optimizes combat power. TO: The Soldiers and Civilians of the United States Army If we seize this concept with conviction, innovativeness, and v1s10n, the Army's landpower will increase and, as a result, playa more significant role in future US national security. This White Paper provides direction for the development of the finest /) /\ light infantry divisions the US Army can field. ( fl~l\;k~ Army leadership is convinced, based on careful examination of studies J N A. WICKHAM, JR. which postulate the kind of world in which we will be living and the i '.. Ge eral, United States Army i Ch ef of Staff nature of conflict we can expect to face, that an important need exists \........ for highly trained, rapidly deployable light forces. The British actiOQ 1 in the Falkland Islands, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and our recent success in Grenada confirm that credible forces do not always have to b. heavy forces. Accordingly, we have committed ourselves to creating a ntt light infantry division structure beginning with the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord. This 10,000(+) man force will have a greater tooth-to-tail ratio than a~ of our other Army divisions and will be deployable worldwide three times faster than existing infantry divisions. It will be an offensively oriented, highly responsive division organized for a wide range of missions worldwide, particu~arly where close fighting terrain exists. "Soldier Power" will make the light infantry division uniquely effective. Soldier power is developed through thorough, rigorous training, physical and mental toughness, excellence in basic infantry skills, and competent, resourceful leadership. We must take advantage of innovative training techniques and integrate lightweight, high-technolog, equipment into the division to give our soldiers a crucial edge over their opponents. We must eliminate the training detractors which would keep us from building the world's finest infantry units, and we must provide a concerned command climate that cares for our soldiers and thei family members. The 7th Infantry Division conversion must be successful, since it will I serve as the blueprint for other light divisions. We must factor in the lessons learned from the COHORT experience and insure that we are developing cohesive, hard hitting units capable of bold, independent, decisive action. 2 --rr--------------------,·--..z / No government will be disposed to violate our rights if it knows that we have the means and are I . ~I' c,ombat pow~r and ~us~ainabi~ity •. In such situatio~s h.ght infantry divisions prepared and resolved to defend them. I can be ass1gned m1SS10ns wh1ch w1ll free up mechan1zed and armored elements ~ for decisive employment elsewhere on the battlefield. James Monroe t ~I Division operations will be characterized by flexibility both in tactical ~ deployment and organization for combat. Light infantry fo:ces will habitually ~operate as combined arms teams with organic engineers, a~t111ery, aviation, The Need for Light Infantry Divisions */and air defense. When suitably augmented and task organ1zed for the mission, . , they will be capable of operating independently at bri~ade, battalion, and Dur1ng.the last 10 years, th~ Total Army has deliberately forged a force I company levels. In addition, they can be reinfo:ced w1th, or can themselves th~t can f1~ht ~utnumbered ~nd W1~ across the broad spectrum of conflict. .1 reinforce, airborne, air ass~ult, special operat10ns, armored or mechanized Th1s mode:n1zat10n program 1S mak1ng the force tougher, more resilient, and l forces. more f~ex1ble. Recently, the Army accelerated the next step in this .. ev~lu~10nar~ process by adopting a new light infantry division structure. Superb leaders, fighting soldiers, and tough tra1n1ng will be their Th1s 1S a t1mely decision based on threat analysis, recent historic lessons hallmarks. Leaders at every level will be masters of the profession of learned, and resource constraints. arms--experts at skilled reconnaissance, resourceful planning and violent execution. They will demand the highest levels of performance and discipline Light infantry divisions will add a new dimension to the strategic from their subordinates. They will establish a challenging command climate mobility of Army Forces. From bases in United States, these divisions will ~ and serve as the role models for tactical and technical proficiency, physical capable of rapidly reinforcing forward deployed US Forces in NATO or the Far i fitness, and ethical behavior. But above all, the leaders will have the high Eas~. They will also b~ available for contingencies elsewhere, including :i personal courage to inspire in their subordinates the respect and daring reg10ns of the world wh1ch lack a developed support infrastructure. t essential for victory under arms. Their rapid deployability will enable them to arrive in a crisis area The soldiers in these units will have confidence in their leaders, their before a conflict begins. By demonstrating US resolve and capability, they • equipment, their comrades--and themselves. By their performance in initial may well prevent the outbreak of war. This is particularly so where low to entry and subsequent training, they will have earned their positions in the mid intensity conflict threatens, when their presence could decisively affect~ unit. They will have the skill and the will to train hard and learn. All