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Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 4

1-24-2012 “Within Ourselves”: The evelopmeD nt of British Light in North America during the Seven Years’ Ian McCulloch Directorate of Heritage and History, Department of National Defence

Recommended Citation McCulloch, Ian (1998) "“Within Ourselves”: The eD velopment of British in North America during the Seven Years’ War," Canadian Military History: Vol. 7: Iss. 2, Article 4. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. McCulloch: “Within Ourselves”: The Development of British Light Infantry in

''Within Ourselves ... '' The Developm.ent of British Light Infantry in North America During the Seven Years' War

Ian McCulloch

" ... I am convinced. that till we have everything necessary. for carrying on the War here. within ourselves. Independent of Aidfrom this Country. we shall go on very slowly." Lord Loudon to the Duke of Cumberland, August, 1756.

Introduction and folklore. "Braddock's Defeat," "The Massacre at Fort William Henry," "The Boston Massacre" he first British regulars to appear in North and even "George Washington's Cutting Down T America were those accompanying a small the Cherry Tree" have all served a variety of British expedition to wrest Manhattan from the purposes down through the centuries. All have Dutch in 1664. Colonel Richard Nicolls' troops become part of the "usable past" and have been landed on Long Island 25 August 1664 at the extensively deployed in any discussions of one exact site where General William Howe's troops of those favourite themes of North American would disembark over a century later. After a historians -the conflict between European and swift Dutch capitulation, Nicolls' redcoats and colonial values and methods. Inevitably subsequent garrisons of British regulars would European warfare vs. North American warfare maintain a solid presence in New York for a (la petite guerre) has been drawn into the mythic virtually uninterrupted period of 119 years. 1 vortex. :l Canadian historian l.K. Steele writes that "North American pride in the ways of the New It has been suggested by one American World has often led to the assumption that, in historian that this factual record has been warfare as in everything else, the new men of conveniently overlooked by most of his the New World were better than the history-laden colleagues in order that "the dismal episode of men of the Old." Braddock's defeat more than Braddock's defeat" can figure prominently in any other engagement of the Seven Years' War history books as the first appearance of British has, "with some misrepresentation," been used redcoats on the North American scene. Thus as key evidence to support this assumption of "they could be made to appear as stupid brutes superiority.4 Stanley Pargellis reinforces this view: led by an eighteenth century Colonel Blimp while American simultaneously appeared as a Military historians hold that Braddock's defeat keen and valiant yeomanry led by that paragon taught a lesson badly needed for the time: you cannot employ parade ground tactics in the of all virtue and destined military hero of the fight bush. To almost everyone who in one 2 for American liberty, George Washington. " connection or another remembers Braddock. this episode stands as a conflict between Old His accusation is a valid one, but not very World and New World ways, with the outcome surprising, as much of early American history justifying the new.5 has become firmly embedded in myth, legend

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However, many historians led by Pargellis, Cromwell's time, took on a new vitality in with Paul Koppermans, Ian Strachan, and America. Each colony, as it became established, Steele in close support, stress that Braddock's was obliged to create its own militia for defeat can no longer be perceived or used as protecting and extending its frontiers. such. 6 While broad generalizations about the Cooperation amongst the of the various utility of close-order formations in woods or the colonies was confined to specific expeditions in cunning and ruthlessness of Indian tactics or which two or more colonies had a mutual the command abilities of the young Washington interest. Organized into units by county or may all be still true, they are not true as township, the militia rarely fought as formed inferences from Braddock's defeat. The general units. Instead, the local unit served as a training consensus now is that Braddock's debacle was and mobilization base from which individuals precipitated in large part by his critical neglect could be selected for active operations. 10 on the day of to observe the fundamental rules of war laid down in the European manuals The effectiveness of the colonial militias of the day. His leadership lapse and varied from bad to very good, their prowess complacency once nearing his objective meant increasing proportionately to their proximity to that his soldiers were never given a chance to the Indian frontier and the no-man's-land demonstrate that Old World methods, properly between New England and New France. The applied, might have very well won the day. 7 His seventy year struggle for the North American column from the day it launched into the North continent commencing in 1689 consisted, in fact, American wilderness adopted well-conceived of four separate . The first three: the War of and generally well-executed security measures the League of Hapsburg ( 1689-1697). the War of as per the manuals. On the day however, these the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) and, the careful measures were inexplicably not ordered War of the Austrian Succession (1744-1748), nor implemented by Braddock and his and were fought by the colonists of both mother their absence was enough to ensure the ruin of countries using colonial methods and military their army and give British officers a reputation resources to hand. The French utilized their for ineptitude under frontier conditions. 8 Indian allies from the outset and armed them with . The American frontier militias This reputation is undeserved, for British were thus forced to assimilate the best features regulars took especial care to prepare of Indian tactics in order to effectively counter themselves for the American theatre, including their enemy: small-unit operations, loose Braddock and subsequent commanders. After formations, informal dress, swift movement, fire Braddock's defeat no inferior guerilla force discipline, ambush and surprise attack. Aided would ever overcome any substantial body of by a greater population base and their own British regulars during the Seven Years' War in Indian allies, many American frontiersmen North America. became adept at marksmanship, a skill which increased as more accurate were developed. 11 "BB"- Before Braddock Russell Weigley, an American military he first English settlers in Virginia and New historian, states. however. that "as the frontier T England arrived with a minimum of receded. the inhabitants of older communities professional military support. In 1607, the gradually lost their skills in shooting. forest lore. Jamestown settlers heeding Captain John and Indian fighting. More and more the militia Smith's advice formed" .. .immediately into three of long-settled communities had to rely not on groups: one to erect fortifications for defence, frontier experience but on European military one to serve as a guard and to plant a crop, a manuals to guide them in their training. " 12 third to explore."9 They encountered hostile Orthodoxy advanced to such an extent that at Indians almost immediately and, for many the outbreak ofthe Seven Year's War (The French decades, had to rely on standing militia forces. and Indian War to the Americans), militia commanders were being advised by Colonel Ironically, this ancient British tradition of the Washington to study war from Humphrey Bland's militia, on the decline in England since Oliver Treatise on Military Discipline, the leading

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Above: Indian auxiLliary with scalp. by Brigadier General George Townshend. ca.l 759. (Author's collection) Right: An Iroquois Warrim: He is formidably armed with a ball club, iron-headed tomahawk and a J1intlock. Note the snowshoes, which would greatly increase his mobility in the snow. and the enemy scalp draped ouer the barrel of his gun. (David M. Sieww'L Museum) English tactical manual of the day. These Our people are nothing but a set of farmers recommendations were no doubt based on and planters, used only to the axe and hoe - Washington's less than charitable opinions of [the Canadians] are not only well trained and disciplined, but they are used to arms from colonial militiamen as expressed in 1755: their infancy among lndians; and are reckoned equal, if not superior in that part of the world Mililia, you will find ... never answer your to veteran troops ... These [Canadians] are expectations. no dependence is to be placed troops that fight without pay - maintain on them: they are obstinate and perverse, they themselves in woods without charges march are egged on by the officers. who lead them to without baggage - and support themselves acts of disobedience, and when they are without stores and magazines ... "' ordered to certain posts for the security of stores, or the protection of the inhabitants. will, In general, the colonial militias before on a sudden. resolve to leave them, and the united vigilance of their officers can not prevent Braddock were not useful unless fighting the1n.'" directly in defence of their own homes and families. Colonial expansion was mostly Washington was not under any illusions accomplished by simple appropriation and either of their utility in forest warfare against settlement - or dubious purchases and deals the French Indian . He wrote that rather than through any coordinated military "without Indians, we shall never be able to cope action by militias. Weigley concludes that "in with those cruel foes to our country. Indians general, the colonial militias were not a reliable are the only match for Indians; and without instrument of war distant from their these, we shall ever fight on unequal terms."14 own firesides .... Militia training did not prepare His views on colonial militia pre-dated one them for extended campaigns, nor did militia British writer who wrote in 1758: organization befit the maintenance of long

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expeditions."16 Thus, a long campaign Marshal Maurice de Saxe. one of the "Great to distant fields that also involved Captains" oj 18'" century w'arrare. was meeting Indian tactics of stealth and a proponent of light irifantry tactics. (Print after a 1 7 48 portmil by Quentin ambuscade, was one for which de La Tour. Photo: R. Chartrand.) colonial militias (except ranger units recruited exclusively from frontiersmen) were eminently officers who served in North unsuited and, moreover, one in America during the Seven which they were unwilling to Years' War. It was the former participate. Governor Robert war in which irregular troops Dinwiddie, however, knew were first employed on a large 19 where to find men to meet the scale by modern armies. In challenge. He wrote to his friend l 7 40-l 7 41, the young Austrian James Abercromby in England: Empress. Maria Theresa. "I am still of Opinion without force mobilized her Croatian and from Home, we shall hardly be able Hungarian military borders (or to drive the French from the Ohio; buffer zones) created to protect her we want Military Men, and particularly empire from the Ottoman Empire. The Ingin eers." 17 Serb-Croat and Pandour troops thus generated were then moved to the central front Were the "Military Men," the British regulars, for the first time in an attempt to eject Frederick equal to the task? Were they capable of waging the Great's troops from Silesia. They performed protracted campaigns in a virtual wilderness invaluable service in every campaign and by 1744 against elusive adversaries well-versed in all Field Marshal Traun had successfully forced the aspects of ? Some perhaps were Prussians out of Bohemia by constant attacks not prepared for the ruthless savagery of scalping on Frederick's supply lines and by harassing his and cannibalism encountered, but many soldiers forage parties. Over 40,000 Serbo-Croatian and their officers were well inured to irregular "Grenzer" would serve in the Hapsburg armies warfare and skirmishing either from experiences during the War, increasing to about 88,000 in Scotland or on the battlefields of Europe. during the Seven Years' War. These fierce "irregulars" were usually dispatched on Various scholars argue that the modified independent operations against enemy outposts, integrated infantry tactics that came to dominate supply centres and lines of communication, but European battlefields from the middle of the some-times played a small part on the battlefield 1 790s were primarily an organic European as posted on the flanks. 20 development extending over the previous century. These developments slowly but gradually The French army adapted to this new aspect combined the techniques of linear formations of warfare from the outset. The Bohemian with those of irregular auxiliaries (Pandours, campaign brought Maurice de Saxe to the fore, , Rangers et al), with regular specialists a subordinate general who, based on his in open order who were already members of the extensive experience with light troops in Eastern line (light companies) and with elite units such Europe and as an author of the first modern as jaegers and . Colonial experience, treatise to deal with the subject, raised a number they argue, tended only to reinforce existing of compagnies ]ranches or "free companies" of trends already in train and not to initiate them. 18 the French Army in 1744. He eventually The historical record bears this out, though it commanded five regiments of light troops during will be seen that all three developments the campaign, each combining infantry and simultaneously occurred within the British operating together. At Fontenoy in 1745, infantry in North America during the Seven Years' Saxe used his light troops on the battlefield itself, War. sending a screen of against the British centre while he deployed his army. He The War of the Austrian Succession ( 1740- also stationed Monsieur de Grassin's new 1200- 1748) and the Jacobite Rebellion (1745-1746) strong Regiment des Arquebusiers on his left were the training grounds for most of the British where their deadly independent fire or feu de