of t~e.o~tcome: And because of their strategic mobility, these light infantry . this we must assure if the light divisions are to achieve their missions. d1v1s10ns w1ll help reassure our friends and allies--and deter our adversaries even as they go about their normal training activities in the United States But it takes units--the combination of leaders and soldiers--to win or in overseas locations. battles. Light infantry forces will be high performance units, capable of bold, aggressive action under.condit~ons of grea~ hardshi~ ~nd.r~sk. Training · will be the crucial catalyst 1n form1ng these un1ts. Tra1n1ng w11l be The Characteristics of Light Infantry Divisions f Icontinuous, imaginative, and vigorous. Teamwork within squads, platoon and · companies, teamwork between maneuver and supporting arms, and teamwork between To deter, light infantry divisions must be able to fight--anytime, ground and air elements will be the product. The result will be "soldier anywhere, and against any opponent. , power"--the synergistic combination of concerned, compete~t leaders an~ well trained soldiers which will make light infantry forces un1quely effect1ve. This demanding mission requires the highest degree of tactical ~xcell~nce. Th~se will be offensively-oriented units. Especially in low The light infantry division will be equipped for the ~ission. Hig~ . 1nten~1ty ~onf~1~t! t~ey will be able to seek out and destroy the enemy on hi, technology will be used to enhance command and control, f1repower, na~1gat10n terra1n uS1ng 1n1t1at1ve, stealth and surprise. Attacks by infiltration air and night" vision and air and ground mobility. The concept of develop1ng assault, ambush, and raid will be the norm. Light infantry divisions wiil be "lightness" in equipment and combat resources will become an integral part of "terrain-using" forces, expert in camouflage, skilled in counter-mobility the Army's acquisition process. Equipment design will be orie~ted tow~r~ tech~iques, and ~u~c~ to, seize ad~antages afforded by their tough and sPirited.1 reduced size and weight for reasons of both strategic and tact1cal mob1l1ty. sold1ers. The d1v1s10ns forte w1ll be operating at night or under condition. of limited visibility. Even on defensive missions in close terrain or This division will take maximum advantage of transfers of high technology built-up areas, light infantry forces will habitually ambush, attack, and conceptJ and equipment from the 9th Infantry Division, Motoriz~d. Soldiers. counter attack. and leaders will have confidence in the reliability and effect1veness of the1r equipment. In mid to high intensity scenarios such as Southwest Asia or NATO, light infantry forces may be augmented with tailored Corps units to strengthen their \, 2 Having the right people in the right structure, with the right skills and) The regimental system will be implemented in all light infantry divisions equipment, properly trained and led, and formed into cohesive units, the light to coincide with unit activations. Light infantry battalions will rotate to infantry division will leave its bootprint wherever the mission requires. overseas locations when commonality of these units has been achieved. Repetitive tours for officers and NCO's will be encouraged to enhance cohesion, training, and combat readiness. Affiliation of training base units The Formation of the Light Infantry Divisions with light infantry regiments will be studied to improve the effectiveness of I initial entry training and unit cohesion. The light infantry division initiative cannot be "business as usual." The) divisions must reach maturity quickly. Their mission is to be ready to . fight. Many of the concepts of light infantry already are time proven. While) Training the Light Infantry Divisions. Training constitutes the most change will occur during evolution of the light infantry concept, it will be critical element of our light infantry blueprint.
Recommended publications
  • The Development of British Light Infantry in North America During The
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Wilfrid Laurier University Canadian Military History Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 4 1-24-2012 “Within Ourselves”: The evelopmeD nt of British Light Infantry in North America during the Seven Years’ War Ian McCulloch Directorate of Heritage and History, Department of National Defence Recommended Citation McCulloch, Ian (1998) "“Within Ourselves”: The eD velopment of British Light Infantry in North America during the Seven Years’ War," Canadian Military History: Vol. 7: Iss. 2, Article 4. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. McCulloch: “Within Ourselves”: The Development of British Light Infantry in ''Within Ourselves ... '' The Developm.ent of British Light Infantry in North America During the Seven Years' War Ian McCulloch " ... I am convinced. that till we have everything necessary. for carrying on the War here. within ourselves. Independent of Aidfrom this Country. we shall go on very slowly." Lord Loudon to the Duke of Cumberland, August, 1756. Introduction and folklore. "Braddock's Defeat," "The Massacre at Fort William Henry," "The Boston Massacre" he first British regulars to appear in North and even "George Washington's Cutting Down T America were those accompanying a small the Cherry Tree" have all served a variety of British expedition to wrest Manhattan from the purposes down through the centuries.