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The Chevalier Claude de Grassin led the robbers. 23 By Fontenoy, however, the most outstanding light corps during the were a regular heavy Austrian Succession War, the infantry regiment of the line, albeit Arquebusiers de Grassin which equipped with a uniform that existedfrom 1744 to 1749. (Prini aJier poriraii atlributed io allowed them greater mobility Duplessis. Photo: R. Chartrand.) as well as broadswords and Highland pistols for close­ repulsed a British quarter fighting. 24 attempt on that flank Major­ General J.F.C. Fuller writes It was open field tactics at that "Grass in's troops were the Falkirk and Prestonpans by first true light infantry of the Highlanders, however, and modern times, behaving not the irregular warfare that splendidly at Fontenoy and flared up on the periphery of the deciding the battle of Mesle. 21 Rebellion, that defeated the Saxe also used them at Lauffeldt, conventional British infantry of against the British, who quickly the day. In early 17 46, British forces gained a great deal of respect for this found themselves engaged in constant eighteenth century commander and irregular warfare; the Chevalier de studied his writings on war carefully. 22 Johnstone, a Jacobite staff officer who served with the Marquis de Montcalm at Quebec, Flanders. where British soldiers fought remarked that "Lord Loudon with his (Highland) principally against French troops, exemplified corps frequently harassed and annoyed the same type of fighting that had characterised us ... keeping us continually on the alert." warfare in Germany, Bohemia, Sardinia and However, Jacobite general Lord George Murray's Italy. The traditional operations and ponderous counter moves drove Loudon's men away from movements of armies, convoys and their base at Inverness allowing Murray to detachments between the set-piece and emerge and launch a series of surprise attacks were being increasingly affected by the on Cumberland's outposts and supply lines. activities of irregulars in all theatres of Johnstone believed that "this bold enterprise operations. Professionals in all armies had a very good effect, and made such an recognised that by the end of the 17 40s, impression on the English that, conceiving irregular light troops and regular light infantry themselves insecure everywhere, they were had a role in wartime, if only to defend one's obliged to redouble their service in the midst of own forces against those of the enemy. The winter."25 British forces in Flanders were, therefore, directly and continuously exposed to these new Many Highlanders however soon came tactical developments as practised by ally and to respect the ability of the English infantry or enemy alike. "red soldiers" to function in mountainous terrain and the professional behaviour of its The Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-1746 commander. On one occasion, General Bland, presented the with some very author of the widely-used Treatise on Discipline, special problems of fighting in mountainous marched with a force of regular and foot, terrain against a very agile, mobile and hardy screened with a force of"Campbells before him" adversary. Highland clans were well-versed in as well as ''the Laird of Graunt [sic] and 100 of the guerilla , stealth and surprise and many his followers." Surrounded by fog, Bland British commanders including Wolfe and Bland received word back of a possible ambush ahead. were complimentary about their warlike skills He halted his column, took up defensive and tactical acumen. Fuller goes so far as to positions and sent a heavily-armed detachment say that the Black Watch in their first iteration forward to investigate. On the "all clear," Bland were an "irregular " who, wise in the ways went forward again assuming his previous of the Highlands, were the best-equipped light march discipline.26 troops to deal with Highland raiders and

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"AB" - Mter Braddock estimation, the requirement also included "a small mobile force of trained officers and men, ritish commanders after Braddock found with enough reserves to garrison captured posts B that war in North America was essentially and maintain a lengthening line of one of geography with such vast problems of communication. In brief, the British needed a communication and supply that their principal small, highly trained army of experts, some of task of generalship was simply in moving a force whom could only be found in the colonies."28 of moderate size into contact with the enemy. With the French on the strategic defensive, it This, then, sets the stage for the arrival of was the British and Americans who had to Braddock who has already been discussed and penetrate hundreds of miles into trackless and provides our starting point. Shy notes that unsettled country. "American conditions weighted the classic tension of warfare- boldness versus caution, American historians, John Shy and Pargellis surprise versus security - in favour of the have underlined the problems of administration cautious approach. Only bad luck could nullify and logistics throughout the War, and agree that the natural English superiority, and only the aptitude of a few individuals for strategy rashness or faulty logistics could enhance the and tactics cannot be an adequate explanation possibility of bad luck. "29 Braddock had of success or failure in the North American crippling supply problems, then lost his battle conflict. Shy observes that "the forces of nature through a single careless act. To future were so nearly overwhelming that the French commanders the message was clear: leave and Indian War had to be a war of organisation nothing to chance and take no risks. and administration. It was a on a grand scale. '027 Essential auxiliaries needed by any Braddock's successor was John Campbell, general aspiring to take New France by the Lake Earl of Loudon, a Highlander officer well-versed Champlain route included bateauxmen, in irregular warfare from service during the and, especially, engineers. In Pargellis' Jacobite Rebellion. Loudon's immediate task was to build a serviceable army from the remains of Braddock's regiments, garrison soldiers, provincials, and new units from Britain, as well as creating a logistical system during 1756-1757 that would form the basis of ultimate victory. With Braddock's defeat fresh in everyone's memory, Loudon was deeply concerned with how his troops would fare in "the Bush fight in which the [French) have so great an advantage by their Canadians and Indians." Loudon was of the opinion in late 1756 that "it is impossible for an Army to act in this Country without Rangers," the latter a group of experienced frontiersmen raised by William Shirley the year before for and patrolling duties.30 Led by Robert Rogers, the Rangers were Americans, but must not be confused with the American provincial or militia regiments. Pargellis writes:

It is an easy fashion today to imagine that every colonial was an adept in Indian warfare, or that if they could not all follow a trail with Deerslayer's

Major Robert Rogers, commander of a unit that specialized in irregular waifare and bush fighting. (Author's Collection)

http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/4 6 McCulloch: “Within Ourselves”: The Development of British Light Infantry in

Private, 60th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans), ca.l 755-1 763. The regimentals consisted of red coat and waistcoat, without the usual decorative lace trimmings, blue coat cuffs, lapels, turnbacks and breeches, pewter buttons, tricorn with white lace and black cockade. Buff leather accoutrements and armed with and bayonet. The white gaiters were for dress parades. Brown "marching" gaiters or green Indian-style leggings with red garters were otherwise used. (Print after reconstruction by P. W. Reynolds. Photo: R. Chartrand.)

adeptness at least they knew some tricks of the woods and could take care of themselves. That is a fond delusion. Loudon would have been only too glad if it had been true, if he could have depended on colonial woodsmen to provide for his command in America what British troops could not provide - a knowledge of the region and oflndian fighting .... But most of the provincial army came from long-settled communities which had never seen an Indian in war-paint ... 31

Loudon's gloomy letter crossed one from the Duke of Cumberland advising Loudon to "teach your troops to go out on Scouting Parties; for 'till Regular Officers with men that they can trust, learn to beat the woods, and to act as Irregulars, you will never gain any certain Intelligence of the Enemy."32 Loudon decided to use a combination of regulars and rangers. Regulars were trained to face both French regulars and irregulars (Canadians and Indians). Bush tactics and dress were soon put into Of particular note is Loudon's surviving practise. British soldiers acting as a covering 1756 training directive to his four party or vanguard learned to march in single file; commanders of the Royal American Regiment if they fell into an ambush, the command "Tree (60th Foot). a new regiment raised in America all" was given and every man found a tree and of which he was the first Colonel-Commandant. looked out for himself. Various suggestions were The Royal Americans were ordered to dress made from time to time to make the regular exactly like line regiments of the British army troops better fitted for the American milieu: less regimental lace but to train specifically for George Scott of the 40th (and later Amherst's their proposed role in forest warfare. and Wolfe's commander of Rangers at Instructions included firing "at Marks, and in Louisbourg and Quebec respectively) devised order to qualify them for the Service of the plans to lighten equipment and reduce firing Woods, they are to be taught to load and fire, motions; James Prevost another Swiss-born lyeing on the Ground and kneeling. They are to Royal American battalion commander who be taught to march in order, slow and faste in shared with countrymen Henri Bouquet and all sorts of Ground. They are frequently to pitch Frederick Haldimand a penchant for "la petite & fold up their Tents and to be accustomed to guerre," went so far as to advocate the formation pack up and carry their necessities in the most of strictly American regiments, clothed for the commodious manner. "33 wilderness, armed with short, light guns, trained