    [Show full text]
  • Exclusive Rulebookrulebook
    Savannah 1779 1 EXCLUSIVEEXCLUSIVE RULEBOOKRULEBOOK ©2005 Rodger B. MacGowan Volume IV American Revolutionary War Series Revised Nov. 2015 T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 1. Prepare for Play .................................................... 2 Historical Scenario ....................................................... 9 2. Victory Conditions ................................................ 3 The Siege of Savannah Historical Article .................... 10 3. Sequence of Play ................................................... 4 Campaign Game Reinforcement Schedule .................. 15 4. Special Rules ........................................................ 4 Sequence of Play .......................................................... 16 © 2005 GMT Games #0508 2 Savannah 1779 Defensive Perimeter, and in so doing switches play from the 1. PREPARE FOR PLAY Strategic to the Tactical Game Turn Track. 1.1 Colors: British: 1.6 Game Turn Tracks: Strategic Turn Track: Game Turns 1–15. Each Turn represents Regulars—Tan with red stripe a day, or in some cases multiple days. Player order is fixed. Germans—Tan with green stripe Weather, Random Events, Construction, Siege & Bombardment, Provincials—Tan with yellow stripe Reinforcements, Movement, Rally, Defensive Artillery Fire, and Tory Militia—Tan with brown stripe Close Combat that is not directed against the Savannah Defensive Perimeter, may apply. French Metropolitan Regulars—Light Turquose with Turquoise stripe Tactical Turn Track: Game Turns 16–25. Each Turn represents one hour. Player order
    [Show full text]
  • The Light- Infantry Division
    The Light- Infantry Division - The Right Stuff, at the Right Place, In Time Volumes have been written docu­ menting the continuing inadequacies of our strategic mobility assets and the fact that we "can't get there from here," either in time or with adequate forces if a crisis occurs in many of the current world flash points. The Army's solution to these inad­ equacies is the development of forces that require less airlift but retain the strength and capability to be effective. The Light Infantry Division is the most obvious of the Army's efforts. This new division is under develop­ ment and many months will go by before the arguments about the size of the rifle squad, the caliber of the ar­ tillery pieces, and the need for combat support are settled. When the profes­ sionals who are charged with the responsibility for this development ar­ rive at acceptable solutions, the Army will have a fighting unit of 10,000 men instead of 16,000 and the ratio of fighters to backup will be 3-to-1 com­ pared to the current 2-to-1 ratio in standard Army divisions. By com­ parison, the new division will be capable of deployment in fewer than one-third the aircraft and one third the time required to move a conventional unit. The critics who maintain that the modern battlefield is too lethal and too sophisticated to be an infantry milieu are dead wrong. No terrain on earth is too inhospitable if it must be defended frorn an enemy or must be taken from him.
    [Show full text]
  • Warfare Issuing an Order to Order a Unit to Attack, Select the Attacking Unit and a Legal Defender (See the Order of Battle Below)
    Warfare Issuing An Order To order a unit to attack, select the attacking unit and a legal defender (see The Order of Battle below). Attacking The attacking unit makes an Attack test against the target units Defense. Roll 1d20, add the acting unit’s Attack bonus. If the result equals or exceeds the defending units Defense, the attack is successful, move to the Power test. Attacking exhausts a unit. Exhausted units cannot attack. Once all units are exhausted, all units refresh. Power In order to inflict a casualty, you must make a Power test against the target’s Toughness. Roll 1d20, add the acting unit’s Power bonus. If the result equals or exceeds the defending units Toughness, you inflicted a casualty! Decrement the casualty die! Casualties Once a casualty die reaches 1, another casualty removes the unit from the battle. Each unit can be Rallied once at this point. Rally A unit about to be removed from battle can be Rallied. Their commander makes a Morale Test, DC15. If successful, the unit remains in the battle, but cannot be Rallied again. Diminished Once a unit is at half strength (for instance, 3 or less on a D6), if it takes a casualty, it must make a Morale test against DC 15 or suffer another casualty. The Order of Battle All units belong to a Rank specified on their unit card. A unit’s rank determines who they can attack, and who they can be attacked by. There are six ranks; Infantry (incl. Levies). Anyone can attack these units. Archers.