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to swim, run and leap obstacles in Loudon fell from grace at the same obedience to the blast of the whistle, time as Cumberland did in England and to be accompanied by dogs for and was replaced by Abercromby chasing the Indians. 34 in the winter of 1757-1758. William Pitt knew Abercromby Loudon, acting on to be weak and thus ensured Cumberland's advice, sent 56 the Commander-in-Chief was volunteer gentlemen from all well-seconded by the dynamic of his regular regiments to and well-loved Brigadier Lord Robert Rogers for intensive George Augustus Howe. Howe training on all aspects of was described by Wolfe as irregular warfare and "bush "that great man" and "the best fighting." According to Rogers, soldier in the British army."39 Loudon ordered him to instruct American historian Francis his charges "to the utmost of my Parkman claims it was Howe that power in the ranging discipline, our "broke through the traditions of methods of marching, retreating, the service and gave it new shapes ambushing and fighting, etc, to suit the time and place." that they might be the better Howe studied forest warfare qualified for any future services General Jeffery Amherst and joined Rogers's Rangers (Author's Collection) against the enemy we had to on several raiding parties, contend with .... "35 sharing all their hardships and making himself one of them. The reforms he introduced were Loudon's intentions in training regulars was the fruits of this rough imposed schooling. to turn them into a regular "light infantry corps" British officers and men were ordered to "throw according to Pargellis. 36 Major General James off all useless encumbrances, cut their hair Abercromby, Loudon's second-in-command and close, wear leggings to protect them from briers, destined to succeed him a few months later, was brown the barrels of their muskets, and carry openly supportive of the plan. He wrote that "the in their knapsack 30 pounds of meal." Until present Rangers ... might be reduced or brought his untimely death during the approach march down to reasonable terms of pay if a light infantry on Ticonderoga in 1 758, this veteran officer of Corps was established which I am confident Flanders (and defacto ground commander of would discharge all the functions of Rangers in troops in North America) effectively used a short time, better than those in your present rangers and light infantry to reconnoitre enemy pay."37 In December 1757, however, Loudon positions, screen the advance of heavy columns, substituted this plan with the creation of a protect those columns while preparing for the regiment of lightly-armed infantry, "Gage's Light assault, and in guarding the retreat.40 Infantry" or the 80th Foot. Pargellis writes: General Jeffery Amherst replaced The importance of this move in the history of Abercromby in autumn 1758 after the irregular warfare is very great; it was the natural and inevitable failure of the provincial Ticonderoga debacle, and, like Loudon and rangers to fulfil the function of acting as Howe, he formed and used light infantry units irregular troops. Gage's regiment constituted and continued to adapt the arms and equipment the first definitely light-armed regiment in the of the regulars to wilderness conditions. He British army; the firelocks issued to them were ordered all regular battalion commanders in the "cut shorter and the stocks dressed to make winter of 1758-1 759 "to practise their men at them lighter" Composed as far as possible of woodsmen, it was officered by men who [were firing at marks, whenever the weather permitted; trained in] Rogers' methods and were also to form a company of men from each regiment. trained in regular discipline. Mter two years and those to be the most active, with Proper experience with local devices, the British army Officers: These to be called of took partly into its own hands the function the regiments they belonged to ... " They were also 38 deemed to be most peculiarly American. to be "dressed agreable [sic] to the pattern given by the General, and armed with a and

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bayonet only."41 Amherst's younger The Light Infantryman's large tricorn brother and ADC, William Amherst, hat was to be cut down into a cap admired the active professionalism "with as much black cloth added of these particular regulars and as will come under his chin and wrote in his journal that the keep him warm when he lies "Light Infantry are certainly of down."44 great use & should always accompany than Army in this Wolfe's professionalism and country, as these troops drive common sense was born of them out of their shelter, experience in Germany and harass them continually& Flanders where he served from treat them in their way."42 1742 to 1745. In 1746 he saw action at Falkirk and Culloden By spring 1760, such was and had held a small the high calibre of training and independent command in hostile skill of these troops that General territory of the southern Amherst confidently sent his newly­ Highlands. Returning to Flanders promoted brother to the the following year, he was forefront of his force to wounded at Lauffeldt and. command these elite troops on Major-General James Wolfe when subsequently promoted the advance to Montreal. The (McCord Musseum) to Lieutenant-Colonel of the young Amherst proudly wrote that on one 20th Foot, found himself with his regiment on forward reconnaissance-in-force "we lost our way garrison duties in Scotland and southern [back] & did not reach the Camp until after dark, England. During that time he established through swamps & the thickest wood we could himself as one of the best trainers in the meet with." He confessed to be glad of it "as it contemporary British army for men and officers shewed the temper of the Corps, expecting to lay alike. Whereas most British regiments attached out all night, without any covering or anything little importance to target practise, Wolfe was a to eat or drink. The bon volonte and cheerfulness firm believer in marksmanship being a decisive I had before met with amongst them still combat multiplier before ever setting foot in subsisted, & I conceive they know no difficulties. North America; in 1755, he wrote from Scotland It is a pleasure serving with such a Corps."43 to a friend:

Major-General James Wolfe, who served as We fire bullets continually, and have great need one of Amherst's brigadiers at Louisbourg, of them .... Marksmen are nowhere so necessary shared his superior's belief in the utility of light as in a mountainous country; besides, firing balls at objects teaches the soldier to level infantry in North America. Wolfe was an energetic incomparably, makes the recruit steady, and reformer in dress, tactics and training of regulars removes the foolish apprehension that seizes to meet the irregular warfare he knew would young soldiers when they first load their arms plague the peripheries of his siege camps around with bullets. We fire first singly, then by files, Quebec. Wolfe ordered that the ad hoc companies 1,2,3, or more, then by ranks, then lastly by platoons; and the soldiers see the effect of their of light infantry, first started at Louisbourg by shot especially at a mark, or upon water. We Amherst, remove their lace for his pending shoot obliquely. and in different situations of campaign against Quebec. In addition, their ground, from heights downwards and heavy redcoats were to be discarded in favour of con trarywise. 45 their waistcoats with the sleeves of their frock coats sewn on as well as extra pockets for ball Wolfe was a new breed of British army officer and flint. Knapsacks were to be carried higher who had made a thorough study of his military and fastened with "a strap of web over the profession, reading classical works, engineering shoulders, as the Indians carry their pack." and drill texts, Marshal Saxe and, especially, the Cartridge boxes were to be carried hung under latest French contemporary treatises on "la the left arm, powder horns issued and slung on petite guerre." Writing in 1756 to a friend seeking the right, and tomahawks hung from the belt. expert advice and instruction for his brother

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entering the army, Wolfe recommended irregulars harassed the British army the aspiring officer to read, amongst with great success. After the others, "the Comte de Turpin's collapse and complete rout of the book [Essai sur l'Art de la Guerre, French regulars from the field, Paris, l 754] ... and a little this same group of French volume entitled "Traite de la irregulars inflicted numerous petite Guerre," that your casualties on the British line brother should take in his regiments who broke ranks to pocket when he goes upon pursue their regular out-duty and detachments. "46 adversaries. It was only when the Light Infantry moved Wolfe, on his return from forward and the line regiments Louisbourg, was told by Pitt reformed into company-sized that he would command the groups that they were finally Quebec Expedition and able to clear this last menace immediately set about gathering from the battlefield."49 a cadre of experienced officers for his Light Infantry Corps. He Thus during the Quebec wrote to Lord Sackville: campaign, we have the Colonel Henri Bouquet synthesis of the "trained" light Carden the American has a (Author's Collection) infantryman - a disciplined, great deal of merit, but wants regular soldier - proficient in all aspects of bread to eat. He is an excellent fellow for the woods .... He is bold, circumspect and more irregular warfare but capable of falling back into artful than his appearance bespeaks - has line during a set-piece battle. This multi­ experience in the method of the American war talented British light infantry under Howe and beyond anybody that I can hear of; I hope we Wolfe at Quebec anticipated by three decades shan't lose such a subject so particularly the French light companies of the Napoleonic adapted to this sort of workY period, the latter described by Peter Paret as "a new all-purpose infantry, in which each soldier From the time Wolfe's army landed on the could fight in the line, in column, as a lie d'Orlean and established fortified camps , and on detached missions. "50 around Quebec, the army's movements were well-protected and screened by light infantry The last refinement and proof of the and rangers. Wolfe's orders to his light infantry developmental progress of the British light were explicit and succinct and, as the summer infantry during the Seven Years' War was to occur progressed, the intensity of the irregular warfare at an obscure spot in the Pennsylvanian increased to a point where Brigadier George v.rilderness. At Bushy Run, a small force of regular Townshend wrote that it was "A Scene of soldiers comprising the light and grenadier Skirmishing, Cruelty and Devastation. It is War companies of the Black Watch, Royal Americans of the Worst Shape."48 and Montgomery's Highlanders under Colonel Henri Bouquet decisively routed a much larger Wolfe's Light Infantry were also instrumental Indian force utilizing company manoeuvre and in assisting the main body to get up and onto small unit tactics. Their commander was an the plains of Abraham to conduct the main battle. experienced Swiss officer, recruited from the They landed first, took Vergor's Camp and the Dutch service to be one of the four original Royal Samos battery (both guarding the Foulon Cove) American battalion commanders. Bouquet had in reverse then, guided the main body to the battlefield. These important duties completed, devoted his training abilities to "combining the qualities of a scout v.rith the discipline of a trained they spent the rest of the battle guarding the soldier" in all soldiers coming under his vulnerable rear (Bougainville's force of 2,000 command. During his seven years in theatre he men was at Cap Rouge) of Wolfe's army and had strived to develop his men literally as actually taking post in the line on the embattled "hunters" (a direct translation of the German left flank where a cloud of Canadien and Indian "Jaegers") so they would be as adept as their

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Indian and coureur de bois adversaries. Bouquet manner of his own invention, which will be of reminded readers in his personal account of the great service in an engagement with Indians. "54 Bushy Run engagement and subsequent campaign that there wasn't "anything new or It was not until Bushy Run in 1763 during extraordinary in this way of fighting which seems Chief Pontiac's Indian uprising, however, that to have been common to most Barbarians" and he got his chance. Quickly forming a disciplined offered numerous examples, not only from defensive perimeter on the first day, Bouquet antiquity, but from his own personal experiences feigned a weakness in his line on the second in Europe, pointing to light infantry formations day to lure the Indians forward. Then, utilising such as those raised by Marshal de Saxe and terrain- a gully of dead ground- Bouquet sent Frederick the Great. "51 Fuller wrote that Bouquet two light companies up to hit the massing "studied Indian warfare not to copy it ... but to attackers from the right flank. Completely discover its nature so that he might devise a surprised, the Indians were driven at the point system of tactics whereby he could destroy it. "52 of the bayonet across the frontage of two other Bouquet identified general maxims that could companies waiting in ambush - who opened apply to all Indians and coureur de bois. First fire with deadly precision. The Indians were they always " ... surround their enemy. The completely routed. second, that they fight scattered, and never in a compact body. The third that they never stand Bushy Run was a decisive action, in spite of their ground when attacked, but immediately give the small numbers engaged, as it proved to be way, to return to the ." It followed then: the turning point in putting down Pontiac's Uprising. It had a powerful dampening effect on lst. That the troops destined to engage Indians the involved Indian tribes' fighting ardour and must be lightly cloathed, armed and accoutred. no further major actions or attacks were mounted 2nd. That having no resistance to encounter in during the rebellion. Bouquet's success at Bushy the attack and defence. they are not to be drawn Run still stands in the annals of British military up in close order. which will only expose them history as "one of the fiercest ever fought with without necessity to a greater loss. Indians" with a codicil by Fortescue as to And, lastly, that all their evolutions must be Bouquet's military genius stating that "had any performed with great rapidity; and the men man of less experience in such wwjare been in enabled by exercise to pursue the''· enemy closely. when put to flight. and command (emphasis mine), its issue might well not give them time to rally. 53 have been disastrous. "55 Fuller, a well-read military Bouquet's training historian, is also explicit, program gave specific stating that Bouquet's attention to items such as tactics and manoeuvre against clothing, arms, training, "a savage foe is probably the most construction of camps and ingenious and effective that the history settlements, logistics and of irregular warfare has to record. "56 tactical manoeuvres to meet Fortescue generously gives the most contingencies. Under his soldiers equal billing when he states: tutelage, the company replaced "the final stratagem whereby the battalion as the unit of manouevre, troops learned A private of Goreham's Nova Scotia snapshooting, to fire from the Rangers according to a French prone and kneeling positions, description of 1 755 which mentions a wheeling on the run over broken short grey coat and a leather cap. terrain, swimming, marching on Ranger and light infantry units raised snowshoes. etc. An American in North America during the Seven Years' provincial observing Bouquet's training War were usually outfitted with caps. regimen in 1758 before the march by short coats of various colour such as General Forbes on Fort Dusquesne brown, green and blue as weLl as grey, with .Indian-style gaiters and moccasins. wrote: "Every afternoon he exercises his (Reconstruction by G.A. EmbLeLon. men in the woods and bushes in the Courtesy. Dept qf NaLionaL DE;Fense.)