    [Show full text]
  • Failure in 1813: the Decline of French Light Infantry and Its Effect on Napoleon’S German Campaign
    United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons Cadet Senior Theses in History Department of History Spring 4-14-2018 Failure in 1813: The eclineD of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign Gustave Doll United States Military Academy, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd Part of the European History Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Doll, Gustave, "Failure in 1813: The eD cline of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign" (2018). Cadet Senior Theses in History. 1. https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd/1 This Bachelor's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at USMA Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cadet Senior Theses in History by an authorized administrator of USMA Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons Cadet Senior Theses in History Department of History Spring 4-14-2018 Failure in 1813: The eclineD of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign Gustave Doll Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY FAILURE IN 1813: THE DECLINE OF FRENCH LIGHT INFANTRY AND ITS EFFECT ON NAPOLEON’S GERMAN CAMPAIGN HI499: SENIOR THESIS SECTION S26 CPT VILLANUEVA BY CADET GUSTAVE A DOLL, ’18 CO F3 WEST POINT, NEW YORK 19 APRIL 2018 ___ MY DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFIES ALL SOURCES USED AND ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT. ___ NO SOURCES WERE USED OR ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT.
    [Show full text]
  • The Development of British Light Infantry in North America During the Seven Years’ War
    Canadian Military History Volume 7 Issue 2 Article 4 1998 “Within Ourselves”: The Development of British Light Infantry in North America during the Seven Years’ War Ian McCulloch Directorate of Heritage and History, Department of National Defence Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation McCulloch, Ian "“Within Ourselves”: The Development of British Light Infantry in North America during the Seven Years’ War." Canadian Military History 7, 2 (1998) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. McCulloch: “Within Ourselves”: The Development of British Light Infantry in ''Within Ourselves ... '' The Developm.ent of British Light Infantry in North America During the Seven Years' War Ian McCulloch " ... I am convinced. that till we have everything necessary. for carrying on the War here. within ourselves. Independent of Aidfrom this Country. we shall go on very slowly." Lord Loudon to the Duke of Cumberland, August, 1756. Introduction and folklore. "Braddock's Defeat," "The Massacre at Fort William Henry," "The Boston Massacre" he first British regulars to appear in North and even "George Washington's Cutting Down T America were those accompanying a small the Cherry Tree" have all served a variety of British expedition to wrest Manhattan from the purposes down through the centuries. All have Dutch in 1664. Colonel Richard Nicolls' troops become part of the "usable past" and have been landed on Long Island 25 August 1664 at the extensively deployed in any discussions of one exact site where General William Howe's troops of those favourite themes of North American would disembark over a century later.
    [Show full text]
  • Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army: How the Past Can Inform the Present and Future
    C O R P O R A T I O N Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army How the Past Can Inform the Present and Future Gian Gentile, David E. Johnson, Lisa Saum-Manning, Raphael S. Cohen, Shara Williams, Carrie Lee, Michael Shurkin, Brenna Allen, Sarah Soliman, James L. Doty III For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1602 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9607-4 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The history of human conflict suggests that the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Infantry Rifle Platoon & Squad (FM 7-8)
    FM 7-8 INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON AND SQUAD HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION – Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. FM 7-8 C1 HEADQUARTERS CHANGE 1 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington, DC, 1 March 2001 1. Change FM 7-8, dated 22 April 1992, as follows: REMOVE OLD PAGES INSERT NEW PAGES None 6-1 through 6-66 2. A star (*) marks new or changed material. 3. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication. This Publication is available on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training And Doctrine Digital Library www.adtdl.army.mil DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited. C1, fm 7-8 1 March 2001 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: ERIC K. SHINSEKI General, United States Army Chief of Staff Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0104302 DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 110782, requirements for FM 7-8. FM 7-8 PREFACE This manual provides doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures on how infantry rifle platoons and squads fight. Infantry rifle platoons and squads include infantry, airborne, air assault, ranger, and light infantry platoons and squads. This manual supersedes FM 7-8, Infantry Platoon and Squad dated April 1981, as well as FM 7-70, The Light In fantry platoon and Squad dated September 1986, and is aligned with the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. It is not intended to be a stand-alone publica- tion. An understanding of FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, and FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, is essential.