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success was won reflects equal credit on the Military pedants in London, having grown fat resource of the commander and the perfect on the stiff mechanical drill of Prussia. could not and would not bring themselves to believe. steadiness of the men."57 Bouquet modestly in spite of the late wars. that light troops were attributes all to his men; "I cannot sufficiently not only an aid, not only a necessity, but an express my admiration for the cool and steady integral part of all skilfully organised armies .. behaviour of the troops who did not fire a shot Nevertheless, a change was taking place, for without orders, and drove the enemy from their as in France, so also in England, pipe-clay. posts with fixed bayonets. The conduct of the hair-grease and the clockwork manoeuvres of 58 the drill square, though they cramped the officers is much above my praises. " efforts of the few able soldiers who still sought to carry on the traditions ofWolfe and Amherst, of Howe, Bouquet and Rogers. they could not 0 Conclusion completely cripple them. '

'"J""he new light infantry tactical organizations In l 771, a company of light infantry was re­ 1. and skills acquired by the British army in introduced to every battalion throughout the line North America during the regiments, though some had unofficially went the way of all new innovations when maintained a flank company in addition peace was achieved. "As must needs be at -·•2't,,,, to the grenadier company known as the the close of every war, the [Prime ~'-'~picket or Highland company. 62 Fuller Minister's l first duty was the reduction ~ ·- believes that this addition of "light of the army to peacetime establishment, companies" at this time, however, was little which was effected by disbanding or more than nominal "window-dressing" as dooming to disbandment all Infantry of most light companies were "looked on as the Line junior to the 70th Foot and penal settlements and were filled with the all Cavalry junior to the 18th Light worst characters of the . "63 . "59 Thus the 80th Regiment of Light Armed Foot (Gage's Light Itwas Infantry) disappeared, though they ~~~~~~~~~~~j>-"recognized had a year's grace when Pontiac's T~Uiii~j in 1774, Uprising broke out and Amherst, just one year desperate for troops, kept them on before Lexington, that strength for the duration of the these "light companies" were so conflict. The 60th Foot (Royal poorly trained and ignorant oftheir Americans) survived and became duties that General William Howe, the principal guardians of the on the order of King George III, was frontier, but were broken up into obliged to form a camp at Salisbury small detachments garrisoning Plain for the instruction of seven myriad, small forts "in the companies of light infantry in wilderness, hundreds of miles certain manoeuvres of his own from any civilised settlement, ill­ developed while commanding fed, ill-provided, ill-cared for - Wolfe's Light Infantry.64 in a word forgotten. "60 One might add ill-exercised and ill­ Shy, in his excellent study of trained. what role the British army played

In 1763, all the light companies in the British Left & Opposite: Privates qf a army were disbanded. The British regular army light infantry company. 1770's. Note the special tactical system of Frederick dress and equipment oj these men. the Great was still in place They wear caps instead oj tricorns and coatees and still exerting its instead of long tailed coats, and are equipped with pervasive influence. Fuller's distress as a a powder horn. modern military man vice historian is evident (Sketches by PJ. de Loutherbergh. Anne S.K. Brown when he wrote: Military Collection. Brown University. Providence. R.I. Photo: R.Chartrand.) 52 http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/4 12 McCulloch: “Within Ourselves”: The Development of British Light Infantry in

in the coming of the American the middle of the war, British light Revolution, has more than adequately infantry had re-invented itself and pointed out that the army and its along with had become political masters in Whitehall were the equal or betters of the American confused as to what their actual backwoodsmen and sharpshooters, new role was to be in their newly Fuller writing that "during the last acquired American empire. He three years of [the war] the asks: English had so well adapted themselves to its nature, that they What was [Shy's emphasis] the army were in no way inferior to their doing in the colonies? No one seemed opponents "66 Despite tactical to know. Defense - as is so often the case when no one is attacking -looked successes of the Americans in a little ridiculous. The plan for Indian irregular warfare fought on the management. not quite defense in the periphery, it was George usual meaning of the word. was Washington's Continental Army, difficult to grasp .... And there was however, assisted by French troops always the hint of duplicity - that the and the French navy using standard British government wanted an army not European tactics and siege warfare to defend but to control the colonists. J'r\:~~~~ The hint concealed a grain of truth, but of the day, that defeated the British what seemed a half-hearted attempt to army strategically in North America. garrison the backcountry led Americans to suspect more was there.65 Steele is correct in noting that "North American pride in the ways of The disbandment of the light the New World has often led to the infantry organizations which were best assumption that, in warfare as in suited to act as a potent gendarmerie everything else, the new men of the on the fringes of a wild and New World were better than the history unpredictable frontier left the typical laden men of the Old." Many American Frederician-style historians have used the defeat of battalions concentrated mainly in Braddock and the Americans' later urban and well-colonised areas of the successes in the American Revolution Thirteen Colonies and the former New "with some misrepresentation ... as France. Thus, an accumulated wealth evidence of this superiority. "67 What is of light infantry tactics and expertise very clear that the British army came and specific to the North American theatre, carefully forced its kind of war on the Northern American cultivated at first by Loudon, Rogers, Howe and wilderness in the Seven Years' War and adapted Amherst, then honed to a fine degree by Wolfe very quickly to its peculiar brand of partisan and Bouquet, was lost by the absence of a warfare. The majority of its commanders were clearly defined role for the infantry in America. aware of, and, in certain cases, innovators and From overseas, a new peacetime political experts in irregular warfare, quickly creating administration meant a return to orthodoxy and ranger units, light infantry companies and adherence to Frederician tactics to maintain the battalions (with parallel improvements in dress, status quo. equipment and tactics) to effectively counter the Indians, Canadians and the French with skill This confusion of role coupled with economic and confidence. restrictions are the main reasons why well­ trained and effective light infantry was not readily The mvth of American superiority of arms available as it might have been in the British in irregula~ warfare and its overall contribution army at the outbreak of the American Revolution to the Americans' ultimate victory during the more than a decade later. During this latter Revolution has been highly exaggerated. This conflict, the tactical successes gained by the "misrepresentation," as Steele has termed it, Americans were nearly all in irregular fighting, serves to partially explain why the achievements which have been seized upon by American of British commanders in developing a highly historians as proof of war-waging superiority. By

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effective light infantry during the Seven Years' contractors to handle purchasing and distribution. See War in North America have been ignored or Weigley. pp.5-12. 11. In the eighteenth century. Swiss and German craftsmen given scant attention by American historians. on the Pennsylvania frontier developed the Pennsylvania To recognize the facts would explode the rifle. a far more accurate firearm than any musket and "superiority" myth. a much lighter and less cumbersome we~pon than any of its kind in Europe. It spread so rapidly over the frontier that it is better known as the Kentucky rifle. Its users earned so impressive a reputation for marksmanship during the Revolution. that Washington Notes urged American soldiers to clothe themselves in the frontiersmen's buckskin costumes to play upon the British soldiers' supposed fear that all Americans were sharpshooting marksmen. See Maurice Matloff, l. Dallas Irvine, "The First British Regulars in North American Military History, (Washington, 1985). pp.38- America.·· Military Affairs, Vol.X. (Winter 1945), 337- 39 and J.F.C. Fuller, British Light. il!{antry in /.he 353. Eighteenth Century, (London, 1925). pp. 127-129. 2. Ibid .. 345. 12. Weigley. pp.9-10. 3. The "Ia petite guerre" or "der kleine Krieg" of eighteenth 13. Quoted in Ibid .. p.16. century military terminology existed alongside the 14. George Washington. The Writings qj'George Washington. regular European warfare which saw large armies ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick, Voi.II. (Washington, 1931- manoeuvring over open terrain between cities utilizing 44). p.302. Frederician tactics. La petile guerre or "irregular war" 15. Quoted in Steele, p. 72. comprised those offensive operations conducted or 16. Weigley, p.12. carried on in the intervals of preparation and build-up 17. Governor Robert Dinwiddie to Abercromby. 15 August between battles, "the secondary aims present in all wars 1754, in The Q[Ticial Records qf Robert. Dinwiddie. by means that are small in relation to the overall effort" Lieutenant-Governor qf /.he Colony q{ Virginia. 1751- according to Clauswitz. These secondary aims were to 1758. Vol.l, (Richmond, 1883). p.286. be gained by patrolling, raiding. ambushes of troops 18. See Peter Paret. Yorclc and the Era of Pruss ian Reform. and supply convoys. and the capture of prisoners, all 1807-1815, (Princeton. 1966), pp.36-39; Michael essential activities for any army contemplating in Howard, War in European Hisl.ory. (London, 1976), moving through unfamiliar wilderness. pp. 75-78: and John Childs. Armies and Wacfcne in 4. Ian K. Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle Europe. 1648·1789, (New York. 1982). pp.l8-20. .forCanada, 1689·1760(Toronto, 1974). p.132. 19. For fuller details see Fuller, pp.46-49: Childs. pp.27- 5. Stanley M. Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat," American 34; and Howard, pp. 75-78. Historical Review, Vol.XLI. (1936). p.253. 20. Fuller. pp.l8-20; Strachan. p.17. 6. Pargellis, pp.253-269; Paul E. Kopperman, Braddock 21. I use the term "irregular" to denote light troops without atLhe Monongahela (Pittsburgh, 1977), pp.93-121; Hew extensive formal training such as Croats. Indians, Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct qf War, coureurs de bois. etc. Light infantry 1 detlne as formally (London, 1983). p.28; and Steele, pp.85-86. trained light troops or regulars. rather than militia or 7. Pargellis, p.269; and Russell F. Weigley. History qf the auxiliaries. , (Bloomington. 1984), pp.23-24. 22. The Marechal de Saxe's Reveries on the Art of War, trans .. 8. Braddock's orders to his men demonstrate his Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg. 1944) w~re written in awareness of the danger of surprise attacks and his 1732 and circulated in manuscript well before they were reliance on current European tactics to respond to the published as a book in 1757. Saxe deals extensively problem. Camps were heavily guarded by sentries with irregular infantry and cavalry tactics on pages 40- supported by armed detachments, and, while on the 1, 48 and 50. march. one third of the force was employed in flanking 23. Fuller. p.53. parties. See "General Braddock's Orderly Book,'' in Will 24. It is interesting to note that The Black Watch while H. Lowdermilk, Hisl.ory qf Cumberland. Embracing an participating in their first set-piece at Fontenoy, Account qf Washington's First Campaign ... Together with deployed troops forward of their main line. driving in aHisl.oryqjBraddock's Expediti.on ... , (Washington, D.C.: Saxe's heavy screen of skirmishers. Archibald Forbes 1878). pp.viii. lii-liii; Winthrop Sargent, The History of in The Black Watch. (London, 1896). p.25. notes that "a an Expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1 755, (Historical detachment of Highlanders acted in support of some Society of Pennsylvania, 1855), p.296.; and Robert Austrian hotly pressed by French light troops Orme. "Captain Orme's Journal." Ibid .. pp.317-318, who were promptly repulsed with loss, and the 339-340. and 348-350. Highlanders were taken notice of for their spirited 9. Weigley, p.4. conduct." 10. Each individual militiaman was expected to provide his 25. James Johnstone, A Memoir qf the '45. eel, by Brian own - usually a smoothbore musket - and Rawson, (London, 1958), pp.11 0-11 1. ammunition, clothing and food for a short expedition, 26. Quoted from "Memoirs of the Rebellion in Aberdeen and much the same as British men of arms in feudal times. Banff." in Walter Biggar Blaikie. eel. Origins q{ the '45 For really long campaigns, the colonial government and Other Paers Relating to that Rising, Vol.1 1, (Scottish would take charge, the assembly appropriating money Historical Society Publications 11916]), p.l53. Wolfe was for supplies of muskets with ammunition for those too an ardent admirer of Bland's Treatise and presented his poor to buy them. appointing supply officers and own personal copy to one of his ensigns in the 20th Foot, William Delaune (later the Light Infantry commander of