    [Show full text]
  • The Clash and Combination of Regular and Irregular Warfare During the French and Indian War Nicole Goetz
    100 Emory Endeavors in History 2013 A Country Dangerous for Discipline: The Clash and Combination of Regular and Irregular Warfare during the French and Indian War Nicole Goetz Abstract This article argues that the reason that the British were victorious in the French and Indian War in the North American theatre was not due to their having superior military technology or deeper pockets than the French, but due to their leadership and military tactics on the battlefield. While both the French and British campaigns engaged in irregular, or guerrilla, and regular warfare, the British combined both tactics into a hybrid way of war that proved superior on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the inability of the French to combine these two strategies made them the weaker, despite being more skilled at irregular warfare. The guerrilla warfare tactics developed during this war would prove to be timeless, reappearing later in America’s military history in the Revolutionary War, the Vietnam War, and more recently in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Introduction uerrilla warfare became a highly important topic of discussion during the Vietnam War. The United States and South Vietnam without a G doubt had more firepower and weapons than North Vietnam, yet the Americans and South Vietnamese struggled to stay afloat against the North Vietnamese. More recently, in the past decade, U.S. troops were again challenged by guerrilla warfare tactics used by the Iraqi insurgency in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. These conflicts proved that it not only mattered which side possessed better firearms technology, but also which side better executed guerrilla warfare tactics.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing Conventional Army Demands and Requirements for Ultra-Light Tactical Mobility
    Assessing Conventional Army Demands and Requirements for Ultra-Light Tactical Mobility Matthew E. Boyer, Michael Shurkin, Jonathan P. Wong, Ryan Schwankhart, Adam Albrich, Matthew W. Lewis, Christopher G. Pernin C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr718 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN 978-0-8330-8776-8 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2015 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo courtesy of Spc. Jesse LaMorte, Special Operations Task Force - South Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface For over a century, the conventional Army has formally and informally used relatively small and light ground vehicles to meet tactical mobility needs in circumstances where standard tac- tical vehicles were too heavy, too large, or otherwise inappropriate.
    [Show full text]
  • Whither the Light Infantry?
    WHITHER THE LIGHT INFANTRY? Maj Jason A. Morische JCSP 43 DL PCEMI 43 AD Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2018. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2018. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 43 DL – PCEMI 43 AD 2017 – 2018 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT WHITHER THE LIGHT INFANTRY? Maj Jason A. Morische “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada.
    [Show full text]
  • The Massachusetts State House Battle Flag Collection
    THE MASSACHUSETTS STATE HOUSE BATTLE FLAG COLLECTION The Commonwealth’s Battle Flag Collection is composed primarily of colors carried by Massachusetts troops during armed conflict. Among these are over 300 flags issued to regiments of infantry, cavalry, light battery and heavy artillery during the Civil War. Originally displayed in Doric Hall, the flags were moved in 1900 to Memorial Hall where glass enclosed cases were constructed specifically to house these precious relics of the War of the Rebellion. Since that time, flags dating from ca. 1780 through the war in Iraq, as well as reproduction and service flags have been invested. Because of their fragile condition, all of the battle flags were removed in 1987 and are now held in storage. Images and histories are available upon request. REVOLUTIONARY WAR ERA: Jonathan Fowle 13-star flag 1 national color REVOLUTIONARY WAR ERA REPRODUCTION FLAGS "Grand Union" flag (Siege of Boston) "Old New England" flag "Bunker Hill Flag" "First Naval Flag of Massachusetts" WAR of 1812 Waldoboro Light Infantry 1 regimental color Pre-1840 Militia flag 1 regimental color MEXICAN WAR Winfield Scott Flag 1 regimental color 1852 Bay State Light Infantry 1 regimental color CIVIL WAR: REGIMENTS OF CAVALRY 1st REGIMENT MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY 1 national standard 1 state standard 1 regimental standard 1 national 2nd REGIMENT MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY 1 state standard 3rd REGIMENT MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY 1 national standard 1 state standard 4th REGIMENT MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY 1 state standard 1 regimental standard 1 guidon
    [Show full text]