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the "Forlorn Hope" at Quebec. 1 759). The latter officer 47. Carden became a light infantry company commander wrote in the frontispiece thai Wolfe "enjoin'd me in Wolfe's Light Infantry which was commanded by particularly lo study General Bland's manual and I had Viscount Howe's youngest brother. William. The younger an opportunity lo discover later what a prime favourite Howe would later became Commander-in-Chief in this Book was with him ... for Bland's general principles America during the American Revolution. The middle and observations he had nothing but praise and I am brother, Richard Howe, would second his efforts as the convinced that these guided his own Conduct and senior naval officer on station. Ibid., p.360. Dispositions- more perhaps than he would acknowledge 48. Townshend to his wife. 6 September 1759, in A.G. at Louis bourg and Quebec, .. Stanley Pargellis, who Doughty and G.W. Parmalee, eds., The Siege qj'Quebec personally examined this original manual (now in The and The Battle oJthe Plains oJ Abraham .. Vol.V, (Quebec, New Brunswick Museum's J.C. Webster Collection), 1901). Voi.V., p.195. observed U1at "in U1e chapter which deals witl1 marching 49. For a complete discussion of irregular and regular in territory where attacks are to be expected. there is tactics used by the British and French armies during frequent underlining of just such maxims as Braddock the battle see Ian McCulloch, "The King Must Be neglected." Stanley Pargellis. '·Braddock's Defeat," Obeyed," The Beaver, Vol. 72 (5), (Oct/Nov 1992). For p.264n. the best contemporary accounts by actual battle 27. John Shy. Towards Lexington: The Role qf the British participants, see Knox. pp.190-200; Extracts Jrom a Army in the Coming qf the American Revolution, Manuscript Journal. .. kept by Colonel Malcolm Fraser, (Princeton, 1965). p.88. (Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, 1868). pp.20- 28. Pargellis, Military Affairs in North America 1758-1763: 24; James Johnstone, A Dialogue in Hades. (Literary Selected Docwnenls from the Cumberland Papers in andHistoricalSocietyofQuebec. 1868), pp.4l-44; and Windsor Castle. (London and New York, 1936), p.XV. for the best secondary account of the battle see. C.P. 29. Shy. p.89. Stacey. Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Baille, (Toronto. 30. Loudon La Cumberland. Ociober 17, 1757, in Pargellis, 1959), pp.128-155. Military Affairs. p.400; Loudon to Cumberland. 1756. 50. Peter Paret, "Colonial Experience and European Military quoted in Shy. p.29. Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century," The 31. Pargellis. Lord Loudon in North America, (New Haven, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 1933). p.98. Voi.XXXVII, (May 1964). p.55. 32. Cumberland lo Loudon, 22 November-26 December, 51. Quoted in R. B. As prey, War in the Shadows: The Guerilla 1756, in Pargellis. Military A[f'airs, p.255-56. in History. Vol.l, (New York. 1975). p.96. 33. Ibid.. pp.292-3. 327-30, and 335-41. 52. Fuller, p.102. 34. Pargellis, Lord Loudon. p.300. 53. Asprey, p.96. 35. Robert Rogers. Journals qj' Major Robert Rogers. ed. by 54. Joseph Shippen lo his Father, 15 August 1758 in G.H. F.B. Hough. (Albany, 1883). p.80. Fisher, "Brigadier-Generai Henry Bouquet." The 36. Pargellis. pp.304-5. Pennsylvania Magazine qf Hist.ory and Biography 37. Quoted in Shy. Towards Lexington. pp.129-130. Vol.lll.l\'o.2, (1879), p.127. 38. It is interesting to note that the 80th was never used as 55. Fortescue, Vol.lll, p.18. a battalion but regularly detached its light companies 56. Fuller, p.110. in support of the regular . It was the closest 57. Fortescue, p.18. the British in North America ever came to emulating 58. Quoted in Lewis Butler. The Anrwls qj' the King's Royal the company-sized "colonial regulars·· or "Compagnies Rifle Corps, Vol.1 - "The Royal Americans," (London, Jranches de la Marine" of the French that were so adept 1913). p.164. at small unit tactics and specialists in "la petite guerre." 59. Fortescue,p.10. While Pargellis slates it was "composed as far as possible 60. Ibid., p.13. of woodsmen" its officers were British and Loudon also 61. Fuller, pp.ll2. 124. permiiled Gage to draft a nucleus of sergeants, 62. Robin May, The British Army in North America, 1775- corporals, and "good active healthy young men" from 1783, (London, 1993), pp.5. 15 and 32. the other British regiments in theatre. Some rank and 63. Fuller, p.l24. file were recruited in the colonies but. for the most part, 64. Ibid., p.125. were made up by drafts from Ireland. Pargellis. p.305. 65. Shy, Towards Lexington, pp.423-424. 39. James Wolfe. The L!fe and Letters of James Wo!fe, ed. 66. Fuller, pp.127-128. by Beckles Willson. (London. 1909). pp.392, 403. 67. Steele. Guerillas and Grenadiers. p.l32. 40. Francis Parkman. Montcalm and Wofj'e. Vo\.11, (London, 1899). p.94. 41. Rogers. pp.111-116; J.W. Fortescue. A History ofthe LCol Ian McCulloch is a recent graduate of BriLLshArmy. Vol. II. (London, 1899-1930). pp.324-329; the RMC War Studies MA program in and Fuller, p.91. Kingston and is now Deputy Director of 42. William Amherst. JournalqfWilliamAmherst in America 1758-1760. ed. by J.C. Webster. (Toronto, 1931). pp.15- History and Heritage for DND in Ottawa. 16. This article is based on research conducted 43. Ibid., p.63. under the tutelage of his thesis advisor, Dr. 44. John Knox, The Siege qj' Quebec and the Campaigns in Desmond Morton of the McGill Institute for North America. 1757-1760, ed. by Brian Connell, (Mississauga, 1980). pp.118-119. the Study of Canada. 45. Wolfe. p.255. 46. Ibid., pp.295-296.

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